“Fast Track” Legislative Procedures
Governing Congressional Consideration of a
Defense Base Closure and Realignment
(BRAC) Commission Report
Christopher M. Davis
Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process
June 10, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43102
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
“Fast Track” Consideration of a BRAC Commission Report
Summary
In 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005, an independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment
(BRAC) Commission was authorized by law to recommend the disposal of unneeded defense
facilities throughout the United States. Recently, the Department of Defense (DOD) formally
asked Congress to provide it with statutory authority to conduct another round of base closures
and realignments in 2015.
Under the terms of the statutes which authorized these previous BRAC rounds, as well as under
the new authority requested by the DOD for 2015, the BRAC Commission’s recommendations
automatically take effect unless, within a stated period after the recommendations are approved
by the President and submitted to the House and Senate, a joint resolution of disapproval is
enacted rejecting them in their entirety. Congressional consideration of this disapproval resolution
is not governed by the standing rules of the House and Senate, but by special expedited or “fast
track” parliamentary procedures laid out in statute. This report describes these expedited
parliamentary procedures and explains how they differ from the regular legislative processes of
Congress. The report will be updated as needed.
Congressional Research Service
“Fast Track” Consideration of a BRAC Commission Report
Contents
BRAC Recommendations on “Fast Track” ..................................................................................... 1
Features of the BRAC Expedited Parliamentary Procedure ............................................................ 2
Introduction and Referral .......................................................................................................... 2
Text of the Joint Resolution of Disapproval .............................................................................. 2
Committee Action ...................................................................................................................... 2
Calling Up the Joint Resolution on the Floor ............................................................................ 3
Floor Debate .............................................................................................................................. 4
Motions and Amendments ......................................................................................................... 4
Voting ........................................................................................................................................ 4
Automatic Legislative “Hookup” .............................................................................................. 4
Presidential Consideration and Subsequent Action ................................................................... 5
Either Chamber May Alter the Expedited Procedure ...................................................................... 5
Tables
Table 1. Resolutions of Disapproval Introduced Under the Terms of the
Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission Statutes .................................................... 6
Contacts
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................. 7
Congressional Research Service
“Fast Track” Consideration of a BRAC Commission Report
BRAC Recommendations on “Fast Track”
In response to concern about the U.S. government’s inability to close or consolidate unneeded
military facilities, Congress in 1988, and again in 1990, enacted statutory provisions establishing
a process intended to insulate base closings from the “political” considerations that are part of the
regular lawmaking process. Pursuant to these provisions, in 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005, an
independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission recommended the
closure and realignment of more than 100 defense facilities throughout the United States.
Recently, the Department of Defense (DOD) formally asked Congress to provide it with statutory
authority to conduct another round of base closures and realignments in 2015.1
Under the BRAC process, the final recommendations of a bipartisan commission are submitted to
Congress and automatically take effect unless Congress passes and the President signs legislation
disapproving the recommendations within a stated time period. To ensure that Congress can
promptly act if it so chooses, the BRAC procedure includes special “fast track” or expedited
legislative procedures laying out the terms for House and Senate consideration of legislation
striking down the BRAC Commission’s report. Such “fast track” procedures have governed
congressional consideration of the five previous rounds of base closures and are included in the
DOD’s recent request to Congress for authority to pursue a 2015 BRAC round.
Under the parliamentary procedures laid out in the BRAC process, a package of suggested base
closures and realignments is to be implemented by the Secretary of Defense unless Congress
passes a joint resolution of disapproval rejecting the entire package within the 45-day2 period
beginning on the date of the President’s submission of the package to Congress, or the sine die
adjournment of the session, whichever occurs earlier.
Congressional consideration of such a BRAC resolution of disapproval is governed not by the
standing rules of the House and Senate, but by special expedited parliamentary procedures laid
out in the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended (P.L. 101-510, 10
U.S.C. 2687 note). The procedures have the same force and effect as standing House and Senate
rules, and exempt the joint resolution of disapproval from many of the time-consuming steps and
obstacles that apply to most measures Congress considers. For example, the procedure dictates
when a joint resolution may be introduced, specifies its text, limits committee and floor
consideration of the measure, prohibits amendments and other motions, and establishes an
automatic “hook-up” of joint resolutions passed by both chambers.
This report outlines the “fast track” parliamentary procedures that have governed congressional
consideration of the recommendations of the BRAC commission in prior rounds and that have
been included in the DOD’s recent request for authority to conduct a 2015 BRAC round.3
1 See EC-1470, a communication from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs), transmitting, a report of
proposed legislation entitled “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014,”Congressional Record, daily
edition, vol. 159 (May 14, 2013), p. S3428.
2 In counting the 45-day period, recesses and adjournments of more than three days (that is, taken pursuant to an
adjournment resolution) by either chamber are not counted. This manner of counting is sometimes referred to as
calculating using “days of continuous session.”
3 Should Congress accede to the DOD’s request to authorize a 2015 BRAC round, the same fast track procedures which
have governed prior BRAC rounds and have been requested again by the DOD could be used or Congress might
(continued...)
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“Fast Track” Consideration of a BRAC Commission Report
Features of the BRAC Expedited
Parliamentary Procedure4
This section describes the parliamentary procedures that have governed congressional
consideration of recent BRAC Commission reports and that were included in a legislative
proposal DOD recently submitted to Congress requesting authority for a BRAC Commission
round in 2015.
Introduction and Referral
Ordinarily, Members of the House and Senate may introduce legislation at any time that their
chamber is in session during the two-year Congress. Under the BRAC procedure, however, a
qualifying joint resolution of disapproval must be introduced within the 10-day period beginning
on the date the President transmits a certified BRAC report to Congress. Such a joint disapproval
resolution may be introduced by any Member in either chamber, and when it is, it is referred to
the House or Senate Committee on Armed Services. There is no limit to the number of
disapproval resolutions that can be introduced, and in prior rounds, multiple disapproval
resolutions introduced have been aimed at the same BRAC report.5
Text of the Joint Resolution of Disapproval
Provisions are included in the BRAC procedure specifying the text of the disapproval resolution.
These are meant to make it clear exactly which legislation is eligible to be considered under the
expedited procedures. The joint resolution of disapproval may not contain a preamble. The title of
the measure is to read: “Joint resolution disapproving the recommendations of the Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Commission.” The text of the joint resolution after the resolving clause
is to read: “That Congress disapproves the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission as submitted by the President on ______,” with the appropriate date
filled in the blank.
Committee Action
With certain exceptions—for example, when time limits are placed on the sequential referral of a
bill by the Speaker—Congress generally does not mandate that a committee act on a bill referred
to it within a specified time frame, or at all. The BRAC procedure, however, places deadlines on
the Committees on Armed Services to act and creates a mechanism to take the resolution away
from them if they do not. These expediting provisions are intended to make it impossible for a
joint resolution of disapproval to be long delayed or blocked outright in committee.
(...continued)
instead choose to establish different procedures governing consideration of a commission report.
4 The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 is part A of title XXIX of P.L. 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687
note. Congressional disapproval procedures are located in §2908. The partial text of the fast track procedure is also
contained in the House Manual: U.S. Congress, House, Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual, and Rules of the House of
Representatives, H.Doc. 111-157, 111th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 2011), §1130(25A), pp. 1238-1242.
5 See Table 1 for examples.
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“Fast Track” Consideration of a BRAC Commission Report
As noted, upon introduction, a joint resolution of disapproval is referred to the House or Senate
Committee on Armed Services. The committee may choose to report such a resolution, but may
not amend it.6 If the committee does not report a joint resolution of disapproval by the end of a
20-day period beginning on the date the President transmits the BRAC report to Congress, the
panel is automatically discharged from its further consideration, and the measure is placed
directly on the House’s Union Calendar or the Senate’s Calendar of Business, as appropriate.
Under the terms of the BRAC procedure, an Armed Services Committee must report just one
resolution of disapproval; if multiple joint resolutions of disapproval are introduced by several
Members and referred to committee, the panel must report only one resolution or a substitute for
it within the 20-day time frame to forestall the automatic discharge of all of the others.
Calling Up the Joint Resolution on the Floor
On or after the third day following the day the House or Senate Armed Services Committee
reports a joint resolution, or it is discharged from its consideration, any Member may move in
chamber to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution. The BRAC law stipulates,
however, that a Member must first, on the preceding calendar day, have given notice of their
intention to offer the motion to proceed.7 This notice can be avoided in the House of
Representatives if the motion is being made at the direction of the committee of referral. The
motion can be made even if the body has previously rejected an identical motion to the same
effect. This provision serves as incentive for the chamber to get to a vote on the underlying joint
resolution of disapproval; if a motion to proceed is defeated, supporters can simply re-offer it
until it passes, or force the chamber to expend time and energy disposing of repeated motions.
Points of order against the resolution and its consideration are waived.
In the Senate, under most circumstances, a motion to proceed to the consideration of a measure is
debatable. Under the BRAC procedure, however, the motion to proceed to the consideration of
the joint resolution of disapproval is not debatable in either chamber, and it cannot be amended or
postponed. Appeals of the decision of the chair relating to consideration of the joint resolution are
decided without debate. If the motion is adopted, the chamber immediately considers the joint
resolution without intervening motion, order, or other business. Once a chamber has chosen to
take up the joint resolution by adopting the motion to proceed, consideration of the measure is, in
a sense, “locked in.” It remains the unfinished business of the chamber until disposed of. Other
business cannot intervene, the joint resolution cannot be laid aside, and it must be disposed of
before other business can be taken up.
6 The BRAC statute does not explicitly bar amendments from being offered in committee markup; however, because
the text of the joint resolution is prescribed by law, any deviation from it would arguably destroy its privileged
parliamentary status. In addition, as is discussed below, no amendment is permitted during floor consideration of a
disapproval resolution, and this stricture presumably applies to committee reported amendments as well as floor
amendments.
7 On September 29, 2005, during the 2005 BRAC round, the House adopted H.Res. 469. Section 3 of the resolution
altered this provision by barring rank and file House Members from making the motion to proceed to the consideration
of a joint resolution disapproving the recommendations of the BRAC. H.Res. 469 stated, “A motion to proceed
pursuant to section 2908 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 shall be in order only if offered by
the Majority Leader or his designee.” These new provisions applied only to the House during the 109th Congress. For a
fuller discussion of either chamber’s ability to change the terms of consideration specified in the base closure statute,
see below.
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“Fast Track” Consideration of a BRAC Commission Report
Floor Debate
In the absence of a special rule dictating otherwise, the standing rules of the House of
Representatives generally call for measures to be debated in the House under the one-hour rule. In
the Senate, debate is usually unlimited except by unanimous consent, by the invocation of cloture,
or by some other special procedure, such as the statutory rules governing the consideration of
budgetary legislation. In keeping with its “fast track” nature, floor consideration of a BRAC joint
resolution of disapproval is limited in both houses. Debate in a chamber on the joint resolution,
and all debatable motions and appeals connected with it, is limited to not more than two hours,
equally divided. A non- debatable motion to further limit debate is also in order.
Motions and Amendments
The BRAC procedure limits Members’ ability to delay consideration of a joint resolution of
disapproval by barring amendments and motions that would ordinarily be permissible under the
House and Senate’s standing rules. Amendments to the measure, a motion to postpone its
consideration, or motions to proceed to the consideration of other business are not permitted. A
motion to recommit the joint resolution to committee is not in order nor is a motion to reconsider
the vote by which the joint resolution is agreed to or disagreed to.
Voting
It is virtually impossible from a parliamentary standpoint to avoid a final vote on a joint
disapproval resolution once a chamber has decided to take it up. At the conclusion of debate, and
after a single quorum call (if requested), without intervening motion, a chamber immediately
votes on passage of the joint resolution of disapproval. Passage of the joint resolution is by simple
majority in each chamber, although, if the disapproval resolution is subsequently vetoed by the
President,8 a two-thirds vote in each chamber would then be required to override the veto.
Automatic Legislative “Hookup”
If, before voting upon a disapproval resolution, either chamber receives a joint resolution passed
by the other chamber, that engrossed joint resolution is not referred to committee. Instead, the
second chamber proceeds to consider its own joint resolution as laid out above, up until the point
of final disposition, when they will lay it aside, take up the joint resolution received from the first
chamber, and vote on it. After the second chamber votes on the first chamber’s joint resolution, it
may no longer consider its own version. This provision is included to avoid the need to reconcile
differences between the chambers’ versions or expend time choosing whether ultimately to act
upon the House or Senate joint resolution.
8 Note that Congress is, in effect, asking the President to enact a joint resolution terminating a list of recommendations
that he recently approved. For this reason, some have argued that should a President be presented with a joint resolution
of disapproval, he would in all likelihood veto it.
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Presidential Consideration and Subsequent Action
For a joint resolution of disapproval to become law, it must be signed by the President or enacted
over his veto. The BRAC procedure does not include expedited provisions governing House and
Senate consideration of a joint disapproval resolution vetoed by the President. Such a veto
message would be considered pursuant to the regular procedures of each house.
Either Chamber May Alter the Expedited Procedure
The fact that an expedited legislative procedure is contained in statute does not mean that another
law must be enacted to alter it. Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution gives each chamber of
Congress the power to determine the rules of its proceedings; as a result, statutory expedited
procedures like those governing BRAC can (like all rules of the House or Senate) be set aside,
altered, or amended by either chamber at any time. As several House Parliamentarians have
observed, a chamber may “change or waive the rules governing its proceedings. This is so even
with respect to rules enacted by statute.”9 These changes can be accomplished, for example, by
the adoption of a special rule from the House Committee on Rules, by suspension of the rules, or
by unanimous consent agreement.
Instances of this ability to “rewrite” expedited procedure statutes have occurred during
consideration of base closure joint resolutions of disapproval. For example, in the 101st Congress,
Representative George E. Brown, Jr. introduced H.J.Res. 165, a joint resolution disapproving the
recommendations of the 1988 Commission on Base Realignment and Closure. Under the terms of
the 1988 BRAC statute, the House Committee on Armed Services had to report a joint
disapproval resolution prior to March 15, 1989, or see it be automatically discharged of its further
consideration. The statute further permitted any Member, at any time three days after this report
or discharge, to make a motion to proceed to the immediate consideration of the resolution. The
House, however, “rewrote” these statutory terms as they related to the consideration of H.J.Res.
165. On March 21, 1989, Representative Les Aspin asked unanimous consent that,
notwithstanding the provisions of the BRAC law, it not be in order to move to proceed to the
consideration of H.J.Res. 165 prior to April 18, 1989.10 Still later, on April 11, 1989, a second
unanimous consent request laid aside not only the terms of the BRAC expedited procedure
statute, but those of Representative Aspin’s March 21 unanimous consent request, as well.11
As noted above, the House again agreed to lay aside certain provisions of the BRAC statute that
governed its consideration of the 2005 round of closures. On September 29, 2005, the House
adopted H.Res. 469, which stated that, despite the BRAC statute’s provision permitting any
Member to make a motion to proceed to the consideration of a joint resolution of disapproval,
that motion “shall be in order only if offered by the Majority Leader or his designee.”
The Senate has also overridden the BRAC fast track procedure by unanimous consent. On
September 15, 1993, the Senate agreed to a unanimous consent agreement governing the
subsequent consideration of S.J.Res. 114, disapproving the recommendations of the 1993 BRAC
9 William Holmes Brown, Charles W. Johnson, and John V. Sullivan, House Practice, A Guide to the Rules,
Precedents, and Procedures of the House (Washington: GPO, 2011), ch. 50, §4, p. 840.
10 Journal of the House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 1st sess., March 21, 1989, p. 173.
11 Journal of the House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 1st sess., April 11, 1989, p. 218.
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“Fast Track” Consideration of a BRAC Commission Report
Commission. This consent agreement limited debate on the disapproval resolution to one hour
(instead of two as provided for in the statute) and permitted the Senate to consider separate
legislation in the midst of its consideration of the joint disapproval resolution.12
In a sense, then, the expedited procedures in the BRAC statute establish a default set of
parliamentary ground rules for consideration of a disapproval resolution; these provisions can be
tailored by Members in either chamber to meet specific situations or for their convenience. Table
1 lists all joint resolutions of disapproval introduced in Congress relating to prior BRAC rounds
and their disposition.
Table 1. Resolutions of Disapproval Introduced Under the Terms of the
Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission Statutes
Date
Introduced /
Committee
Floor
Final
Measure
Congress Sponsor
Consideration
Consideration
Disposition
H.J.Res. 165
03/01/89
Rep. George E.
Reported adversely Considered by
Rejected, 43-381
Brown, Jr.
unanimous
101st Congress
03/14/89
consenta
04/18/89
H.Rept. 101-7
04/12/89 and
(Roll call #32)
04/18/89
S.J.Res. 80
03/15/89
Sen. John McCain
—
—
—
101st Congress
S.J.Res. 175
07/10/91
Sen. Arlen
Reported
— Indefinitely
Specter
unfavorably
postponed by
102nd Congress
unanimous
07/25/91
consent
S.Rept. 102-123
02/03/92b
H.J.Res. 298
07/11/91
Rep. Olympia J.
Marked up by
— —
Snowe
subcommittee and
102nd Congress
forwarded to full
committee
07/23/91
H.J.Res. 308
07/18/91
Rep. Thomas M.
Reported adversely Considered by
Rejected, 60-364
Foglietta
motion
102nd Congress
07/25/91
07/30/91
07/30/91c
H.Rept. 102-163
(Rol cal #232)
S.J.Res. 114
07/20/93
Sen. Dianne
Reported
Considered by
Rejected 12-83
Feinstein
unfavorably
unanimous
103rd Congress
consent
09/20/93
07/30/93
09/20/93d
(Rol cal #271)
S.Rept. 103-118
H.J.Res. 101
07/13/95
Rep. Vic Fazio
—
—
—
104th Congress
12 Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 139 (September 15, 1993), pp. 21457-21458.
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“Fast Track” Consideration of a BRAC Commission Report
Date
Introduced /
Committee
Floor
Final
Measure
Congress Sponsor
Consideration
Consideration
Disposition
H.J.Res. 102
07/18/95
Rep. Frank
Reported adversely Considered by
Rejected, 75-343
Tejeda
motion
104th Congress
08/01/95
09/08/95
09/08/95e
H.Rept. 104-220
(Rol cal #647)
H.J.Res. 64
09/20/05
Rep. Harold E.
— — —
Ford, Jr.
109th Congress
H.J.Res. 65
09/20/05
Rep. Ray LaHood Reported adversely Considered by
Rejected, 85-
motion
324-1
109th Congress
09/29/05
10/27/05f
10/27/05
H.Rept. 109-243
(Rol cal #548)
Source: Legislative Information System of the U.S. Congress (LIS).
Notes: The 1988 base closure round was considered under the terms of P.L. 100-526. The 1991, 1993, 1995,
and 2005 rounds were considered under the terms of P.L. 101-510, as amended.
a. Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 135 (April 12 & 18, 1989), pp. 6293-6319, 6845-6871.
b. Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 138 (February 3, 1992), p. 1215.
c. Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 137 (July 30, 1991), pp. 20333-20367.
d. Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 139 (September 20, 1993), pp. 21677-21694, 21717.
e. Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 141 (September 8, 1995), pp. 24129-24149.
f.
Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 151 (October 27, 2005), pp. 23979-24001.
Author Contact Information
Christopher M. Davis
Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process
cmdavis@crs.loc.gov, 7-0656
Congressional Research Service
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