Haiti Under President Martelly: Current
Conditions and Congressional Concerns
Maureen Taft-Morales
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
May 10, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42559
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns
Summary
Haiti shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic. Since the fall of the Duvalier
dictatorship in 1986, Haiti has struggled to overcome its centuries-long legacy of
authoritarianism, extreme poverty, and underdevelopment. During that time, economic and social
stability improved considerably, and many analysts believed Haiti was turning a corner toward
sustainable development. Unfortunately, Haiti’s development was set back by a massive
earthquake in January 2010 that devastated much of the capital of Port-au-Prince and other parts
of the country. Poverty remains massive and deep, and economic disparity is wide: Haiti remains
the poorest country in the western hemisphere.
Haiti is the Obama Administration’s top foreign assistance priority for Latin American and
Caribbean countries. Haiti’s developmental needs and priorities are many. The Haitian
government and the international donor community are implementing a 10-year recovery plan
focusing on territorial, economic, social, and institutional rebuilding. An outbreak of cholera that
began in late 2010 has swept across most of the country and further complicated assistance
efforts. While some progress has been made in developing democratic institutions, they remain
weak. In May 2011, following yet another controversial election, President René Préval was
succeeded by Michel Martelly, a popular musician without any previous political experience.
President Martelly’s difficulty in forming a government and political gridlock, especially the
lengthy and contentious delays in beginning a long overdue elections process, are hampering
reconstruction efforts and frustrating international donors. Some steps toward elections have been
made, including naming an electoral council and passing a political parties law.
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has been in Haiti to help restore
order since the collapse of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s government in 2004. It
currently has 9,464 troops. The mission has helped facilitate elections, conducted campaigns to
combat gangs and drug trafficking with the Haitian National Police, and played a key role in
emergency responses to natural disasters, especially after the earthquake. Nonetheless, popular
protests have called for MINUSTAH’s withdrawal because of sexual abuse by some of its forces
and scientific findings that its troops apparently introduced cholera to the country. In February
2013 the U.N. said it would not compensate cholera victims, citing diplomatic immunity.
The main priorities for U.S. policy regarding Haiti are to strengthen fragile democratic processes,
continue to improve security, and promote economic development. Other concerns include the
cost and effectiveness of U.S. aid; protecting human rights; combating narcotics, arms, and
human trafficking; and alleviating poverty. The Obama Administration granted Temporary
Protected Status to Haitians living in the United States at the time of the earthquake.
Congressional concerns include the pace and effectiveness of reconstruction, respect for human
rights, security issues, counternarcotics efforts and trade issues. Congress is also concerned that
overdue Senate and local elections be scheduled quickly and be free, fair, and peaceful.
Current legislation related to Haiti includes P.L. 112-74, P.L. 111-171, P.L. 110-246, P.L. 109-
432, H.R. 651, H.R. 1525, H.R. 1749, H.Res. 31, H.Res. 61, and S.Res. 12.
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Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns
Contents
Political Background ....................................................................................................................... 1
Haitian Democratic History in Brief ......................................................................................... 1
The 2010-2011 Election of President Martelly and a new Parliament ................................ 4
Adoption of Constitutional Reforms ................................................................................... 5
Overdue Elections Process Grows Contentious .................................................................. 5
President Martelly’s Administration .......................................................................................... 6
Stability and the Investigation of Former Heads of State .......................................................... 9
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) ............................................... 10
Haiti’s Development Challenges and Socioeconomic Conditions ................................................. 12
Cholera Epidemic .................................................................................................................... 13
Strategies for Haiti’s Reconstruction and International Assistance ............................................... 15
Reconstruction Efforts ............................................................................................................. 15
Relations with Donors ............................................................................................................. 16
Coordination of Foreign Assistance .................................................................................. 17
Outlook Regarding Haitian Development ............................................................................... 17
Potential for Mining .......................................................................................................... 19
U.S. Policy Objectives and Assistance .......................................................................................... 19
U.S. Assistance to Haiti ........................................................................................................... 20
Temporary Protected Status ..................................................................................................... 22
Congressional Response and Concerns ......................................................................................... 22
Post-Earthquake Reconstruction.............................................................................................. 22
Transparency and Accountability of the Haitian Government ................................................ 26
Respect for Human Rights ....................................................................................................... 26
Investigations of Duvalier and Aristide for Human Rights Violations .............................. 27
Curbing Violence against Women ..................................................................................... 29
Security and the Debate over Reestablishing the Haitian Army .............................................. 30
Counternarcotics ...................................................................................................................... 31
Trade Preferences for Haiti ...................................................................................................... 32
Legislation Passed in the 112th Congress ....................................................................................... 33
Legislation in the 113th Congress ................................................................................................... 33
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Haiti ..................................................................................................................... 1
Figure 2. U.S. Government Post-Earthquake Assistance in Haiti .................................................. 21
Figure 3. Total Post-Earthquake USG Funding to Haiti Summary ................................................ 24
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Haiti Fiscal Years 2011 to 2013 ......................................................... 20
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Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 34
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Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns
Figure 1. Map of Haiti
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
Political Background
Haiti shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic; Haiti occupies the western
third of the island. Since the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, Haiti has struggled to
overcome its centuries-long legacy of authoritarianism, extreme poverty, and underdevelopment.
While significant progress has been made in improving governance, democratic institutions
remain weak. Poverty remains massive and deep, and economic disparity is wide. In proximity to
the United States, and with such a chronically unstable political environment and fragile
economy, Haiti has been a constant policy issue for the United States. The U.S. Congress views
the stability of the nation with great concern and evidenced a commitment to improving
conditions there.
Haitian Democratic History in Brief
Haiti has been struggling to build and strengthen democratic institutions for 25 years, ever since
massive popular protests and international pressure forced dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier to
abandon his rule and flee the country in 1986. Known as “Baby Doc,” Duvalier came to power in
1971, succeeding his father, Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier, who had ruled since 1957. Their 29-
year dictatorship was marked by repression and corruption. Hoping to reverse almost 200 years of
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mostly violent and authoritarian rule, Haitians overwhelmingly approved a new constitution
creating a democratic government in 1987.
De facto military rule, coups, and thwarted attempts at democratic elections continued until a
provisional civilian government conducted what were widely heralded as Haiti’s first free and fair
elections in 1990, in which Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a former Catholic priest, was elected
president. In 1991, the Haitian military overthrew Aristide in a coup, just eight months after he
was inaugurated. Aristide went into exile in the United States. Three years later, under the threat
of a U.S. military intervention, the military finally bowed to international pressure and allowed
Aristide to finish his term. Aristide returned to Haiti in 1994 under the protection of some 20,000
U.S. troops, who transferred responsibility to a United Nations mission in 1995. With U.S.
assistance, President Aristide disbanded the army and began to train a professional civilian police
force.
In 1996 Haitians saw their first transfer of power between two democratically elected presidents
in Haitian history when Aristide was succeeded by René Préval.1 Five years later, in 2001,
Aristide was reelected, and there was another peaceful transfer of power. Political conflict
embroiled Aristide and the opposition, however, and led to the collapse of his government in
2004, and Aristide again went into exile, eventually ending up in South Africa. An interim
government followed, from 2004 to 2006. Charges of corruption against Aristide, dissolution of
the parliament by Préval in his first term, questions regarding the interim government’s
legitimacy, and flawed elections under all of them contributed to their inability to establish a fully
accepted or functioning government. Nonetheless, with the support of the United Nations
Stabilization Mission for Haiti (MINUSTAH)—which arrived in Haiti in 2004—and other
donors, security conditions improved, reform of the country’s police force began, and elections
were held in 2006.
As a result of those elections the Parliament, which had not been fully functional since the
collapse of the Aristide government in 2004, was reestablished, and René Préval began his second
five-year term as president of Haiti. During his first three years in office, Préval established
relative internal political stability and oversaw a period of economic growth. In 2007, the Préval
Administration published its Poverty Reduction Strategy, a key step in meeting International
Monetary Fund (IMF) requirements for debt relief. International donors pledged more than $1.5
billion in economic assistance to Haiti.
In the long term, democratization in Haiti has contributed to the slow strengthening of
government capacity and transparency. From 2004 to 2009, Haiti made what the IMF and others
called “remarkable progress” toward political stability and economic stabilization.2 With much
international support, the government conducted democratic presidential and parliamentary
elections and enacted wide-ranging reforms, especially in economic governance. Elected
1 Jean Bertrand Aristide served as President in Haiti from February through September 1991; 1994-1996; and 2001-
2004. René Préval served as President from 1996-2001; and 2006-2011. The Haitian constitution limits presidents to
two non-consecutive terms.
2 Ugo Fasano, “Haiti’s Economic, Political Turnaround,” IMF Survey Magazine: Countries & Regions, September 17,
2007; and World Bank, “Haiti Country Brief,” September 2008, at http://go.worldbank.org/55NM6XlVQ0. See also,
“Remarks by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon at a High-Level Donor Conference on Haiti (as released
by the UN),” and “Statement by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, United States Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, in the U.N. Security Council (as released by the US Mission to the U.N. in New York),” Federal News
Service, April 21, 2009.
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governments have developed long-term development plans resulting in international technical and
financial assistance. They have developed national budgets and made them public. The number of
employees in bloated state enterprises has been reduced. The government carried out the fiscal
management and transparency reforms necessary to qualify for debt relief from multilateral and
some bilateral creditors under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in 2009.
Human rights violations have been drastically reduced. Although crime and violence continued to
undermine Haitian development, security improved significantly enough during this period that
the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was shifting the focus of its
biggest contingent from security to development.3
Haiti’s fragile stability has been repeatedly shaken, however, if not by political problems, then by
climatic ones. During this same period of relative stability, a worsening food crisis led to violent
protests and the removal of Haiti’s prime minister in 2008. U.N. officials said political opponents
and armed gangs infiltrated the protests and fired at U.N. peacekeepers in an effort to weaken the
government. Without a prime minister, Haiti could not sign certain agreements with foreign
donors or implement programs to address the crisis for over four months. There were some 19
political parties in the legislature competing for influence and positioning themselves for
legislative and presidential elections, further complicating governability.
And then a devastating earthquake struck the nation in January 2010, ravaging the Haitian capital
of Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas.4 Political stability was especially uncertain after the
disaster, due to the loss of many political figures and government officials and massive damage to
government infrastructure. Some 17% of the country’s civil service were killed, and the
presidential palace, the parliament building, and 28 of 29 ministry buildings were destroyed.5
Along with the buildings, government records were destroyed; reestablishing and expanding
transparency in government spending has been particularly challenging.
After yet another controversial election cycle, Peasant Response party candidate Michel Martelly,
one of Haiti’s most popular entertainers, was sworn into office as Haiti’s new president on May
14, 2011. When outgoing President René Préval, of the Unity party, gave him the presidential
sash it was the first time in Haitian history that a peaceful, democratic transfer of power occurred
between presidents of opposing parties. Much of his term to date has been characterized by
gridlock between the executive and legislative branches.
There is still much to be accomplished in the democratization of Haiti. Some parts of the
government are not fully independent, the judicial system is weak, and corruption and political
violence still threaten the nation’s stability. Haitian governance capacities, already limited, were
considerably diminished by the earthquake. Much of the Haitian public perceives progress in
reconstruction and distribution of over $9 billion in pledged international assistance as much too
slow, adding to mounting public frustration with international donors and the government.
3 Jonathan M. Katz, “Largest UNforce in Haiti to focus on development,” Associated Press, April 25, 2009.
4 For more information on the earthquake, see CRS Report R41023, Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response, by Rhoda
Margesson and Maureen Taft-Morales.
5 U.S. Dept. of State & U.S. AID, FY2010 Haiti Supplemental Budget Justification, p.4.
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The 2010-2011 Election of President Martelly and a new Parliament6
The president, senators, and deputies are elected to serve five-year terms. The constitution limits
presidents to two non-consecutive terms. There are no term limits for the legislature, although
turnover for its members has been high. The first round of both the presidential and legislative
elections took place on November 28, 2010. According to the Haitian constitution, if no candidate
receives an absolute majority of the vote, a runoff vote between the top two candidates is held for
presidential and Chamber of Deputies seats. For Senate seats, candidates who lack an absolute
majority but have at least 20% more votes than the next candidate are declared the winner.
President Préval was completing his second non-consecutive term, the maximum allowed by the
Haitian constitution. Nineteen candidates vied to succeed him in the first round. Like most
previous elections in Haiti, this one centered on personalities more than parties or issues. A group
of Haitian journalists, the Public Policy Intervention Group, with the support of the National
Democratic Institute and the Commission on Presidential Debates, tried to encourage more
substantive discussions among the presidential candidates by holding a series of debates that were
broadcast nationwide. All 19 presidential candidates participated.
The first round produced contested results involving the governing party’s candidate, and
politically motivated violence. After the Haitian government accepted the recommendations of
international observers, the dispute was resolved and the vote went to a second round between
Mirlande Manigat, a professor of constitutional law and former first lady, and Michel Martelly.
Martelly, a famous Haitian kompa dance musician known for his bawdy performances, and called
“Sweet Micky,” was popular with young voters. Martelly, also a businessman, had personal
financial issues. He defaulted on over $1 million in loans and had three properties in Florida go
into foreclosure, raising questions about his financial management skills.7 Although Martelly won
68% of the votes cast in the March 20, 2011, elections, turnout was low, so those votes
constituted the support of only 15% of all registered voters. Martelly, age 50, was inaugurated on
May 14, 2011.
The legislative offices up for election included the entire 99-member Chamber of Deputies, and
11 of 30 Senate seats. The results of the second round of voting for legislative seats were
contentious. Charges of fraud led to violent demonstrations across the country resulting in the
deaths of at least two people, including the director of a hospital that was set on fire.
The legislature sworn in on April 25, 2011, was incomplete: at that time the results in 19 districts
had been challenged. International observers reported that the final results released by the
provisional electoral council (CEP) for those districts had been changed to favor candidates
associated with then-President Préval’s Inité (Unity) coalition, and demanded that all 19 results be
annulled. The CEP reviewed the cases and endorsed 15 of the 19 original results; the government
published the official results; and those 15 legislators were able to take their seats. It appears that
the four remaining disputed seats in the chamber of deputies will be voted on in the next
elections. The Inité coalition captured a majority in both houses of the legislature, so President
Martelly had to negotiate with them to get his proposals passed.
6 For more in-depth discussion of the 2011 presidential and legislative elections, see CRS Report R41689, Haiti’s
National Elections: Issues, Concerns, and Outcome, by Maureen Taft-Morales
7 Frances Robles, “Haiti candidate Martelly lost three S. Florida properties to foreclosure,” Miami Herald, March 7,
2011.
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Adoption of Constitutional Reforms
The new legislature began to work before Martelly was sworn in, including adopting
constitutional reforms that had been passed under the previous legislature, in hopes of getting
them to take effect quickly. Constitutional amendments passed by two consecutive legislatures go
into effect when the next president takes office. Controversy arose around the status of these
amendments as well.
The amendments were in a state of constitutional limbo for about a year. To become law, bills
passed by the legislature must be published by the executive branch. The wording of the
amendments sent to be published by the outgoing Préval Administration differed from that
actually passed by the legislature, according to the State Department, so the amendments did not
become law. In June 2011, Martelly stopped the altered version from being printed, and there was
debate over whether the original version should be printed, or the process started anew.
President Martelly finally published the constitutional amendments that had been passed by two
legislatures. These amendments include a streamlined process for creating a permanent electoral
council. They also allow Haitians with dual citizenship to vote and hold many government
positions, including Cabinet positions. This had been a sore point for Haitians in the diaspora who
wanted to be able to vote, or return and serve in the government. Those with dual citizenship will
still be prohibited from becoming president, prime minister, or members of either chamber of the
legislature. Martelly said that leaders of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches had
agreed to publish the corrected amendments, cooperation he described as a great step forward in
Haiti’s democratic process.8
Overdue Elections Process Grows Contentious
One-third of the Senate seats expired on May 8, 2012. Elections to replace those legislators were
to have taken place by January 2012 at the latest. These and local elections for municipal
councils, town delegates, and other posts, which are also long overdue, have yet to be scheduled.
An electoral council is needed to set dates for and organize new elections. Prime Minister
Lamothe estimated the elections would cost about $16 million.
The government failed to meet his pledge that the elections would be held by the end of 2012;
instead the process became contentious, progressed in fits and starts, and contributed to political
tensions. Martelly fired the members of the previous CEP in December 2011. He did not begin to
form a new electoral council until June 2012.The executive, legislative, and judicial branches,
each responsible for naming several members of the electoral council, finally agreed on a
mechanism outside the established procedure with the help of a mediating ecumenical group, and
named a council in April 2013. The parliament also took a step forward in April, passing a
political party law. A difficult process remains ahead: the council personnel are largely
inexperienced in elections work; an internal procedure must be established; and an electoral law
drafted and passed. The government must also decide which elections will be held—whether
overdue legislative and local elections will be held simultaneously, and whether they should be
combined with other elections coming due soon.
8 Joseph Guyler Delva, “Haiti Constitutional Amendments Finally Take Effect,” Reuters, June 19, 2012.
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Experts say that an absolute minimum of six months are needed to organize any of these
elections. In order for them to be held before December holidays, they would need to be called by
June 15. Otherwise, the election date will need to be pushed into 2014.
Since May 2012 the Senate has had only 20 members, which makes it more difficult to meet the
16-member quorum needed to conduct business. The Inité party lost four Senators and some of its
clout in that chamber. President Martelly’s Peasant Response party had no members in the Senate,
and he lost about four allies there.
Additional concern has been raised over the government’s decision to replace most of the 120
mayors elected in 2006, whose terms have expired, with government appointees. According to the
U.N. Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, Michel Forst, this decision
“was met with bafflement and incomprehension on the part of the national and international
communities.”9
That the election process has become contentious is not surprising. As Haiti has been making its
transition from a legacy of authoritarian rule to a democratic government, elections have usually
been a source of increased political tensions and instability in the short term. It is important to
note, however, that in the long term elected governments in Haiti have contributed to the gradual
strengthening of government capacity and transparency. Still, in the present circumstances, the
international community is becoming more and more concerned that the delayed elections are
exacerbating political polarization and threatening stability.
President Martelly’s Administration
During most of Martelly’s first year in office, Haiti was without a prime minister, which severely
limited the government’s ability to act and the international community’s ability to move forward
with reconstruction efforts. Martelly was not able to form a government for almost five months
because of disputes with a parliament dominated by the opposition Inité coalition over his first
two nominees for prime minister. Dr. Garry Conille, a senior U.N. development specialist and
former aide to then-U.N. Special Envoy to Haiti Bill Clinton, was confirmed as prime minister on
October 4, 2011. Conille lasted only four months in the position, after which he was reportedly
pressured by President Martelly to resign in part because of disagreements over an investigation
of $300 million-$500 million in post-earthquake contracts linked to Martelly and former Prime
Minister Jean-Max Bellerive. Bellerive, now an adviser to Martelly, and also his cousin, said he
was the victim of a smear campaign.10
Authorities in the Dominican Republic are also investigating corruption allegations linked to
President Martelly. According to Dominican journalist Nuria Piera, a company owned by
Dominican Senator Felix Bautista was awarded a $350 million contract for reconstruction work
in Haiti, despite not meeting Haitian procurement requirements. Bautista allegedly gave over $2.5
million to President Martelly before and after he won the election. Martelly has denied the
charges.11
9 Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Haiti, Michel Forst, U.N. General Assembly
Human Rights Council, report A/HRC/22/65, February 7, 2013, p. 5.
10 Associated Press, “Martelly denies Kickback in Construction Firm Scandal,” Jamaica Gleaner, April 4, 2012.
11 Associated Press, “Martelly denies Kickback in Construction Firm Scandal,” op. cit., and “DR-Haiti Contracts
(continued...)
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After the first prime minister resigned, another three months went by before a new prime minister
was confirmed. Laurent Lamothe, Martelly’s foreign affairs minister and a former
telecommunications executive, was named prime minister on May 4; his cabinet and government
plan were approved by parliament on May 14, 2012. The cabinet includes two new posts: one
minister to address poverty and another to support farmers.12
Because Martelly and much of his team—reportedly mostly childhood friends—lack political or
management experience, many observers are concerned about the president’s ability to carry out
his promises of free and compulsory education, job creation, agricultural development, and
strengthened rule of law. That political inexperience may have contributed to the gridlock and
animosity between Martelly’s administration and the parliament that have characterized Haitian
politics since he took office. His justice minister resigned after police violated the immunity
legislators have and arrested a legislator who had allegedly escaped from jail. Legislators
responded by blocking many of Martelly’s legislative proposals, and opening an investigation
into whether he held U.S. citizenship, which would make him ineligible for office.
In April Martelly was absent from Haiti for two weeks while being treated in Miami for a blood
clot in his lung. Upon his return, he reached out in a speech to the parliament, urging them to
work together to avoid “falling further ahead into trouble.”13 Martelly also said that “all problems
we are facing today result from the weakness of our institutions,” and called on the international
community to keep helping Haiti strengthen its institutions.
International donors, including the United States, have been working with the Haitian government
at all levels to rebuild government infrastructure, support the development of transparency and
accountability within government institutions, and broaden and strengthen the provision of public
services. International assistance continues to professionalize and strengthen the Haitian National
Police force and reform other elements of Haiti’s weak judicial system. Donors also are training
Haiti’s public sector workforce so that it will eventually be able to coordinate and carry out
development programs. In late 2011, the Haitian government adopted a “Roadmap for the Rule of
Law,” created with support from MINUSTAH, outlining short-, middle-, and long-term actions to
develop and guarantee the rule of law in Haiti.
Martelly began several other initiatives during his first year. He inaugurated a housing loan
program and appointed advisers to an earthquake recovery panel. He launched a free education
initiative to be funded through taxes on phone calls and wired remittances from abroad. Critics
express concern that the fund lacks transparency and a clear policy.14 The government collected
$22 million for the fund, which is on hold with the Central Bank until the legislature authorizes it
to be released. In the meantime, the government took money from other parts of the national
budget to pay for the tuition of 1 million children.15 In May 2012 the government launched a
program in which it transfers cash credits of up to $20 a month to mothers who keep their
(...continued)
Scandal,” Caribbean Update, May 1, 2012.
12 Associated Press, “Haiti’s New Prime Minister Says New Mining Legislation being Drafted to Benefit Country,”
Washington Post, May 15, 2012.
13 Text of report by Haitian Radio Vision 2000 on 30 April, “Haitian President Returns, Calls for Unity, Seeks
Strengthening of Institutions,” BBC Monitoring Americas, May 1, 2012.
14 Jacqueline Charles, “Martelly marks 100 days in Haiti with little progress,” Miami Herald, August 22, 2011.
15 Trenton Daniel, “Modest Gains Mark Haitian Leader’s First Year,” Associated Press, May 12, 2012.
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children in school. The program will initially benefit 100,000 families in four of Port-au-Prince’s
poorest neighborhoods. Prime Minister Lamothe said the program would extend nation-wide by
year’s end.16
In May 2012 the president also launched two health initiatives in the government’s Office of
Workers’ Compensation Insurance, Illness, and Maternity. He opened a new physiotherapy
department, supported by the French Red Cross. He also announced a pilot program that will give
about 500 workers, including 100 in the informal sector, free health insurance cards facilitating
access to health care. Martelly stated that “we are fighting for all of Haiti to fully enjoy its right to
health by the end of my term.”17
President Martelly named three members to the Supreme Court, including its president. The latter
post had been vacant for six years. According to the State Department, this is the first time in over
25 years that Haiti has those three branches of government in place.18 As mentioned above,
Martelly, the legislature, and the court finally agreed on the nine new electoral council members
needed to organize overdue elections in April 2013. The publication of the constitutional
amendments was supposed to have made that process easier to accomplish. The amendments also
created a high council to conduct administrative management of the judicial branch, and a
constitutional court to resolve disputes between the executive branch and the parliament. The
amendments also require that at least 30% of government posts be held by women.19
In July 2012 Prime Minister Lamothe visited Washington, DC, meeting with then- Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton. Clinton noted that she had made Haiti “a foreign policy priority” when she
came into office, and has been committed to “building the capacity of the Haitian government and
the Haitian society so they can have the means and the experience and the expertise to solve their
own problems.”20 Lamothe said progress had been made toward that end, as Haiti was building its
capacity to collect its own revenues through taxes and custom duties, among other programs.
Lamothe said the Haitian government had made improving the fight against corruption its
“number one priority,” along with education and reducing extreme poverty.
In his last report before resigning in March 2013, the U.N. human rights expert acknowledged
progress made against corruption, but also expressed serious concerns. Forst praised the
government’s commitment to building police and judicial capacity for investigating transnational
crimes, corruption, and political crimes, and the allocation of both human and financial resources
to two anti-corruption units. He also said, however, that he was “struck by the corrosive effect
that corruption has had on [Haiti’s] judicial institutions …” and that “corruption remains rife at all
levels.”21
16 “Haiti to Pay Mothers School Incentives via Mobile,” BBC News, May 28, 2012.
17 Caribbean Journal staff, “Haiti’s Martelly Opens Therapy Centre, Launches Insurance Card Initiative,” Caribbean
Journal, May 29, 2012.
18 Cheryl Mills, Haiti—Two Years Post Earthquake: What You May Not Know, U.S. Department of State, Dipnote:
U.S. Dept. of State Official Blog, January 9, 2012, http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/site/entry/
haiti_two_years_post_earthquake.
19 Joseph Guyler Delva, “Haiti Constitutional Amendments Finally Take Effect,” Reuters, June 19, 2012.
20 “U.S. Department of the [sic] State” [transcript of joint press conference], FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database,
July 24, 2012.
21 Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Haiti, Michel Forst,op. cit., p. 7.
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The U.N. human rights expert also voiced concern over the politicization of the judiciary and the
national police under the Martelly Administration, stating that “the practice of appointing or
removing judges to advance partisan or political ends … continues unabated.” U.N. Secretary
General Ban Ki-Moon echoed that concern, adding that institutional politicization and frequent
Cabinet changes hindered the efforts of MINUSTAH and other international donors to build
capacity within those institutions.22 Human rights expert Forst also criticized the Martelly
Administration for making arbitrary and illegal arrests and for threatening journalists.
The international community is increasing pressure on the Martelly administration to end the
political impasse that donors and other analysts believe is inhibiting development and threatening
stability. The outgoing head of MINUSTAH said in February 2013 that, in addition to the
government’s failure to organize elections, its failure to address vast unemployment also needed
to be addressed as soon as possible. “They have a work force of 4.2 million people and in formal
jobs they have only 200,000,” said Mariano Fernandez, adding that “... this is a permanent source
of instability.”23
Stability and the Investigation of Former Heads of State
A potentially destabilizing factor has been the reappearance on the scene of two of Haiti’s most
divisive leaders shortly before Martelly’s election and the possibility of trials for both of them.
Former dictator Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier returned unexpectedly from 25 years in exile
on January 16, 2011. Two days later, the Haitian government under President Préval formally
charged him with corruption and embezzlement. Private citizens filed charges of human rights
violations against Duvalier for abuses they allege they suffered under his 15-year regime.
Former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, in exile since his government collapsed in the face of
political conflict in 2001, then said that he would also like to return, and did so, with a Haitian
government-issued passport, on March 18, 2011, two days before the second round elections.
Reportedly greeted by thousands of supporters, Aristide did not directly support any candidate,
and has kept a low profile since his arrival. President Préval, once an Aristide protégé, had long
said Aristide was free to return, but that he should be prepared to face corruption and other
charges as well. For details on the status of charges against both Aristide and Duvalier, see
“Investigations of Duvalier and Aristide for Human Rights Violations” below.
It is a significant accomplishment that Haiti, long characterized by impunity for its leaders, has
brought charges against its former dictator, and is questioning another former head of state. The
judicial system is not considered independent, though, and various U.N. officials have criticized
the Martelly administration for interfering in the judicial system for political purposes. Trying
Duvalier and/or Aristide could be a severe strain on Haiti’s weak judicial system. Both Duvalier
and Aristide are seen as highly polarizing figures able to stir up unrest. Aristide recently said that
his Lavalas party plans to participate in upcoming elections.
22 Ibid., pp. 6-7, and Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, U.N.
Security Council report S/2013/139, March 8, 2013, p. 16.
23 “Elections, jobs critical for Haiti’s current and future stability, says outgoing UN envoy,” M2 Presswire, February 1,
2013.
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The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH)
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has been in Haiti to help restore
order since the collapse of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s government. Armed
rebellion and diminished international support for Aristide led him to flee into exile in February
2004. An international force authorized by the U.N. arrived shortly after his departure, and was
replaced by MINUSTAH in June 2004. MINUSTAH worked closely with the interim government
from 2004 to 2006, when, after several delays, elections were held. The mission continued to
work closely with the Préval Administration. Although some Haitians call for the removal of
foreign troops, former President Préval supported the mission’s presence, saying that he would
“not adopt a falsely nationalist position,” and that MINUSTAH should stay until Haiti is ready to
assume responsibility for security.24 More recently, popular protests have called for
MINUSTAH’s removal because of allegations of its role in introducing cholera to the country,
and sexual abuse by some of its forces. Although critical of some aspects of MINUSTAH,
President Martelly nonetheless advocates extending MINUSTAH’s term to help maintain stability
and to assist in the reconstruction effort. He has called for its eventual replacement with a revived
Haitian army. The U.N. Security Council and international donors call instead for a continued
strengthening of the Haitian National Police.
MINUSTAH’s mandate includes three basic components: (1) to help create a secure and stable
environment; (2) to support the political process by fostering effective democratic governance
and institutional development, supporting government efforts to promote national dialogue and
reconciliation and to organize elections; and (3) to support government and nongovernmental
efforts to promote and protect human rights, as well as to monitor and report on the human rights
situation. MINUSTAH has played a key role in emergency responses to natural disasters,
including facilitating the delivery of emergency humanitarian assistance. As part of its work, the
mission has also conducted campaigns to combat gangs and drug-trafficking with the Haitian
police.
MINUSTAH’s current troop strength is 9,298 total uniformed personnel, consisting of 6,684
troops and 2,614 police. Nineteen countries contribute military personnel, and 44 countries
supply police personnel. They are supported by 451 international civilian personnel; 1,317 local
civilian staff; and 206 United Nations volunteers. The mission’s budget for this year (July 1,
2012-June 30, 2013) is about $677 million. MINUSTAH’s current authorization runs through
October 15, 2013. The U.N. has been gradually reducing MINUSTAH’s number of troops to pre-
earthquake levels.25
MINUSTAH and the U.N. have been widely criticized for not responding strongly enough to an
outbreak of cholera in October 2010, the first such outbreak in at least a century in Haiti. A team
of researchers from France and Haiti conducted an investigation at the request of the Haitian
government. They reported that their findings “strongly suggest that contamination of the
Artibonite [River in Haiti] and 1[sic] of its tributaries downstream from a [MINUSTAH] military
24 “Haiti: MlNUSTAH to Stay on for 2 to 3 Years,” Latinnews Daily, March 13, 2006.
25 MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH Facts and Figures, [figures given are as of
January 31, 2013] March 5, 2013, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/facts.shtml.
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camp triggered the epidemic,” noting that there was “an exact correlation in time and places
between the arrival of a Nepalese battalion from an area experiencing a cholera outbreak and the
appearance of the first cases in [the nearby town of] Meille a few days after.”26 Other studies have
come to the same conclusion. While the authors of the study caution that the findings are not
definitive, they and others have suggested that “to avoid actual contamination or suspicion
happening again, it will be important to rigorously ensure that the sewage of military camps is
handled properly.”
The U.N. has been under increasing pressure to take full responsibility for introduction of the
disease, but announced on February 21, 2013, that it would not compensate cholera victims,
claiming diplomatic immunity. Over 5,000 cholera victims or relatives of victims have filed legal
claims against the U.N., demanding reparations, a public apology, and a nationwide response
including “medical treatment for current and future victims, and clean water and sanitation
infrastructure.”27 The Boston-based Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, which filed the
victims’ claims with the U.N., announced on May 8 that if the U.N. did not agree to the demands
laid out in the claims within 60 days, it will pursue the case in U.S. and European courts. Many
Haitians’ mistrust of the U.N. has manifested itself in protests and strained relations between
MINUSTAH and the population for which it is there to help provide protection and stability.
Charges of sexual abuse by MINUSTAH personnel have also fueled anti-MINUSTAH sentiment.
The U.N. has a zero tolerance policy toward sexual abuse and exploitation.28 In the case of
peacekeepers, the U.N. is responsible for investigating charges against police personnel, but the
sending country is responsible for investigating charges against its military personnel. The U.N.
returns alleged perpetrators to their home country for punishment. Five MINUSTAH
peacekeepers from Uruguay were sent home in September 2011, to be tried on charges of
sexually abusing an 18-year-old man at a U.N. base while filming it on a cellphone.
According to the U.N., it completed investigations in Haiti for five substantiated cases of sexual
exploitation and abuse and was investigating13 other cases in 2012, 29 including at least two cases
of sexual exploitation of children by U.N. police.30 The investigations led to three members of a
Pakistani police unit being convicted of raping a 14-year-old boy in one of the cases. The trial
took place in March 2012 in Haiti, but was conducted by a Pakistani military tribunal, which
dismissed the men from the military and sentenced them to one year in prison. As of March 1,
2013, only one case was pending, according to the U.N. Conduct and Discipline Unit.
26 Renaud Piarroux et al., “Understanding the Cholera Epidemic, Haiti,” Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, July
2011, http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1707.110059.
27 Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti, Over 5,000 Haitian Cholera Victims Sue UN, Seeking Justice, Press
release, November 8, 2011, http://ijdh.org/archives/22789.
28 For additional information, see CRS Report RL33700, United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, by
Marjorie Ann Browne, section entitled, “Prince Zeid Report (2005).”
29 U.N. Conduct and Discipline Unit, “Statistics: Status of Investigations (Sexual Exploitation and Abuse),
MINUSTAH,” March 5, 2013, http://cdu.unlb.org/Statistics/StatusofInvestigationsSexualExploitationandAbuse.aspx
30 U.N. News Centre, Haiti: U.N. opens probe into cases of alleged child sexual exploitation, January 23, 2012,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41008&Cr=haiti&Cr1=.
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Haiti’s Development Challenges and Socioeconomic
Conditions
Long before the earthquake struck, Haiti was a country socially and ecologically at risk,
possessing some of the lowest socioeconomic indicators in the world,31 and in an acute
environmental crisis. Following several hurricanes that hit Haiti in 2008, the president of the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Luis Moreno, called Haiti the most fragile of IDB’s
member countries, saying that no other nation in Latin America and the Caribbean is as
vulnerable to economic shocks and natural disasters as is Haiti.
Plagued by chronic political instability and frequent natural disasters, Haiti is the poorest country
in the Western Hemisphere. Haiti’s poverty is massive and deep. There is extreme economic
disparity between a small privileged class and the majority of the population. Over half the
population (54%) of 9 million people lives in extreme poverty, living on less than $1 a day; 78%
live on $2 or less a day, according to the World Bank. Poverty among the rural population is even
more widespread: 69% of rural dwellers live on less than $1 a day, and 86% live on less than $2 a
day.
Hunger is also widespread: 81% of the national population and 87% of the rural population do not
get the minimum daily ration of food defined by the World Health Organization. In remote parts
of Haiti, children have been dying of malnutrition.32 Food security has worsened throughout Haiti
following Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy in 2012, which destroyed about 70% of Haiti’s crops.
Some 1.5 million people live in severe food insecurity in rural areas affected by the storms. As
many as 450,000 people are at risk of severe acute malnutrition, including at least 4,000 children
less than five years of age.33
Over 40 years, from the late 1960s until the early 2000s, Haiti’s per capita real GDP declined by
30%. By around 20007, Haiti began making some macroeconomic progress: the Haitian economy
was growing for three years prior to the earthquake, and the government had improved
management of its resources. In order to reach its Millennium Development Goal of eradicating
extreme poverty and hunger by 2015, Haiti’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would have to grow
3.5% per year, a goal the IMF says Haiti is not considered likely to achieve. Therefore, economic
growth, even if it is greater than population growth, is not expected to be enough to reduce
poverty; programs specifically targeted at poverty reduction are needed as well.
In 2009, Haiti passed a minimum wage law. The law mandated increases in wages in two phases.
In 2010, the minimum wage rose from about $1.75 per day to $3.75 per day. In October 2012, it
is scheduled to increase to $5.00 per day. The average daily wage for textile assembly workers is
$5.25, above the new minimum wage, so some manufacturers said that they would have to raise
wages proportionally. Despite the wage increase, the fundamental inequality of Haitian society
remains basically unchanged.
31 World Bank, Country Report: Haiti, 2010, http://go.worldbank.org/GBXI5JKM50.
32 “Rural Haitian Children Starving,” Associated Press, November 21, 2008.
33 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Haiti: Emergency Revision of the 2012 Consolidated
Appeal—Needs arising from the impact of Hurricane Sandy,” November 10, 2012, pp. 1, 8.
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The global economic crisis led to a drop of about 10% in remittances from Haitians
abroad, which amounted to about $1.65 billion in 2008, more than a fourth of Haiti’s
annual income.34 Damage and losses caused by the 2010 earthquake were estimated to be
$7.8 billion, an amount greater than Haiti’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009.35
Haiti’s GDP contracted by slightly more than 5% in 2010, but grew by 5.6% in 2011. The
International Monetary Fund predicted that Haiti would have the highest growth in the
Latin America and Caribbean region (7.8%) in 2012.36 But growth reached only 2.8%,
slowed by hurricanes, drought, and “delays in implementing key public investment
projects.”37
The likelihood that economic growth will contribute to the reduction of poverty in Haiti is further
reduced by its enormous income distribution gap. Haiti has the second-largest income disparity in
the world. Over 68% of the total national income accrues to the wealthiest 20% of the population,
while less than 1.5% of Haiti’s national income is accumulated by the poorest 20% of the
population. When the level of inequality is as high as Haiti's, according to the World Bank, the
capacity of economic growth to reduce poverty “approaches zero.”38
The Haitian government and international donors have focused efforts on manufacturing and
agricultural production; both were initially making a steady recovery. But agriculture faces
significant limitations in Haiti, with all but 2% of the forest cover deforested,39 85% of the
watersheds degraded, little or no rural infrastructure, and limited access to credit. Hurricane
Sandy caused further loss of agricultural land; the U.N. estimated that an addition $40 million
would be needed to address the new needs arising from that storm. High rates of unemployment,
income inequality, and poverty continue to be serious roadblocks to overall economic
development.
Cholera Epidemic
Cholera broke out in October 2010, in what may be the first such outbreak ever in Haiti. There is
evidence linking the outbreak to inadequate sanitation facilities at a MINUSTAH camp (see “The
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)” above). Because Haitians had not
been exposed to it previously and lacked immunity, and Haiti lacks adequate sewage and
sanitation facilities, the waterborne disease spread quickly. Less than two years later, according to
the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Haiti had the highest number of cholera
cases in the world.40 Well over half a million cases (almost 636,000) have been reported, with
34 Mike Blanchfield, “In recession, Haitians abroad send less money home,” Canwest News Service, March 17, 2009.
35 Government of Haiti, “Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of damage, losses, general and sectoral needs,” March
2010, p.6.
36 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: Growth Resuming, Dangers Remain, April 2012, p. 196.
37 International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Concludes 2012 Article IV Consultation with Haiti,
Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 13/41, April 2, 2013, p.1.
38 World Bank, “Income Distribution, Inequality, and Those Left Behind,” in Global Economic Prospects 2007:
Managing the Next Wave of Globalization, p. 83. December 1, 2006.
39 World Bank, Country Report: Haiti, 2010, http://go.worldbank.org/GBXI5JKM50.
40 Associated Press, “CDC Study Shows Haiti Cholera has Changed, Experts Say It Suggests Disease Becoming
Endemic,” The Washington Post, May 3, 2012.
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many cases believed to go unreported. Almost 8,000 people have died because of cholera.41 The
number of new cases has decreased over time, but spikes during the rainy season, when flooding
spreads the disease.
President Martelly authorized a cholera vaccination program that began, after several months’
delay, in April 2012. (The previous government declined a pilot vaccination program, arguing that
vaccinating only a portion of the population would incite tensions among those not vaccinated.)
The pilot program inoculated only about 1% of the population: 90,000 people in some of the
poorest areas of Port-au-Prince and in the rural Artibonite River Valley. Partners in Health (PIH),
a Boston-based nongovernmental organization, which has worked in Haiti for decades, and its
Haitian partner in the pilot program, GHESKIO, say the program’s success led the Haitian
Ministry of Health to examine how to conduct widespread immunization. According to PIH, the
vaccination is 70% effective, and costs $3.70 per patient for the two-dose treatment.42
Other, immediate, small-scale preventive measures include building latrines and distributing soap,
bleach, and water-purification tablets. Treatment includes oral rehydration salts, antibiotics, and
IV fluids. The United States has spent over $95 million for such preventive measures, and
supporting staff and supplies for 45 cholera treatment centers and 117 oral rehydration posts, and
working with the Haitian Ministry of Health to set up a national system for tracking the disease.
But most observers say cholera will persist in Haiti until nationwide water and sanitation systems
are developed. This would cost approximately $800 million to $1.1 billion, according to the New
York Times.43 Haiti’s first wastewater treatment site was opened in the fall of 2011. A study
released by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention indicated that the strain of
cholera in Haiti is changing as survivors develop some immunity to the original strain. This could
be an indication that the disease is becoming endemic in Haiti.44
The number of total cases and deaths declined in 2012. Nonetheless, some critics assert that the
international response to the epidemic has been inadequate, and warn that the closing of cholera
treatment centers is reducing the country’s ability to respond to the disease and already
contributed to an increase in the mortality rate in late 2012.45 In 2012 the U.N. announced an
effort to raise over $2 billion for a 10-year cholera eradication plan, to which it will contribute
$23 million, or about one percent of what it says is needed.
41 USAID, Haiti—Earthquake and Cholera, Fact Sheet #3, Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, December 12, 2011.
42 Partners in Health, Cholera, Next Steps, May 30, 2012, Cholera, PIH’s Response, February12, 2013,
http://www.pih.org/pages/cholera.
43 Deborah Sontag, “In Haiti, Global Failures on a Cholera Epidemic,” New York Times, March 31, 2012.
44 Associated Press, “CDC Study Shows Haiti Cholera has Changed, Experts say it Suggests Disease Becoming
Endemic,” Washington Post, May 3, 2012.
45 Center for Economic and Policy Research, “Pressure Builds on UN to Take Responsibility as Choler Still Far From
‘Under Control’,” January 11, 2013.
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Strategies for Haiti’s Reconstruction and
International Assistance46
Reconstruction Efforts
Prior to the earthquake in 2010, the United Nations had already designated Haiti as one of the 50
least developed countries in the world, facing greater risk than other countries of failing to
emerge from poverty, and therefore needing the highest degree of attention from the international
community.47
After the earthquake, the Haitian government established a framework for reconstruction in the
10-year recovery plan, Action Plan for the Reconstruction and National Development of Haiti,
with four areas of concentration:48
• Territorial building, including creating centers of economic growth to support
settlement of displaced populations around the country and to make Port-au-
Prince less congested, developing infrastructure to promote growth, and
managing land tenure;
• Economic rebuilding, including modernizing the agricultural sector for both
export and food security, promoting manufacturing and tourism, and providing
access to electricity;
• Social rebuilding, prioritizing building education and health systems; and
• Institutional rebuilding, focusing on making government institutions
operational again and able to manage reconstruction, and strengthening
governmental authority while also decentralizing basic services, and creating a
social safety net for the poorest population.
Some of the overarching goals of the plan are including environmental factors and risk and
disaster management in all recovery and reconstruction activities; actively providing employment
and vocational training; and providing assistance to the population affected by the earthquake
while hastening recovery efforts with an eye to reducing dependence on foreign aid.
Some analysts emphasize that the Haitian government and civil society must be partners in
designing any development strategy if they are to succeed and be sustainable. They also warn that
job creation and other development efforts must occur not only in the cities, but also in rural
areas, to reduce urban migration, dependence on imported food, and environmental degradation.
As mentioned above, economic growth alone is unlikely to reduce poverty in Haiti. Therefore, the
46 For further information, see CRS Report RL34029, Haiti’s Development Needs and a Statistical Overview of
Conditions of Poverty, by Maureen Taft-Morales and Demond Alexander Drummer; for background on the 2004-2007
strategy, see CRS Report RL33156, Haiti: International Assistance Strategy for the Interim Government and
Congressional Concerns, by Maureen Taft-Morales.
47 United Nations Office for Least Developed Countries. Facts about Least Developed Countries (LDCs) available at
http://www.unohrlls.org/UserFiles/File/Publications/Factsheet.pdf, January 15, 2010.
48 Republic of Haiti, “Action Plan for the Reconstruction and National Development of Haiti,” March 2010, available at
http://www.haitisantodomingo2010.org/hsd2010/content/documents.
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Haitian government and many in the international donor community maintain that donors must
continue to make a long-term commitment to Haitian development. Furthermore, in order to
reduce poverty across the board, some observers say that development strategies must specifically
target improving the living conditions of the poor and address the inequities and prejudices that
have contributed to Haiti’s enormous income disparity.49
The Haitian government, the Obama Administration, other international donors, and other
observers have all stated the need for improved accountability of all donor assistance to Haiti, to
improve aid effectiveness and reduce the potential for corruption. Recent Haitian governments
have made major progress in reducing corruption, increasing transparency, and improving fiscal
management. These improvements qualified Haiti for Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC)
debt relief in 2009. To ensure transparency further, the U.S. Agency for International
Development has helped Haiti establish an online system to monitor both donor pledges and
spending and implementation of assistance.
Relations with Donors
Since Haiti’s developmental needs and priorities are many, and deeply intertwined, the Haitian
government and the international donor community are implementing an assistance strategy that
attempts to address these many needs simultaneously. The challenge is to accomplish short-term
projects that will boost public and investor confidence, while also pursuing long-term
development plans to improve living conditions for Haiti’s vast poor population. The challenge
has been made more daunting by developments such as rising food and gasoline prices world-
wide, internal political crises, and, of course, the lingering damage done by the earthquake and
other natural disasters.
The Haitian government has criticized the donor community for not dispersing funds quickly
enough. Some international donors complain that the instability generated first by the elections
process, then by the prolonged lack of a prime minister, the ongoing gridlock between the Haitian
executive and legislative branches and the current inability to organize elections hinder
reconstruction efforts as well.
There are other frustrations on the part of both donors and the Haitian government regarding
foreign assistance. The Haitian government is frustrated that U.S. and other foreign aid is
provided primarily through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) rather than directly to the
government. Donors are worried about the lack of Haitian capacity to design and implement
programs, as well as corruption. The donor community has grown extremely frustrated at the lack
of coordination and the inability or unwillingness of various government actors to seek consensus
on development priorities and plans, such as elections that are now more than a year overdue. The
State Department’s Special Coordinator for Haiti, Thomas Adams, recently warned that, “Haiti
will lose international support if it is seen as undemocratic,” by failing to address corruption,
human rights violations, or government accountability through elections.50
49 See for example, Robert Maguire, “Paul Collier’s Report on Economic Security in Haiti,” March 2009. Focal Point,
Vol. 8, Issue 2.
50 U.S. Institute of Peace, “Haiti’s Election Conundrum: Fraught but Necessary?,” March 27, 2013.
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Coordination of Foreign Assistance
The Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC) was created after the earthquake to
coordinate foreign aid and reconstruction activities. It was co-chaired by the Government of Haiti
and the UN Special Envoy to Haiti, former President Bill Clinton. Its 18-month mandate expired
in October 2011 without the establishment of the Haitian-run Haitian Development Authority,
which was to take its place. (Clinton’s mandate as Special Envoy expired January 31, 2013, and
was not extended.) While there has been criticism that the IHRC was not approving and
distributing aid effectively, there has also been widespread concern that the Haitian government is
not ready to assume full control of the process either. The government’s nascent institutions,
which had limited capacity before the earthquake, were set back severely by the earthquake’s
destruction. The president asked the legislature to pass an extension of the IHRC while an
alternative mechanism was developed; it failed to do so. In the meantime, the 12 largest
international donors continued to coordinate among themselves and with the Haitian government.
In November 2012 the Haitian government presented to the donor community a plan for the
coordination of foreign aid, the Framework for Coordination of Foreign Aid for Haitian
Development (Cadre de Coordination de l’aide Externe au Developpement d’Haiti, CAED).
Headed by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Planning and External Cooperation, it will have
an international committee that is supposed to meet at least twice a year, a national committee
that is supposed to meet four to six times a year, and working groups to address various
development priorities such as education, employment, energy, extreme poverty, and rule of law.
Although some parts of the framework have begun to function, the government is seeking donor
funds to support the CAED. In February 2013 donors told the government they would not attend
a CAED international committee meeting because it still had no plans or date for elections. The
meeting was rescheduled for May.
Outlook Regarding Haitian Development
Despite the economic and social problems currently existing in Haiti and the comprehensive and
complex challenges facing the country, Haiti could become a middle-income country, according
to the State Department’s Special Coordinator for Haiti, Thomas Adams. Such a transition could
take about 30 years, even with good economic growth, Adams said, and would require continued
development of “credible democratic institutions” and private investment, in addition to support
from the international donor community.51
Statements by U.N. officials and other donors indicate growing frustration with the current
political stalemate in Haiti, however. Political polarization is inhibiting the capacity building
needed to strengthen democratic institutions, keeping away private investment, they say, and
contributing to donor fatigue. As discussed earlier, donors and other analysts say that unless some
sort of national consensus is reached on a legislative agenda and development priorities, Haiti’s
reconstruction will continue to be stalled, and stability and security threatened.52
51 Associated Press, “Haiti Faces 30-Year Climb to Middle Income Status,” Jamaica Observer, May 28, 2012.
52 See “Overdue Elections Process Grows Contentious,” “President Martelly’s Administration,” above, and
International Crisis Group, Governing Haiti: Time for National Consensus, Latin America and Caribbean Report no.46,
February 4, 2013, and “Gridlock in Haiti; Our Opinion: Political infighting threatens to paralyze the recovery without
elections,” Miami Herald editorial, April 3, 2013.
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Prior to the earthquake, prominent analysts noted with optimism the progress Haiti had made and
its potential for sustainable development. In the wake of the damage wrought by the earthquake,
Haiti must recover from the enormous losses suffered and build on the advances and advantages
pointed out by these analysts.
The U.N. Security Council noted in 2009 that the country had made significant improvements in
security and judicial reform, although it still needed to contend with widespread poverty and
susceptibility to natural disasters. The two governments preceding the Martelly government (the
Préval and the preceding interim government) also made progress toward goals outlined in Haiti‘s
international assistance strategy, including improved macroeconomic management, procurement
processes, and fiscal transparency; increased voter registration; and jobs creation. The
government had also made progress in providing broader access to clean water and other
services.53
The U.N. Secretary-General also had commissioned a report, published in 2009, that
recommended a strategy to move Haiti beyond recovery to economic security.54 Many of its
findings still apply to a post-earthquake Haiti. According to the U.N. report, “the opportunities for
[economic development in] Haiti are far more favorable than those of the ‘fragile states’ with
which it is habitually grouped.” The report’s author, economist Paul Collier, is known for his
book, The Bottom Billion, which explores why there is poverty and how it can be reduced.
Among his reasons for optimism regarding Haiti: Haiti is part of a peaceful and prosperous
region, not a conflictive one; and while political divisions and limited capacity make governing
difficult, Collier believed that Haiti’s leadership at the time was “good by the standards of most
post-conflict situations … [exhibiting] integrity, experience and ability, and a deep concern with
the maintenance of social peace.” The U.N. report recommended that modest and focused actions
be taken to build economic security on the foundation of social stability that has been built in
Haiti in recent years. Because that stability was—and remains—fragile, the report advised that
such actions should be taken immediately and should focus on strengthening security by creating
jobs, especially in the garment and agricultural sectors; providing basic services; enhancing food
security; and fostering environmental sustainability. These strategies remain part of the post-
earthquake approach to development.
Collier and other analysts note that Haiti has an important resource in the 1.5 million Haitians
living abroad, for their remittances sent back home, technical skills, and political lobbying. The
efforts of Haitian Americans and others lobbying on Haiti’s behalf led to another advantage Haiti
has: the most advantageous access to the U.S. market for apparel of any country, through the
HOPE II Act (the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act, P.L.
110-246; see “Trade Preferences for Haiti” section below). Supporters say the HOPE Act
provides jobs and stimulates the Haitian economy. Critics worry that it exploits Haitians as a
source of cheap labor for foreign manufacturers, and hurts the agricultural economy by drawing
more people away from farming.
53 “Haiti: U.N. Council Mission reports strides in security, worrisome poverty,” States News Service, March 19, 2009.
54 Paul Collier, “Haiti: From Natural Catastrophe to Economic Security, A Report for the Secretary-General of the
United Nations,” January 2009, available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org.
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Potential for Mining
In the past year, U.S. and Canadian companies have conducted exploratory drilling in Haiti,
reporting a potential $20 billion worth of gold, copper, and silver below Haiti’s northeastern
mountains.55 While discoveries of such mineral wealth have led to economic booms in many
countries, they also bring risks such as environmental contamination, health problems, and
displacement of communities. And like many poor countries that could use the revenue from
mineral extraction, Haiti does not have the government infrastructure to enforce laws that would
regulate mining—reportedly, the last time gold was mined there was in the 1500s. The Préval
government negotiated the agreement with the only company that has full concessions; the terms
of that agreement would return to Haiti $1 out of every $2 of profits, a high return. Prime
Minister Lamothe said the government is already drafting mining legislation to establish royalties
paid to the government and safeguards for citizens and the environment in mining areas.
U.S. Policy Objectives and Assistance
Obama Administration officials have said that Haiti is a priority in its foreign policy, and the
Administration’s top priority in the Latin America and Caribbean region in terms of bilateral
foreign assistance.56 Haiti is being allotted more funds than any other country in the hemisphere.
At a hearing in April 2012, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta
Jacobson stated that the Obama Administration’s FY2013 request for the hemisphere
prioritizes assistance for Haiti to support the country’s ongoing development efforts,
focusing on: sanitation and health services to help prevent and treat cholera and other water-
borne diseases, expansion of energy infrastructure, and economic growth to increase
agricultural incomes and get Haitians back to work, and improving the government’s ability
to deliver needed services and restore faith with its people.57
Other concerns for U.S. policy regarding Haiti include the cost and effectiveness of U.S. aid;
protecting human rights; combating narcotics, arms, and human trafficking; addressing Haitian
migration; and alleviating poverty. The United States and other members of the international
community continue to support efforts to hold free and fair elections in Haiti in the belief that in
the long run they will contribute to improved governance and, eventually, improved services to
Haitian citizens and greater stability, which will allow for increased development. Congress has
given bipartisan support to this policy approach.
55 Figures and dates in this paragraph from: Associated Press, “Haiti’s New Prime Minister Says New Mining
Legislation being Drafted to Benefit Country,” Washington Post, May 15, 2012; and Martha Mendoza, “Gold! Haiti
Hopes Ore Find Will Spur Mining Boom,” Associated Press, May 12, 2012.
56 “U.S. Department of the [sic] State” [transcript of joint press conference], FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database,
July 24, 2012; and briefings, conversations with State Dept. and USAID officials, February 22, 2011, June 22, 2012;
refers to combined State Dept. and USAID funding.
57 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Testimony,
Honorable Roberta S. Jacobson, Asst. Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State,
Hearing: “Western Hemisphere Budget Review 2013: What are U.S. Priorities?,” 112th Cong., April 25, 2012.
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U.S. Assistance to Haiti
The Obama Administration’s request for FY2013 assistance for Haiti was just under $340 million.
This represented a $17.2 million decrease from FY2012 funding.
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Haiti Fiscal Years 2011 to 2013
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
Increase /
($ in thousands)
Actual
Estimate
Request
Decrease
TOTAL 380,261
357,161
339,963
-17,198
Economic Support Fund
131,000
148,281
141,000
-7281
Food for Peace Title II
44,838
23,000
23,000
-
Foreign Military Financing
1,597
-
1,600
1,600
Global Health Programs - State
156,240
141,240
131,543
-9,697
Global Health Programs - USAID
26,946
25,000
25,100
100
International Military Education and Training
220
220
220
-
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
19,420
19,420
17,500
-1,920
Source: U.S. Dept. of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Annex: Regional
Perspectives, Fiscal Year 2013, p. 797.
FY2013 foreign assistance is being funded through a continuing resolution (P.L. 113-6), however,
which funds most accounts at the FY2012 enacted level. Furthermore, sequestration required by
the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25), as amended by the American Taxpayer Relief Act
of 2012 (P.L. 112-240/H.R. 8, signed into law January 2, 2013), is currently in effect and requires
an across-the-board reduction from the FY2013 enacted funding level. Given uncertainty over the
country allocations that would be used as the base line to calculate the sequestration, CRS is
unable to calculate post-sequestration funding levels for Haiti. A possible rough estimate could be
reached by reducing FY2012 estimates by 5%; that would assume that all cuts would be even
across the board, which they will not necessarily be.
U.S. assistance to Haiti focuses on the four key sectors outlined in the Action Plan for
Reconstruction and National Development of Haiti, with funding directed towards infrastructure
and energy projects, governance and rule-of-law programs, programs for health and other basic
services, and food and economic security programs. The Administration’s approach is detailed in
its “Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy toward Renewal and Economic Opportunity.” Figure 2
shows the distribution of reconstruction and development spending by type of program.
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Figure 2. U.S. Government Post-Earthquake Assistance in Haiti
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, February 11, 2013.
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Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns
The Administration said in 2012 that across the four areas of aid, “funds are moving, existing
programs are making progress, and new programs are coming to fruition.”58 The Administration
also stated, however, that the protracted absence of an empowered prime minister and the lapse of
the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission impeded progress of the plan’s implementation.59 These
issues—political gridlock and weak coordination—continue to be impediments to carrying out
U.S. aid programs.
Temporary Protected Status60
Over the years, after various domestic crises, Haitians repeatedly sought Temporary Protected
Status (TPS), which would allow them to remain in the United States without threat of
deportation for a specific amount of time. The Haitian government and others argued that the
return of deportees would contribute to instability and be a further drain on already inadequate
services, and that Haiti depends on the remittances those in the United States send back to Haiti.
Opponents of TPS argued that granting it could encourage a wave of new immigrants. After
2010’s devastating earthquake, the United States granted TPS to Haitians living in the United
States at the time of the disaster. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet
Napolitano has extended TPS through July 22, 2014, and allowed eligible Haitians who came to
the United States up to one year after the earthquake to be granted TPS. The policy of interdicting
Haitian migrants on the high seas and returning them to Haiti continues.
Congressional Response and Concerns
There has been bipartisan support in Congress to assist Haiti both before and since the
earthquake. In the years preceding the earthquake, Congress passed several bills, in addition to
appropriations bills, to support Haiti. This included a series of trade preferences for Haiti, which
are described in more detail below. Another issue of concern to Congress has been efforts to
ensure that free, fair, and safe elections are held in Haiti. As mentioned above (see “Overdue
Elections ”), one-third of the Haitian Senate seats expired on May 8, 2012. These and local
elections for municipal councils, town delegates, and other posts, which are more than a year
overdue, have yet to be scheduled. Other congressional concerns include post-earthquake
reconstruction; transparency and accountability of the Haitian government; respect for human
rights, particularly for women; security issues, including Martelly’s proposal to reconstitute the
Haitian army; and counternarcotics efforts.
Post-Earthquake Reconstruction
In the aftermath of the earthquake, Congress appropriated $2.9 billion for aid to Haiti in the 2010
supplemental appropriations bill (P.L. 111-212).61 This included $1.6 billion for relief efforts, $1.1
58 Dept. of State, “Report to Congress: Assessment of the U.S. Government Haiti Rebuilding and Development
Strategy,” February 29, 2012, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/185118.pdf
59 Dept. of State, “Report to Congress: Assessment of the U.S. Government Haiti Rebuilding and Development
Strategy,” June 6, 2012, http://www.state.gov/s/hsc/rpt/191881.htm.
60 For further information, see CRS Report RS21349, U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants, by Ruth Ellen
Wasem.
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billion for reconstruction, and $147 million for diplomatic operations. Since then, Congress has
expressed concern about the pace and effectiveness of U.S. aid to Haiti. According to the U.N.
Special Envoy for Haiti’s office, of the approximately $1.2 billion the United States pledged at
the 2010 donors conference for aid to Haiti, 19% had been disbursed as of March 2012, and about
33% as of December 2012. All donors had pledged about $6.4 billion, and disbursed just over
45% of that as of March 2012, and disbursed 56% of it by the end of 2012.62
When looking at the broader range of funding available for Haiti, the Obama Administration says
the rate of disbursal is higher. According to USAID and the State Department, 100% of the $1.3
billion allotted for humanitarian relief assistance, and 51% of the $2.3 billion allotted for
recovery, reconstruction and development assistance had been distributed as of December 31,
2012.63 The recovery, reconstruction and development assistance includes the amount pledged at
the U.N. recovery conference (and appropriated through the FY2010 supplemental appropriations
bill), plus other appropriated fiscal year funds (base FY2010, FY2011, and FY2012), and USAID
prior year funds reallocated to meet urgent Haitian recovery and reconstruction needs. Using
these figures, the Administration calculates that it has disbursed 72% of funding available for
Haiti. (See Figure 3 below.)
(...continued)
61 For further details, see CRS Report R41232, FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and
Other Programs, coordinated by Amy Belasco, and CRS Report R41023, Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response, by
Rhoda Margesson and Maureen Taft-Morales.
62 Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, “New York conference recovery pledge status and modalities as of [March
2012; December 2012] in USD millions,” http://www.haitispecialenvoy.org/download/International_Assistance/6-ny-
pledge-status.pdf. According to discussions with the State Dept., figures for the U.S. in the Special Envoy’s December
2012 table were as of September 30, 2012, and USG calculations for that date showed a disbursal rate of 46%.
63 USAID, Dept. of State, “Total Post-Earthquake USG Funding to Haiti Summary, All Accounts—As of December
31, 2012” (table).
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Figure 3. Total Post-Earthquake USG Funding to Haiti Summary
Al Accounts—As of December 31, 2012
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, February 11, 2013.
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While Haiti is making some progress in its overall recovery effort, enormous challenges remain.
International donors responded to the earthquake with a massive humanitarian effort. Most of the
rubble created by the earthquake has been removed and three-fourths of those living in tent
shelters have left the camps.64 Nevertheless, many criticize the pace and methods of the recovery
process regarding displaced persons. About 61,000 of those who left the camps were forcibly
evicted, and about 78,000 live on private land under threat of eviction, with the U.N. expressing
concern about the human rights violations involved in such expulsions. About 358,000 people
remain in tent shelters in almost 500 sites.65
The Caracol Industrial Park. A major element of U.S. aid to Haiti has been the development of
the Caracol Industrial Park in Haiti’s northern region. Although the region was not hit by the
earthquake, the project is part of an effort—begun before the earthquake—to “decentralize”
development, stimulating the economy and creating jobs outside of overcrowded Port-au-Prince.
The Obama Administration says the Caracol park is supposed to create 20,000 permanent jobs
initially, with the potential for up to 65,000 jobs; as of October 2012 then-Secretary of State
Hillary Rodham Clinton said about 1,000 Haitians were employed there.66
The Caracol Industrial Park has generated much controversy. According to the New York Times,
State Department officials acknowledged that they did not conduct a full inquiry into allegations
of labor and criminal law violations by Sae-A in Guatemala before choosing the company to
anchor the park.67 Environmentalists, who had marked Caracol Bay to become Haiti’s first marine
protected area, were reportedly “shocked” to learn an industrial park would be built next to it.
U.S. consultants who helped pick the site said they had not conducted an environmental analysis
before recommending the site, the Times reported, and in a follow-up study said the site posed a
high environmental risk and that, even if wastewater were treated the bay would be endangered,
and the U.S.-financed power plant would have “a ‘strongly negative’ impact on air quality.” Civil
society groups argue that the park, built on some of Haiti’s rare arable land, displaced farmers and
promotes manufacturing at the expense of agriculture.68
A Haitian government website defended the park, saying Sae-A’s Guatemalan branch took
corrective action, and that the U.S. Department of Labor has led several delegations to review the
manufacturer’s compliance with labor law.69 The Ministry of Economy and Finances said that
“environmental protection activity” was already underway, including development of a modern
wastewater treatment plant, and that “complementary alternative energy sources” were also being
pursued. As for the agricultural issues, the government said the farmers were given compensation
64Dept. of State, Office of the Haiti Special Coordinator, “Fast Facts on the U.S. Government’s Work in Haiti: Rubble,”
and “Fast Facts on the U.S. Government’s Work in Haiti: Shelter and Housing,” January 16, 2013.
65 Oxfam, Salt in the Wound: The Urgent Need to Prevent Forced Evictions from Camps in Haiti, December 10, 2012,
p. 3; and The Caribbean Journal, “Haiti: UN ‘Concerned’ over Forced Evictions of Displaced Persons,” March 12,
2013.
66 Dept. of State, Office of the Haiti Special Coordinator, “Fast Facts on the U.S. Government’s Work in Haiti: Caracol
Industrial Park,” January 16, 2013; and Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks at the Caracol Industrial Park Opening
Ceremony,” October 22, 2012.
67 Deborah Sontag, “Earthquake Relief Where Haiti Wasn’t Broken,” New York Times, July 5, 2012.
68 Briefing with Camille Chalmers, Executive Director of the Haitian Advocacy Platform for an Alternative
Development, May 22, 2012.
69 Administrator, “Fact Check- The New York Times: Earthquake Relief Where Haiti Wasn’t Broken,” Parc Industriel
de Caracol, July 6, 2012, http://www.ute.gouv.ht/caracol/en/news/3-newsflash/174-fact-check-the-new-york-times-
earthquake-relief-where-haiti-wasnt-broken.
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packages, including title to farmland elsewhere, and a U.S.-sponsored training program would
help local residents gain skills for new job opportunities.
Transparency and Accountability of the Haitian Government
As part of its concern about the effectiveness of U.S. aid to Haiti, Congress has supported efforts
over the years to improve the transparency and accountability of the Haitian government’s
spending. Congress prohibited certain aid to the central government of any country that does not
meet minimum standards of fiscal transparency through the foreign assistance appropriations act
for 2012 (P.L. 112-74). While acknowledging Haiti’s progress toward fiscal transparency, the
State Department reported that Haiti did not meet those minimum standards, but waived the
restriction on the basis of national interest. In its memorandum of justification, the Department
argued that, “Without assistance and support, Haiti could become a haven for criminal
activities…. Without sufficient job creation, Haiti could become a greater source of refugee
flows….”70
The Justification noted progress made, such as the government’s routine posting of budgetary,
public finance and investment documents and legislation online, public discussions of the draft
national budget for the first time, the increasing role of the parliament in budget oversight, and
the adoption of an integrated financial management system to track expenditures in one central
database. Some of Haiti’s transparency shortcomings include the failure to identify natural
resource revenues in the budget; inadequate access to contracting procedures for investors trying
to engage in public procurement; extra-budgetary spending; and the lack of skill within the
Supreme Audit Authority to carry out its oversight of public enterprises.
Respect for Human Rights
Congress has long advocated for the respect for human rights in Haiti, which has improved
dramatically under civilian democratic government. The government is no longer an agent of
officially sanctioned and executed violations of human rights. Nonetheless, many problems
remain. According to the U.S. Department of State’s Human Rights report from 2012:
The most serious human rights problems included abuses by government security forces and
representatives of the judiciary, including extrajudicial killings by police and government
officials; allegations of sexual exploitation by members of MINUSTAH; and chronic, severe
corruption in all branches of government.
Other human rights problems included torture and excessive use of force against suspects
and prisoners; overcrowding and poor sanitation in prisons; prolonged pretrial detention; an
inefficient, unreliable, and inconsistent judiciary subject to significant outside and personal
influence; rape, other violence, and societal discrimination against women; child abuse; and
human trafficking. In addition there were multiple incidents of mob violence and vigilante
retribution against both government security forces and ordinary citizens, including setting
houses on fire, burning police stations, throwing rocks, beheadings, and lynchings.71
70 U.S. Dept. of State, Action Memo for Deputy Secretary Nides, Haiti—Fiscal Transparency National Interest Waiver
Request and Determination of Progress, undated (2012, probably August-October).
71 U.S. Dept. of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: Haiti, May 24, 2012,
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dynamic_load_id=186522.
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The U.N. Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, Michel Forst, made a
blunt assessment of the current state of human rights in Haiti in his final address before the U.N.’s
Human Rights Council. Before stepping down from the position he said, “I cannot, and I do not
want to hide from you my anxiety and disappointment regarding developments in the fields of the
rule of law and human rights….”72 Saying that “impunity reigns,” the human rights expert said,
“It is inconceivable that, under the rule of law, those responsible for enforcing the law feel
authorized not to respect the law and that such behavior goes unanswered by the judicial system.”
Forst strongly criticized the nomination of magistrates for political ends, citing the case in which
he said the current Minister of Justice appointed a judge especially for the purpose of ordering the
release of Calixte Valentin, a presidential adviser being held in preventive detention on a murder
charge. His statement bemoaned threats against journalists, arbitrary and illegal arrests, and the
failure to implement identified solutions that would improve conditions in the Haitian prison—
which he said “remains a cruel, inhuman and degrading place.” He expressed his wish that the
Martelly administration take up the work of the Ministry of Justice under President Préval in the
revision of the penal code. Forst applauded the strong efforts of the Préval and Martelly
administrations in strengthening the police, with international support, and the renewed public
confidence in the police. He noted persisting problems however, commenting that the case of a
person tortured to death in a police station in a Port-au-Prince suburb was not an isolated incident.
The human rights specialist also noted positive developments in human rights, including the role
played by the Office of Citizen Protection, Haiti’s human rights ombudsman, in promoting
respect for human rights, and a strong civil society with professional human rights organizations
advocating for issues such as women’s rights and food security. Forst also praised the
appointment of a Minister for Human Rights and the Fight against Extreme Poverty.
An aide to the Prime Minister, George Henry Honorat, was killed March 23, 2013, in a drive-by
shooting. Motives are not known, but Honorat was also the editor in chief for a weekly
newspaper, Haiti Progres, and was secretary general of the Popular National Party that opposed
the Duvalier regimes.
Investigations of Duvalier and Aristide for Human Rights Violations
Legal proceedings against both former dictator Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier and former
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide pose extremely challenging tests of Haiti’s judicial system, and
its ability to prosecute human rights abuses and other crimes. As mentioned above, about a third
of U.S. assistance to Haiti supports governance and rule-of-law programs, which include judicial
reform and strengthening.
After Duvalier’s unexpected return from exile in 2011, private citizens filed charges of human
rights violations against him for abuses they allege they suffered under his 15-year regime. In
2012 a judge ruled that Duvalier could be tried for corruption, but that a statute of limitations
would prevent him from being tried for any murder claims. A judge was due to hear an appeal
against that decision in February 2013. International organizations argue that under international
72 “Departing UN official blasts Haiti’s human rights record in open letter,” AP, March 28, 2013; “Michel Forst vide
son sac,” Le Nouvelliste, March 27, 2013, at http://lenouvelliste.com/article4.php?newsid=115004, author’s translation;
U.N. Office at Geneva, “Council Holds Interactive Dialogue with Independent Experts on the Situation of Human
Rights in Cote d’Ivoire and in Haiti,” March 19, 2013.
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law, to which Haiti is bound, there is no statute of limitations for crimes against humanity such as
political torture, disappearances and murder. Duvalier repeatedly failed to appear in court, then,
under threat of arrest from the judge, appeared in court on February 28, much to the astonishment
of many observers. When asked about murders, political imprisonment, summary execution and
forced exile under his government, the former dictator replied that “Murders exist in all countries;
I did not intervene in the activities of the police.”73 For almost two years after his return, Duvalier
was not allowed to leave the country, but in December 2012 the Martelly government re-issued
his diplomatic passport.74
The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights has offered to help Haitian authorities prosecute
crimes committed during Duvalier’s rule.75 U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon called on the
international community to continue to work with the Haitian government to bring about systemic
rule-of-law reform, saying that
the return of Jean-Claude Duvalier has brought the country’s turbulent history of State-
sponsored violence to the fore. It is of vital importance that the Haitian authorities pursue all
legal and judicial avenues in this matter. The prosecution of those responsible for crimes
against their own people will deliver a clear message to the people of Haiti that there can be
no impunity. It will also be incumbent upon the incoming Administration to build on the
achievements of the Préval presidency, which put an end to State-sponsored political
violence and allowed Haitians to enjoy freedom of association and expression.76
Former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide is also facing charges since his return in March 2011. A
small group of people has filed a complaint against Aristide, alleging they were physically abused
and used to raise money when they were children in the care of Aristide’s Fanmi se Lavi
organization, created in the late 1980s to house and educate homeless children. A prosecutor
questioned Aristide on January 9. Now a court must decide whether to dismiss the case or refer it
to a judge to decide whether to file formal charges.
On May 8 Aristide testified before a judge regarding an investigation into the murder of
prominent Haitian journalist Jean Dominique in 2000. Thousands of supporters followed his
motorcade through the capital. Earlier in the year, former President Rene Préval, who was in
office at the time of the murder, also testified in the case. Both men were once friends of
Dominique. At the time of his death Dominique was seen as a possible presidential candidate;
Aristide was already preparing to run for a second term. Dominique’s widow, Michele Montas, is
a former journalist and U.N. spokeswoman. She says, “The investigation has led to people close
to the high levels of the Lavalas Family party that Aristide headed….I am sure he knows who did
it.” Several people allegedly involved in the assassination and witnesses have been killed or
disappeared over the years.77
73 “Haiti-Duvalier: Everything that was said at the hearing of 28 February,” HaitiLibre.com, March 2, 2013.
74 Trenton Daniel, “Attorney: Haiti’s ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier hospitalized,” Associated Press, March 4, 2013.
75 United Nations Radio, UN offers to help Haitian authorities prosecute Duvalier, February 1, 2011,
http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/detail/112772.html.
76 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, March
24, 2011, S/2011/183, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d9448d32.html, paragraphs 81-82.
77 Susana Ferreira, “Ex-Haiti leader Aristide Testifies on Assassination; Statement to aid Investigation into Journalists’s
Death,” Chicago Tribune.
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Because the judicial system is not fully independent, the attitudes of the president could have a
large impact on any judicial process. As a candidate, Martelly called for clemency for the former
leaders, saying that, “If I come to power, I would like all the former presidents to become my
advisors in order to profit from their experience.”78 He also said he was “ready” to work with
officials who had served under the Duvalier regimes, 79 and adult children of Duvalierists hold
high positions in his government.80 Since becoming president, Martelly has repeated the
possibility that he would pardon Duvalier, citing a need for national reconciliation.81 He retracted
at least one of those statements, and Prime Minister Lamothe recently stated that the Haitian state
is not pursuing a pardon for Duvalier.82
The U.N.’s Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, Kyung-wha Kang, in a visit to Port-
au-Prince in July 2011, urged the creation of a truth commission, which she said would help
promote national reconciliation in Haiti.
The U.N. expert on human rights in Haiti, Michel Forst, called the appearance of former president
Jean-Claude Duvalier before the Haitian courts a victory for the rule of law. He also said that
despite assurances “at the highest level of State” that the executive branch would not interfere in
the judicial proceedings, that “that unfortunately was not the case.”83
Curbing Violence against Women
Some Members of Congress have expressed special concern about violence against women in
Haiti. Discrimination against women has been practiced in Haiti throughout its history. The
widespread nature and Haitian society’s tolerance of this sexual discrimination, says the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, “has in turn fueled brutal acts of violence and abuse
towards women on a regular basis.”
Gender-based or sexual violence against women and girls has been described by many sources for
many years as common and under-reported in Haiti. The most prevalent forms of this violence are
domestic abuse, rape—sometimes as a political weapon—and childhood slavery. Violence against
women has also included murder. Haitian girls and women in the poor majority are at particular
risk of violence. The issue gained new attention after the earthquake, when women in tent camps
became especially vulnerable to gender-based violence. Haitian government enforcement of or
adherence to its obligations to protect rights that would protect women and girls from gender-
based or sexual violence in particular is weak and inadequate.
The Martelly Administration has dramatically increased the budget of the Ministry for Women’s
Affairs and Rights, which is responsible for developing national equality policies and the
advancement of women. The FY2012 budget for the Ministry is US$40.76 million, an increase of
828.2% (from 0.17% of the government’s budget in FY2011 to 1.41% in FY2012). Reportedly,
78 Clarens Renois, “Haiti politicians hope for reconciliation,” Agence France Presse, January 21, 2011, http://www.abs-
cbnnews.com/global-filipino/world/01/21/11/haiti-politicians-hope-reconciliation
79 “Haitian candidate open to including Duvalier officials,” Agence France Presse, March 2, 2011.
80 Jacqueline Charles, “The Case against Haiti’s ‘Baby Doc’,” Miami Herald, February 27, 2013.
81 Niko Price, “Haitian Leader Could Pardon Duvalier,” Associated Press, January 27, 2012.
82 Statement at Center for Strategic and International Studies, Statesmen’s Forum, April 18, 2013.
83 “Michel Forst vide son sac,” op.cit.
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the ministry has plans to introduce comprehensive legislation to prevent and eliminate violence
against women and girls this year, but has not done so yet.
Security and the Debate over Reestablishing the Haitian Army
For years, Congress has expressed concern over citizen security in Haiti. Congress has supported
various U.N. missions in Haiti, and the professionalization and strengthening of the Haitian
National Police force and other elements of Haiti’s judicial system in order to improve security
conditions in Haiti. In what has proven to be a very controversial move, President Martelly has
proposed recreating the Haitian army to replace MINUSTAH in a few years. The army, which
committed gross violations of human rights over decades, according to numerous reports by the
State Department, the OAS Inter-American Human Rights Commission, Amnesty International,
and others, was disbanded by President Aristide in 1995. Martelly’s plan calls for creation of a
3,500-member army84 to be built over three and a half years, at a cost of approximately $95
million, including $15 million to compensate former soldiers who were discharged.85
Parliament would have to approve recreating the force. The majority Inité coalition said the
government cannot afford an army, and should further develop the Haitian National Police, which
MINUSTAH is already training to assume its functions.86 The United States and other
international donors support reform and capacity building in the police force, which currently
numbers about 10,000, as the best means of continuing to improve citizen security. Others have
also suggested establishing civilian corps to carry out disaster response and other duties Martelly
is proposing for the army. In January 2012 Martelly reportedly acknowledged that a new army
wasn’t realistic, but also pledged to build a new Haitian security force of 3,000-5,000 members. It
was not clear what difference there was between an army and a new security force.87
Former members of the Haitian army and would-be soldiers have protested in favor of
reestablishing the army, and in 2012 occupying 10 old military bases. About 50 of them, wearing
fatigues and some bearing arms, disrupted a session of parliament in April 2012 to voice their
demands. After months of inaction, and under pressure from the U.N., the Haitian government
closed the occupied bases and arrested dozens of pro-army protesters—including two U.S.
citizens—after a march turned violent in May 2012.88
A U.N. Security Council mission to Haiti lamented the slow pace of police strengthening and
worried that it could foster pro-army sentiments:
Although the performance of the Haitian National Police has been slowly improving, … it
still lacks the quantity and quality of personnel necessary to assume full responsibility for
internal security…. The pace of recruitment, vetting and training, however, has been
84 “Haiti president wants to start recruiting new army,” Agence France Presse, September 28, 2011.
85 “Martelly moves ahead with plan to restore army,” Latin American Caribbean & Central America Report, RC-11-10,
October 2011, p. 16.
86 Ibid.
87 Niko Price, “Haitian Leader Could Pardon Duvalier,” Associated Press, January 27, 2012.
88 Associated Press, “Mass. Man Jailed in Haiti Could Face Three Years behind Bars,” CBS Boston, May 24, 2012,
http://boston.cbslocal.com/2012/05/24/mass-man-jailed-in-haiti-could-face-three-years-behind-bars/. The two men are
Jason William Petrie of Ohio, and Steven Parker Shaw of Massachusetts. If convicted of conspiracy charges, the two
could face up to three years in prison according to a Haitian prosecutor.
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unsatisfactory. The mission was informed that the start of training for the next group of
cadets was delayed owing to funding shortfalls and other administrative difficulties. The
mission heard accounts that the slower-than-expected pace of development of the Haitian
police risks fuelling support among certain Haitian sectors for the near-term creation of a
national army.89
Counternarcotics
President Obama designated Haiti as a major drug trafficking country in 2012, in large part
because of its weak counternarcotics capacity in general, and the lack of virtually any law
enforcement capacity along its southern coastline facing the Caribbean. Haiti is a transit point for
cocaine being shipped by both sea and air from South America, and for marijuana coming from
Jamaica to the United States, Canada, Europe, and other Caribbean countries. Some drugs are
also sent through Haiti by land to the Dominican Republic. Weak institutions, poorly protected
borders and coastlines, and widespread corruption are conditions that make Haiti attractive to
drug traffickers and make it difficult for Haiti to combat trafficking.
Nonetheless, the Haitian government has committed itself to combating narcotics trafficking in
recent years. According to the State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report (INCSR) published in March 2013, the Martelly Administration is planning to strengthen
the Haitian National Police to make them more effective in counternarcotics efforts, approving a
new five-year development plan for the Haitian National Police (HNP) which will expand the
counternarcotics unit to 200 officers90. The Obama Administration worked with other donors to
update the development plan for the Haitian Coast Guard, and coordinate international efforts.
Although corruption is a widespread problem, the State Department reports that the government
does not encourage or facilitate distribution of illicit drugs or the laundering of drug trafficking
profits, and has fully staffed the HNP Inspectorate General at the upper leadership level for the
first time in its 17-year history. Low pay and widespread poverty make low-level police and other
officials vulnerable to bribery, however. The State Department has noted in the past that Haitian
law enforcement officials cannot investigate allegations that some legislators may be involved in
illicit activities because the constitution provides them with blanket immunity. The 2013 INCSR
adds that “… resource shortages, a lack of expertise, and insufficient political will represent
substantial obstacles to anti-corruption efforts.”
Since 2008, Congress has included counternarcotics funds for Haiti in regional initiatives in
addition to bilateral funding—first through the Merida Initiative, and then through the Caribbean
Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). The Merida aid package aimed to “combat drug trafficking and
related violence and organized crime.”91 Although the Merida Initiative initially included Central
America, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, its main focus was Mexico. CBSI, launched by the
Obama Administration in 2010, is a regional security effort by the United States and Caribbean
nations aiming to reduce illicit trafficking, advance public safety and security, and promote social
89 U.N. Security Council, Report of the Security Council Mission to Haiti, 13-16 February 2012, S/2012/534, July 11,
2012, p. 3.
90 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Vol. I, Drug and Chemical Control,
“Haiti,” March 5, 2013.
91 U.S. Department of State, The Merida Initiative, U.S.-SICA Dialogue on Security, December 11-12, 2008,
Washington, DC, December 2008, p. 3, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB861.pdf.
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justice.92 U.S. counternarcotics programs in Haiti aim to enhance the professionalism and
capability of the Haitian National Police. Such support ranges from providing police cadets with
food and uniforms, to training in community-oriented policing and investigation methodology, to
renovation of an operating base for the police’s counternarcotics unit, joint enforcement
operations, and support of five Haitian Coast Guard vessels.93 In its 2013 report the
Administration concludes that, “despite progress, the tempo of drug enforcement actions in Haiti
remains stubbornly low.”
Trade Preferences for Haiti
Congress passed several bills, before and after the earthquake, to provide trade preferences for
Haiti. In 2006 Congress passed the HOPE Act, or the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through
Partnership Encouragement Act (P.L. 109-432, Title V), providing trade preferences for U.S.
imports of Haitian apparel. The act allows duty-free entry to specified apparel articles 50% of
which were made and/or assembled in Haiti, the United States, or a country that is either a
beneficiary of a U.S. trade preference program, or party to a U.S. free trade agreement (for the
first three years; the percentage became higher after that). The act requires ongoing Haitian
compliance with certain conditions, including making progress toward establishing a market-
based economy, the rule of law, elimination of trade barriers, economic policies to reduce poverty,
a system to combat corruption, and protection of internationally recognized worker rights. It also
stipulates that Haiti not engage in activities that undermine U.S. national security or foreign
policy interests, or in gross violations of human rights.
Those trade preferences were expanded in 2008 with passage of the second HOPE Act as part of
the 2008 farm bill (Title XV, P.L. 110-246), in response to a food crisis and then-President
Préval’s calls for increased U.S. investment in Haiti.94 HOPE II, as it is commonly referred to,
extended tariff preferences through 2018, simplified the act’s rules, extended the types of fabric
eligible for duty-free status, and permitted qualifying apparel to be shipped from the Dominican
Republic as well as from Haiti. The act mandated creation of a program to monitor labor
conditions in the apparel sector, and of a Labor Ombudsman to ensure the sector complies with
internationally recognized worker rights.
Congress again amended the HOPE Act after the 2010 earthquake. Through the HELP, or Haiti
Economic Lift Program Act (P.L. 111-171), Congress made the HOPE trade preferences more
flexible and expansive, and extended them through September 2020. Supporters of these trade
preferences maintain that they will encourage foreign investment and create jobs. Others argue
that while the textile manufacturing sector may create jobs, some of the new industrial parks are
being built on arable land and putting more farmers out of jobs, and that the manufacturing sector
is being supported at the expense of the agricultural sector.95
92 U.S. Department of State, Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cbsi/, undated, after
November 10, 2011, June 22, 2012.
93 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Vol. I, Drug and Chemical Control,
March 2012, pp. 247-250, and March 5, 2013.
94 For more information see CRS Report RL34687, The Haitian Economy and the HOPE Act, by J. F. Hornbeck.
95 Briefing with Camille Chalmers, Executive Director of the Haitian Advocacy Platform for an Alternative
Development, May 22, 2012.
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Legislation Passed in the 112th Congress
P.L. 112-74 [H.R.2055]. Under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, none of the funds
appropriated under Title III—bilateral economic assistance; Title IV—international security
assistance; Title V—multilateral assistance; Title VI—export and investment assistance; or Title
VIII—overseas contingency operations may be obligated or expended for assistance to Haiti
except as provided through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on
Appropriations. Haiti is deemed eligible to purchase defense articles and services under the Arms
Export Control for the Coast Guard. Prior to the initial obligation of funds, the Secretary of State,
in consultation with the Administrator of the USAID, shall submit to the Committees on
Appropriations a detailed spend plan for bilateral economic assistance and international security
assistance for Haiti. The bill authorizes specified funds to be made available for the Fund for
Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank for debt relief to Haiti. The act also
prohibits funds appropriated by it from being disbursed for a U.S. contribution to the general
capital increases of the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank until the Secretary
of the Treasury reports to the Committees on Appropriations that they are making substantial
progress toward implementing specific reform commitments agreed to by the World Bank in 2009
concerning sound finances, effective management and governance, transparency and
accountability, focus on core mission, and results, and agreed to by the IDB in 2010, including
transfers of at least $200,000,000 annually to a grant facility for Haiti. Signed into law December
23, 2011.
P.L. 112-234 [S.3315]. The GAO Mandates Revision Act of 2012 eliminated the requirement that
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) annually review the program that governs the
earned import allowance rule applicable to Haiti under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery
Act. The GAO’s mandate had been to evaluate the effectiveness of, and make recommendations
for improvements in, the program. (The GAO published several such reports from 2010-2012.96)
Signed into law December 28, 2012.
Legislation in the 113th Congress
H.R. 1525. Save America Comprehensive Immigration Act of 2013, would amend the
Immigration and Nationality Act with (among other things), Title XI, Haitian Parity, to adjust the
status of certain Haitian nationals present in the United States for at least one year to permanent
resident status, at the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, under certain conditions.
It would also amend the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998 (8 U.S.C. 1255 note)
regarding Determinations with Respect to Children, and New Applications and Motions to
Reopen. It would also express the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of Homeland Security
should be more liberal with respect to Haiti in deciding whether to designate that country for
temporary protected status. Introduced April 12, 2013, referred to House Committees on
Judiciary; Homeland Security; Oversight and Government Reform; referred to Subcommittee on
Immigration and Border Security April 30.
96 GAO: Exporters’ Use of the Earned Import Allowance Program for Haiti Is Negligible because They Favor Other
Trade Provisions, GAO-10-654, Jun 16, 2010; Earned Import Allowance Program for Haiti, GAO-12-204R, Nov 30,
2011; and Follow-up on the Haiti Earned Import Allowance Program, GAO-13-219R, Dec 14, 2012.
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H.R. 1749. Assessing Progress in Haiti Act, to measure the progress of recovery and development
efforts in Haiti following the earthquake of January 12, 2010, and for other purposes. Introduced,
referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, April 25, 2013.
H.Res. 31. Would recognize the anniversary of the tragic earthquake in Haiti on January 12,
2010, honoring those who lost their lives, and expressing continued solidarity with the Haitian
people. Introduced January15, 2013, referred to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere February 25, 2013.
H.Res. 61. Would express the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States should
work with the Government of Haiti to address gender-based violence against women and
children. Introduced February 6, 2013; referred to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
the Western Hemisphere on February 25, 2013.
S.Res. 12. Would recognize the third anniversary of the tragic earthquake in Haiti on January 12,
2010, honoring those who lost their lives in that earthquake, and expressing continued solidarity
with the people of Haiti. Introduced January 24, 2013; agreed to in Senate with an amendment
and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent on March 11, 2013.
Author Contact Information
Maureen Taft-Morales
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
mtmorales@crs.loc.gov, 7-7659
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