Russian Political, Economic, and
Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Jim Nichol, Coordinator
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
April 29, 2013
Congressional Research Service
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www.crs.gov
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CRS Report for Congress
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epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Summary
Russia made uneven progress in democratization during the 1990s, but this limited progress was
reversed after Vladimir Putin rose to power in 1999-2000, according to many observers. During
this period, the State Duma (lower legislative chamber) became dominated by government-
approved parties, gubernatorial elections were abolished, and the government consolidated
ownership or control over major media and industries, including the energy sector. The Putin
government showed low regard for the rule of law and human rights in suppressing insurgency in
the North Caucasus, according to critics. Dmitriy Medvedev, Putin’s longtime protégé, was
elected president in 2008; President Medvedev immediately designated Putin as prime minister
and continued Putin’s policies. In August 2008, the Medvedev-Putin “tandem†directed military
operations against Georgia and recognized the independence of Georgia’s separatist South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, actions condemned by most of the international community. In late 2011, Putin
announced that he would return to the presidency and that Medvedev would become prime
minister. This announcement, and flawed Duma elections at the end of the year, spurred popular
protests, which the government addressed by launching some reforms and holding pro-Putin
rallies. In March 2012, Putin was (re)elected president by a wide margin. The day after Putin’s
inauguration on May 7, the legislature confirmed Medvedev as prime minister. Since then, Putin
appears to be tightening restrictions on freedom of assembly and other human rights.
Russia’s Economy
Russia’s economy began to recover from the Soviet collapse in 1999, led mainly by oil and gas
exports, but the decline in oil and gas prices and other aspects of the global economic downturn
beginning in 2008 contributed to an 8% drop in gross domestic product in 2009. Since then, rising
world oil prices have bolstered the economy. Russian economic growth continues to be dependent
on oil and gas exports. The economy is also plagued by an unreformed healthcare system and
unhealthy lifestyles; low domestic and foreign investment; and high rates of crime, corruption,
capital flight, and unemployment.
Russia’s Armed Forces
Russia’s armed forces now number less than 1 million, down from 4.3 million Soviet troops in
1986. Troop readiness, training, morale, and discipline have suffered, and much of the arms
industry has become antiquated. Russia’s economic growth during most of the 2000s allowed it to
increase defense spending to begin addressing these problems. Stepped-up efforts have begun to
restructure the armed forces and improve their quality. Opposition from some in the armed forces,
mismanagement, and corruption seemingly have slowed this restructuring.
U.S. – Russia Relations
After the Soviet Union’s collapse, the United States sought a cooperative relationship with
Moscow and supplied almost $19 billion in aid for Russia from FY1992 through FY2010 to
encourage democracy and market reforms and in particular to prevent the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the past, U.S.-Russia tensions on issues such as NATO
enlargement and proposed U.S. missile defenses in Eastern Europe were accompanied by some
cooperation between the two countries on anti-terrorism and nonproliferation. Russia’s 2008
conflict with Georgia, however, threatened such cooperation. The Obama Administration has
worked to “re-set†relations with Russia and has hailed such steps as the signing of a new
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Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in April 2010; the approval of new sanctions against Iran by
Russia and other members of the U.N. Security Council in June 2010; the accession of Russia to
the World Trade Organization on August 22, 2012; and the cooperation of Russia in Afghanistan
as signifying the “re-set†of bilateral relations. However, in late 2012, Russia ousted the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) from the country, and criticized the help that
USAID had provided over the years as unnecessary or intrusive. H.R. 6156 (Camp), authorizing
permanent normal trade relations for Russia, was signed into law on December 14, 2012 (P.L.
112-208). The bill includes provisions sanctioning those responsible for the detention and death
of lawyer Sergey Magnitsky and for other gross human rights abuses in Russia.
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Contents
Most Recent Developments ............................................................................................................. 1
Post-Soviet Russia and Its Significance for the United States ......................................................... 2
Political and Human Rights Developments ..................................................................................... 3
Background................................................................................................................................ 3
Putin’s First Two Presidential Terms: The Tightening of Presidential Power ........................... 4
The 2008-2012 Medvedev-Putin “Tandem†.............................................................................. 5
The Run-Up to the 2011-2012 Elections ............................................................................. 6
Putin’s September 2011 Announcement of Candidacy for the Presidency ......................... 6
The December 4, 2011, State Duma Election ..................................................................... 7
The March 2012 Presidential Election and Its Aftermath ................................................... 9
President Putin Redux ............................................................................................................. 10
Human Rights Problems and Issues ........................................................................................ 13
The Magnitsky Case .......................................................................................................... 13
Retaliating Against the Magnitsky Act: Russia’s Dima Yakovlev Act .............................. 15
The Case of Punk Rockers Mariya Alekhina, Yekaterina Samutsevich, and
Nadezhda Tolokonnikova ............................................................................................... 17
Other Moves against Oppositionists.................................................................................. 18
Raids against Nongovernmental Organizations ................................................................ 20
The Elimination of the U.S.-Russia Working Group on Civil Society .............................. 20
Insurgency and Terrorism in the North Caucasus .................................................................... 21
U.S.-Russia Counter-Terrorism Cooperation on Chechnya .............................................. 24
Defense Reforms ..................................................................................................................... 26
U.S. Perspectives ............................................................................................................... 29
Trade, Economic, and Energy Issues ............................................................................................. 30
Russia and the Global Economic Crisis .................................................................................. 30
Russia’s Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and PNTR for Russia .............. 31
Russian Energy Policy ............................................................................................................. 32
Foreign Policy ................................................................................................................................ 35
Russia and the West ................................................................................................................. 35
NATO-Russia Relations .................................................................................................... 36
Russia and the European Union ........................................................................................ 38
Russia and the Soviet Successor States ................................................................................... 41
U.S.-Russia Relations .................................................................................................................... 44
The Incoming Obama Administration “Re-sets†Bilateral Relations ...................................... 45
Bilateral Relations during Obama’s Second Term ............................................................ 48
Bilateral Relations and Afghanistan ........................................................................................ 50
Bilateral Relations and Iran ..................................................................................................... 53
Russia’s Role in the Middle East Quartet ................................................................................ 57
Bilateral Relations and North Korea ....................................................................................... 60
Bilateral Relations and Syria ................................................................................................... 62
Arms Control Issues ................................................................................................................ 65
Cooperative Threat Reduction........................................................................................... 65
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ....................................................................... 66
Russia and Missile Defense ............................................................................................... 67
U.S.-Russia Economic Ties ..................................................................................................... 77
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U.S. Assistance to Russia ........................................................................................................ 79
The Ouster of the U.S. Agency for International Development ........................................ 80
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Russia, 1995-2012 ............................................................ 77
Table 2. U.S. Government Funds Budgeted for Assistance to Russia, FY1992-FY1999 .............. 81
Table 3. U.S. Government Funds Budgeted for Assistance to Russia, FY2000-FY2010 .............. 82
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 83
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 83
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Most Recent Developments
On April 15, 2013, two ethnic Chechen brothers, who had entered the United States in the early
2000s as minors (their father was granted asylum; one brother was a permanent resident, and the
other became a U.S. citizen), set off two bombs at the Boston Marathon, killing three individuals
and wounding hundreds. Both the sitting leadership of Russia’s Chechnya Republic and the
regional Caucasus Emirate terrorist organization disavowed responsibility for the attack. The
possibility that at least one of the brothers received terrorist training and guidance from the
Caucasus Emirate or other terrorist groups abroad is being investigated (see below, “Insurgency
and Terrorism in the North Caucasusâ€).
On April 12, 2013, the U.S. Treasury Department released the “Magnitsky list†of names of 18
Russians subject to visa bans and asset freezes. The Magnitsky list contains the names of
Russians involved in events leading to the death of accountant Sergey Magnitsky in Russia in
2009 or in other gross human rights violations. Most of the names are related to the Magnitsky
case and include police and tax officials and judges, but two individuals are associated with
human rights abuses in Chechnya. Besides this list, the State Department has an unreleased list of
Russians subject to visa bans in connection with the Magnitsky case and human rights abuses.
Russian presidential spokesman Dmitriy Peskov warned that the publication of the “Magnitsky
list†by the State Department would lead to a “symmetrical response†by Russia.†Media in
Russia reported that Moscow planned to release its own list of U.S. citizens to be barred from
entry. Senator Jim McGovern earlier had proposed that 240 Russians associated with the
Magnitsky case be listed. On April 12, he raised concerns that the published list was too limited,
but indicated that he had been assured by the Administration that more individuals were being
investigated for inclusion on the list. On April 13, Russia released its own list, also containing 18
names of U.S. citizens, including former Bush Administration officials and Guantanamo base
commanders allegedly implicated in torture, and lawyers and judges involved in prosecuting
Russian organized crime figures (see below, “The Magnitsky Caseâ€).
In February-March 2013, a think tank closely linked to the presidential administration and the
Foreign Intelligence Service released several videos asserting that Russia has regained its status
of a “superpower†by virtue of its aircraft building, nuclear missile technology, and cyberattacks.
The videos allege that the United States is developing shale gas, deploying missile defenses in
Europe, and fomenting revolution in Russia to weaken it. Having failed in these efforts, the
United States and other Western countries are now trying to sow self-doubts among the
population by publishing false studies on Russia’s future economic and other challenges,
according to the think tank.
At a meeting of the influential Supreme School of Economics in early April 2013, Deputy Prime
Minister for Economic Development Andrey Klepach, a holdover from Putin’s stint as prime
minister, denounced a report issued by several prominent economists that called for strengthening
the rule of law to boost economic growth. He asserted that there was no correlation between
economic growth and democratization, that corruption was not overly corrosive to growth, and
that there should be more emphasis on infrastructure improvements, education, and arms exports.
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Post-Soviet Russia and Its Significance for the
United States
Although Russia may not be as central to U.S. interests as was the Soviet Union, cooperation
between the two is essential in many areas. Russia remains a nuclear superpower. It still has a
major impact on U.S. national security interests in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Russia has
an important role in the future of arms control, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), and the fight against terrorism.
Russia is a potentially important trading partner. Russia is the only country in the world with a
greater range and scope of natural resources than the United States, including oil and gas
reserves. It is the world’s second-largest producer and exporter of oil (after Saudi Arabia) and the
world’s largest exporter of natural gas. It has a large, well-educated labor force and scientific
establishment. Also, many of Russia’s needs—food and food processing, oil and gas extraction
technology, computers, communications, transportation, and investment capital—are in areas in
which the United States is highly competitive, although bilateral trade remains relatively low.1
1 According to the National Intelligence Council, Russia will face growing domestic and international challenges over
the next two decades. It will need to diversify and modernize its economy, but the percentage of its working-age
population will decline substantially. Under various scenarios, its economy will remain very small compared to the
U.S. economy. Social tensions may increase as the percentage of Muslims increases in the population to about 19%.
Putin’s legacy of mistrust toward the West could stifle the country’s integration into the world economy and
cooperation on global issues, and increasing militarism could pose threats to other Soviet successor states. See Global
Trends 2030: Alternative Futures, December 2012.
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Political and Human Rights Developments
Russia: Basic Facts
Background
Area and Population: Land area is 6.6 million sq. mi.,
about 1.8 times the size of the United States. The
Russia is a multi-ethnic state with over 100
population is 142.5 million (The World Factbook, mid-2013
nationalities and a complex federal structure
est.). Administrative subdivisions include 46 regions, 21
inherited from the Soviet period that includes
republics, 9 territories, and 7 others.
regions, republics, territories, and other
Ethnicity: Russian 79.8%; Tatar 3.8%; Ukrainian 2%;
subunits. During Boris Yeltsin’s presidency,
Bashkir 1.2%; Chuvash 1.1%; other 12.1% (2002 census).
many of the republics and regions won greater
Gross Domestic Product: $2.5 trillion; per capita
autonomy. Only the Chechen Republic,
GDP is about $17,700 (World Factbook, 2012 est.,
however, tried to assert complete
purchasing power parity).
independence. During his presidency,
Political Leaders: President: Vladimir Putin; Prime
Vladimir Putin reversed this trend and rebuilt
Minister: Dmitriy Medvedev; Speaker of the State Duma:
the strength of the central government vis-Ã -
Sergey Naryshkin; Speaker of the Federation Council:
vis the regions. In coming decades, the
Valentina Matviyenko; Foreign Minister: Sergey Lavrov;
Defense Minister: Gen. Sergey Shoygu.
percentage of ethnic Russians is expected to
decline because of relatively greater birthrates
Biography: Putin, born in 1952, received a law degree
among non-Russian groups and in-migration
in 1975 from Leningrad State University (LSU) and a
candidate’s degree in economics in 1997 from the St.
by non-Russians. In many of Russia’s ethnic-
Petersburg Mining Institute. In 1975, he joined the
based republics and autonomous regions,
Committee for State Security (KGB), and was stationed
ethnic Russians are becoming a declining
in East Germany from 1985 to 1990. In 1990-1991, he
share of the population, resulting in the titular
worked at Leningrad State University and the Leningrad
city council. He resigned from the KGB in 1991. From
nationalities becoming the majority
1991-1996, he worked with St. Petersburg Mayor
populations. Implications may include
Anatoliy Sobchak, and became first deputy mayor.
changes in domestic and foreign policies
Starting in 1996, he worked in Moscow on property
under the influence of previously marginalized
management, and then on federal relations, under then-
ethnic groups, including the revitalization of
President Boris Yeltsin. In 1998-1999, he was chief of the
Federal Security Service (a successor agency of the
Yeltsin-era moves toward federal devolution.
KGB). In August 1999, he was confirmed as prime
Alternatively, an authoritarian Russian central
minister, and became acting president on December 31,
government that carries out chauvinist policies
1999. He won election as president in 2000 and was
could contribute to rising ethnic conflict and
reelected in 2004. From 2008-2012 he was prime
even separatism.
minister; he was reelected president in 2012.
The Russian Constitution combines elements of the U.S., French, and German systems, but with
an even stronger presidency. Among its more distinctive features are the ease with which the
president can dissolve the legislature and call for new elections and the obstacles preventing the
legislature from dismissing the government in a vote of no confidence. The president, with the
legislature’s approval, appoints a prime minister who heads the government. The president and
prime minister appoint government ministers and other officials. The prime minister and
government are accountable to the president rather than the legislature. In November 2008,
constitutional amendments extended the presidential term to six years and the term of State Duma
(lower legislative chamber) deputies from four to five years, and these provisions came into force
with the most recent Duma election in December 2011 and the most recent presidential election in
March 2012.
The bicameral legislature is called the Federal Assembly. The State Duma, the more powerful
chamber, has 450 seats. In May 2005, a law was passed that all 450 Duma seats would be filled
by party list elections, with a 7% threshold for party representation. The upper chamber, the
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Federation Council, has 166 seats, two from each of the current 83 regions and republics of the
Russian Federation. Deputies are appointed by the regional chief executive and the regional
legislature.
The judiciary is the least developed of the three branches. Some of the Soviet-era structure and
practices are still in place. Criminal code reform was completed in 2001. Trial by jury was
planned to expand to cover most cases, but instead has been restricted following instances where
state prosecutors lost high-profile cases. The Supreme Court is the highest appellate body. The
Constitutional Court rules on the legality and constitutionality of governmental acts and on
disputes between branches of government or federative entities. The courts are widely perceived
to be subject to political manipulation and control.
Putin’s First Two Presidential Terms:
The Tightening of Presidential Power
Former President Boris Yeltsin’s surprise resignation in December 1999 was a gambit to permit
then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to become acting president, in line with the constitution, and
to situate him for election as president in March 2000. Putin’s electoral prospects were enhanced
by his depiction in state-owned television and other mass media as a youthful, sober, and plain-
talking leader; and by his decisive launch of military action against the breakaway Chechnya
region (see his biography above, Russia: Basic Facts).
Putin’s priorities as president were strengthening the central government and restoring Russia’s
status as a great power. His government took nearly total control of nation-wide broadcast media,
shutting down or effectively nationalizing independent television and radio stations. In 2006, the
Russian government forced most Russian radio stations to stop broadcasting programs prepared
by the U.S.-funded Voice of America and Radio Liberty. Journalists critical of the government
have been imprisoned, attacked, and in some cases killed with impunity.
A defining political and economic event of the Putin era was the October 2003 arrest of Mikhail
Khodorkovskiy, the head of Yukos, then the world’s fourth-largest oil company. Khodorkovskiy’s
arrest was triggered by his criticism of some of Putin’s actions, his financing of political parties
that had launched substantial efforts in the Duma to oppose Putin’s policies, and his hints that he
might enter politics in the future. Khodorkovskiy’s arrest was seen by many as politically
motivated, aimed at eliminating a political enemy and making an example of him to other Russian
businessmen. In May 2005, Khodorkovskiy was found guilty on multiple criminal charges of tax
evasion and fraud and sentenced to eight years in prison. Yukos was broken up and its principal
assets sold off to satisfy alleged tax debts. Since then, the government has renationalized or
otherwise brought under its control a number of other large enterprises that it views as “strategic
assets,†and installed senior government officials to head these enterprises. This phenomenon led
some observers to conclude that “those who rule Russia, own Russia,†In December 2010,
Khodorkovskiy was found guilty in a new trial on charges of embezzlement, theft, and money-
laundering and sentenced to several additional years in prison. In February 2011, an aide to the
trial judge alleged that the conviction was a case of “telephone justice,†where the verdict had
been dictated to the court by higher authorities. In late May 2011, the Russian Supreme Court
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upheld the sentence on appeal.2 However, in December 2012, the Moscow City Court reduced the
sentence slightly, so that he may be freed in 2014.
Another pivotal event was the September 2004 terrorist attack on a primary school in the town of
Beslan, North Ossetia, that resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties. President Putin seized the
opportunity provided by the crisis to launch a number of political changes he claimed were
essential to quash terrorism. In actuality, the changes marked the consolidation of his centralized
control over the political system and the vitiation of fragile democratic reforms of the 1980s and
1990s, according to many observers. The changes included abolishing the popular election of
regional governors (replacing such elections with the appointment of presidential nominees that
are confirmed by regional legislatures) and mandating that all Duma Deputies be elected on the
basis of national party lists. The first measure made regional governors wholly dependent on, and
subservient to, the president. The second measure eliminated independent deputies, further
strengthening the pro-presidential parties that already held a majority of Duma seats. In early
2006, President Putin signed a new law regulating nongovernment organizations (NGOs), which
Kremlin critics charged has given the government leverage to shut down NGOs that it views as
politically troublesome.
The 2008-2012 Medvedev-Putin “Tandemâ€
Almost immediately after the 2007 Duma election—in which the United Russia Party, headed by
Putin, won more than two-thirds of the seats—Putin announced that his protégé Dmitriy
Medvedev was his choice for president. Medvedev announced that, if elected, he would ask Putin
to serve as prime minister. This arrangement was meant to ensure political continuity for Putin
and those around him. The Putin regime manipulated election laws and regulations to block
“inconvenient†candidates from running in the March 2008 presidential election, according to
many observers. Medvedev garnered 70% of the vote against three candidates. As with the Duma
election, the OSCE refused to submit to restrictions demanded by Moscow and did not send
electoral observers.3
Many observers had hoped that President Medvedev would be more democratic than former
President Putin. Despite some seemingly liberal statements and decisions by President Medvedev,
the main trend was a continuation of the political system honed by Putin, according to most
observers.4 In late 2008, President Medvedev proposed a number of political changes that were
subsequently enacted or otherwise put into place. Observers regarded a few of the changes as
progressive and most of the others as regressive. These included constitutional changes extending
2 S.Res. 189 (111th Congress), introduced by Senator Roger Wicker on June 18, 2009, and a similar bill, H.Res. 588
(111th Congress), introduced by Representative James McGovern on June 26, 2009, expressed the sense of the chamber
that the prosecution of Khodorkovskiy was politically motivated, called for the new charges against him to be dropped,
and urged that he be paroled as a sign that Russia was moving toward upholding democratic principles and human
rights. S.Res. 65 (112th Congress), introduced by Senator Wicker on February 17, 2011, expressed the sense of the
Senate that the conviction of Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev constituted a politically motivated case of selective arrest
and prosecution and that it should be overturned. For Congressional comments after Khodorkovskiy received a second
sentence, see Senator Wicker, Congressional Record, January 5, 2011, p. S54; Representative David Dreier,
Congressional Record, January 19, 2011, p. H329.
3 RFE/RL, Newsline, February 5, 20, 2008.
4 Analyst Gordon Hahn has argued that even though President Medvedev’s overall reform record was disappointing,
some of his changes to the criminal code were progressive. See “Assessing Medvedev’s Presidential Legacy,†Other
Points of View, November 3, 2011, at http://russiaotherpointsofview.com.
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the presidential term to six years and State Duma deputies’ terms to five years (as mentioned
above), requiring annual government reports to the State Duma, permitting regional authorities to
dismiss mayors, reducing the number of signatures for a party to participate in elections, reducing
the number of members necessary in order for parties to register, abolishing the payment of a
bond in lieu of signatures for participation in elections, and giving small political parties more
rights (see below). In October 2011, President Medvedev signed legislation to reduce the voting
hurdle for party representation in the State Duma elected in 2016 from 7% to 5% (Putin had
raised the limit from 5% to 7% in 2004). As with a similar move by President Nursultan
Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, the flip-flop in the percentage was proclaimed to mark advancing
democratization.
The Run-Up to the 2011-2012 Elections
At a meeting of United Russia in May 2011, Prime Minister Putin called for the creation of a
“broad popular front [of] like-minded political forces,†to participate in the upcoming December
2011 Duma election, to include United Russia and other political parties, business associations,
trade unions, and youth, women’s and veterans’ organizations. Nonparty candidates nominated by
these various organizations would be included on United Russia’s party list, he announced. Then-
deputy prime minister and chief of government staff Vyacheslav Volodin was named the head of
the popular front headquarters. Critics objected that it was illegal for government resources and
officials to be involved in political party activities. They also claimed that the idea of the “popular
front†was reminiscent of the one in place in the German Democratic Republic when Putin served
there in the Soviet-era KGB.
Putin’s September 2011 Announcement of Candidacy for the Presidency
In late September 2011, at the annual convention of the ruling United Russia Party, Prime
Minister Putin announced that he would run in the March 2012 presidential election. President
Medvedev in turn announced that he would not run for reelection, and endorsed Putin’s
candidacy. Putin stated that he intended to nominate Medvedev as his prime minister, if elected.
The two leaders claimed that they had agreed in late 2007, when they decided that Medvedev
would assume the presidency, that Putin could decide to reassume it in 2012. Putin suggested that
Medvedev head the party list. In his speech to the compliant delegates, Putin warned that global
economic problems posed a severe test for Russia, implying that Russia needed his leadership to
solve these problems. The official news service hailed the continuation of the “effective†and
“successful†Putin-Medvedev “tandem†as the best assurance of Russia’s future modernization,
stability, and “dignity.â€5
Just after the party convention, Medvedev fired eminent Russian Finance Minister and Deputy
Prime Minister Alexey Kudrin after Kudrin stated that he would not serve under Medvedev as
prime minister (according to some reports, Kudrin may have expected to be named prime
minister). A United Russia Party convention to formally nominate Putin as its candidate was held
in late November 2011. Russian analyst Pavel Baev stated that the legitimacy of Putin’s return to
the presidency “is seriously compromised because the spirit, if not the letter, of the constitution is
clearly violated†(at issue is one word in the constitution, which specifies that presidents are
5 ITAR-TASS, September 25, 2011.
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limited to two successive terms in office).6 Some critics have warned that Putin might well feel
free to fill out another two terms as president until the year 2024, making his term in office longer
than that of former General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Leonid Brezhnev, who
served for 18 years and who was remembered for his senility and the “era of stagnation†during
the last years of his rule.
The December 4, 2011, State Duma Election
In the run-up to the December 2011 State Duma election, seven political parties were approved to
run, although during the period since the last election in late 2007, several other parties had
attempted to register for the election but were blocked from doing so. These actions had elicited
criticism from the U.S. State Department that diverse political interests were not being fully
represented. As election day neared, Russian officials became increasingly concerned that the
ruling United Russia Party, which had held most of the seats in the outgoing Duma, was swiftly
losing popular support. According to some observers, Russian authorities, in an attempt to prevent
losses at the polls, not only used their positions to campaign for the party but also planned ballot-
box stuffing and other illicit means to retain a majority of seats for the ruling party. In addition,
then-President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin insisted on limiting the number of OSCE
observers. Russian authorities also moved against one prominent Russian nongovernmental
monitoring group, Golos (Voice), to discourage its coverage of the election.
According to the OSCE’s final report on the outcome of the election, the close ties between the
Russian government and the ruling party, the refusal to register political parties, the pro-
government bias of the electoral commissions and most media, and ballot-box stuffing and other
government manipulation of the vote marked the election as not free and fair. OSCE observers
reported that vote counting was assessed as bad or very bad in terms of transparency and other
violations in one-third of polling stations they visited and in up to one-quarter of territorial
electoral commissions.7 Golos has estimated that just by padding the voting rolls, electoral
officials delivered 15 million extra votes to United Russia, nearly one-half of its vote total (by
this assessment, United Russia only received some 25% of the vote, even after authorities used
various means to persuade or coerce individuals to vote for the party).8 On December 23, 2011,
the Presidential Human Rights Council called for the head of the CEC—Vladimir Churov—to
resign because he had lost “the people’s trust,†and for new electoral laws to be drawn up in
preparation for an early legislative election. Instead, outgoing President Medvedev later gave
Churov one of the highest state awards for his service.9
Protests After the State Duma Election
On December 4-5, rallies were held in Moscow and St. Petersburg to protest against what was
viewed as a flawed election, leading to hundreds of detentions by police. On December 5, about
6 Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 3, 2011.
7 OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Russian Federation Elections to the State
Duma, 4 December 2011, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission: Final Report, January 12, 2012.
8 Golos, Domestic Monitoring of Elections to the 6th State Duma of the Federal Assembly, Russian Federation, 4
December 2011: Final Report, January 27, 2012. In mid-March 2013, a Russian mathematician released a report that
argued that the Communist Party actually had won the most seats in the election.
9 CEDR, December 23, 2011, Doc. No. CEP-950175.
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5,000 protesters or more held an authorized rally in central Moscow. When many of the protesters
began an unsanctioned march toward the Central Electoral Commission, police forcibly dispersed
them and detained hundreds. The Kremlin also mobilized pro-government youth groups to hold
large demonstrations termed “clean victory†to press home their claim that minority groups would
not be permitted to impose their will on the “majority†of the electorate. On December 7, 2011,
several U.S. Senators issued a statement condemning Russian police crackdowns on those
demonstrating against the “blatant fraud†of the Duma election.
On December 10, large demonstrations under the slogan “For Fair Elections†(a movement with
this name was formed by various political groups) were held in Moscow and dozens of other
cities. At the Moscow rally, deemed by some observers as the largest in many years, Boris
Nemtsov, the co-head of the unregistered opposition Party of People’s Freedom, presented a list
of demands that included the ouster of electoral chief Churov, the release of those detained for
protesting and other “political prisoners,†the registration of previously banned parties, and new
Duma elections. Some protesters shouted “Russia without Putin.†Local authorities had approved
the demonstration and police displayed restraint. Another large demonstration sponsored by the
“For Fair Elections†group occurred in Moscow on December 24, 2011.
According to one Russian analyst, although the authorities were alarmed by the December
opposition protests, they quickly devised countermeasures, including the rallying of state workers
and patriots to hold staged counter-demonstrations.10
On February 4, 2012, the “For Fair Elections†group sponsored peaceful protests in Moscow and
other cities. Turnout in Moscow was estimated at 38,000 by police but up to 160,000 by the
organizers. The protesters called for disqualified liberal candidate Grigoriy Yavlinskiy (see
below) to be permitted to run in the presidential election, the release of “political prisonersâ€
Khodorkovskiy and others, and legal reforms leading to new legislative and presidential elections.
In Moscow, a counter-demonstration termed “Anti-Orange Protest†(referring to demonstrations
in Ukraine in late 2004 that led to a democratic election) was organized by pro-Kremlin parties
and groups, including the Patriots of Russia Party and Deputy Prime Minister Dmitriy Rogozin’s
ultranationalist Congress of Russian Communities group. Moscow police claimed that 138,000-
150,000 individuals joined this protest. Prime Minister Putin praised the turnout for the counter-
demonstration. The counter-protesters reportedly accused the “For Fair Election†demonstrators
as wishing for the destruction of Russia and alleged that the United States was fomenting “regime
change†in Russia. Just before the “Anti-Orange Protest,†state television aired a “documentaryâ€
about how the United States allegedly had conspired in the late 1980s and 1990s to take over
Russia’s resources.
Seemingly as a reaction to the December 2011 protests, then-President Medvedev proposed
several democratic reforms. Many observers have argued that these reforms subsequently were
watered down, although some progressive measures eventually were enacted. Among the
proposals:
• Amendments to the law on political parties were signed into law on April 3,
2012, permitting the registration of new parties after they submit 500 signatures
from members (a reduction from the previous requirement of 40,000 signatures).
However, the retention of strict reporting requirements on party activities and
10 CEDR, May 7, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-6001.
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finances and the ban on electoral blocs were viewed by some observers as less
progressive, the latter because it would prevent small parties from cooperating in
elections. By early 2013, the number of registered parties had increased from
seven to more than five dozen.
• A law signed on May 2, 2012, eliminated the need for political parties not
represented in the Duma to gather signatures in order to participate in Duma
elections. The law also reduced the number of signatures required for these
parties to field presidential candidates and the number required for self-
nominated candidates. These changes were viewed by many observers as
progressive.
• A law reestablishing gubernatorial elections was signed into law on May 2, 2012.
It provides for local officials to approve candidates, for a presidential option to
nominate candidates, and for a president to remove governors, a hybrid direct and
indirect electoral procedure. At the same time, the law places new conditions on
the election of mayors of regional capitals. The provisions on gubernatorial
elections are considered only semi-progressive by many observers (see below).
• The establishment of public television appeared progressive, although its
freedom of operation appeared to be vitiated by creating it by presidential edict
(which could be repealed at any time), and by making its head a presidential
appointee.11
The March 2012 Presidential Election and Its Aftermath
Five candidates were able to register for the March 4, 2012, presidential election. Besides Putin,
three of the other four candidates—Communist Party head Gennadiy Zyuganov, Liberal
Democratic Party head Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, and A Just Russia Party head Sergey Mironov—
were nominated by parties with seats in the Duma. The remaining candidate, businessman
Mikhail Prokhorov, was self-nominated and was required to gather 2 million signatures to
register. Other prospective candidates dropped out or were disqualified on technical grounds by
the Central Electoral Commission (CEC). Opposition Yabloko Party head Grigoriy Yavlinskiy
was disqualified by the CEC on the grounds that over 5% of the signatures he gathered were
invalid. Many critics argued that he was eliminated because he would have been the only bona
fide opposition candidate on the ballot. Of the registered candidates running against Putin, all but
Prokhorov had run in previous presidential elections and lost badly.
According to the final report of the CEC, Putin won 63.6% of 71.8 million votes cast, somewhat
less than the 71.3% he had received in his last presidential election in 2004. In their final report,
OSCE monitors concluded that the election was well organized, but that there were several
problems. Although the report did not state outright that the election was “not free and fair,†some
of the monitors at a press conference stated that they had not viewed it as free and fair. According
to the report, Putin received an advantage in media coverage, and authorities mobilized local
officials and resources to garner support for him. The OSCE monitors witnessed irregularities in
vote-counting in nearly one-third of the 98 polling stations visited and in about 15% of 72 higher-
level territorial electoral commissions.12
11 CEDR, April 27, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-49013.
12 OSCE, ODIHR, Russian Federation, Presidential Election, 4 March 2012, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation
(continued...)
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The protests after Putin’s election by those who viewed the electoral process as tainted appeared
smaller in size and number than after the Duma election. Authorities approved a protest rally in
Pushkin Square in central Moscow on March 5, along with Putin victory rallies elsewhere in the
city. After some of the protesters allegedly did not disperse after the time for the rally had
elapsed, police forcibly intervened and reportedly detained up to 250 demonstrators, including
activist Alexey Navalny, who later was released.
The May 6, 2012, Bolotnaya Square Protest
Opposition politicians Alexey Navalny, Boris Nemtsov, and Sergey Udaltsov were among the
organizers of an approved demonstration on May 6, 2012, in Moscow. Turnout was approved for
5,000 participants, but police reported that about 8,000 turned out. Other observers estimated that
over 20,000 turned out. Allegedly, regional authorities had been ordered to prevent dissidents
from traveling to Moscow, and warnings appeared that military enlistment offices would issue
conscription summonses to young male protesters. The demonstrators marched down Bolshaya
Yakimanka Street to a destination point at Bolotnaya Square. Police blocked the square,
eventually triggering large-scale violence. About 100 police and protesters reportedly were
injured, and hundreds were detained, among them Navalny, Nemtsov, and Udaltsov. Most later
were released, but 18 were held on serious charges of fomenting violence. The Investigative
Committee, a presidential body, has been developing cases against these and others alleged
involved in the May 6 protests (for further developments, see below, “Other Moves against
Oppositionistsâ€).
President Putin Redux
For Putin’s presidential inauguration on May 7, 2012, police and security personnel encircled a
large swath of the downtown and cleared it of humans and cars along the route that the motorcade
would take from Putin’s former prime ministerial office to the Kremlin for the swearing-in
ceremony. These precautions supposedly were taken in the wake of the violent demonstrations the
previous day. Because of the heavy security, the public was forced to view the inauguration solely
via television, watching as the motorcade traversed a surreal, “after humans†Moscow.
Putin issued a number of decrees immediately after taking the oath of office, which he explained
were aimed at implementing his campaign pledges. Among them, he decreed that birth rates
would increase and death rates would decrease by 2018, that a new foreign policy concept
(strategy document) be formulated, and that defense spending be increased.
On May 10, 2012, the Russian Republican Party—which had been liquidated by order of the
Supreme Court in 2007—received notice from the Justice Ministry that its legal registration had
been restored. In January 2012, the Supreme Court had reversed its judgment against the party’s
registration after the European Court of Human Rights had ruled that the judgment was invalid.
The restored registration of the party was viewed by observers as providing the opposition with
added legal means of political participation.
(...continued)
Mission: Final Report, May 11, 2012.
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The government cabinet was announced on May 21, 2012. In all, 20 of 28 ministers and agency
heads were replaced. According to analyst Anders Ã…slund, several of the former KGB operatives
and notoriously corrupt and inefficient ministers were replaced, possibly opening the way to some
economic reforms, although he cautioned that Putin and his associates still controlled the state-
owned corporations and would resist privatization and anti-corruption reforms.13 Other observers
argued that several of these ex-agency heads have been retained as presidential advisors, and
raised concerns that a Putin presidency would maintain control over the cabinet and that few if
any reforms would be undertaken.14
After his election, Putin stepped down as the leader of the United Russia Party, claiming that the
president should be nonpartisan (raising the question of why then-President Medvedev headed the
party’s Duma list of candidates in late 2011). At a United Russia Party congress in late May 2012,
Putin recommended Medvedev for the chairmanship, stating that in other democracies, the head
of government oversees the ruling party’s legislative efforts.
Several laws were passed after Putin returned to the presidency that appeared to limit or negate
the initiatives carried out during Medvedev’s presidency that were viewed as supporting
democratization and human rights to some degree.
• In June 2012, Putin approved a law increasing the fine for individuals convicted for
“violating the public order†to over $9,000 and for organizers of unapproved
demonstrations to $30,500. Most observers viewed the law as a further threat to freedom
of assembly in Russia.
• In July 2012, Putin approved a law requiring NGOs that receive foreign grants to register
as “foreign agents.†The law entered force on November 20, 2012. Some NGOs have
refused to register under the new law, and may face closure, including the For Human
Rights NGO, headed by Lev Ponomaryev, and the Moscow Helsinki Group, headed by
Lyudmila Alekseyeva. Both groups reported that they had requested and received letters
from the State Department denying that the U.S. government played any role in the day-
to-day affairs of the NGOs. In response to the statements by some groups that they would
not register, the legislature enacted amendments to the law in October 2012 imposing
fines of up to $16,000 on NGOs that fail to register. Perhaps a sign that domestic donors
are now capable, the Moscow Helsinki Group reported in December 2012 that many
citizens had rallied to support the NGO, and that it even had received a government grant.
• In late July 2012, Putin approved a law partly restoring a law changed last year that had
de-criminalized defamation. Under the new law, a civil penalty of up to $155,000 may be
levied. The old law, which classified defamation as a felony, had led to hundreds of
convictions each year. Critics viewed the new law as reinstituting means to suppress
media reporting on or citizens’ complaints about official malfeasance. In late August
2012, media reported that a United Russia Duma deputy had stated that the legislature
was considering amending the new law to criminalize Internet postings, including those
defaming the United Russia Party as “the Party of crooks and thieves.â€
13 The Moscow Times, May 29, 2012.
14 CEDR, May 23, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950037; Catherine Belton and Charles Clover, “Putin’s People,†Financial
Times, May 30, 2012.
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• In late July 2012, Putin approved a law “protecting children†from Internet content
deemed harmful, including child pornography and advocacy of drug use, as well as
materials that incite racial, ethnic, or religious hatred. A blacklist of thousands of Internet
sites reportedly is being finalized, and the government is setting up the institutional
framework to block them. Observers have raised concerns about the ambiguity of the law
and about the danger that whole websites, rather than individual webpages, might be
blocked.
• In late September 2012, the Supreme Court decreed that Russian citizens who received
beatings from the police had no right to resist, because the beatings were presumed to be
lawful unless they later were challenged in court.
• In late September 2012, legislation was being drafted in the Duma to tighten penalties on
those deemed to have insulted religious sensibilities or desecrated holy sites. Some
members of the Duma and others have objected to the expansiveness of the legislation.
As of April 2013, the bill is being considered in the Duma, and has the backing of the
presidential administration.
• In early November 2012, Putin signed a law broadening the definition of treason to
include divulging a state secret or “providing consulting or other work to a foreign state
or international organization,†that later is deemed to be working against Russian security
interests. The office of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy issued a statement raising concerns about the ambiguous and
broad scope of the legislation, and warned that it and other recent laws “would limit the
space for civil society development, and increase the scope for intimidation.â€15
• In early April 2013, Putin signed a law permitting regions/republics to rescind direct
gubernatorial elections. The law permits parties represented in regional/republic
legislatures to propose a list of candidates, in consultation with the president, which is
then winnowed by the president to three candidates. The legislature then selects one of
these candidates as governor. The Russian government justified the legislation by
claiming that officials in ethnically diverse North Caucasian republics were concerned
that direct elections might violate the rights of minority ethnic groups (perhaps alluding
to long-time arrangements of allocating posts among several ethnic groups) and
contribute to violence.16 Critics charged that the change was enacted because the United
Russia Party feared any degree of open electoral competition. Another possible reason
was that President Putin aimed to appoint new and more pliable governors in the region
in the run-up to the 2014 Olympics in Sochi, a town in southern Russia.
In addition to these laws, President Putin submitted draft legislation to the Duma in late June
2012 to change the procedure for filling seats in the Federation Council.17 He called for regional
voters to have a role in “democratically†electing one of the two members of the Federation
Council (often termed senators), proposing that a candidate running in a gubernatorial election
15 Statement by the Spokesperson of High Representative on the New Law on Treason in Russia, Press Release, Council
of the European Union, October 25, 2012.
16 RIA Novosti, April 2, 2013.
17 Under current practice, where each region or republic has two senators, one senator is selected by the governor (and
confirmed by the regional/republic legislature), and the other is selected by the regional/republic legislature.
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select three possible senators who would appear on the ballot with him. After winning, the
governor would designate one of the candidates as the regional senator. The other regional
member of the Federation Council would be chosen by the regional legislature, he proposed. The
bill was approved by both chambers of the Federal Assembly in November and entered into force
on January 1, 2013. Critics charged that the process was at best an indirect means of choosing
senators. As mentioned above, the April 2013 law permitting regions/republics to rescind direct
gubernatorial elections also contained new provisions for an indirectly elected governor to
propose three local or Duma deputies as possible members of the Federation Council, to be voted
on by the regional legislature.
Several local elections were held on October 14, 2012, including five gubernatorial elections, the
first held since they were banned in 2004. Golos reported that these elections gave no evidence of
improvements in the registration of candidates, campaigning, and voting procedures since
problematic Duma and presidential elections a few months previously. Golos also stated that the
range of infringements remained the same, and included ballot-stuffing, repeat voting, “familyâ€
voting (casting ballots for absent family members), and vote tabulation irregularities. Observers
also claimed that the selection of gubernatorial candidates had been substantially controlled by
the ruling United Russia party, which facilitated the reelection of the incumbent governors.18
Human Rights Problems and Issues
The Magnitsky Case
The death of Sergey Magnitsky—a lawyer for the Hermitage Fund, a private investment firm—in
November 2009 after being detained for 11 months has been a highly visible example of the
failure of the rule of law in Russia, according to many observers. He had been detained on tax
evasion charges after he alleged that police and other officials had illicitly raided Hermitage
assets. In July 2011, a group of human rights advisors to the president issued a report providing
evidence that Magnitsky’s arrest was unlawful, that he had been beaten and possibly tortured
while in detention (including just before his death), and that prison officials and possibly higher-
level officials had ordered doctors not to treat him. The Russian Prosecutor-General’s Office and
Interior Ministry rejected the findings. Medvedev ordered an official investigation into
Magnitsky’s death, and in September 2011 these investigators narrowly concluded that his death
was due to the negligence of two prison doctors. In late November 2011, Hermitage Capital
released a report giving details of how government officials allegedly ordered that Magnitsky be
beaten and blocked medical treatment, resulting in his death. On December 8, 2011, the Russian
Interior Ministry rejected the conclusions of the Hermitage Capital report, and reasserted that
Magnitsky had died of a heart attack rather than trauma. A prison doctor and the deputy head of
the prison were charged in mid-2011, but the case against the doctor was dropped in April 2012
on the grounds that the time limit for filing charges had expired. The trial of the prison official is
ongoing.
In August 2011, the Constitutional Court upheld the resumption of criminal proceedings against
the dead man, ostensibly on the grounds that Russian law allows for such a case to proceed at the
request of the family, to possibly result in a confirmation of innocence (or, in effect, guilt). The
family has denied that it formally requested the resumption of the trial. In February 2012, the
18 Interfax, October 15, 2012.
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Moscow Helsinki Committee, a human rights NGO, condemned the ongoing trial of a dead man
and persecution of the family as “a new alarming symptom of complete degradation of Russian
justice.â€19 In July 2012, several Russian senators (members of the Federation Council) visited
Washington, DC, and met with some Members of Congress and others. The senators claimed that
the Federation Council had carried out an investigation of the Magnitsky case, and they presented
the findings, which upheld Magnitsky’s guilt. However, no such investigation actually had taken
place and their “findings†had been provided by the Interior Ministry. On September 6, 2012,
President Putin stated that Magnitsky’s death was a “tragedy,†that investigators were looking into
the case, and that if “culprits†responsible for the death are found, they will be punished.20 On
November 2, 2012, the Interior Ministry completed its investigation and forwarded the
materials—no details were released—to the Prosecutor’s Office for further action.
In the 112th Congress, H.R. 4405 (McGovern), introduced on April 19, 2012; S. 1039 (Cardin),
introduced on May 19, 2011; and S. 3406 (Baucus), introduced on July 19, 2012, imposed visa
and financial sanctions on persons responsible for the detention, abuse, or death of Sergei
Magnitsky, or for the conspiracy to defraud the Russian Federation of taxes on corporate profits
through fraudulent transactions and lawsuits against Hermitage. In addition, the bills imposed
global sanctions on persons responsible for other gross violations of human rights. H.R. 4405 was
ordered to be reported by the Foreign Affairs Committee on June 7, 2012. One amendment to the
bill changed the global applicability of some sanctions to specify that they pertain to Russia. S.
1039 was ordered to be reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as amended, on July
23, 2012. S. 3406 was ordered to be reported by the Senate Finance Committee on July 19, 2012.
Sections 304-307 of S. 3406 contain language similar to S. 1039, as reported, along with
language authorizing the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade relations
treatment) to Russia and Moldova.
On November 13, 2012, H.Res. 808 was reported to the House by the Rules Committee,
providing an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 6156 (Camp), containing language
authorizing normal trade relations treatment along with provisions similar to H.R. 4405 as
reported by the Foreign Affairs Committee. H.R. 6156, retitled the Russia and Moldova Jackson-
Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, was approved by
overwhelming margins by the House on November 16, 2012, and by the Senate on December 6,
2012 (see also below, “Russia’s Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and PNTR for
Russiaâ€). The bill was signed into law on December 14, 2012 (P.L. 112-208).
During debate over early versions of the Magnitsky bills, the State Department announced that
some unnamed Russian individuals they deemed responsible for Magnitsky’s detention and death
would—under existing law—be subject to visa restrictions. In support of the bills, a Russian
human rights group issued an expansive list of over 300 individuals it deemed had violated
Magnitsky’s rights or those of other human rights activists. This latter list incensed some Russian
officials who appeared to believe that it had become part of the State Department action. In late
October 2011, Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that some U.S. citizens had been placed on a
Russian visa ban list. Other ministry officials and media reported that the listed U.S. citizens had
been involved in incidents linked to the Guantanamo Bay, Bagram, and Abu Ghraib detention and
prison facilities. In addition, U.S. citizens involved in prosecuting Russian organized crime
figures allegedly were listed.
19 CEDR, February 29, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950048.
20 Interfax, September 6, 2012.
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The Russian Foreign Ministry condemned the House passage of H.R. 6156 as “belligerently
unfriendly and provocative.†The ministry called for the Congress instead to examine alleged
human rights problems in the United States.21 After the Senate passage of the bill in early
December, the Foreign Ministry denounced the action as an “absurd†and “ridiculousâ€
reanimation of the Cold War. Interestingly, a Russian poll in November 2012 indicated that a
sizeable percentage of Russians were supportive of the U.S. Magnitsky bill, with many of them
commending its emphasis on punishing those responsible for his death and corrupt officials.22
Retaliating Against the Magnitsky Act: Russia’s Dima Yakovlev Act
A bill was introduced in the Duma on December 10, 2012, to bar U.S. citizens from entry who
allegedly have violated the rights of Russian citizens. As amended, the bill also barred designees
from investing and freezes their assets in the country. Another provision facilitated the closure of
NGOs that receive U.S. funding that are found to violate “Russian interests.†The bill also barred
U.S. adoptions of Russian children and called for terminating the U.S.-Russia adoption treaty,
which had entered into force less than two months previously.23 The bill was entitled the “Dima
Yakovlev Act,†in honor of a Russian adoptee who had died in the United States.
While initially silent on the amended legislation, on December 20, 2012, President Putin appeared
to endorse it, stating that he had been “outraged†by the U.S. legal treatment of those who have
harmed or killed Russian adoptees, and asserting that the U.S.-Russia adoption treaty had turned
out to be “absurd,†since U.S. states are circumventing it. He also apparently referred to the U.S.
Magnitsky law in terming U.S. actions as undeserved “provocations†and as slaps in the face,
while at the same time the United States is “up to its ears†in its own human rights problems.24
Foreign Minister Lavrov, in contrast, raised concerns about the Duma bill’s call for the
termination of the adoption treaty. Moscow Helsinki Group head Lyudmila Alexeyeva also
criticized the bill, arguing that 19 Russian adoptees had died in the United States over the past 20
years (other sources stated over 10 years), some of whom had health problems when they were
adopted, while over 2,200 children adopted by Russian families had died over the past 20 years.25
The Russian bill was approved overwhelmingly by the Duma on December 21, 2012, and by the
Federation Council on December 26. The bill was signed into law by President Putin on
December 28, 2012, and went into effect on January 1, 2013.
The same day that Putin signed the bill, the Foreign Ministry harshly asserted that the ban was
justified because U.S. culture is violent, resulting in many child murders; that Americans are
prejudiced against Russian adoptees; and that the United States has not ratified the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, including because Americans approve of spankings and
incarcerating children. It also claimed that the deaths of Russian children “at the hands of
American adoptersâ€â€”Russian sources had claimed there were at least 19 such deaths at the
time—were the “tip of the iceberg,†since Russian authorities usually became aware of deaths
from U.S. news media, which might not report the origin of the child. The ministry also dismissed
21 CEDR, November 16, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950209.
22Victor Davidoff, “Why the Magnitsky Act Is Pro-Russian,†The Moscow Times, December 9, 2012; Interfax,
December 7, 2012.
23 The treaty may be terminated one year after notification by one of the parties.
24 Interfax, December 13, 2012; CEDR, December 20, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950103.
25 Interfax, December 20, 2012.
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the argument that Americans adopt many otherwise unadoptable Russian children with
disabilities, claiming that less than 10% of such adoptees in 2011 were disabled. It bitterly
accused the U.S. judicial system of excusing the murders of Russian adoptees on the grounds that
the children suffered from a “bad heritage.â€26 On January 23, 2013, Lavrov additionally stated
that the adoption ban was justified because Russian authorities had become convinced that the
U.S. adoption system had low standards, which contributed to the deaths of adoptees, and he
asserted that such problems and deaths did not occur among adoptees in other counties.27
Perhaps indicative of some confusion in Russia over the impact of the new law, U.S. adoption
agencies and prospective parents reported that while the bill was being debated, there was a
slowdown by Russian courts in issuing adoption decrees and by authorities involved in the final
release of children into the physical custody of adoptive parents. Perhaps indicative of this
confusion, just after the bill was signed into law, Russia’s Presidential Ombudsman for Children’s
Rights, Pavel Astakhov, called for the several dozen U.S. adoptions already finalized by the
courts to be overturned and for the governors of regions where prospective adoptees resided to
direct the children’s futures.
On January 22, 2013, however, the Russian Supreme Court issued a letter clarifying that in
implementing the new law, local courts should leave standing adoption cases finalized by the
courts before the beginning of the year—about 56 cases—and proceed to transfer the children to
the custody of their adoptive parents. According to the State Department, virtually all U.S.
families since have received custody of these legally adopted children.
The State Department has urged the Russian government to permit all U.S. families in the process
of adopting Russian children to complete their adoptions, primarily the prospective parents where
the Russian courts have granted custody and those cases where the prospective parents have met
with orphans. Estimates have varied about the number of the latter cases, ranging up to 500. The
Russian government, however, has indicated that these latter cases will not move forward.
Adoption agencies reportedly have stopped taking applications and some of these U.S. families
have received notification that Russian local courts have rejected hearing their referrals.
Many Members of Congress have joined in writing letters, sponsoring legislation, and otherwise
protesting the adoption ban and urging Russia to reconsider its implications for prospective U.S.
parents, Russian orphans, and U.S.-Russia relations. In the 113th Congress, the Senate approved
S.Res. 628 (Landrieu) on January 1, 2013, expressing “deep disappointment†in and
“disapproval†of the Russian Dima Yakovlev law, urging that it be reconsidered to protect the
well-being of parentless Russian children, and calling for adoptions in process to be permitted to
proceed. A similar bill to S.Res. 628 was introduced by Representative Michelle Bachmann in the
113th Congress (H.Res. 24) on January 14, 2013. On January 15, 2013, Representative
Christopher Smith introduced H.Res. 34, which expresses “deep sadness over the untimely and
tragic deaths in the United States of some adopted Russian children and over the other cases of
abuseâ€; urges the United States and Russia to continue to abide by the bilateral adoption
agreement; and calls for Russia to permit adoptions underway to proceed.
A 139-member bipartisan Congressional Coalition on Adoption (CCA), co-chaired by Senators
Mary Landrieu and James Inhofe and Representatives Michele Bachmann and Karen Bass, has
26 CEDR, December 28, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950169.
27 CEDR, January 24, 2013, Doc. No. CEP-049001.
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played a prominent role in protesting the adoption ban. In a letter to President Putin dated
December 21, 2012, 16 Senators encouraged President Putin to veto the Yakovlev bill, arguing
that the legislation, while harming prospective U.S. parents, mainly harmed Russian orphans.28 In
a strongly worded response, Konstantin Dolgov, the Foreign Ministry’s Special Representative on
Human Rights, asserted that the law was passed because abuses against Russian adoptees lately
had occurred lately “on a regular basis,†but U.S. federal and local officials had been
“consistently non-constructive†in protecting Russian children and had “sabotaged†the adoption
agreement. U.S. courts had often failed to adequately prosecute abusers of Russian children,
while giving harsh sentences to abusers of U.S.-born children, he also alleged.29
On January 17, 2013, 46 Representatives signed a letter to President Putin urging him to permit
adoptions to move forward where the prospective parents had met with the orphan. A similar
bicameral letter to President Putin on January 18, 2013, signed by over 70 Members of Congress,
also called for him to permit such adoptions to move forward, particularly those cases where the
child was older or had special needs, and so would be more difficult to place and faced the risk of
remaining institutionalized. An associated letter to President Obama urged him to make the
adoption ban a priority issue in U.S.-Russia relations.
Ten U.S. Senators met with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak in late January 2013 to urge the
Russian government to reverse the adoption ban and carry through adoptions where the
prospective parents already had met with Russian orphans. Ambassador Kisyak stated that the
Yakovlev law was unlikely to be reversed and that the law was passed because of “prevailing
concerns†in Russia over the fate of adoptees in the United States.30
A Russian governmental delegation traveled to the United States and met with State Department
officials and Members of Congress on April 17, 2013, to discuss Russian concerns about the
wellbeing of Russian adoptees.
The Case of Punk Rockers Mariya Alekhina, Yekaterina Samutsevich, and
Nadezhda Tolokonnikova
On August 17, 2012, a Russian court sentenced punk rockers Mariya Alekhina, Yekaterina
Samutsevich, and Nadezhda Tolokonnikova (members of the “Pussy Riot†singing group) to two
years in prison on charges of hooliganism motivated by religious hatred and feminist extremism.
The group briefly had sung anti-Putin songs in the Russian Orthodox Church of Christ the Savior
in Moscow in February 2012. The court claimed that the songs were not political in nature so that
the prosecution was not political. Many in the international community and in Russia had called
for the charges against the singers to be reduced to a misdemeanor or dropped. Russian state
media appeared to present the trial as juxtaposing the beliefs and attitudes of a majority of
Russians against those of a minority of immoral oppositionists. Commenting on the sentences in
early October 2012, President Putin stated that the sentences were appropriate given the fact that
28 Congressional Record, December 31, 2012, p. S8591.
29 “Ambassador Dolgov’s Letter,†Congressional Coalition on Adoption Institute, January 14, 2013, at
http://ccainstituteblog.org/page/2/, CEDR, January 31, 2013, Doc. No. CEP-046016. The Dolgov letter also addressed a
concern raised by Deputy Prime Minister Golodets (see above) that the Yakovlev law violated the U.N. Convention on
the Rights of the Child by asserting that the Convention deals with adoption processes and not obligations regarding
inter-country adoptions.
30 Olga Belogolova, “U.S. Lawmakers Press Russia to Ease Adoption Ban,†National Journal, February 3, 2013.
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the singers were “undermining morality and destroying the country,†and because the case had
been publicized internationally.31 A few days later, the sentence of one of the singers was reduced
to two years of probation, but the other two were sent to Siberian work camps.
Other Moves against Oppositionists
• In June 2012, police raided the home of “moderate opposition†television
personality Kseniya Sobchak, as part of a crackdown on opposition leaders, after
which she was fired from her state television job. Perhaps also in retaliation, her
mother was replaced as a senator in the Federation Council. In October 2012,
Kseniya Sobchak was elected to a leadership position in the newly formed
Opposition Coordination Council, which plans to organize protests, foster
support for the release of “political prisoners,†and advocate for new elections.
• In mid-2012, The Investigative Committee ruled that a case should proceed
against activist Alexey Navalny on charges that in 2009 he illicitly had stolen
timber belonging to a state-owned firm. On December 20, 2012, the Investigative
Committee additionally charged him with involvement in a scheme to defraud a
mail delivery firm. A trial in the city of Kirov on the alleged timber theft is
scheduled to begin in April 2013.
• On August 18, 2012, a Russian court sentenced opposition activist Taisiya
Osipova to eight years in prison on charges of drug trafficking. She had been
arrested in November 2010 and sentenced in late 2011 to 10 years in prison, but
the case had been overturned on appeal. The court rejected witness testimony that
police had planted the drugs in Osipova’s house. Her supporters suggested that
authorities had prosecuted Osipova to pressure her husband, a leader of The
Other Russia Party, to withdraw an application to register the party.
• In September 2012, the State Duma voted to remove the electoral mandate of
deputy Gennadiy Gudkov, a member of the Just Russia Party, on the grounds that
he was violating legislative rules by carrying out commercial activity
incompatible with his status as a deputy. Gudkov and other observers argued that
other Duma members had business interests, and that he was ousted because of
his participation in opposition protests against the flawed Duma and presidential
elections.
• In early October 2012, the Moscow office of Human Rights Watch, an
international NGO, reported that the deputy director of the office, Tanya
Lokshina, had received emails threatening her bodily harm. U.S. Ambassador to
Russia Michael McFaul and Russian human rights ombudsman Vladimir Lukin
were among those calling on the Russian Interior Ministry to investigate the
threats. Lokshina left Russia in October 2012, but plans to return in the spring of
2013.
31 Interfax, October 7, 2012.
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The Targamadze Involvement Case
On October 5, 2012, the pro-government NTV television network broadcast a “documentary†that
alleged that several oppositionists had met with Georgian Givi Targamadze, the then-chairman of
the defense committee in the Georgian legislature, to discuss raising cash and organizing protests
and riots aimed at forcibly seizing power in Russia, and that the oppositionists subsequently
attempted to carry out this plan during a protest on May 6, 2012, in Moscow. Although the
Investigative Committee already was investigating the events of May 6, the broadcast appeared to
spur the development of added criminal charges against oppositionists Sergey Udaltsov, his
assistant Konstantin Lebedev, and Leonid Razvozzhayev, a staffer for an opposition member of
the Duma. Razvozzhayev fled to Ukraine in mid-October 2012, where he met with officials from
an affiliate body of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to explore requesting
political asylum.32 During a break while meeting with the refugee officials, he allegedly was
abducted by Russian security personnel and illicitly brought back to Moscow for detention. He
claimed that they had tortured him to force him to confess and implicate Udaltsov and others, and
he recanted his confession. Udaltsov and Lebedev were placed under house arrest. Russian
human rights activist Lyudmila Alexeyeva, head of the Moscow Helsinki Group, raised concerns
on October 23 that these new investigations “mean the beginning of the crushing of the
opposition.â€33
In December 2012, the Investigative Committee widened its probe to include a meeting attended
in Lithuania in early 2012 by several opposition activists, allegedly including Taisia Alexandrova,
Anna Kornilova, and Yuri Nabutovsky. Although the meeting was sponsored by the OSCE to
discuss election monitoring procedures, the Investigative Committee asserted that Targamadze
was behind the meeting and that its main purpose was to explore means to overthrow the Russian
government. On December 20, 2012, President Putin asserted that Targamadze had “instructedâ€
Russian oppositionists to commit terrorist acts in Russia, including blowing up a train.34
In February 2013, a Moscow Court ordered that Targamadze be arrested in absentia for
conspiracy to organize mass riots and violence. At the end of March 2013, Razvozzhayev’s
detention was extended by a Moscow court. In early April, the Prosecutor General’s Office
prepared to indict Lebedev—on charges of organizing mass riots—for trial by the Moscow City
Court.
On April 6, 2013, several hundred demonstrators in Moscow called for the release of 18
individuals charged in relation to the May 6 events.
32 UNHCR, Press Release: UNHCR Seeks Information on Fate of Disappeared Asylum-Seeker, October 25, 2012, at
http://www.unhcr.org/5089556e6.html.
33 Interfax, October 23, 2012. While Razvozzhayev’s allegations were being publicized, the Duma’s International
Affairs Committee was holding a hearing on alleged U.S. human rights abuses. The head of the committee, Aleksey
Pushkov, proclaimed during the hearing that although Russia has some human rights problems, Russia, unlike the
United States, “does not kidnap people†(referring to Russian citizen Viktor Bout’s apprehension and trial in the United
States). Interfax, October 22, 2012.
34 Interfax, December 20, 2012.
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Raids against Nongovernmental Organizations
In February 2013, Putin demanded that executive branch authorities strictly implement the law on
NGOs receiving foreign funding, and agencies ranging from consumer protection to civil defense
and the Justice Ministry launched inspections of over 200 suspect NGOs, according to a
compilation by the Agora human rights group. NGOs that were inspected included the Moscow
offices of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Transparency International, the Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung (closely connected to the ruling German Christian Democrats), and the
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (connected to the main German opposition Social Democratic Party), as
well as prominent Russian NGOs such as the Moscow Helsinki Group and Memorial human
rights NGO. Visiting Germany in early April 2013, President Putin rebuffed concerns by
Chancellor Angela Merkel about the inspections, asserting that they constituted proper
“oversight†of NGO activity and were triggered by the alleged receipt by the groups of over $1
billion in foreign money since the beginning of the year.
In late March 2013, the State Department raised “deep concerns†that the large number of NGO
inspections, which included religious and educational organizations, constituted a “witch huntâ€
that harmed civil society. It also indicated that funding would be made available for NGOs in
Russia through third parties. The Russian Foreign Ministry denounced the concerns as
“provocative†and the plan to continue funding as an attempt to circumvent Russia’s laws and as
interference in its internal affairs.35
According to one Russian media report, nearly a dozen NGOs have been fined as a result of the
inspections. On April 10, 2013, the Justice Ministry charged Golos with failing to register as a
foreign agent. The organization faces a fine and possible closure. Golos denied that it had
received any foreign funding since the enactment of the law, stating that since the law was not
retroactive, the Justice Ministry’s complaints that the organization had once received such funds
were invalid.
The Elimination of the U.S.-Russia Working Group on Civil Society
A Working Group on Civil Society, part of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission
(BPC; see below, “The Incoming Obama Administration “Re-sets†Bilateral Relationsâ€), held its
first U.S. meeting in late January 2010. As per agreement, the working group was composed
mainly of government officials and a few NGO representatives. The officials and NGO
representatives met in separate sessions, and then the two groups compared notes. The topics of
discussion included countering corporate corruption, protecting children, prison reform, and
rights of immigrants (the White House subsequently described these topics as discussed by
separate subgroups). Some Members of Congress had called in December 2009 for the
Administration to boycott the meetings until Russia changed its head of the group.36 In late 2011,
the heads of the Working Group—both advisors to their respective presidents—were replaced by
lower-tier diplomats, seemingly marking a lowered status for the Working Group. New co-chairs
met in early 2012.
The last reported action was a Working Group session in mid-June 2012 in Moscow. This meeting
apparently only involved the co-chairs and did not address a full range of issues. The Russian co-
35 RFE/RL, March 30, 2013;U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, March 28, 2013.
36 “Interview: McFaul on U.S., Russian Stereotypes and His Controversial Co-Chair,†RFE/RL, January 28, 2010.
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chair claimed that the United States had convicted two Russian citizens (including Viktor Bout)
on “political grounds,†and urged that they be returned to Russia. He also called for U.S. citizens
who violated the rights of adopted Russian children to be adequately prosecuted and raised
concerns that the Magnitsky Act threatened the rights of prospective Russian travelers to the
United States.
On January 25, 2013, the State Department announced that the United States was withdrawing
from the Civil Society Working Group because it was not effective in addressing the increasing
restrictions on civil society in Russia. At the same time, the State Department stated that it hoped
to continue assisting civil society groups in Russia and rejected that the withdrawal signaled that
the BPC was not working on other issues.37
Insurgency and Terrorism in the North Caucasus
During and after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the largely Muslim North Caucasus
area of Russia—an area between the Black and Caspian Seas—experienced substantial disorder.
Among such disorder, Chechen separatism gained ground, contributing to the breakup of the
then-Chechen-Ingush Republic along ethnic lines. Russia’s then-President Boris Yeltsin
implemented a federal system that permitted substantial regional autonomy. While some of the
ethnic-based “republics†pushed for greater autonomy, but otherwise opted to remain in Russia,
Chechnya was at the forefront in demanding independence.
In 1994-1996, Russia fought against Chechen separatists in a bloody campaign that led to
thousands of Russian and Chechen casualties and hundreds of thousands of displaced persons.
Ceasefire accords in 1996 resulted in de facto self-rule in Chechnya. Organized crime and Islamic
extremism subsequently greatly increased in Chechnya—infusing and supplanting the earlier,
more secular, separatist movement (see below)—and spread into other areas of Russia. In 1999,
Chechen terrorists were alleged to have bombed several apartment buildings in Moscow and
elsewhere, and a group of Chechen guerrillas invaded the neighboring Dagestan republic to
support Islamic extremism there.
Ostensibly in response to this rising cross-border violence, Russia’s then-Premier Putin ordered
military, police, and security forces to reenter Chechnya at the end of 1999. By early 2000, these
forces occupied most of the region. High levels of fighting continued for several more years and
resulted in thousands of Russian and Chechen casualties and hundreds of thousands of displaced
persons. In 2005, then-Chechen rebel leader Abdul-Khalim Saydullayev decreed the formation of
a Caucasus Front against Russia among Islamic believers in the North Caucasus, in an attempt to
widen Chechnya’s conflict with Russia. After his death, his successor, Doku Umarov, declared
continuing jihad to establish an Islamic fundamentalist Caucasus Emirate in the North Caucasus
and beyond.
Russia’s pacification policy in Chechnya has involved setting up a pro-Moscow regional
government and transferring more and more local security duties to this government. An
important factor in Russia’s seeming success in Chechnya has been reliance on pro-Moscow
Chechen clans affiliated with regional President Ramzan Kadyrov. Police and paramilitary forces
37 U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, January 25, 2013.
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under his authority have committed flagrant abuses of human rights, according to myriad rulings
by the European Court of Human Rights and other assessments.
In January 2010, an existing administrative grouping of southern regions and republics was
divided into two districts. A North Caucasus Federal District was formed from more restive areas,
including the Chechen, Dagestan, Ingush, Kabardino-Balkar, Karachay-Cherkess, and North
Ossetia-Alania Republics and the Stavropol Kray. A Southern Federal District was formed from
somewhat more stable areas, including the Astrakhan, Volgograd, and Rostov Regions, the
Adygea and Kalmykia Republics, and the Krasnodar Kray. A presidential envoy was appointed
for each district. The division appeared to permit the central government and envoys to focus on
separate development plans for each district. According to some speculation, the division also
was partly driven by the 2007 selection of Sochi, in Krasnodar Kray, as the site of the 2014
Winter Olympics, and the need to focus on building facilities and improving security in Sochi.
A North Caucasus development strategy was promulgated in September 2010. It sets forth goals
through 2025, stressing investments in agriculture, tourism, health resorts, energy and mining,
and light industry. It also calls for encouraging ethnic Russians to resettle in the area. The strategy
sets forth an optimum scenario where average wages increase by 250% and unemployment
decreases by 70% by 2025. An inter-agency commission to carry out the strategy was formed
with then-Prime Minister Putin as its head. At a May 2011 session, the Regional Development
Minister stated that $9.7 billion would be budgeted for development projects in the North
Caucasus through 2013.38 At a December 2011 commission meeting, Putin rejected the views of
some that the North Caucasus should be permitted to secede from Russia, warning darkly that
anti-Russian interests (presumably, foreign interests) would then launch efforts to break up the
rest of Russia. Instead, he argued, Russia must continue to foster economic development in the
region.39 At a meeting of the commission in Grozny in late June 2012, the newly installed head,
Prime Minister Medvedev, pledged that economic development of the region was “one of the
government’s most important priorities,†and the new Regional Development Minister stated that
up to $52 billion was planned to develop the region over the period 2013-2025.40
Terrorist attacks in the North Caucasus increased from 2007 through 2010, with a slight decrease
in 2011, according to some reports. In 2010-2011, the insurgents appeared to be focusing more on
killing and wounding civilians. Terrorist incidents decreased in most of the North Caucasus in
2011 and 2012. The number of killed or captured terrorists also increased, perhaps marking more
successful counter-terrorist efforts. An appeal by Umarov in early 2012 that his fighters cease
carrying out mass casualty attacks—in solidarity with Russians demonstrating against the flawed
Duma election—was another possible contribution to the reduced number of terrorist incidents.41
38 Interfax, May 4, 2011.
39 Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, During a Visit to the Chechen Republic, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
Holds a Meeting of the Government Commission on the Socio-Economic Development of the North Caucasus Federal
District in Gudermes, December 23, 2011.
40 The Moscow Times, June 20, 2012.
41 Interfax, December 25, 2012; Gordon Hahn, Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia Report (IIPER), Center for
Strategic and International Studies, October 2, 2012; IIPER, January 13, 2013; IIPER, February 24, 2013; The North
Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration, Ethnicity, and Conflict, International Crisis Group, October 19, 2012; The
North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration, Islam, the Insurgency, and Counter-Insurgency, International Crisis
Group, October 19, 2012.
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A major change in the pattern of terrorist incidents has been a reduction since 2010 in the number
of incidents in Chechnya and increases in other republics of the North Caucasus, including
Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Ingushetia. Dagestan has led in the level of violence. The
republic is a multi-ethnic republic where Salafi Islam, as advocated by the Caucasus Emirate or
imported from the Middle East, has made increasing inroads. Salafists have clashed with security
forces and secular authorities, and with those practicing traditional Sufi Islam in the republic.
Terrorist violence in Dagestan accounted for more than one-half of all terrorism in the North
Caucasus in 2012 (262 out of 438 terrorist incidents), according to one estimation.42
Among recent terrorist incidents:
• In early March 2012, an alleged Caucasus Emirate plan to assassinate Putin and
Medvedev, uncovered in Ukraine, was publicized by the Russian government
during the final period of the presidential election campaign (perhaps
coincidently, an assassination plot also had been alleged during Putin’s 2000
presidential campaign). On May 4, 2012, two suicide car bombings occurred in
downtown Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan, reportedly killing over a dozen
civilians and injuring nearly 100.
• On May 10, 2012, Russia’s National Anti-Terrorism Committee—NAK; an
interagency coordinating and advisory body—announced that Russian and
Abkhazian security agents had uncovered a plot by Umarov to launch a large-
scale attack at the planned 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. Several large stashes
of grenade launchers, surface to air missiles, mines, and other weaponry were
discovered in Abkhazia. The NAK asserted that Umarov “had close ties to
Georgia’s intelligence services,†implying that Georgia was assisting Umarov.
The Georgian Foreign Ministry called these allegations “absurd,†and pointed out
that Russia has eliminated Georgian efforts to exercise authority in Abkhazia and
that Russia had not raised such claims during meetings in Geneva on resolving
issues associated with the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict.43
• On July 19, 2012, Tatarstan Mufti Ildus Faizov was injured by a car bomb and his
deputy and head of the Tatarstan Muslim Board educational department, Valiulla
Yakupov, was shot and killed by assailants outside his home in Kazan. The
“Mujahadeen of Tatarstan,†which appeared linked to Umarov, claimed
responsibility. On August 20, 2012, a car exploded in Kazan, killing four alleged
terrorists. Some observers have warned that Islamic fundamentalism has greatly
increased in Tatarstan.44
• On August 28, 2012, Sufi scholar Sheikh Said-afandi al-Chirkavi (Said Atsayev)
and five other victims were killed by a suicide bomber in the village of Chirkei in
Dagestan. The bombing reportedly was carried out by Sunni Islamic extremists
targeting Sufi religious leaders. The State Department condemned the killing and
raised concerns that extremist attacks were increasing in some areas of Russia.
• In mid-January 2013, a Dagestani Supreme Court judge was killed, with the
Caucasus Emirate’s Dagestani branch, the Dagestan Vilaiyat, taking
42 Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Violence in Dagestan Accelerated in 2012,†North Caucasus Analysis, January 10, 2013.
43 CEDR, May 10, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-6019 and Doc. No. CEP-950199.
44 CEDR, August 7, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-015006.
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responsibility. Perhaps related to this and other onging terrorism in Dagestan, the
republic head was replaced in late January 2013 by former ambassador Ramazan
Abdulatipov, who may have been viewed by Putin as a more pliable leader.
• On February 14, 2013, a suicide bomber killed four policemen and wounded six
in Khasavyurt, Dagestan. Experts suggested that the Caucasus Emirate’s
Dagestani branch, the Dagestan Vilaiyat, was responsible for this first suicide
bombing in Russia in 2013.
U.S. analyst Gordon Hahn, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has warned that
the Caucasus Emirate forms the hub of Islamic terrorism in Russia and receives substantial
material and ideological support from the global terrorist network. The Caucasus Emirate
provides ideological, financial, and weapons support, and loose guidance and some coordination
for the activities of perhaps up to three dozen republic/regional and local combat jamaats
(assemblies or groups of believers) in the North Caucasus and Volga areas, Moscow, and
elsewhere. The Caucasus Emirate may take the lead when major terrorist operations are planned.
In April 2009, Umarov announced that the former “Riyadus Salikhin†Martyrs’ Battalion (which
had taken responsibility for attacking the grade school in Beslan in September 2004 and which
appeared defunct after its leader, Shamil Basiyev, was killed in 2006) had been revived and was
carrying out suicide bombings across Russia. Hahn reports that major ideologists of the global
jihadi movement have praised these bombings and have supported greater material and other aid
for the Caucasus Emirate. He also warns that over time, the Caucasus Emirate has expanded its
operations globally, with cells being discovered in Belgium, Germany, Czech Republic, France,
and Azerbaijan.45
U.S.-Russia Counter-Terrorism Cooperation on Chechnya
U.S. policymakers long have emphasized that U.S.-Russian cooperation in combating terrorism in
Chechnya and elsewhere is an important U.S. priority. On December 3, 1999, State Department
spokesman James Rubin averred that the United States was concerned about the links between
Osama bin Ladin and Chechen terrorism and thus had some understanding for Russian
government counter-terrorism actions in Chechnya. In testimony to Congress on February 2,
2000, Central Intelligence Agency Director George Tenet tended to foresee lengthy Russian
fighting in Chechnya to prevent the separatist region from “becom[ing] the calling card of this
millennium in terms of where do terrorists go and train and act.’‘ He warned that sympathizers
from abroad were going to Chechnya to train and fight, and that they later could directly threaten
U.S. interests.46
At a U.S.-Russia summit in June 2000, then-President Bill Clinton and Russian President Putin
agreed to set up a Working Group on Afghanistan to discuss joint efforts to stem the threats from
Taliban support for terrorist activities worldwide. The meetings also involved cooperation on
45 Gordon Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 59-66; Gordon Hahn,
“The Caucasus Emirate’s Return to Suicide Bombing and Mass Terrorism,†Islam, Islamism, and Politics in Eurasia
Report, November 30, 2009; Gordon Hahn, “Abu Muhammad Asem al-Maqdisi and the Caucasus Emirate,†Islam,
Islamism, and Politics in Eurasia Report, January 8, 2010; Gordon Hahn, Getting the Caucasus Emirate Right, Center
for Strategic and International Studies, August 2011; Gordon Hahn, “The Caucasus Emirate Goes Global,†Islam,
Islamism, and Politics in Eurasia Report, November 30, 2012.
46 State Department, Daily Press Briefing, December 3, 1999; U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing
on Worldwide Threats, February 2, 2000.
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other counter-terrorism, and in mid-2002, the two sides renamed the conclave the Working Group
on Counter-terrorism, to reflect enhanced bilateral cooperation in combating global terrorism in
the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. At the July 2002 meeting, the
two sides discussed the U.S. Georgia Train and Equip Program, under which the United States
facilitated Georgia’s efforts to combat Chechen and al Qaeda-linked terrorism in Georgia’s
Pankisi Gorge. The Working Group has met regularly, and has reported discussions involving
Chechen and North Caucasian terrorism at several meetings. In 2009, it was included as one of
the working groups under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC), a part of
President Obama’s “reset†policy toward Russia.
Among recent activities, President Obama and then-Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev agreed
to enhanced counter-terrorism cooperation at a summit meeting in Deauville, France, in May
2011. At this summit, President Medvedev thanked the United States for its terrorist designation
of the Caucasus Emirate (see below). Just before this summit, the then-Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, and the then-Russian Chief of the General Staff,
Nikolay Makarov, met under the aegis of the BPC Working Group on Military Cooperation and
signed a memorandum of understanding on counter-terrorism cooperation, including on such
issues as aerial hijacking. President Obama and newly re-elected President Putin pledged further
counter-terrorism cooperation at their June 2012 summit meeting.
In April 2013, in the wake of the explosions in Boston, Presidents Obama and Putin agreed in a
phone conversation to step up counter-terrorism cooperation, and Secretary of State John Kerry
and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, meeting on the sidelines of the NATO-Russia
Council meeting in Brussels, discussed counter-terrorism cooperation.
Among U.S. terrorist designations, on September 14, 2003, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell
issued Executive Order 13224, denoting three Chechen organizations—the Islamic International
Brigade (IIB), the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR), and the Riyadus-Salikhin
Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs—as Specially Designated Global
Terrorists. They had carried out acts of terrorism in Russia, including hostage-taking and
assassinations, that “have threatened the safety of U.S. citizens and U.S. national security or
foreign policy interests.†All three groups, it stated, had been involved in the Moscow theater
incident that included the death of one U.S. citizen. The IIB had been founded and run by long-
time Chechen military and political figure Shamil Basayev and the Saudi Arabian terrorist Emir
Khattab. Basayev resigned from IIB after the Moscow hostage crisis, but remained the head of
Riyadus-Salikhin until his death in 2006. SPIR’s founder, Chechen figure Movsar Barayev, was
killed in the siege at the Moscow theater, and also was a commander of Riyadus-Salikhin. The
State Department reported that Basayev and Khattab had received commitments of financial aid
and guerrillas from bin Laden in October 1999, just after Russia had launched its Chechnya
campaign, and that al Qaeda helped train Chechen terrorists. The State Department asserted that
“the IIB, the SPIR, and the Riyadus-Salikhin are clearly associated with al Qaeda, Osama bin
Laden, and the Taliban.†The executive order blocks assets of these groups that are in the United
States or held by U.S. persons.47
On June 23, 2010, then-Secretary of State Clinton designated Caucasus Emirates leader Doku
Umarov as a terrorist under Presidential Executive Order 13224, which targets terrorists and those
47 U.S. Department of State, Press Statement: Terrorist Designation Under Executive Order 13224, February 28, 2003;
U.S. Department of State,.Statement of the Case: Chechen Groups, September 28, 2003.
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providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism, to help stem the flow of financial and other
assistance to Umarov. On May 26, 2011, the United States similarly designated the Caucasus
Emirate under Presidential Executive Order 13224 as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist
group, and included Doku Umarov in its “Rewards for Justice†program, offering a reward of up
to $5 million for information leading to his location.48
While successive U.S. Administrations have supported Russia’s counter-terrorist efforts in
Chechnya and elsewhere in the North Caucasus, they also have been critical of serious human
rights abuses by Russian government forces as well as by terrorism groups.49
Congressional Response
Congress has raised concerns about terrorism emanating from Chechnya but also has criticized
Russia’s human rights abuses in Chechnya and has called for various sanctions. These concerns
about Chechen terrorism have been reflected in hearings and other legislative action. Among the
latter, in the 108th Congress, Members approved S.Res. 421 (Daschle) in September 2004,
condemning the terrorism in North Ossetia. In the 111th Congress, H.Res. 1315 (Hastings),
introduced in April 2010, called on the Secretary of State to designate the Caucasus Emirate as a
foreign terrorist organization. In April 2013, the House Europe Subcommittee held a hearing on
whether Chechen terrorism is a threat to the U.S. homeland.
Even after September 11, 2001—when the Administration’s focus was on forging an international
anti-terrorist coalition that included Russia—Congress retained a provision first included in
FY2001 appropriations that cut 60% of planned aid to the Russian central government unless the
President determined that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were given full access to
Chechnya. This provision most recently was included in Consolidated Appropriations for FY2012
(P.L. 112-74; signed into law on December 23, 2011). In practice, aid to Russia’s central
government was restricted under other provisions opposing Russian nuclear support to Iran.
Congress also in recent years directed aid for conflict mitigation and humanitarian assistance for
Chechnya and the North Caucasus. This assistance averaged about $6 million annually. For
FY2013, the Administration requested $6.19 million for conflict mitigation and reconciliation in
the North Caucasus under the Economic Support Fund account. However, Russia directed that
such aid end in FY2012, and criticized the assistance to the North Caucasus as interference in
Russia’s internal affairs.
Defense Reforms
Despite the sizeable reduction in the size of the armed forces since the Soviet period—from 4.3
million troops in 1986 to a reported 880,000 at present—the Russian military remains formidable
in some respects and is by far the largest in the region.50 Because of the reduced capabilities of its
conventional forces, however, Russia relies on nuclear forces to maintain its status as a major
power. There is sharp debate within the Russian armed forces about priorities between
48 U.S. Department of State, Press Statement: Designation of Caucasus Emirates Leader Doku Umarov, June 23, 2010;
Media Note: Rewards for Justice - Doku Umarov Reward Offer, May 26, 2011.
49 For the most recent treatment of abuses in the North Caucasus, see U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 2012, April 19, 2013.
50 For more detail, see CRS Report R42006, Russian Military Reform and Defense Policy, by Jim Nichol.
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conventional versus strategic forces and among operations, readiness, and procurement. Russia is
trying to increase security cooperation with the other Soviet successor states that belong to the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).51 The passage of legislation in October 2009
providing for the Federation Council to authorize the use of troops abroad to protect its
“peacekeepers†and citizens, and to combat piracy at sea, appears to underline that Russia might
use military force to reinforce the “lesson†that small countries adjacent to Russia may disregard
Moscow’s interests and warnings only at their peril.
The improvement of Russia’s economy since 1999, fueled in large part by the cash inflow from
rising world oil and gas prices, enabled Russia to reverse the budgetary starvation of the military
during the 1990s. Defense spending increased substantially in most of the 2000s, and even
continued to increase slightly after the global financial crisis of 2008 impacted Russia’s economy.
Even factoring in purchasing power parity, however, Russian defense spending still lags far
behind current U.S. or former Soviet levels. The efficacy of the larger defense budgets is reduced
by systemic corruption. Some high-profile military activities have been resumed, such as large-
scale multi-national military exercises, show-the-flag naval deployments to the Mediterranean
and the Atlantic, and strategic long-range bomber patrols that approach U.S. and NATO airspace.
In February 2007, then-President Putin appointed Anatoliy Serdyukov as defense minister. With a
career outside the military establishment, many observers suggest that Serdyukov was chosen to
carry out a transformation of the armed forces from a mobilization model—large divisions only
partially staffed and dependent upon the mobilization of reserves during emergencies—to
permanently staffed smaller brigades. Problems of force composition, training, command and
control, equipment, and doctrine were highlighted during the August 2008 Russia-Georgia
conflict.52 Partly in response, a reform plan entitled “The Future Outlook of the Russian
Federation Armed Forces and Priorities for its Creation for the period of 2009–2020†was
launched in October 2008 that called for accelerating planned cuts in the bloated officer corps,
revamping the training of noncommissioned officers, cutting the number of personnel at the
Defense Ministry and General Staff, and reducing the number of higher military schools. Also,
the four-tier command system of military districts, armies, divisions, and regiments would be
altered to a three-tier system of strategic and tactical commands and brigades. The total size of the
armed forces would be reduced from 1.2 million to 1 million, according to this plan.
During 2009, the brigade system for ground forces was set up and other reforms were carried out.
Efforts to shift to a professional (contract) military faltered, and conscription of some portion of
the armed forces remains a long-term policy. The armed forces now face a crisis in finding
enough young men to conscript for a one-year term of service given a sharp decline in births in
past years and unhealthy living conditions. Alternatives include officially acknowledging and
adjusting to an armed forces well below 1 million or increasing the length of service.
In late 2010, the existing six military districts were consolidated into Western, Eastern, Southern
and Central military districts. An over $700 billion weapons modernization plan for 2011-2020
also was launched. Substantial modernization is contingent on rebuilding the largely obsolete
defense industrial complex. Policymakers decided to import some weapons and technologies to
spur this rebuilding effort.
51 Members include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and
Uzbekistan. Georgia withdrew following the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict.
52 The Military Balance, p. 211.
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The policy of legally acquiring some arms technologies from abroad came under scrutiny in
2012, however, after the appointment of former NATO emissary Dmitriy Rogozin as deputy
prime minister in charge of arms procurement. He and Putin have appeared to question the
continuation of foreign arms technology acquisitions. At a meeting with his Security Council in
late August 2012, President Putin allowed that cooperation with “foreign partners†was desirable
in some areas, but stressed that Russia should not merely “launch screwdriver facilities
assembling foreign ... military hardware,†but should develop the full range of capabilities, from
weapons design through series production.53 In March 2013, Rogozin stated that Russia would
not purchase finished military products abroad, but would emphasize the granting of citizenship
and other incentives to encourage military arms specialists to move to Russia (see also below).54
On May 7, 2012, immediately following Putin’s inauguration, edicts were signed on greatly
boosting military pay, pensions, and housing allowances; on increasing the number of troops
under contract; on creating a reserve of troops; and on modernizing defense industries (OPK).
One Russian critic pointed out that none of these spending initiatives had been included in the
2012 budget or planned budgets for 2013-2014, and warned that the initiatives would raise
military spending as a percentage of GDP to over 4% (and possibly much more, given the opaque
nature of much of this spending), approaching the U.S. percentage.55 At a conference on defense
industries on May 10, 2012, President Putin stressed that $89 billion out the $700 billion
allocated for weapons modernization through 2020 was targeted for modernizing the defense
industrial sector and increasing pay and educational opportunities for defense workers. Putin had
announced several of these defense initiatives in an earlier presidential campaign article.
On November 6, 2012, Serdyukov was fired by President Putin after media reports highlighted
his alleged involvement in corrupt transfers of defense-owned real estate. Other reports alleged
more simply that the large list of officials and active and retired military officers opposed to
Serdyukov’s reforms finally were able to convince Putin to remove him. The governor of the
Moscow region and former emergencies minister, Army General Sergey Shoygu, was appointed
the new defense minister. Putin also quickly replaced Makarov with Colonel General Valeriy
Gerasimov as Chief of the General Staff.
Those opposed to Serdyukov’s reforms have strongly urged Shoygu to roll back the reforms. In
making the appointment, however, Putin directed that Shoygu should continue the reforms.
Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin has been quick to hail Shoygu’s initial moves as restoring
patriotism to military service. Some analysts have suggested that a major factor in Serdyukov’s
dismissal was rising friction between the minister and defense industries that have refused to
modernize the weapons systems that they sell to the ministry. These analysts also have suggested
that the defense industries now have triumphed in their opposition to foreign arms technology
acquisitions, with the Defense Ministry ceasing it threats to pursue foreign purchases to
encourage home-grown innovation. Perhaps as an alternative, private industries have been
encouraged to compete with the defense industries.56
53 The Kremlin, President of Russia, Vladimir Putin Held an Expanded-Format Security Council Meeting, Novo-
Ogarevo, Moscow Region, August 31, 2012.
54 CEDR, March 26, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-54682223.
55 CEDR, May 15, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-358003.
56 Roger McDermott, Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 13, 2012; CEDR, December 10, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-009016.
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U.S. Perspectives
As part of the Obama Administration’s “reset†in U.S.-Russia relations, at the July 2009 U.S.-
Russia Summit, the two sides agreed to the resumption of military-to-military activities—which
had been suspended since the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict—by setting up a Military
Cooperation Working Group as part of the Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC; see below,
“The Incoming Obama Administration “Re-sets†Bilateral Relationsâ€). The United States has
pursued military-to-military ties in order to promote cooperation in counter-terrorism and
international peace-keeping, including Russia’s support for U.S. and ISAF operations in
Afghanistan, to advocate democracy and respect for human rights within the Russian military,
and also to assess Russian military reforms and civil-military relations. In July 2012, General
Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with General Nikolay Makarov, then-
Chief of the Russian General Staff, in Washington, DC, for the annual meeting of the Working
Group. A short summary reported that they discussed U.S. and Russian armed forces
transformation, Afghanistan, crises in the Middle East and North Africa, threats and
developments in the Asia-Pacific region, and missile defense. Bilateral military cooperation also
has been evidenced by the signing of a memorandum of understanding on counter-terrorism
cooperation in May 2011 by the then-Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Nikolay Makarov,
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen.
In September 2010, the United States and Russia also agreed to set up a Working Group on
Defense Relations as part of the BPC, co-headed by the U.S. defense secretary and the Russian
defense minister, with eight subgroups ranging from logistics to strategy. The brief public
accounts of these meetings seem to indicate that Russia seeks knowledge of best practices as part
of its modernization effort. The Working Group last met in March 2011, although the sub-
working groups remain active. Most recently, the State Department reported that the
Training/Education/Human Resources Sub-Working Group met in Colorado Springs in October
2012, and discussed cadet exchanges and other matters. The Russian co-head, Chief of the
Education Directorate of the Defense Ministry Yekaterina Priyezzheva, was ousted a few weeks
later. A planned Logistics Cooperation Sub-Working Group meeting in Moscow in late October
apparently was postponed.
Russian media have reported that Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has been invited to Moscow in
May 2013. The White House has stated that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Martin Dempsey, will travel to Russia in early June 2013 to convene a meeting of the Military
Cooperation Working Group.
Although agreeing at the July 2009 summit to also renew the activities of the Joint Commission
on POW/MIAs—that seeks to account for personnel from World War II, the Korean War, the
Vietnam War, and the Cold War, including Soviet military personnel unaccounted for in
Afghanistan—Russia only moved in June 2011 to appoint its co-chair, Yekaterina Priyezzheva,
and 30 commissioners. The Joint Commission held its first meeting under the new Russian co-
chair in St. Petersburg in June 2012. Priyezzheva’s dismissal in December 2012 has renewed
concerns about the future functioning of the Joint Commission.
In March 2013, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper presented the intelligence
community’s annual worldwide threat assessment, which included an appraisal that “the reform
and modernization programs will yield improvements that will allow the Russian military to more
rapidly defeat its smaller neighbors and remain the dominant military force in the post-Soviet
space, but they will not—and are not intended to—enable Moscow to conduct sustained offensive
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operations against NATO collectively. He stated that “funding, bureaucratic, and cultural
hurdles,†complicate Russia’s efforts to modernize its conventional, asymmetric, and nuclear
capabilities. Nuclear deterrence will remain the focal point of defense planning to offset Russia’s
weakness vis-a-vis potential opponents with more capabilities, at least until high-precision
conventional arms become operational, he assessed.57
Trade, Economic, and Energy Issues
Russia and the Global Economic Crisis58
The Russian economy was hit hard by the global financial crisis and resulting economic
downturn. The crisis exposed weaknesses in the economy, including its significant dependence on
the production and export of oil and other natural resources and its weak financial system. Russia
shows signs of economic recovery, but persistent flaws in the economy could limit the recovery’s
depth and length.
Before the global financial crisis, Russia experienced a decade of strong economic growth. From
1999 to 2008, Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) increased 6.9% on average per year in
contrast to an average annual decline in GDP of 6.8% during the previous seven years (1992-
1998). The surge in economic growth—largely the result of increases in world oil prices—helped
raise the Russian standard of living and brought a large degree of economic stability that Russia
had not experienced since the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. Russia’s
government revenues increased, and that, together with fiscal discipline, allowed the government
to generate budget surpluses after years of large deficits. Economic growth also contributed to
strong popular support for Vladimir Putin and Dmitriy Medvedev.
However, in 2008, Russia faced a rapid decrease in the prices for oil and other commodities. It
also faced investor unease caused in part by Russia’s military confrontation with Georgia in
August 2008 and also by the Russian government’s reassertion of control over major industries,
especially in the energy sector. Along with these events, the global financial crisis hit Russia in
the latter part of 2008 as foreign banking credits, on which many Russian companies depend,
decreased. As a result, Russia’s period of economic growth came to an abrupt end. Although
Russian real GDP increased 5.6% in 2008 as a whole, it did not grow at all during the fourth
quarter of 2008. Russian GDP declined 7.9% in 2009. The decline occurred across most sectors of
the economy, with manufacturing, construction, and transportation hit especially hard.59
The economic downturn also exposed Russia’s dependence on the production and export of oil,
natural gas, and other fossil fuels for economic growth and government revenues. On July 4,
2008, the price of a barrel of Urals-32 (the Russian benchmark price for oil) peaked at $137.61
and declined to a low point of $34.02 by January 2, 2009—a drop of 75.3% in six months.60 The
57 U.S. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence, Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US
Intelligence Community, James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, March 12, 2013.
58 Prepared by William H. Cooper, Specialist in International Trade and Finance.
59 Economist Intelligence Unit.
60 CRS calculations based on data from the U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Energy Information Administration,
http://www.eia.doe.gov.
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fuels accounted for about two-thirds of Russia’s export revenues and for more than half of
government revenues. Such a sharp drop in oil prices, along with heightened government
expenditures to stimulate the economy, forced the government to incur its first budget deficit in
10 years in 2009—a deficit equivalent to 5.9% of GDP.61
The Russian government responded in 2008-2009 to the global financial crisis with various fiscal
measures including heavier spending and tax cuts equivalent to more than 6% of GDP. These
measures were designed mostly to support the banking system, increase social expenditures, and
assist large state enterprises. The stimulus also included monetary measures that included
reducing refinance rates by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR).62 The CBR also drew down
foreign reserves in order to defend the ruble against rapid depreciation.
Russia is slowly emerging from its recession. Russian real GDP is estimated to have increased by
4.5% in 2010, 4.3% in 2011, and 3.4% in 2012. Russia is once again benefitting from an increase
in world oil prices. Nevertheless, in the long term, unless Russia can reduce its dependence on the
production of oil and other commodities and diversify and reform its economy, any recovery will
likely remain fragile.63 On several occasions, former President Medvedev expressed the need for
Russia to diversify its economy.64 Looking ahead an important issue regarding Russia is whether
President Putin will carry through on economic reform or protect the status quo.
Russia’s Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
PNTR for Russia
In 1993, Russia formally applied for accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). In 1995, its application was taken up by the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
successor organization of the GATT. However, after a number of fits and starts during the 18-year
process, the 153 members of the WTO, on December 16, 2011, invited Russia to join the
organization. Russia officially joined the WTO on August 22, 2012, after both houses of the
national legislature approved the protocol of accession. In joining the WTO, Russia has
committed to bring its trade laws and practices into compliance with WTO rules. Those
commitments include nondiscriminatory treatment of imports of goods and services; binding
tariff levels; ensuring transparency when implementing trade measures; limiting agriculture
subsidies; enforcing intellectual property rights for foreign holders of such rights; and forgoing
the use of local content requirements and other trade-related investment measures.
Congress does not have a direct role in Russia’s accession to the WTO but has an indirect role in
the form of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status. “Normal trade relations†(NTR), or
“most-favored-nation†(MFN), trade status denotes nondiscriminatory treatment of a trading
partner compared to that of other countries.65 Title IV of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 applied
61 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report—Russia, September 2010, p. 21.
62 IMF. Russian Federation: 2010 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; and Public Information Notice on the
Executive Board Discussion, July 2010, p. 8.
63 The World Bank, Russian Economic Report, No. 22, June 2010, p. 1.
64 Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report—Russia. January 2010.
65 MFN has been used in international agreements and at one time was used in U.S. law to denote the fundamental trade
principle of nondiscriminatory treatment. However, “MFN†was replaced in U.S. law, on July 22, 1998, by the term
“normal trade relations.†(P.L. 105-206). MFN is still used in international trade agreements. The terms are used
interchangeably in this report.
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conditions on Russia’s status, including compliance with freedom of emigration criteria under
Section 402—the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment. Therefore, the United States was not in
compliance with the WTO requirement of “unconditional MFN†without Congress lifting the
applicability of Title IV as it applied to Russia and authorizing the President to grant Russia
PNTR before Russia enters the WTO.
On November 16, 2012, the House passed H.R. 6156 that authorizes PNTR for Russia. The
Senate followed by passing the bill on December 6, 2012. The bill was signed into law on
December 14, 2012 (P.L. 112-208). The legislation also contained provisions of the “Magnitskiy
Act†discussed above.
Russian Energy Policy66
The Russian oil and natural gas industries are important players in the global energy market,
particularly in Europe and Eurasia. In 2011, Russia had by far the largest natural gas reserves in
the world, possessing over 21% of the world’s total. It had over 5% of global oil reserves. Firms
in these industries are either directly controlled by the Russian government or are subject to
heavy Russian government influence. The personal and political fortunes of Russia’s leaders are
tied to the energy firms. In 2012, half of total Russian government revenue came from oil and
natural gas taxes, according to President Putin. Russia’s economic revival in the Putin era has
been heavily dependent on the massive wealth generated by energy exports to Europe.
Some Members of Congress, U.S. officials, and European leaders (particularly those in Central
and Eastern Europe) have claimed that European dependence on Russian energy and Russia’s
growing influence in large segments of Europe’s energy distribution infrastructure poses a long-
term threat to transatlantic relations. Russia accounts for about one-quarter of the EU’s natural
gas supplies. Some central and eastern European countries are almost entirely dependent on
Russia for their oil and natural gas. Analysts have noted that Russia views its natural resources as
a political tool. Russia’s “National Security Strategy to 2020,†states that “the resource potential
of Russia†is one of the factors that has “expanded the possibilities of the Russian Federation to
strengthen its influence on the world arena.â€67
This dependence does not go only in one direction, however. Europe is also the most important
market for Russian natural gas exports. In 2011, about 53% of Gazprom’s natural gas exports
went to the EU. About 30% went to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), many of
which have been unreliable in paying what they owe and/or receive natural gas at subsidized
prices.68 The rest went to Turkey and other non-EU countries in Europe, and to Asia.
Concerns about Russian energy policy have centered largely on Russia’s natural gas supplies to
Europe. In 2009, the state-controlled Russian natural gas firm Gazprom halted all gas supplies
transiting Ukraine for nearly three weeks after the two sides failed to reach agreement on several
issues, including a debt allegedly owed by Ukraine to Gazprom and the price that Ukraine would
66 Prepared by Steven Woehrel, Specialist in European Affairs.
67 The text of the National Security Strategy, which was released in 2009, can be found at the website of the Russian
National Security Council at http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html
68 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan with Turkmenistan and Ukraine having unofficial status. Georgia
withdrew from the CIS in 2009.
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pay for gas supplies. At the time, about 80% of Europe’s natural gas imports from Russia
transited Ukrainian pipelines. A similar Russian-Ukrainian dispute had led to a gas cutoff to
Europe at the beginning of 2006. In 2010 and 2011, disputes between Russian and Belarus over a
variety of issues, including energy prices, debts owed by Belarus, and transit fees paid by Russia
for the use of Belarusian pipelines, led to temporary reductions of oil and natural gas supplies to
Belarus and neighboring countries. These incidents provided evidence of Russia’s unreliability as
an energy supplier, according to some observers.
Conversely, concerns about the reliability of gas transit through Ukraine caused Russia and some
European countries to support new pipeline projects to bypass Ukraine and other countries in
Central and Eastern Europe. In 2011, Gazprom began transporting natural gas directly from
Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea via a new pipeline, known as Nord Stream. A second
pipeline became operational in 2012, giving Nord Stream a total capacity of 55 billion cubic
meters (bcm) per year, as compared to the Ukrainian pipeline system, which has a capacity in
principle of about 150 bcm per year. Russia is studying the possibility of a third and even a fourth
Nord Stream pipeline, but Germany has rejected the idea so far.
Many European Union countries are concerned about the possible consequences of
overdependence on Russia for energy. The EU has supported the building of a “Southern
Corridor†of pipelines circumventing Russian territory that would transport gas supplies from
Azerbaijan and Central Asia to Europe. At least one new pipeline is expected to transport
Azerbaijan’s gas from its Shah Deniz 2 project to Europe by 2019, but its small capacity (about
10 bcm per year to Europe) will not significantly reduce European dependence on Russia. Russia
has tried to undermine European efforts to tap much larger supplies by casting doubt on the
legality of the planned and EU-supported Trans-Caspian Pipeline, which would transport gas
from Turkmenistan (which has very large gas reserves) and other Central Asian countries across
the Caspian Sea to connect up with other pipelines that would carry gas on to Europe.
Russia has also tried to maintain its grip on EU energy supplies by supporting a rival project to
the Southern Corridor. In 2007, Gazprom and the Italian firm ENI signed an agreement to build
South Stream, which would run from Russia under the Black Sea to Bulgaria, with branches to
Austria, Italy, and Greece. Serbia, Hungary, and Slovenia have also signed on to the project.
President Putin symbolically started construction of South Stream in December 2012, but real
progress in building the pipeline is not expected to occur until late 2013, with the first deliveries
by the end of 2015. The pipeline is supposed to reach its planned capacity of 63 bcm per year in
2019.
In order to build political support in European countries for South Stream, Russia enticed key
Western European companies to participate. It has also discussed the possibility of modifying the
pipeline’s route in order to play potential transit countries off against each other. However, some
observers are skeptical about South Stream’s prospects, pointing to its escalating cost. Observers
also question Russia’s ability to significantly expand its gas production so that it can fill current
and planned pipelines. Russia could also free up supplies for export by curbing growing domestic
demand for gas through further increases in now-subsidized domestic prices, but it has put off
doing so, perhaps for political reasons.
While building pipelines that circumvent Ukraine, Russia nevertheless continues its long-standing
efforts to gain control of Ukraine’s pipeline system. Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych has
expressed concern about the impact of Nord Stream and South Stream on transit volumes through
Ukraine’s pipeline system. He has offered Russia partial control of the Ukrainian pipeline system
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(with EU firms gaining part of the control as well) in exchange for a share in natural gas fields in
Russia and guaranteed transit volumes through Ukraine’s pipelines. Russia has not accepted
Kyiv’s terms. Gazprom officials have warned Ukrainian leaders that they should sell control of
Ukraine’s pipelines to it while it can get a good price. Otherwise, they say, Gazprom may find it
more profitable to build and use South Stream rather than modernize Ukraine’s aging system.
Russia has repeatedly rejected Ukraine’s demands to renegotiate the current gas supply contract
in order to cut the price Kyiv pays for gas. Russia has also demanded that Ukraine renounce its
membership in the European Energy Community, which would bar Gazprom from owning both
the pipelines and the energy supplies, limiting it to only one or the other.
Ukraine’s seeming desperation to secure lower gas prices could induce it to give Gazprom de
facto control over its pipelines in exchange for cheaper gas. However, for now, Ukraine is taking
another path—sharply reducing its intake of expensive Russian gas and increasing domestic and
other foreign energy sources. Gazprom has responded by demanding a $7 billion fine from
Ukraine, due to its failure to take as much gas as it has contracted under its take-or-pay contract
with Gazprom. Ukraine has refused to pay the fine.
Russia has gained control of Belarus’s gas infrastructure. In 2011, Gazprom completed a deal to
buy all the shares of Beltransgaz, Belarus’s gas pipeline transport company, in exchange for
sharply reduced gas prices. The Yamal-Europe gas pipeline, which runs through Belarus and
Poland, has a capacity of 33 bcm. Gazprom has said it plans to modernize the Belarusian system
and add an additional pipeline to the Yamal-Europe system by 2019. The move may perhaps put
yet more pressure on Ukraine to cede control of its system to Russia.
On the other hand, there are factors that could diminish Russia’s leverage over Eurasian natural
gas supplies. Previously difficult-to-develop “unconventional†gas deposits, including shale gas,
in the United States, Europe and elsewhere could diversify supplies and keep prices down. The
rapid growth of the spot market for natural gas and the expansion of liquefied natural gas
infrastructure in Europe could also help diversify supplies as well as reduce dependence on
Russian-controlled pipelines. Already, European companies have successfully pressured Gazprom
into cutting prices, reportedly by about 15%. However, Gazprom is still strongly resisting major
changes to its pricing formula (based on the price of oil, not on gas spot market prices) or to
reliance on long-term, inflexible “take or pay†contracts.
Russia has threatened to supply more gas to China and other Asian countries if Europe does not
exempt Gazprom from the EU’s Third Energy Package, which bars companies from controlling
both the production of energy supplies and their transport and distribution. By 2030, the Russian
government plans to increase gas exports to Asian countries such as China, South Korea, and
Japan until they make up 19%-20% of the total. However, Russia has a considerable way to go to
meet this objective. In 2010, gas exports to Asia made up about 7% of total Russian gas exports,
all in the form of LNG. Russian hopes of providing large amounts of natural gas to China by
pipeline have been stymied for over a decade by the fact that China has been unwilling to offer
anything close to the price Europe pays for Russian natural gas, as it can secure Central Asian gas
for about two-thirds of the price Russia is offering.69 The Trans-Asia Gas Pipeline delivers 30
bcm per year from Central Asia to China. This is expected to increase to 55 bcm by 2015.
69 For more information on Russia’s official energy strategy, see Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period up to 2030, at
http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-2030_(Eng).pdf.
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Some observers assert that a March 2013 summit meeting between Putin and Chinese leader Xi
Jinping could represent a turning point on the pricing issue. The Chinese reportedly raised the
possibility of pre-paying for the gas, perhaps effectively offering the Russian side an interest-free
long-term loan. Other analysts have expressed skepticism, noting past “agreements to agreeâ€
between the two sides have yielded few practical results.
Foreign Policy
Russia and the West
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the turmoil associated with the Yeltsin period, a
consensus emerged as the Putin era began on reestablishing Russia’s global prestige as a “great
power†and its dominance in “the former Soviet space.†The pursuit of these goals by then-
President Putin and his closest policy advisors seemed to be driven by the belief that the West,
and in particular the United States, had taken advantage of Russia’s political turmoil and overall
weakness during the Yeltsin years. Putin and his advisors were determined to restore what they
believed to be Russia’s rightful place as a significant influence on the world stage.
Fueled in part by the massive inflow of petro-dollars, Moscow’s self-confidence grew over the
several years prior to the late 2008 global economic downturn, and officials and observers in
Europe and the United States expressed growing concern about what they viewed as an
increasingly contrarian Russian foreign policy. This was evident in recent years in Russia’s sharp
political struggles with Estonia and Ukraine, its opposition to a planned U.S. missile defense
system in Eastern Europe, the suspension of compliance with the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe Treaty, and its strong opposition to NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia.
According to analyst Dmitri Trenin, then-President Putin became greatly alarmed following the
“orange revolution†in Ukraine in 2004-2005 and the “tulip revolution†in Kyrgyzstan later in
2005, and his attitude toward the United States hardened. Trenin claims that Putin viewed these
popular revolts as “part of a U.S.-conceived and led conspiracy. At minimum, these activities ...
aimed at drastically reducing Russia’s influence.... At worst, they constituted a dress rehearsal for
... installing a pro-U.S. liberal puppet regime in the Kremlin.â€70 In February 2007, at the 43rd
annual Munich Security Conference, President Putin delivered a particularly harsh speech
attacking Bush Administration policies and condemning the “unipolar†world he alleged the
United States wanted to create.71
In contrast to Putin, President Medvedev was considered by some observers to be a potentially
pragmatic leader who could shift Russia’s attitudes more positively toward the United States and
the West. However, during Medvedev’s first year or so in office, Russia’s relations with the West
became increasingly tense. In the aftermath of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, relations
between Russia and the West reached what many considered to be their lowest point since the
Cold War. Russia continued to voice strong opposition to NATO enlargement to Georgia and
Ukraine; invaded Georgia and occupied two of its regions; refused to recognize Kosovo’s
70 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Spheres of Interest, not Influence,†The Washington Quarterly, October 2009.
71 The full text of Vladimir Putin’s speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 10, 2007, can be
found at http://www.securityconference.de.
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independence; cut off or reduced energy supplies in disputes with Ukraine and Belarus; boosted
ties with Cuba and Venezuela; and attempted to end the use of airbases in Central Asia by the
United States and NATO. However, President Obama’s efforts to “reset†bilateral ties in 2009
somewhat overlapped and then ameliorated some of these elements of tension.
Russian analyst Liliya Shevtsova argues that Medvedev’s presidency presented a face of foreign
policy reasonableness that facilitated the “reset†in U.S.-Russia relations and the EU-Russia
Partnership for Modernization. She argues that these ties would not have developed if Putin had
remained the visible leader, but that the West was essentially responding to the fictitious
liberalization of the Russian political system.72
NATO-Russia Relations73
Post-Cold War efforts to build a cooperative NATO-Russia partnership have had mixed results, at
best. Russian views toward NATO, particularly since the beginning of the Putin era, have been
marked predominantly by suspicion and skepticism regarding NATO’s intentions. In an effort to
improve relations, at NATO’s 2010 summit in Lisbon, Portugal, the two sides announced what
was characterized as the beginning of a new era in NATO-Russia ties, based on practical
cooperation on common security challenges. Observers point out though that while some progress
has been made, Russian officials, and particularly President Putin, remain critical of many aspects
of NATO policy. Within the alliance, member states have criticized what some consider
increasingly hostile rhetoric toward NATO and the United States and have expressed heightened
concern about the Russian government’s human rights record and perceived rejection of
democratic principles and institutions. Disagreement over NATO missile defense plans remains a
key obstacle to closer cooperation.
The principal institutional mechanism for NATO-Russia relations is the NATO-Russia Council
(NRC), established in May 2002, five years after the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act provided
the formal basis for bilateral cooperation. Recognizing that both NATO and Russia face many of
the same global challenges and share similar strategic priorities, Russian and NATO leaders
structured the NRC as a “consensus†forum of equals with a goal of “political dialogue, common
approaches, and joint operations.â€
Most observers agree that despite having advanced NATO-Russia cooperation in some areas, the
NRC has failed to live up to its potential. The NRC’s perceived shortcomings are often attributed
to Russian suspicion about NATO’s long-term intentions. Many in Russia viewed NATO’s
enlargement in 1999 and 2004 to 10 former Soviet-oppressed states as a serious affront to Russian
power and prestige and Russian leaders continue to oppose the idea of NATO enlargement to
former eastern bloc countries.74 The establishment of U.S. and NATO airbases in Central Asia for
operations in Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and a United States
decision to establish military facilities, albeit nonpermanent, in Bulgaria and Romania after
NATO’s 2004 enlargement were viewed by some in Moscow as further evidence of an
encirclement of Russia by NATO and the United States.
72 Open Source Center, Europe: Daily Report, March 14, 2012, Doc. No. EUP-232005.
73 Prepared by Paul Belkin, Analyst in European Affairs.
74 The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary joined the alliance in March 1999; Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined in March 2004.
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Tensions between Russia and NATO escalated in the wake of Russia’s August 2008 invasion of
Georgia, after which the two sides suspended formal ties in the NATO-Russia Council. Russia’s
actions sparked a strong debate within the alliance over how Europe should react to what many
considered a new, more aggressive Russian foreign policy intended to reestablish a Russian
sphere of influence along its border with Europe. Some argued that NATO’s unwillingness or
inability to prevent Russia from moving to establish a permanent military presence in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia diminished the credibility of the alliance’s core principle of collective defense,
as enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Although Georgia is not a member of the
alliance, Georgian leaders contended that NATO had given the impression that it could concede to
Russian demands in its relations with aspiring alliance members. Several Central and Eastern
European allies also expressed concern about a reported lack of NATO contingency planning in
response to the possibility of future Russian action against a NATO ally or partner.
The allies have consistently sought to assure Moscow that NATO does not pose a security threat
to Russia. NATO leaders emphasize the two sides’ shared interests and have pushed to make these
interests the basis for enhanced cooperation. NATO and Russia have developed a Joint Review of
21st Century Security Challenges, intended to serve as a platform for future cooperation. Common
security challenges identified include ongoing instability in Afghanistan; terrorism; the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; piracy; and natural and man-made disasters. In
December 2012, the NATO-Russia Council agreed to a “program of activities†for 2013 that
builds on cooperation in these areas. This includes expanding cooperation to support the Afghan
government and promote peace and stability in the region, and enhancing joint counterterrorism
efforts and initiatives to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea. Since the 2010 Lisbon Summit,
NATO-Russia cooperation has expanded in some of these areas, while NRC working groups have
made little or no progress in others.
U.S. and NATO officials highlight several areas of enhanced NATO-Russia cooperation, citing
Afghanistan as a key example. Since 2008, Russia has allowed the transit over its territory (via air
and land) of cargo for NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The transit routes
are of particular importance to NATO as ISAF coordinates the withdrawal of forces in line with
NATO’s goal to transition away from a lead security role in Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
Moscow has also been training Afghan, Pakistani, and Central Asian counter-narcotics officers,
with a view toward reducing narcotics transit to and through Russia. The program, which has
trained upward of 2,000 officers from seven countries, is set to expand in 2013. Finally, Russian
helicopters, operated by civilian crews, have been providing transport in Afghanistan, and the
NATO Russia Council has established a Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund (HMTF). The Trust
Fund, jointly funded by NATO and Russia, provides maintenance and repair support to the
Afghan National Security Forces.
In April 2011, the NRC approved a new Action Plan on Terrorism, designed to improve both
sides’ capabilities to deter, combat, and manage the consequences of terrorist attacks. Joint
activities include exchange of classified information, development of technology to detect
explosive devices, and improved protection of critical infrastructure. One aspect of the counter-
terrorism cooperation agenda is the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI), aimed at preventing
attacks like those of September 11, 2001, through coordinated interception of renegade aircraft.
As part of the CAI, NATO and Russian fighter aircraft have conducted joint exercises since 2011.
These are expected to continue during 2013 and beyond.75 Additional joint counterterrorism
75 NATO, NATO-Russia Council Practical Cooperation Fact Sheet, November 2012. http://www.nato-russia-
(continued...)
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projects include the so-called STANDEX (Stand-off Detection of Explosives) initiative. Under
the initiative, a consortium of Russian and European research institutions has sought to develop
technology to detect explosives on potential suicide bombers in mass transport hubs. An initial
demonstration of the technology is scheduled to take place in the Paris metro system in June
2013.
Observers point out that while progress has been made in the aforementioned areas, disagreement
both within the alliance and between NATO and Russia persists on some core issues. NATO and
Russia’s November 2010 agreement to pursue cooperation on missile defense was seen as a
significant breakthrough and was recognized as one of the primary achievements of the Lisbon
Summit. Negotiations have, however, been marked by disagreement and increasingly vocal
Russian opposition to NATO plans, with Russian officials even reportedly suggesting that Russia
could use preemptive force against NATO missile defense installations (discussed in more detail
below).76 In addition, little, if any, progress has been made on the issue of Georgia’s territorial
integrity and NATO membership prospects, the unratified Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE Treaty), and Russian calls for more influence within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.
Moscow has criticized NATO member states for their refusal to recognize the Russian-
encouraged independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has vocally opposed proposals to
enhance NATO ties with Georgia and Ukraine. Moscow was also highly critical of NATO’s Libya
operation in 2011, which it believes was intended to topple the the Qadhafi regime, despite a U.N.
mandate and stated intention to protect civilians. Given the experience in Libya, most observers
believe Russia would oppose U.N. authorization for military intervention in Syria.
NATO’s ongoing efforts to improve ties with Russia appear in line with the Obama
Administration’s stated intention to pursue a path of constructive engagement with Moscow. At
the same time, NATO and U.S. officials stress that they will continue to oppose Russian policies
that they perceive as conflicting with the core values of the alliance. They say, for example, that
NATO will not recognize a Russian sphere of influence outside its borders and will continue to
reject Russia’s recognition of Georgia’s breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Some
allies have argued that NATO should take a firmer stance against perceived Russian provocations
and intransigence. Officials in Lithuania and Poland, for example, have at times expressed
concern that the alliance is not serious about standing up to Russian behavior it has deemed
unacceptable. In this vein, they have urged the United States Administration to consider the
interests and views of all NATO allies as it seeks to improve relations with Moscow.
Russia and the European Union77
Many analysts observe that the European Union (EU) has had difficulty developing a consistent
and comprehensive strategic approach to Russia. On the one hand, the EU considers Russia to be
a “strategic partner.†The EU and Russia have extensive economic and energy ties, and many
Europeans assert that Russian cooperation is important on issues such as energy, Iran, Syria,
climate change, and arms control. On the other hand, there are tensions in the relationship related
to energy policy, governance and human rights issues, and perceived attempts by Russia to extend
(...continued)
council.info/media/82207/2012.11.28_nrc_practical_cooperation_factsheet.pdf.
76 “Russian Military Ups the Ante on Missile Defense,†The Associated Press, May 3, 2012.
77 Prepared by Derek E. Mix, Analyst in European Affairs.
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its influence over neighboring countries. There are also a number of foreign policy disagreements
involving the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. A central challenge for European
policymakers has been how to balance values with pragmatism in managing the presentation of
disputes and objections alongside a desire to maintain constructive engagement and cooperation.
Perceptions and preferences as to the correct weighting of priorities vary between and within the
EU institutions and the 27 member states.
Overall, relations between the EU and Russia revolve largely around energy and economics.
Russia supplies the EU with more than one-quarter of its total gas and oil, and some EU member
states are almost completely reliant on Russian energy. As discussed above (see “Russian Energy
Policyâ€), energy dependence and aggressive Russian energy policies have contributed to the
tensions felt by some of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with regard to Russia. The
EU’s energy dependence on Russia is expected to grow substantially over the next 20 years and
the apparent Russian inclination to use energy supplies as an instrument of foreign policy has
raised concerns about potential vulnerabilities that could arise from this trend. Many officials and
analysts agree on the need for the EU to further diversify its energy supply. According to some
observers, the willingness of numerous EU member states to conclude bilateral energy deals with
Russia has served to undermine the prospects of developing a stronger common energy policy.
To a large extent, however, the EU-Russia energy relationship works two ways: while Russia is a
crucial energy supplier for Europe, Europe is also a vital energy market for Russia. In terms of
trade and investment, the EU is an even more important partner for Russia, accounting for nearly
half of Russia’s trade and three-quarters of its foreign direct investment (FDI). Russia, in turn, is
the EU’s third-largest trade partner (behind the United States and China); EU-Russia trade totaled
€307.5 billion (approximately $403 billion) in 2011.78 Energy accounts for more than three-
quarters of Russia’s exports to the EU.
A number of friction points have been developing in the EU-Russia relationship over the past 12
to 18 months. In September 2012, the European Commission launched an investigation into
allegations of price fixing by Gazprom in eight eastern EU member states. The process, which is
also examining allegations that Gazprom has hindered the free flow of gas between EU countries
and prevented the diversification of gas supply, could take years to conclude and could
theoretically result in a large fine. Russian officials have criticized the EU probe and the Kremlin
has reportedly been pressuring the EU for a “friendly settlement†of the issue.79
Russia also continues to object to provisions of the EU’s “third energy package,†legislation that
seeks to increase competition in the EU energy market by “unbundling†the ownership of gas
production from distribution, and which requires an independent operator of transit and
transmission systems. Russian officials have argued that the requirements unfairly target
Gazprom and other Russian firms and violate WTO rules; while seeking to negotiate exceptions
and exemptions from the package, Russia has also been threatening to file a case at the WTO.
Following the December 2012 EU-Russia Summit, President Putin told a news conference that
the EU measures are “steps towards confiscating Russian investments.â€80
78 Eurostat news release, “EU27 deficit in trade of goods with Russia down to 65 bn euro in the first nine months of
2012,†December 19, 2012.
79 Andrew Rettman, “Kremlin backs its dog in EU-Gazprom fight,†EUobserver.com, September 7, 2012,
http://www.euobserver.com/economic/117474.
80 “Putin dismisses 3rd Energy Package as confiscation of Russia’s investment,†ITAR-TASS, December 21, 2012.
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Russian officials angrily condemned the levy on bank accounts in Cyprus that have deposits over
€100,000 (approximately $131,000), imposed as part of a €10 billion (approximately $13.1
billion) EU-IMF financial assistance package in March 2013. Cyprus had become a major
offshore banking center for wealthy Russian citizens and businesses, with Russians accounting
for about half of the deposits by nonresidents in Cypriot banks, totaling an estimated €19 billion
to €24 billion (approximately $25 billion to $31.5 billion).
For its part, the EU continues to warn Russia that it faces action at the WTO if it does not open its
markets to competition. Although the EU welcomed Russia’s accession to the WTO in August
2012, EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht has singled out Russia’s ban on European live
animal imports and the imposition of a fee on imported vehicles as examples that Russia is not
moving forward to apply WTO rules on market liberalization.81
EU leaders have also long expressed concerns about human rights, political pluralism, and rule of
law in Russia. Following Russia’s December 2011 parliamentary election, EU High
Representative Catherine Ashton observed that “reports of procedural violations, such as lack of
media impartiality, lack of separation of party and state, and the harassments of independent
monitoring attempts, are … of serious concern.â€82 At the June 2012 EU-Russia Summit, EU
leaders reportedly expressed their concerns about the arrest of opposition leaders participating in
peaceful demonstrations; the sentencing of the three female band members who staged an anti-
Putin protest; legal developments affecting the freedom of assembly, expression, and the media,
including efforts to limit internet content; the Magnitsky investigation; and continued
intimidation and impunity in cases involving human rights advocates, journalists, and lawyers.
On October 23, 2012, the European Parliament approved a resolution urging the Council of the
EU to draw up a list and impose a visa ban and asset freeze on officials implicated in Magnitsky’s
death. The Russian Foreign Ministry denounced the passage of the resolution and demanded that
the EU instead investigate human rights abuses among its own member states. In March 2013,
German officials were sharply critical after Russian authorities raided the offices of German
political foundations in the context of a wider crackdown on NGOs, allegedly in the name of
combating corruption and money laundering.83
The EU and Russia have been negotiating a new framework agreement to replace the EU-Russia
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that came into force in 1997.84 Under that
agreement, the EU and Russia launched efforts in 2003 to develop a more open and integrated
Common Economic Space (CES) and to establish deeper cooperation on issues such as rule of
law, human rights, research, education, crisis management, and nonproliferation.85 The 2010 EU-
Russia Summit launched a “Partnership for Modernization†in which the EU pledged to help
develop and diversify the Russian economy while encouraging reforms related to governance and
rule of law.86 Some analysts have asserted that progress on most of these initiatives appears to
81 Lénaïc Vaudin d’Imécourt, “Moscow Threatens WTO Action Against EU’s Third Energy Package,†Europolitics,
December 21, 2012.
82 Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, on the Duma elections in the Russian Federation,
December 6, 2011, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126596.pdf.
83 Richard Fuchs, “Germany outraged over NGO raids in Russia,†Deutsche Welle, March 29, 2013.
84 The PCA was valid for an initial period of 10 years. Since 2007, it has been renewed on an annual basis.
85 European Union External Action Service, http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/common_spaces/index_en.htm.
86 Council of the European Union, Joint Statement on the Partnership for Modernization, June 1, 2010,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/114747.pdf.
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have stalled, although Russia has voiced satisfaction with some business cooperation under the
Partnership for Modernization program.87
EU visa liberalization has long been a priority and a topic of frustration for the Russian
government, and the December 2012 EU-Russia Summit featured a discussion on visa and
mobility issues. Negotiations on upgraded visa facilitation appear to be progressing, and pending
the implementation of a set of conditions related to document security, border security, and rule of
law issues, the EU member states could decide whether to launch negotiations on a visa waiver
agreement. The December 2012 summit also included discussions on Russia’s chairmanship of
the G-20 in 2013, counterterrorism cooperation, human rights issues, the energy policy and WTO-
related disputes, and international issues including Syria, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran, and
the Western Balkans.
Russia and the Soviet Successor States88
Russia’s May 2009 National Security Strategy and February 2013 foreign policy concept hail
cooperation within the CIS as a priority. The National Security Strategy proclaims that the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO; see below) is “the main interstate instrument†to
combat regional military threats. The February 2010 Military Doctrine states that the priorities of
military-political cooperation are Belarus (formally part of a union with Russia), the CSTO, and
the CIS.89 Despite Russia’s emphasis on interests in the CIS, there has long been scant progress
toward overall CIS integration. Many CIS summit meetings have ended in failure, with many of
the presidents sharply criticizing lack of progress on common concerns and Russian attempts at
domination.
In early October 2011, Prime Minister Putin published an article calling for the creation of a
“Eurasian Union†of Soviet successor states. This “Eurasian Union†would be integrated
economically, politically, and militarily, and would unite the structures and functions of the CIS,
the Union State between Belarus and Russia, and the CSTO, as well as the Common Economic
Space between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan that was inaugurated at the beginning of 2012.
Putin raised the hope that the Soviet successor states would be able to integrate more rapidly than
states forming the EU. The “Eurasian Union†would forge close links with the EU, he argued.
The argument’s strong presumption appears to be that economic and other contacts between
Soviet successor states and the rest of the world (including the EU) would be mediated by Russia.
One Russian critic dismissed the article as campaign rhetoric, arguing that in his past elections,
Putin had attempted to attract the votes of those nostalgic for the Soviet era.90 In late July 2012,
Putin appointed a Russian ultranationalist as his advisor on Eurasian integration.
87 “Russia, EU Plan to Increase Partnership for Modernization Initiative Projects,†Interfax, December 21, 2012.
88 Prepared by Jim Nichol, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs, and Steven Woehrel, Specialist in European
Affairs.
89 Russian Federation Security Council, Russian Federation National Security Strategy Until 2020, May 12, 2009; The
Kremlin, President of Russia. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, February 5, 2010; Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation Approved by President of the Russian Federation V.
Putin, February 12, 2013.
90 Vladimir Socor, “Putin’s Eurasian Manifesto Charts Russia’s Return To Great Power Status,†Eurasia Daily
Monitor, October 7, 2011; Pavel Felgenhauer, “Putin Prioritizes Rebuilding the Lost Empire,†Eurasia Daily Monitor,
October 6, 2011.
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The worth of the CSTO (currently composed of CIS members Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan) has been a matter of debate among its members and others,
since it has not been efficacious in protecting borders or halting internal disorder. The CSTO was
formed in 2002 with a headquarters in Moscow.91 An airbase at Kant, Kyrgyzstan, was designated
in 2002 to provide support for Central Asian rapid reaction forces, but the base has housed
Russian troops. President Medvedev called in February 2009 for forming a new and sizeable
CSTO rapid reaction force based in Russia, which he claimed would rival NATO. Uzbekistan
raised concerns that the force could be used by Russia to intervene in its internal affairs, and
refused to sign a June 2009 agreement on the formation of the force. Belarus too balked at signing
the agreement until October 2009 (see below). Despite the lack of consensus within the CSTO,
Russia moved forward unilaterally, assigning the 98th Airborne Division and the 31st Airborne
Assault Brigade (reportedly 8,000 troops) to the force. The rapid reaction force ostensibly is to be
used to repulse military aggression from outside the CSTO, react to natural disasters, and to
combat terrorist groups, trans-national organized crime, and drug traffickers. The decision to use
the rapid reaction force is made by the presidents of the member-states at the request of one or a
group of member states.
At a CSTO summit in December 2011, all the members signed a pledge that no nonmember
military bases could be established on their territories unless all members agreed, a measure that
appeared aimed against the United States. They also reportedly agreed on procedures for
intervening in domestic “emergency†situations within a member state at the behest of the
member. Uzbekistan reportedly objected to these procedures, perhaps spurring its decision to
leave the CSTO.92 At a CSTO summit in December 2012, a new CSTO Collective Security Force
was proclaimed, to include the rapid reaction forces, as well as new special operations, aviation,
and emergencies (natural and man-made disasters) components. A CSTO General Staff with a
dedicated chief also was created, and Russia appointed Lieutenant-General Alexander Studenikin
to the post. President Putin, addressing the other heads of the member-states, called for bolstering
the capabilities of the organization to cope with the challenges posed by the ISAF drawdown in
Afghanistan in 2014. Armenian President Serzh Sargisyan stated that he expected the CSTO to
act in case of aggression by Azerbaijan against Nagorno Karabakh, but raised concerns that the
member-states were not voicing support for Armenian foreign policy regarding Azerbaijan.
Belarus is Russia’s most loyal ally in Europe. Russian policy toward Belarus has been focused on
gaining control of Belarus’s key economic assets and ensuring the country remains in Moscow’s
geopolitical orbit. Moscow forced Belarus to sell the Beltransgaz natural gas firm (which controls
the pipelines and other infrastructure on Belarusian territory) to Russia in 2011 by threatening
steep gas price rises if it did not. Russia cut gas prices to Belarus sharply after the Beltransgaz
sale. Moscow has manipulated the supply of inexpensive Russian crude oil to Belarusian
refineries, which has been a key de facto subsidy to Belarus’s economy. Russia has also provided
loans to prop up Belarus’s economy, in exchange for a commitment by Belarus to privatize state-
owned firms. Belarus has focused on developing joint ventures between Belarusian and Russian
firms. Belarus, already member of a Russia-led Customs Union, is further integrating its economy
with Russia’s in the “Single Economic Space.â€
On the other hand, Belarus has shown independence from Moscow on some issues, such as
refusing to recognize the independence of Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South
91 The Collective Security Treaty was signed in 1992 and renewed in 1999.
92 Interfax, December 21, 2011.
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Ossetia, despite Russian pressure. Belarus is a member of the CSTO, but has distanced itself from
the CSTO’s rapid reaction force, saying that Belarus would not deploy its forces outside its
borders. In other circumstances, Russian economic pressure on Belarus could have caused Minsk
to seek closer ties with the United States and EU, as it has in the past. However, relations with the
West have been seriously damaged by Lukashenko’s repression of opposition groups after
Belarus’s fraudulent December 2010 election.
In Moldova, Russian objectives appear to be to thwart Moldova’s moves toward EU integration
as well as any prospect of closer cooperation with NATO. One important tool in this effort has
been Russia’s support for Moldova’s breakaway Transnistria region. Russian forces remain
stationed in Transnistria against the wishes of the Moldovan government. Russia has provided
economic subsidies to bolster the pro-Russian regime in Transnistria and Russian firms own key
Transnistrian businesses. Russian leaders have conditioned the withdrawal of their troops on the
resolution of Transnistria’s status. Transnistrian leaders have sought Russia’s recognition of their
region’s independence, so far without success. Moscow may remain satisfied with the status quo,
which could suffice to hinder Moldova’s European integration prospects.
Relations between Russia and Ukraine have improved since pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych
became President of Ukraine in 2010. Yanukovych renounced the NATO membership aspirations
of the previous government, saying that the country will remain outside all military blocs. Russia
and Ukraine agreed to extend the stay of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea until 2042. In
exchange, Russia agreed to provide Ukraine with discounted prices for natural gas supplies for 10
years, a benefit that the two sides estimated as worth $40 billion. However, rising global energy
prices negated much of the savings Kyiv counted on from the accord, and Yanukovych continues
to seek further gas price reductions from Russia. This situation may give Moscow more leverage
to secure additional foreign policy and economic concessions from Kyiv. Russian firms, with
Russian government support, have sought to buy key industrial assets in Ukraine during
Yanukovych’s presidency.
However, some of Russia’s boldest proposals for integration appear to have gone further than
Kyiv can support. Ukraine has rebuffed Russian suggestions that it join the CSTO. It has not
accepted Russia’s proposal that that it join the Customs Union, which would conflict with a
planned free trade agreement with the European Union. Ukraine’s offer to join only certain
provisions of the Customs Union have been rejected by Russia. The EU has put off signing the
free trade accord with Kyiv (and the association agreement of which it is a part) until November
2013 at the earliest due to the imprisonment of key Ukrainian opposition leader Yuliya
Tymoshenko and other shortcomings in Ukraine’s democratic development and the rule of law.
Moscow hopes that the EU’s delay will persuade Ukraine to change its mind and join the
Customs Union and other Russian-led integration plans.
Moscow has used the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh to pressure both
sides, maintain Armenia as an ally, and otherwise exercise influence in the South Caucasus
region. The international community condemned Russia’s military incursion into Georgia in early
August 2008 and President Medvedev’s August 26, 2008, decree officially recognizing the
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russian officials announced in September 2008
that two army brigades, each consisting of approximately 3,700 troops, would be deployed to new
military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (the brigades were reduced to a reported 1,700-
1,800 troops each in mid-2009). A part of the Black Sea Fleet also was deployed to Ochamchire
in Abkhazia. The United States and others in the international community have called for Russia
to reverse these deployments and rescind the recognitions of independence.
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Russia and Georgia have yet to reestablish diplomatic relations that Georgia broke off following
the August 2008 conflict. In 2011, Switzerland mediated talks between Georgia and Russia to
address Georgia’s calls for customs control along its borders between Russia and the breakaway
regions, as a condition for Georgia’s consent for Russia’s joining the World Trade Organization.
Then-President Medvedev stated in November 2011 that Russia would accept some private third-
party monitoring of the border and electronic data on trade, resolving this issue blocking Russia’s
WTO accession. After Bidzana Ivanishvili became prime minister of Georgia in October 2012,
his government raised hopes that political and economic relations with Russia could improve.
There appears to be movement on increasing trade between the two countries, but relations
remain cool on the issue of the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Citing instability and the threatened spread of Islamic extremism on its southern flank as a threat
to its security, Moscow intervened in Tajikistan’s civil war in 1992-1996 against Tajik rebels.
Russia’s policy of trying to exclude U.S. influence from Central Asia as much as possible was
temporarily reversed by President Putin after the September 11, 2001, attacks, but appeared to be
put back in place as the 2000s progressed. In July 2005, the Uzbek government directed the
United States to cease its operations at the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) airbase within six months.
Tashkent is believed to have acted not only in response to Russian and Chinese urging but also
after the United States criticized the Uzbek government’s repression in Andijon in May 2005. In
February 2009, Kyrgyzstan accepted a large loan proffered by Russia and simultaneously
requested that the United States wind up operations at the Manas airbase by August 2009. After
intense U.S.-Kyrgyz talks, Kyrgyzstan reversed course in late June 2009 and agreed to permit
U.S. and NATO cargoes to transit through Manas, reportedly angering Putin.93 In the wake of the
“reset†in U.S.-Russia relations since 2009, however, there has appeared to be some cooperation
from Russia regarding the transit of U.S. and NATO materiel to and from Afghanistan.
U.S.-Russia Relations
The spirit of U.S.-Russian “strategic partnership†of the early 1990s was replaced by increasing
tension and mutual recrimination in succeeding years. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001,
attacks, the two nations reshaped their relationship on the basis of cooperation against terrorism
and Putin’s goal of integrating Russia economically with the West.94 However, tensions soon
increased on a number of issues that contributed to ever-growing discord in U.S.-Russian
relations. Cooperation continued in some areas, and then-Presidents Bush and Putin strove to
maintain at least the appearance of cordial personal relations. In the wake of the August 2008
Russia-Georgia conflict, however, bilateral ties deteriorated to their lowest point since the Cold
War.
93 For more on Russian policy in these regions, see CRS Report RL33453, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political
Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, and CRS Report RL33458, Central Asia: Regional Developments
and Implications for U.S. Interests, all by Jim Nichol.
94 For the change in Russian policy toward integration with the West and cooperation with the United States, see CRS
Report RL31543, Russian National Security Policy After September 11, by Stuart D. Goldman.
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The Incoming Obama Administration “Re-sets†Bilateral Relations
The incoming Obama Administration called for starting a dialogue with Russia from a fresh slate.
A February 2009 speech in Munich by Vice President Biden to “re-set†U.S.-Russian relations
was an early sign of the President’s intentions. At their first “get acquainted†meeting on April 1,
2009, in London, President Obama and then-President Medvedev issued joint statements on
opening nuclear weapons talks and on U.S.-Russia relations.
In their joint statement on U.S.-Russia relations, the two presidents agreed to “deepen cooperation
to combat nuclear terrorism†and to “support international negotiations for a verifiable treaty to
end the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.†President Obama confirmed his
commitment to work for U.S. Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
Both sides also pledged to bring into force the bilateral Agreement for Cooperation in the Field of
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, which former President Bush had withdrawn from
consideration in the U.S. Senate following the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. Russia
agreed to assist the United States and the international community in responding to terrorism and
the insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to drug trafficking from Afghanistan. The two
sides called for the continuation of the Six-Party Talks and for the verifiable denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula. They also pledged to strengthen Euro-Atlantic and European security,
including through the OSCE and NATO-Russia Council.95
Reflective of Russia’s views of the bilateral relationship, its May 2009 National Security Strategy
states that Moscow strives to establish “an equal and full-fledged strategic partnership†with the
United States. The Strategy claims that the two countries have “key†influence in the world and
should work together on arms control, on confidence-building measures, on the nonproliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, on counterterrorism, and on the settlement of regional conflicts.
The Strategy proclaims that Russia will work to maintain parity with the United States in strategic
offensive weapons even if the United States deploys a global missile defense system.96
At the July 2009 summit in Moscow, President Obama stated that “the relationship between
Russia and the United States has suffered from a sense of drift†in recent years, and that the two
presidents had “resolved to re-set U.S.-Russian relations.†He stressed that the United States
wanted “to deal as equals†with Russia, since both countries are nuclear superpowers, and that the
United States has recognized that its role “is not to dictate policy around the world, but to be a
partner with other countries†to solve global problems. Some observers have argued that these
statements were aimed at assuaging Russian sensitivities about the country’s status in the world.
One achievement of the summit was the establishment of a U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential
Commission (BPC) intended to strengthen consultations and diplomacy. President Obama
highlighted the commission as the “foundation†element in re-setting relations, since it would
greatly expand communications between the two countries. The presidents are the co-chairs, and
the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister coordinate meetings.
Meeting on November 15, 2009, on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific summit in Singapore,
President Obama and then-President Medvedev continued discussions on START and Iran.
95 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks By President Obama and Russian President Medvedev
after Meeting, April 1, 2009.
96 Russian Federation Security Council. Russian Federation National Security Strategy Until 2020, May 12, 2009.
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The Obama Administration’s National Security Strategy, released in May 2010, asserts that the
United States endeavors “to build a stable, substantive, multidimensional relationship with
Russia, based on mutual interests. The United States has an interest in a strong, peaceful, and
prosperous Russia that respects international norms.†The strategy calls for bilateral cooperation
with Russia—termed one of the 21st century centers of influence in the world—in bolstering
global nonproliferation; in confronting violent extremism, especially in Afghanistan; in forging
new trade and investment arrangements; in promoting the rule of law, accountable government,
and universal values within Russia; and in cooperating as a partner in Europe and Asia. At the
same time, the strategy stresses that the United States “will support the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Russia’s neighbors.â€97
Then-President Medvedev visited the United States on June 22-24, 2010, to focus on business and
technology ties between the two countries. In 11 joint statements, the two presidents pledged
further cooperation to achieve stability in Afghanistan, to foster open government, and to
strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation, among other issues. In a joint statement on strategic
stability, they vowed to continue “the development of a new strategic relationship based on
mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation.†President Obama also called for
accelerating efforts with other members of the WTO to complete the steps necessary for Russian
accession to the WTO. He announced that Russia had agreed to purchase 50 Boeing aircraft,
worth $4 billion, and that the two countries had reached an agreement that would permit U.S.
poultry products to again be exported to Russia.98
Just days after Medvedev’s U.S. visit, the United States announced on June 28, 2010, the arrest of
11 Russian spies (one spy was outside the United States and apparently escaped). The spies had
lived in several U.S. metropolitan areas for up to 10 years or longer. They were arrested on
charges that included money-laundering and not registering as foreign agents. An FBI
investigation against the “deep cover†agents reportedly had been ongoing for several years. The
timing of the arrests may have been determined by suspicions of one of the agents that her cover
had been blown. The 10 agents were swapped in Vienna, Austria, on July 9 for 4 Russian citizens
whom Moscow had alleged were U.S. or British spies. Some U.S. observers suggested that the
focus of the 10 Russian agents on seemingly public information gathering was a reflection of the
paranoia and myopia of Russia’s political leaders.99 Some observers in the United States and
Russia speculated that the quick resolution of the spy case indicated a concerted effort among
policymakers in both countries to preserve the “re-set†in bilateral relations.
In November 2010, Presidents Obama and Medvedev met on the sidelines at the Group of 20
industrialized states in Seoul, South Korea, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Summit in Yokohama,
Japan, and at the NATO-Russia summit in Lisbon, Portugal. At the session of the NATO-Russia
Council in Lisbon, the heads of state agreed to work on cooperation on common security
challenges, to resume theater ballistic missile defense exercises, to identify opportunities for
Russia to cooperate with NATO’s new territorial missile defense capability, to expand Russia’s
support for NATO operations in Afghanistan, and to explore revitalizing and modernizing the
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. President Obama hailed the agreements as part of
97 The White House. National Security Strategy, May 2010.
98 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. U.S.-Russia Joint Statements, June 24, 2010; Remarks by President
Obama and President Medvedev of Russia at Joint Press Conference, June 24, 2010.
99 Financial Times (London), July 1, 2010.
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the “reset†in NATO-Russia relations and as indicating that Russia is a partner rather than an
adversary of NATO.
In May 2011, President Obama and then-President Medvedev met on the sidelines at the Group of
8 (G-8; a grouping of industrialized countries) meeting in Deauville, France. The main topics
discussed included U.S. plans for missile defense deployments in Central Europe, counter-
terrorism cooperation, and economic issues, including Russia’s efforts to obtain entry into the
WTO. President Medvedev indicated that Russia would continue discussions about its concerns
over NATO missile defense plans, but stated that there was no breakthrough at the talks and
suggested that progress might have to be deferred to 2020 (the then-planned final phase of missile
deployments) and to “other politicians.†The two presidents also discussed the “Arab Spring,â€
Iran’s nuclear program, and NATO actions in Libya. In regard to the latter, McFaul indicated that
the views of the two presidents did not widely diverge, and Deputy National Security Advisor
Ben Rhodes stated that President Obama agreed to consult with the Russians about events in
Libya.
The two sides signed or issued nine agreements, statements, memoranda of understanding (MoU),
and reports, ranging from statements of cooperation on visa issues, counter-terrorism, and the
Bering Strait Region to a report assessing future missile challenges (the presidents stated that the
latter report had been finalized, but it was not released). It also was announced that two new
working groups had been created as part of the BPC, a working group on innovation and a
working group on the rule of law. According to McFaul, a major goal of the working group on
innovation was to assist in then-President Medvedev’s modernization campaign (which has
received lukewarm verbal support from his successor, President Putin), including investment at
the Skolkovo research center outside of Moscow, and a major goal of the working group on the
rule of law was to strengthen legal institutions in Russia to facilitate investment.100
Then-Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov met in Washington, DC, on July 13, 2011.
They signed a long-anticipated adoptions agreement and exchanged diplomatic notes to bring into
force the U.S.-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement.
President Obama and lame duck President Medvedev met on the sidelines of the nuclear security
summit in Seoul, South Korea, on March 26, 2012. Both presidents mentioned tensions in
relations, including on missile defense, but both also stressed the accomplishments of the “resetâ€
in relations, such as the START Treaty, Russia’s imminent accession to the WTO, and other
initiatives undertaken by the BPC.101
President-elect Putin met with U.S. National Security Advisor Thomas Danilon on May 4, 2012,
and reportedly conveyed that constructive dialogue between the two countries would continue.
Although he cancelled plans to attend the G-8 meeting at Camp David, he detailed Medvedev to
attend.
100 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama and President Medvedev of Russia
after Bilateral Meeting in Deauville, France, May 26, 2011; Fact Sheet: U.S.-Russia Agreements and Joint Statements,
May 26, 2011; Press Briefing by National Security Council Senior Director for Russia and Eurasia McFaul and
Deputy National Security Advisor Rhodes, May 26, 2011.
101 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama and President Medvedev of Russia
After Bilateral Meeting, March 26, 2012.
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At the presidential summit on June 18, 2012, on the sidelines of the G-20 (Group of 20 major
developed and developing countries) summit in Los Cabos, Mexico, Presidents Obama and Putin
reaffirmed that they would continue to cooperate on many issues, and they issued a long joint
statement listing areas of existing and proposed cooperation, including on Afghanistan, bilateral
investment and trade, health, the environment, and educational and cultural exchanges.102
However, it appeared that the activities of the many Working Groups and Sub-Working Groups of
the BPC had fallen off somewhat, perhaps related to the electoral cycles in both countries, and on
the Russian side, to the anti-Americanism that was a leitmotif of Putin’s presidential campaign.
Putin and Medvedev openly indicated that they supported Obama’s re-election.
In September 2012, Russia requested that the United States wrap up USAID programs in Russia
by October 1, 2012, many of which had been part of the BPC process (see below, “The Ouster of
the U.S. Agency for International Developmentâ€). In late 2012, Russia also informed the United
States that it was unwilling to renew an agreement in its current form sanctioning Cooperative
Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) programs in Russia (see below, “Cooperative Threat
Reductionâ€). In both cases, Russia asserted that the United States was interfering in its affairs and
that it was capable of carrying out further activities by its own means.
On December 5, 2012, Russia pushed for greater regional integration at a CIS Summit in
Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan. The attendees agreed to work toward an integrated currency market
and to initiatives on joint air defense and counter-terrorism. At the OSCE foreign ministerial
meeting in Dublin the next day, then-Secretary Clinton raised concerns that these Russian moves
marked an attempt to “re-Sovietize,†and stated that the United States would seek to counter such
threats to the independence of the successor states. President Putin responded a few days later that
the U.S. concerns were “nonsense,†and claimed that more sovereignty has been ceded by EU
member states than was ever ceded by the republics when they “joined†the Soviet Union.
As a sign of Putin’s continuing anti-Western and anti-American orientation, the RT (Russia
Today) news agency, a propaganda organ of the government, reportedly has stepped up its
activities, including in the United Kingdom and the United States. The U.S. governmental Open
Source Center warned in late 2012 that an RT television channel in the United States was working
to undermine faith in the US Government and fuel political protest.103
Bilateral Relations during Obama’s Second Term
Although there was some media speculation in late 2012 and early 2013 that the Obama
Administration would alter its Russia policy during its second term, recent statements have
indicated a stress on maintaining and building on cooperative ties where possible.104
102 The White House, Office of the Spokesperson, Fact Sheet: The United States and Russia: A Multifaceted
Relationship, June 18, 2012.
103 “Kremlin’s TV Seeks To Influence Politics, Fuel Discontent in U.S.,†Open Source Center Analysis, December 12,
2012.
104 For examples of these statements, see U.S. Department of State, Background Briefing on Secretary of State Kerry’s
Trip to Great Britain, Germany, and France: Special Briefing, Senior State Department Official, February 24, 2013;
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Readout of Telephone Call between President Obama and President
Putin, March 1, 2013; U.S. Embassy, Moscow, Ambassador McFaul’s Blog, 28 Days of Cooperation: U.S. and R.F.,
March 1, 2013.
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John Kerry first met with Lavrov in his capacity as Secretary of State in Berlin on February 26,
2013. The main issue at the meeting was developments in Syria. Lavrov termed the meeting
“constructive,†and indicated that he had raised concerns about the lack of diplomatic notification
and access to Russian adoptees. Kerry also met with Lavrov on April 10, 2013, on the sidelines of
the G-8 foreign ministerial meeting in London. Reportedly, Syria was again a major topic, with
Lavrov also stating that the two sides agreed to step up the activities of the BPC. The two sides
also discussed North Korea and the Middle East peace process. Kerry and Lavrov are expected to
meet on the sidelines of the NATO-Russia Council ministerial meeting in Brussels on April 23,
2013.
National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon visited Russia and met with officials on April 15,
2013. Russian officials reported that he carried a letter from President Obama to President Putin
outlining possible areas of cooperation between the two countries. The two presidents plan to
meet on the sidelines of a scheduled June 2013 G-8 meeting in Northern Ireland.
In testimony to Congress in March 2013 on worldwide threats, Director of National Intelligence
James Clapper argued that Russian foreign policy was a nexus of organized crime, state policy,
and business interests. He warned that Russia and China are the most persistent intelligence
threats and aggressively target U.S. business and finance. He predicted that social discontent
might increase in Russia in 2013, including because of a sluggish economy, increasing
restrictions on political pluralism, and ongoing corruption. He estimated that Russian foreign
policy would not greatly change in 2013. Putin would continue to be very sensitive to U.S.
criticism of Russian domestic policy, but views some ties with the United States as useful on
certain issues. Russia would continue to look for U.S. and NATO guarantees that a missile
defense system is not directed at Russia. On Syria, Russia would remain focused on preventing
outside military intervention to overthrow the al-Asad regime, since Putin is suspicious that the
West is pursuing regime change that could be aimed against Russia. Moscow also would not
likely alter its argument that an incremental system of rewards is the best means to move Iran to
address the concerns of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Despite these differences
between the United States and Russia on Syria and Iran, Russia would continue to support the
Northern Distribution Network as a pillar of U.S.-Russia cooperation. Russian foreign policy
would place more emphasis on integration among the Soviet successor states.105
Russia’s February 2013 foreign policy concept views relations with the Euro-Atlantic states
(including the United States) as a top foreign policy priority, just behind relations with the CIS
states. The concept follows recent statements by Russian officials in calling for the development
of trade and other U.S.-Russian economic ties as the central focus of a post-“reset.†The concept
also spells out that Russia expects the United States not to interfere in the domestic affairs of
other states and that Russia will work to prevent the U.S. imposition of sanctions against Russian
citizens and businesses. The concept cautions that further reductions in strategic nuclear arms
depend on global strategic stability and the balance of strategic offensive and defensive warfare.
In written testimony during a hearing on his nomination to be the commander of the U.S.
European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Philip Breedlove stated
that Russia was an “aspirational superpower,†as well as a regional power, but that “mounting
internal stressors—politico-economic, socio-cultural, and demographic,†would challenge its
105 U.S. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence, Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US
Intelligence Community, James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, March 12, 2013.
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aspirations. The United States and NATO will need to reassure Allies and partners who reside in
Russia’s declared sphere of influence of their resolve to counter untoward influence efforts, he
stated. At the same time, he called for continuing successful engagement with Russia, such as
through the Arctic Council and the NATO-Russia Council, and on such issues as health,
combating terrorism, and countering piracy, and for encouraging Russia to play a constructive
role in world affairs.106
The most recent issue of the Administration’s BPC Newsletter lists a number of meetings of the
Working Groups and sub-Working Groups that have taken place and are scheduled to take place
in coming months, perhaps indicating some revivification of the BPC.107
Bilateral Relations and Afghanistan
In a meeting with Afghan President Hamid Karzai in August 2008, Russian President Medvedev
called for “opening a new page in relations†between the two countries, “because, unfortunately,
our countries are coming up against similar threats and problems.†Russia provides some foreign
assistance and investment to Afghanistan, although it has rejected sending military forces. At the
July 2009 U.S.-Russia summit, a joint statement on assistance to Afghanistan called for
enhancing cooperation within the U.S.-Russia Counter-Terrorism Working Group (established in
2000); further implementing the Russia-NATO Council’s counter-narcotics project; supporting
Afghanistan-related activities of the OSCE; increasing training for the Afghan National Army,
police, and counter-narcotics personnel; and greatly increasing cooperation to halt illicit financial
flows related to heroin trafficking in Afghanistan.
Russia’s then-permanent representative to NATO, Dmitriy Rogozin, and Moscow Regional
Governor Boris Gromov (the former commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan) called in
January 2010 for NATO forces not to “withdraw without victory†in Afghanistan. They asserted
that the “Russian position†is that NATO should ensure political stability in Afghanistan and
claimed that Russia is forming the CSTO’s rapid reaction forces to protect Central Asia as a
hedge against NATO’s failure in Afghanistan. In late March 2010, Rogozin suggested that Russia
should link its cooperation as a transit state for supply shipments to Afghanistan (see below) to a
NATO pledge to combat drug trafficking into Russia. Seeking to elevate its status, the CSTO has
repeatedly called for NATO to formally cooperate with it in order to stanch drug trafficking from
Afghanistan and to defeat the Taliban.108
Russia’s reaction to NATO’s announcement in late 2010 of a planned drawdown of ISAF by the
end of 2014 appeared complex. On the one hand, Russia welcomed a lessened U.S. presence in
Afghanistan and Central Asia, but on the other was concerned about regional security during and
after the drawdown. In January 2011, Russia’s Ambassador to Afghanistan, Andrey Avetisyan,
stressed that NATO forces should not leave Afghanistan until the country is able to defend itself.
He stated that Russia was ready to assist Afghanistan in rebuilding infrastructure and facilities
106 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on the Nomination of Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, for
Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander of the U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe., Testimony by Philip Breedlove, April 11, 2013.
107 U.S. Department of State, U.S.-Russia BPC: Newsletter, February-March 2013.
108 ITAR-TASS, January 18, 2010; Boris Gromov and Dmitry Rogozin, “Russian Advice on Afghanistan,†The
International Herald Tribune, January 12, 2010; BBC Worldwide Monitoring, March 31, 2010; “NATO Not
Cooperating Sufficiently with Russia—CSTO Head,†RIA Novosti, March 27, 2010.
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that had been constructed by the former Soviet Union, but that such rebuilding would need
international financing. He also renewed Russia’s call for NATO to combat drug production.109
In December 2011, Rogozin argued at a NATO-Russia Council meeting that Russia should link
its cooperation with NATO in Afghanistan to NATO granting Russia a larger role in decision-
making on the future of Afghanistan after the planned NATO drawdown of troops in 2014. Also
in December, the CSTO presented a plan to the presidents of the member states for defending
common borders with Afghanistan after the planned NATO drawdown.
At the June 2012 Obama-Putin summit, the joint statement acknowledged Russia’s “significant
contribution†to promote stability in Afghanistan, but only touched on areas of existing and future
cooperation, including the NDN, counter-terrorism, and counter-narcotics. A fact sheet issued by
the State Department praised the work of the NATO-Russia Council counternarcotics program,
which has trained more than 2,000 law-enforcement officers from Central Asia, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan since 2006. The fact sheet also highlighted Russia-NATO cooperation in setting up the
Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund to support Afghanistan’s fleet of Russian-built platforms.
Russian cooperation has included training Afghan maintenance personnel.110
In an April 1, 2013, Russian media interview, Avetisyan stated that since ISAF plans to wind up
its operations in Afghanistan in 2014, Russia sees no reason for some troops from “third
countries†(presumably referring to the United States or other NATO countries) to remain. He
also stressed that Russia will provide security assistance to Afghanistan after 2014, but will not
establish bases and send troops to the country.111
Alternative Supply Routes to and from Afghanistan
In late 2008, the United States and NATO stepped up efforts to develop supplemental air and land
routes into Afghanistan because of growing problems in sending supplies through Pakistan. The
incoming Obama Administration also planned increasing the number of troops in Afghanistan,
which also spurred the search for alternate supply routes. What was later termed the “Northern
Distribution Network†(NDN) was envisaged for transits through Russia or the South Caucasus to
Central Asia and then to Afghanistan. The U.S. Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan, established in late
2001, was to be a component of this route. In February 2009, however, Kyrgyzstan announced
that it intended to close the airbase, but an agreement was reached in late June 2009 to keep it
open in exchange for higher U.S. rent and other payments.
As early as the April 2008 NATO summit, Russia’s then-President Putin had offered to permit the
shipment of nonlethal NATO goods through Russia to Afghanistan. In late 2008, Russia also
permitted Germany to ship weapons and other equipment by land to its troops in Afghanistan.
NATO reached agreement with Russia in February 2009 on the land transit of nonlethal supplies
to Afghanistan, and all the Central Asian states except neutral Turkmenistan also agreed to permit
overland shipments. The first railway shipment from the Baltic states reached Afghanistan—after
transiting Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan—in late March 2009.
109 Interfax, January 27, 2011.
110 U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Russia Cooperation on Afghanistan, June 18, 2012.
111 Interfax, April 1, 2013.
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At the U.S.-Russia summit meeting in early July 2009, Foreign Minister Lavrov and Under
Secretary of State Burns signed an agreement allowing up to 4,500 annual official air flights of
troops and lethal supplies through Russia to Afghanistan, and unlimited numbers of commercial
charter flights of nonlethal supplies. Lauded by McFaul as “historic,†the agreement complements
the NATO-Russia arrangement reached in early 2009 on land transit. The Administration reported
that air transit through Russia could save the United States government up to $133 million
annually in fuel, maintenance and other transportation costs, and that this agreement would be
free of any air navigation charges.
Reportedly, the first flight by the United States using this route took place in early October 2009,
and another took place in November 2009. Allegedly, Russia was slow in facilitating such flights,
and the United States and NATO used alternative air transit through the Caspian region to reach
Afghanistan. According to Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon, these air transit problems
soon were resolved.112
A factsheet issued at the June 2012 U.S.-Russia summit stated that 2,200 U.S. official flights over
Russia had carried over 379,000 personnel and troops and over 45,000 cargo containers of lethal
and nonlethal equipment. About three-quarters of supplies transiting the NDN go through Russia.
At the summit, President Obama reported that he had thanked Putin for Russia’s cooperation in
the NDN, and the two sides pledged to strengthen the NDN.
A June 2010 Administration factsheet on the results of the “re-set†gave some information on
Russian commercial support for the Afghan conflict. It stated that Russian companies had made
over 12,000 flights in support of U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, had supplied over 30%
of the fuel U.S. military troops use in Afghanistan, and provided over 80 MI-17 helicopters to the
Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and Afghan Drug Interdiction Forces.113
Russia is a substantial supplier of jet fuel for U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan. This
relationship became more apparent in September 2011 when the U.S. Defense Logistics Agency
placed its first order for fuel with the Gazpromneft-Aero-Kyrgyzstan joint venture, which is
majority-owned by Russia’s Gazprom state-controlled gas firm, to supply aviation fuel to the
Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan. The Transit Center is the main U.S. airbase in Central Asia,
and provides major aerial refueling services over northern Afghanistan. According to one report,
the fuel is directly supplied from Gazprom’s oil refineries and transported by the Russian Transoil
company to the transit center.114
In early February 2012, Russian media reported that NATO and Russia had agreed that cargo
aircraft bringing materials out of Afghanistan could land at the Ulyanovsk airport, north of the
Caspian Sea. From there, the materials would transit by railway to Riga or Tallinn. Russian planes
reportedly would haul some of the cargoes. Such flights circumvent road and railway transit
delays in Central Asia, according to some reports.115 At a military meeting in early August 2012,
President Putin stated that Russia had an interest in peace and stability “on our southern bordersâ€
(apparently including Central Asia as part of Russia), and so would assist NATO forces in
112 U.S. Department of State. U.S.-Russia Relations Under the Obama Administration: Remarks at the German
Marshall Fund, June 16, 2010.
113 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. U.S.-Russia Relations: “Re-set†Fact Sheet, June 24, 2010.
114 CEDR, September 28, 2011, Doc. No. CEP-950073.
115 Interfax, February 3, 2012.
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Afghanistan, including by opening the Ulyanovsk airport to NATO transport. He averred that it
was better for Russia to support NATO than to have to mobilize Russian troops to deal with
insecurity emanating from Afghanistan.116
In May 2012, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman hailed a statement by the Kyrgyz president
that the country did not plan to renew the lease on the U.S. military facility at Manas. The
spokesman stated that Russia’s position was that the airbase would not be needed after the United
States withdraws most of its troops by the end of 2014.
On April 1, 2013, a Russian newspaper published an interview with Alexander Vershbow, Deputy
Secretary-General of NATO, who reportedly stated that the Ulyanovsk transit center had proven
to be a costly route for the egress of materiel from Afghanistan, so that NATO preferred other
routes, even though the center had been approved for use and one test flight through the center
had occurred.
Bilateral Relations and Iran
Russian perceptions of the Iranian nuclear threat and its policies toward Iran are driven by a
number of different and sometimes competing factors. Russia signed an agreement to build a
nuclear power plant outside the Iranian town of Bushehr and provide other assistance for Iran’s
civilian nuclear program in January 1995. Although the White House and Congress long warned
that Iran would use the civilian nuclear reactor program as a cover for a clandestine nuclear
weapons program, Russia refused to cancel the project. Moscow maintains that its cooperation
with Iran’s civilian nuclear program is legal, proper, and poses no proliferation threat, arguing
that Iran is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and that the light water
reactor built by Russia is not well-suited for producing weapons-grade fissionable material.
Russia agrees with the United States and many other nations that a nuclear-armed Iran would be
destabilizing and undesirable. After Iran’s clandestine program to master the entire nuclear cycle,
including uranium reprocessing, was revealed, Russia withheld delivery of nuclear fuel for the
Bushehr reactor, pending agreement with Tehran about return of spent fuel to Russia for
reprocessing. Russia joined the United States and the “EU-3†group (Great Britain, France, and
Germany) in approving a series of limited U.N. Security Council (UNSC) sanctions related to
Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, including asset freezes and trade bans targeting certain Iranian
entities and individuals.117 Moscow temporarily withdrew most of its technicians and scientists
from the unfinished Bushehr reactor in 2007. However, Russia soon resumed construction and
shipment of nuclear fuel to Bushehr. Fuel delivery was completed in early 2008. In early 2011,
Russia’s permanent representative to NATO alleged that a computer virus had delayed the start-
up of the reactor.118 Reportedly, some damaged systems had to be replaced, but Russian officials
announced that the reactor had begun operation on May 8, 2011. The plant began supplying
power for the electric grid in September 2011. Management of the plant will be transferred to Iran
in 2013, and up to 300 Russian specialists will continue to work at the plant for several years.
116 Interfax, August 2, 2012.
117 See CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
118 Interfax, January 27, 2011.
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In September 2009, Iran informed the IAEA that it had been building a second uranium
enrichment plant near the city of Qom. Many observers considered the disclosure further
evidence that Iran intended to build nuclear weapons. A few days later, President Obama reported
that a meeting he held with then-President Medvedev on the sidelines of a U.N. General
Assembly session dealt mostly with Iran. Medvedev stated that the international “task is to create
... a system of incentives that would allow Iran to continue its fissile nuclear program, but at the
same time prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons.â€119 In a meeting with concerned nations on
October 1, 2009 (now termed the Sextet or P5+1, consisting of the United States, United
Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany), Iran agreed to a late October IAEA inspection of
the Qom enrichment site and initially appeared positive toward a plan to export most of its low-
enriched uranium to Russia or France to be further enriched to fuel the Tehran Research Reactor.
Russia reportedly mediated with Iran to urge it to accept the research reactor fuel deal, but Iran
rejected the deal. In late November, Russia joined other representatives of the IAEA in censuring
Iran for concealing the enrichment plant near Qom. In February 2010, Iran announced that it
would start enriching uranium to 20% to fuel the Tehran Research Reactor.
In June 2010, Russia supported the approval of UNSC Resolution 1929, which expressed
growing international concern with Iran’s lack of compliance with ensuring that its nuclear
program is peaceful and directed an expanded international arms embargo and added restrictions
on commerce dealing with “proliferation-sensitive activities†in Iran. Explaining Russia’s vote for
the resolution, U.N. Permanent Representative to the U.N. Vitaliy Churkin stated that “it has
become inevitable that additional restrictive measures should be adopted to constrain
development in those Iranian activities that run counter to the task of strengthening the
nonproliferation regime.â€120 Perhaps also a significant factor, simultaneously with Russia’s
agreement on the draft resolution, its state arms export agency, Rosoboronexport, and other
Russian firms were removed from U.S. lists of sanctioned entities.121 Appearing to be one strategy
to deflect Iran’s anger, Russia has denounced added sanctions imposed by the United States, the
EU, and other countries in the wake of the approval of UNSC Resolution 1929.
After CIA revelations about Iran’s possession of highly enriched uranium, then-President
Medvedev concurred in July 2010 that “Iran is nearing the possession of the potential which in
principle could be used for the creation of a nuclear weapon.†He also stated that “we should not
forget that Iran’s attitude [toward cooperation with the international community] is not the best
one.â€122 Causing further strains in Russian-Iranian relations, in September 2010 President
Medvedev signed a decree banning the supply of the S-300 surface-to-air missile system to Iran,
asserting that the weapons transfer to Iran was blocked by UNSC Resolution 1929.
Lavrov reported that in November 2010, he urged the Sextet to back a “step-by-step†approach to
resolving tensions over Iran’s nuclear program, involving easing and eventually eliminating
UNSC sanctions in response to Iranian moves to comply with IAEA concerns.123
119 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Remarks by President Obama and President Medvedev of Russia
after Bilateral Meeting, September 23, 2009.
120 United Nations. Security Council. 6335th Meeting, Meeting Record, S/PV.6335, June 9, 2010.
121 CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
122 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Speech by Dmitry Medvedev, President of the Russian
Federation, at the Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives to International Organizations,
July 13, 2010; Agence Presse France, July 13, 2010.
123 Transcript of Sergey Lavrov Interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 2, 2011.
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In testimony in December 2010, Under Secretary of State William Burns asserted that “Russia’s
partnership [with the United States] in the diplomacy which led to Resolution 1929 and to its own
decision to cancel the S–300 sale was crucial. Without Russia’s partnership, I don’t think we
would have had Resolution 1929 [or] as significant a set of measures from the EU and from many
others. So that painstaking effort to work together with regard to a shared concern about Iran’s
nuclear ambitions has been right at the core of our relationship with Russia over the last couple of
years.†At the hearing, some Members raised concerns that Russia’s past and ongoing support for
Iran’s civil nuclear program might have facilitated its nuclear weapons ambitions. Under
Secretary Burns argued that Russia and other countries have become increasingly worried about
Iran’s nuclear intentions and have intensified their support for countervailing international
actions.124
In January 2011, Russia joined the other members of the Sextet at a meeting with Iran in Istanbul
to urge Iran to commit to a modified agreement worked out by Russia, the United States, and
France to exchange the bulk of Iran’s low-enriched uranium for fuel rods for the Tehran research
reactor. Iran raised preconditions to such an agreement that were rejected by the Sextet. Just
before the meeting, Russia joined the Sextet in calling for fully implementing the sanctions under
UNSC Resolution 1929, but again refused to join what it termed “unilateral sanctions†beyond
those agreed to by the UNSC.
On June 1, 2011, Lavrov stated that because the United States and European countries imposed
added sanctions on Iran after the approval of UNSC Resolution 1929—sanctions that he claimed
they had agreed to forego during negotiations prior to the approval of the resolution—Russia
would not agree to further UNSC sanctions.125 That same day, the Russian Foreign Ministry
reported that Lavrov rejected a call by visiting Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Moshe Ya'alon for
concerned countries to warn Iran that it faces military reprisals if it proceeds with its nuclear
weapons development program. According to the Foreign Ministry, Lavrov reiterated Russia’s
views that concerns about Iran’s nuclear program should be resolved exclusively through
negotiations and that Iran has the right to pursue a peaceful nuclear program.126
On June 9, 2011, the Sextet issued a statement calling for Iran to hold discussions on many
unresolved concerns to rule out a military component to Iran’s nuclear program. The statement
was issued in response to an announcement by Iran that it would greatly increase uranium
enrichment to 20%.
In November 2011, the IAEA issued a report warning that Iran had intensified its nuclear
weapons development program. Lavrov denounced the report as making “a totally unsupported
conclusion that Iran’s nuclear program had a military dimension.â€127 Russia reportedly opposed
UNSC action on the report, terming further sanctions an attempt to trigger “regime change†in
Iran. Russia has instead urged the Sextet to pursue its “step-by-step†plan for easing sanctions in
return for actions by Iran to dispel international concerns.
124 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearing on Implementing Tougher Sanctions on
Iran: A Progress Report, December 1, 2010.
125 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, June 2, 2011.
126 CEDR, June 1, 2011, Doc. No. CEP-950139; June 1, 2011, Doc. No. CEP-365001.
127 CEDR, January 25, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950142.
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In November 2011, the Washington Post alleged that Russian scientists were assisting Iran’s
nuclear program. Refuting the Washington Post and other Western media reports, on January 8,
2012, Russia’s state-owned Rosatom nuclear energy and weapons firm asserted that it had played
no role in Iran’s nuclear program beyond building the Bushehr nuclear power plant and supplying
medical isotopes.
In early January 2012, Iran announced that it had begun uranium enrichment at its underground
Fordow facility north of Qom. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gennadiy Gatilov voiced “regret
[that] Iran continues to ignore international demands to alleviate concern over its nuclear program
and to freeze construction of [the] enrichment facility.†At the same time, he reiterated Russia’s
opposition to further UNSC sanctions against Iran.
The United States imposed added financial and other sanctions on Iran under the National
Defense Authorization Act of 2012, signed into law on December 31, 2011. An executive order
implementing these and other sanctions was issued on February 6, 2012. On January 23, 2012,
the EU also bolstered its sanctions on Iran, including by beginning to draw down imports of
Iranian oil and to restrict financial transactions with Iranian banks. The U.S. sanctions came into
full effect in August 2012. Lavrov and other Russian officials have criticized the added U.S. and
EU sanctions.
On April 14, 2012, Iran and the Sextet (formally led by the EU High Representative for Foreign
Affairs) resumed talks in Istanbul after a 15-month lapse, and agreed to present detailed proposals
at a May 23-24, 2012, meeting in Baghdad. At this meeting, Iran rejected proposals put forth by
the Sextet, insisting that economic sanctions be immediately lifted and its right to enrich uranium
be acknowledged. Russia’s emissary to the talks, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov,
stated that Russia was satisfied with its level of cooperation with the United States at the talks,
although there were some differences. According to some reports, Russia wanted to play a larger
role in the talks, and it agreed to host another meeting on June 18-19. This meeting, as well as a
Sextet experts’ session in Istanbul on July 3, 2012, were reported to be inconclusive, although the
sides agreed to continue meeting.
Just before President Putin’s June 25-26, 2012, visit to Israel, Foreign Minister Avigdor
Lieberman stated that although Russia was closely allied with the Sextet position on Iran, Israel
would seek to impress upon Putin the danger that faces Israel if Iran obtains nuclear weapons.
During Putin’s visit, President Shimon Peres urged him to take actions to prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that he called for Russia to demand
that Iran halt enriching uranium, relinquish all its enriched uranium, and dismantle its
underground nuclear facility near Qom. He also averred that the international community must
boost sanctions against Iran. President Putin stated that calls in Iran for Israel’s annihilation were
unacceptable, that the question of Iran’s nuclear program should be the subject of negotiations,
and that Iran has the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy if the international community has
“absolute guarantees†that the program will not lead to nuclear weapons.128
In August 2012, the Russian Foreign Ministry raised concerns that newly implemented U.S.
sanctions against Iran could harm the interests of Russian firms operating in Iran, and thus impact
128 The Kremlin, President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin Answered Russian Journalists’ Questions, June
27, 2012; Israel, Government Press Office, Press Release: PM Netanyahu’s Statement After Meeting with President of
the Russian Federation, Mr. Vladimir Putin, June 25, 2012.
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U.S.-Russia relations.129 On October 17, 2012, the Russian Foreign Ministry criticized the
implementation of tighter EU sanctions on Iran, stating that such action outside of U.N. sanctions
harmed the unity of the Sextet. Foreign Minister Lavrov argued a few days later that support for
the Arab Spring and for “so-called democratization in the Middle East,†presumably by the
United States, created a situation where Iran and other countries may contemplate developing
nuclear weapons to counteract revolutions and regime changes.130
On November 8, 2012, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov reiterated Russia’s
position that there is no proof that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons development program in
violation of the NPT. A few days later, Ryabkov reportedly called for Iran and the United States to
open direct talks on Iran’s nuclear program to supplement stalled Sextet talks, although he urged
that Sextet partners be kept abreast about the content of such bilateral talks.131
Russia’s February 2013 foreign policy concept states that Russia will stress a “political and
diplomatic settlement†to the Iranian nuclear issue “through a dialogue based on a phased
approach, reciprocity, and strict compliance with the nuclear nonproliferation regime.â€
At the February 26-27, 2013, Sextet talks with Iran in Almaty, Kazakhstan, Ryabkov reportedly
took a stronger stance in criticizing Iran’s noncompliance with UNSC resolutions and IAEA
requests, and hinted that Russia might back added sanctions in the UNSC against Iran. At the
April 5-6, 2013, Sextet talks with Iran in Almaty, Ryabkov indicated that “one of our bigger
worries,†was Iran’s refusal to halt uranium enrichment above 5%. At the same time, he praised
Iran’s participation in the talks and urged that they continue. Days after these talks, Iran
announced plans for new uranium mining and milling activities. The Russian Foreign Ministry
stated that such plans hinder the development of trust between the Sextet and Iran that is
necessary for the continuation of talks.
Russia’s Role in the Middle East Quartet
Russia is a member of “the Quartet†(formed in 2002 by Russia, the United States, the EU, and
the U.N.) that mediates between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), chaired
by President Mahmoud Abbas.132 Russia supported the holding of the U.S.-brokered Annapolis
Conference in 2007 on a two-state solution, and the Quartet has agreed in principle to a Russian
proposal to hold a follow-on conference in Moscow at some point.
According to Russian analyst Dmitriy Trenin, Russia seeks to present itself as an unbiased arbiter
in the Quartet, and participates in order to demonstrate its status as a great power.133 Russian
Foreign Minister Lavrov met with Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in 2006 to discuss the future of
the peace process after Hamas won a majority of seats in the Palestinian National Authority
Legislative Council. Russia argues that Hamas has popular support among Palestinians and that
129 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, as reported in CEDR, August 13, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-
950144.
130 Interfax, October 18, 2012; October 23, 2012.
131 Interfax, November 8, 2012; James Blitz and Charles Clover, “Moscow Urges Direct US-Iran Talks,†Financial
Times, November 11, 2012.
132 See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
133 Dmitriy Trenin, Russia’s Policy in the Middle East: Prospects for Consensus and Conflict with the United States,
The Century Foundation, 2010.
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Russian contacts with Hamas enable Russia to urge Hamas to moderate its behavior and take part
in the establishment of a peaceful Palestinian state. The other members of the Quartet maintain
that that there should be no engagement with Hamas until it forswears terrorism, recognizes
Israel’s right to exist, and supports the Middle East peace process as outlined in the 1993 Oslo
Accords. Russian President Medvedev met with Meshaal during his May 2010 trip to Syria. Israel
condemned Medvedev’s meeting with Meshaal.134
Russia and other members of the Quartet urged the resumption of direct talks between the PLO
and Israel after the last such talks in 2008. The sides agreed to resume direct talks in August 2010
and PLO chairman Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met on
September 2, 2010, in Washington, DC. Just days before the end of Israel’s moratorium on
settlements on the West Bank, the Quartet met and issued a statement on September 21, 2010,
calling for the moratorium to be continued.
In January 2011, then-President Medvedev met with President Abbas in Jericho, where Medvedev
did not declare recognition of Palestinian statehood but reaffirmed a statement of such support
made by the former Soviet Union in 1988. On February 18, 2011, the United States vetoed a
UNSC draft resolution supported by Russia that the United States termed “unbalanced and one-
sided†in its condemnation of all Israeli settlements established in occupied Palestinian territory
since 1967 as illegal.
Russia supported the signing of the agreement in May 2011 between Fatah and Hamas on
forming a power-sharing Palestinian Authority government for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Russia endorsed the formation of a cabinet that would “base [its] policies on the platform of the
PLO and on the Arab peace initiative,†including the recognition of Israel, rejection of violence,
and adherence to Quartet decisions.135 On May 20, 2011, the Quartet issued a statement of
support “for the vision of Israeli-Palestinian peace outlined by U.S. President Barack Obama on
May 19, 2011. The Quartet agrees that moving forward on the basis of territory and security
provides a foundation for Israelis and Palestinians to reach a final resolution of the conflict
through serious and substantive negotiations and mutual agreement on all core issues.â€136 Deputy
Prime Minister Moshe Ya’alon visited Russia in early June 2011 and reportedly praised Russia’s
participation in the Quartet, but stressed that “Hamas cannot be a partner for negotiations [and]
cannot be recognized as the legitimate authority in Gaza until it recognizes the State of Israel and
renounces terror entirely.â€137 The United States has rejected dealing with Hamas unless it
renounces terrorism and meets other principles enunciated above by the Quartet, and has been
wary of French and Russian proposals for convening international conferences until the Israelis
and the Palestinians themselves make progress toward reopening talks.
The Obama Administration opposed the application for U.N. membership submitted by Palestine
to the UNSC on September 23, 2011, a submission supported by Russia. After the submission, the
Quartet issued a statement that acknowledged the submission, but stressed the resumption of
134 “Israel Slams Russia’s Hamas Stance,†Jerusalem Post, May 12, 2010; Baraq Ravid, “Are Russia-Israel Ties Really
‘Better Than Ever’ Under Lieberman?†Haaretz, November 15, 2010.
135 Bloomberg Full Transcript Of Sergey Lavrov Interview, June 1, 2011, Moscow Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation, June 2, 2011; Transcript of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Interview with Russian Media after
Attending CSTO Foreign Ministers Council Meeting in Minsk, May 31, 2011, Moscow Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Russian Federation, June 1, 2011.
136 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Joint Statement by the Quartet, May 20, 2011.
137 CEDR, June 1, 2011, Doc. No. CEP-365001.
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direct bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiations without delay or preconditions. The Quartet called
for progress on settling issues of territory and security within a few months, and it endorsed
Russia’s call for convening a Moscow conference to examine progress.
Holding the presidency at the 187th session of the UNESCO Executive Board in September-
October 2011, Russia recommended that the UNESCO General Conference at the end of October
vote to admit Palestine as a member. The United States voted against admission. Foreign Minister
Lavrov explained that Russia accepted the argument of Palestine that admission would not
substitute for reaching a negotiated peace settlement with Israel.138
In January 2012, Israeli-Palestinian negotiators held inconclusive “exploratory talks†that were
sponsored by Jordan and the Quartet. In February 2012, Fatah and Hamas agreed that Abbas
would form and lead a temporary unity government. Russia welcomed the agreement, stating that
a government led by Abbas would promote Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in line with the
proposals made by the Quartet in September 2011. In March 2012, Islamic Jihad took
responsibility for launching missiles from Gaza into Israel, attacks that occurred days before a
meeting of the Quartet at the U.N. in New York. Israel stated that it held Hamas fully responsible
for security in Gaza. The Quartet, including then- Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov,
issued a statement deploring “provocative actions†by both sides. In the UNSC, however, Clinton
condemned “in the strongest terms†the precipitating missile attacks from the Gaza Strip.
In November 2012, Russia supported a proposed UNSC press statement expressing grave concern
about the violence in Gaza and calling for a halt to all military activities, but U.N. Ambassador
Churkin reported that it was blocked by “one country,†presumably a reference to the United
States. The United States and others objected that the statement did not mention the ongoing
missile attacks from Gaza. Churkin threatened to submit a Russian draft resolution to the UNSC,
and called for the Quartet to convene to discuss the crisis. President Obama stressed on
November 18, 2012, that Israel had the right to defend itself against the missile attacks from
Gaza. Russia hailed the ceasefire that was brokered by Egypt on November 22, 2012.
Russia voted in favor of a November 29, 2012, U.N. General Assembly resolution granting the
Palestinian Authority the status of a nonmember observer state. The United States voted against
the resolution. Russia stated that it hoped that the approval of the resolution would facilitate the
renewal of direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the convocation of a ministerial meeting of
the Quartet. The next day, Israel announced the approval of new construction of 3,000 dwellings
in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Russia raised serious concerns that the new construction
jeopardized the reopening of direct Israeli-Palestinian talks, but the United States noted that the
construction plan came on the heels of the “provocative†U.N. vote, and called for both sides to
renew direct talks without preconditions.139
In an interview in early December 2012, Foreign Minister Lieberman described Russia’s position
on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as frequently enigmatic. A meeting of special representatives of
the Quartet met in Brussels on December 12, 2012. Russia had urged that the a Quartet meeting
be held at the ministerial level, but the United States reportedly had called for postponing such a
138 For details, see CRS Report R42022, Palestinian Initiatives for 2011 at the United Nations, by Jim Zanotti and
Marjorie Ann Browne.
139 Mark Lander, “For Obama, Israel’s Timing on Settlements Is Old News,†The New York Times, December 1, 2012.
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meeting until after parliamentary elections in Israel in January 2013. Russia reiterated a proposal
that the Arab League be added as a participant in the settlement process.
At his meeting with Secretary Kerry on April 10, 2013, Foreign Minister Lavrov reported that the
two sides agreed that a ministerial meeting of the Middle East Quartet should be soon convened.
Lavrov stated that he urged the participation of representatives of Arab States, Israel, and the
Palestinians in the meeting.
Bilateral Relations and North Korea
Russia has expanded its ties with North Korea in recent years as part of its policy of strengthening
its role as an Asia-Pacific power. Russia stresses a negotiated settlement of the Korean conflict
that protects the stability of its eastern regions and ensures a draw-down of U.S. forces in South
Korea. Russia also seeks the continuation of the six-party talks on North Korea’s de-
nuclearization (see below) as a means of containing, if not reducing, the threat posed by a
nuclear-armed Pyongyang, according to some observers. Russia prefers that the consolidation of
power by Kim Jong-un after the December 2011 death of his father, Kim Jong-Il, be relatively
peaceful, rather than involve a regime collapse that could involve refugee flows into Russia or
other trans-border problems, or the occupation of North Korea by South Korea or China,
according to some observers. Moscow has hoped to retain effective relations with Pyongyang
throughout the succession period, in this view. Russia seeks working relations with South Korea
for many of the same reasons—the pursuit of Asia-Pacific regional influence and stability in areas
near its borders—as well as for economic and trade benefits.140
A phase of closer Russia-North Korea ties was launched in February 2000, when the foreign
ministers of the two countries signed a Treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighborly Relations and
Cooperation. President Vladimir Putin visited Pyongyang in July 2000 and Supreme Leader Kim
Jong-Il visited Russia in August 2001. Because of the closer bilateral ties, North Korea insisted in
2003 that it would not take part in multinational denuclearization talks unless Russia also
participated. These six-party talks (including the two Koreas, the United States, Russia, China,
and Japan) opened in August 2003. Russia-North Korea relations appeared strained somewhat
after Russia supported UNSC Resolution 1718 in October 2006 that criticized a North Korean
nuclear test and applied sanctions. In February 2007, North Korea pledged to shut down and
dismantle its Yongbyon nuclear facilities in exchange for humanitarian and developmental
assistance, but further progress evaporated and six-party talks have been halted since December
2008. In April 2009, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the talks.
Russian-North Korean tensions increased in April-May 2009 after Russia supported the UNSC in
approving Resolution 1874 that condemned North Korean missile and nuclear tests and increased
sanctions on North Korea. Russia’s Ambassador Churkin stressed that the sanctions excluded
military force and argued that they would be reviewed once North Korea renewed cooperation
within the format of the six-party talks. Russia and China insisted that a UNSC Presidential
Statement issued in July 2010 not assess blame for the sinking of the South Korean naval corvette
Cheonan. Russia argued that its stance of not assessing blame would help “de-escalate tensions
140 Alexander Vorontsov, Current Russia—North Korea Relations: Challenges And Achievements, The Brookings
Institution, February 2007; Georgy Toloraya, “Russia and the North Korean Knot,†The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan
Focus Newsletter, April 19, 2010.
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on the Korean Peninsula, restore dialogue and interaction between North Korea and South Korea,
and resume the six-party talks.â€141
Seemingly taking a stronger stance than in the case of the attack on the Cheonan, Russian Foreign
Minister Lavrov immediately condemned the North Korean artillery attack and the loss of life on
South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island in late November 2010, but also called for restraint by both
sides. He similarly expressed “profound concern†over revelations by North Korea in November
2010 that it was enriching uranium as part of a civil nuclear power program, and termed such
enrichment a violation of UNSC resolutions and the 2005 denuclearization statement.142 The
heads of state of the G-8 issued a statement in late May 2011 warning that the nuclear programs
of North Korea and Iran were a threat to global stability.
In late August 2011, then-Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Il met with President Medvedev in the
southeastern Russian town of Ulan-Ude. Kim Jong-Il reportedly reiterated a proposal to return to
the six-party talks “without preconditions,†while accepting a moratorium on nuclear tests and
production after the resumption of the talks. The U.S. State Department issued a statement that
“any engagement with the North Koreans should be conducted in a way that does not detract from
the international community’s clear message of concern about the North’s weapons programs, and
the necessity for Pyongyang to do what is necessary to return to the Six-Party talks.â€143 The
Russian ambassador to South Korea admitted that the announcement by North Korea that it
would resume six-party talks “without preconditions†was a repudiation of U.S. and South
Korean calls for North Korea to halt all of its nuclear activities and allow U.N. inspectors to
verify the suspension before the resumption of talks. He asserted that Russia agrees with the other
parties to the talks, but he appeared to argue for further talks with North Korea to alter its
stance.144
At the G-8 Summit in Camp David, MD, on May 18-19, 2012, Russian Prime Minister Medvedev
joined President Obama and other G-8 leaders in raising concerns about North Korea’s
“provocative actions,†including its uranium enrichment program, and they “condemned†an
April 2012 attempted ballistic missile launch. They also pledged to cooperate in the UNSC in
case of additional North Korean acts.145
Russia condemned the launch of a ballistic missile by North Korea in December 2012, and stated
that the action threatened to hinder the resumption of the Six-Party talks. On January 22, 2013,
Russia supported the passage of UNSC Res. 2087, condemning the North Korean missile launch
and strengthening sanctions. A February 12, 2013, North Korean test of an alleged 7-8 kiloton
“miniaturized†nuclear device was conducted not far from Russia’s Far East borders, perhaps
spurring Russia’s support for the U.S.-China initiative in the UNSC to impose new financial and
transit inspection sanctions in UNSC Resolution 2094, approved on March 7, 2013. At his
141 “Moscow Backs UN Security Council Statement on S. Korean Corvette Incident,†Russia & CIS General Newswire,
July 10, 2010.
142 CEDR, December 1, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-8009; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Working
Visit to Russia by Pak Ui Chun, Foreign Minister of the DPRK, December 14, 2010.
143 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Taken Question: Russia/North Korea: Joint Naval Exercises
in 2012, September 15, 2011.
144 Open Source Center, Korean Peninsula: Daily Report, August 26, 2011, Doc. No. KPP-971084.
145 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Camp David Declaration, May 19, 2012.
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meeting with Secretary Kerry on April 10, 2013, Foreign Minister Lavrov reported that he called
for the urgent resumption of the Six-Party talks.
Bilateral Relations and Syria
U.S.-Russia relations increasingly have become strained as a result of a Syrian government
crackdown on civil unrest that intensified in early 2011.146 Russia has maintained ties with the
regime of Syrian President Bashar Hafez al-Asad throughout the conflict. These ties include arms
sales and a naval base at Tartus—Russia’s only Mediterranean Sea facility—which Russia had
refurbished before the intensified unrest. Russian firms also allegedly sell Syrian oil on world
markets. Putin has asserted that Russia will not tolerate a replay of the “regime change†in Libya
that transpired after Russia abstained on UNSC Resolution 1973. Also, Putin and other Russian
officials have long intimated that Western interests orchestrated the so-called “color revolutionsâ€
(changes in government) in several Soviet successor states, and they remain concerned about such
possible Western “regime change.†In contrast to the Russian government, some Russian citizens
have decried the growing violence of the al-Asad government, including ethnic Circassians, some
of whom have called for the Russian government to evacuate or otherwise provide assistance to
the approximately 50,000-100,000 ethnic Circassians whom had fled imperial Russia and had
settled in Syria in the 19th century. Some sources have alleged that a few members of the Chechen
mujahidin have traveled to Syria to fight against the al-Asad government.147
In October 2011, Russia and China vetoed a UNSC resolution that strongly condemned “the
continued grave and systematic human rights violations and the use of force against civilians by
the Syrian authorities†and called on all states “to exercise vigilance and restraint†in supplying
arms to the Syrian government. Russia had continued to provide weaponry to the al-Asad
government as the violence had intensified. In early February 2012, the United States strongly
urged Russia and China to support a second, stronger UNSC resolution condemning “gross
violations†of human rights by the al-Asad government against civilians and calling for the
“political transition to a democratic, plural political system.†Both countries, however, vetoed the
resolution on February 4, 2012. U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. Susan Rice stated
after the veto that “the United States is disgusted that a couple of members of this Council
continue to prevent us from ... addressing an ever-deepening crisis in Syria.... This intransigence
is even more shameful when you consider that at least one of these members continues to deliver
weapons to al-Asad.â€148 Foreign Minister Lavrov rejected the resolution as unbalanced, arguing
that it gave more support to the oppositionists than to the al-Asad government, and urged
negotiations between conflicting parties to end the violence.
On March 20, 2012, Lavrov appeared to signal greater Russian displeasure with actions of the al-
Asad government, and indicated that Russia would support a presidential statement by the UNSC
in support of a peace effort by the Special Emissary of the U.N. and Arab League, Kofi Annan. At
the same time, Lavrov continued to reject efforts to get President al-Asad to step down. Russia
supported the UNSC presidential statement on March 22, 2012, that called for a ceasefire and
146 See also CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response, by Jeremy M. Sharp and
Christopher M. Blanchard.
147 CEDR, August 24, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-377001.
148 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, At a Security Council Session on Syria, February 4, 2012.
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expressed backing for the Annan mission. Russian diplomats presented the presidential statement
as a “success†of Russian foreign policy in obtaining UNSC recognition of its viewpoint.
Following the killing of over 100 civilians in the village of al Hawlah (Houla) on May 26, 2012,
Russia agreed to a UNSC resolution that condemned Syrian government artillery and tank
shelling of the village, but rejected accusations that the Syrian government was involved in the
point-blank killings of many of the civilians. Russian U.N. emissary Aleksandr Pankin claimed
that the killings were in effect a provocation by the insurgents and those opposed to the Annan
peace efforts. Russian state-owned television went further, claiming that the killings had been
carried out by al Qaeda and other insurgents who were allied with Western interests, in order to
justify Western intervention and the overthrow of al-Asad.149 The Russian Foreign Ministry also
deplored the subsequent ouster of Syrian diplomats from several EU states in protest against the
killings. On May 28, 2012, Foreign Minister Lavrov claimed that Russia’s main interest was
halting the violence in Syria and that Russia did not care what regime ruled the country. However,
he immediately appeared to contradict this statement by criticizing those calling for regime
change.
On May 31, 2012, then-Secretary Clinton warned that Russia’s stance was threatening to result in
the emergence of full-scale civil war in Syria, something Russia claimed to fear, and she urged
Russia to back a political transition in the country. That same day, U.S. Permanent Representative
to the U.N. Susan Rice criticized as “reprehensible†the docking of a Russian ship a few days
previously that contained weapons for the al-Asad regime.
The main issue of discussion at the June 2012 U.S.-Russia summit appeared to be Syria. Both
leaders claimed that they had agreed on some aspects of the situation in Syria, and both called for
a cessation of violence, adherence to the peace efforts undertaken by Kofi Annan, and a political
transition to a democratic system “implemented by the Syrians themselves.†The latter
formulation appeared based on Russia’s insistence on noninterference in Syria’s internal affairs.
Tensions appeared exacerbated during the summit by a report that a Russian ship was on its way
to deliver attack helicopters to Syria. The supply ship subsequently turned around after British
insurers cancelled the ship’s coverage. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov later claimed that
the ship was carrying refurbished attack helicopters and air defense equipment, and asserted that
the latter was aimed to enhance Syria’s ability to “expel external aggression.â€150
At an international meeting in Geneva on the Syria conflict in late June 2012, U.N. Envoy Kofi
Annan reportedly worked to achieve agreement between the United States and Russia on a peace
plan for Syria. The conferees agreed that the al-Asad government and the rebels would form a
transitional government leading to a political settlement of the conflict. Russia objected to a U.S.
call for al-Asad not to be part of the transitional government. At a conference of the Friends of
Syria group of countries in Paris on July 6, 2012, then-Secretary Clinton called for Russia (which
boycotted the conference) to support sanctions against the al-Asad government in case of
noncompliance with the peace plan.
On July 19, 2012, Russia (and China) vetoed a UNSC resolution that extended the mandate of the
Annan observer mission if the al-Asad government moved troops and heavy weapons from
populated civilian areas. If the al-Asad government failed to comply, the resolution called for
149 CEDR, May 29, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950146.
150 Open Source Center, Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), June 21, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950170.
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possible sanctions against the Syrian government upon further UNSC action. Russia claimed that
approval for possible sanctions could open the way to military intervention, a stance that U.S.
ambassador to the U.N. Susan Rice asserted was “paranoid if not disingenuous.â€151 An alternative
resolution—extending the mandate of the mission without provisions opposed by Russia—was
approved.
On December 13, 2012, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov admitted that rebel
gains might result in the fall of the al-Asad government, spurring an endorsement from the State
Department that Russia was “waking up to reality,†and that it should move to support a
democratic transition. Bogdanov also stated that plans were being developed for the possible
evacuation of thousands of Russian citizens from Syria, and he claimed that about one-half of
Russians in Syria supported the opposition.152
On December 3, 2012, during his state visit to Turkey, President Putin argued that “we are not the
inveterate defenders of the Syrian regime,†but that Russia is concerned that terrorists seek to take
over in Syria. The next day, then-Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov met in Dublin,
where the two diplomats reportedly agreed to further discuss a political transition in Syria,
although Lavrov continued to reject a call for al-Asad to step down. On December 11, 2012,
Foreign Minister Lavrov condemned a U.S. announcement of recognition of the National
Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as the legitimate representative of the
Syrian people. He claimed that the announcement violated the Geneva peace plan for talks
between the opposition and the al-Asad government. Russia likewise criticized the overwhelming
support by the Friends of Syria of the legitimacy of the National Coalition for Syrian
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces on December 12.153
During his first meeting with Lavrov as Secretary of State in Berlin in late February 2013, Kerry
reportedly urged Russia to work with the rest of the international community to implement the
Geneva accords on a transition to a democratic Syria. He also called for Russia to halt arms
deliveries and other support to the al-Asad regime. In testimony on March 20, 2013, Ambassador
to Syria Robert Ford pointed out that although Russia has agreed to the Geneva peace framework,
Moscow should “go far, far beyond that,†first of all by halting arms transfers to the Syrian
government, and secondly by joining the international community in the economic sanctions
regime against the al-Asad government.154
Russia criticized the decision of the Arab League in late March 2013 to seat the National
Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.
Lavrov reported that at his meeting with Secretary Kerry on April 10, 2013, he called for the
United States to press the Syrian National Coalition to form a delegation for talks with Syrian
government representatives. Representatives of the Syrian Popular Front (the pro-al-Asad
“constructive oppositionâ€), headed by Syrian Deputy Prime Minister Qadri Jamil, visited
151 U.N. Security Council, 6810th Meeting, Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria That Would Have
Threatened Sanctions, Due to Negative Votes of China, Russian Federation, Press Release, July 19, 2012.
152 Interfax, December 13, 2012; Reuters, December 13, 2012.
153 Andrey Fedyashin, “U.S. Recognizes Syrian Opposition and Offers Moscow Mediatory Role,†Voice of Russia,
December 12, 2012; Open Source Center, Europe: Daily Report, December 4, 2012, Doc. No. EUP-335001.
154 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearing on the Crisis in Syria: The U.S. Response,
March 20, 2013.
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Moscow on April 15-16, 2013, and met with Lavrov. Jamil reportedly praised Russia’s stance on
Syria.
Objecting to sales by Russia’s Rosoboronexport state arms export firm to the al-Asad regime, on
July 19, 2012, the House of Representatives approved language in H.R. 5856 (Young), the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY2013, to prohibit the provision of U.S. funds to
Rosoboronexport. In introducing the language, Representative James Moran criticized a 2011
contract by the Defense Department with Rosoboronexport for the delivery of 21 helicopters for
the Afghan National Security Forces, but should make alternative supply arrangements. The final
delivery of the 21 helicopters occurred in mid-2012, but the Defense Department exercised an
option to purchase an additional 10 helicopters. The Defense Department had argued in a late
March 2012 letter to Senator John Cornyn and others that procurement from Rosoboronexport
gave the best assurance of quality and support.
On December 4, 2012, the Senate attached the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013 as
an amendment to H.R. 4310, and included language submitted by Senator John Cornyn to bar the
Defense Department from allocating FY2013 funds to enter a contract or cooperative agreement
with Rosoboronexport. However, a presidential waiver was exercised to provide 30 additional
helicopters, triggering a challenge from Representative James Moran at a hearing on April 16,
2013, that U.S. funds should not be supporting a Russian defense firm that sells weapons to Syria.
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel responded that it was a “cold-blooded decision,†to supply the
added helicopters, because the Afghan armed forces are used to operating and maintaining the
helicopters.155
Arms Control Issues156
Cooperative Threat Reduction
Since 1992, the United States has spent over $10 billion to help Russia and the other former
Soviet states dismantle nuclear weapons and ensure the security of nuclear weapons, weapons-
grade nuclear material, other weapons of mass destruction, and related technological know-how.
This funding supports the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) managed by the
Department of Defense, along with nonproliferation programs managed by the Departments of
Energy and State. These programs have helped to eliminate nuclear weapons and delivery
vehicles in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and to transport, store, and eliminate weapons in
Russia. They have also funded improvements in security at storage areas for both nuclear
weapons and nuclear materials. The two sides have also cooperated to construct a chemical
weapons destruction facility in Shchuch’ye.
The focus of U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance has changed over the years.
Initially, many in Congress saw U.S. assistance as an emergency response to impending chaos in
the Soviet Union. Even after the sense of immediate crisis passed in 1992 and 1993, many
analysts and Members of Congress remained concerned about the potential for diversion or a loss
of control of nuclear and other weapons. Now, much of the work on strategic offensive arms
155 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, Budget Hearing:
Department of Defense, video feed, at http://appropriations.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=326870.
156 Prepared by Amy Woolf, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy.
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reductions has been completed, and the United States has allocated a growing proportion of its
funding to projects that focus on securing and eliminating chemical and biological weapons and
securing storage sites that house nuclear warheads removed from deployed weapons systems.
Further, in recent years, the United States has increased funding for projects that seek to secure
borders and track materials, in an effort to keep weapons of mass destruction away from
terrorists. This has directed a growing proportion of the funding to nations other than Russia.
The Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Russia that governs
implementation of these threat reduction and nonproliferation programs is due to expire in mid-
2013. The agreement, initially negotiated in 1992 and extended in 1999 and 2006, contains some
provisions, such as those that relate to liability protections and inspections, that Russia has
objected to over the years. In October and November 2012, several Russian officials indicated
that Russia was unwilling to extend the agreement in its current form, and either wanted to
modify it to address Russia’s concerns or allow it to lapse. If the agreement lapses, U.S.-Russian
cooperation on weapons security and elimination could end.
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
The Obama Administration pledged to pursue arms control negotiations with Russia and to,
specifically, negotiate a new treaty to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START). In April 2009, Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed that a new treaty would
address deployed strategic offensive nuclear forces, leaving discussions on nonstrategic nuclear
weapons and warheads in storage to a future agreement, and to reduce their deployed forces to
levels below those set by the 2002 Moscow Treaty.
After nearly a year of negotiations, the United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty
on April 8, 2010. This treaty limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed
ICBM and SLBM launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry
nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs,
deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty
also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads. The new treaty also contains a
number of complex and overlapping monitoring provisions that will help each side verify the
other’s compliance with the treaty. Many analysts believe that this verification regime is
particularly important because it mandates transparency and cooperation between the two sides.
The Obama Administration argued that the New START Treaty would strengthen U.S. security
and contribute to the “re-set†in relations with Russia. The Administration also noted that the
treaty contributes to U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals by indicating that the United States and
Russia are both committed to meeting their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Some, however, have questioned whether the United States and
Russia need a treaty to maintain stability in their relationship and reduce their nuclear weapons.
They note that Russia is already reducing its forces as it retires aging systems. Moreover, some
question whether arms control agreements between the United States and Russia will have any
effect on the goals and interests of nations seeking their own nuclear weapons.
The Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Armed Services Committee, and Senate Intelligence
Committee held a total of 21 hearings and briefings with Administration officials, senior
statesmen, and outside analysts between April and July 2010. Most witnesses praised the treaty,
and, although recognizing that it contains only modest reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear
weapons, argued that, on balance, it will enhance stability and predictability. Many also noted that
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its verification regime would restore the ability of the United States and Russia to monitor each
other’s strategic forces. Some, however, questioned whether the treaty might restrain U.S. missile
defense programs. The Administration sought to alleviate this concern by noting that the treaty
contains no limits on current or planned missile defense programs and simply acknowledges that
robust missile defenses can undermine offensive forces. Others have noted that the treaty did not
address Russia’s stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Treaty supporters agreed with this
point but argued that the United States and Russia could only move on to a treaty that will address
these weapons after they ratify and implement New START. On September 16, 2010, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee approved the Resolution of Ratification on the New START by a
vote of 14-4. The full Senate approved the treaty’s ratification by a vote of 71-26, on December
22, 2010.
New START entered into force on February 5, 2011. According to the U.S. State Department,
implementation is well underway, and “the process so far has been positive and pragmatic.†The
parties exchanged thousands of 1,800 notifications during the nearly two years of
implementation, and both have conducted their full complement of permitted on-site inspections.
The Treaty’s Bilateral Consultative Commission has also met four times.
The Obama Administration has indicated that it believes the United States can reduce its nuclear
weapons further. During his 2013 State of the Union address, he indicated that he believed the
United States and Russia should reduce together, but it may be difficult to negotiate another
treaty. Russia has indicated that it will not reduce offensive nuclear weapons further until the
United States agrees to legally binding limits on its missile defense programs. The United States
has rejected this proposal, and has indicated that it would like to limit strategic and nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. Russia has indicated that it will not negotiate limits on nonstrategic nuclear
weapons until the United States withdraws its remaining nuclear weapons from Europe. These
competing priorities could delay or derail further negotiations.
Russia and Missile Defense157
Background: Recent U.S. Missile Defense Plans158
Successive U.S. governments have supported the development of a ballistic missile defense
(BMD) system to protect against limited long-range ballistic missile threats from adversary states.
The Bush Administration argued that North Korea and Iran represented strategic threats and
questioned whether they could be deterred by conventional means. In 2007, the Bush
Administration proposed deploying a ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) element of the
larger Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in Europe to defend against a possible Iranian
missile threat. This “European Capability†(EC) system would have included 10 interceptors in
Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic. Both countries signed agreements with the Bush
Administration permitting GMD facilities to be stationed on their territory; however, the two
countries’ parliaments decided to wait to ratify the accords until after the Obama Administration
clarified its intentions on missile defense policy.
157 For additional information, see CRS Report RL34051, Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe, by Steven
A. Hildreth and Carl Ek.
158 Prepared by Steven A. Hildreth, Specialist in Missile Defense.
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In September 2009, the Obama Administration canceled the Bush-proposed European BMD
program. Instead, Defense Secretary Gates announced U.S. plans to further develop a regional
BMD capability that could be surged on relatively short notice during crises or as the situation
might demand. Gates argued this new capability, known as the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA),
would be based initially around existing BMD sensors and Patriot, THAAD and Aegis BMD
interceptors, and would be more responsive and adaptable to growing concern over the direction
and pace of Iranian short- and medium-range ballistic missile proliferation. The Administration
plans for the PAA to evolve and expand over the next decade to include BMD against
intermediate- and long-range Iranian ballistic missiles. This effort is largely supported by
Congress. Phase 1 of the Administration’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) was
completed on December 21, 2011, as planned.
In March 2013, the Obama Administration dropped Phase 4 of the EPAA, which would have
deployed no earlier than 2022 in Europe land-and possibly sea-based versions of advanced naval
BMD interceptors designed to destroy limited numbers of first generation Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Instead, the Administration proposed adding 14 additional ground-
based interceptors to the existing GMD (Ground-based Midcourse Defense) site in Alaska by
2017. This would represent an almost 50 percent increase in the numbers of ICBM interceptors
designed to destroy potential long-range missile threats from North Korea and Iran and available
at least five years before Phase 4 would have been available. Plans for Phases 2 and 3 of the
EPAA remain unchanged and on track, according to the Department of Defense. The Pentagon is
currently examining options for “beyond Phase 3†of the EPAA.
The Russian Response159
The EC program significantly affected U.S.-Russia relations. At the February 2007 Wehrkunde
security conference in Munich, President Putin strongly criticized the Bush Administration’s
proposal, maintaining that it would lead to “an inevitable arms race.†Russia threatened to
abrogate the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and also announced that it had
suspended compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. In August 2008, following
the signing of the U.S.-Poland agreement, Russia once more vociferously objected to the Bush
Administration’s missile defense plan; a Russian general stated that Poland’s hosting of the
interceptors could make it a target for a nuclear attack.
Some analysts argued that Russia had other motives for raising alarms about the U.S. missile
defense system: to foment discord among NATO member states; and to draw attention away from
Russia’s suppression of domestic dissent, its aggressive foreign policy actions, and its past
nuclear technology cooperation with Iran. Observers pointed out that Russian acceptance of
NATO enlargement in 2004 was conditioned on a tacit understanding that NATO or U.S. military
expansion into the new member states would not occur. The proposed European GMD in this
regard was seen as unacceptable to Russia.
In a joint statement issued at their “get acquainted†meeting on April 1, 2009, Presidents Obama
and Medvedev acknowledged that differences remained in their views toward the placement of
U.S. missile defenses in Europe, but pledged to examine “new possibilities for mutual
international cooperation in the field of missile defense.†Later that month, however, Russian
Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov charged that “[U.S.] work in the missile defense has
159 Prepared by Carl Ek, Specialist in International Relations.
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intensified, including in the NATO format.†Shortly thereafter, in a Russian media interview,
Ryabkov was asked to comment on U.S.-Russia-NATO cooperation on missile defense through
the use of Russian radar installations. He explained that the Russian offer was predicated on the
fulfillment of “certain preliminary stages,†including the U.S. cancellation of the EC program,
followed by a threat assessment, and then by political and economic measures to eliminate the
threat.160
As noted above, in September 2009 the Obama Administration’s announced a new program for a
European-based BMD. In Russia, President Medvedev called the change “a responsible move,â€
adding that “we value the responsible approach of the U.S. President to our agreement. I am
ready to continue our dialogue.â€161 In addition, Moscow appeared to back away from an earlier
signal that it might deploy Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad. In November, the U.S. ambassador to
Ukraine quashed rumors that the United States had been discussing with Kyiv the deployment of
missile defense facilities in Ukraine. In October 2009, during a visit to Warsaw by Vice President
Biden, Polish President Donald Tusk announced that Poland would participate in the Obama
Administration’s new BMD program by hosting SM-3 short- to medium-range missiles.162
Some analysts on both sides of the Atlantic argued that cancelling the Bush Administration’s
BMD plan could be viewed by Moscow as a climb-down resulting from Russia’s incessant
diplomatic pressure. Further, some critics faulted the White House for not having gained anything
from Moscow in exchange for its change in policy. However, Obama Administration supporters
maintained that Russia likely would not have wished to reveal an obvious quid pro quo
immediately; Administration backers advised critics to wait and see what actions Russia would
take.
In December 2009, NATO foreign ministers commented favorably on the new U.S. missile
defense plan, and reiterated the alliance’s willingness to cooperate with Russia on the issue,
stating that they reaffirmed “the Alliance’s readiness to explore the potential for linking United
States, NATO and Russian missile defense systems at an appropriate time. The United States’ new
approach provides enhanced possibilities to do this.†The Russian media reported that NATO and
Russia had formed a working group to study the issue. In a speech shortly thereafter, NATO
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that he hoped the alliance and Russia would have
a joint system by 2020.163
Before long, however, Russia began to criticize the new U.S. plan, reviving the argument that it
would compromise Russia’s nuclear forces. In December Prime Minister Putin tied discussions
over missile defense to the renegotiation of START. He asserted that Moscow would need to beef
160 “President Obama, Russian President Medvedev Commit To Reduce Nuclear Arms, Reset Relationship,†US Fed
News, April 11, 2009; “Russia Warns U.S. Stepping Up Shield Plans—Agency,†Reuters, April 21, 2009; Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interview of Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Ryabkov on Disarmament
Issues, April 23, 2009.
161 “Obama Cancels Bush Plan For European Missile Shield That Had Soured Relations With Russia,†Associated
Press Newswire. September 17, 2009; “Medvedev Praises Obama’s Move on Europe Missile Shield,†RIA Novosti,
September 17, 2009.
162 “US/CEE: Biden Touts New Missile Plan In Central Europe,†Oxford Analytica, October 22, 2009.
163 NATO. Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters,
Brussels: Final Statement, December 4, 2009, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_59699.htm?mode=
pressrelease; “Russia, NATO Form Working Group on Missile Defense—Rogozin,†RIA Novosti, December 5, 2009;
“Russia Not Ready to Set Up Missile Defense Shield Together With U.S.—Lavrov,†Interfax, January 22, 2010.
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up its offensive nuclear weapons forces in order to “preserve a strategic balance†with the planned
U.S. missile defense system. The State Department acknowledged the relationship between
offensive and defensive missile capabilities, but maintained that the two countries should discuss
missile defense “in a separate venue.†The Administration also said that it would “continue to
reject any negotiated restraints on U.S. ballistic missile defenses.â€164
In January 2010, the United States and Poland announced that, under the terms of the August
2008 agreement between Warsaw and Washington, a battery of short-range, surface-to-air Patriot
missiles would be rotated from Germany to Poland in June and stationed close to Poland’s border
with Kaliningrad. Foreign Minister Lavrov claimed that he “doesn’t understand†the apparent
need for Poland to defend itself from Russia. In response to the planned deployment of the
Patriots, a Russian official indicated that Moscow might strengthen its Baltic fleet.165
On February 4, 2010, the U.S. and Romanian governments announced that Bucharest had agreed
to host U.S. short-to-medium-range interceptor missiles to extend missile defense into southern
Europe. The Romanians reportedly hope that the deployment would help cement bilateral ties, as
well as protect Romanian territory—the Bush Administration’s plan would only have covered the
western part of the country from a possible Iranian missile launch. A State Department
spokesperson and Romanian President Traian Basescu both stated that the system was not
intended to guard against Russia.
Russian officials, including the chief of Russia’s general staff, countered that the missile defense
system was indeed directed at Russia, and that the proposed deployment likely would delay
negotiations in arms talks between Russia and the United States. Moscow also expressed vexation
over the possibility of U.S. Aegis anti-missile ships patrolling the Black Sea. Nevertheless,
commenting on Iran’s stepped-up uranium enrichment activities, the head of Russia’s National
Security Council appeared to confirm international concerns about whether Iran’s eventual goals
are scientific or military; he stated that doubts about Iran’s intentions “are fairly well-grounded.â€
Similarly, a Russian military analyst, writing in RIA Novosti, conceded that the Obama-proposed
SM-3 interceptors stationed anywhere in Europe would be incapable of downing Russian long-
range ballistic missiles. He argued that Moscow’s main objections were that (1) it had not been
consulted on the decision, and (2) the U.S. system might be subject to change. On the first point,
a spokesperson for the Romanian Foreign Ministry maintained that Russia had been kept in the
loop, stating that “information coming from our American partners indicate that in the time that
followed the September 2009 announcement by the U.S. president, the U.S. had detailed
consultations with Russia concerning their plans for the anti-missile defense system.†Also, on
February 16, a State Department official said that Russia had been told of the planned deployment
to Romania. On the latter point, Russia is concerned that the SM-3 interceptors could eventually
be upgraded to bring down ICBMs without Russia’s knowledge, as the United States is not
required to share information about its missile defense system.166
164 U.S. Department of Defense. Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, Pt. IV, February 2010.
165 “CEE/Russia: CEE Attitudes to Russia become More Sober,†Oxford Analytica, January 21, 2010; “Polish Missile
Base Reignites Tension with Russia,†Deutsche Welle, January 22, 2009; “USA May Renege on Patriot Missile
Deployment Accord—Polish Daily,†BBC Monitoring European, February 12, 2010.
166 “Romania Says U.S. Informed Russia on Anti-missile Shield Plan,†BBC Monitoring European, February 10, 2010;
“U.S. Kept Russia Informed About Romania Missiles Plan—U.S. Diplomat,†Interfax, February 16, 2010; “U.S. and
Romania: A New Alignment?†RIA Novosti, February 9, 2010; “Russia Cool to U.S. Plan for Missiles in Romania,â€
New York Times, February 6, 2010.
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On February 12, Bulgaria’s prime minister announced that he supported participation in the U.S.
missile defense system; the U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria confirmed that discussions on such a
deployment were in their early stages with Bulgaria—and with other countries. Bulgaria’s foreign
minister noted that the missile shield would also protect Russia from the threat of Iranian
missiles. Russia, however, professed that it had been caught unawares by the announcement;
Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that “we have already questioned our U.S. partners in Washington
... as to the meaning of this, and why we have this Bulgarian surprise after the Romanian
surprise.†Russian NATO Ambassador Rogozin tweeted that “Bulgarians are our brothers, but
politically they are promiscuous.†A few days later, Russia turned aside an apparent offer by
Transnistria, a breakaway region of Moldova, to host Russian Iskander missiles.167
Russia sought to tie discussions over missile defense to the renegotiation of START, contrary to
the July 2009 agreement reached by Presidents Obama and Medvedev not to link the two.
However, the United States refused to accede to the Russian position, and on April 8, 2010, the
two governments signed the New START Treaty, which was ratified by the U.S. Senate in
December and by the Russian Duma in January 2011. The agreement acknowledges that there is a
relationship between offensive and defensive systems, but does not place any limits on missile
defense or on the expanded system that has been proposed by the Obama Administration.168
On July 3, 2010, Secretary of State Clinton and Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski signed an
annex to the 2008 U.S.-Poland agreement permitting the deployment of U.S. BMD in Poland.
The amendment provided approval for the deployment of SM-3 missiles, rather than silo-based
interceptors. After the signing ceremony, Sikorski stated that Russia would be permitted to
inspect the facilities.
At their November 19-20, 2010, summit in Lisbon, NATO heads of state and government
officially identified territorial missile defense as a core alliance objective, and adopted it as a
NATO program in response to the threat of ballistic missile proliferation by potentially unfriendly
regimes. The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) meeting, held in conjunction with the alliance
meeting, endorsed cooperation between NATO and Moscow in the area of missile defense. The
NRC Joint Statement declared that
[w]e agreed to discuss pursuing missile defense cooperation. We agreed on a joint ballistic
missile threat assessment and to continue dialog in this area. The NRC will also resume
Theater Missile Defense Cooperation. We have tasked the NRC to develop a comprehensive
Joint Analysis of the future framework for missile defense cooperation. The progress of this
Analysis will be assessed at the June 2011 meeting of NRC Defense Ministers.169
The NATO-Russia accord did not constitute immediate full collaboration; rather, Russia approved
the involvement of Russian technicians in the planning and development of the system. President
Medvedev cautioned that missile defense cooperation must eventually amount to “a full-fledged
167 “Bulgaria Wants to Participate in US Missile Defense Shield: PM,†Agence France Presse, February 12, 2010;
“Russia Wants Bulgaria to Explain favor of U.S. Missile Shield,†Agence France Presse, February 14, 2010; “Russia’s
NATO Envoy Quashes Transdniestr Missiles Bid—Report,†Dow Jones International Press, February 16, 2010; “U.S.
Missile Shield Not Targeting Russia, Bulgaria Says,†Agence France Presse, February 17, 2010; “Dmitry Rogozin
Accuses Bulgarian Leadership of ‘Political Promiscuity,’†WPS: Defense and Security, February 17, 2010.
168 CRS Report R41251, Ballistic Missile Defense and Offensive Arms Reductions: A Review of the Historical Record,
by Steven A. Hildreth and Amy F. Woolf.
169 NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement. November 20, 2010. NATO website: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
news_68871.htm?selectedLocale=en
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strategic partnership between Russia and NATO.†However, a State Department official
emphasized that, although Russia would be involved in the program, the United States would
“continue to reject any constraints or limitations on our missile defense plans.†In a televised
interview with Larry King, Prime Minister Putin indicated that if Russia perceives that the
PAA/NATO missile defense program is compromising Moscow’s nuclear deterrent, “Russia will
just have to protect itself using various means, including the deployment of new missile systems
to counter the new threats to our borders.â€170
Analysts have argued that, despite its often-voiced reservations, Moscow may have believed itself
compelled to cooperate on missile defense; because Russia could “neither block the [emergence
of missile defense] in Europe nor restrict its capacity by means of treaty constraints, [instead] the
only way ... to influence its shape is to join the [missile defense] program on as favorable terms as
can possibly be snatched.â€171 On December 20, 2010, Foreign Minister Lavrov indicated that
Russian acceptance of and participation in NATO missile defense would be fundamental to the
success of such a system—and for improved Russia-NATO relations.172 Although details as to
how Russia might cooperate technologically remain to be seen, it is clear that NATO and the
United States want to find ways to engage Russia in partnership on BMD.
At the Lisbon summit, President Medvedev suggested without elaborating that Moscow preferred
a “sectoral†approach to missile defense. The plan was later clarified as one under which Russia
and NATO would guard the airspace above their respective territories: Russia would be
responsible for taking out missiles crossing its territory toward Europe, while NATO countries
would shoot down over Europe any missiles headed toward Russia. Moscow reportedly is seeking
agreement on such a plan because it remains concerned that the Phased Adaptive Approach might
eventually compromise Russia’s nuclear forces.
Although Moscow is advocating a “common†system with sectoral defense responsibilities,
NATO Secretary General Rasmussen has insisted that NATO and Russia must maintain
independent systems, and that cooperation will consist of information sharing. The Russian
proposal is unacceptable to NATO for reasons of both sovereignty and capabilities. According to
Rasmussen, NATO “is responsible for protecting the territory of NATO member states and for the
safety of their populations. We do not intend to transfer that responsibility to anyone else.†In
addition, analysts note that current Russian missile defense technology lags far behind that of the
170 “NATO Invites Russia To Join Europe Missile Shield,†The Washington Post, November 20, 2010. “Russia To Aid
NATO On Anti-Missile Network In Europe.’†The Washington Post, November 20, 2010. Europe and Eurasia: The
Obama Administration’s Efforts To Implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach. Testimony before the House
Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces by U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frank A. Rose.
December 2, 2010. Transcript of TV Interview Vladimir Putin to CNN’s Larry King. RIA-Oreanda News. December 2,
2010.
171 Prospects For Joint Russia-NATO Missile Defense System. By Beata Gorka-Winter, Robert Smigielski. Bulletin of
the Polish Institute of International Affairs. No. 129 (205). October 29, 2010.
172 “Success of Russia-NATO Relations Improvement Process Not Guaranteed - Lavrov Tells Interfax,†Interfax Russia
and CIS General Newswire. December 20, 2010.
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NATO countries.173 Moscow also stated that it sought written assurances from the United States
and NATO that the interceptors not be aimed at Russia.174
Negotiations over a new missile defense architecture continued through the first half of 2011.
Vice President Biden met with President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin in March 2011, and
the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with his Russian counterpart in May 2011; and
at the end of the month, President Obama and Medvedev discussed the issue during the G-8
meeting in Deauville, France. On June 2, President Medvedev expressed impatience with the pace
of ongoing negotiations, stating “So far, I’m not pleased with how the U.S. and all NATO
countries reacted to my proposals because we are losing time.â€175 Russia also voiced objections to
the announcement that Turkey would permit missile defense radar to be based on its soil, and to
Spain’s decision in October to permit Aegis ships to be stationed at its the naval port at Rota.176
Discussions in the second half of 2011 focused on two major sticking points: Moscow’s proposal
for sectoral missile defense, and its insistence upon written legal guarantees that the missile shield
would not be directed against Russia. Both proposals are unacceptable to NATO. As Secretary-
General Rasmussen noted, acceding to the first demand would violate the very concept of Article
5, NATO’s mutual defense clause, and would be equivalent to “outsourcing†missile defense for
the treaty area. Similarly, the alliance has rejected the demand for written legal guarantees
because it would permit Russia to determine alliance defense doctrine and would tie the hands of
future political and military leaders. As an alternative, the State Department proposed that Russia
be offered “written assurances†that the EPAA would not be directed against Russia.
In November 2011, Russian officials renewed their objections to NATO’s plans to proceed with
its missile defense plans, and countered by indicating that Moscow would develop new missiles
equipped with counter-measures capable of foiling missile defenses. The Russians also once more
said that they might deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad. In addition, Moscow announced its
intention to base a radar station in the Russian exclave, a move that one Russian analyst argued
was already planned. Finally, officials indicated that Russia might withdraw from the New
START Treaty and disallow NATO use of the northern supply routes to Afghanistan.177 In
response, at the NATO-Russia Council meeting of foreign ministers in early December, U.S. and
NATO officials reiterated their intention to continue with the development of EPAA. NATO
Secretary General Rasmussen argued that “It would definitely be a waste of valuable money if
Russia started to invest heavily in countermeasures against an artificial enemy that doesn’t
exist.… That money could … be invested to the benefit of the Russian people in job creation and
modernization.â€178
173 “Medvedev Wants Missile Defense Carve-up Of Europe: Reports,†Agence France Presse, November 22, 2010.
“NATO, Russia Missile Systems To Stay Separate: NATO Chief,†Agence France Presse, January 20, 2011. “NATO,
Russia vow unity on terrorism, disagree on shield,†Agence France Presse, January 26, 2011. “The Boogeyman the
Kremlin Loves To Hate,†The Moscow Times, February 8, 2011.
174 “Russia Seeks Pledge From NATO On Missile Defense,†New York Times, May 21, 2011.
175 “Without Russia, European Missile Defense Is Doomed,†The Voice of Russia, June 1, 2011. “Medvedev Says
Russia, US ‘Losing Time’ On Missile Defense,†Space Daily, June 2, 2011.
176 “Moscow Anxious On Turkey’s Shield Role,†Hurriyet Daily News [Turkey], July 28, 2011. “Russia Says U.S.
Approach to Missile Defense ‘Unacceptable,’†Bloomberg Government, October 6, 2011.
177 Medvedev Mollifies the West. The Moscow Times. November 20, 2011. NATO Rebuffs Russian Missile-Defense
Threats. Washington Post. December 8, 2011.
178 Russia and NATO Trade Barbs Over Missile Shield. Agence France Presse. December 7, 2011.
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Some observers have questioned whether the Russian leadership might have realized at the outset
that their proposals would be unacceptable, but stuck to them anyway because they never
intended to cooperate on missile defense and wished to portray the alliance as unreasonable.
Other observers speculate that the hard-line stance might be motivated by domestic political
considerations. Finally, some argue that Russia may be hoping to create a rift within NATO; they
note that in June 2011, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov stated that the missile
defense debate depended on Washington’s views, claiming that “[t]his is a U.S. position. There is
a number of [NATO] countries expressing only concern. We could have received their
support.â€179
In March 2012, Medvedev said Russia would adopt its nuclear forces—in phases—to account for
upgrades of the EPAA, arguing that “we are not closing the door on dialog, [b]ut we need to
prepare ourselves.â€180 A few days later, in a side meeting during an arms control summit in Korea,
President Obama discussed missile defense with Medvedev—in the vicinity of a “hotâ€
microphone. During the conversation, Obama told the Russian leader “This is my last election,
and after my election I’ll have more flexibility.†Medvedev replied that he understood, and that he
would transmit that point to “Vladimirâ€â€”Prime Minister Putin. Obama’s comments were sharply
criticized by presidential candidate Mitt Romney as “caving†to Russia. Representative Turner,
chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, requested a
clarification of the remarks. Vice President Joseph Biden later argued that, given the political
environment in both countries during an election year, President Obama had “stated the
obvious.â€181
During a conference on missile defense hosted in early May 2012 by Russia, a State Department
official said that “[w]e cannot agree to preconditions outlined by the Russian government. We
cannot agree to any limitations on our missile defense deployment.… We are able to agree,
however, to a political statement that our missile defenses are not directed at Russia.†Later, at the
same conference, Russian Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Nikolai Makarov indicated that
“[w]e’re open to consider different kinds of guarantees.†However, Makarov also warned that, in
response to continued development of EPAA, “a decision to use destructive force preemptively
will be taken if the situation worsens.â€182
Newly reelected President Putin, claiming he needed to remain at home to form a new
government, declined to attend either the NATO summit in Chicago or the G-8 meeting, held in
Camp David, MD—both were in late May 2012. At the NATO summit, the alliance declared
EPAA to have an “interim capability.†It is scheduled to achieve “initial operational capability†in
2015, and “full operational capability†by 2018.183 In their summit declaration, alliance leaders
proposed
179 “Russia May Develop Nuclear Offensive,†RIA Novosti, June 8, 2011.
180 Medvedev Urges Military To Parry U.S. Missile Shield. International Herald Tribune. March 22, 2012.
181 Obama To Medvedev: No Missile Deal Before the Vote. Wall Street Journal. March 26, 2012. Obama ‘Stated the
Obvious’ In Russia Remarks: Biden. Agence France Presse. April 1, 2012.
182 Russia To Make Hi-tech Case Against NATO Missile Shield. Reuters. May 2, 2012. Moscow Raises Alarm On
European Missile-Defense Plan. Wall Street Journal. May 3, 2012. Russia’s Military Threatens Preemptive Strike If
NATO Goes Ahead With Missile Plan. Canadian Press. May 3, 2012.
183 NATO Activates Missile Shield, Reaches Out To Russia. Agence France Presse. May 20, 2012. Fact Sheet:
Chicago Summit—NATO Capabilities. The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. May 20, 2012.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/20/fact-sheet-chicago-summit-nato-capabilities.
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to develop a transparency regime based upon a regular exchange of information about the
current respective missile defense capabilities of NATO and Russia. Such concrete missile
defense cooperation is the best means to provide Russia with the assurances it seeks
regarding NATO’s missile defense plans and capabilities. In this regard, we today reaffirm
that the NATO missile defense in Europe will not undermine strategic stability. NATO
missile defense is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia’s strategic
deterrence capabilities…. While regretting recurrent Russian statements on possible
measures directed against NATO’s missile defense system, we welcome Russia’s
willingness to continue dialogue.184
The Kremlin remained unsatisfied. On May 24, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman said that,
while the declaration was “a step in the right direction … political statements cannot serve as a
foundation for cooperation. Reliable and based on precise military and technical parameters, legal
guarantees of the nontargeting of the deploying missile defense network against the Russian
nuclear deterrence forces are essential to us.â€185 However, this appeared to contradict General
Marakov’s statement (see above) three weeks earlier that Russia was “open to consider different
kinds of guarantees.â€
In response to Russian statements about developing strategic countermeasures, Secretary General
Rasmussen told Russian officials that NATO had no intention of attacking their country, and
advised that they not to step up their defense budget to defend against an “artificial enemy.†Not
long thereafter, however, former Russian NATO Ambassador and current Deputy Prime Minister
Dmitry Rogozin warned that Moscow would “create a system of piercing and suppressing any
missile defense. If there’s anyone who thinks we can be surrounded with an anti-missile wall, we
were breaking a door into Europe back in the times of Peter [the Great] and now we’ll break
down everything the whole wall, if anyone tries to isolate us or bring us to our knees.â€186
In a sideline meeting of the G-20, Presidents Putin and Obama discussed missile defense, among
other issues. They issued a joint statement, declaring that “[d]espite differences in assessments,
we have agreed to continue a joint search for solutions to challenges in the field of missile
defense.†However, an aide to President Putin stated that “[i]t will be possible to resume authentic
and detailed political discussions of missile defense only after the presidential election in the
United States.†In the meantime, he added, discussions would continue at the working level.187
Russia has continued to press for a joint missile defense system, and for written guarantees. As
noted above, the May 2012 NATO Chicago summit declaration reaffirmed that the alliance’s
missile defense capability would not be directed against Russia, and would not compromise
strategic stability. But in July, Russia’s acting NATO ambassador reiterated Moscow’s stance that
this was “not enough. It must be upheld by explanations as to why it is so, what parameters of this
system need to be taken into consideration, and how Russia, regardless of what it hears, could
judge by itself that these parameters are being observed.†Perhaps in response, NATO Secretary
184 Chicago Summit Declaration. May 20, 2012. NATO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease.
185 Moscow Still Needs Legal Guarantees NATO Missile Defense Not Aimed At It—Lukashevich. Interfax. May 24,
2012.
186 Rasmussen Tells Russia Not to Waste Money on Missile Countermeasures. Interfax. June 6, 2012. Russia To ‘Break
Down’ NATO Missile Defense ‘Wall’—Rogozin. Interfax. July 2, 2012.
187 US, Russia to Seek ‘Joint Solutions’ To Missile Defense Row. Agence France Presse. June 18, 2012. Russia Hopes
to Resume Missile Defense Talks After US Elections—Aide. ITAR-TASS World Service. June 22, 2012.
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General Rasmussen on July 16 pointed out that 15 years ago, the alliance and Russia had signed a
statement declaring that they “would not use force against each other. … We are still committed
to this declaration.â€188
There was little movement on the missile defense issue in the months after the U.S. elections.
Following a December 4 NATO-Russia Council meeting, Russia’s NATO envoy pronounced the
talks stalemated; however, Foreign Minister Lavrov indicated that the two sides would hold
further consultations to assess whether a proposal regarding joint threat analysis.189
Speaking at a December 20 news conference, President Putin averred that “[t]he creation of [the
U.S./NATO PAA] annuls our nuclear missile potential.†He added that “deployment of a missile
defense does worsen our relations. But we are not enemies. We’ve got to be patient and look for
compromises,†and added that, although these disputes will not likely “harm the investment
climate or hinder the development of the economy ... we must defend the interests of Russia.â€190
For the first few weeks of 2013, Russian officials sent mixed signals on missile defense,
announcing on the one hand that they were prepared to discuss the issue, while on the other
continuing to call for legal assurances from NATO and the United States that EPAA would not be
used to deter Russia’s nuclear forces. In mid-February, following a meeting with U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov stated that
Russia’s “position remains without any new nuances ... .†He also took note of the most recent
U.S. test launch, observing that “It was, I think, the 24th successful test of the 30 accomplished.
The U.S. capabilities must not be underestimated.â€191
As noted above, the Obama Administration on March 15 announced the curtailment of the fourth
phase of EPAA, along with plans to emplace additional interceptors in Alaska. Observers noted
that this final phase, which was intended to establish the capability to intercept long-range
ballistic missiles, was the one that Russia most objected to. Nevertheless, the initial reaction from
Deputy Minister Ryabkov was “we feel no euphoria in connection with what was announced by
the U.S. Defense Secretary.†He added that “this was not a concession to Russia, and we don’t see
it as such.†Within a week, however, some observers detected an apparent effort by Russia to dial
back on their complaints and call for dialogue. It was reported that Russian and U.S. officials
would attend a May conference in Moscow, where missile defense would be one of the topics. On
March 25, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu telephoned Secretary of Defense Chuck
Hagel and invited him to hold discussions on missile defense. NATO officials also expressed
optimism that talks could move forward.192
188 Moscow Insists On Legal Guarantees That European Missile Shield Not Targeted Against It—Diplomat. Interfax.
July 12, 2012. Rasmussen Notes Lack of Progress with Russia on Missile Defense System. Interfax. July 16, 2012.
189 Dialogue Over Missile Defense With NATO Stalled – Grushko. ITAR-TASS. December 7, 2012. Russia, NATO To
Hold Consultations on Missile Defense – Lavrov. Interfax. December 5, 2012.
190 Interfax Russia & CIS Diplomatic Panorama. Interfax. December 21, 2012. Russia, US Must Seek Compromises on
Complex Problems - Putin. ITAR-TASS. December 20, 2012.
191 Russia Ready to Discuss Missile Defence Cooperation with NATO. ITAR-TASS. January 16, 2013. Russia, US Can
Start Concrete Missile Defence Talks After Kerry’s Appointment. ITAR-TASS. January 28, 2013. Moscow Insists on
Being Given Legally-binding Guarantees on European Missile Defense – Duma Chairman. Interfax. February 6, 2013.
Russia, U.S. Positions on Missile Defense Have Not Changed – Ryabkov. Interfax. February 15, 2013. Russia to Press
for Legal Guarantees that US Missile Defence Not Aimed at It. ITAR-TASS. February 18, 2013.
192 RF Sees No Grounds to Change Stance on Missile Defense – Deputy FM. ITAR-TASS. March 18, 2013. U.S.
Cancels Part of Missile Defense that Russia Opposed. New York Times. March 16, 2013. Moscow to Discuss Changes
(continued...)
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During his April 11, 2013, confirmation hearing to become commander of the U.S. European
Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, U.S. Air Force General Phillip Breedlove
reaffirmed the NATO/U.S. commitment to continue negotiations with Moscow by stating “Both
the U.S. and NATO Russia Council are working on constructive engagements with Russia on
Missile Defense, to include joint technical studies and exercises when Russia is ready.â€193
The Economist Intelligence Unit suggested that “Russia’s leadership now faces a choice: to
engage constructively with the U.S. proposal, in the hope of getting meaningful concessions
(either by giving Russia access to the system, or by obtaining guarantees that it will not attain the
technical parameters that would undermine the Russian deterrent), or to remain resolute in
opposition.â€194
U.S.-Russia Economic Ties195
U.S.-Russian trade and investment flows have increased in the post-Cold War period, reflecting
the changed U.S.-Russian relationship. Many experts have suggested that the relationship could
expand even further. U.S.-Russian trade, at least U.S. imports, has grown appreciably. The surge
in the value of imports is largely attributable to the rise in the world prices of oil and other natural
resources—which comprise the large share of U.S. imports from Russia—and not to an increase
in the volume of imports. U.S. exports span a range of products including meat, machinery parts,
and aircraft parts. U.S. imports increased more than 244%, from $7.8 billion to $26.8 billion from
2000 to 2008, and U.S. exports rose 343%, from $2.1 billion to $9.3 billion. However, U.S.
exports and imports with Russia declined substantially in 2009, as a result of the global financial
crisis and economic downturn, but increased in 2010 as both countries have shown signs of
recovery.
Table 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Russia, 1995-2012
(in billions of dollars)
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Trade
U.S.
U.S.
Trade
Year
Exports
Imports
Balances Year
Exports
Imports
Balances
1995
2.8 4.0 -1.2
2004 3.0 11.9 -8.9
1996
3.3 3.6 -0.3
2005 3.9 15.3
-11.3
1997
3.4 4.3 -0.9
2006 4.7 19.8
-15.1
1998
3.6 5.7 -2.1
2007 7.4 19.4
-12.0
(...continued)
in the US Missile Defense Plans. RIA Novosti. March 20, 2013. Russia Tones Down Criticism of New U.S. Missile
Plans. Reuters. March 21, 2013. Russia Keen for Talks on Missile Defense: Pentagon. AFP. March 25, 2013. NATO
Eyes Missile Shield Progress with Russia After US Move. Reuters. March 31, 2013.
193 The nomination of Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, to be Commander of the U.S. European Command and
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing. April 11, 2013.
194 Russia Politics: Quick View – Changes to US Missile Defence Plan. EIU ViewsWire. March 19, 2013.
195 Prepared by William H. Cooper, Specialist in International Trade and Finance.
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U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Trade
U.S.
U.S.
Trade
Year
Exports
Imports
Balances Year
Exports
Imports
Balances
1999
2.1 5.9 -3.8
2008 9.3 26.8
-17.5
2000
2.1 7.7 -5.6
2009 5.4 18.2
-12.8
2001
2.7 6.3 -3.5
2010 6.0 25.7
-19.7
2002
2.4 6.8
-4.4
2011 8.3 34.6
-26.3
2003
2.4 8.6 -6.2 2012 10.7 29.3 -18.6
Source: Compiled by CRS from U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau data. FT900.
Note: Major U.S. exports: machinery; vehicles; meat; aircraft. Major U.S. imports: mineral fuels; inorganic
chemicals aluminum; steel.
Russia accounted for 1.3% of U.S. imports and 0.7% of U.S. exports in 2012, and the United
States accounted for 2.7% of Russian exports and 5.3% of Russian imports.196 Russia was the
28th-largest export market and 16th-largest source of imports for the United States in 2012.
According to Russian government data, by the end of 2011, the United States accounted for less
than 1.2% of total accumulated foreign direct and portfolio investments in Russia. However, the
first four countries were Switzerland (48.2%), Cyprus (10.6%), the Netherlands (8.8%), and
Luxembourg (2.5%), suggesting that more than 70% of the investments might have been
repatriated Russian funds.197
Russia and the United States have never been major economic partners, and it is unlikely that the
significance of bilateral trade will increase much in the near term. However, in some areas, such
as agriculture, Russia has become an important market for U.S. exports. Russia is the largest
foreign market for U.S. poultry. Furthermore, U.S. exports to Russia of energy exploration
equipment and technology, as well as industrial and agricultural equipment, have increased as the
dollar has declined in value. Russian demand for these products will likely grow as old equipment
and technology need to be replaced and modernized. Russia’s significance as a supplier of U.S.
imports will also likely remain small given the lack of international competitiveness of Russian
production outside of oil, gas, and other natural resources. U.S.-Russian investment relations
could grow tighter if Russia’s business climate improves; however, U.S. business concerns about
the Russian government’s seemingly capricious intervention in energy and other sectors could
dampen the enthusiasm of all but adventuresome investors.
The greater importance of Russia’s economic policies and prospects to the United States lies in
their indirect effect on the overall economic and political environment in which the United States
and Russia operate. From this perspective, Russia’s continuing economic stability and growth can
be considered positive for the United States. Because financial markets are interrelated, chaos in
even some of the smaller economies can cause uncertainty throughout the rest of the world. Such
was the case during Russia’s financial meltdown in 1998 and more recently with the 2008-2009
crisis. Promotion of economic stability in Russia has been a basis for U.S. support for Russia’s
membership in international economic organizations, including the IMF, the World Bank, and the
WTO. As a major oil producer and exporter, Russia influences world oil prices that affect U.S.
consumers.
196 World Trade Atlas. Global Trade Information Services, Inc.
197 Russian Federal Statistics Service. http://www.gks.ru.
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U.S. Assistance to Russia
U.S. assistance to Russia began around the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union to address
concerns over possible nuclear proliferation risks and humanitarian needs. The former was
authorized by the Soviet Threat Reduction Act (P.L. 102-228; termed the Nunn-Lugar program
after its sponsors), and the latter was formalized in the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992 (P.L.
102-511). Initially, more U.S. assistance was provided to Russia than to any other Soviet
successor state, but aid to Russia as a percentage of all aid to Eurasia declined over the years.
From FY1992 through FY2012, the U.S. government budgeted nearly $19 billion in assistance to
Russia (see Table 2 and Table 3, below; aid totals for FY2011-FY2012 are being finalized). The
bulk of this assistance (nearly 60%) was expended on CTR (Nunn-Lugar) and other security-
related programs aiming to prevent the proliferation of WMD, combat drug-trafficking and
transnational crime, foster law enforcement and criminal justice sector reforms, and support
reconciliation and recovery efforts in Chechnya and other areas of the North Caucasus. Other aid
was provided for democratization, market reform, and health needs.198
Annual foreign operations appropriations bills contained conditions that Russia was expected to
meet in order to receive assistance:
• A restriction on aid to Russia was approved in the FY1998 appropriations act and
each year thereafter, prohibiting any aid to the central government (local and
regional government assistance is permitted) unless the President certified that
Russia had not implemented a law discriminating against religious minorities.
Other democratization and human rights conditions were added for FY2008 and
retained thereafter in the face of abuses during the run-up to the December 2007
State Duma election. Although religious freedom was generally respected in
recent years, successive administrations issued waivers to overcome the
restrictions on aid because of ongoing problems of democratization and other
human rights.
• Since FY1996, direct assistance to the government of Russia hinged on whether
it was continuing the sale of nuclear reactor technology to Iran. As a result, 60%
of planned U.S. assistance to Russia’s central government was cut. In actuality,
little if any aid was provided directly to the central government in recent years.
• The FY2001 foreign aid bill prohibited 60% of aid to the central government of
Russia if it was not cooperating with international investigations of war crime
allegations in Chechnya or providing access to NGOs doing humanitarian work
in Chechnya. Possibly as a result of Russian cooperation with the United States
in anti-terrorism efforts, the war crime provision was dropped in subsequent
years.
• A condition in the FREEDOM Support Act prohibited aid to a Soviet successor
state that had violated the territorial integrity of another successor state.
Presidential waivers for Russia were exercised after the 2008 Russia-Georgia
conflict.
198 See CRS Report RL32866, U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet Union, by Curt Tarnoff.
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The Ouster of the U.S. Agency for International Development
During a September 8, 2012, meeting between then-Secretary Clinton, Russian President Putin,
and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov (a meeting that took place on the sidelines of the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation, or APEC, summit in Vladivostok), Clinton was informed that
Russia was planning to end USAID programs in the country by October 1, 2012. A formal
diplomatic note was sent to the State Department on September 12. On September 19, the
Russian Foreign Ministry stated that the work of USAID in Russia “did by no means always meet
the stated purposes of contributing to the development of bilateral humanitarian cooperation.
There were attempts to influence, by means of allocating grants, political processes including
elections at different levels and civic institutions. The activity of USAID in Russian regions,
especially in the North Caucasus, raised serious questions.... It should also be noted that Russia ...
rejects the status of recipient of aid from all international organizations. As for the Russian
society, it has become mature enough and does not need ‘external guidance.’â€199 The State
Department asked for time beyond the deadline to close its USAID office and wind up existing
programs.
In a press briefing on September 18, State Department Spokesperson Victoria Nuland stated that
USAID had administered about $2.7 billion in assistance to Russia since 1992 and that its
programs in FY2012 amounted to about $51 million. She averred that it was Russia’s sovereign
right to end the programs, but voiced the hope that the United States would be able to continue
some support to Russian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that support democratization
and human rights. However, she appeared to acknowledge that other U.S. programs might not be
continued after the end of FY2012 when she stated that the United States has “worked over the
years with the Russian Government on programs that fight AIDS there, fight tuberculosis, help
orphans, help the disabled, combat trafficking, support Russian programs in the environmental
area, [such as] wildlife protection. So it is our hope that Russia will now, itself, assume full
responsibility and take forward all of this work.†She also indicated that the planned USAID
funding for Russia ($52 million was requested for FY2013, of which the bulk would have been
administered by USAID) could now be reallocated to other countries with needs.200 Many of
these programs have been part of cooperation efforts discussed by the working groups of the BPC
and had been the subject of accords reached at the U.S.-Russia summit in Los Cabos, Mexico, in
June 2012, and at other U.S.-Russia summits.
On September 20, 2012, Nuland pointed out that the ruling United Russia Party had received aid
for voter education and other party-representative efforts over the years, in effect disputing the
characterization by the Foreign Ministry that U.S. assistance favored opposition parties.
On March 28, 2013, Nuland indicated that the United States hoped to continue some aid to
Russian NGOs through third parties, referring to international organizations. The Russian Foreign
199 “Comment from the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Official Spokesman Aleksandr Lukashevich on the USAID
Shutting Down its Activity in the Russian Federation,†reported in CEDR, September 19, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950104.
On September 18, 2012, USAID had issued a fact sheet on its 20 years of activities in Russia, including support for
health, civil society, rule of law, judicial reform, and entrepreneurship. USAID stated that it had given support for the
writing of Russia’s constitution, civil code, tax code, and land code. See USAID, USAID in Russia, September 18,
2012, at http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/usaid-russia.
200 U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, September 18, 2012; Press Statement: On Russian Decision to End
USAID Activities in Russia, September 18, 2012.
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Ministry denounced such plans as attempts to circumvent Russian law and as interference in
Russia’s internal affairs.
Table 2. U.S. Government Funds Budgeted for Assistance to Russia, FY1992-FY1999
(in millions of dollars)
Fiscal Year/
Program
Area 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Economic
Growth
84.68
137.21
1,187.92 231.37 72.69 39.35 51.21 74.0
Governing Justly
& Democratically
33.93 63.82 238.65 70.8 49.97 38.16 67.27 83.85
Humanitarian
Assistance
167.89
1060.4 39.49 48.44 35.34 0.93 6.34
1,167.34
Investing in
People
13.1 8.31 79.85 12.67 10.98 10.59 10.55 15.42
Peace & Security
28.81 182.71 361.69 203.19 323.18 456.21 461.36 790.05
Program Support
0 0
4.0
0.44 0 0 0 0
Cross-Cutting
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total
2320.41 3445.45 3,905.6 2561.91 2488.16 2542.24 2594.73 4,129.66
Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia.
Notes: Includes “all spigot†program and agency assistance. Classified assistance is excluded.
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Table 3. U.S. Government Funds Budgeted for Assistance to Russia, FY2000-FY2010
(in millions of dollars)
Fiscal Year/
Total
Program
FY1992-
Area
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
FY2010
Economic
58.65 60.13 60.62
54.47 33.93
9.54 7.71 3.41 1.21 0.91
1.3
2,170.3
Growth
Governing Justly
&
68.26 82.26 79.89
79.98 64.31
64.04 78.7 57.41 67.88 60.57
64.6
1,414.3
Democratically
Humanitarian
Assistance
243.1 92.37 23.83 26.1 19.97 1.5 13.23 0.0 3.67 4.2 1.7
2,955.8
Investing in
People
15.88 21.92 21.92
19.36 21.31
28.59 23.82 23.95 29.64 23.71 9.9 366.0
Peace &
Security
667.52 694.86 822.79
727.59 802.43
897.75 854.8 926.66 779.58
1,093.58
790.5
1,1865.3
Program
Support
0 0 0
0 0
0
0.1
1.25
1.41
7.84
5.9
20.9
Cross-Cutting
0 4.19 5.49 5.0 2.71
6.88 4.48
0
0
0 0 28.74
Total
3053.41 2956.73 3016.54 2915.5 2948.66 3013.3 2988.84 3019.68 2891.39 3,199.81
2883.9 1,8821.4
As % of Eurasia
aid
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Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia.
Note: Includes Freedom Support Act and other program and agency assistance.
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Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Author Contact Information
Jim Nichol, Coordinator
Amy F. Woolf
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy
jnichol@crs.loc.gov, 7-2289
awoolf@crs.loc.gov, 7-2379
William H. Cooper
Steven A. Hildreth
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Specialist in Missile Defense
wcooper@crs.loc.gov, 7-7749
shildreth@crs.loc.gov, 7-7635
Carl Ek
Paul Belkin
Specialist in International Relations
Analyst in European Affairs
cek@crs.loc.gov, 7-7286
pbelkin@crs.loc.gov, 7-0220
Steven Woehrel
Derek E. Mix
Specialist in European Affairs
Analyst in European Affairs
swoehrel@crs.loc.gov, 7-2291
dmix@crs.loc.gov, 7-9116
Acknowledgments
Some portions of this report are based on the work of former Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
Stuart Goldman.
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