U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation:
The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Kristin M. Finklea
Analyst in Domestic Security
June 12, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41349
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

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U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond

Summary
Brazen violence perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations and other criminal groups is
threatening citizen security and governance in some parts of Mexico, a country with which the
United States shares a nearly 2,000 mile border and $500 billion in annual trade. Although the
violence in Mexico has generally declined since late 2011, analysts estimate that it may have
claimed more than 60,000 lives between December 2006 and November 2012. The violence has
increased U.S. concerns about stability in Mexico, a key political and economic ally, and about
the possibility of violence spilling over into the United States.
U.S.-Mexican security cooperation increased significantly as a result of the development and
implementation of the Mérida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime assistance package for
Mexico and Central America first funded in FY2008. Whereas U.S. assistance initially focused on
training and equipping Mexican counterdrug forces, it now places more emphasis on addressing
the weak institutions and underlying societal problems that have allowed the drug trade to
flourish in Mexico. The Mérida strategy now focuses on (1) disrupting organized criminal groups,
(2) institutionalizing the rule of law, (3) creating a 21st century border, and (4) building strong and
resilient communities. As part of the Mérida Initiative, the Mexican government pledged to
intensify its anticrime efforts and the U.S. government pledged to address drug demand and the
illicit trafficking of firearms and bulk currency to Mexico.
Inaugurated on December 1, 2012, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto has vowed to continue
U.S.-Mexican security cooperation, albeit with a shift in focus toward reducing violent crime in
Mexico. Peña Nieto has begun to adjust the process and priorities of U.S.-Mexican efforts,
adjustments which President Obama has pledged to support. The Interior Ministry is now the
primary entity through which Mérida training and equipment requests are coordinated and
intelligence is channeled. The Mexican government is requesting increased assistance for judicial
reform and prevention efforts, but limiting U.S. involvement in some law enforcement and
intelligence operations. As the Peña Nieto government fleshes out its security strategy, Mérida
programs are likely to be adjusted in order to support those efforts that align with U.S. priorities.
The 113th Congress is likely to continue funding and overseeing the Mérida Initiative and related
domestic initiatives, but may also consider supporting new programs. From FY2008 to FY2012,
Congress appropriated $1.9 billion in Mérida assistance for Mexico, roughly $1.2 billion of which
had been delivered as of April 2013. The Obama Administration asked for $234.0 million for
Mérida programs in in its FY2013 budget request and $183 million in its FY2014 request.
Congress may wish to examine how well the Mexican government’s security strategy supports
U.S. interests in Mexico. Congressional approval will be needed should the State Department
seek to reprogram some of the funding already in the pipeline for Mérida, or shift new funding to
better align with Mexico’s new priorities. Should disagreements occur between Mexican and U.S.
priorities, Congress may weigh in on how those disagreements should be resolved. Congress may
also debate how to measure the impact of Mérida Initiative programs, as well as the extent to
which Mérida has evolved to respond to changing security conditions in Mexico. Another issue of
congressional interest involves whether Mexico is meeting the human rights conditions placed on
Mérida Initiative funding.

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Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Concerns About Violence in Mexico ............................................................................................... 2
Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Violence in Mexico .................................................. 2
Potential “Spillover” Violence in the United States .................................................................. 5
Development and Implementation of the Mérida Initiative ............................................................. 5
Evolution of U.S.-Mexican Counterdrug Cooperation .............................................................. 5
Developing Cooperation Through the Mérida Initiative ........................................................... 6
Funding the Mérida Initiative .................................................................................................... 7
Implementation .......................................................................................................................... 8
U.S. Efforts to Complement the Mérida Initiative .................................................................... 9
The Peña Nieto Administration’s Security Strategy and the Mérida Initiative .............................. 10
The Four Pillars of the Mérida Initiative ....................................................................................... 12
Pillar One: Disrupting the Operational Capacity of Organized Crime .................................... 12
Pillar Two: Institutionalizing Reforms to Sustain the Rule of Law and Respect for
Human Rights in Mexico ..................................................................................................... 13
Reforming the Police ......................................................................................................... 14
Reforming the Judicial and Penal Systems ....................................................................... 16
Pillar Three: Creating a “21st Century Border” ....................................................................... 18
Northbound and Southbound Inspections ......................................................................... 19
Preventing Border Enforcement Corruption ..................................................................... 19
Pillar Four: Building Strong and Resilient Communities ........................................................ 20
Issues.............................................................................................................................................. 23
Measuring the Success of the Mérida Initiative ...................................................................... 23
Dealing with Drug Production in Mexico ............................................................................... 25
Human Rights Concerns and Conditions on Mérida Initiative Funding ................................. 26
Role of the U.S. Department Of Defense in Mexico ............................................................... 28
Balancing Assistance to Mexico with Support for Southwest Border Initiatives .................... 30
Integrating Counterdrug Programs in the Western Hemisphere .............................................. 31
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 31

Figures
Figure 1. Organized Crime-Related Killings in Mexico in 2011 by State ....................................... 4
Figure 2. Individuals Extradited from Mexico to the United States .............................................. 24

Tables
Table 1. FY2008–FY2014 Mérida Funding for Mexico by Aid Account and
Appropriations Measure ............................................................................................................... 8
Table A-1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico by Account, FY2007-FY2014 ........................................... 33

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Appendixes
Appendix A. U.S. Assistance to Mexico ........................................................................................ 33
Appendix B. U.S. Domestic Efforts to Complement the Mérida Initiative ................................... 34
Appendix C. Selected U.S.—Mexican Law Enforcement Partnerships ........................................ 39

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 41

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Introduction
For several years, violence perpetrated by warring criminal organizations has threatened citizen
security and governance in Mexico and presented serious challenges to the country’s justice
sector institutions. While the illicit drug trade has been prevalent in Mexico for decades, an
increasing number of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are fighting for control of smuggling
routes into the United States and resisting the Mexican government’s efforts against them. This
violence resulted in more than 60,000 deaths in Mexico between December 2006 and November
2012.1 According to government estimates, at least 6,000 additional organized crime-related
deaths have occurred during the first six months (December 2012-May 2013) of the new Peña
Nieto Administration.2
Targets of the violence in Mexico have often included rival criminal organizations, but also
included Mexican security forces and public officials, journalists, and civilians, including
Americans. In February 2011, two U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents
were shot, one fatally, while driving to Mexico City. This marked the first death of a U.S. law
enforcement agent in Mexico since 1985. In August 2012, two Central Intelligence Agency
employees were wounded as their vehicle came under heavy fire from Mexican Federal Police,
raising concerns about the competency and corruptibility of Mexican law enforcement.3
Violence in northern Mexico and the potential threat of spillover violence along the Southwest
border have focused congressional concern on the efficacy of the Mérida Initiative and related
domestic efforts in both countries. Between FY2008 and FY2012, Congress appropriated more
than $1.9 billion for Mérida Initiative programs in Mexico (see Table 1). Over that period,
Mexico invested some $46.6 billion of its own resources on security and public safety.4 While
bilateral efforts have yielded some positive results, the apparent weakness of Mexico’s criminal
justice system seems to have limited the effectiveness of anti-crime efforts.
Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) took office
in December 2012 vowing to reduce violence in Mexico and adjust the current U.S.-Mexican
security strategy (see “The Peña Nieto Administration’s Security Strategy and the Mérida
Initiative”). As Mexico’s security strategy changes, Congress may need to examine how those
priorities align with U.S. interests. When considering the Obama Administration’s FY2014
budget request, Congress may analyze how Mérida and related funds have been used and the
degree to which U.S.-funded programs in Mexico complement other U.S. counterdrug and border
security efforts. Compliance with Merida’s human rights conditions is likely to be closely
monitored to ensure that anticrime efforts are carried out in a way that respects human rights and
the rule of law. Oversight of U.S. domestic pledges under the Mérida Initiative may also continue,
particularly those aimed at reducing weapons trafficking. Congress could also explore how the

1 This figure is an estimate. Cory Molzahn, Octavio Rodriguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk, Drug Violence in Mexico:
Data and Analysis Through 2012, Trans-Border Institute (TBI), February 2013, p. 14. Hereinafter TBI, February 2013.
2 F. Martínez, “Hubo en el País 6,247 Homicidios Dolosos en el Primer Semestre de Peña,” La Jornada, June 7, 2013.
3 Mexico’s Attorney General’s Office is still investigating the motive behind the attack. Thus far, 14 Federal Police
officers have been charged with attempted murder and five commanders are being investigated for allegedly ordering
those officers to lie about the circumstances surrounding the incident. “Mexico Focus on Police Commanders in CIA
Shooting,” Associated Press, November 19, 2012.
4 Government of Mexico, “Mexico’s Fight for Security: Strategy and Main Achievements,” June 2011. Figure for
Mexico’s 2012 budget for security and public safety is from Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies.
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use of newer tools—such as aerial drones that monitor criminal activity in the border region—
might bolster current security cooperation efforts under Mérida.
This report provides a framework for examining the current status and future prospects for U.S.-
Mexican security cooperation. It begins with a brief discussion of the scope of the threat that drug
trafficking and related crime and violence now pose to Mexico and the United States, followed by
an analysis of the evolution of the Mérida Initiative. The report then provides an overview of the
Peña Nieto government’s security strategy and how it may affect the Mérida Initiative. The report
then then delves deeper into key aspects of the current U.S.-Mexican security strategy and
concludes by raising policy issues that may affect bilateral efforts.
Concerns About Violence in Mexico
Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Violence in Mexico5
Mexico is a major producer and supplier to the U.S. market of heroin, methamphetamine, and
marijuana and a major transit country for more than 95% of the cocaine sold in the United States.6
Mexico is also a consumer of illicit drugs, particularly in northern states where criminal
organizations have been paying their workers in product rather than in cash. Illicit drug use in
Mexico increased from 2002 to 2008, and then remained relatively level from 2008 to 2011.7
According to the 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment, Mexican drug trafficking organizations
and their affiliates “dominate [in] the supply and wholesale distribution of most illicit drugs in the
United States” and are present more than one thousand U.S. cities.8
The violence and brutality of the Mexican drug trafficking organizations escalated as they have
battled for control of lucrative drug trafficking routes into the United States and local drug
distribution networks in Mexico. U.S. and Mexican officials now often refer to the DTOs as
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) since they have increasingly branched out into other
criminal activities, including human trafficking, kidnapping, armed robbery, and extortion. From
2007 to 2011, kidnapping and violent vehicular thefts increased at even faster annual rates than
overall homicides in Mexico.9 The expanding techniques used by the traffickers, which have
included the use of car bombs and grenades, have led some to liken certain DTOs’ tactics to those
of armed insurgencies.10

5 For background, see CRS Report R41576, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the
Violence, by June S. Beittel.
6 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), March 2013,
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2013/vol1/204050.htm#Mexico.
7 According to data from Mexico’s National Survey of Addictions, the prevalence of illicit drug use in Mexico
increased from 0.8% of the population in 2002 to 1.4% in 2008, but remained relatively stable at 1.5% in 2011.
8 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment: 2011,
August 2011, http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs44/44849/44849p.pdf. DOJ did not release a similar report in 2012.
9 From 2007 to 2011, the homicide rate per 100,000 people in Mexico increased by an annual average of 15.4% During
that same period, kidnappings increased at an average annual rate of 23.5% and armed vehicular robberies by 19.7%.
Mexico Evalúa, Indicadores de Víctimas Visibles y Invisiblesde Homicidio, Mexico, D.F., November 2012, available
at: http://mexicoevalua.org/descargables/413537_IVVI-H.pdf.
10 Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, “Cartel Evolution Revisited: Third Phase Cartel Potentials and Alternative
Futures in Mexico,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 21, no. 1 (March 2010).
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The Felipe Calderón Administration (December 2006-November 2011) made combating drug
trafficking and organized crime its top domestic priority.11 Government enforcement efforts,
many of which were led by Mexican military forces, took down leaders from all of the major
DTOs, either through arrests or deaths during operations to detain them. The pace of those
takedowns accelerated beginning in late 2009, partly due to increased U.S.-Mexican intelligence-
sharing. In 2009, the Mexican government identified the country’s 37 most wanted criminals, and
by October 2012, at least 25 of those alleged criminals had been captured or killed.12 The
Calderón government extradited record numbers of criminals to the United States, including 93 in
2011 (see Figure 2); however few, if any, were successfully prosecuted in Mexico.13 At the same
time, Mexico also experienced record levels of drug trafficking-related violence, partially in
response to government efforts, as criminal organizations split and proliferated.14
Analysts estimate that drug trafficking or organized crime-related violence in Mexico may have
resulted in some 60,000 deaths over the course of Calderón’s presidency; another 25,000
individuals reportedly went missing over that period, although not all due to criminal activity.15
Several sources have reported that violence peaked in 2011, before falling in 2012, perhaps by
more than 25%. The violence has primarily taken place in contested drug production and transit
zones and remained concentrated in less than 10% of Mexican municipalities.16
Still, the regions of the country most affected by the violence have shifted over time to include
large cities (such as Monterrey, Nuevo León) and tourist zones (Acapulco, Guerrero). As seen in
Figure 1, there have been incidents of violence across the country, with the security situation in
particular areas sometimes changing rapidly. For example, violence spiked dramatically in
Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, in 2008 and remained at extremely high levels through mid-2011,
before rapidly declining. A 2012 State Department Travel Warning cited security concerns in parts
of 19 of Mexico’s 32 states and urged U.S. citizens to “defer non-essential travel” to Chihuahua,
Coahuila, Durango, and Tamaulipas.17
Upon taking office, President Peña Nieto’s made violence reduction one of his top priorities.
Mexico’s Interior Ministry reportedly maintains that organized crime-related violence fell 16.5%
during the first six months of the Administration as compared to the same period last year.18

11 The Calderón Administration’s security strategy focused on: (1) carrying out joint police-military operations to
support local authorities and citizens; (2) increasing the operational and technological capacities of the state (such as
the Federal Police); (3) initiating legal and institutional reforms; (4) strengthening crime prevention and social
programs; and (5) strengthening international cooperation (such as the Mérida Initiative). Government of Mexico,
Mexico’s Fight for Security: Strategy and Main Achievements, June 2011.
12 “Mexico’s Drug Lords: Kingpin Bowling,” The Economist, October 20, 2012.
13 William Booth, “Mexico’s Crime Wave has Left About 25,000 Missing, Government Documents Show,”
Washington Post, November 29, 2012.
14 Shannon K. O'Neil, "Drug Cartel Fragmentation and Violence," Council on Foreign Relations Blog, August 9, 2011.
15 TBI, February 2013; Booth op. cit. Mexico’s Attorney General’s Office is investigating how many of the
disappearances may have been linked to organized crime or rogue government actors.
16 TBI, February 2013.
17 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Travel Warning: Mexico, November 20, 2012, available at:
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_5815.html.
18 James Bargent, “Mexico Govt: Organized Crime Murders Down for May,” InsightCrime Organized Crime in the
Americas, June 7, 2013.
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Experts have challenged the government’s numbers; maintaining that organized crime violence
has likely remained relatively stable or slightly declined since Peña Nieto took office.19
Figure 1. Organized Crime-Related Killings in Mexico in 2011 by State

Source: Map created by CRS using data from the Trans-Border Institute (TBI), University of San Diego.
Notes: Mexican government and TBI data drawn from presentation in Cory Molzahn, Viridiana Ríos, and David
A. Shirk, Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2011, Trans-Border Institute, March 2012. Data
limitations prevented TBI from producing a similar map for 2012.
Congress has expressed serious concerns about the impact that drug trafficking-related violence
has had on governability in Mexico, a neighbor and key U.S. ally. Congress has analyzed how the
violence has affected U.S. interests in Mexico, paying particularly close attention to the safety of
U.S. citizens in Mexico. The 111th and 112th Congress held several hearings on the violence in
Mexico, efforts by the Mexican and U.S. government to address the situation, and implications of
the violence for the United States. More recently, Congress has also taken an interest in the
effects of the violence, and government efforts to suppress it, on the quality of democracy and
respect for human rights in Mexico.

19 Alejandro Hope, “Mexico's Violent Crime Numbers Don't Add Up,” InsightCrime Organized Crime in the Americas,
April 24, 2013; Benito Jimémez, “Cuestionan Cifra Oficial de Muertos,” Reforma, June 8, 2013.
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Potential “Spillover” Violence in the United States20
The prevalence of drug trafficking-related violence within and between the DTOs in Mexico—
and particularly in those areas of Mexico near the U.S.-Mexico border—has generated concern
among U.S. policy makers that this violence might spill over into the United States. U.S. officials
deny that the increase in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has resulted in a significant
spillover of violence into the United States, but acknowledge that the prospect is a real concern.21
Congress faces several policy questions related to potential or actual spillover violence. One
question involves whether the increasing violence between the drug trafficking organizations in
Mexico affects either the level or nature of drug trafficking-related violence in the United States.
Of note, violent drug trafficking-related crimes have previously existed and continue to exist
throughout the United States. However, data currently available on these crimes do not allow
analysts to determine whether or how these existing levels of drug trafficking-related violence in
the United States have been affected by the surge of violence in Mexico.
Development and Implementation of the
Mérida Initiative
Evolution of U.S.-Mexican Counterdrug Cooperation
The United States began providing Mexico with equipment and training to eradicate marijuana
and opium poppy fields in the 1970s, but bilateral cooperation declined dramatically after Enrique
Camarena, a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent, was assassinated in Mexico in
1985. From the mid-1980s through the end of the 1990s, bilateral cooperation stalled due to U.S.
mistrust of Mexican counterdrug officials and concerns about the Mexican government’s
tendency to accommodate drug leaders.22 At the same time, the Mexican government was
reluctant to accept large amounts of U.S. assistance due to its opposition to U.S. drug certification
procedures23 and to concerns about sovereignty. The Mexican government also expressed
opposition to the DEA carrying out operations against drug trafficking organizations in Mexican
territory without authorization. Mexican military officials proved particularly reticent to
cooperate with the U.S. military due to concerns about past U.S. interventions in Mexico.24

20 For background, see CRS Report R41075, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover
Violence, by Kristin Finklea.
21 See for example, Department of Homeland Security, “Remarks by Secretary Napolitano on Border Security at the
University of Texas at El Paso,” press release, January 31, 2011.
22 Under this system, arrests and eradication took place, but due to the effects of widespread corruption, the system was
“characterized by a working relationship between Mexican authorities and drug lords” through the 1990s. Francisco E.
González, “Mexico’s Drug Wars Get Brutal,” Current History, February 2009.
23 Beginning in 1986, when the U.S. President was required to certify whether drug producing and drug transit
countries were cooperating fully with the United States, Mexico usually was criticized for its efforts, which in turn led
to increased Mexican government criticism of the U.S assessment. Reforms to the U.S. drug certification process
enacted in September 2002 (P.L. 107-228) essentially eliminated the annual drug certification requirement, and instead
required the President to designate and withhold assistance from countries that had “failed demonstrably” to make
substantial counternarcotics efforts.
24 Craig A. Deare, “U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations: An Incompatible Interface,” Strategic Forum, Institute for
(continued...)
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U.S.-Mexican cooperation began to improve and U.S. assistance to Mexico increased after the
two countries signed a Binational Drug Control Strategy in 1998. U.S. assistance to Mexico,
which totaled $397 million from FY2000 to FY2006, supported programs aimed at interdicting
cocaine; combating production and trafficking of marijuana, opium poppy, and
methamphetamine; strengthening the rule of law; and countering money-laundering. In 2007, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that while U.S. programs had helped improve
Mexico’s counterdrug efforts, drug seizures in Mexico remained relatively low, and corruption
continued to hinder bilateral efforts.25
Developing Cooperation Through the Mérida Initiative
In October 2007, the United States and Mexico announced the Mérida Initiative, a package of
U.S. assistance for Mexico and Central America that would begin in FY2008.26 The Mérida
Initiative was developed in response to the Calderón government’s unprecedented request for
increased U.S. support and involvement in helping Mexico combat drug trafficking and organized
crime. As part of the Mérida Initiative’s emphasis on shared responsibility, the Mexican
government pledged to tackle crime and corruption and the U.S. government pledged to address
drug demand and the illicit trafficking of firearms and bulk currency to Mexico.
The Mérida Initiative, as it was originally conceived, sought to (1) break the power and impunity
of criminal organizations; (2) strengthen border, air, and maritime controls; (3) improve the
capacity of justice systems in the region; and (4) curtail gang activity and diminish local drug
demand. U.S. funds provided for the first goal far surpassed all other aid categories. The U.S.
government also provided extensive intelligence-sharing and operational support for Mexican
military and police personnel engaged in anti-crime efforts.
Acknowledging that Mexico cannot effectively confront organized crime with tactical victories
alone, in March 2010, the Obama Administration and the Mexican government agreed to a new
strategic framework for security cooperation under the Mérida Initiative.27 Whereas U.S.
assistance initially focused on training and equipping Mexican security forces for counternarcotic
purposes, it has shifted toward addressing the weak government institutions and underlying
societal problems that have allowed the drug trade to thrive in Mexico. The strategy focuses more
on institution-building than on technology transfers and broadens the scope of bilateral efforts to
include economic development and community-based social programs, areas where Mexico had
not previously sought U.S. support. There is also increasing funding at the sub-national level for
Mexican states and municipalities. The four pillars of the current strategy are:
1. Disrupting the operational capacity of organized criminal groups.

(...continued)
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, July 2009.
25 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, but
the Flow of Illicit Narcotics into the United States Remains High, 08215T, October 2007, available at:
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071018.pdf.
26 In FY2008 and FY2009, the Mérida Initiative included U.S. assistance to Mexico and Central America. Beginning in
FY2010, Congress separated Central America from the Mexico-focused Mérida Initiative by creating a separate Central
American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).
27 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of the Mérida Initiative High-Level Consultative Group on Bilateral
Cooperation Against Transnational Organized Crime,” March 29, 2010.
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2. Institutionalizing reforms to sustain the rule of law and respect for human
rights).28
3. Creating a 21st century border.
4. Building strong and resilient communities.
For a detailed discussion of each of the pillars, see: “The Four Pillars of the Mérida
Initiative” below.
U.S. and Mexican officials have described the Mérida Initiative as a "new paradigm" for bilateral
security cooperation. As part of Mérida, the Calderón government put sovereignty concerns aside
to allow extensive U.S. involvement in Mexico’s domestic security efforts. The two governments
increased cooperation through the establishment of a multi-level working group structure to
design and implement bilateral security efforts that included annual cabinet-level meetings. It
appears that those meetings will continue to occur during the Peña Nieto government.
Weak government institutions and underlying societal problems have allowed the drug trade to
flourish in Mexico; and many Mexican analysts welcomed the Mérida Initiative’s 2010 shift in
focus. Observers continue to argue, however, that border modernization and community building
programs have been underfunded. In addition, most Mexicans continue to have reservations about
the anti-organized crime efforts under Merida’s pillar one because of the perception that they
contributed to record levels of violent crime. Both the U.S. and Mexican governments have also
struggled to fulfill their domestic pledges under the Mérida Initiative.
Funding the Mérida Initiative
Congress, with the power of the purse, has played a major role in determining the level and
composition of Mérida funding for Mexico. From FY2008 to FY2012, Congress appropriated
more than $1.9 billion for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative (see Table 1for Mérida
appropriations and Table A-1 in Appendix A for overall U.S. assistance to Mexico). In the
beginning, Congress included funding for Mexico in supplemental appropriations measures in an
attempt to hasten the delivery of certain equipment. Congress has also earmarked funds in order
to ensure that certain programs are prioritized, such as efforts to support institutional reform.
From FY2012 onward, funds provided for pillar two have exceeded all other aid categories.
Congress has sought to influence human rights conditions and encourage efforts to combat abuses
and impunity in Mexico by placing conditions on Mérida-related assistance. Congress directed
that 15% of certain assistance provided to Mexican military and police forces would be subject to
certain human rights conditions. The conditions included in the FY2012 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-74) are slightly different than in previous years (see “Human Rights
Concerns and Conditions on Mérida Initiative Funding”). In H.Rept. 112-331 accompanying P.L.
112-74, the conferees directed the Secretary of State to provide a report within 90 days of the
enactment of the act detailing how U.S. programs are helping to achieve judicial and police
reform in Mexico. They also called upon the State Department to develop and implement a
coordinated border security strategy with Mexico.

28 See: CRS Report R43001, Supporting Criminal Justice System Reform in Mexico: The U.S. Role, by Clare Ribando
Seelke.
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Table 1. FY2008–FY2014 Mérida Funding for Mexico by Aid Account and
Appropriations Measure
($ in millions)
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
Supp.
FY2009
Supp.
FY2010
Supp.
FY2011
FY2012
(P.L. 110-
(P.L. 111-
(P.L. 111-
(P.L. 111-
(P.L. 111-
(P.L. 112-
(P.L. 112-
Account
FY2013
FY2014
Account
252)
8)
32)
117)
212)
10)
74)
Totals
Request
Request
ESF 20.0
15.0
0.0
15.0a 0.0 18.0 33.3
101.3
35.0 35.0
INCLE 263.5 246.0 160.0 190.0 175.0 117.0 248.5
1,400.0
199.0 148.1
FMF 116.5
39.0
260.0
5.3
0.0
8.0
Not
428.8
Not
Not
applicableb
applicable
applicable
Total
400.0 300.0 420.0 210.3 175.0 143.0 281.8
1,930.1 234.0 183.1
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2008-FY2014.
Notes: ESF=Economic Support Fund; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; INCLE=International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement.
a. $6 million was later reprogrammed for global climate change efforts by the State Department.
b. Beginning in FY2012, FMF assistance is not included as part of the Mérida Initiative.
Although the appropriations committees in both houses of Congress reported out their respective
versions of the FY2013 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act (H.R. 5857 and S. 3241) in May 2012, consideration of the FY2013
appropriations bills did not occur until after the November 2012 elections. Both the House and
Senate appropriations committees’ versions of the foreign operations bill would have increased
funding for Mérida above the Administration’s request. In September 2012, Congress enacted a
six-month continuing resolution (P.L. 112-175) that continued funding the Mérida Initiative at
FY2012 levels. Prior to the expiration of that stopgap measure, Congress approved new
legislation to fund federal programs through FY2013 on March 21, 2013 that was signed into law
by President Obama on March 26 (P.L. 113-6). Under P.L. 113-6, most State-Foreign Operations
accounts are funded at the same level as in FY2012. These accounts are subject to the budget
sequestration process that is currently in effect, which may significantly reduce the actual funding
levels that are made available to agencies. Given uncertainty regarding how sequestration will be
applied to particular programs, it is currently unclear how much funding will be provided through
Mérida in FY2013. The aid that is provided through P.L. 113-6 will be subject to the same
conditions as those enacted in FY2012 (P.L. 112-74).
Implementation
Over the past few years, Congress has maintained an interest in ensuring that Mérida-funded
equipment and training is delivered efficiently. 29 After initial delays in 2009-2010, deliveries
accelerated in 2011, a year in which the U.S. government provided Mexico more than $500
million worth of equipment, training, and technical assistance. As of November 2012, some $1.1
billion worth of assistance had been provided. That total included roughly $873.7 million in

29 In H.Rept. 112-494, House appropriators maintained that Congress “continues to be concerned with the delivery of
assistance to Mexico” and urge agencies to “use all appropriate means necessary to ensure the prompt delivery of
equipment and training.”
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equipment (including 21 aircraft30 and more than $100 million worth of non-intrusive inspection
equipment) and $146.0 million worth of training.
As of April 30, 2013, deliveries had inched upwards to $1.2 billion ($900 million in equipment
and $147.7 million worth of training). While $95 million in FY2012 INCLE funding is being
withheld due to a congressional hold, roughly $600 million in Mérida funding appropriated prior
to FY2013 has yet to be delivered. Recent delays in implementation have occurred partially due
to the fact that the Peña Nieto government is still honing its security strategy and determining the
amount and type of U.S. assistance needed to support that strategy. According to Assistant
Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs William Brownfield,
“We don't yet have a defined strategy [from the Mexican government] that we can say we can
program…and implement against.”31 The new procedure for processing all requests from
Mexican ministries for Mérida support through the Interior Ministry, which is discussed below,
has also reportedly contributed to implementation delays.32
U.S. assistance has increasingly focused on supporting efforts to strengthen institutions in Mexico
through training and technical assistance. U.S. funds support training courses offered in new
academies for customs personnel, corrections staff, canine teams, and police (federal, state, and
local).33 Some of that training is designed according to a “train the trainer” model in which the
academies train instructors who in turn are able to train their own personnel. As of May 2013,
some 19,000 law enforcement officers (including 4,000 federal police investigators) had
completed U.S. courses. Another 8,500 federal and 22,500 state justice sector personnel had
received training on their roles in Mexico’s new accusatorial justice system.34 Despite these
numbers, high turnover rates within Mexican criminal justice institutions, particularly since the
transition from PAN to PRI rule, has limited the impact of some U.S. training programs.35
U.S. Efforts to Complement the Mérida Initiative
In the 2007 U.S.-Mexico joint statement announcing the Mérida Initiative, the U.S. government
pledged to “intensify its efforts to address all aspects of drug trafficking (including demand-
related portions) and continue to combat trafficking of weapons and bulk currency to Mexico.”36
Although not funded through the Mérida Initiative, the U.S. government has made efforts to
address each of these issues (see Appendix B for how those efforts have advanced); some have
been more successful than others. When debating future support for the Mérida Initiative,

30 Aerial equipment deliveries thus far have included four CASA 235 maritime surveillance aircraft, nine UH-60 Black
Hawk helicopters, and eight Bell 412 helicopters. The only pending aircraft delivery is an Intelligence Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (ISR) Dornier 328-JET aircraft that has been contracted for the Federal Police.
31 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, U.S.-Mexico
Security Cooperation: An Overview of the Merida Initiative 2008–Present, 113th Cong., 1st sess., CQ Congressional
Transcripts, May 23, 2013. Hereinafter: An Overview of the Mérida Initiative, May 2013.
32 CRS interviews with State Department officials and Mexican analysts in Mexico City, May 6-8, 2013.
33 Mérida assistance is also supporting Mexican institutions like the National Public Security System (SNSP), which
sets police standards and provides grants to states and municipalities for police training, and the National Institute of
Criminal Sciences (INACIPE), which provides training to judicial sector personnel.
34 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, op. cit.
35 CRS interviews with State Department officials and Mexican analysts in Mexico City, May 6-8, 2013.
36 U.S. Department of State and Government of Mexico, “Joint Statement on the Mérida Initiative: A New Paradigm
for Security Cooperation,” October 22, 2007.
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Congress may consider whether to simultaneously provide additional funding for these or other
domestic activities that would enhance the United States’ abilities to fulfill its pledges.
The Peña Nieto Administration’s Security Strategy
and the Mérida Initiative
PRI President Enrique Peña Nieto, a former governor of the state of Mexico, took office on
December 1, 2012. Upon his inauguration, the centrist PRI, a nationalistic party that governed
Mexico from 1929 to 2000, retook the presidency after 12 years of rule by the conservative
National Action Party (PAN). The PRI also controls a plurality (but not a majority) in Mexico's
Senate and Chamber of Deputies.
Upon his inauguration, President Peña Nieto announced a reformist agenda with specific
proposals under five broad categories: (1) reducing violence; (2) combating poverty; (3) boosting
economic growth; (4) reforming education; and (5) fostering social responsibility. The
overarching aim of those proposals is to bolster Mexico’s competitiveness. Leaders from the PAN
and leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) signed on to President Peña Nieto’s “Pact
for Mexico,” an agreement aimed at advancing the reform agenda. Two of the thirteen priority
proposals Peña Nieto mentioned at his inauguration included introducing a proposal for a unified
code of criminal procedure for the country to advance judicial reform and launching a national
crime prevention plan.
On December 17, 2012, President Peña Nieto outlined a strategy that aims to achieve a “Mexico
in Peace” where human rights are respected and protected by implementing a “State” security
policy that involves binding commitments from all levels of government. The six pillars of the
strategy include (1) planning; (2) prevention; (3) protection and respect of human rights; (4)
coordination; (5) institutional transformation; and (6) monitoring and evaluation.37 Six months
later, analysts and U.S officials maintain that many details of the Peña Nieto government’s
security strategy—particularly how it plans to combat criminal groups without exacerbating
violence—are still being fleshed out.38
In order to better plan, integrate, and evaluate security efforts, President Peña Nieto secured
approval from the Mexican Congress to place the Secretariat of Public Security (Federal Police)
and intelligence functions under the authority of the Interior Ministry. That ministry is now the
focal point for security collaboration and intelligence-sharing with foreign governments, as well
as with coordination with state and municipal authorities. The states have in turn been divided
into five geographic regions and are being encouraged to stand up unified state police commands
to coordinate with federal forces. Some critics appear to be concerned that too much power is
concentrated in the Interior Ministry.39
In addition to strengthening the role of the Interior Ministry in security efforts, the Peña Nieto
government envisions a revamped and modernized Attorney General’s Office. Peña Nieto’s

37 The strategy is outlined in some detail in Spanish on the Mexican Presidency’s website:
http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/articulos-prensa/ii-sesion-extraordinaria-del-consejo-nacional-de-seguridad-publica.
38 An Overview of the Mérida Initiative, May 2013.
39 Julián Aguilar, “In Mexico, a New Approach to Stanching Drug Violence,” New York Times, December 29, 2012.
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security strategy calls for accelerated implementation of the judicial reforms passed in 2008, a
key priority of pillar two (institutional reform) of the Mérida Initiative. It also calls for a reduced
usage of preventive detention and prison reform that includes rehabilitation and reinsertion.
Peña Nieto’s security strategy explicitly prioritizes human rights, citizen participation, and crime
prevention; this could portend an increase in bilateral efforts under Mérida’s pillar two (to protect
human rights through institutional reform) and pillar four (to build resilient communities). Peña
Nieto’s strategy pledges to increase victims’ assistance as per the Victim’s Law enacted in
January 2013, transfer cases of military abuses against civilians to civilian courts, and find
missing persons while also preventing future disappearances. Human rights groups are
monitoring how those pledges are translated into specific actions; some have been critical of
government efforts to translate rhetoric into reality. The government has launched a national
prevention program with a $9 billion budget for 2013 that includes socioeconomic, education,
infrastructure and drug treatment programs. The program is being focused on 57 high-crime
communities, but that includes additional actions in 251 municipalities.
While U.S. and Mexican interests have recently coalesced around security concerns along the
border, analysts maintain that there is potential for broader cooperation focused on economic
dynamism under pillar three of the Mérida Initiative (creating a 21st century border). 40 President
Peña Nieto has expressed support for creating a border police force, using technology and risk
analysis to speed up border crossings, and developing a regional fund for North American
infrastructure.41 Hastening bilateral plans to reach the goal of developing a “21st Century Border”
could support Peña Nieto’s goal of bolstering U.S.-Mexican economic integration.
Many details of Peña Nieto’s security strategy that will have implications for U.S.-Mexican
cooperation under pillars one and two of Mérida have yet to be announced, much less
implemented. For example, the strategy envisions a continued role for the Mexican military in
public security efforts through at least 2015; whether and how the role of the military will be
different than under the Calderón government still needs to be clarified. According to one security
analyst, some 30% of the military forces that had been deployed to conduct antidrug operations
under the Calderón government were initially sent back to their barracks by the Peña Nieto
government. Security conditions then reportedly deteriorated in some of those areas.42 For
instance, military forces recently had to be re-deployed to counter deteriorating security
conditions in Michoacán.
Although President Peña Nieto has committed to reform, rather than dismantle, the Federal
Police, how the force will be reconfigured to focus on investigations and combating key crimes
(such as kidnapping and extortion) remains to be seen. In addition to a reconfigured Federal
Police, President Peña Nieto also proposes to create a new militarized police entity, the National
Gendarmerie, whose forces may initially be drawn from the military but placed under the control
of the Interior Ministry.43 The Gendarmerie, rather than the Federal Police, may replace military

40 Arizona State University Center for Transborder Studies, Realizing the Strength of Our 21st Century Border: Trade,
Education, and Jobs, Conference Report, October 2012.
41 Miriam Castillo, “Peña Quiere Patrulla Fronteriza Mexicana,” Milenio, October 9, 2012; Enrique Peña Nieto,
México, la Gran Esperanza (Mexico, D.F.: Grijalbo, 2011), p. 149.
42 CRS interview with Raul Benitez Manaut, National Autonomous University of Mexico, May 7, 2013.
43 The Gendarmerie is to begin with roughly 10,000 forces drawn from the Army and the Navy. It may expand,
however, to include some 50,000 officers. Questions remain, however, about how responsibilities would be divided
between the Federal Police and the Gendarmerie, including whether the gendarmes would only operate in rural areas
(continued...)
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forces currently charged with assisting municipalities overwhelmed by violence and guarding
border crossings, ports, and airports.
In general, President Peña Nieto and his cabinet appear more wary of overt U.S. involvement in
security operations in Mexico than the previous Calderón government. The Interior Ministry has
notified U.S. agencies operating in Mexico that all requests for new Mérida-funded training or
equipment made by Mexican government entities must be approved by a central office in that
ministry. Ongoing programs are not affected by the new procedure. According to U.S. officials,
this process has thus far proven to be slow and cumbersome.44 The Peña Nieto government has
also removed some U.S. personnel from fusion centers established by the previous government
and centralized the handling of sensitive intelligence, reportedly prompting concern from U.S.
law enforcement personnel that cooperation could suffer.45
The Four Pillars of the Mérida Initiative
Pillar One: Disrupting the Operational Capacity of
Organized Crime
During the Calderón Administration, Mexico focused much of its efforts on dismantling the
leadership of the major DTOs. U.S. assistance appropriated during the first phase of the Mérida
Initiative (FY2008-FY2010) enabled the purchase of equipment to support the efforts of federal
security forces engaged in anti-DTO efforts. That equipment included $590.5 million worth of
aircraft and helicopters, as well as forensic equipment for the Federal Police and Attorney
General’s respective crime laboratories. As the DTOs continue to employ new weapons, new
types of training and/or equipment may be needed to help security officials combat those new
threats. As the Peña Nieto government moves to establish a National Gendarmerie, assistance
may be requested to assist that entity, as well as existing federal forces.
The Mexican government has increasingly been conceptualizing the DTOs as for-profit
corporations. Consequently, its strategy, and U.S. efforts to support it, has begun to focus more
attention on disrupting the criminal proceeds used to finance DTOs’ operations. In August 2010,
the Mexican government imposed limits on the amount of U.S. dollars that individuals can
exchange or deposit each month. In October 2012, the Mexican Congress approved an anti-
money laundering law establishing a financial crimes unit within the Attorney General’s office
(PGR), subjecting industries vulnerable to money laundering to new reporting requirements, and
creating new criminal offenses for money laundering. Future Mérida assistance could be used to
provide additional equipment and technical assistance to units within the Finance Ministry and
the PGR that are investigating money laundering cases.
As mentioned, the DTOs are increasingly evolving into poly-criminal organizations, perhaps as a
partial result of drug interdiction efforts cutting into their profits. As a result, many have urged

(...continued)
(as they have in many countries), or in urban zones as well.
44 CRS interviews with State Department officials in Mexico City, May 6, 2013.
45 Dana Priest, “U.S. Role at a Crossroads in Mexico’s Intelligence War on the Cartels,” Washington Post, April 27,
2013; Nick Miroff, “In Mexico, Restrictions on U.S. Agents Signal Drug War Shift,” Washington Post, May 14, 2013.
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both governments to focus on combating other types of organized crime, such as kidnapping and
alien smuggling. Some may therefore question whether the funding provided under the Mérida
Initiative is being used to adequately address all forms of transnational organized crime.
Intelligence-sharing and cross-border law enforcement operations and investigations have been
suggested as possible areas for increased cooperation. During the Calderón Administration, U.S.
law enforcement and intelligence officials supported Mexican intelligence-gathering efforts in
northern Mexico and U.S. drones gathered information that was shared with Mexican officials.46
While bilateral intelligence-sharing and law enforcement cooperation has continued under the
Peña Nieto government, its exact scope and nature is still being determined.47
A more general question that may arise for policy makers as they review the Administration’s
budget requests for the Mérida Initiative is whether proposed funding would be used to expand
existing bilateral partnerships (described in Appendix B), or whether it would be used to
establish new partnerships. This may depend on the effectiveness of current partnerships, as well
as whether new partnerships are needed to address emerging law enforcement challenges. And, as
U.S. assistance increasingly flows to state-level law enforcement, policy makers may consider if
and to what extent those forces should participate in bilateral law enforcement partnerships.
Pillar Two: Institutionalizing Reforms to Sustain the Rule of Law
and Respect for Human Rights in Mexico48
Reforming Mexico’s corrupt and inefficient criminal justice system is widely regarded as a
crucial for combating criminality, strengthening the rule of law, and better protecting citizen
security and human rights in the country.49 Due to concerns about the corruption and
ineffectiveness of police and prosecutors, less than 13% of all crimes are reported in Mexico.50
Even so, recent spikes in violence and criminality have overwhelmed Mexico’s law enforcement
and judicial institutions, with record numbers of arrests rarely resulting in successful convictions.
Increasing cases of human rights abuses committed by authorities at all levels, as well as
Mexico’s inability to investigate and punish those accused of abuses, are also pressing concerns.
Federal police reform got underway during the Calderón Administration, although recent cases of
police misconduct have highlighted lingering concerns about federal forces. Serious questions
also remain as to when and how the National Gendarmerie will take over the anti-drug functions
currently being carried out by the Mexican military. President Peña Nieto has indicated that the
military will remain engaged in public security functions for the foreseeable future. Another
major challenge will be to expand police reform efforts to the state and municipal level, possibly
through the establishment of state level unified police commands. Some Mérida funding is being

46 Ginger Thompson, “U.S. Widens Role in Battle Against Mexican Drug Cartels,” New York Times, August 6, 2011;
Mary Beth Sheridan, “Mexico Confirms Use of U.S. Drones in Drug War,” Washington Post, March 16, 2011.
47 CRS interviews with State Department officials in Mexico City, May 6, 2013.
48 For more information on this pillar, see: CRS Report R43001, Supporting Criminal Justice System Reform in
Mexico: The U.S. Role.
49 David Shirk, The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat, Council on Foreign Relations, March 2011,
available at: http://www.cfr.org/mexico/drug-war-mexico/p24262.
50 Gobierto Federal de Mexico, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Geografía (INEGI), 2012 Encuesta Nacional de
Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública.
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used to extend U.S.-funded federal police training and prison reform efforts to the states of
Chihuahua, Nuevo León, Sonora, and Puebla.
With impunity rates hovering around 82% for homicide and even higher for other crimes,51
experts maintain that it is crucial for Mexico to implement the judicial reforms passed in the
summer of 2008 and to focus on fighting corruption at all levels of government. In order for
Mexico to transition its criminal justice system to an accusatorial system with oral trials by 2016,
many have argued that U.S.-funded judicial training programs need to be expanded. And, while
U.S. assistance has helped federal prisons expand and improve, thousands of federal prisoners are
still being housed in state prisons that are overcrowded and often extremely insecure.52
Reforming the Police
Police corruption has presented additional challenges to the campaign against DTOs in Mexico.
While corruption has most often plagued municipal and state police forces, in June 2012 corrupt
Federal Police officers involved in running a drug smuggling ring out of the Mexico City airport
killed three of their colleagues. Corrupt officials have also been dismissed from the PGR’s
organized crime unit, as well as its police force.
The Calderón Administration took steps to reform Mexico’s police forces by dramatically
increasing police budgets, raising selection standards, and enhancing police training and
equipment at the federal level. It also created a national database through which police at all
levels can share information and intelligence, and accelerated implementation of a national police
registry. President Calderón initially proposed the creation of one unified federal police force
under the Secretariat for Public Security (SSP), but two laws passed in 2009 created a Federal
Police (FP) force under the SSP and a Federal Ministerial Police (PFM) force under the PGR,
both with some investigative functions.53 It took the Mexican government another year to issue
regulations delineating the roles and responsibilities of these two police entities. It remains to be
seen how the Peña Nieto government’s placement of the SSP under the authority of the Interior
Ministry and its plan to create a new National Gendarmerie will affect bilateral efforts. U.S.
officials have offered to help Mexico develop national policing standards.54
Whereas initiatives to recruit, vet, train, and equip the FP under the SSP rapidly advanced (with
support from the Mérida Initiative), efforts to build the PGR’s police forces have lagged behind.
According to the State Department, Mérida funding supported specialized training courses to
improve federal police investigations, intelligence collection and analysis, and anti-money
laundering capacity, as well as the construction of regional command and control centers.55 The

51 In other words, about 82% of perpetrators have not been brought to justice. Guillermo Zepeda, Seguridad y Justicia
Penal en los Estados: 25 Indicadores de Nuestra Debilidad Institucional, Mexico Evalúa, March 2012.
52 Federal prison reform in Mexico began in 2008. Since that time, the Mexican government has invested $6.4 billion in
prison reform and the U.S. government has provided $23 million in Mérida assistance. U.S. training and equipment
supported the establishment of a federal penitentiary academy in Veracruz; the expansion of federal prison capacity
through the construction of nine new facilities; and the accreditation of eight of México’s federal facilities by the
American Correctional Association.
53 Daniel Sabet, Police Reform in Mexico: Advances and Persistent Obstacles, Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico
Institute, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, May 2010, available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Sabet.pdf.
54 An Overview of the Mérida Initiative, May 2013.
55 U.S. Department of State, FY2010 Mérida Initiative Spending Plan for Mexico, June 10, 2010.
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Calderón government also sought U.S. technical assistance in developing in-service evaluations
and internal investigative units to prevent and punish police corruption and human rights abuses,
although experts maintain that much more could be done in that area. Mérida assistance has also
begun to support the PFM, although not to the same degree. Additional U.S. training could be
requested to bolster the PFM, as Peña Nieto has pledged to do, as well as to support new FP units
dedicated to combating kidnapping and extortion.
Thus far, state and local police reform has lagged behind federal police reform efforts. A public
security law codified in January 2009 established vetting and certification procedures for state
and local police to be overseen by the National Public Security System (SNSP). Federal subsidies
have been provided to state and municipal units whose officers meet certain standards.
Nevertheless, as of November 2012, the head of the SNSP at that time reported that only six
states had complied with the 2009 law’s requirement that all state and municipal police officers
be vetted by January 2013; that deadline since has been extended. Still, concerns have been raised
about the tests’ reliability. And, even in states where vetting requirements have been met, a
significant percentage of officers who failed the tests have remained on the job.56
The establishment of unified state police commands that could potentially absorb municipal
police forces has been debated in Mexico for years.57 The Mexican Congress failed to pass a
constitutional reform proposal put forth by the Calderón government to establish unified state
police commands. Nevertheless, President Peña Nieto is helping states move in that direction. In
the meantime, some states have moved forward with plans to do away with municipal forces.58
The outcome of the aforementioned reform efforts could have implications for U.S. initiatives to
expand Mérida assistance to state and municipal police forces, particularly as the Mexican
government determines how to organize and channel that assistance. Mérida funding has
supported state-level academies in Chihuahua, Nuevo León, Puebla, and Sonora. Those
academies may be turned into regional training hubs, an idea that President Peña Nieto has
endorsed. U.S. funds could potentially help stand up intelligence task forces in several states, as
well as accredited state police units. Training courses offered to state and municipal police might
have a slightly different emphasis than those given to federal forces, but a focus on building
investigatory capacity is likely to be needed in order for all police to function in the new
accusatorial justice system.
In order to complement these efforts, analysts have maintained that it is important to provide
assistance to civil society and human rights-related non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in
Mexico in order to strengthen their ability to monitor police conduct and provide input on
policing policies. Some maintain that citizen participation councils, combined with internal
control mechanisms and stringent punishments for police misconduct, can have a positive impact
on police performance and police-community relations. Others have mentioned the importance of
establishing citizen observatories to develop reliable indicators to track police and criminal justice
system performance, as has been done in some states.

56 “Mexico: the Tough Task of Cleaning up the Police,” Latin American Weekly Report, November 15, 2012.
57 Proponents of the reform maintain that it would improve coordination with the federal government and bring
efficiency, standardization, and better trained and equipped police to municipalities. Skeptics argue that police
corruption has been a major problem at all levels of the Mexican policing system and argue that there is a role for
municipal police who are trained to deal with local issues.
58 CRS phone interview with State Department officials, November 8, 2012.
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Reforming the Judicial and Penal Systems
The Mexican judicial system has been widely criticized for being opaque, inefficient, and corrupt.
It is plagued by long case backlogs, a high pre-trial detention rate, and an inability to secure
convictions. The vast majority of drug trafficking-related arrests that have occurred over the last
six years have not resulted in successful prosecutions. The PGR has also been unable to secure
charges in many high-profile cases involving the arrests of politicians accused of collaborating
with organized crime, such as Gregorio Sanchez, the former mayor of Cancun.59
Mexican prisons, particularly at the state level, are also in need of significant reforms. Increasing
arrests have caused prison population to expand significantly, as has the use of preventive
detention. Those suspected of involvement in organized crime can be held by the authorities for
40 days without access to legal counsel, with a possible extension of another 40 days, a practice
known as “arraigo” (pre-charge detention) that has led to serious abuses by authorities.60 Many
inmates (perhaps 40%)61 are awaiting trials, as opposed to serving out sentences. As of July 2012,
prisons were at 26% over-capacity.62 Prison breaks are common in state facilities, many of which
are controlled by crime groups.
In June 2008, then-President Calderón signed a judicial reform decree after securing the approval
of Congress and Mexico’s states for an amendment to Mexico’s Constitution. Under the reform,
Mexico has until 2016 to replace its trial procedures at the federal and state level, moving from a
closed-door process based on written arguments to a public trial system with oral arguments and
the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. In addition to oral trials, judicial systems are
expected to adopt additional means of alternative dispute resolution, which should help make it
more flexible and efficient, thereby relieving some of the pressure on the country’s prison system.
To implement the reforms, Mexico will need to revise federal and state criminal procedure codes
(CPCs), build new courtrooms, retrain current legal professionals, update law school curricula,
and improve forensic technology—a difficult and expensive undertaking.
Five years into the reform process, progress has stalled at the federal level. From the beginning,
analysts had predicted that progress in advancing judicial reform was “likely to be very slow as
capacity constraints and entrenched interests in the judicial system (including judges) delay any
changes.”63 Still, the Calderón government devoted more funding and political will towards
modernizing the police than strengthening the justice system.64 In addition, some of the tough
measures for handling organized crime cases it included in the 2008 judicial reforms appear to

59 Patrick Corcoran, “Mayor Goes Free, Mexico Fails Again to Prosecute ‘Corrupt’ Politicians,” In Sight Organized
Crime in the Americas, July 21, 2011.
60 This practice first came into existence in the 1980s, and was formally incorporated into the Mexican Constitution
through a constitutional amendment passed in 2008 as a legal instrument to fight organized crime. Its use has been
criticized by several United Nations bodies, the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights of the Organization of
American States, and international and Mexican human rights organizations. For more, see Janice Deaton, Arraigo and
Legal Reform in Mexico, University of San Diego, June 2010.
61 U.S. Department of State, 2012 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Mexico, April 2013,
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper.Hereinafter: Country Report: Mexico, 2012.
62 Ibid.
63 “Mexico Risk: Legal and Regulatory Risk,” Economist Intelligence Unit-Risk Briefing, January 8, 2010.
64 Andrew Selee and Eric L. Olson, Steady Advances, Slow Results: U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation After Two Years
of the Obama Administration, Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute, April 2011.
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run counter to the spirit of the reforms, which include protections for the rights of the accused.65
Former President Calderón proposed a new federal CPC—a key element needed to guide reform
efforts—in September 2011, but it was not enacted.
President Peña Nieto has repeatedly pledged to advance judicial reform and overhaul the PGR.
The Mexican Congress is currently considering different versions of a unified code of criminal
procedure that would cover the federal and state levels. It may also limit or do away with arraigo.
Experts have praised the Peña Nieto government’s apparent embrace of judicial reform and
pledge to use arraigo only sparingly, but remain unsure of how its backing of a unified code of
criminal procedure will affect reform efforts.
In contrast to this lack of progress at the federal level, the reform has moved forward in many
Mexican states. As of December 2012, 22 of Mexico’s 32 states had enacted new criminal
procedure codes and 12 states had begun operating under the new system.66 Reform states have
seen positive initial results as compared to non-reform states: faster case resolution times, less
pre-trial detention, and tougher sentences for cases that go to trial.67 Still, daunting challenges
remain, including the need to improve the investigative capacity of police and prosecutors,
counter-reform efforts, and opposition from judges and other key justice sector operators.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is concentrating most of its work in
support of judicial reform at the state level. USAID had been supporting code reform, judicial
exchanges, alternative dispute resolution, and Citizen’s Participation Councils, as well as training
justice sector operators in five Mexican states since 2004. USAID expanded its rule of law efforts
with roughly $104 million in FY2008-FY2012 Mérida assistance, a significant portion of which
is supporting comprehensive judicial reform programs in seven of Mexico’s 32 states. USAID
plans to expand its programs into at least 13 other states, with assistance to each state tailored to
the stage that it is at in the reform process.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) is supporting judicial reform at the federal level, including the
adoption of a federal CPC. DOJ is administering some $46 million in State Department funding.
In 2012, DOJ worked with the PGR to design and implement a national training program known
as Project Diamante through which 7,700 prosecutors, investigators, and forensic experts were
trained to work as a team rather than in isolation (as was customary). DOJ has also started a
training program in Puerto Rico for Mexican federal judges. The future of DOJ programming in
Mexico may depend upon the extent to which Mexico’s Attorney General Jesús Murillo Karam
embraces the Diamante model.
Congress has expressed support for the continued provision of U.S. assistance for judicial reform
efforts in Mexico in appropriations legislation, hearings, and committee reports. Congressional
funding and oversight of judicial reform programs in Mexico is likely to continue for many years.
Over time, Congress may consider how best to divide funding between the federal and state

65 For a discussion of these concerns and the reform process in general, see: David Shirk, "Criminal Justice Reform in
Mexico: An Overview," Mexican Law Review, vol. 2, no. 3 (January-June 2011).
66 Matthew C. Ingram, Criminal Procedure Reform in Mexico: Where Things Stand Now, Woodrow Wilson Center's
Mexico Institute, Working Paper, December 2012.
67 USAID, Justice Studies Center of the Americas, and Coordination Council for the Implementation of the Criminal
Justice System and its Technical Secretariat (SETEC); Monitoring the Implementation of the Criminal Justice Reform
in Chihuahua, the State of Mexico, Morelos, Oaxaca, and Zacatecas: 2007-2011, November 2012.
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levels; how to sequence and coordinate support to key elements within the rule of law spectrum
(police, prosecutors, courts); and how the efficacy of U.S. programs is being measured.
Pillar Three: Creating a “21st Century Border”
Policy makers have questioned not only what it means to have a 21st century border, but
specifically how this will enhance law enforcement’s abilities to combat the drug trafficking
organizations and reduce the related violence. In an increasingly globalized world, the notion of a
border is necessarily more complex than a physical line between two sovereign nations.
Consequently, the proposed 21st century border is based on (1) enhancing public safety via
increased information sharing, screenings, and prosecutions; (2) securing the cross-border flow of
goods and people; (3) expediting legitimate commerce and travel through investments in
personnel, technology, and infrastructure; (4) engaging border communities in cross-border trade;
and (5) setting bilateral policies for collaborative border management.68
On May 19, 2010, the United States and Mexico declared their intent to collaborate on enhancing
the U.S.-Mexican border.69 Twenty-First Century Border Bilateral Executive Steering Committee
(ESC) that met in December 2010, December 2011, and April 2013 to develop bi-national action
plans for the subsequent year.70 The plans are focused on setting measurable goals within broad
objectives: coordinating infrastructure development, expanding trusted traveler and shipment
programs, establishing pilot projects for cargo pre-clearance, improving cross-border commerce
and ties, and bolstering information sharing among law enforcement agencies.
Both the United States and Mexico spend significant funds—outside of Mérida—related to border
security. Because border policies and practices have been different along the U.S. side of the
Southwest border and the Mexican side, each country’s goals in further developing the border
may necessarily differ as well. A related issue is whether funds appropriated under the revised
Mérida Initiative should be divided equally or equitably between border initiatives on the U.S.
and Mexican sides of the border.
While policy makers may generally question what constitutes a “21st century border,” they may
more specifically question which aspects of this border will be mutually beneficial to both U.S.
and Mexican efforts to combat the DTOs. Although a key goal of the Mérida Initiative is to
combat the DTOs and their criminal activities, the U.S. border strategy does not discriminate
between combating drug trafficking-related illicit activities and other illegal behaviors along the
border. The current U.S. border strategy strives to secure and manage the U.S. border through
obtaining effective control of the borders, safeguarding lawful trade and travel, and identifying
and disrupting transnational criminal organizations.71 As such, it remains to be seen whether

68 U.S. Department of State, “United States - Mexico Partnership: A New Border Vision,” press release, March 23,
2010.
69 The White House, “Declaration by The Government Of The United States Of America and The Government Of The
United Mexican States Concerning Twenty-First Century Border Management,” press release, May 19, 2010. As
mentioned, U.S. - Mexican security cooperation along the border did not begin with the Mérida Initiative. This ESC is
one of the most recent developments in the bilateral cooperation.
70 The 2010 Action Plan is available at http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/pdf/plan-eng.pdf. The 2011 Action Plan is
available at http://photos.state.gov/libraries/mexico/310329/15dec11/Action-Plan_15_DIC.pdf.
71 For a fuller discussion of U.S. border security policies, see CRS Report R42138, Border Security: Immigration
Enforcement Between Ports of Entry, by Marc R. Rosenblum. CRS was unable to locate an official Mexican border
strategy for comparison with the U.S. border strategy.
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enhancements to the border will specifically support the Mérida Initiative’s goal of combating the
DTOs or whether the funds put toward border development will result in a general strengthening
of the security of the border—and, as a byproduct, aid in disrupting drug trafficking activities.
Northbound and Southbound Inspections72
One element of concern regarding enhanced bilateral border security efforts is that of southbound
inspections of people, goods, vehicles, and cargo. In particular, both countries have
acknowledged a shared responsibility in fueling and combating the illicit drug trade. Policy
makers may question who is responsible for performing northbound and southbound inspections
in order to prevent illegal drugs from leaving Mexico and entering the United States and to
prevent dangerous weapons and the monetary proceeds of drug sales from leaving the United
States and entering Mexico. Further, if this is a joint responsibility, it is unclear how U.S. and
Mexican border officials will divide the responsibility of inspections to maximize the possibility
of stopping the illegal flow of goods while simultaneously minimizing the burden on the
legitimate flow of goods and preventing the duplication of efforts.
In addition to its inbound/northbound inspections, the United States has undertaken steps to
enhance its outbound/southbound screening procedures. Currently, DHS is screening 100% of
southbound rail shipments for illegal weapons, cash, and drugs. Also, CBP scans license plates
along the Southwest border with the use of automated license plate readers (LPRs). In FY2010,
CBP deployed 17 new mobile Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) Systems and 22 more large-scale
NII technology imaging systems to aid in inspection and processing of travelers and shipments.73
Historically, Mexican Customs had not served the role of performing southbound (or inbound)
inspections. As part of the revised Mérida Initiative, CBP has helped to establish a Mexican
Customs training academy to support professionalization and promote the Mexican Customs’ new
role of performing inbound inspections. Additionally, CBP is assisting Mexican Customs in
developing an investigator training program and, as of May 2012, had donated 192 canines and
trained 192 handlers to assist with the inspections.74
Preventing Border Enforcement Corruption
Another point that policy makers may question regarding the strengthening of the Southwest
border is how to prevent the corruption of U.S. and Mexican border officials who are charged
with securing the border. On March 11, 2010, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and
Integration held a hearing on the corruption of U.S. border officials by Mexican DTOs. According
to testimony from the hearing, in FY2009, the DHS Inspector General opened 839 investigations
of DHS employees. Of the 839 investigations, 576 were of CBP employees, 164 were of ICE
employees, 64 were of Citizen and Immigration Services (CIS) employees, and 35 were of

72 There is a dearth of open-source data that currently measures the extent of inbound and outbound inspections
performed by both the United States and Mexico along the Southwest border. Rather, existing data tends to address
seizures of drugs, guns, and money as well as apprehensions of suspects. Therefore, this section addresses current U.S.
and additional initiatives to bolster cross-border inspections.
73 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Securing America's Borders: CBP Fiscal Year 2010 in Review Fact Sheet,
March 15, 2011, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/cbp_overview/fy2010_factsheet.xml.
74 Embassy of Mexico, Fact Sheet: The Mérida Initiative—An Overview, May 2012.
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Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employees.75 It is unknown, however, how many
of these cases involve alleged corruption by Mexican DTOs or how many involve suspected
corruption of DHS employees working along the Southwest border.
To date, the Administration’s proposal for a 21st century border has not directly addressed this
issue of corruption. Congress may consider whether preventing, detecting, and prosecuting public
corruption of border enforcement personnel should be a component of the border initiatives
funded by the Mérida Initiative. If the corruption is as pervasive as officials say,76 resources
provided for new technologies and initiatives along the border may be diminished or negated by
corrupt border personnel. For instance, at the end of 2009, CBP was able to polygraph between
10% and 15% of applicants applying for border patrol positions, and of those who were
polygraphed, about 60% were found unsuitable for service.77 If this pattern holds true and 85%-
90% of current new hires were not subjected to a polygraph, anywhere between 51% and 54% of
all CBP new-hires may not be found suitable for service. Further, between October 1, 2004, and
March 11, 2010, 103 CBP officers were arrested or indicted on “mission-critical corruption
charges including drug smuggling, alien smuggling, money laundering and conspiracy.”78
Congress may decide to increase funding—as part of or separately from Mérida funding—for the
vetting of new and current border enforcement personnel.
Pillar Four: Building Strong and Resilient Communities
This pillar is a new focus for U.S.-Mexican cooperation, the overall goals of which are to address
the underlying causes of crime and violence, promote security and social development, and build
communities that can withstand the pressures of crime and violence. Pillar four is unique in that it
has involved Mexican and U.S. federal officials working together to design and implement
community-based programs in high-crime areas in municipalities near the U.S.-Mexico border.
Pillar four seeks to empower local leaders, civil society representatives, and private sector actors
to lead crime prevention efforts in their communities.
In January 2010, in response to a violent massacre of 15 youth with no apparent connection to
organized crime in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, the Mexican government began to prioritize crime
prevention and community engagement. Responding to criticisms of its military-led strategy for
the city, federal officials worked with local authorities and civic leaders to establish six task
forces to plan and oversee a strategy for reducing criminality, tackling social problems, and
improving citizen-government relations. The strategy, aptly titled “Todos Somos Juarez” (“We
Are All Juárez”), was launched in February 2010 and involved close to $400 million in federal

75 See testimony by Thomas M. Frost, Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ad Hoc
Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration, New Border War: Corruption of U.S.
Officials by Drug Cartels, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 11, 2010.
76 See testimony by Kevin L. Perkins, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of
Investigation before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ad Hoc
Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration, New Border War: Corruption of U.S.
Officials by Drug Cartels, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 11, 2010.
77 See testimony by James F. Tomsheck, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Internal Affairs, Customs and Border
Protection before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ad Hoc
Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration, New Border War: Corruption of U.S.
Officials by Drug Cartels, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 11, 2010.
78 Ibid.
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investments in the city.79 While federal officials began by amplifying access to existing social
programs and building infrastructure projects throughout the city, they later sought to respond to
local demands to concentrate efforts in certain “safe zones.” At the same time, control over public
security efforts in the city shifted from the Mexican military to the Federal Police, and finally to
municipal authorities.80
Prior to the endorsement of a formal pillar four strategy, the U.S. government’s pillar four efforts
in Ciudad Juárez involved the expansion of existing initiatives, such as school-based “culture of
lawfulness”81 programs and drug demand reduction and treatment services.82 They also included
new programs, such as support for an anonymous tip line for the police. USAID supported a
crime and violence mapping project83 that enabled Ciudad Juarez’s municipal government to
identify hot spots and respond with tailored prevention measures as well as a program to provide
safe spaces, activities, and job training programs for youth at-risk of recruitment to organized
crime. USAID also provided $1 million in grants to local organizations working in the areas of
social cohesion in Ciudad Juarez, with activities focused specifically on education, mental health,
and at-risk youth, among others.
It may never be determined what role the aforementioned efforts played in the significant
reductions in violence that has occurred in Ciudad Juaréz since 2011.84 Nevertheless, lessons can
be gleaned from this example of Mexican and U.S. involvement in municipal crime prevention.
Analysts have praised the sustained, high-level support Ciudad Juárez received from the Mexican
and U.S. governments; community ownership of the effort; and coordination that occurred
between various levels of the Mexican government. The work of the security task force (Mesa de
Seguridad) proved crucial for developing trust between citizens and authorities, communication
among authorities, and citizen oversight of government efforts.85 The strategy was not well-
targeted, however, and monitoring and evaluation of its effectiveness has been relatively weak.86

79 Adam Thompson, “Troubled Juárez starts to breathe again,” Financial Times, October 11, 2012.
80 Each of these forces has committed human rights violations and exhibited corruption. Despite concerns about his
aggressive tactics, the current municipal police chief in Ciudad Juárez has won praise by some for reducing crime rates.
William Booth, “In Mexico’s Murder City, the War Appears Over, Washington Post, August 20, 2012; Damien Cave,
“A Crime Fighter Draws Plaudits, and Scrutiny,” New York Times; December 23, 2011.
81 Culture of Lawfulness (CoL) programs aim to combine “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches to educate all
sectors of society on the importance of upholding the rule of law. Key sectors that CoL programs seek to involve
include law enforcement, security forces, and other public officials; the media; schools; and religious and cultural
institutions. The U.S. government is supporting school-based “culture of lawfulness” programs, as well as “culture of
lawfulness” courses that are being taught to federal and state police.
82 U.S.-funded demand reduction programs are helping to create a network to connect Mexico’s 334 prevention and
treatment centers, to develop curricula for drug counselors at the centers, and to help certify Mexican drug counselors.
83 The project has gathered available data on where violence is occurring in the city. See
http://www.observatoriodejuarez.org/.
84 While many analysts credit the decline in violence to the end of a turf war between the Sinaloa and Juárez DTOs,
federal and local officials have variously taken credit for the reduction. See, for example, “Looking Back on the
Calderón Years,” The Economist, November 22, 2012.
85 Lucy Conger, "The Private Sector and Public Security: The Cases of Ciudad Juarez and Monterrey," in forthcoming
volume: Building Resilient Communities: Civic Responses to Violent Organized Crime in Mexico (Woodrow Wilson
Center's Mexico Institute and the Trans-Border Institute at the University of San Diego, Expected in 2013).
86 Diana Negroponte, Pillar IV of ‘Beyond Merida:’ Addressing the Socio-Economic Causes of Drug Related Crime
and Violence in Mexico, Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute, May 2011, available at:
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Merida%20-%20Pillar%20IV%20Working%20Paper%20Format1.pdf
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In April 2011, the U.S. and Mexican governments formally approved a bi-national pillar four
strategy.87 The strategy focuses on three objectives: (1) strengthening federal civic planning
capacity to prevent and reduce crime; (2) bolstering the capacity of state and local governments to
implement crime prevention and reduction activities; and (3) increasing engagement with at-risk
youth.88 U.S.-funded pillar four activities complement the work of the Mexico’s National Center
for Crime Prevention and Citizen Participation, an entity within the Interior Department that
implemented projects in high crime areas in 237 cities in 2012 where local authorities were
making similar investments in crime prevention.
In support of this new strategy, USAID launched a three-year, $15 million Crime and Violence
Prevention program in nine target communities identified by the Mexican government in Ciudad
Juárez, Monterrey, Nuevo León, and Tijuana, Baja California. The program supports the
development of community strategies to reduce crime and violence in the target localities,
including outreach to at-risk youth, improved citizen-police collaboration, and partnerships with
private sector enterprises. More recently, USAID awarded $10 million in local grants to six civil
society organizations for innovative crime prevention projects that engage at-risk youth and their
families. USAID also supports a $1 million evaluation of crime in the target communities that
will help the U.S. and Mexican governments understand the risk factors contributing directly to
increased violence and enable both governments to identify successful models for replication.
Experiences in U.S. and Latin American cities have shown the importance that municipal-based
crime prevention programs play in efforts to reduce violence. USAID has supported local
prevention programs in Central America since the mid-2000s, and lessons learned can be drawn
from that experience. Some may argue that similar programs in Mexico should be scaled up,
while others may assert that Mexico, a middle-income country, has the capacity to pay for its own
prevention programs. As a result, the U.S. government’s pillar four programs were designed as
pilots for future replication in other areas of Mexico with similar characteristics and
vulnerabilities. Mexican participation and ultimate ownership and responsibility of these
programs, as well as local civil society participation and oversight, will be crucial to sustaining
these investments. Pillar four appears to be a top priority for the Peña Nieto government and
future bilateral efforts will likely seek to complement Mexico’s National Crime and Violence
Prevention Program.

87 The State Department reprogrammed $8.5 million in FY2010 funding and $14 million in FY2011 funding to support
pillar four projects. To date (FYs 2010, 2010 supplemental, 2011, 2012 and 2013), USAID has dedicated $35.9 million
in Economic Support Fund monies to pillar four.
88 U.S. programs under the first objective may help refine the Mexican government’s national crime prevention plan
and support federal entities engaged in developing, monitoring, and evaluating municipal crime prevention efforts.
Under the second objective, USAID may support the development and implementation of municipal crime prevention
plans. Programs under the third objective may include helping communities build networks of resources for at-risk
youth. See USAID-Mexico, “Pillar Four: Building Strong and Resilient Communities,”
http://www.usaid.gov/mx/pillariveng.html.
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Issues
Measuring the Success of the Mérida Initiative
With little publicly available information on what specific metrics the U.S. and Mexican
governments are using to measure the impact of the Mérida Initiative, analysts have debated how
bilateral efforts should be evaluated.89 How one evaluates the Mérida Initiative largely depends
on how one has defined the goals of the program. While the U.S. and Mexican governments’
long-term goals for the Mérida Initiative may be similar, their short-term goals and priorities may
be different. For example, both countries may strive to ultimately reduce the overarching threat
posed by the DTOs—a national security threat to Mexico and an organized crime threat to the
United States. However, their short-term goals may differ; Mexico may focus more on reducing
drug trafficking-related crime and violence, while the United States may place more emphasis on
aggressively capturing DTO leaders and seizing illicit drugs. More information on the State
Department’s metrics for evaluating Mérida may eventually be made public now that it has
opened a monitoring and evaluation office in Mexico City.
One basic measure by which Congress has evaluated the Mérida Initiative has been the pace of
equipment deliveries and training opportunities. A December 2009 Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report identified several factors that had slowed the pace of Mérida
implementation.90 It is unclear, though, whether more expeditious equipment deliveries to Mexico
have resulted in a more positive evaluation of Mérida. Moreover, if equipment is not adequately
maintained, its long-term impact could be reduced. Measures of the volume of training programs
administered, including the number of individuals completing each course, have also been used to
measure Mérida success. This measure is imperfect, however, as it does not capture the impact
that a particular training course had on an individuals’ performance. U.S. agencies are generally
not currently measuring retention rates for those whom they have trained; some agencies have
identified high turnover rates within the agencies as a major obstacle for the sustainability of
Mérida-funded training programs.91
U.S.-funded antidrug programs in source and transit countries (of which Mexico is both) have
also traditionally been evaluated by examining the number of DTO leaders arrested and the
amount of drugs and other illicit items seized, along with the price and purity of drugs in the
United States. The State Department has attributed increased arrests and certain drug seizures
(i.e., cocaine and methamphetamine) to success of the Mérida Initiative.92 U.S. officials have also
highlighted the downward trend (since 2006) of cocaine availability and purity in the United
States as evidence of the success of Mérida and other U.S.-funded antidrug efforts.93

89 See, for example, Andrew Selee, Success or Failure? Evaluating U.S.-Mexico Efforts to Address Organized Crime
and Violence, Center for Hemispheric Policy- Perspectives on the Americas Series, December 20, 2010.
90 Government Accountability Office, Status of Funds for the Mérida Initiative, 10-253R, December 3, 2009.
91 U.S. Agency for International Development, Justice Studies Center of the Americas, and Coordination Council for
the Implementation of the Criminal Justice System and its Technical Secretariat (SETEC); Executive Summary of the
General Report: Monitoring the Implementation of the Criminal Justice Reform in Chihuahua, the State of Mexico,
Morelos, Oaxaca, and Zacatecas: 2007-2011, November 2012.
92 U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, “Fact Sheet: Law Enforcement Achievements,” press release, May 2011,
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/mexico/310329/16may/Law%20Enforcement%20May%202011%20Final.pdf.
93 ONDCP, 2011 National Drug Control Strategy, July 11, 2011.
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However, a principal challenge in assessing the success of Mérida is separating the results of
those efforts funded via Mérida from those efforts funded through other border security and
bilateral cooperation initiatives. The data available do not allow U.S. officials or analysts to
determine the success that can be directly attributed to Mérida. Changes in seizure data and drug
prices may not be directly related to U.S.-Mexican efforts to combat the DTOs. It is equally
difficult to parcel out the reasons for periodic fluctuations in drug purity in the United States.
President Enrique Peña Nieto has vowed to reduce drug trafficking-related violence. Should a
decrease in drug trafficking-related deaths be used as an indicator of success for the Mérida
Initiative, or is an imminent decline in the violence unrealistic given other countries’ experiences
combating entrenched organized criminal groups? If violence reduction is used as a measure of
success, how should it be weighed against other measures?
In addition to a decline in drug trafficking-related violence, analysts have suggested that success
in pillars two and four would be evidenced by, among other things, increases in popular trust in
the police and courts. Measuring citizens’ perceptions on crime and violence, on the one hand, as
well as governmental effectiveness, on the other, could also prove useful.
Still others, including U.S. officials, have maintained that the success of the Mérida Initiative may
be measured by a broad range of indicators that show increased bilateral cooperation. For
instance, the State Department has cited the arrests and killings of high-profile DTO leaders that
have been made since late 2009 as examples of the results of increased bilateral law enforcement
cooperation. Another example of Mérida success—in the form of bilateral cooperation—cited by
the State Department is the high number of extraditions from Mexico to the United States.
Figure 2. Individuals Extradited from Mexico to the United States
1995–2011
120
107
s
95
94
n 100
93
83
itio
80
trad
63
x
60
f E
o
41
er
40
31 34
b
25
m
u
20
13 13
17
12 14 12
N
4
0
95
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
08
09
10
11
19
1996 1997 19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
2007 20
20
20
20

Source: 1995—2006 data from U.S. Embassy of Mexico, U.S. - Mexico at a Glance: Law Enforcement at a Glance,
http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/eng/eataglance_law.html. Data for 2007—2008 from the Trans-Border
Institute, Justice in Mexico, News Report January 2009, January 2009, Data for 2009 from the U.S. Department of
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State, “United States - Mexico Security Partnership: Progress and Impact,” press release, May 19, 2010. 2010 and
2011 figures from the U.S. Department of Justice.
As illustrated in Figure 2, however, these extraditions may have been more a reflection of the
Calderón government’s commitment to combating the DTOs than of Mérida successes.
Extraditions began to increase before the Mérida Initiative was authorized in October 2007 and
before the first funds obligated for equipment and training were realized in Mexico.
Dealing with Drug Production in Mexico
Drug eradication and alternative development programs have not been a focus of the Mérida
Initiative even though Mexico is a major producer of cannabis (marijuana), opium poppy (used to
produce heroin), and methamphetamine. According to U.S. government estimates, marijuana and
opium poppy cultivation in rural Mexico expanded significantly in 2009-2010, before declining
in 2011 due to drought conditions in crop-growing regions and slight increases in eradication. At
the same time, despite Mexican government import restrictions on precursor chemicals and
efforts to seize precursor chemicals and dismantle clandestine labs, the production of
methamphetamine appears to have continued at high levels.
The Mexican government has engaged its military in drug crop eradication efforts since the
1930s, but personnel constraints have inhibited recent eradication efforts. Indeed, increases in
drug production have occurred as the government assigned more military forces to public security
functions, including anti-DTO operations, than to drug crop eradication efforts. Should Mexicans
become increasingly wary of the government’s strategy of using the military to perform police
functions, there may be calls for the troops to return to more traditional antidrug functions.
Similarly, if drug production in Mexico further expands, particularly production of the potent and
dangerous “black tar” variety of heroin, U.S. policy makers may decide to direct some Mérida
assistance to support eradication efforts in Mexico.
The Mexican government has not traditionally provided support for alternative development even
though many drug-producing regions of the country are impoverished rural areas where few licit
employment opportunities exist. Alternative development programs have traditionally sought to
provide positive incentives for farmers to abandon drug crop cultivation in lieu of farming other
crops, but may be designed more broadly to assist any individuals who collaborate with DTOs out
of economic necessity. In Colombia, studies have found that the combination of jointly
implemented eradication, alternative development, and interdiction is more effective than the
independent application of any one of these three strategies.94 Despite those findings, alternative
development often takes years to show results and requires a long-term commitment to promoting
rural development, two factors which may lessen its appeal as a policy tool for Mexico.

94 Vanda Felbab-Brown, Joel M. Jutkowitz, Sergio Rivas, et al. Assessment of the Implementation of the United States
Government’s Support for Plan Colombia’s Illicit Crop Reduction Components, report produced for review by the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), April 17, 2009.
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Human Rights Concerns and Conditions on Mérida
Initiative Funding
There have been ongoing concerns about the human rights records of Mexico’s military and
police. For the past several years, State Department’s human rights reports covering Mexico have
cited credible reports of police involvement in extrajudicial killings, kidnappings for ransom, and
torture.95 There has also been increasing concern that the Mexican military, which is less
accountable to civilian authorities than the police, is committing more human rights abuses since
it is has been tasked with carrying out public security functions. A November 2011 Human Rights
Watch (HRW) report maintains that cases of torture, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial
killings have increased significantly in states where federal authorities (police and military) have
been deployed to fight organized crime.96 According to Mexico’s Human Rights Commission
(Commisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos or CNDH), complaints of human rights abuses by
Mexico’s Department of Defense (SEDENA) increased from 182 in 2006 to a peak of 1,800 in
2009 before falling to 1,626 in 2011.97 Complaints of abuses against the Secretariat of the Navy
(SEMAR) increased by 150% from 2010 to 2011 as its forces became more heavily involved in
anti-DTO efforts.98 While troubling, only a small percentage of those allegations have resulted in
the CNDH issuing recommendations for corrective action to SEDENA and SEMAR, which those
agencies say they have largely accepted and acted upon.99
In addition to expressing concerns about current abuses, Mexican and international human rights
groups have criticized the Mexican government for failing to hold military and police officials
accountable for past abuses. They fault the government for not taking further steps to comply
with rulings by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) and decisions by Mexico’s
Supreme Court affirming that cases of military abuses against civilians should be tried in civilian
courts. The Calderón government transferred a few dozen cases to civilian jurisdiction; the Peña
Nieto government has pledged to transfer all such cases to the civilian justice system.100
In 2008, Congress debated whether human rights conditions should be placed on Mérida
assistance beyond the requirements in Section 620J of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961.
That section was re-designated as Section 620M and amended by the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-74). It states that an individual or unit of a foreign country’s
security forces is prohibited from receiving assistance if the Secretary of State receives “credible
evidence” that an individual or unit has committed “a gross violation of human rights.”

95 Country Report: Mexico, 2012.
96 Human Rights Watch, Neither Rights nor Security: Killings, Torture, and Disappearances in Mexico’s “War on
Drugs,” November 2011, available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico1111webwcover_0.pdf.
Hereinafter HRW, November 2011.
97 The Trans-Border Institute found that the number of abuses by SEDENA forces that have been investigated and
documented by CNDH has also declined since 2008-2009, particularly in areas where large-scale deployments have
been scaled back. Catherine Daly, Kimberly Heinle, and David A. Shirk, Armed with Impunity: Curbing Military
Human Rights Abuses in Mexico, Trans-Border Institute, 2012, available at:
http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/12_07_31_armed-with-impunity.pdf, P. 21.
98 Benito Jiménez, “Acumula Marina Quejas por Abusos,” Reforma, March 5, 2012.
99 In 2011, for example, the 1,695 complaints filed with CNDH against SEDENA resulted in 25 recommendations.
100 For background, see: Maureen Meyer, Recent Developments on the Use of Military Jurisdiction in Mexico, WOLA,
January 31, 2012. CRS interview with Mexican Embassy officials, June 4, 2013.
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The FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252), which provided the first tranche of
Mérida funding, had less stringent human rights conditions than had been proposed earlier,
largely due to Mexico’s concerns that some of the conditions would violate its national
sovereignty. The conditions required that 15% of INCLE and Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
assistance be withheld until the Secretary of State reports in writing that Mexico is taking action
in four human rights areas:
1. improving transparency and accountability of federal police forces;
2. establishing a mechanism for regular consultations among relevant Mexican
government authorities, Mexican human rights organizations, and other relevant
Mexican civil society organizations, to make consultations concerning
implementation of the Mérida Initiative in accordance with Mexican and
international law;
3. ensuring that civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities are investigating and
prosecuting, in accordance with Mexican and international law, members of the
federal police and military forces who have been credibly alleged to have
committed violations of human rights, and the federal police and military forces
are fully cooperating with the investigations; and
4. enforcing the prohibition, in accordance with Mexican and international law, on
the use of testimony obtained through torture or other ill-treatment.
Similar human rights conditions were included in FY2009-FY2011 appropriations measures that
funded the Mérida Initiative.101 However, the first two conditions are not included in the 15%
withholding requirement in the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-74). The
FY2013 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-6) contained the same
withholding requirement as P.L. 112-74.
Thus far, the State Department has submitted three 15% progress reports on Mexico to
congressional appropriators (in August 2009, September 2010, and August 2012) that have met
the statutory requirements for FY2008-FY2013 Mérida funds that had been on hold to be
released. Nevertheless, the State Department has twice elected to hold back some funding
pending further progress in key areas of concern. In the September 2010 report, for example, the
State Department elected to hold back $26 million in FY2010 supplemental funds as a matter of
policy until further progress was made in the areas of transparency and combating impunity.102
Those funds were not obligated until the fall of 2011.

101 In P.L. 110-252, the human rights conditions applied to 15% of the funding for INCLE and FMF, or approximately
$57 million dollars. In the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8), the 15% conditions applied all of the
funding accounts but excluded amounts for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption and rule of law
activities, which were earmarked at not less than $75 million. The total aid withheld was $33.4 million. In the FY2009
Supplemental (P.L. 111-32), the conditions effectively only applied to the $160 million in the INCLE account, or
roughly $24 million, because the $260 million in FMF funds was excluded from the 15% withholding requirement. In
the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), the 15% withholding applied to all of the accounts but
excluded assistance for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption and rule of law activities. The total aid
withheld was some $12 million. In the FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-212), the conditions
applied to 15% of the INCLE appropriated or roughly $26 million. The same conditions that were included in P.L. 111-
117 applied to assistance provided in the FY2011 Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act
(P.L. 112-10). According to the State Department, the FY2011 funds on hold totaled approximately $3.5 million. Email
from State Department official, January 24, 2012.
102 In the September 2010 15% report, the State Department urged the Mexican Congress to approve pending
(continued...)
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In the August 2012 report, the State Department again decided to hold back all of the FY2012
funding that would have been subject to the conditions (roughly $18 million) as a matter of policy
until it can work with Mexican authorities to determine steps to address key human rights
challenges. Those include improving the ability of Mexico’s civilian institutions to investigate
and prosecute cases of human rights abuses; enhancing enforcement of prohibitions against
torture and other mistreatment; and strengthening protection for human rights defenders.103
The State Department has established a high-level human rights dialogue with Mexico, provided
human rights training for Mexican security forces (at least eight hours for every course offered),
and implemented a number of human rights-related programs. For example, USAID has provided
$1.3 million to the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to help civil society
groups monitor abuses by security forces and to improve how security agencies respond to those
abuses. In 2011, USAID launched a $5 million program being implemented by Freedom House to
improve protections for Mexican journalists and human rights defenders. Human rights groups
have acknowledged these discrete efforts, but have criticized the U.S. government more broadly
for failing to enforce Mérida’s human rights restrictions and for backing Mexico’s military-led
security strategy.
Congress may choose to augment Mérida Initiative funding for human rights programs, such as
ongoing human rights training programs for military and police, or newer efforts, such as support
for human rights organizations through ESF funds. Human rights conditions in Mexico, as well as
compliance with conditions on Mérida assistance, are also likely to continue to be important
oversight issues as well. Policy makers may closely follow how the Peña Nieto moves to punish
past human rights abuses and prevent new abuses from occurring.
Role of the U.S. Department Of Defense in Mexico
In contrast to Plan Colombia, the Mérida Initiative does not include an active U.S. military
presence in Mexico, largely due to Mexican concerns about national sovereignty stemming from
past conflicts with the United States. The Department of Defense (DOD) did not play a primary
role in designing the Mérida Initiative and is not providing assistance through Mérida aid
accounts. However, DOD administers assistance provided through the FMF account, which was
part of Mérida until FY2012. As an implementing agency, DOD’s role largely involved
overseeing the procurement and delivery of Mérida equipment for Mexican security forces.

(...continued)
legislation that would strengthen the power of the CNDH and the Calderón government to submit legislation to reform
the Military Justice Code so that military officials accused of human rights crimes against civilians would be tried in
civilian courts. The Mexican Congress approved a series of reforms that elevate human rights conditions in
international treaties signed by Mexico to the level of the constitution and strengthen the power of the CNDH and state-
level human rights commissions. The reforms were promulgated in June 2011. A reform of Article 57 of the military
justice code was submitted by President Calderón in October 2010 mandating that at least certain human rights
violations be investigated and prosecuted in civilian courts. A more comprehensive proposal that required that all cases
of alleged military human rights violations be transferred to the civilian justice system was approved by the Mexican
Senate’s Justice Commission in April 2012; however, the bill was subsequently blocked from coming to a vote. In
September 2012, another proposal to reform Article 57 was presented in the Mexican Senate as it began its first period
of sessions with its new members.
103 U.S. Department of State, Mexico- Merida Initiative Report (“15 Percent”Report), August 30, 2012.
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Despite its limited role in the Mérida Initiative, DOD assistance to Mexico has been increasing,
as has military cooperation between the two countries and Mexican participation in DOD training
programs in the United States. These trends that have accelerated since then-President Calderón
deployed the military to confront the DTOs.104 For example, according to press reports, in
response to a request from the Mexican government, DOD has begun sending unmanned aerial
vehicles into Mexico to gather intelligence on criminal organizations.105 In December 2011, DOD
and DHS announced that the mission for National Guard troops on the U.S.-Mexico border would
shift from serving in law enforcement support roles to providing aerial surveillance support for
the Border Patrol. That mission is continuing in 2013.106
Apart from the Mérida Initiative, DOD has its own legislative authorities to provide certain
counterdrug assistance. DOD programs in Mexico are overseen by the U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM), which is located at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado. DOD can provide
counterdrug assistance under guidelines outlined in Section 1004 of P.L. 101-510, as amended
through FY2014, and can provide additional assistance to certain countries as provided for in
Section 1033 of P.L. 105-85, as amended through FY2013. DOD counternarcotics support to
Mexico totaled roughly $34.2 million in FY2009, $89.7 million in FY2010, and $84.7 million in
FY2011. DOD is using some $50 million in FY2011 per Section 1033 of P.L. 105-85 funds to
improve security along the Mexico-Guatemala-Belize border. Total DOD support to Mexico in
stood at $83.5 million in FY2012, but may decline to $57.3 million this fiscal year.107
While DOD is unlikely to provide Mexico with the same amount of funds it has provided to
Colombia, the same variety of programs may be funded. Future training programs may focus on
how to work with police forces to conduct intelligence-driven operations and investigations. The
future of the U.S.-Mexican defense relationship may depend on what role President Peña Nieto
envisions for the armed forces to play in Mexico’s future counterdrug and anticrime efforts.
Since DOD counterdrug assistance is obligated out of global accounts and the agency is not
required to submit country-specific requests to Congress for its programs, obtaining recent data
on DOD programs and plans for Mexico may be difficult. Regardless, policy makers may want to
receive periodic briefings on those efforts in order to guarantee that current and future DOD
programs are being adequately coordinated with Mérida Initiative efforts. They may also want to
ensure that DOD-funded programs are not inadvertently reinforcing the militarization of public
security in Mexico. Experts have urged the United States “not to focus too much on military

104 Roderic Ai Camp, Armed Forces and Drugs: Public Perceptions and Institutional Challenges, Woodrow Wilson
Center, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Collaboration, May 2010; Richard D. Downie, “Critical
Decisions in Mexico: the Future of U.S./Mexican Defense Relations,” Strategic Issues in U.S.-Latin American
Relations, vol. 1, no. 1 (July 2011).
105 Ginger Thompson and Mark Mazzetti, “U.S. Drones Fly Deep in Mexico to Fight Drugs,” New York Times, March
16, 2011.
106 DHS, "DHS and DOD Announce Continued Partnership in Strengthening Southwest Border Security," press
release, December 20, 2011. “Guard Troops' Border Mission Extended,” Arizona Star, December 6, 2012.
107 FY2009-FY2010 figures are from a DOD response to CRS request, March 21, 2011. FY2011 figures are from a
DOD response to CRS request, February 17, 2012. FY2012-FY2013 figures are from a DOD response to a CRS
request, June 6, 2013.These data reflect non-budget quality estimates of DOD counternarcotics support provided or
efforts in these nations/regions; DOD does not budget counternarcotics programs by regions/countries, but by program.
These figures reflect both “direct” support to those countries (e.g., training, equipment, information sharing,
infrastructure and other categories) and “indirect” support via DOD and other U.S. Government counterdrug operations
with regard to those countries (e.g., transportation, communications, intelligence analysis, radar, air and maritime
patrol, liaison personnel, and other categories).
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assistance and neglect other, more effective forms of aid … [such as assistance for] the
development, training, and professionalization of Mexico’s law enforcement officers.”108
Balancing Assistance to Mexico with Support for Southwest
Border Initiatives
The Mérida Initiative was designed to complement domestic efforts to combat drug demand, drug
trafficking, weapons smuggling, and money laundering. These domestic counter-drug initiatives
are funded through regular and supplemental appropriations for a variety of U.S. domestic
agencies. As the strategy underpinning the Mérida Initiative has expanded to include efforts to
build a more modern border (pillar three) and to strengthen border communities (pillar four),
policy makers may consider how best to balance the amount of funding provided to Mexico with
support for related domestic initiatives.109
Regarding support for law enforcement efforts, some would argue that there needs to be more
federal support for states and localities on the U.S. side of the border that are dealing with crime
and violence originating in Mexico. Of those who endorse that point of view, some are
encouraged that the Obama Administration has increased manpower and technology along the
border, whereas others maintain that the Administration’s efforts have been insufficient to secure
the border.110 In contrast, some maintain that it is impossible to combat transnational criminal
enterprises by solely focused on the U.S. side of the border, and that domestic programs must be
accompanied by continued efforts to build the capacity of Mexican law enforcement officials.
They maintain that if recent U.S. efforts are perceived as an attempt to “militarize” the border,
they may damage U.S.-Mexican relations and hinder bilateral security cooperation efforts.
Mexican officials from across the political spectrum have expressed concerns about the
construction of border fencing and the effects of border enforcement on migrant deaths.111
With respect to pillar four of the updated strategy, as previously mentioned, Mexico and the
United States are supporting programs to strengthen communities in Ciudad Juárez, Monterrey,
and Tijuana. In targeting those communities most affected by the violence, greater efforts will
necessarily be placed on community-building in Ciudad Juárez and Tijuana than on their sister
cities in the United States. However, if the U.S. government provides aid to these communities in
Mexico, some may argue that there should also be federal support for the adjacent U.S. border
cities. For example, initiatives aimed at providing youth with education, employment, and social
outlets might reduce the allure of joining a DTO or local gang. Some may contend that increasing
these services on the U.S. side of the border as well as the Mexican side could be beneficial.

108 Robert C. Bonner, “The New Cocaine Cowboys: How to Defeat Mexico’s Drug Cartels,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 89,
no. 4 (July/August 2010).
109 The SWBCS, 2011 includes a new chapter on U.S. efforts to promote strong communities by, in part, increasing
crime prevention efforts and drug prevention and treatment programs in U.S. border communities.
110 For a fuller discussion of U.S. border enforcement efforts, see: CRS Report R42138, Border Security: Immigration
Enforcement Between Ports of Entry, by Marc R. Rosenblum.
111 See, for example, Marc R. Rosenblum, Obstacles and Opportunities for Regional Cooperation: the U.S.-Mexico
Case, Migration Policy Institute, April 2011.
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Integrating Counterdrug Programs in the Western Hemisphere
U.S. State Department-funded counterdrug assistance programs in the Western Hemisphere are
currently in transition. Counterdrug assistance to Colombia and the Andean region is in decline
after record assistance levels that began with U.S. support for Plan Colombia in FY2000 and
peaked in the mid-2000s. Antidrug aid to Mexico increased dramatically in FY2008-FY2010 as a
result of the Mérida Initiative, but is also now gradually being reduced. Conversely, funding for
Central America is increasing as a result of the Central American Regional Security Initiative
(CARSI) 112 and support for the Caribbean increased in FY2010 and has remained relatively
stable due to the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).
The Obama Administration has taken steps to coordinate the aforementioned country and regional
antidrug programs and to ensure that U.S.-funded efforts complement the efforts of partner
governments and other donors. The Administration has appointed a coordinator within the State
Department (the Principal Deputy Assistance Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs)
to oversee the planning and implementation of the aforementioned security assistance packages.
The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the National Security Council conduct
annual reviews of counterdrug efforts in the Americas. ONDCP and the State Department use a
high-level committee process to oversee programming and planning. The Administration is
encouraging countries that have received U.S. assistance in the past—particularly Colombia—to
share technical expertise with other countries in the region, a strategy that analysts have
recommended. One area in which closer cooperation between the United States, partner
governments, and other donors will likely be necessary is in efforts to better secure the porous
Mexico-Guatemala and Mexico-Belize borders.
Outlook
Mexico has experienced a transition from a PAN Administration focused on combating organized
crime to a PRI government focused on bolstering competitiveness by enacting structural reforms.
As a result, security issues may take a back seat to economic issues on the bilateral agenda for the
first time since September 2001. On May 2, 2013, President Obama traveled to Mexico for a trip
focused on enhancing economic cooperation and expanding educational exchanges between the
two countries.113 When asked about changes in Mexico’s security strategy, President Obama said
“it is up to the Mexican people to determine their security structures and how [they will engage]
with other nations, including the United States.”114 He reiterated his Administration’s support for
Mexico’s efforts to reduce violence and criminality, including continued U.S. assistance.
When examining the future of the Mérida Initiative, Congress may first consider defining the
desired end state of the Mérida Initiative. Congress may then seek to ensure that those who are
implementing the Initiative have developed adequate metrics to measure progress, and that those
metrics are shared with Congress for review and oversight. Given the level of progress that has

112 CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by
Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.
113 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “White House Fact Sheet on U.S.-Mexico Partnership,” Press
Release, May 2, 2013.
114 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama and President Peña Nieto of Mexico
in a Joint Press Conference,” Press Release, May 2, 2013.
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been made thus far, the current Mérida strategy may be deemed sufficient or insufficient. If it is
judged insufficient, Congress may consider how it might be improved. When considering future
assistance for the Mérida Initiative, Congress may compare how much funding programs in
Mexico, an upper middle income country, are receiving from the Peña Nieto government, and
whether U.S. funding is complementing or duplicating Mexican efforts.
As President Peña Nieto implements his security strategy, the 113th Congress may wish to
examine how the Mexican government’s priorities align with U.S. interests. Congressional
approval will be needed should the State Department seek to shift funding to better align with
Mexico’s new priorities. Should disagreements occur between Mexican and U.S. priorities,
Congress may weigh in on how those disagreements should be resolved. If the Peña Nieto
Administration no longer has the same goals as the United States or Congress sees a significant
change in Mexican cooperation, Congress may consider reevaluating some types of Mérida
Initiative funding.
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Appendix A. U.S. Assistance to Mexico
Table A-1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico by Account, FY2007-FY2014
(U.S. $ millions)
FY2013
FY2014
Account FY2007 FY2008a FY2009b FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
(req.)
(req.)
INCLE
36.7 242.1
454.0c 365.0d 117.0 248.5 199.0 148.1
ESF
11.4 34.7
15.0 15.0 18.0 33.3 35.0 35.0
FMF
0.0 116.5
299.0e 5.3 8.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
IMET
0.1 0.4
0.8
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.4
NADR
1.3 1.4 3.9
3.9 5.7 5.4 4.0 3.9
GHCSf
3.7 2.7
2.9
3.5 3.5 1.0 0.0 0.0
DA
12.3 8.2
11.2
10.0 25.0
33.4
23.0
10.0
TOTAL 65.4 405.9
786.8

403.7 178.2
329.6
269.5
205.4
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2008-FY2014.
Notes: GHCS=Global Health and Child Survival; DA=Development Assistance; ESF=Economic Support Fund;
FMF=Foreign Military Financing; IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE=International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism and Related Programs.
Funds are accounted for in the fiscal year for which they were appropriated as noted below:
a. FY2008 assistance includes funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252).
b. FY2009 assistance includes FY2009 bridge funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L.
110-252) and funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32).
c. $94 million provided under P.L. 111-32 and counted here as part of FY2009 funding was considered by
appropriators “forward funding” intended to address in advance a portion of the FY2010 request.
d. $175 million provided in the FY2010 supplemental (P.L. 111-212) and counted here as FY2010 funding was
considered by appropriators as “forward funding” intended to address in advance a portion of the FY2011
request.
e. $260 million provided under a FY2009 supplemental (P.L. 111-32) and counted here as FY2009 funding was
considered by appropriators “forward funding” intended to address in advance a portion of the FY2010
request.
f.
Prior to FY2008, the Global Health and Child Survival account was known as Child Survival and Health.
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Appendix B. U.S. Domestic Efforts to Complement
the Mérida Initiative
Drug Demand
Drug demand in the United States fuels a multi-billion dollar illicit industry. In 2011, about 22.5
million individuals were current (past month) illegal drug users, representing 8.7% of individuals
aged 12 and older.115 Administration officials and experts alike have acknowledged that U.S.
domestic demand for illegal drugs is a significant factor driving the global drug trade, including
the drug trafficking-related crime and violence that is occurring in Mexico and other source and
transit countries.116
In April 2013, the Administration released its 2013 National Drug Control Strategy, which
continues to emphasize the need to reduce U.S. drug demand. The Strategy furthers the goal of
cutting drug use among youth by 15% by 2015.117 Drug policy experts have praised the
Administration’s focus on reducing consumption, but criticized the Administration for requesting
relatively modest budget increases in funding for treatment programs.118 Some have questioned
whether the federal government allocates enough of the drug budget to adequately address the
demand side; the FY2013 drug budget continues to spend a majority of funds on supply reduction
programs including drug crop eradication in source countries, interdiction, and domestic law
enforcement efforts.119 In addition to federal efforts, however, many state, local, and nonprofit
agencies also channel funds toward demand reduction.
Firearms Trafficking120
Illegal firearms trafficking from the United States has been cited as a significant factor in the drug
trafficking-related violence in Mexico. To address this issue, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) stepped up enforcement of domestic gun control laws in the four
Southwest border states under an agency-wide program known as “Project Gunrunner.” ATF has

115 See the National Survey on Drug Use and Health, an annual survey of approximately 67,500 people, including
residents of households, non-institutionalized group quarters, and civilians living on military bases. The survey is
administered by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services and is available at http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k11Results/NSDUHresults2011.htm.
116 See, for example, testimony of R. Gil Kerlikowske, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, before the
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs, Transnational Drug Enterprises (Part II): U.S. Government Perspectives on the Threat to Global
Stability and U.S. National Security, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., March 30, 2010.
117 That strategy is available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/2013-national-drug-control-strategy . For more
information on the National Drug Control Strategy and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), see CRS
Report R41535, Reauthorizing the Office of National Drug Control Policy: Issues for Consideration, by Lisa N. Sacco
and Kristin Finklea.
118 See, for example, Testimony of John T. Carnevale, President, Carnevale Associates, before the House Oversight and
Government Reform Subcommitee on Domestic Policy, April 14, 2010.
119 Office of National Drug Control Policy, FY2013 Budget and Performance Summary, April 2012.
120 For background, see CRS Report R40733, Gun Trafficking and the Southwest Border, by Vivian S. Chu and
William J. Krouse as well as CRS Report RL32842, Gun Control Legislation, by William J. Krouse.
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also trained Mexican law enforcement officials to use its electronic tracing (eTrace) program,
through which investigators are sometimes able to trace the commercial trail and origin of
recovered firearms. In the past, ATF has periodically released data on firearms traces performed
for Mexican authorities. Although substantive methodological limitations preclude using trace
data as a proxy for the larger population of “crime guns” in Mexico or the United States, trace
data have proven to be a useful indicator of trafficking trends and patterns. In June 2009, GAO
recommended to the Attorney General that he should direct ATF to update regularly its reporting
on aggregate firearms trace data and trends.121 For the last two years, however, ATF has only
released limited and arguably selected amounts of trace data.
In February 2011, ATF came under intense congressional scrutiny for a Phoenix, AZ-based
Project Gunrunner investigation known as Operation Fast and Furious, when ATF whistleblowers
reported that suspected straw purchasers122 had been allowed to acquire relatively large quantities
of firearms as part of long-term gun trafficking investigations.123 Some of these firearms are
alleged to have “walked,” or been trafficked to gunrunners and other criminals, before ATF
moved to arrest the suspects and seize all of their contraband firearms. Two of those firearms
were reportedly found at the scene of a shootout near the U.S.-Mexico border where U.S. Border
Patrol Agent Brian Terry was shot to death.124 Questions have also been raised about whether a
firearm that was reportedly used to murder ICE Special Agent Jamie Zapata and wound Special
Agent Victor Avila in Mexico on February 15, 2011, was initially trafficked by a subject of a
Houston, TX-based Project Gunrunner investigation.125 While it remains an open question
whether ATF or other federal agents were in a position to interdict the firearms used in these
deadly attacks before they were smuggled into Mexico,126 neither DOJ nor ATF informed their
Mexican counterparts about these investigations and the possibility that some of these firearms
could be reaching Mexico.127
Legislators in both the United States and Mexico have voiced ongoing concerns about Operation
Fast and Furious.128 Repeated congressional inquiries prompted U.S. Attorney General Eric
Holder to direct his Inspector General to conduct a third evaluation of Project Gunrunner, which
was delivered to Congress in September 2012.129 In addition, in July 2011, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) approved an ATF multiple rifle sales reporting requirement for a

121 GAO, Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face Planning and Coordination
Challenges, GAO-09-709, June 2009, p. 59.
122 A “straw purchase” occurs when an individual poses as the actual transferee, but he is actually acquiring the firearm
for another person. In effect, he serves as an illegal middleman. Straw purchases can be prosecuted under two
provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968, as amended (18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C. §924(a)(1)(A)).
123 James v. Grimaldi and Sari Horwitz, “ATF Probe Strategy Is Questioned,” Washington Post, February 2, 2011.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Operation Fast and Furious was launched in November 2009. It was approved as an Organized Crime and Drug
Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) investigation in February 2010. As an OCDETF investigation, it was then directed
largely by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Phoenix. While ICE and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents were also part
of this investigation, so far their role in this operation has not generated public or congressional scrutiny.
127 Richard A. Serrano, “U.S. Embassy Kept in Dark as Guns Flooded Mexico,” Salt Lake Tribune, July 25, 2011.
128 Dennis Wagner, “Gun Shop Told ATF Sting Was Perilous,” Arizona Republic, April 15, 2011, p. A1.
129 United States Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Statement of Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector
General, U.S. Department of Justice before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Concerning
Report by the Office of the Inspector General on the Review of ATF’s Operation Fast and Furious and Related Matters,
September 20, 2012, http://www.justice.gov/oig/testimony/t1220.pdf.
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three-year period.130 Under this reporting requirement, federally licensed gun dealers in
Southwest border states are required to report to ATF whenever they make multiple sales or other
dispositions of more than one rifle within five consecutive business days to an unlicensed
person.131
Bulk Cash Smuggling/Money Laundering
It is estimated that between $19 billion and $29 billion in illicit proceeds flow from the United
States to drug trafficking organizations and other organized criminal groups in Mexico each
year.132 Much of the money is generated from the illegal sale of drugs in the United States and is
laundered to Mexico through mechanisms such as bulk cash smuggling. While bulk cash
smuggling has been a prominent means by which criminals move illegal profits from the United
States into Mexico, they have also turned to stored value cards to move money. With these cards,
criminals are able to avoid the reporting requirement under which they would have to declare any
amount over $10,000 in cash moving across the border. Current federal regulations regarding
international transportation only apply to monetary instruments as defined under the Bank
Secrecy Act.133 Of note, stored value cards are not considered monetary instruments under current
law.
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)134 has issued a final rule, defining “stored
value” as “prepaid access” and implementing regulations regarding the recordkeeping and
suspicious activity reporting requirements for prepaid access products and services.135 This rule
does not, however, directly address whether stored value or prepaid access cards would be subject
to current regulations regarding the international transportation of monetary instruments. A
separate proposed rule would amend the definition of “monetary instrument,” for the purposes of
BSA international monetary transport regulations, to include prepaid access devices.136 Even if
FinCEN were to issue a final rule and implement regulations requiring individuals leaving the
United States to declare stored value, the GAO has identified several challenges that would

130 Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Reviews Completed in the Last
30 Days, DOJ-ATF, Report of Multiple Sale or Other Disposition of Certain Semi-Automatic Rifles, OMB Control
Number: 1140-0100.
131 This reporting requirement is limited to firearms that are (1) semiautomatic, (2) chambered for ammunition of
greater than .22 caliber, and (3) capable of accepting a detachable magazine.
132 DHS, United States-Mexico Bi-National Criminal Proceeds Study, June 2010.
133 31 U.S.C. §5312 defines a monetary instrument as “(A) United States coins and currency; (B) as the Secretary may
prescribe by regulation, coins and currency of a foreign country, travelers’ checks, bearer negotiable instruments,
bearer investment securities, bearer securities, stock on which title is passed on delivery, and similar material; and
(C) as the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide by regulation for purposes of sections 5316 and 5331 , checks, drafts,
notes, money orders, and other similar instruments which are drawn on or by a foreign financial institution and are not
in bearer form.”
134 FinCEN, under the Department of the Treasury, administers the BSA and the nation’s financial intelligence unit.
FinCEN also supports law enforcement, intelligence, and regulatory agencies by analyzing and sharing financial
intelligence information. For more information, see http://www.fincen.gov/about_fincen/wwd/strategic.html.
135 Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, “Bank Secrecy Act Regulations—Definitions
and Other Regulations Relating to Prepaid Access,” 76, No. 146 Federal Register 45403-45420, July 29, 2011.
136 Department of the Treasury, "Bank Secrecy Act Regulations Definition of “Monetary Instrument," 76 Federal
Register 64049, October 17, 2011. Entities such as the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control have urged the
Administration to finalize this rule. See, for instance, Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, The Buck Stops
Here: Improving U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Practices, April 2013.
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remain.137 These challenges relate to law enforcement’s ability to detect the actual cards and to
differentiate legitimate from illegitimate stored value on cards; travelers’ abilities to remember
the amount of stored value on any given card; and law enforcement’s ability to determine where
illegitimate stored value is physically held and subsequently freeze and seize the assets.
Aside from bulk cash smuggling and stored-value cards, Mexican traffickers move and launder
money by using digital currency accounts, e-businesses that facilitate money transfers via the
Internet, online role-playing games or virtual worlds that enable the exchange of game-based
currencies for real currency, and mobile banking wherein traffickers have remote access—via cell
phones—to bank and credit card accounts as well as prepaid cards.138 The proceeds may then be
used by DTOs and other criminal groups to acquire weapons in the United States and to corrupt
law enforcement and other public officials.
Countering financial crimes—including money laundering and bulk cash smuggling—is one
effort outlined by the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy (SWBCS).139 To curb
the southbound flow of money from the sale of illicit drugs in the United States, the SWBCS
includes several goals: stemming the flow of southbound bulk cash smuggling, prosecuting the
illegal use of MSBs and electronic payment devices, increasing targeted financial sanctions,
enhancing multilateral/bi-national collaboration, and empirically assessing the money laundering
threat.140
In 2005, ICE and CBP launched a program known as “Operation Firewall,” which increased
operations against bulk cash smuggling in the U.S.-Mexico border region. This operation was re-
initiated in January 2010, and between January 2010 and April 2011, Operation Firewall resulted
in eight arrests and the seizure of $6 million in U.S. currency.141 U.S. efforts against money
laundering and bulk cash smuggling are increasingly moving beyond the federal level as well, as
experts have recommended.142 In December 2009, for example, ICE opened a bulk cash
smuggling center to assist U.S. federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies track and
disrupt illicit funding flows. Still, the GAO has identified several ways in which CBP outbound
inspections and other U.S. efforts against bulk cash smuggling, particularly those aimed at
combating the use of stored value cards, might be improved.143
The United States and Mexico have created a Bilateral Money Laundering Working Group to
coordinate the investigation and prosecution of money laundering and bulk cash smuggling. A

137 GAO, Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in the Federal Government’s Effort to Stem Cross Border
Smuggling, October 2010, pp. 48–49.
138 Douglas Farah, Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling: Challenges for the Merida Initiative, Woodrow
Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, May 2010, p. 161,
available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Farah.pdf.
139 ONDCP, National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, 2011, available at
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/swb_counternarcotics_strategy11/
swb_counternarcotics_strategy11.pdf. Herein after, SWBCS, 2011. The SWBCS is implemented by the Director of
National Drug Control Policy, in conjunction with the DHS Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement as well as the DOJ
Office of the Deputy Attorney General.
140 Ibid., pp. 31-36.
141 U.S. Embassy, “Fact Sheet: Combating Money Laundering,” April 2011.
142 Farah, op. cit.
143 GAO, Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in the Federal Government’s Effort to Stem Cross Border
Smuggling, GAO-11-73, October 2010, available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-73.
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recent Bi-national Criminal Proceeds Study revealed that some of the major points along the
Southwest border where bulk cash is smuggled include San Ysidro, CA; Nogales, AZ; and
Laredo, McAllen, and Brownsville, TX.144 Information provided from studies such as these may
help inform policy makers and federal law enforcement personnel and assist in their decisions
regarding where to direct future efforts against money laundering.

144 DHS, United States - Mexico Bi-National Criminal Proceeds Study, 2010.
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Appendix C. Selected U.S.—Mexican Law
Enforcement Partnerships
Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST)
The BEST Initiative is a multi-agency initiative, led by Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), wherein task forces seek to identify,
disrupt, and dismantle criminal organizations posing significant threats to border security—both
along the Southwest border with Mexico as well as along the Northern border with Canada.145
Through the BEST Initiative, ICE partners with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP);
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); U.S. Coast Guard; and U.S.
Attorneys’ Offices; as well as local, state, and international law enforcement agencies. In
particular, the Mexican Secretariat for Public Security (SSP) or federal police is a partner along
the Southwest border. There are currently 21 BEST teams around the country, 12 of which are
along the Southwest border and one in Mexico City. BEST is the umbrella for the Vetted Arms
Trafficking Group, the Weapons Virtual Task Force, and the ICE Border Liaison Program.
Operation Against Smugglers (and Traffickers) Initiative on Safety
and Security (OASISS)
CBP and the Mexican government have partnered through OASISS, a bi-lateral program aimed at
enhancing both countries’ abilities to prosecute alien smugglers and human traffickers along the
Southwest border.146 Through OASISS, the Mexican government is able to prosecute alien
smugglers apprehended in the United States. From the time of its inception in August 2005
through May 2010, OASISS generated 2,031 cases.147 This program is supported by the Border
Patrol International Liaison Unit, which is responsible for establishing and maintaining working
relationships with foreign counterparts in order to enhance border security.
Illegal Drug Program (IDP)
The Illegal Drug Program (IDP) is an agreement between ICE and the Mexican Attorney
General’s Office (PGR) wherein ICE can transfer cases of Mexican nationals smuggling drugs

145 Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Border Enforcement Security Task
Forces, November 3, 2009, http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/080226best_fact_sheet.htm.
146 See testimony by Audrey Adams, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of International Affairs, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on
International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, U.S. - Mexico Relations, 109th Cong., April 26,
2006.
147 Testimony by Allen Gina, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism, and House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: Next Steps for the Merida
Initiative, 111th Cong., 1st sess., May 27, 2010.
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into the United States to the PGR for prosecution.148 The program was initiated in Nogales, AZ, in
October 2009 and subsequently adopted in El Paso, TX. Under the IDP, the U.S. Attorneys’
Offices review the cases and then transfer them to the PGR rather than to local law enforcement
agencies, as was previously done. The PGR has agreed to accept any drug smuggling case
referred by the U.S. Attorneys, regardless of quality, quantity, or type of illegal drug seized.
Project Gunrunner149
Project Gunrunner is an initiative led by ATF in DOJ. Its goal is to disrupt the illegal flow of guns
from the United States to Mexico. In addition to its domestic objectives, Project Gunrunner also
aims to bolster U.S. and Mexican law enforcement coordination along the border in firearms and
violent crime cases as well as to train U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials to identify
firearms traffickers. Between FY2005 and FY2010, ATF investigations in those border states
have led to the seizure of over 8,700 guns and the indictment of 1,705 defendants, of whom 1,170
were convicted, in federal court.150 Project Gunrunner has recently been criticized, in part, for not
systematically and consistently sharing information with Mexican and U.S. partners as well as for
focusing investigations on gun dealers and straw purchasers over high-level traffickers.151 In
September, 2010, ATF released a new strategy, “Project Gunrunner—A Cartel Focused Strategy,”
that reportedly addresses these issues.152
Electronic Trace Submission System153
ATF maintains a foreign attaché in Mexico City to administer an Electronic Trace Submission
System (ETSS), also known as the eTrace program, for Mexican law enforcement authorities. In
January 2008, ATF announced that e-Trace technology would be deployed to an additional nine
U.S. consulates in Mexico (Mérida, Juarez, Monterrey, Nogales, Hermosillo, Guadalajara,
Tijuana, Matamoros, and Nueva Laredo).154 More recently, ATF has developed and deployed a
Spanish language version of its eTrace program that enables Mexican authorities to submit
firearm trace requests electronically to ATF officials in the United States. From FY2007 through
FY2010, ATF processed 78,194 trace requests for Mexican authorities.155 Most of those requests

148 For more information on the IDP, see U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “ICE, Mexican authorities meet
and agree to prosecution plan for drug smugglers captured at the border: DHS, Government of Mexico announce new
agreement to help curb narcotics smuggling,” press release, April 15, 2010, http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/1004/
100415elpaso.htm.
149 For more information on Project Gunrunner, see CRS Report R41206, The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives (ATF): Budget and Operations for FY2011, by William J. Krouse.
150 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, ATF Congressional Budget
Submission, Fiscal Year 2012, February 2011, p. 5.
151 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of ATF’s Project Gunrunner, I-2011-001,
November 2010, pp. iii-v, http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e1101.pdf.
152 Ibid., p. ix.
153 For more information on the Electronic Trace Submission System, see CRS Report R41206, The Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF): Budget and Operations for FY2011, by William J. Krouse.
154 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Office of Public Affairs, “ATF Expands Efforts to
Combat Illegal Flow of Firearms to Mexico,” January 16, 2008.
155 U.S. Embassy, Mexico City, Fact Sheet: Combating Arms Trafficking, April 2011.
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involved firearms that were either manufactured in or imported into the United States for civilian
markets.156
Mexican American Liaison and Law Enforcement Training
(MALLET)
The FBI created Mexican American Liaison and Law Enforcement Training (MALLET) seminars
in 1988.157 These week-long seminars, hosted at least four times annually in the United States
throughout the four Southwest border states, train Mexican law enforcement officers on various
topics including law enforcement management and investigative techniques. The Mexican law
enforcement officials participating in these trainings come from all levels of government—
federal, state, and municipal. These seminars provide not only training, but opportunities for
building trusted partnerships on both sides of the border. The MALLET seminars are funded
through the FBI’s Office of International Operations.158
Policia Internacional Sonora Arizona (PISA)
The Policia Internacional Sonora Arizona (PISA) is a nonprofit organization that was established
in 1978 and has continued to enhance international law enforcement communication and train
officers in laws and procedures across borders.159 With nearly 500 representatives from various
levels of Mexican and U.S. government, PISA promotes training and mutual assistance to
extradite fugitives and solve crimes from auto thefts to homicides. For example, state and local
law enforcement from Arizona have been involved in providing tactical, SWAT, and money
laundering training to Mexican police.

Author Contact Information

Clare Ribando Seelke
Kristin M. Finklea
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Analyst in Domestic Security
cseelke@crs.loc.gov, 7-5229
kfinklea@crs.loc.gov, 7-6259



156 It is highly probable that most of these firearms were illegally smuggled into Mexico, because the Mexican
government only authorizes a relatively small number of firearms to be imported for civilian markets.
157 For more information, see Federal Bureau of Investigation, On the Border: Training Our Mexican Colleagues, May
11, 2009, http://elpaso.fbi.gov/boader051109.htm.
158 From CRS communication with FBI representative, April 27, 2010.
159 For more information on PISA, see the website at http://www.azpisa.org/.
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