Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues
for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke, Coordinator
Specialist in Naval Affairs
April 25, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41153
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has
heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region’s future. The United States, by virtue of
Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial interests in the region. On January 12, 2009, the
George W. Bush Administration released a presidential directive, called National Security
Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25 (NSPD 66/HSPD 25),
establishing a new U.S. policy for the Arctic region.
Record low extents of Arctic sea ice over the past decade have focused scientific and policy
attention on links to global climate change and projected ice-free seasons in the Arctic within
decades. These changes have potential consequences for weather in the United States, access to
mineral and biological resources in the Arctic, the economies and cultures of peoples in the
region, and national security.
The five Arctic coastal states—the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (of
which Greenland is a territory)—are in the process of preparing Arctic territorial claims for
submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The Russian claim to the
enormous underwater Lomonosov Ridge, if accepted, would reportedly grant Russia nearly one-
half of the Arctic area. There are also four other unresolved Arctic territorial disputes.
The diminishment of Arctic ice could lead in coming years to increased commercial shipping on
two trans-Arctic sea routes—the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. Current
international guidelines for ships operating in Arctic waters are being updated.
Changes to the Arctic brought about by warming temperatures will likely allow more exploration
for oil, gas, and minerals. Warming that causes permafrost to melt could pose challenges to
onshore exploration activities. Increased oil and gas exploration and tourism (cruise ships) in the
Arctic increase the risk of pollution in the region. Cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters will
be more difficult than in other areas, primarily because effective strategies have yet to be
developed.
Large commercial fisheries exist in the Arctic. The United States is currently meeting with other
countries regarding the management of Arctic fish stocks. Changes in the Arctic could affect
threatened and endangered species. Under the Endangered Species Act, the polar bear was listed
as threatened on May 15, 2008. Arctic climate change is also expected to affect the economies,
health, and cultures of Arctic indigenous peoples.
Two of the Coast Guard’s three polar icebreakers—Polar Star and Polar Sea—have exceeded
their intended 30-year service lives, and Polar Sea is not operational. The possibility of increased
sea traffic through Arctic waters raises an issue concerning Arctic search and rescue capabilities.
On May 12, 2011, representatives from the member states of the Arctic Council signed an
agreement on cooperation on aeronautical and maritime search and rescue in the Arctic.
The Arctic has increasingly become a subject of discussion among political leaders of the nations
in the region. Although there is significant international cooperation on Arctic issues, the Arctic is
also increasingly being viewed by some observers as a potential emerging security issue. In
varying degrees, the Arctic coastal states have indicated a willingness to establish and maintain a
military presence in the high north. U.S. military forces, particularly the Navy and Coast Guard,
have begun to pay more attention to the region.
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Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Definitions of the Arctic ............................................................................................................ 1
Arctic Circle Definition and Resulting Arctic Countries .................................................... 1
Definition in Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 .......................................... 2
Other Definitions ................................................................................................................. 4
U.S. Arctic Research .................................................................................................................. 5
Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984, As Amended ......................................... 5
FY2014 NSF Budget Request for Arctic Research ............................................................. 6
January 2009 Arctic Policy Directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25) ..................................................... 7
May 2010 National Security Strategy........................................................................................ 8
The Arctic and the U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ....................................... 8
Background to UNCLOS .................................................................................................... 8
Part VI of UNCLOS and Commission on Limits of Continental Shelf .............................. 9
U.S. Activities As a Non-Party to UNCLOS ....................................................................... 9
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 10
Climate Change and Loss of Arctic Sea Ice ............................................................................ 10
Territorial Claims and Sovereignty Issues ............................................................................... 14
Commercial Sea Transportation .............................................................................................. 16
Background ....................................................................................................................... 16
Regulation of Arctic Shipping ........................................................................................... 19
Oil, Gas, and Mineral Exploration........................................................................................... 21
Oil and Gas ........................................................................................................................ 23
Extent of the Continental Margin ...................................................................................... 24
Minerals ............................................................................................................................. 26
Oil Pollution and Pollution Response ...................................................................................... 27
Oil Pollution Implications of Arctic Change ..................................................................... 27
Response and Cleanup Challenges in the Arctic Region................................................... 29
Fisheries ................................................................................................................................... 31
Protected Species ..................................................................................................................... 32
Indigenous People Living in the Arctic ................................................................................... 33
Background ....................................................................................................................... 33
Effects of Climate Change ................................................................................................ 35
Polar Icebreaking ..................................................................................................................... 38
Search and Rescue ................................................................................................................... 41
General .............................................................................................................................. 41
Coast Guard Statements .................................................................................................... 42
State Department Statement .............................................................................................. 43
Arctic Council Agreement on Arctic Search and Rescue (May 2011) .............................. 44
Geopolitical Environment ....................................................................................................... 47
Multilateral Cooperation ................................................................................................... 48
Security Issues ................................................................................................................... 50
U.S. Military Forces and Operations ....................................................................................... 53
DOD in General ................................................................................................................ 53
Navy and Coast Guard ...................................................................................................... 61
U.S.-Canadian Military Cooperation................................................................................. 70
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January 2009 Arctic Policy Directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25) ................................................... 71
CRS Reports on Specific Arctic-Related Issues ............................................................................ 73
Figures
Figure 1. Arctic Area of Alaska as Defined by ARPA ..................................................................... 3
Figure 2. Entire Arctic Area as Defined by ARPA ........................................................................... 4
Figure 3. Arctic Sea Ice Extent in September 2008, Compared with Prospective Shipping
Routes and Oil and Gas Resources ............................................................................................. 13
Figure 4. Illustrative Map of Arctic SAR Areas in Arctic SAR Agreement .................................. 46
Appendixes
Appendix A. Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373) ................ 74
Appendix B. P.L. 101-609 of 1990, Amending Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of
1984 ............................................................................................................................................ 82
Appendix C. January 2009 Arctic Policy Directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25) .................................... 84
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 92
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Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has
heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region’s future. Issues such as Arctic sovereignty
claims; commercial shipping through the Arctic; Arctic oil, gas, and mineral exploration;
endangered Arctic species; and increased military operations in the Arctic could cause the region
in coming years to become an arena of international cooperation, competition, or conflict. The
United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial political, economic,
energy, environmental, and other interests in the region. Decisions that Congress, the executive
branch, foreign governments, international organizations, and commercial firms make on Arctic-
related issues could significantly affect these interests.
This report provides an overview of Arctic-related issues for Congress, and refers readers to more
in-depth CRS reports on specific Arctic-related issues. Congressional readers with questions
about an issue discussed in this report should contact the author or authors of the section
discussing that issue. The authors are identified by footnote at the start of each section.
This report does not track legislation on specific Arctic-related issues. For tracking of legislative
activity, see the CRS reports relating to specific Arctic-related issues.
Background1
Definitions of the Arctic
There are multiple definitions of the Arctic that result in differing descriptions of the land and sea
areas encompassed by the term. Policy discussions of the Arctic can employ varying definitions
of the region, and readers should bear in mind that the definition used in one discussion may
differ from that used in another. This CRS report does not rely on any one definition.
Arctic Circle Definition and Resulting Arctic Countries
The most common and basic definition of the Arctic defines the region as the land and sea area
north of the Arctic Circle (a circle of latitude at about 66.34o North). For surface locations within
this zone, the sun is generally above the horizon for 24 continuous hours at least once per year (at
the summer solstice) and below the horizon for 24 continuous hours at least once per year (at the
winter solstice).
The Arctic Circle definition includes the northernmost third or so of Alaska, as well as the
Chukchi Sea, which separates that part of Alaska from Russia, and U.S. territorial and Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) waters north of Alaska. It does not include the lower two-thirds or so of
Alaska or the Bering Sea, which separates that lower part of the state from Russia.
1 Except for the subsection on the Arctic and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, this section was prepared by
Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
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Eight countries have territory north of the Arctic Circle: the United States (Alaska), Canada,
Russia, Norway, Denmark (by virtue of Greenland, a member country of the Kingdom of
Denmark), Finland, Sweden, and Iceland.2 These eight countries are often referred to as the Arctic
countries, and they are the member states of the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum
established in 1996.3 A subset of the eight Arctic countries are the five countries that are
considered Arctic coastal states: the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (by
virtue of Greenland).
Definition in Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984
Section 112 of the Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July
31, 1984)4 defines the Arctic as follows:
As used in this title, the term “Arctic” means all United States and foreign territory north of
the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north and west of the boundary formed by the
Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers [in Alaska]; all contiguous seas, including the
Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain.
This definition, which is codified at 15 U.S.C. 4111,5 includes certain parts of Alaska below the
Arctic Circle, including the Aleutian Islands and portions of central and western mainland Alaska,
such as the Seward Peninsula and the Yukon Delta.
Figure 1 below shows the Arctic area of Alaska as defined by ARPA.
2 On November 25, 2008, voters in Greenland approved a referendum for greater autonomy that some observers view
as a step toward eventual independence from Denmark. (Alan Cowell, “Greenland Vote Favors Independence,” New
York Times, November 26, 2008.)
3 For more on the Arctic Council on the Internet, see http://www.arctic-council.org/.
4 Title II of P.L. 98-373 is the National Critical Materials Act of 1984.
5 As codified, the definition reads, “As used in this chapter.... ”
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Figure 1. Arctic Area of Alaska as Defined by ARPA
Source: U.S. Arctic Research Commission (http://www.arctic.gov/maps/ARPA_Alaska_only_150dpi.jpg,
accessed on December 23, 2011).
Figure 2 shows the entire Arctic area as defined by ARPA.
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Figure 2. Entire Arctic Area as Defined by ARPA
Source: U.S. Arctic Research Commission (http://www.arctic.gov/maps/ARPA_Polar_150dpi.jpg, accessed on
December 23, 2011).
Other Definitions
Other definitions of the Arctic are based on factors such as average temperature, the northern tree
line, the extent of permafrost on land, the extent of sea ice on the ocean, or jurisdictional or
administrative boundaries.6 A definition based on a climate-related factor could circumscribe
differing areas over time as a result of climate change.
The 10o C isotherm definition of the Arctic defines the region as the land and sea area in the
northern hemisphere where the average temperature for the warmest month (July) is below 10o
Celsius, or 50o Fahrenheit. This definition results in an irregularly shaped Arctic region that
excludes some land and sea areas north of the Arctic Circle but includes some land and sea areas
south of the Arctic Circle. This definition currently excludes all of Finland and Sweden, as well as
6 For discussions and (in some cases) maps, see Susan Joy Hassol, Impacts of a Warming Arctic [Executive Summary].
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 4. Available online at http://amap.no/acia/; Oran R. Yong and Niels
Einarsson, Arctic Human Development Report, Stefansson Arctic Institute, Akureyri, Iceland, 2004, pp. 17-18,
available online at http://www.svs.is/AHDR/AHDR%20chapters/English%20version/Chapters%20PDF.htm; and Hugo
Ahlenius, editor in chief, et al. Vital Arctic Graphics, People and Global Heritage on Our Last Wild Shores,
UNEP/GRID-Arendal, Arendal, Norway, p. 6, available online at http://www.grida.no/publications/vg/arctic/.
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some of Alaska above the Arctic Circle, while including virtually all of the Bering Sea and
Alaska’s Aleutian Islands.7
The definition of the Arctic adopted by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme
(AMAP)—a working group of the Arctic Council—“essentially includes the terrestrial and
marine areas north of the Arctic Circle (66°32’ N), and north of 62° N in Asia and 60° N in North
America, modified to include the marine areas north of the Aleutian chain, Hudson Bay, and parts
of the North Atlantic, including the Labrador Sea.”8 The AMAP website includes a map showing
the Arctic Circle, 10o C isotherm, tree line, and AMAP definitions of the Arctic.9
Some observers use the term “high north” as a way of referring to the Arctic. Some observers
make a distinction between the “high Arctic”—meaning, in general, the colder portions of the
Arctic that are closer to the North Pole—and other areas of the Arctic that are generally less cold
and further away from the North Pole, which are sometimes described as the low Arctic or the
subarctic.
U.S. Arctic Research
Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984, As Amended
The Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July 31, 1984)10
“provide[s] for a comprehensive national policy dealing with national research needs and
objectives in the Arctic.”11 The act, among other things
• made a series of findings concerning the importance of the Arctic and Arctic
research;
• established the U.S. Arctic Research Commission (USARC) to promote Arctic
research and recommend Arctic research policy;
• designated the National Science Foundation (NSF) as the lead federal agency for
implementing Arctic research policy;
• established the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC) to
develop a national Arctic research policy and a five-year plan to implement that
policy, and designated the NSF representative on the IARPC as its chairperson;12
and
7 A map showing the line that results from 10o isotherm definition is available online at https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/reference_maps/pdf/arctic.pdf.
8 Discussion entitled “Geographical Coverage,” available online at http://www.amap.no/ (click on “About AMAP” and
then the tab “Geographical coverage.”)
9 Discussion entitled “Geographical Coverage,” available online at http://www.amap.no/ (click on “About AMAP” and
then the tab “Geographical coverage.”)
10 Title II of P.L. 98-373 is the National Critical Materials Act of 1984.
11 These words are taken from the official title of P.L. 98-373. (Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 is the short title
of Title I of P.L. 98-373.) The remainder of P.L. 98-373’s official title relates to Title II of the act, the short title of
which is the National Critical Materials Act of 1984.)
12 The IARPC currently includes more than a dozen federal agencies, departments, and offices. Additional information
on the IARPC is available on the Internet at http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/arctic/iarpc/start.jsp.
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• defined the term “Arctic” for purposes of the act.
The Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 was amended by P.L. 101-609 of November 16,
1990. For the texts of the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 and P.L. 101-609, see
Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively.
FY2014 NSF Budget Request for Arctic Research
NSF—the lead federal agency for implementing Arctic research policy (see “Arctic Research and
Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984, As Amended”)—carries out Arctic research activities through its
Division of Polar Programs (PLR), which is part of its Directorate for Geosciences (GEO).13 NSF
is requesting a total of $464.9 million for PLR for FY2014, including $139.3 million for research
in both the Arctic and Antarctic and $44.0 million for Arctic research support and logistics.14 NSF
states in its FY2014 overview of GEO that
As the primary U.S. supporter of fundamental research in the polar regions, GEO provides
interagency leadership for U.S. polar activities. In the Arctic, NSF helps coordinate research
planning as directed by the Arctic Research Policy Act of 1984. The NSF Director chairs the
Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee created for this purpose, which is now a
component of the President’s National Science and Technology Council.15
NSF states in its FY2014 overview of PLR that
The Division of Polar Programs (PLR) is the primary U.S. supporter of, and serves NSF
interagency leadership responsibilities for, fundamental research in the polar regions. The
Arctic Sciences section supports research in social, earth systems, and a broad range of
natural sciences; its Research Support & Logistics program is driven by and responds to
research by assisting researchers with access to the Arctic and for engagement in planning
and sharing of results with local Arctic communities....
PLR’s FY 2014 Request reflects three key priorities: (1) maintaining strong disciplinary
programs that provide a base for investments in cross-disciplinary science programs; (2)
focusing basic research on cross-foundation (e.g., Science, Engineering, and Education for
Sustainability (SEES), Cyberinfrastructure Framework for 21st Century Science,
Engineering, and Education (CIF21), GEOTRACES), and interagency priorities; and (3)
supporting and improving the efficiency of critical facilities that enable research in both
polar regions.... For the Arctic, shared cross-directorate basic research objectives, the
recently released Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee’s (IARPC) Arctic Research
Plan FY 2013-2017 (Five-Year Plan) and the National Ocean Policy (NOP) Implementation
Strategy inform science investment priorities.
13 NSF used to conduct its Arctic research activities through a Division of Arctic Sciences (ARC) that formed part of an
Office of Polar Programs (OPP). NSF states that in FY 2013, a realignment of offices previously under the Office of
the Director was implemented, and that as a part of this realignment, OPP became PLR within GEO. (National Science
Foundation, FY 2014 Budget Request to Congress, April 10, 2013, Footnote 2 in Summary Tables—3 (pdf page 25 of
506). The document is available at http://www.nsf.gov/about/budget/fy2014/pdf/EntireDocument_fy2014.pdf.)
14 National Science Foundation, FY 2014 Budget Request to Congress, April 10, 2013, p. GEO-15 (pdf page 127 of
506).
15 National Science Foundation, FY 2014 Budget Request to Congress, April 10, 2013, p. GEO-1 (pdf page 113 of 506).
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In general, 40 percent of the PLR research portfolio is available for new grants and 60
percent for continuing grants. Approximately 70 percent of the overall budget supports
facilities and logistics.16
NSF states that, compared to the FY2012-enacted funding level, changes reflected in the FY2014
request for $139.4 million for Arctic and Antarctic research activities within PLR include, among
other things,
• Funding increases to develop mechanisms to coordinate with Alaska Native organizations
to build partnerships and broaden participation in scientific research, and to strengthen
PLR’s long-standing commitment to engaging Alaska Native students and communities.
(+$200,000, to a total of $300,000)
• PLR will collaborate with OCE [the Division of Ocean Sciences within GEO] to support
the U.S. components of several marine expeditions under the GEOTRACES program to
measure trace elements and isotopes across the Arctic Ocean and the connecting passages
between the Arctic, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans. (+$2.0 million, to a total of $2.0 million)
• Core Arctic research will be prioritized to support reinvestment in sustained synthesis of
modeling and observational data at the system level and for research on the Chukchi and
Beaufort Seas, also taking an integrative system-level approach. These will complement the
more focused research supported by mission agencies, such as the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management (BOEM) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
and contribute to the coordinated activity under IARPC. ($6.0 million)17
Regarding its FY2014 request for $44.0 million for Arctic research support and logistics within
PLR, NSF states:
The Arctic Research Support and Logistics program provides support for Arctic researchers,
including airplanes, helicopters, access to icebreakers and field camps for researchers
participating in approximately 150 projects in remote sites in Alaska, Canada, Arctic
Scandinavia, Russia, and the Arctic Ocean. Summit Station on the Greenland icecap operates
as a year-round international site for a variety of atmospheric and geophysical measurements.
Increased funding [requested for FY2014, compared to the enacted FY2012 level] will
support anticipated ship-time on the new UNOLS [University National Oceanographic
Laboratory System] vessel SIKULIAQ. (+$460,000, to a total of $460,000).18
January 2009 Arctic Policy Directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25)
On January 12, 2009, the George W. Bush Administration released a presidential directive
establishing a new U.S. policy for the Arctic region. The directive, dated January 9, 2009, was
issued as National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25
(NSPD 66/HSPD 25). The directive was the result of an interagency review, and it superseded for
16 National Science Foundation, FY 2014 Budget Request to Congress, April 10, 2013, pp. GEO-15 and GEO-16 (pdf
pages 127 and 128 of 506).
17 National Science Foundation, FY 2014 Budget Request to Congress, April 10, 2013, p. GEO-16 (pdf page 128 of
506).
18 National Science Foundation, FY 2014 Budget Request to Congress, April 10, 2013, p. GEO-17 (pdf page 129 of
506).
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the Arctic (but not the Antarctic) a 1994 presidential directive on Arctic and Antarctic policy. The
directive, among other things,
• states that the United States is an Arctic nation, with varied and compelling
interests in the region;
• sets forth a six-element overall U.S. policy for the region;
• describes U.S. national security and homeland security interests in the Arctic; and
• discusses a number of issues as they relate to the Arctic, including international
governance; the extended continental shelf and boundary issues; promotion of
international scientific cooperation; maritime transportation; economic issues,
including energy; and environmental protection and conservation of natural
resources.
The Obama Administration has not issued a new directive superseding NSPD 66/HSPD 25; it is
currently operating under the Bush Administration’s policy directive.19 For the text of NSPD
66/HSPD 25, see Appendix C.
May 2010 National Security Strategy
In May 2010, the Obama Administration released a national security strategy document that
states:
The United States is an Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic
region, where we seek to meet our national security needs, protect the environment,
responsibly manage resources, account for indigenous communities, support scientific
research, and strengthen international cooperation on a wide range of issues.20
The Arctic and the U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)21
Background to UNCLOS
In November 1994, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) entered
into force. This convention establishes a treaty regime to govern activities on, over, and under the
world’s oceans. It builds on the four 1958 law of the sea conventions and sets forth a framework
for future activities in parts of the oceans that are beyond national jurisdiction.22 The 1982
Convention and its 1994 Agreement relating to Implementation of Part XI of the Convention were
19 CRS communication with State Department official, October 8, 2010.
20 National Security Strategy, Washington, May 2010, p. 50. The quoted sentence constitutes the entirety of the
document’s comments specifically on the Arctic. It is the final sentence of a section on “sustain[ing] broad cooperation
on key global challenges” that includes longer discussions on climate change, peacekeeping and armed conflict,
pandemics and infectious disease, transnational criminal threats and threats to governance, and safeguarding the global
commons.
21 This section prepared by Marjorie Ann Browne, Specialist in International Relations, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and
Trade Division.
22 The United States is party to the four conventions adopted in 1958: Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, Convention on the High Seas, Convention on the Continental Shelf, and Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas.
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transmitted to the Senate on October 6, 1994.23 In the absence of Senate advice and consent to
adherence, the United States is not a party to the convention and agreement.
Part VI of UNCLOS and Commission on Limits of Continental Shelf
Part VI of the convention, dealing with the Continental Shelf, and Annex II, which established a
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, are most pertinent to the Arctic as it becomes
more accessible ocean space, bordered by five coastal states.24 The convention gives the coastal
state sovereign jurisdiction over the resources, including oil and gas, of its continental shelf.25
Under Article 76 of the convention, a coastal state with a broad continental margin may establish
a shelf limit beyond 200 nautical miles. This jurisdiction is subject to the submission of the
particulars of the intended limit and supporting scientific and technical data by the coastal state to
the commission for review and recommendation.26 The commission reviews the documentation
and, by a two-thirds majority, approves its recommendations to the submitting state. Coastal
states agree to establish the outer limits of their continental shelf, in accordance with this process
and with their national laws. In instances of disagreement with the commission’s
recommendations, the coastal state may make a revised or new submission. The actions of the
commission “shall not prejudice matters relating to delimitation of boundaries between States
with opposite or adjacent coasts.”27 The “limits established by a coastal State on the basis of these
recommendations shall be final and binding.”28
U.S. Activities As a Non-Party to UNCLOS
As a non-party to the convention, the United States cannot participate as a member of the
commission; it cannot submit a claim under Article 76. Over the years, however, it has submitted
observations on submissions made by other states, requesting that those observations be made
available online and to the commission. In addition, since 2001, the United States has gathered
and analyzed data to determine the outer limits of its extended continental shelf. Starting in 2007,
this effort became the Extended Continental Shelf Project, directed by an interagency task force
under the lead of the Department of State.29
23 Treaty Document 103-39.
24 Other relevant provisions of the Convention, applicable depending on the extent of Arctic melting, relate to
navigation, high seas freedoms, fisheries, and exclusive economic zones.
25 The continental shelf is the under-sea extension of a coastal state’s land territory. Article 76 of the Convention
defines the continental shelf, inter alia, as “the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its
[coastal state’s] territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the
continental margin.”
26 A coastal State party has 10 years from the entry into force of the Convention for submission of information on its
proposed limits. In May 2001, the Meeting of States Parties to the Convention decided that for any State for which the
Convention entered into force before May 13, 1999, the date of commencement of the 10-year time period for making
submissions to the Commission is May 13, 1999.
27 Annex II, Article 9. Article 83 of the Convention provides that questions relating to these boundary delimitation
disputes shall be resolved by agreement between the States or by the Dispute Settlement options set forth in Part XV of
the Convention.
28 Article 76, para. 8.
29 For more information, see http://www.state.gov/g/oes/continentalshelf/index.htm.
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Some observers have suggested that a separate regime be negotiated to address the changing
circumstances in the Arctic. They maintain that this phenomenon was not envisioned at the time
the Law of the Sea Convention was negotiated. Still others suggest that the Arctic region above a
certain parallel be designated a wilderness area, and they cite as precedent Article 4 of The
Antarctic Treaty, under which any current claims to sovereign territory are frozen and
No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis
for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create
any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim,
to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.
Supporters of the Law of the Sea Convention maintain that changing circumstances in the Arctic
strengthen their argument that the United States should become a party to the convention. In this
way, they argue, the United States can be best situated to protect and serve its national interests,
under both Article 76 and other parts of the convention.
Issues for Congress
Climate Change and Loss of Arctic Sea Ice30
Record low extents of Arctic sea ice in 2012 and 2007 have focused scientific and policy attention
on climate changes in the High North, and to the implications of projected ice-free31 seasons in
the Arctic within decades. The Arctic has been projected by several scientists to be ice-free in
most late summers as soon as the 2030s.32 This opens opportunities for transport through the
Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route, extraction of potential oil and gas resources, and
expanded fishing and tourism (Figure 3).
More broadly, physical changes in the Arctic include warming ocean, soil, and air temperatures;
melting permafrost; shifting vegetation and animal abundances; and altered characteristics of
Arctic cyclones. All these changes are expected to affect traditional livelihoods and cultures in the
region and survival of polar bear and other animal populations, and raise risks of pollution, food
supply, safety, cultural losses, and national security. Moreover, linkages (“teleconnections”)
between warming Arctic conditions and extreme events in the mid-latitude continents are
increasingly evident, identified in such extreme events as the heat waves and fires in Russia in
30 This section prepared by Jane Leggett, Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy, Resources, Science, and
Industry Division.
31 In scientific analyses, “ice-free” does not necessarily mean “no ice.” The definition of “ice-free” or sea ice “extent”
or “area” varies across studies. Sea ice “extent” is one common measure, equal to the sum of the area of grid cells that
have ice concentration of less than a set percentage—frequently 15%. For more information, see the National Snow and
Ice Data Center, http://nsidc.org/seaice/data/terminology.html.
32 Muyin Wang and James E. Overland, “A Sea Ice Free Summer Arctic within 30 Years?,” Geophysical Research
Letters 36, no. L07502 (April 3, 2009): 10.1029/2009GL037820; Marika Holland, Cecilia M. Bitz, and Bruno
Tremblay, “Future abrupt reductions in the summer Arctic sea ice,” Geophysical Research Letters 33, no. L23503
(2006); But see also Julien Boé, Alex Hall, and Xin Qu, “Sources of spread in simulations of Arctic sea ice loss over
the twenty-first century,” Climatic Change 99, no. 3 (April 1, 2010): 637-645; I. Eisenman and J. S. Wettlaufer,
“Nonlinear threshold behavior during the loss of Arctic sea ice,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106,
no. 1 (January 6, 2009): 28-32; Dirk Notz, “The Future of Ice Sheets and Sea Ice: Between Reversible Retreat and
Unstoppable Loss,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106, no. 49 (December 8, 2009): 20590-20595.
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2010; severe winters in the eastern United States and Europe in 2009/2010 and in Europe in
2011/2012;33 and Indian summer monsoons and droughts. Hence, changing climate in the Arctic
suggests important implications both locally and across the Hemisphere.
Like the rest of the globe, temperatures in the Arctic have varied34 but show a significant warming
trend since the 1970s, and particularly since 1995.35 The annual average temperature for the
Arctic region (from 60o to 90o N) is now about 1.8o F warmer than the “climate normal” (the
average from 1961 to 1990). Temperatures in October-November are now about 9o F above the
seasonal normal. Scientists have concluded that most of the global warming of the last three
decades is very likely caused by human-related emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG, mostly
carbon dioxide); they expect the GHG-induced warming to continue for decades, even if, and
after, GHG concentrations in the atmosphere have been stabilized. The extra heat in the Arctic is
amplified by processes there (the “polar amplification”) and may result in irreversible changes on
human timescales.
The observed warmer temperatures along with rising cyclone size and strength in the Arctic have
reduced sea ice extent, thickness, and ice that persists year-round (“perennial ice”); natural
climate variability has likely contributed to the record low ice extents of 2007 and 2012. The
2007 minimum sea ice extent was influenced by warm Arctic temperatures and warm, moist
winds blowing from the North Pacific into the central Arctic, contributing to melting and pushing
ice toward and into the Atlantic past Greenland. Warm winds did not account for the near-record
sea ice minimum in 2008.36 In early August 2012, an unusually large storm with low pressure
developed over the Arctic, helping to disperse the already weak ice into warmer waters and
accelerating its melt rate. By August 24, 2012, sea ice extent had shrunk below the previous
observed minimum of late September 2007.37
Modeling of GHG-induced climate change is particularly challenging for the Arctic, but it
consistently projects warming through the 21st century, with annual average Arctic temperature
increases ranging from +1° to +9.0° C (+2° to +19.0° F), depending on the GHG scenario and
33 Overland et al. state that “a warm Arctic-cold continent pattern represents a paradox of recent global warming: there
is not a uniform pattern of temperature increases” due to a set of newly recognized processes described in Overland, J.
E, K. R Wood, and M. Wang. “Warm Arctic-cold Continents: Climate Impacts of the Newly Open Arctic Sea.” Polar
Research 30 (2011). The authors raise a critical, unanswered question, “Is the observed severe mid-latitude weather in
two adjacent years simply due to an extreme in chaotic processes alone, or do they included a partial but important
Arctic forcing and connection due to recent changing conditions?” In other words, are recent patterns random
anomalies, or might we expect more of the same?; among other examples, see also Lim, Young-Kwon, and Siegfried
D. Schubert. “The Impact of ENSO and the Arctic Oscillation on Winter Temperature Extremes in the Southeast
United States.” Geophysical Research Letters 38, no. 15 (August 11, 2011): L15706.
34 There was a regionally warm period in the Arctic from the mid-1920s to around 1940, which scientists have assessed
to have been driven by natural climate variability. They have found that period to be distinctly different from the recent
multi-decadal warming, in part because the early 20th century warming was concentrated in the northern high latitudes.
See, for example, Figure 2, upper left graphic, in Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, “Simulatoin of Early 20th
Century Warming” at http://www.gfdl.noaa.gov/early-20th-century-global-warming.
35 Steele, Michael, Wendy Ermold, and Jinlun Zhang. “Arctic Ocean Surface Warming Trends over the Past 100
Years.” Geophysical Research Letters 35, no. 2 (January 29, 2008): L02614.
36 J. Overland, J. Walsh, and M. Wang, Arctic Report Card - Atmosphere (NOAA Arctic Research Program, October 6,
2008), http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/reportcard/atmosphere.html.
37 National Snow and Ice Data Center, “Arctic sea ice extent breaks 2007 record low” (August 27, 2012); Japanese
Aerospace Exploration Agency, “A new record minimum of the Arctic sea ice extentn was set on 24 August 2012”;
Arctic ROOS (Norway), “Daily Updated Time series of Arctic sea ice area and extent derived from SSMI data
provided by NERSC” at http://arctic-roos.org/observations/satellite-data/sea-ice/ice-area-and-extent-in-arctic.
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model used. While such warming is projected by most models throughout the Arctic, some
models project slight cooling localized in the North Atlantic Ocean just south of Greenland and
Iceland. Most warming would occur in autumn and winter, “with very little temperature change
projected over the Arctic Ocean” in summer months.38
Due to observed and projected climate change, scientists have concluded that the Arctic will have
changed from an ice-covered environment to a recurrent ice-free39 ocean (in summers) as soon as
the late 2030s. The character of ice cover is expected to change as well, with the ice being
thinner, more fragile, and more regionally variable. The variability in recent years of both ice
quantity and location could be expected to continue.
38 William L. Chapman and John E. Walsh, “Simulations of Arctic Temperature and Pressure by Global Coupled
Models,” Journal of Climate 20, no. 4 (February 1, 2007): 609-632.
39 See footnote 31. Also, although one Canadian scientist has predicted that recurrent ice-free summers may begin
sometime between 2013 and 2020, this is not consistent with other climate models’ projections.
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Figure 3. Arctic Sea Ice Extent in September 2008, Compared with Prospective
Shipping Routes and Oil and Gas Resources
Source: Graphic by Stephen Rountree at U.S. News and World Report, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/
world/2008/10/09/global-warming-triggers-an-international-race-for-the-artic/photos/#1.
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Territorial Claims and Sovereignty Issues40
Motivated in part by a desire to exercise sovereign control over the Arctic region’s increasingly
accessible oil and gas reserves (see “Oil, Gas, and Mineral Exploration”), the four Arctic coastal
states other than the United States—Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (of which Greenland
is a territory)—are in the process of preparing territorial claims in the Arctic, including claims for
expanded Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), for submission to the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf. (As mentioned earlier—see “U.S. Activities As a Non-Party to
UNCLOS”—the United States, as a non-party to UNCLOS, cannot participate as a member of the
commission; it cannot submit a claim under Article 76. Over the years, however, it has submitted
observations on submissions made by other states, requesting that those observations be made
available online and to the commission. In addition, since 2001, the United States has gathered
and analyzed data to determine the outer limits of its extended continental shelf.)
Russia has been attempting to chart the Arctic Ocean’s enormous underwater Lomonosov Ridge
in an attempt to show that it is an extension of Russia’s continental margin. The Russian claim to
this ridge, if accepted, would reportedly grant Russia nearly one-half of the Arctic area; a 2001
claim submitted by Russia was rejected as insufficiently documented. Canada also claims a
portion of the Lomonosov Ridge as part of its own underwater continental shelf.41 In August
2007, a Russian submersible on a research expedition deposited an encased Russian Federation
flag on the seabed of the presumed site of the North Pole. The action captured worldwide
attention, but analysts note that it did not constitute an official claim to the territory and was
therefore a purely symbolic act.
At a May 2008 meeting in Ilulissat, Greenland, the five Arctic coastal states reaffirmed their
commitment to the UNCLOS legal framework for the establishment of extended continental shelf
limits in the Arctic.42 (For further discussion, see “Extent of the Continental Margin” in “Oil, Gas,
and Mineral Exploration.”)
In addition to this process, there are four unresolved Arctic territorial disputes:
• Scientists have forecast that in coming decades, global warming will reduce the
ice pack in Canada’s northern archipelago sufficiently to permit ships to use the
trans-Arctic shipping route known as the Northwest Passage during the summer
months (see “Commercial Sea Transportation”). The prospect of such traffic
raises a major jurisdictional question. Ottawa maintains that such a passage
would be an inland waterway, and would therefore be sovereign Canadian
territory subject to Ottawa’s surveillance, regulation, and control. The United
States, the European Union, and others assert that the passage would constitute
an international strait between two high seas.
• The United States and Canada are negotiating over a binational boundary in the
Beaufort Sea.
40 This section prepared by Carl Ek, Specialist in International Relations, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
41 “Russia, Canada Make Competing Claims To Arctic Resources,” The Canadian Press, September 16, 2010.
42 “5 Countries Agree To Talk, Not Compete, Over the Arctic,” New York Times, May 29, 2008.
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• The United States and Russia in 1990 signed an agreement regarding a disputed
area of the Bering Sea; the U.S. Senate ratified the pact the following year, but
the Russian Duma has yet to approve the accord.
• Denmark and Canada disagree over which country has the territorial right to
Hans Island, a tiny, barren piece of rock between Greenland and Canada’s
Ellesmere Island. Some analysts believe the two countries are vying for control
over a future sea lane that might be created if the Arctic ice were to melt
sufficiently to create a Northwest Passage. Others claim that the governments are
staking out territorial claims in the event that future natural resource discoveries
make the region economically valuable.43
In addition to these disputes, Norway and Russia had been at odds for decades over the boundary
between the two in the so-called “Grey Zone” in the Barents Sea, an area believed to hold rich
undersea deposits of petroleum. On September 15, 2010, Norwegian Prime Minister Jens
Stoltenberg and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed an agreement in Murmansk, a
Russian city near the Norwegian border. The accord awards roughly half of the 175,000-square-
kilometer area to each country; it spells out fishing rights, and provides for the joint development
of future oil and gas finds that straddle the boundary line. Some observers believe it is noteworthy
that Russia would concede sovereignty over such a large, resource-rich territory to a small,
neighboring country. But others have noted that Moscow may be hoping for Norwegian
cooperation in developing offshore resources, and eventually in winning approval when Russia
submits its Article 76 UNCLOS claim.44
In August 2010, Canadian Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon announced a new “Statement of
Canada’s Arctic Policy,” which reaffirmed the government’s commitment to Canada’s sovereignty
in the region, to economic and social development, to environmental protection, and to
empowerment of the peoples in the north. The statement also emphasized the government’s
intention to negotiate settlements to its disputes with the United States over the Beaufort Sea
boundary, and with Denmark over Hans Island. Minister Cannon declared that “making progress
on outstanding boundary issues will be a top priority.”45 Also, despite their dispute over Hans
Island, Canada and Denmark have been working together on Arctic issues. In May 2010, the two
countries’ military chiefs of staffs signed a memorandum of understanding on Arctic Defense,
Security, and Operational Cooperation, committing the two countries to “enhanced consultation,
information exchange, visits, and exercises.”46
43 For additional information, see Natalie Mychajlyszyn, The Arctic: Geopolitical Issues, Canadian Library of
Parliament, October 24, 2008.
44 “Russia, Norway Sign Deal On Barents Sea Border, Seek More Development in Mineral-rich Arctic,” Associated
Press, September 15, 2010.
45 Cannon quoted in “Canada Seeks To Settle Arctic Borders,” Agence France Presse, August 20, 2010. For additional
information concerning Canada’s August statement on Arctic policy, see “Statement on Canada’s Arctic foreign policy:
Exercising sovereignty and promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy abroad,” Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Canada website, http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/canada_arctic_foreign_policy-
la_politique_etrangere_du_canada_pour_arctique.aspx?lang=eng.
46 “Canada and Denmark Sign Arctic Cooperation Arrangement,” Targeted News Service, May 17, 2010.
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Commercial Sea Transportation47
Background
The search for a shorter route from the Atlantic to Asia has been the quest of maritime powers
since the Middle Ages. The melting of Arctic ice raises the possibility of saving several thousands
of miles and several days of sailing between major trading blocs.48 If the Arctic were to become a
viable shipping route, the ramifications could extend far beyond the Arctic. For example, lower
shipping costs could be advantageous for China (at least its northeast region), Japan, and South
Korea because their manufactured products exported to Europe or North America could become
less expensive relative to other emerging manufacturing centers in Southeast Asia, such as
India.49 Melting ice could potentially open up two trans-Arctic routes (see Figure 3):50
• The Northern Sea Route (NSR, a.k.a. the “Northeast Passage”), along Russia’s
northern border from Murmansk to Provideniya, is about 2,600 nautical miles in
length. It was opened by the Soviet Union to domestic shipping in 1931 and to
transit by foreign vessels in 1991. Even so, these waters are little used by non-
Russian ships.51 This route would be applicable for trade between northeast Asia
(north of Singapore) and northern Europe.
• The Northwest Passage (NWP) runs through the Canadian Arctic Islands. The
NWP actually consists of several potential routes. The southern route is through
Peel Sound in Nunavut, which has been open in recent summers and contains
mostly one-year ice. However, this route is circuitous, contains some narrow
channels, and is shallow enough to impose draft restrictions on ships. The more
northern route, through McClure Strait from Baffin Bay to the Beaufort Sea north
of Alaska, is much more direct, and therefore more appealing to ocean carriers,
but more prone to ice blockage.52 The NWP is potentially applicable for trade
between northeast Asia (north of Shanghai) and the northeast of North America,
but may be less commercially viable than the NSR.53
47 This section prepared by John Frittelli, Specialist in Transportation Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry
Division.
48 Extended daylight hours in the Arctic during the summer may also be an advantage.
49 Presentation by Stephen Carmel, Senior Vice President, Maersk Line Ltd., Halifax International Security Forum,
Arctic Security: The New Great Game? November 21, 2009, available at http://fora.tv/.
50 A third but more remote possibility is a route directly over the North Pole.
51 In the summer of 2009, two German-owned ships are believed to be the first non-Russian ships to transit the NSR,
sailing from Korea to deliver oil-service equipment to the Russian Arctic and then sailing on to Rotterdam.
52 This was the route pioneered by the SS Manhattan, an oil tanker modified for ice breaking in 1969 to carry Alaskan
North Slope oil to the Atlantic. This was the first commercial passage through the NWP, but the building of the
Alaskan pipeline was found to be the more economical means of transporting oil from the North Slope to the lower 48
states.
53 Although the NWP is often compared to the alternative route through the Panama Canal in terms of distance and
sailing days from Asia to the U.S. east coast, another alternative to consider is the shorter and faster transcontinental
rail route across Canada or the United States. The Panama Canal is undergoing an expansion project, expected to be
completed by 2015, to allow larger ships with about three times the cargo capacity to pass through.
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Destination Traffic, Not Trans-Arctic Traffic
Almost all cargo ship activity currently taking place in the Arctic is to transport natural resources
from the Arctic or to deliver general cargo and supplies to communities and natural resource
extraction facilities. Thus, cargo ship traffic in the Arctic presently is mostly regional, not trans-
Arctic. While there has been a recent uptick in Arctic shipping activity, this activity has more to
do with a spike in commodity prices than it does with the melting of Arctic ice. Even so, recent
activity is less than it has been in the past. The NSR continues to account for the bulk of Arctic
shipping activity. The western end of the NSR, in the Barents Sea, is open year round. Further
east, sections of the NSR are open for as little as two and a half months during the summer.
However, in 2011, the route was open for five months and 34 ships, accompanied by a Russian
icebreaker, passed through.54
Cruise Ship Activity
Considerable cruise ship activity takes place in Arctic waters. In the summer of 2007, three cruise
ships reportedly sailed through the NWP from the Atlantic to Alaska’s North Slope.55 In August
2010, a cruise ship with over 150 passengers ran aground in the NWP. In the Barents Sea, there
are regular cruise ships sailing to Svalbard. The inherent dangers for passenger ships in the Arctic
have prompted calls for international regulations promoting the safety of cruise ships in the area.
Some have suggested that cruise ships sail in pairs to provide assistance to one another, given the
Arctic’s remoteness and the difficulty land-based rescuers would have in reaching a vessel in
distress.56 Requiring that Arctic cruise vessels have ice-strengthened hulls and be equipped with
enclosed lifeboats could be other safety requirements. In 2003, some Arctic cruise and tourist
operators formed the Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators (AECO) to establish
agreed-upon safety and environmental protection guidelines, but this organization only covers the
portion of the Arctic around Greenland, Svalbard, and Jan Mayen.57
Unpredictable Ice Conditions Hinder Trans-Arctic Shipping
Arctic waters do not necessarily have to be ice free to be open to shipping. Multiyear ice can be
over 10 feet thick and problematic even for icebreakers, but one-year ice is typically 3 feet thick
or less. This thinner ice can be more readily broken up by icebreakers or ice class ships (cargo
ships with reinforced hulls and other features for navigating in ice-infested waters). However,
more open water in the Arctic has resulted in another potential obstacle to shipping: unpredictable
ice flows. In the NWP, melting ice and the opening of waters that were once covered with one-
year ice has allowed blocks of multiyear ice from farther north, or icebergs from Greenland, to
flow into potential sea lanes. The source of this multiyear ice is not predicted to dissipate in spite
of climate change. Moreover, the flow patterns of these ice blocks are very difficult to predict,
and they have floated into potential routes for shipping.58 Thus, the lack of ice in potential sea
lanes during the summer months can add even greater unpredictability to Arctic shipping. This is
54 ITAR-TASS, “Rosatomflot Ends Shipping Season Along Northern Sea Route,” November 29, 2011.
55 “U.S. Needs to Prepare for Arctic Traffic Surge,” Anchorage Daily News, February 12, 2008, p. A4.
56 “Northern Waters,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), August 14, 2008, p. A8.
57 See http://www.aeco.no/index.htm for more information.
58 S.E.L. Howell and J.J. Yackel, “A Vessel Transit Assessment of Sea Ice Variability in the Western Arctic, 1969-
2002: Implications for Ship Navigation,” Canadian Journal of Remote Sensing, vol. 30, no. 2, 2004.
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in addition to the extent of ice versus open water, which is also highly variable from one year to
the next and seasonally.
The unpredictability of ice conditions is a major hindrance for trans-Arctic shipping in general,
but can be more of a concern for some types of ships than it is for others. For instance, it would
be less of a concern for cruise ships, which may have the objective of merely visiting the Arctic
rather than passing through and could change their route and itinerary depending on ice
conditions. On the other hand, unpredictability is of the utmost concern for container ships that
carry thousands of containers from hundreds of different customers, all of whom expect to unload
or load their cargo upon the ship’s arrival at various ports as indicated on the ship’s advertised
schedule. The presence of even small blocks of ice or icebergs from a melting Greenland ice sheet
requires slow sailing and could play havoc with schedules. Ships carrying a single commodity in
bulk from one port to another for just one customer have more flexibility in terms of delivery
windows, but would not likely risk an Arctic passage under prevailing conditions.
Ice is not the sole impediment to Arctic shipping. The region frequently experiences adverse
weather, including not only severe storms, but also intense cold, which can impair deck
machinery. During the summer months when sea lanes are open, heavy fog is common in the
Arctic.
Commercial ships would face higher operating costs on Arctic routes than elsewhere. Ship size is
an important factor in reducing freight costs. Many ships currently used in other waters would
require two icebreakers to break a path wide enough for them to sail through; ship owners could
reduce that cost by using smaller vessels in the Arctic, but this would raise the cost per container
or per ton of freight.59 Also, icebreakers or ice-class cargo vessels burn more fuel than ships
designed for more temperate waters and would have to sail at slower speeds. The shipping season
in the Arctic only lasts for a few weeks, so icebreakers and other special required equipment
would sit idle the remainder of the year. None of these impediments by themselves may be
enough to discourage Arctic passage but they do raise costs, perhaps enough to negate the savings
of a shorter route. Thus, from the perspective of a shipper or a ship owner, shorter via the Arctic
does not necessarily mean cheaper and faster.60
Basic Navigation Infrastructure Is Lacking
Considerable investment in navigation-related infrastructure would be required if trans-Arctic
shipping were to become a reality. Channel marking buoys and other floating visual aids are not
possible in Arctic waters because moving ice sheets will continuously shift their positions.
Therefore, vessel captains would need to rely on marine surveys and ice charts. For some areas in
the Arctic, however, these surveys and charts are out of date and not sufficiently accurate.61 To
remedy this problem, aviation reconnaissance of ice conditions and satellite images would need to
59 “Arctic Unlikely to See Major Shipping Growth,” New Zealand Transport and Logistics Business Week, April 24,
2008.
60 Presentation by Stephen Carmel, Senior Vice President, Maersk Line Ltd., Halifax International Security Forum,
Arctic Security: The New Great Game? November 21, 2009, available at http://fora.tv/.
61 In July and August 2010, NOAA surveyed the Bering Straits area in order to update its charts but stated that it will
take more than 25 years to map the prioritized areas of navigational significance in U.S. Arctic waters. See
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2010/20100720_fairweather.html.
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become readily available for ship operators.62 Ship-to-shore communication infrastructure would
need to be installed where possible. Refueling stations may be needed, as well as, perhaps,
transshipment ports where cargo could be transferred to and from ice-capable vessels at both ends
of Arctic routes. Shipping lines would need to develop a larger pool of mariners with ice
navigation experience. Marine insurers would need to calculate the proper level of risk premium
for polar routes, which would require more detailed information about Arctic accidents and
incidents in the past.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, along with the state of Alaska, is studying the feasibility of a
“deep-draft” port in the Arctic (accommodating ships with a draft of up to 35 feet). The northern
and northwestern coastlines of Alaska are exceptionally shallow, generally limiting harbor and
near shore traffic to shallow-draft barges. Coast Guard cutters and icebreakers have drafts of 35 to
40 feet while NOAA research vessels have drafts of 16 to 28 feet, so at present these vessels are
based outside the Arctic and must sail considerable distances to reach Arctic duty stations. Supply
vessels supporting offshore oil rigs typically have drafts over 20 feet. A deep-draft port could
serve as a base of operations for larger vessels, facilitating commercial maritime traffic in the
Arctic.63
Another study on maritime infrastructure needs is being conducted by the U.S. Committee on the
Marine Transportation System, a Cabinet-level committee of federal agencies with
responsibilities for marine transportation. It is due to report to Congress in 2012 a priority of
federal actions the committee believes are needed to ensure maritime safety, environmental
protection, and national security in the Arctic.64
Regulation of Arctic Shipping
Due to the international nature of the shipping industry, maritime trading nations have adopted
international treaties that establish standards for ocean carriers in terms of safety, pollution
prevention, and security. These standards are agreed upon by shipping nations through the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), a United Nations agency that first met in 1959.65
Key conventions that the 168 IMO member nations have adopted include the Safety of Life at Sea
Convention (SOLAS), which was originally adopted in response to the Titanic disaster in 1912
but has since been revised several times; the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL),
which was adopted in 1973 and modified in 1978; and the Standards for Training, Certification,
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (SCTW), which was adopted in 1978 and amended in 1995. It is
up to ratifying nations to enforce these standards. The United States is a party to these
conventions, and the U.S. Coast Guard enforces them when it boards and inspects ships and
crews arriving at U.S. ports and the very few ships engaged in international trade that sail under
the U.S. flag.
Like the United States, most of the other major maritime trading nations lack the ability to
enforce these regulations as a “flag state” because much of the world’s merchant fleet is
62 Ice reporting that currently exists is intended for scientists not mariners.
63 For further information, see http://www.poa.usace.army.mil/en/cw/AKPortsStudy.htm, and FY2013 USACE Budget
Justification, p. POD-5.
64 See http://www.cmts.gov/Activities/ActionTeams.aspx.
65 See http://www.imo.org/ for more information.
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registered under so-called “flags of convenience.” While most ship owners and operators are
headquartered in developed countries, they often register their ships in Panama, Liberia, the
Bahamas, the Marshall Islands, Malta, and Cyprus, among other “open registries,” because these
nations offer more attractive tax and employment regulatory regimes. Because of this
development, most maritime trading nations enforce shipping regulations under a “port state
control” regime—that is, they require compliance with these regulations as a condition of calling
at their ports. The fragmented nature of ship ownership and operation can be a further hurdle to
regulatory enforcement. It is common for cargo ships to be owned by one company, operated by a
second company (which markets the ship’s space), and managed by a third (which may supply the
crew and other services a ship requires to sail), each of which could be headquartered in different
countries.
Arctic Guidelines
While SOLAS and other IMO conventions include provisions regarding the operation of ships in
ice-infested waters, they are not specific to the polar regions. To supplement existing
requirements, in December 2002, the IMO approved guidelines for ships operating in Arctic ice-
covered waters.66 These were only recommendations for ships operating in the Arctic, not
requirements. They apply to passenger and cargo ships of 500 gross tons or more engaged in
international voyages. They do not apply to fishing vessels, military vessels, pleasure yachts, and
smaller cargo ships. The guidelines are intended to improve safety and prevent pollution in the
Arctic, and they include provisions on ship construction, ship equipment related to navigation,
and crew training and ship operation. The guidelines recommend that ships carry fully enclosed
lifeboats or carry tarpaulins to cover their lifeboats. They recommend that each crew include at
least one ice navigator with documented evidence of having completed an ice navigation training
program. The IMO is in the process of drafting mandatory requirements for ships operating in the
Arctic.67
Nations can enforce additional requirements on ships arriving at their ports or sailing through
their coastal waters. For instance, U.S. Coast Guard regulations largely follow IMO conventions
but mandate additional requirements in some areas. U.S. coastal states can require ships calling at
their ports to take additional safety and pollution prevention safeguards. Canada and Russia have
additional pollution regulations for Arctic waters exceeding MARPOL. The U.S. Coast Guard is
seeking agreement with Russia to establish a vessel traffic separation scheme for the Bering Strait
between Alaska and Russia, which now experiences over 300 transits per year.68
66 See MSC/Circ. 1056/MEPC/Circ.399 at http://www.imo.org/.
67 Edwin H. Anderson, “Polar Shipping, The Forthcoming Polar Code and Implications for the Polar Environments,”
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, v. 43, no. 1, January 2012.
68 The Coast Guard is studying shipping routes through the Bering Strait for possible safety enhancements. See 75 FR
68568, November 8, 2010.
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Oil, Gas, and Mineral Exploration69
Decreases in summer polar ice will likely allow for more options for exploring for oil and gas in
certain offshore areas. Similarly, shrinking glaciers onshore could expose land containing
economic deposits of gold, iron ore, or other minerals that were previously covered by glacial ice.
Currently offshore areas encompassing more than 1 billion acres and more than 6,000 miles of
coastline—more coastline than in the rest of the United States combined—are considered
potential areas for offshore energy development. These Arctic regions include the Beaufort and
Chukchi Seas, the Bering Sea, Cook Inlet, and the Gulf of Alaska.
Warming that causes permafrost to melt could pose challenges to onshore exploration activities
because ground structures, such as pipelines and other infrastructure that depend on footings sunk
into the permafrost for support, could become unstable. Despite the warming temperatures,
however, exploration and development in the Arctic would still be subject to harsh conditions,
especially in winter, which makes it costly and challenging to develop infrastructure necessary to
produce, store, and transport oil, gas, and minerals from newly discovered deposits. In offshore
areas, severe weather poses challenges to the ongoing operation of federally regulated operations
involving six producing wells.70
Shrinking sea ice cover in the Arctic has also intensified interest in surveying and mapping the
continental margins of countries with lands in the Arctic. Delineating the extent of the continental
margins beyond the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) could lead to considering
development on substantial amounts of submerged lands.71 Mapping projects are underway, by
individual countries and through cooperative government studies, to support national claims to
submerged lands which may contain large amounts of oil, natural gas, methane hydrates, or
minerals.
One historical determinant of energy resource management in the Arctic has been federal
moratoriums enacted by Congress on an annual basis (as part of DOI appropriations acts) and
issued by the President through treaties or executive orders.72 While not affecting all Alaska
operations, these moratoriums effectively banned federally regulated planning and permitting in
the Bristol Bay area of the North Aleutian Basin. Since Congress allowed most statutory bans in
the region to expire in 2004,73 federal policy on development rights and permits governing access
to the Arctic for drilling has been in flux. In 2010, President Obama reinstated a moratorium in
the North Aleutian Basin, withdrawing acreage located in Bristol Bay from eligibility for oil and
69 This section prepared by Curry Hagerty, Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy, Resources, Science, and
Industry Division; Peter Folger, Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry
Division; and Marc Humphries, Analyst in Energy Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division.
70 Data provided by written communication to CRS from Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement on October
4-11, 2012. There are no federally regulated production facilities or pipelines in the Alaska region.
71 One way of delineating the extent of the continental margins that is currently under way in the region is by the terms
of Article 76 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
72 CRS Report R41132, Outer Continental Shelf Moratoria on Oil and Gas Development, by Curry L. Hagerty.
73 FY 2004 DOI Appropriations (P.L. 108-108). Furthermore, the Continuing Appropriations Resolution 2009 (P.L.
110-329) did not extend the annual congressional moratorium on oil and gas leasing activities in the lower 48 states. On
March 11, 2009, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8) was enacted without moratorium provisions,
confirming that the oil and gas development bans in federal waters along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, parts of
Alaska, and the Gulf of Mexico that had been in place since 1982 had not been restored in 2009 appropriations
measures.
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gas leasing until after 2017.74 Pursuant to this executive ban, gathering geological and
geophysical data and other development-related activities are prohibited in Bristol Bay.
Federal officials report regional operations related to the six producing wells are stable75 and that
plans are unfolding for oil and gas leasing activity in the future.76 Prompted by claims voiced by
some Alaska state officials, energy, trade and shipping groups favoring greater geographical
diversity for federally regulated offshore energy projects, President Obama and many in Congress
have expressed interest in expanding America’s ocean energy portfolio in the region.77 As part of
the Administration’s strategy to enhance domestic energy production, DOI approved a program
referred to as the Five Year Program announcing regulatory actions in offshore areas from 2012
through 2017.78 This program was formulated in part by lessons learned in the aftermath of the
Deepwater Horizon events in the Gulf of Mexico.79 While the program defers activities in the
Bristol Bay (pursuant to the executive moratorium), it proposes three lease sales elsewhere in the
region: in the Chukchi Sea (2016), Cook Inlet (2016), and the Beaufort Sea (2017).
One example of current offshore permitting activity in the region includes a subsidiary of Shell
Oil Company80 gaining permits for exploratory oil and natural gas drilling operations in the
Chukchi and Beaufort Seas during the 2012 drilling season.81 Public attention to these Shell
permits peaked during reports of a December 31, 2012, incident involving a drillship named the
Kulluk, owned by Shell. Media reports that the drillship ran aground on the shoreline of
Sitkalidak Island, AK, sparked attention to safety issues.82 As part of a response to the grounding,
federal safety officials commenced an investigation of the incident.83 Industry commentators,
74 “Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer Continental Shelf from Leasing Disposition,” §12(a)
OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. 1341(a) (March 31, 2010). This memorandum is available at http://www.doi.gov/whatwedo/energy/
ocs/upload/2010alaska-mem-rel.pdf.
75 See statement of the Alaska OCS Region at http://www.boem.gov/About-BOEM/BOEM-Regions/Alaska-Region/
Index.aspx. On March 27, 2012, BOEM issued a Request for Interest, with respect to the Cook Inlet planning area.
76 For example with respect to pre-leasing activities in the Cook Inlet, on March 27, 2012, BOEM issued a Request for
Interest, with respect to the Cook Inlet planning area. In light of responses to the Request, BOEM decided to proceed
with the pre-sale process for the Cook Inlet and to place the date for a potential lease sale in 2016 to allow time to
complete the necessary steps to develop additional resource and environmental information, and conduct analysis
required by NEPA.
77 For statements of legislative interest, see House Committee on Natural Resources 113th Congress Oversight Plan
(adopted January 23, 2013). For statements of interest by President Obama see 2013 State of the Union address at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/state-of-the-union-2013.
78 43 U.S.C. §1344. The current Five Year Program took effect August 27, 2012, and is expected to remain in effect
until 2017. 77 Federal Register 40080 (July 6, 2012).
79 On April 20, 2010, an explosion occurred at the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico,
resulting in 11 fatalities. The platform sank into the Gulf on April 22, 2010, amid a significant release of oil at the sea
floor. According to the National Incident Command’s Flow Rate Technical Group estimate, the well released
approximately 206 million gallons (4.9 million barrels) of oil before it was contained July 15, 2010.
80 Shell is a global group of energy and petrochemical companies with 90,000 employees in more than 80 countries. In
the United States, Shell operates in 50 states as an oil and natural gas producer, gasoline and natural gas marketer, and
petrochemical manufacturer. See more at http://www.shell.com.
81 Among other approvals, on August 4, 2011, BOEM issued a conditional approval of Shell’s revised exploration plan
(EP) for the Beaufort Sea to drill up to four exploration wells starting in summer 2012. On December 16, 2011, BOEM
issued conditional approval of Shell’s revised EP in the Chukchi Sea to drill up to six exploration wells beginning in
the 2012 drilling season.
82 Shell’s Kulluk ran aground off the southern coast of Alaska in a storm. The rig was towed to safe harbor, with no
serious injuries to the crew.
83 The U.S. Coast Guard conducted this review with the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) and
(continued...)
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including Randall Luthi, President of the National Ocean Industries Association (NOIA), noted
that drilling in U.S. waters can be achieved safely and that this incident should not be a stumbling
block to further development in the region.84 Other commentators countered that developing
Arctic resources is risky and investigating this incident offers guidance for future permitting in
the region.85
The future of offshore drilling in the region is somewhat dependent on the outcome of judicial
proceedings that govern aspects of Shell’s permitting process.86 The future timetable for Shell’s
permits might also depend on DOI regulatory actions focusing on, among other issues, the Arctic
Challenger (an Arctic Containment System, ACS), a key component of Shell’s drilling plan.87 As
part of listing various operational and management issues in the investigatory report described
above, DOI announced further studies are warranted prior to approving future Shell drilling
operations. Specifically, in terms of fabricating and testing certain safety systems and establishing
the scope of its operational plans, DOI investigators found Shell lacked adequate preparation and
Shell’s timelines did not allow for full certification of its ACS.88 Based on the information
available to date from the courts and from DOI on the status of the Shell permitting process, it
remains to be seen how permitting for drilling in the Arctic might proceed, if at all, with respect
to the 2013 drilling season.
Oil and Gas
A primary driver for the increased interest in exploring for oil and gas offshore in the Arctic is the
shrinking Arctic ice cap, or conversely, the growing amount of ice-free ocean in the summertime.
Reduced sea ice in the summer means that ships towing seismic arrays89 can explore previously
(...continued)
the National Transportation Safety Board providing technical assistance. For more details on this review see “Secretary
Salazar Launches Expedited Assessment of 2012 Arctic Operations High-Level, Expedited Review of the 2012 Offshore
Drilling Program in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas Will Assess Activities, Provide Lessons Learned,” (January 8,
2013) at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/secretary-salazar-launches-expedited-assessment-of-2012-arctic-
operations.cfm.
84 For Mr. Luthi’s full statement see Keep Cool Head on Arctic Energy Development, by Amy Harder, National
Journal, reporting available at http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2013/01/are-arctic-oildrilling-challen.php.
85 For a full discussion of this perspective see We’re Not Yet Arctic-Ready by Marilyn Heiman, Director of the Pew
Environment Group’s U.S. Arctic Program (January 21, 2013). This statement is available at
http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2013/01/are-arctic-oildrilling-challen.php.
86 Prior to DOI approvals issued in 2012, Shell had attempted to establish an exploratory drilling program offshore
Alaska in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas for several years. Shell’s long-standing goal has been to confirm a major
discovery of oil in commercially-viable quantities in the Alaskan Arctic Ocean. For a comprehensive discussion of case
law featuring Shell as a defendant and as a plaintiff in litigation over federal leasing in the Alaska program areas see
CRS Report WSLG332, A Preemptive Legal Strike? Shell Seeks Injunction to Prevent Environmental Group
Challenges to Drilling Permits, by Adam Vann.
87 DOI required Shell to include in its drilling plan an in-theater subsea containment system capable of functioning in
the event of an emergency and subject to review and oversight by federal agencies responsible for Arctic exploration.
For further information see “Secretary Salazar Launches Expedited Assessment of 2012 Arctic Operations,” January 8,
2013 available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/secretary-salazar-launches-expeditedassessment- of-2012-
arctic-operations.cfm.
88 See Report to the Secretary of the Interior; Review of Shell’s 2012 Alaska Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration
Program (March 8, 2013) at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/upload/Shell-report-3-8-13-Final.pdf.
89 A seismic array is typically a long string or streamer of geophones—acoustic devices used for recording seismic
signals—towed behind a ship while the ship traverses a prospective oil and gas-bearing portion of the seafloor. The
seismic signals are processed and interpreted to give a cross-section or three-dimensional image of the subsurface.
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inaccessible regions of the Arctic Ocean, Chukchi Sea, Beaufort Sea, and other offshore regions
for longer periods of time without as much risk of colliding with floating sea ice. Less sea ice
over longer periods compared to previous decades also means that the seasonal window for
offshore drilling in the Arctic remains open longer in the summer and increases the chances for
making a discovery.
In addition to the improved access to larger portions of the Arctic afforded by shrinking sea ice,
interest in Arctic oil and gas was fueled by a 2008 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) appraisal of
undiscovered oil and gas north of the Arctic Circle.90 The USGS asserted that the “extensive
Arctic continental shelves may constitute the geographically largest unexplored prospective area
for petroleum remaining on Earth.”91 In the report, the USGS estimates that 90 billion barrels of
oil, nearly 1,700 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids may
remain to be discovered in the Arctic. An article published in Science magazine indicated that
30% of the world’s undiscovered natural gas and 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil may be
found north of the Arctic Circle.92
Despite the warming trend in the Arctic, a discovery of new oil and gas deposits far from existing
storage, pipelines, and shipping facilities cannot be developed until infrastructure is built to
extract and transport the petroleum. Other areas with oil and gas potential, such as offshore east
Greenland, may take even longer to develop because they are still covered by substantial summer
sea ice that would hinder exploration and development unless more ice melts.93 Further, in 2010
Secretary of the Interior Salazar asked the USGS to assess the science needs that would inform
the Obama Administration’s consideration of how to develop oil and gas resources in the Arctic.94
The USGS released a report in response that identified some overarching themes, which include
the need for (1) large-scale synthesis of data and information, (2) enhanced dialog and
collaborative science planning, and (3) a more transparent and inclusive planning and decision-
making process.95
Extent of the Continental Margin
Increased interest in developing offshore resources in the Arctic has sparked efforts by nations
bordering the Arctic Ocean to map the extent of their continental margins beyond the 200-mile
EEZ limit. Under UNCLOS, nations can submit a claim to submerged lands if they demonstrate
that their continental margin extends beyond the 200-mile limit according to the definition in
Article 76. Under Article 76, the extent of the continental margin beyond the 200-mile limit
depends on the position of the foot of the continental slope, the thickness of sediments, and the
depth of water. Also, the continental margin could include geologic features that extend from the
90 See USGS Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal website at http://energy.usgs.gov/arctic/.
91 USGS Fact Sheet 2008-3049: Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of
the Arctic Circle; at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/.
92 Donald L. Gautier, et al., “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic,” Science, vol. 324, no. 5931, pp.
1175-1179 (2009).
93 The Associated Press, “Greenland Opens to Oil Firms; Melting Ice Unlocks Reserves,” International Herald Tribune
(January 14, 2008), at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/01/14/business/NA-FIN-US-Greenland-Oil-Companies.php.
94 Secretary Salazar Unveils Arctic Studies Initiative that will Inform Oil and Gas Decisions for Beaufort and Chukchi
Seas: Press Release April 13, 2010, http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/2010_04_13_releaseA.cfm.
95 U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2011-3048, 4 p. (2011).
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continent out to sea, which may include undersea ridges continuing for hundreds of miles
offshore.
As mentioned earlier—see “U.S. Activities As a Non-Party to UNCLOS”—the United States, as a
non-party to UNCLOS, cannot participate as a member of the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf; it cannot submit a claim under Article 76. Over the years, however, it has
submitted observations on submissions made by other states, requesting that those observations
be made available online and to the commission. In addition, since 2001 the United States has
gathered and analyzed data to determine the outer limits of its extended continental shelf.
Arctic border countries have begun the complex investigations needed to support claims for an
extended continental shelf in the Arctic. Claims have already been submitted by several countries,
including the Russian Federation, which submitted its UNCLOS claim to a portion of the Arctic
continental shelf in 2001.96 Russia made claims to the Lomonosov Ridge, an undersea feature
spanning the Arctic from Russia to Canada, as an extension of its continental margin. The
submission demonstrated Russia’s bid to extend activities in Arctic regions. The United States has
started to gather and analyze data through an initiative called the Extended Continental Shelf
Project.97 In this effort, the United States is working closely with Canada to prepare and present
Canada’s submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.
Canada and the United States share overlapping regions of the seabed as part of the extended
continental margin of both nations. Both countries have conducted research singly and jointly to
map the extended continental shelf.98 Consistent with past U.S. directives addressing the extended
continental shelf and boundary issues in the Arctic,99 the Obama Administration has undertaken
an initiative to improve the delivery of relevant scientific information to officials responsible for
energy development decisions in the Arctic.100 This initiative is part of a broader response to
USGS recommendations that more dialogue and collaborative science planning occur between
and among the scientific community and federal agencies involved in Arctic oil and gas
development decisions.101 These USGS recommendations stem from earlier USGS findings that
most of the potential oil and gas resources estimated for the Arctic are likely to exist within
96 Tony Halpin, “President Medvedev Threatens Russian Arctic Annexation,” Times Online (September 18, 2008), at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4773567.ece.
97 The purpose of the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project is to establish the full extent of the continental shelf of
the United States, consistent with international law. Involved in this mission are the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG),
Department of State (DOS), and the University of New Hampshire (UNH). NOAA has the lead in collecting
bathymetric data. The U.S. Geological Survey has the lead in collecting seismic data.
98 See USGS, U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project, at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/continentalshelf/.
99 A prominent directive issued by the Bush Administration addressed, among other issues, national security and
maritime transportation. National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-66 and Homeland Security Presidential
Directive/HSPD-25, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2009/01/20090112-3.html.
100 This initiative is part of an effort Arctic Research Commission Chairman Fran Ulmer began in December 2011. For
a full discussion of this initiative see “Obama Administration Outlines Arctic Energy Policy Initiatives,” Oil and Gas
Journal (February 7, 2012). Available at http://www.ogj.com/articles/2012/02/obama-administration-outlines-arctic-
energy-policy-initiatives.html.
101 Holland-Bartels, Leslie, and Pierce, Brenda, eds., 2011, An evaluation of the science needs to inform decisions on
Outer Continental Shelf energy development in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas, Alaska: U.S. Geological Survey
Circular 1370, 278 p. (2011). This report is available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1370/.
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already agreed-upon territorial boundaries.102 (For further discussion, see “Territorial Claims and
Sovereignty Issues.”)
Minerals
A warming Arctic means new opportunities and challenges for mineral exploration and
development. Receding glaciers expose previously ice-covered land that could host economic
mineral deposits that were previously undetectable and un-mineable below the ice. Longer
summers would also extend exploration seasons even for areas not currently ice-covered but
which are only accessible for ground surveys during the warmer months. In some parts of the
Arctic, such as Baffin Island, Canada, less sea ice allows ships to transport heavy equipment to
remote locations, and to convey ore from mines to the market further south. Some railway and
mining operators are considering developing railroads and other infrastructure to transport ore
year-round.103 As with onshore oil and gas development, however, mining infrastructure that
depends on footings sunk into permafrost could become unstable if the permafrost melts in
response to warmer temperatures. Also, as with oil and gas development, mineral deposits that
may be technically recoverable with current technology may not be economically profitable.
Some industry commentators suggest that mining might offer better long-term economic
development opportunities compared to oil and gas development because of a larger permanent
workforce and project lifelines of several decades.104 Similar to oil and gas, however, industry
observers note that uncertainties and knowledge gaps exist in the understanding of environmental
change in the Arctic, and how to deal with the risks of significant Arctic industrial activity.105
One important part of the current infrastructure in the Arctic that supports oil, gas, and mineral
development is the construction and use of ice roads—built and used during the winter—but
which are not passable during the warmer months. Warmer temperatures are shortening the ice
road transport seasons and creating transportation challenges. For example, the opening date for
tundra roads in northern Alaska usually occurred in early November prior to 1991 and has shifted
to January in recent years.106
102 Don Gautier, Research Geologist, USGS, quoted in “Countries in Tug-of-War Over Arctic Resources,” CNN.com
(January 2, 2009), at http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/science/01/02/arctic.rights.dispute/index.html?iref=newssearch.
103 Carolyn Fitzpatrick, “Heavy Haul in the High North,” Railway Gazette International (July 24, 2008), at
http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/single-view/view/10/heavy-haul-in-the-high-north.html.
104 Cecelia Jamasmie, Melting Arctic is nothing but good news for the mining industry: Lloyd's/Chatham House,
Mining.com, April 13, 2012, http://www.mining.com/melting-arctic-is-nothing-but-good-news-for-the-mining-
industry-lloydschatam-house/.
105 Charles Emmerson and Glada Lahn, Arctic Opening: Opportunity and Risk in the High North, Chatham House,
2012, http://www.lloyds.com/~/media/Files/News%20and%20Insight/360%20Risk%20Insight/
Arctic_Risk_Report_20120412.pdf.
106 See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Arctic Change, at http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/detect/land-
road.shtml?page=land.
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Oil Pollution and Pollution Response107
Oil Pollution Implications of Arctic Change
Climate change impacts in the Arctic, particularly the decline of sea ice and retreating glaciers,
have stimulated human activities in the region, many of which have the potential to create oil
pollution. A primary concern is the threat of a large oil spill in the area. Although a major oil spill
has not occurred in the Arctic region,108 recent economic activity, such as oil and gas exploration
and tourism (cruise ships), increases the risk of oil pollution (and other kinds of pollution) in the
Arctic. Significant spills in high northern latitudes (e.g., the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska
and spills in the North Sea) suggest that the “potential impacts of an Arctic spill are likely to be
severe for Arctic species and ecosystems.”109
Risk of Oil Pollution in the Arctic
A primary factor determining the risk of oil pollution in the Arctic is the level and type of human
activity being conducted in the region. Although climate changes in the Arctic are expected to
increase access to natural resources and shipping lanes, the region will continue to present
logistical challenges that may hinder human activity in the region. For example (as discussed in
another section of this report),110 the unpredictable ice conditions may discourage trans-Arctic
shipping. If trans-Arctic shipping were to occur on a frequent basis, it would represent a
considerable portion of the overall risk of oil pollution in the region. In recent decades, many of
the world’s largest oil spills have been from oil tankers, which can carry millions of gallons of
oil.111
Although the level of trans-Arctic shipping is uncertain, many expect oil exploration and
extraction activities to intensify in the region.112 Oil well blowouts from offshore oil extraction
operations have been a source of major oil spills, eclipsing the largest tanker spills. The largest
unintentional oil spill in recent history was from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf
of Mexico.113 During that incident, the uncontrolled well released (over an 84-day period)
approximately 200 million gallons of crude oil into the Gulf.114 The second-largest unintentional
oil spill in recent history—the IXTOC I, estimated at 140 million gallons—was due to an oil well
blowout in Mexican Gulf Coast waters in 1979.115
107 This section prepared by Jonathan L. Ramseur, Specialist in Environmental Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry
Division.
108 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Arctic Oil and Gas 2007 (2008).
109 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Arctic Oil and Gas 2007 (2008).
110 See this report’s section “Implications for Sea Transportation,” by John Fritelli.
111 For example, the Exxon Valdez spilled approximately 11 million gallons of oil, but its carrying capacity was
approximately 60 million gallons.
112 See this report’s section “Implication of Changes in the Arctic for Oil, Gas, and Mineral Exploration and
Development,” by Peter Folger and Marc Humphries.
113 Larger oil spills occurred during the 1991 Iraq War, but many of those spills were deliberate. A 1910-1911 onshore
oil blowout in the California San Joaquin Valley is reported to have spilled 9.4 million barrels of crude oil (almost 400
million gallons).
114 See CRS Report R41531, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: The Fate of the Oil, by Jonathan L. Ramseur.
115 National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies of Science, Oil in the Sea III: Inputs, Fates, and
(continued...)
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Until the 2010 Deepwater Horizon incident, the spill record for offshore platforms in U.S. federal
waters had shown improvement from prior years.116 A 2003 National Research Council (NRC)
study of oil and gas activities on Alaska’s North Slope stated “the conclusion of these analyses is
that blowouts that result in large spills are unlikely.”117 Similar conclusions were made in federal
agency documents regarding deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico before the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon event.118 Some would likely contend that the underlying analyses behind these
conclusions should be adjusted to account for the 2010 Gulf oil spill. However, others may argue
that the proposed activities in U.S. Arctic waters present less risk of an oil well blowout than was
encountered by the Deepwater Horizon drill rig, because the proposed U.S. Arctic operations
would be in shallower waters (150 feet) than the deepwater well (approximately 5,000 feet) that
was involved in the 2010 Gulf oil spill. In addition, Shell Oil has stated that the pressures in the
Chukchi Sea (the location of Shell’s recent interest) would be two to three times less than they
were in well involved in the 2010 Gulf oil spill.119 Regardless of these differences, even under the
most stringent control systems, some oil spills and other accidents are likely to occur from
equipment failure or human error.
Potential Impacts
No oil spill is entirely benign. Even a relatively minor spill, depending on the timing and location,
can cause significant harm to individual organisms and entire populations. Regarding aquatic
spills, marine mammals, birds, bottom-dwelling and intertidal species, and organisms in early
developmental stages—eggs or larvae—are especially vulnerable. However, the effects of oil
spills can vary greatly. Oil spills can cause impacts over a range of time scales, from only a few
days to several years, or even decades in some cases.
Conditions in the Arctic may have implications for toxicological effects that are not yet
understood. For example, oil spills on permafrost may persist in an ecosystem for relatively long
periods of time, potentially harming plant life through their root systems. Moreover, little is
known about the effects of oil spills on species that are unique to the Arctic, particularly, species’
abilities to thrive in a cold environment and the effect temperature has on toxicity.120
The effects of oil spills in high latitude, cold ocean environments may last longer and cause
greater damage than expected. Some recent studies have found that oil spills in lower latitudes
have persisted for longer than initially expected, thus raising the concern that the persistence of
(...continued)
Effects (2003).
116 See CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills in U.S. Coastal Waters: Background and Governance, by Jonathan L.
Ramseur; and Dagmar Etkin (Environmental Research Consulting), Analysis of U.S. Oil Spillage, Prepared for
American Petroleum Institute, August 2009.
117 National Research Council of the National Academies of Science, Cumulative Environmental Effects of Oil and Gas
Activities on Alaska’s North Slope (2003).
118 See, for example, Minerals Management Service (MMS), Outer Continental Shelf Oil & Gas Leasing Program:
2007-2012, Final Environmental Impact Statement, April 2007, Chapter 4; MMS, Proposed Gulf of Mexico OCS Oil
and Gas Lease Sale 206, Central Planning Area, Environmental Assessment, October 2007;
119 Letter from Marvin E. Odum, President, Shell Oil Company to S. Elizabeth Birnbaum, Minerals Management
Service (May 14, 2010). Cited in a staff paper from the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
and Offshore Drilling (“The Challenges of Oil Spill Response in the Arctic,” January 2011).
120 AMAP, Arctic Oil and Gas 2007 (2008).
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oil in the Arctic may be understated. In terms of wildlife, population recovery may take longer in
the Arctic because many of the species have longer life spans and reproduce at a slower rate.121
Response and Cleanup Challenges in the Arctic Region
Climate changes in the Arctic are expected to increase human activities in the region, many of
which impose a risk of oil pollution, particularly from oil spills. Conditions in the Arctic region
impose unique challenges for personnel charged with (1) oil spill response, the process of getting
people and equipment to the incident, and (2) cleanup duties, either recovering the spilled oil or
mitigating the contamination so that it poses less harm to the ecosystem. These challenges may
play a role in the policy development for economic activities in the Arctic.
Spill Response Challenges
Response time is a critical factor for oil spill recovery. With each hour, spilled oil becomes more
difficult to track, contain, and recover, particularly in icy conditions, where oil can migrate under
or mix with surrounding ice.122 Most response techniques call for quick action, which may pose
logistical challenges in areas without prior staging equipment or trained response professionals.
Many stakeholders are concerned about a “response gap” for oil spills in the Arctic region.123 A
response gap is a period of time in which oil spill response activities would be unsafe or
infeasible. The response gap for the northern Arctic latitudes is likely to be extremely high
compared to other regions.124
According to the former Commander of the 17th Coast Guard District (Alaska), “we are not
prepared for a major oil spill [over 100,000 gallons] in the Arctic environment. The Coast Guard
has no offshore response capability in Northern or Western Alaska.”125 The transportation
infrastructure along Alaska’s northern coast poses challenges for oil spill responders. The Coast
Guard has no designated air stations north of Kodiak, AK, which is almost 1,000 miles from the
northernmost point of land along the Alaskan coast in Point Barrow, AK.126 Although some of the
communities have airstrips capable of landing cargo planes, no roads connect these
communities.127 Vessel infrastructure is also limited. The nearest major port is in the Aleutian
Islands, approximately 1,300 miles from Point Barrow. A 2010 Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report identified further logistical obstacles that would hinder an oil spill response
121 AMAP, Arctic Oil and Gas 2007 (2008).
122 World Wildlife Fund, Oil Spill: Response Challenges in Arctic Waters (2007).
123 Coastal Response Research Center, Opening the Arctic Seas: Envisioning Disasters and Framing Solutions (2009),
partnership between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the University of New Hampshire.
124 Although the response gap in the Arctic has not been quantified, a recent estimate of Prince William Sound (PWS)
may be instructive. A 2007 study found a response gap for PWS of 38% for the time of the study period (65% during
the winter season). Note that PWS has existing infrastructure for response, while the more remote Arctic areas do not.
Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC, Response Gap Estimate for Two Operating Areas in Prince William Sound,
Alaska (2007), Report to Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council.
125 Arthur Brooks (Commander, 17th Coast Guard District) Coast Guard Journal, Arctic Journal (April 7, 2008).
126 U.S. Coast Guard, Report to Congress: U.S. Coast Guard Polar Operations, December 2008.
127 A single road connects Deadhorse, Alaska and the Prudhoe Bay with central Alaska (Fairbanks). For more details
and maps of the area, see Nuka Research and Planning Group, Oil Spill Prevention and Response in the U.S. Arctic
Ocean: Unexamined Risks, Unacceptable Consequences, Commissioned by Pew Environment Group, November 2010.
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Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
in the region, including “inadequate” ocean and weather information for the Arctic and
technological problems with communications.128
The history of oil spills and response in the Aleutian Islands raises concerns for potential spills in
the Arctic region:
The past 20 years of data on response to spills in the Aleutians has also shown that almost no
oil has been recovered during events where attempts have been made by the responsible
parties or government agencies, and that in many cases, weather and other conditions have
prevented any response at all.129
Oil Spill Cleanup Challenges
The behavior of oil spills in cold and icy waters is not well understood.130 Cleaning up oil spills in
ice-covered waters will be more difficult than in other areas, primarily because effective
strategies have yet to be developed. Natural oil seeps, which are a major source of oil in the arctic
environment, may offer opportunities for studying the behavior of oil.131
The Arctic conditions present several hurdles to oil cleanup efforts. In colder water temperatures,
there are fewer organisms to break down the oil through microbial degradation. Oil evaporates at
a slower rate in colder water temperatures. Although slower evaporation may allow for more oil
to be recovered, evaporation removes the lighter, more toxic hydrocarbons that are present in
crude oil.132 The longer the oil remains in an ecosystem, the more opportunity there is for
exposure. Oil spills may get trapped in ice, evaporating only when the ice thaws. In some cases,
oil could remain in the ice for years.
Icy conditions enhance emulsification—the process of forming different states of water in oil,
often described as “mousse.” Emulsification creates oil cleanup challenges by increasing (1) the
volume of the oil/water mixture and (2) the mixture’s viscosity (resistance to flow). The latter
change creates particular problems for conventional removal and pumping cleanup methods.133
Moreover, two of the major non-mechanical recovery methods—in-situ burning and dispersant
application—may be limited (or “precluded”) by the Arctic conditions and lack of logistical
support: aircraft, vessels, and other infrastructure.134
128 Government Accountability Office, Coast Guard: Efforts to Identify Arctic Requirements Are Ongoing, but More
Communication about Agency Planning Efforts Would Be Beneficial, GAO-10-870, September 2010.
129 Transportation Research Board of the National Academy of Sciences, Risk of Vessel Accidents and Spills in the
Aleutian Islands: Designing a Comprehensive Risk Assessment (2008), Special Report 293, National Academies Press.
Washington, DC.
130 Coastal Response Research Center, Opening the Arctic Seas: Envisioning Disasters and Framing Solutions, (2009),
partnership between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the University of New Hampshire. See
also, U.S. Arctic Research Commission, (Draft) White Paper: U.S. Arctic Research Commission Recommends Steps to
Expanded U.S. Funding for Arctic/Subarctic Oil Spill Research (February 24, 2010).
131 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Arctic Oil and Gas 2007 (2008).
132 National Research Council, Cumulative Environmental Effects of Oil and Gas Activities on Alaska’s North Slope
(2003).
133 Arturo A. Keller and Kristin Clark, Oil Recovery with Novel Skimmer Surfaces under Cold Climate Conditions
(2007), prepared for the Minerals Management Service.
134 World Wildlife Fund, Oil Spill: Response Challenges in Arctic Waters (2007). For further discussion of issues
relating to oil spills, see CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills in U.S. Coastal Waters: Background and Governance, by
(continued...)
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Existing Policy Framework
Considering both the recent increase in human activity in the region (and expectation of further
interest) and the response and recovery challenges that an oil spill would impose in Arctic waters,
many would assert that the region warrants particular attention in terms of governance. However,
the existing framework for international governance of maritime operations in the Arctic region
lacks legally binding requirements. While the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) and
other International Maritime Organization (IMO) conventions include provisions regarding ships
in icy waters, the provisions are not specific to the polar regions. Although the IMO has
“Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic,” a 2009 NOAA report described the non-binding IMO
provisions as “inconsistent with the hazards of Arctic navigation and the potential for
environmental damage from such an incident.”135
Fisheries136
Large commercial fisheries exist in the Arctic, including in the Barents and Norwegian Seas north
of Europe, the Central North Atlantic off of Greenland and Iceland, and the Newfoundland and
Labrador Seas off of northeastern Canada.137
In the 110th Congress, P.L. 110-243 stated that “the United States should initiate international
discussions and take necessary steps with other Arctic nations to negotiate an agreement or
agreements for managing migratory, transboundary, and straddling fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean
and establishing a new international fisheries management organization or organizations for the
region.” In response to this, the United States participated in meetings with other Arctic nations at
the March 2009 U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization Committee on Fisheries meetings in
Rome. These international discussions are continuing. No additional legislation has been enacted
related to U.S. fisheries in the Arctic.
On February 5, 2009, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council, acting under the authority
of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, unanimously approved the
Council’s draft Arctic Fisheries Management Plan and approved the preferred alternative, which
would (1) close the Arctic to commercial fishing until information improves so that fishing can be
conducted sustainably and with due concern to other ecosystem components; (2) determine the
fishery management authorities in the Arctic and provide the Council with a vehicle for
addressing future management issues; and (3) implement an ecosystem-based management policy
that recognizes the resources of the U.S. Arctic and the potential for fishery development that
might affect those resources, particularly in the face of a changing climate.
On November 3, 2009, the National Marine Fisheries Service (Department of Commerce) issued
a final rule that implemented the North Pacific Council’s Fishery Management Plan for Fish
(...continued)
Jonathan L. Ramseur.
135 Coastal Response Research Center, Opening the Arctic Seas: Envisioning Disasters and Framing Solutions, (2009),
partnership between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the University of New Hampshire.
136 This section prepared by Eugene Buck, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry
Division.
137 Erik J. Molenaar and Robert Corell, Arctic Fisheries, Arctic Transform, February 9, 2009; available at http://arctic-
transform.org/download/FishBP.pdf.
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Resources of the Arctic Management Area, as well as Amendment 29 to the Fishery Management
Plan for Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands King and Tanner Crabs. This action followed the North
Pacific Council’s recommendations establishing a basis for sustainable management of
commercial fishing in the Arctic Management Area and moving the northern boundary of the crab
fishery south of the Arctic Management Area to Bering Strait.138 In October 2009, an international
symposium focused on conservation of fish stocks and the potential for future fisheries
management in the Arctic Ocean.139 The National Marine Fisheries Service maintains an “Arctic
Fisheries” web page summarizing activates related to fisheries.140
Protected Species141
Concern over development of the Arctic relates to how such development might affect threatened
and endangered species. Under the Endangered Species Act (ESA, 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1543), the
polar bear was listed as threatened on May 15, 2008. The failure by the Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) to make a 90-day finding on a 2008 petition to list Pacific walrus led to submission of 60-
days’ notice of a future citizen suit. However, eventually walruses were listed as candidate species
under ESA;142 this status means that federal agencies carrying out actions that may affect the
species must confer with FWS though they are not necessarily obliged to modify their actions.
Both polar bears and walruses are heavily dependent during their life cycles on thick sea ice,
making them especially susceptible to the shrinking Arctic ice cap.
On December 30, 2008, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) determined that a listing
of ribbon seal as threatened or endangered was not warranted.143 On October 22, 2010, NMFS
listed the southern distinct population segment (DPS) of spotted seals as threatened.144 Listing of
two other DPS (Okhotsk and Bering Sea) had earlier been determined to not be warranted.145 On
December 10, 2010, NMFS proposed that (1) four subspecies of ringed seal be listed as
threatened,146 and (2) that two DPS of one subspecies of bearded seal be listed as threatened.147
In either terrestrial or marine environments, the extreme pace of change makes a biological
response many times more difficult. For species with adaptations for a specific optimum
temperature for egg development, or production of young timed to match the availability of a
favored prey species, or seed dispersal in predictable fire regimes, etc., evolutionary responses
may well not keep pace with the rate of change.148 While species of plants and animals farther
138 74 Federal Register 56734-56746, November 3, 2009.
139 Information on the symposium is available at http://www.nprb.org/iafs2009/.
140 The website is available at http://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/sustainablefisheries/arctic/.
141 Prepared by Lynne Corn and Eugene Buck, Specialists in Natural Resources Policy, Resources, Science, and
Industry Division.
142 Fish and Wildlife Service, “Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Review of Native Species That Are
Candidates for Listing as Endangered or Threatened; Annual Notice of Findings on Resubmitted Petitions; Annual
Description of Progress on Listing Actions; Proposed Rule,” 76 Federal Register 66370-66439, October 26, 2001.
143 73 Federal Register 79822-79828.
144 75 Federal Register 65239-65248.
145 74 Federal Register 53683-58696, October 20, 2009.
146 75 Federal Register 77476-77495.
147 75 Federal Register 77496-77515.
148 Among biologists, it is traditionally said that a species faced with extreme change can respond in three basic ways:
“migrate, mutate, or die.” When change is rapid enough, mutation (accompanied by natural selection of individuals
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south might migrate, drift, or be transplanted from warming habitats to more northerly sites that
may continue to be suitable,149 once a terrestrial species reaches the Arctic Ocean, it is very
literally at the end of the line. No more northern or colder habitat is available.
The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA; 16 U.S.C. §§1361 et seq.) protects whales, seals,
walruses, and polar bears. The MMPA established a moratorium on the “taking” of marine
mammals in U.S. waters and by U.S. nationals on the high seas, including the Arctic. The MMPA
protects marine mammals from “clubbing, mutilation, poisoning, capture in nets, and other
human actions that lead to extinction.” Under the MMPA, the Secretary of Commerce, acting
through National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), is responsible for the conservation and
management of whales and seals. The Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS), is responsible for walruses and polar bears.150 Despite the MMPA’s
general moratorium on taking, the MMPA allows U.S. citizens to apply for and obtain
authorization for taking small numbers of mammals incidental to activities other than commercial
fishing (e.g., offshore oil and gas exploration and development) if the taking would have only a
negligible impact on any marine mammal species or stock, provided that monitoring requirements
and other conditions are met.
Indigenous People Living in the Arctic151
People have been living in the Arctic for thousands of years, and indigenous peoples developed
highly specialized cultures and economies based on the physical and biological conditions of the
long-isolated region. However, with trade, the influx of additional populations especially since
the 19th century, and ongoing physical changes in the Arctic, indigenous populations have already
experienced substantial change in their lifestyles and economies. Over the past two decades,
greater political organization across indigenous populations has increased their demands for
international recognition and broader rights, as well as attention to the economic, health, and
safety implications of climate change in the North.
Background
Seven of the eight Arctic nations have indigenous peoples,152 whose predecessors were present in
parts of the Arctic over 10,000 years ago, well before the arrival of peoples with European
(...continued)
within the population more suited to the changed environment) may not be able to occur fast enough, leaving migration
and death as the only options. The problem of response rate is more severe for species that reproduce slowly (e.g., polar
bears) and less severe for species that reproduce rapidly (e.g., algae).
149 The efficacy and the effect of this tactic is often questioned, since natural migration is unlikely to involve the entire
suite of species in an ecosystem (e.g., host plants might not move north (or up) as fast as their moth herbivores, nor as
fast as the birds that depend on the moths). Moreover, the southerners will not find a land of sterile bare dirt—the
species that are already there may be threatened themselves by the competition from the new arrivals, perhaps tipping
the balance and pushing still more species toward extinction.
150 Under the MMPA, both NMFS and FWS have responsibility for additional marine mammal species (e.g., manatees,
sea otters, dolphins) which are not currently found in the Arctic.
151 This section was originally prepared by Roger Walke, who was a Specialist in American Indian Policy, Domestic
Social Policy Division, until his retirement from CRS in October 2010. It has been updated by Jane A. Leggett,
Specialist in Environmental and Energy Policy in CRS’s Resources, Science and Industry Division.
152 Arctic Human Development Report, ed. Joan Nymand Larsen, et al. (Akureyri, Iceland: Stefansson Arctic Institute,
2004), p. 47; this report is subsequently cited in this section as AHDR. The seven countries are Canada, Denmark-
(continued...)
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backgrounds.153 Current Arctic indigenous peoples comprise dozens of diverse cultures and speak
dozens of languages from eight or more non-Indo-European language families.154
Before the arrival of Europeans, Arctic indigenous peoples lived in economies that were chiefly
dependent, in varying proportions, on hunting land and marine mammals, catching salt- and
fresh-water fish, herding reindeer (in Eurasia), and gathering, for their food, clothing, and other
products.155 Indigenous peoples’ interaction with and knowledge of Arctic wildlife and
environments has developed over millennia and is the foundation of their cultures.156
The length of time that Arctic indigenous peoples were in contact with Europeans varied across
the Arctic. As recorded by Europeans, contact began as early as the 9th century CE, if not before,
in Fennoscandia157 and northwestern Russia, chiefly for reasons of commerce (especially furs); it
progressed mostly west-to-east across northern Asia, reaching northeastern Arctic Asia by the 17th
century.158 North American Arctic indigenous peoples’ contact with Europeans started in Labrador
in the 16th century and in Alaska in the 18th century, and was not completed until the early 20th
century.159 Greenland’s indigenous peoples first saw European-origin peoples in the late 10th
century, but those Europeans died out during the 15th or 16th century and Europeans did not return
permanently until the 18th century.160
Contact led to significant changes in Arctic indigenous economies, political structures, foods,
cultures, and populations, starting especially in the 20th century. For example, life expectancy
among Alaska Natives has increased from 47 years in 1950 to over 69 years in 2000 (though it
still lags behind that of U.S. residents overall, at 77 years).161
(...continued)
Greenland, Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States.
153 John F. Hoffecker, A Prehistory of the North: Human Settlement of the Higher Latitudes (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 2005), pp. 8, 81, 112-115.
154 AHDR, pp. 47, 53; David Crystal, Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), chap. 50; Ethnologue: Languages of the World, 16th ed., ed. M. Paul Lewis (Dallas: SIL
International, 2009) available online at http://www.ethnologue.com/. The number of languages and language families
varies not only with definitions of the Arctic but with definitions of languages and language families.
155 Jim Berner, et al., Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chapter 12;
this report is subsequently cited in this section as ACIA.
156 ACIA, pp. 654-655.
157 Fennoscandia refers to the Scandinavian Peninsula, Finland, the Kola Peninsula of Russia, and certain parts of
Russia bordering on Finland.
158 Janet Martin, Treasure in the Land of Darkness: The Fur Trade and Its Significance for Medieval Russia
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 41-42; James Forsyth, A History of the Peoples of Siberia:
Russia’s North Asian Colony, 1581-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 69-83, 102; Lassi K.
Heininen, “Different Images of the Arctic and the Circumpolar North in World Politics,” in Knowledge and Power in
the Arctic, Proceedings at a Conference in Rovaniemi, April 16-18, 2007, Arctic Centre Reports 48, ed. Paula
Kankaanpaa, et al. (Rovaniemi, Finland: University of Lapland, Arctic Centre, 2007), p. 125.
159 James W. VanStone, “Exploration and Contact History of Western Alaska,” and David Damas, “Copper Eskimo,”
and J. Garth Taylor, “Historical Ethnography of the Labrador Coast,” in Handbook of North American Indian: Vol. 5,
Arctic, vol. ed. David Damas, gen. ed. William C. Sturtevant (Washington: Smithsonian, 1984), pp. 149-155, 408, 509-
510.
160 Inge Kleivan, “History of Norse Greenland,” in Handbook, Vol. 5, Arctic, op. cit.,, pp. 549-555; Finn Gad, “Danish
Greenland Policies,” in Handbook of North American Indians: Vol. 4, History of Indian-White Relations, vol. ed.
Wilcomb E. Washburn, gen. ed. William C. Sturtevant (Washington: Smithsonian, 1988), p. 110.
161 Parkinson, Alan J. The Arctic Human Health Initiative. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human
(continued...)
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Also, at present, most Arctic indigenous peoples have become minorities in their countries’ Arctic
areas, except in Greenland and Canada. (One source estimates that, around 2003, about 10% of an
estimated 3.7 million people in the Arctic were indigenous.)162 While many Arctic indigenous
communities remain heavily dependent on hunting, fishing, and herding and are more likely to
depend on traditional foods than non-indigenous Arctic inhabitants,163 there is much variation.
Most Arctic indigenous people may no longer consume traditional foods as their chief sources of
energy and nutrition.164 Major economic change is also relatively recent but ongoing.165 Many
Arctic indigenous communities have developed a mixture of traditional economic activities and
wage employment.166 The economics of subsistence and globalization will be key factors in the
effects of climate change on Arctic indigenous peoples, and on their reactions to Arctic climate
change.
Arctic indigenous peoples’ current political structures vary, as do their relationships with their
national governments. Some indigenous groups govern their own unique land areas within the
national structure, as in the United States and Canada; others have special representative bodies,
such as the Saami parliaments in Norway, Finland, and Sweden;167 a few areas have general
governments with indigenous majorities, such as Greenland (a member country of Denmark),
Nunavut territory in Canada, and the North Slope and Northwest Arctic boroughs in Alaska.168
Control of land, through claims and ownership, also varies among Arctic indigenous peoples, as
do rights to fishing, hunting, and resources.169 Arctic indigenous peoples’ political relationships to
their national and local governments, and their ownership or claims regarding land, are also
significant factors in the responses to Arctic climate change by the indigenous peoples and by
Arctic nations’ governments.
Effects of Climate Change
Arctic climate change is expected to affect the economies, population, subsistence, health,
infrastructure, societies, and cultures of Arctic indigenous peoples. Changes in sea ice and sea
level, permafrost, tundra, weather, and vegetation distributions, as well as increased commercial
shipping, mineral extraction, and tourism, will affect the distribution of land and sea mammals, of
(...continued)
Services, 2006.
162 AHDR, pp. 19, 29. Estimates of Arctic indigenous populations are complicated by varying definitions not only of the
Arctic but also of indigenous peoples; for instance, Russia does not count some non-European Arctic ethnic groups,
such as the Yakut, as “indigenous minorities” (see “Peoples of the Arctic: Characteristics of Human Populations
Relevant to Pollution Issues,” in AMAP Assessment Report: Arctic Pollution Issues, ed. Simon J. Wilson et al. (Oslo:
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, 1998), pp. 167-169; this report is subsequently cited in this section as
AMAP 1998.
163 AMAP 1998, chapter 5; see also Birger Poppel et al., SLiCA Results, Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic
(Anchorage: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Alaska Anchorage, 2007), pp. 4-7,
http://www.arcticlivingconditions.org.
164 Annika E. Nilson and Henry P. Huntington, Arctic Pollution 2009 (Oslo: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment
Programme, 2009), p. 39-41; this report is subsequently cited in this section as AMAP 2009.
165 ACIA, p. 1000.
166 SLiCA Results, op.cit., pp. v, 4-8.
167 AHDR, p. 232.
168 AHDR, chapter 4, and pp. 232-233.
169 AHDR, chapters 6-7, and pp. 232-233.
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freshwater and marine fish, and of forage for reindeer. These will in turn affect traditional
subsistence activities and related indigenous lifestyles.170 Arctic indigenous peoples’ harvesting of
animals is likely to become riskier and less predictable, which may increase food insecurity,
change diets, and increase dependency on outside, non-traditional foods.171 Food cellars in many
locations have thawed during summers, threatening food safety. Related health risks of diabetes,
obesity, and mental illness have been associated with these changes.172
Sea, shoreline ice, and permafrost changes have damaged infrastructure and increased coastal and
inland erosion, especially in Alaska, where GAO found in 2003 that “coastal villages are
becoming more susceptible to flooding and erosion caused in part by rising temperatures.”173 In
response, Congress funded the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to conduct a Baseline Erosion
Assessment that identified and prioritized among the 178 communities identified at risk from
erosion.174 (Risks from flooding were not examined.) GAO concluded in 2009 that many Native
villages must relocate, but even those facing imminent threats have been impeded by various
barriers, including difficulties identifying appropriate new sites, piecemeal programs for state and
federal assistance, and obstacles to eligibility for certain federal programs.175 The Alaska
Federation of Natives placed among its 2010 federal priorities a request to Congress to mitigate
flooding and erosion in Alaska Native villages and to fund relocation of villages where
necessary.176 However, “the cost is extraordinary,” acknowledges Senator Lisa Murkowski.177
Oil, gas, and mineral exploration and development are expected to increase, as are other
economic activities, such as forestry and tourism, and these are expected to increase economic
opportunities for all Arctic residents, including indigenous peoples.178 Pressures to increase
participation in the wage economy, however, may speed up changes in indigenous cultures.
Increased economic opportunities may also lead to a rise in the non-indigenous population, which
may further change the circumstances of indigenous cultures. Some representatives of Arctic
170 ACIA, pp. 1000-1001, 1004.
171 ACIA, pp. 1000-1001, 1004.
172 Parkinson, Alan J. The Arctic Human Health Initiative. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 2006; Brubaker, Michael, James Berner, Raj Chavan, and John Warren. “Climate Change and Health Effects
in Northwest Alaska.” Global Health Action 4 (October 18, 2011).
173 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Alaska Native Villages: Villages Affected by Flooding and Erosion
Have Difficulty Qualifying for Federal Assistance, GAO-04-895T, June 29, 2004, p. i, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04895t.pdf. See also, Government Accountability Office, Alaska Native Villages: Most Are Affected by Flooding and
Erosion, but Few Qualify for Federal Assistance, GAO-04-142, December 12, 2003, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04142.pdf.
174 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Alaska Baseline Erosion Assessment (BEA), March 2009.
175 GAO, Alaska Native Villages: Limited Progress Has Been Made on Relocating Villages Threatened by Flooding
and Erosion, June 3, 2009.
176 Alaska Federation of Natives, Human Resources Committee, 2010 Federal Priorities (Anchorage: Alaska
Federation of Natives, 2010), pp. 22-23; available at http://www.nativefederation.org/documents/
2010_AFN_Federal_Priorities.pdf. See also, Government Accountability Office, Alaska Native Villages: Limited
Progress Has Been Made on Relocating Villages Threatened by Flooding and Erosion, GAO-09-551, June 3, 2009,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09551.pdf. For a more detailed anecdote, see a 2012 interview with Brice Eningowuk,
Shishmaref Erosion and Relocation Committee member at Shearer, Christine. “Climate Crisis: Alaskan Village
Shishmaref Sinking Into the Sea.” Imagined Magazine, July 8, 2012. http://imaginedmag.com/2012/07/climate-crisis-
alaskan-village-shishmaref-sinking-into-the-sea/.
177 Press Office of Senator Lisa Murkowski. “Murkowski Urges Greater Tribal Consultation from Administration;
Senator Spotlights ‘Monumental’ Climate Struggles Faced by Alaska Natvies, Coastal Communities”, July 19, 2012.
178 ACIA, pp. 1001, 1004.
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indigenous people have related a “conflicting desire between combating climate change and
embracing the potential for economic growth through foreign investment.”179
Although important advances in public health have occurred in indigenous communities over past
decades, some health problems may increase with continued Arctic climate change. Economic
development may exacerbate Arctic pollution problems, including higher exposure to mercury, air
pollution, and food contamination. The influx and redistribution of contaminants in the air,
oceans, and land may change in ways that are now poorly understood.180 Warmer temperatures
and longer warm seasons may increase insect- and wildlife-borne diseases.181 Climate change
may lead to damage to water and sanitation systems, reducing protection against waterborne
diseases.182 Changes in Arctic indigenous cultures may increase mental stress and behavioral
problems.183
The response to climate change by Arctic indigenous peoples has included international activities
by Arctic indigenous organizations and advocacy before their national governments. As one
report noted, “the rise of solidarity among indigenous peoples organizations in the region is
surely a development to be reckoned with by all those interested in policy issues in the Arctic.”184
Six national or international indigenous organizations are permanent participants of the Arctic
Council, the regional intergovernmental forum.185 Due in part to advocacy by Arctic indigenous
people, the United Nations General Assembly adopted in 2007 the Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.186 In April 2009, the Inuit Circumpolar Council (an organization of Inuit in
the Arctic regions of Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Russia) hosted in Alaska the worldwide
“Indigenous Peoples Global Summit on Climate Change.”187 The conference report, forwarded to
the Copenhagen Conference of the Parties of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change (December 2009), noted “accelerating” climate change caused by “unsustainable
development” and, among several recommendations, called for a greater indigenous role in
179 Aqqaluk Lynge, Chair, Inuit Circumpolar Council, quoted in Stephanie McFeeters, “Lynge talks future of Inuit
people,” The Dartmouth, February 8, 2012.
180 See, for example, “Health: Increased Bacterial Loads in Potable Water Could Have Significant Health Effects on
Indigenous People From the Arctic to Uganda, Says Vanier Scholar.” National Aboriginal Health Organization
(NAHO), February 17, 2012. http://www.naho.ca/blog/2012/02/17/health-increased-bacterial-loads-in-potable-water-
could-have-significant-health-effects-on-indigenous-people-from-the-arctic-to-uganda-says-vanier-scholar/; or,
Kallenborn, et al. Combined Effects of Selected Pollutants and Climate Change in the Arctic Environment. Oslo,
Norway: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Arctic Council, 2011.
181 AMAP Assessment 2009: Human Health in the Arctic, ed. Simon J. Wilson and Carolyn Symon (Oslo: Arctic
Monitoring and Assessment Programme, 2009), pp. 4-6, 143.
182 Brubaker, Michael, James Berner, Raj Chavan, and John Warren. “Climate Change and Health Effects in Northwest
Alaska.” Global Health Action 4 (October 18, 2011); John Warren, “Climate change could affect human health,”
Mukluk Telegraph, January/February 2005, pp. 5-6.
183 John Warren, “Climate change could affect human health,” Mukluk Telegraph, January/February 2005, pp. 5-6.
184 AHDR, p. 235.
185 See http://www.arctic-council.org/. The six organizations are the Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan
Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, RAIPON (Russian Association of Indigenous
Peoples of the North), and Saami Council.
186 United Nations, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Resolution A/RES/61/295, at http://social.un.org/
index/IndigenousPeoples/DeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples.aspx.
187 See http://www.indigenoussummit.com/servlet/content/home.html.
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national and international decisions on climate change, including a greater role for indigenous
knowledge in climate change research, monitoring, and mitigation.188
Polar Icebreaking189
The Coast Guard’s polar icebreakers perform a variety of missions supporting U.S. interests in the
Arctic (and Antarctic), including the following:
• conducting and supporting U.S. scientific research in the Arctic;190
• defending U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic by helping to maintain a presence in the
region;
• defending other U.S. interests in the Arctic, including economic interests relating
to the U.S. exclusive economic zone (EEZ) north of Alaska;
• monitoring sea traffic in the Arctic, including ships bound for the United States;
and
• conducting other typical Coast Guard missions (such as search and rescue, law
enforcement, and protection of marine resources) in Arctic waters, including U.S.
territorial waters north of Alaska.
The Coast Guard’s two existing heavy polar icebreakers—Polar Star and Polar Sea—have
exceeded their originally intended 30-year service lives. Polar Star was placed in caretaker status
on July 1, 2006. Congress in FY2009 and FY2010 provided funding to repair it and return it to
service for an additional 7 to 10 years of service; the repair work was completed and the ship was
reactivated on December 14, 2012.
On June 25, 2010, the Coast Guard announced that Polar Sea had suffered an unexpected engine
casualty; the ship was unavailable for operation after that. The Coast Guard placed Polar Sea in
commissioned, inactive status on October 14, 2011. Section 222 of the Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Act of 2012 (H.R. 2838/P.L. 112-213 of December 20, 2012) prohibits the Coast
Guard from removing any part of Polar Sea and from transferring, relinquishing ownership of,
dismantling, or recycling the ship until it submits a business case analysis of the options for and
costs of reactivating the ship and extending its service life to at least September 30, 2022, so as to
maintain U.S. polar icebreaking capabilities and fulfill the Coast Guard’s high latitude mission
needs, as identified in the Coast Guard’s July 2010 High Latitude Study.
The Coast Guard’s third polar icebreaker—Healy—entered service in 2000. Compared to Polar
Star and Polar Sea, Healy has less icebreaking capability (it is considered a medium polar
icebreaker), but more capability for supporting scientific research. The ship is used primarily for
supporting scientific research in the Arctic.
188 K. Galloway-McLean et al., Report of the Indigenous Peoples’ Global Summit on Climate Change: 20-24 April
2009, Anchorage, Alaska (Darwin, Australia: United Nations University—Traditional Knowledge Initiative, 2009), pp.
5-7; available at http://www.indigenoussummit.com/servlet/content/home.html.
189 This section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division. It is adapted from CRS Report RL34391, Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
190 The Coast Guard’s polar icebreakers also support U.S. scientific research in the Antarctic.
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The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2013 budget includes $8 million in acquisition funding to initiate
survey and design activities for a new polar icebreaker. The Coast Guard’s Five Year Capital
Investment Plan includes an additional $852 million in FY2014-FY2017 for acquiring the ship.
The Coast Guard anticipates awarding a construction contract for the ship “within the next five
years” and taking delivery on the ship “within a decade.” The project to design and build a polar
icebreaker is a new acquisition project initiated in the FY2013 budget.
With the reactivation of Polar Star, the operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet consists of one
heavy polar icebreaker (Polar Star) and one medium polar icebreaker (Healy). The new polar
icebreaker for which initial acquisition funding is requested in the FY2013 budget would replace
Polar Star at about the time Polar Star’s 7- to 10-year reactivation period ends.
In July 2011, the Coast Guard provided to Congress a study on the Coast Guard’s missions and
capabilities for operations in high-latitude (i.e., polar) areas. The study, commonly known as the
High Latitude Study and dated July 2010 on its cover, concluded the following:
• The Coast Guard requires three heavy and three medium icebreakers to fulfill its
statutory missions. These icebreakers are necessary to (1) satisfy Arctic winter and
transition season demands and (2) provide sufficient capacity to also execute summer
missions. Single-crewed icebreakers have sufficient capacity for all current and
expected statutory missions. Multiple crewing provides no advantage because the
number of icebreakers required is driven by winter and shoulder season requirements.
Future use of multiple or augmented crews could provide additional capacity needed to
absorb mission growth.
• The Coast Guard requires six heavy and four medium icebreakers to fulfill its
statutory missions and maintain the continuous presence requirements of the
Naval Operations Concept. Consistent with current practice, these icebreakers are
single-crewed and homeported in Seattle Washington.
• Applying crewing and home porting alternatives reduces the overall requirement
to four heavy and two medium icebreakers. This assessment of non-material
solutions shows that the reduced number of icebreakers can be achieved by having all
vessels operate with multiple crews and two of the heavy icebreakers homeporting in the
Southern Hemisphere.
Leasing was also considered as a nonmaterial solution. While there is no dispute that the
Coast Guard’s polar icebreaker fleet is in need of recapitalization, the decision to acquire this
capability through purchase of new vessels, reconstruction of existing ships, or commercial
lease of suitable vessels must be resolved to provide the best value to the taxpayer. The
multi-mission nature of the Coast Guard may provide opportunities to conduct some subset
of its missions with non government-owned vessels. However, serious consideration must be
given to the fact that the inherently governmental missions of the Coast Guard must be
performed using government-owned and operated vessels. An interpretation of the national
policy is needed to determine the resource level that best supports the nation’s interests....
The existing icebreaker capacity, two inoperative heavy icebreakers and an operational
medium icebreaker, does not represent a viable capability to the federal government. The
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time needed to augment this capability is on the order of 10 years. At that point, around
2020, the heavy icebreaking capability bridging strategy expires.191
At a July 27, 2011, hearing on U.S. economic interests in the Arctic before the Oceans,
Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard subcommittee of the Senate Commerce, Science, and
Transportation Committee, the following exchange occurred:
SENATOR OLYMPIA J. SNOWE: On the high latitude study, do you agree with—and
those—I would like to also hear from you, Admiral Titley, as well, on these requirements in
terms of Coast Guard vessels as I understand it, they want to have—I guess, it was a three
medium ice breakers. Am in correct in saying that? Three medium ice breakers.
ADMIRAL ROBERT PAPP, COMMANDANT OF THE COAST GUARD: I agree with the
mission analysis and as you look at the requirements for the things that we might do up there,
if it is in the nation’s interest, it identifies a minimum requirement for three heavy ice
breakers and three medium ice breakers and then if you want a persistent presence up there,
it would require—and also doing things such as breaking out (inaudible) and other
responsibilities, then it would take up to a maximum six heavy and four medium.
SNOWE: Right. Do you agree with that?
PAPP: If we were to be charged with carrying out those full responsibilities, yes, ma’am.
Those are the numbers that you would need to do it.
SNOWE: Admiral Titley, how would you respond to the high latitude study and has the
Navy conducted its own assessment of its capability?
REAR ADMIRAL DAVID TITLEY, OCEANORGRAPHER AND NAVIGATOR OF THE
NAVY: Ma’am, we are in the process right now of conducting what we call a capabilities
based assessment that will be out in the summer of this year.
We are getting ready to finish that—the Coast Guard has been a key component of the
Navy’s task force on climate change, literally since day one when the Chief of Naval
Operations set this up, that morning, we had the Coast Guard invited as a member of our
executive steering committee.
So we have been working very closely with the Coast Guard, with the Department of
Homeland Security, and I think Admiral Papp—said it best as far as the specific comments
on the high latitude study but we have been working very closely with the Coast Guard.192
Potential issues for Congress regarding Coast Guard polar icebreaker modernization include the
following:
• the numbers and capabilities of polar icebreakers the Coast Guard will need in
the future;
• the disposition of Polar Sea;
• whether the new polar icebreaker initiated in the FY2013 budget should be
funded with incremental funding (as proposed in the Coast Guard’s Five Year
191 United States Coast Guard High Latitude Region Mission Analysis Capstone Summary, July 2010, pp. 12-13, 15.
192 Source: Transcript of hearing.
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Capital Investment Plan) or full funding in a single year, as required under the
executive branch’s full funding policy;
• whether new polar icebreakers should be funded entirely in the Coast Guard
budget, or partly or entirely in some other part of the federal budget, such as the
Department of Defense (DOD) budget, the National Science Foundation (NSF)
budget, or both;
• whether to provide future icebreaking capability through construction of new
ships or service life extensions of existing polar icebreakers; and whether future
polar icebreakers should be acquired through a traditional acquisition or a leasing
arrangement.
Search and Rescue193
General
The possibility of increased sea and air traffic through Arctic waters has increased concerns
regarding Arctic-area search and rescue capabilities. Given the location of current U.S. Coast
Guard operating bases, it could take Coast Guard aircraft several hours, and Coast Guard cutters
days or even weeks, to reach a ship or a downed aircraft in distress in Arctic waters. In addition,
the harsh climate complicates search and rescue operations in the region. Particular concern has
been expressed about cruise ships that may experience problems and need assistance; there have
already been incidents of this kind in recent years in waters off Antarctica. A May 7, 2011, press
report stated:
U.S. and Canadian military commanders say they are examining their rescue capabilities in
the Arctic as a shrinking ice cap brought about by climate change opens up rich oil and gas
reserves and draws more commercial traffic to the top of the globe....
[U.S. Admiral James Winnefeld, commander of the U.S. Northern Command and the North
American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD] and NORAD’S deputy commander,
Canadian Forces Lt. Gen. Marcel Duval, said more ships in the Arctic Ocean - and more
jetliners crossing Arctic skies - could mean more emergencies.
“More ships, more chances of accidents,” Duval said in a separate interview in his office at
NORAD headquarters at Peterson.
Last summer, the Canadian Coast Guard rescued 197 people from the cruise ship Clipper
Adventurer, which ran aground inside the Arctic Circle....
Sea traffic is still light, with only about 25 ships a year currently crossing the maritime
Arctic boundary between Alaska and the Yukon. But that number is increasing by 10 to 15
percent a year, according to NORAD statistics.
Civilian air traffic over the Arctic is booming. U.S. and Canadian aviation agencies report
more than 9,600 civilian flights across the North Pole in 2010, up nearly 21 percent from
2008.194
193 This section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division.
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One option for mitigating the risks associated with cruise ship operations in the Arctic would be
to require the vessels to sail in pairs, so that if one ship experiences a problem, the other one
could quickly come to its aid.
Increasing U.S. Coast Guard search and rescue capabilities for the Arctic could require one or
more of the following: enhancing or creating new Coast Guard operating bases in the region;
procuring additional Arctic-capable aircraft, cutters, and rescue boats for the Coast Guard; and
adding systems to improve Arctic maritime communications, navigation, and domain
awareness.195 It may also entail enhanced forms of cooperation with navies and coast guards of
other Arctic countries.
Coast Guard Statements
A January 2011 press report summarized remarks made by the Commandant of the Coast Guard,
Admiral Robert Papp, concerning Coast Guard search and rescue capabilities in the Arctic. The
article quoted Papp as saying that there is a need for a range of Coast Guard operational
capability for the Arctic, and that “In the meantime, he said the service will lean on partnerships
with other Arctic nations. However, he warned that the Coast Guard will likely not be able to
respond to any crises in the Arctic circle in a timely fashion. He recalled that the Canadian Coast
Guard came under fire when it took six days to rescue a cruise ship and oil tanker that both ran
aground in its northern waters.” The article stated:
“We wouldn’t be able to make it in six days,” he said. “It’d probably take us six weeks to get
adequate resources up for a similar thing in our waters, so we have to start focusing on
this.”196
A March 2011 press report summarizing remarks made by Admiral Papp during and after a
hearing before the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation subcommittee of the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee stated:
Because retreating ice continues to make the passageways in the Arctic Ocean more
navigable, the Coast Guard needs to have air stations in the region to conduct helicopter
rescue missions, Papp said. He has not chosen specific cities for the air station sites, but he
said the Alaskan cities of Barrow and Kotzebue come to mind.
When lawmakers focus on Arctic resources, the United States’ shortage of icebreakers
usually draws the bulk of attention, but Papp said the Coast Guard is also in dire need of
small boats to conduct rescue missions.197
(...continued)
194 Dan Elliott, “NORAD Chiefs Eye Busier Arctic,” Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, May 7, 2011.
195 For a report assessing certain emergency scenarios in the Arctic, including search and rescue scenarios, see Opening
the Arctic Seas, Envisioning Disasters and Framing Solutions, Coastal Response and Research Center, University of
New Hampshire, report of January 2009, based on conference held March 18-20, 2008, at Durham, New Hampshire.
196 Cid Standifer, “Coast Guard Comandant: Service Still Committed To Eight NSCs,” Inside the Navy, January 17,
2011.
197 Jennifer Scholtes, “Papp: Coast Guard Arctic Plan Must Look Beyond Icebreakers,” CQ Homeland Security, March
1, 2011.
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At a June 23, 2011, hearing on the Coast Guard’s proposed FY2012 budget before the Oceans,
Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard subcommittee of the Senate Commerce, Science, and
Transportation Committee, the following exchange occurred:
ADMIRAL ROBERT J. PAPP, JR., COMMANDANT OF THE COAST GUARD: I visited
Barrow, Kotzebue, and Nome. And, actually, it was a revisit because I had served up there as
an ensign (ph) 35 years ago. And so it was good to get back up there and see the changes.
But what has not changed is the infrastructure up there. And I think that we have to have a
robust discussion on the infrastructure needed to support what is no doubt going to be an
increase in human activity up there off the – the North Coast of Alaska.
Icebreakers I think are important, but they cloud the discussion of the other needs that we
have up there. And I think we've focused on icebreakers over the last few years, even though
they are important...
SENATOR MARK BEGICH: Right.
PAPP: ... and needed. But, right now, if we were to have to mount a response like we did in
the Gulf of Mexico—I sent 3,000 people down for Deepwater Horizon. You know how
many hotel rooms are available in Barrow.
BEGICH: That’s right.
PAPP: And we—we have no place to put people up there. We have no hangars for aircraft.
We have no piers, no Coast Guard boats. So my immediate, pressing concern is as human
activity occurs, as you have that ship that goes through that—first of all, we'll assure safety
standards because no matter where ships operate in the world, we are involved in their safety
standards.
But if an accident happens, how do we respond? And, right now, we’ve got zero capability to
respond in the Arctic right now. And we've got to do better than that.
That—when people ask me what keeps me awake at night—an oil spill, a collision, a ship
sinking in the Arctic keeps me awake at night because we have nothing to respond or, if we
respond, it’s going to take us weeks to get there.198
State Department Statement
The State Department states that:
the United States and the seven other Arctic Council (AC) Member States (Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden) adopted a Ministerial
Declaration in April 2009 in Tromso, Norway, which established a Task Force with the
mandate of developing a Search and Rescue (SAR) agreement for the Arctic. The United
States hosted the first meeting of the Arctic SAR Task Force during December 9-11, 2009, in
Washington, D.C. The next round of negotiations is scheduled [sic] for February 25-26,
2010, in Moscow, Russian Federation. The Arctic SAR Task Force has been asked to
finalize the Arctic SAR agreement such that it can be presented for adoption by the AC at its
Ministerial meeting in Spring 2011.
198 Source: Transcript of hearing.
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The United States is at the forefront of efforts to promote safety in the Arctic. The
Department of State’s Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs is coordinating federal interagency
interest to negotiate an instrument for the saving of lives at sea and the rescue of survivors
after aircraft accidents in the Arctic. The U.S. Coast Guard is a prominent agency
participating in this effort. With so few resources available for SAR in the Arctic, developing
a regional agreement to set baseline standards for greater international cooperation and
coordination will be of great value.199
Arctic Council Agreement on Arctic Search and Rescue (May 2011)
On May 12, 2011, representatives from the member states of the Arctic Council, meeting in
Nuuk, Greenland, signed an agreement on cooperation on aeronautical and maritime search and
rescue in the Arctic. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton signed for the United States. Key
features of the agreement include the following:
• Article 2 states: “The objective of this Agreement is to strengthen
aeronautical and maritime search and rescue cooperation and coordination in
the Arctic.”
• Article 3 and the associated Annex to the agreement essentially divide the
Arctic into search and rescue areas within which each party has primary
responsibility for conducting search and rescue operations, stating that “the
delimitation of search and rescue regions is not related to and shall not
prejudice the delimitation of any boundary between States or their
sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction,” and that “each Party shall
promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an adequate and
effective search and rescue capability within its area.”
• Article 4 and the associated Appendix I to the agreement identify the
competent authority for each party. For the United States, the competent
authority is the Coast Guard.
• Article 5 and the associated Appendix II to the agreement identify the
agencies responsible for aeronautical and maritime search and rescue for each
party. For the United States, those agencies are the Coast Guard and the
Department of Defense.
• Article 6 and the associated Appendix III to the agreement identify the
aeronautical and/or maritime rescue coordination centers (RCCs) for each
party. For the United States, the RCCs are Joint Rescue Coordination Center
Juneau (JRCC Juneau) and Aviation Rescue Coordination Center Elmendorf
(ARCC Elmendorf).
• Article 7 states that “the Parties shall conduct aeronautical and maritime search
and rescue operations pursuant to this Agreement consistent” with certain general
guidelines.200
199 Source: State Department website accessed at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/opa/arc/c29382.htm on July 7, 2011.
200 The guidelines, as stated in Article 7, are as follows:
(a) search and rescue operations conducted pursuant to this Agreement in the territory of a Party
shall be carried out consistent with the laws and regulations of that Party;
(continued...)
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• Article 8 states that “a Party requesting permission to enter the territory of a Party
or Parties for search and rescue purposes, including for refueling, shall send its
request to a search and rescue agency and/or RCC of the relevant Party or
Parties,” and that “the Party receiving such a request shall immediately confirm
such receipt. The receiving Party, through its RCCs, shall advise as soon as
possible as to whether entry into its territory has been permitted and the
conditions, if any, under which the mission may be undertaken.”
• Article 9 states that “the Parties shall enhance cooperation among themselves in
matters relevant to this Agreement,” that “the Parties shall exchange information
that may serve to improve the effectiveness of search and rescue operations,” and
that “the Parties shall promote mutual search and rescue cooperation by giving
due consideration to collaborative efforts.”
• Article 10 states that “the Parties shall meet on a regular basis in order to
consider and resolve issues regarding practical cooperation.”
• Article 11 states that “after a major joint search and rescue operation, the search
and rescue agencies of the Parties may conduct a joint review of the operation led
by the Party that coordinated the operation.”
• Article 12 states that “unless otherwise agreed, each Party shall bear its own costs
deriving from its implementation of this Agreement,” and that “implementation
of this Agreement shall be subject to the availability of relevant resources.”
• Article 18 states that “any Party to this Agreement may, where appropriate, seek
cooperation with States not party to this Agreement that may be able to contribute
to the conduct of search and rescue operations, consistent with existing
international agreements.”
• Article 19 states that “any Party may at any time withdraw from this Agreement
by sending written notification thereof to the depositary201 through diplomatic
channels at least six months in advance.”202
(...continued)
(b) if a search and rescue agency and/or RCC of a Party receives information that any person is, or
appears to be, in distress, that Party shall take urgent steps to ensure that the necessary assistance is
provided;
(c) any Party having reason to believe that a person, a vessel or other craft or aircraft is in a state of
emergency in the area of another Party as set forth in paragraph 2 of the Annex shall forward as
soon as possible all available information to the Party or Parties concerned;
(d) the search and rescue agency and/or RCC of a Party that has received information concerning a
situation provided for in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph may request assistance from the other
Parties;
(e) the Party to whom a request for assistance is submitted shall promptly decide on and inform the
requesting Party whether or not it is in a position to render the assistance requested and shall
promptly indicate the scope and the terms of the assistance that can be rendered;
(f) the Parties shall ensure that assistance be provided to any person in distress. They shall do so
regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is
found; and
(g) a Party shall promptly provide all relevant information regarding the search and rescue of any
person to the consular or diplomatic authorities concerned.
201 Article 20 identifies the government of Canada as the depository for the agreement.
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Figure 4 shows an illustrative map of the national areas of search and rescue responsibility
based on the geographic coordinates listed in the Annex to the agreement.
Figure 4. Illustrative Map of Arctic SAR Areas in Arctic SAR Agreement
(Based on geographic coordinates listed in the agreement)
Source: “Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement,” accessed July 7, 2011 at http://www.arcticportal.org/features/
features-of-2011/arctic-search-and-rescue-agreement.
The State Department states that the agreement:
is the first legally-binding instrument negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council. It
coordinates life-saving international maritime and aeronautical SAR coverage and response
among the Arctic States across an area of about 13 million square miles in the Arctic.
As Arctic sea ice coverage decreases, ship-borne activities are increasing significantly in the
Arctic. Flight traffic is also on the rise as new polar aviation routes cross the Arctic air space
in several directions. As human presence and activities in the Arctic expand, the potential for
accidents increases as well. Limited rescue resources, challenging weather conditions, and
the remoteness of the area render SAR operations difficult in the Arctic, making coordination
(...continued)
202 Source: Text of final version of agreement made ready for signing and dated April 21, 2011, accessed July 7, 2011,
at http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/Arctic_SAR_Agreement_EN_FINAL_for_signature_21-Apr-2011.pdf
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among the Arctic nations imperative. The SAR Agreement will improve search and rescue
response in the Arctic by committing all Parties to coordinate appropriate assistance to those
in distress and to cooperate with each other in undertaking SAR operations. For each Party,
the Agreement defines an area of the Arctic in which it will have lead responsibility in
organizing responses to SAR incidents, both large and small. Parties to the Agreement
commit to provide SAR assistance regardless of the nationality or status of persons who may
need it.
The Arctic Council launched this initiative at its 2009 Ministerial Meeting in Tromso,
Norway, establishing a Task Force, co-chaired by the United States and the Russian
Federation. The Task Force proceeded in a highly collaborative spirit, meeting five times (in
Washington, Moscow, Oslo, Helsinki and Reykjavik).
The signature of the SAR Agreement in Nuuk is a positive step toward building partnerships
in the Arctic. In particular, it reflects the commitment of the Arctic Council States to enhance
their cooperation and offer responsible assistance to those involved in accidents in one of the
harshest environments on Earth.
This Agreement illustrates one of the most successful negotiations to date to address
emerging issues in the Arctic. Arctic Council participants approached SAR negotiations with
collaboration and dedication to a positive outcome. The United States congratulates its
colleagues in this effort and looks forward to further collaboration on the vital issues facing
the rich but fragile Arctic region.203
Geopolitical Environment204
Many observers have noted that the loss of Arctic ice205 is already leading to stepped-up human
activity in the high north, particularly in the form of increasing commercial traffic and
development. This trend has brought forth a range of issues on the geopolitical front, from
environmental protection to search-and-rescue capabilities to the delineation of national
boundaries—which will determine access to natural resources. These concerns are being
addressed cooperatively in both bilateral and multilateral fashion, especially under the aegis of
the Arctic Council and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Nonetheless,
some observers continue to raise questions concerning security in the high north, and have
advanced sometimes conflicting views regarding the potential roles of military forces in the
region. Of the other Arctic coastal nations, the United States enjoys strong political and
commercial ties with Canada, Norway, and Denmark; all four countries are members of NATO.
Although the United States views Russia as an important partner in developing policies to cope
with changing conditions in the Arctic, relations with Moscow have been somewhat problematic.
Several non-Arctic nations, including India and China, have also evinced interest in gaining
permanent observer status in the Arctic Council. In addition, the European Union, which sought
but was denied full observer status in 2009, is nonetheless developing policy toward the Arctic.206
203 Source: State Department website accessed at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/163285.htm on July 7, 2011.
204 This section prepared by Carl Ek, Specialist in International Relations, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division.
205 “Arctic Sea Ice Continues to Decline, Hits Near Record Low,” IB Times, October 4, 2011.
206 “China, India Enter Heating-up Arctic Race,” Asia Times, January 25, 2012. “Aston in Far North to Reach EU
Policy on Arctic,” Agence France Presse, March 8, 2012. “EU Application to Arctic Council Postponed,” North
Norway European Office, May 18, 2011 http://www.northnorway.org/nyheter/847-eu-application-to-arctic-council-
(continued...)
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Multilateral Cooperation
As noted elsewhere in this report (see “Territorial Claims and Sovereignty Issues”), in late May
2008, ministerial representatives of the five Arctic littoral states attended a meeting convened by
Denmark in Ilulissat, Greenland (a semi-autonomous territory of Denmark). Danish Foreign
Minister Stig Møller implied that the meeting was intended to develop interim measures for
Arctic governance: “We must continue to fulfill our obligations in the Arctic area until the U.N.
decides who will have the right to the sea and the resources in the region. We must agree on the
rules and what to do if climate changes make more shipping possible.”207 Attendees discussed a
variety of issues, including the environment, transportation, resources, and security. The Danish
Foreign Ministry stated that the resulting Ilulissat Declaration
sent a clear political signal to the local inhabitants and the rest of the world that we will act
responsibly when addressing the development in the Arctic Ocean. We have committed
ourselves politically to solve any disagreements through negotiation. Thus, hopefully, we
have eradicated all the myths about a ‘race for the North Pole.’ The legal framework is in
place and the five States have now declared that they will abide by it.208
The Arctic has increasingly become a subject of discussions in bilateral meetings among leaders
of the nations in the region. The main international forum for cooperation in the high north,
however, is the eight-nation Arctic Council, of which the United States is an active member. The
chief topics addressed by the six working groups of the Council, which was formed in 1996, are
sustainable development, environmental protection, and the social well-being of the indigenous
communities. The United States vetoed security as an issue of consideration for the Council. The
Council holds ministerial-level meetings biennially, while the working groups meet more
frequently. Sweden currently holds the two-year revolving Council chairmanship; Canada will
take over in 2013, followed by the United States.209
On May 11-12, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attended the most recent Arctic Council
ministerial summit, held in Nuuk, Greenland; she was accompanied by U.S. Interior Secretary
Ken Salazar. They were the first U.S. Cabinet members to attend an Arctic Council meeting, and
observers noted that their visits served to raise the profile of Arctic issues. The meeting was led
by Sweden, which currently chairs the Council. Noting the increased commercial activity in the
region, Secretary Clinton stated, “We need to pursue these opportunities in a smart, sustainable
way that preserves the Arctic environment and ecosystem.”210 Among other issues, attendees
focused on efforts to reduce emissions that cause “black carbon” to settle on the Arctic region,
(...continued)
postponed See also: “Arctic Governance: Balancing Challenges and Development,” European Parliament Regional
Briefing 2012, DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2012_136 June, 2012
207 Conference on the Arctic Ocean, May 26, 2008, Arctic Council website: http://arctic-council.org/article/2008/5/
conference_on_the_arctic_ocean.
208 Conference In Ilulissat, Greenland: Landmark Political Declaration on the Future of the Arctic, Edited December
11, 2008, website of the Danish Foreign Ministry, http://www.um.dk/en.
209 The Council members are the “Arctic 5” coastal States plus Sweden, Finland, and Iceland. Six indigenous Arctic
peoples organizations are permanent participants. Several other countries, including Spain, China, and the UK, have
observer status. For additional information, see the Arctic Council’s website: http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/
en/. “Document On Cooperation In Arctic Search and Rescue Efforts Could Be Ready In April 2011,” Interfax: Russia
& CIS Military Newswire, February 26, 2010.
210 “States Set Rules on Exploiting Arctic Wealth,” Agence France Presse, May 12, 2011.
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accelerating ice melt. In addition, the Council discussed launching a longer-term study on
methods to cope with possible future oil spills.
The major “deliverable” of the summit, however, was the signing of an Agreement on
Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) in the Arctic. The accord
was hailed as the “first legally-binding instrument negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic
Council.” The SAR initiative, developed mainly by the United States and Russia, had been
introduced during the April 2009 summit. The Council also approved the establishment of a
permanent secretariat, to be based in Tromsø, Norway.211
In early June 2012, Secretary Clinton traveled once more to the Arctic, visiting the new
secretariat in Tromsø as part of an eight-day trip to Scandinavia. While there, she emphasized that
the United States “want[s] the Arctic Council to remain the premier institution that deals with
Arctic questions.”212
Analysts note that Russia is keen to capitalize on natural resource development and shipping in
the Arctic. As noted elsewhere in this report, Russia and Norway in late 2010 resolved a 40-year
dispute over national borders in the Barents Sea; the accord will permit exploration for undersea
oil, believed to be in rich supply there. In addition, scientists estimate that the sea route along the
Siberian coast (referred to as the Northeast Passage or the Northern Sea Route, or NSR) will be
ice-free and navigable well before the Northwest Passage through the Canadian archipelago; 34
vessels sailed the NSR in 2011. Russia sees significant economic opportunities in offering
icebreaker escorts, refueling posts, and supplies to the commercial ships that will use the
waterway.213 But Russian leaders also understand that doing so will require international
cooperation and goodwill. In August 2012, Russia is scheduled to join the United States and
Norway in the military exercise Northern Eagle 2012.214
Although its borders lie some distance from the Arctic, China has also displayed a growing
interest in the region, based mainly upon the potential opportunities for shorter sea routes and the
eventual development of energy-related natural resources. China’s economy is strongly dependent
upon exports; some analysts have estimated that as much as one-half of China’s GDP is reliant
upon exports and shipping. China also is reliant upon ocean transportation for its large petroleum
imports. The opening of Arctic sea corridors north of Russia and/or Canada would drastically
reduce both sailing times and transportation costs. Beijing is keenly interested in having free
access to these future waterways.
211 “Secretary Clinton Signs the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement with Other Arctic Nations,” U.S. Department of
State website, May 12, 2011. “Warming Arctic Opens Way to Competition For Resources,” Washington Post, May 16,
2011.
212 “Clinton in Arctic to See Impact of Climate Change,” Agence France Presse, June 2, 2012.
213 During an October 2011 conference on Arctic shipping, President Putin enthused that “the Arctic is the shortcut
between the largest markets of Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.… It is an excellent opportunity to optimize costs.”
“Warming Revives Dream of Sea Route in Russian Arctic,” New York Times, October 17, 2011.
214 “Foreign Ministers of Russia and Canada Agreed To Go To the Ice Without the Third Parties,” WPS: Defense &
Security, September 20, 2010. “Russia Will Staunchly Defend its Interests in the Arctic Region – Putin,” Interfax. June
30, 2011. “Russia to Deploy Troops to Defend Interests in Arctic,” Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2011. “Russia, U.S.,
Norway to Hold Joint Naval Drills in August,” RIA Novosti, May 24, 2012 http://en.rian.ru/world/20120524/
173654802.html.
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Many Chinese believe that the Arctic should be considered as part of the global commons.
According to David Curtis Wright of the Naval War College, “The mantra that the Arctic and its
natural resource wealth belong to no one country but constitute the common heritage of all
humankind is virtually de rigueur in recent Chinese public commentary on Arctic affairs.”215
During a May 2012 workshop on Sino-Nordic cooperation hosted in Beijing, Chinese participants
referred to their country as a “near-Arctic state” and a “stakeholder.” Some analysts believe that
China will likely remain officially circumspect on this question, as its “foreign policy rests on a
profound respect for territorial integrity.”216 Nonetheless, some Chinese analysts reportedly are
encouraging the government to challenge Canada’s claim of sovereignty over the Northwest
Passage. China has also been active in conducting research on the Arctic; it acquired a large
icebreaker in 1993 and has constructed a state-of-the-art polar capable research vessel, the Snow
Dragon. In April 2012, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Sweden and Iceland, and two months
later President Hu Jintao went to Denmark; the two leaders were reportedly discussing large-scale
investments in the region. In addition, China (like several other nations) has established a
research station in the Svalbard archipelago and has beefed up the size of its embassy staff in
Iceland.
Security Issues
Throughout the Cold War, the Arctic region was a zone of strategic interest, where the United
States, the Soviet Union, and allied states conducted air and naval maneuvers and tested ballistic
missiles. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, however, the importance of
the high north diminished in the 1990s. Although the establishment of sovereignty through the
demarcation of boundaries in the region is being conducted peacefully under the auspices of the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Arctic is once again being viewed by
some as a potential emerging security issue. In a December 2011 Washington Post op-ed, Heather
Conley, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, noted several recent
developments:
In April [2011], President Obama signed a new command plan that gives NORAD and the
U.S. Northern Command greater responsibility in protecting the North Pole and U.S. Arctic
territory.… In 2009, Norway moved its operational command to its northern territories above
the Arctic Circle. Russia has plans to establish a brigade that is specially equipped and
prepared for military warfare in Arctic conditions. Denmark has made it a strategic priority
to form an Arctic Command. Canada is set to revitalize its Arctic fleet, including spending
$33 billion to build 28 vessels over the next 30 years.217
Canadian academic Rob Huebert has pointed out that in August 2010 the United States, Canada,
and Denmark conducted in the Canadian Arctic their annual joint naval exercises involving
several advanced and powerful warships. Huebert observed that “while defence officials are quick
to point out they see no military threat to the region, it’s still interesting to see these three Arctic
215 “The Dragon Eyes the Top of the World,” David Curtis Wright, Naval War College, China Maritime Studies
Institute, Number 8, August 2011.
216 “China Defines Itself as a ‘Near-Arctic State,’ Says SIPRI,” Swedish International Peace Research Institute, May
10, 2012. “China’s Arctic Ambitions,” Stratfor, June 18, 2012. “China: Icebreaking in the Arctic,” The ISN Blog, May
4, 2012. “Ice Station Dragon: China’s Strategic Arctic Interest,” Defense News, May 16, 2011.
217 Heather Conley, “The Colder War: U.S., Russia and Others Are Vying for Control of Santa’s Back Yard,”
Washington Post, December 23, 2011.
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friends coming together to improve their naval combat capability in the Far North.”218 In varying
degrees, the Arctic coastal states have indicated a willingness to establish and maintain a military
presence in the high north.219 Although some have argued that terrorism and hijacking may
constitute security concerns in the region, others maintain that such threats are chimerical, given
the challenges of distance and geography, and the difficulty of navigating in a polar environment.
The Economist has asserted that “the risks of Arctic conflict have been exaggerated. Most of the
Arctic is clearly assigned to individual countries. According to a Danish estimate, 95% of Arctic
mineral resources are within agreed national boundaries.”220
The Arctic has also become a region of interest for NATO. However, as one writer has noted,
“[t]here is currently no consensus within the alliance that NATO has any role to play in the Arctic,
as Canada strongly opposes any NATO involvement on sovereignty grounds and other NATO
members are concerned with negative Russian reaction.”221 Speaking in Reykjavík in January
2009, former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer urged that member states not allow
the Arctic to become a divisive issue. He also recommended that the alliance and Russia
cooperate through building upon their shared experience in search-and-rescue operations. Former
Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who became secretary general of the alliance in
August 2009, has also addressed security in the high north. Citing the “potentially huge security
implications” of Arctic climate change, Rasmussen in October 2009 stated that “I think it is
within the natural scope of work for NATO to be the forum for consultation and discussion on
[selected Arctic] issues.”222 In March 2009, however, Russia’s NATO ambassador stated that
Moscow would not cooperate with the alliance on Arctic matters. And in September 2010,
President Medvedev reportedly observed that “the Arctic can do fine without NATO,” and that his
government “views [possible NATO] activity with quite serious tension, because it is after all a
zone of peaceful cooperation, economic cooperation, and of course the military factor always—at
a minimum—creates additional questions.” On a visit to Moscow in November 2010, Rasmussen
assured the Russians that NATO does not intend to establish a presence in the Arctic.223 Since
2006, several member and partner states have participated in Cold Response, a wide-ranging
annual crisis response exercise hosted by Norway. During the most recent joint maneuvers in
218 “Welcome To a New Era of Arctic Security,” Rob Huebert, Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs Institute, August,
2010.
219 See, for example, “Canada Vows ‘Firm’ Defence of Arctic Border,” Canwest News Service, November 24, 2009.
“Danes With Dogs To Join Military Sovereignty Patrol Of Canadian Arctic,” The Canadian Press, March 3, 2010.
“Norway Plans One New Arctic Base, Perhaps More,” Defense News, March 8, 2010.
220 “The Arctic: Special Report,” The Economist, June 16, 2012. p. 10.
221 “A New Security Architecture for the Arctic: An American Perspective,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), January 2012, p. 30.
222 Nonetheless, one analyst has noted that the word “Arctic” does not appear either in the 2010 NATO Strategic
Concept, nor in the Summit Declaration of the 2012 Chicago Summit – likely at the insistence of Canada. See “NATO
in the Arctic: Challenges and Opportunities,” by Luke Coffee, Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 3646, June 22,
2012.
223 “Russia, Norway Sign Border Deal For Arctic Energy,” Reuters, September 15, 2010. “NATO Chief Cautions
Against Division Over Arctic,” Canwest News Service, January 29, 2009. “NATO Proposes Arctic Cooperation With
Russia,” Reuters, January 29, 2009. Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer On Security Prospects
In the High North, January 29, 2009, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2009/s090129a.html. “NATO Chief Wars Of
Climate Change Security Risks,” Agence France Presse, October 1, 2009. “Rogozin Says He Won’t Discuss
Cooperation In Arctic With NATO,” Interfax: Russia & CIS General Newswire, March 27, 2009.
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March 2012, 14 nations fielded air, land, and naval assets and more than 16,000 troops. Although
the exercises are multilateral, they are not conducted under the auspices of NATO.224
It has been noted that Russia “has at least half of the Arctic in terms of area, coastline, population
and probably mineral wealth.”225 The Russian government has stated that, although it deplores the
notion of an arms race in the region and does not foresee a conflict there, it intends to protect its
Arctic interests.226 However, Russia has at times appeared to be sending out mixed messages. For
example, at the conclusion of a meeting in September 2010, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov and Canadian Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon stated that “any militarization [of the
Arctic] is out of the question.” And in June 2011, then-Prime Minister (and currently President)
Vladimir Putin stated, “Russia will definitely expand its presence in the Arctic. We are open for
dialogue with our foreign partners and with all neighbors in the Arctic region. But we will
naturally defend our own geopolitical interests firmly and consistently.” The following month,
Putin announced plans to build a large shipping port on the Yamal peninsula, and the government
stated that it would be sending two brigades to the north to protect its interests.
Similarly, some Chinese leaders have voiced concern over perceived emerging security issues in
the Arctic. In early March 2010, a Chinese admiral stated that “the current scramble for the
sovereignty of the Arctic among some nations has encroached on many other countries’ interests,”
and he added that China had to “make short and long term ocean strategic development plans to
exploit the Arctic because it will become a future mission for the navy.” Some analysts, however,
believe that China’s general approach toward the Arctic will remain decidedly low-key: “To date,
China has adopted a wait-and-see approach to Arctic developments, wary that active overtures
would cause alarm in other countries due to China’s size and status as a rising global power.”
China is believed to be keen on resolving through diplomacy the national interests of both littoral
and non-Arctic states in the high north. Toward that end, it has sought permanent observer status
on the Arctic Council. However, its candidacy may be imperiled by a dispute with Norway, which
in 2010 awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. Norwegian political
scientist Gunhild Hoogense Gjørv has noted that “[e]veryone is interested in the moves that China
is making.”227
As noted, the Arctic Council does not address regional security issues. To fill this apparent void, a
recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies has proposed the creation of a
separate organization, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF), consisting initially of the eight
Arctic Council states, but possibly expanding eventually to include other countries willing to
contribute assets. The ACGF, which could potentially be headquartered at the U.S. Air Force base
in Thule, Greenland, would “focus first on information sharing yet should also seek to develop
224 “NATO Tests Its Forces in Arctic,” February 16, 2012, Atlantic Council web page: http://www.
acus.org/natosource/nato-tests-its-forces-arctic “NATO, Russia Stage Arctic War Games,” April 25, 2012 Atlantic
Council web page: http://www. acus.org/print/68922 See also Cold Response 2012, Norwegian Armed Forces web
page: http://mil.no/excercises/coldresponse2012/pages/default.aspx
225 “The Arctic: Special Report,” The Economist, June 16, 2012. p. 11.
226 “Russia Will Protect Interests In Arctic: Official,” Agence France Presse, June 10, 2009. “Russia Opposes Arms
Race In Arctic Region—Diplomat,” ITAR-TASS World Service, July 21, 2009.
227 “China Prepares For An Ice-free Arctic,” Linda Jakobson, SIPRI Insights On Peace and Security, No. 2010/2,
March 2010. “Admiral Urges Government To Stake Claim In the Arctic,” South China Morning Post, March 6, 2010.
“Norway Wants to Block China from Arctic Council Over 2010 Nobel Peace Prize Row,” Agence France Presse,
January 25, 2012. “Clinton in Arctic to See Impact of Climate Change,” Agence France Presse, June 2, 2012.
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methods of cooperation in support of the Arctic Council’s search-and-rescue agreement and future
international oil spill response agreement.”228
U.S. Military Forces and Operations229
During the Cold War, the Arctic was an arena of military competition between the United States
and the Soviet Union, with both countries, for example, operating nuclear-powered submarines,
long-range bombers, and tactical aircraft in the region.230 The end of the Cold War and the
collapse of most elements of the Russian military establishment following the dissolution of the
Soviet Union in December 1991 greatly reduced this competition and led to a reduced emphasis
on the Arctic in U.S. military planning.
The diminishment of Arctic sea ice is now leading U.S. military forces to pay renewed attention
to the Arctic. This is particularly true in the case of the Navy and Coast Guard, for whom
diminishment of Arctic sea ice is opening up potential new operating areas for their surface ships.
Navy and Coast Guard activities relating to the Arctic are taking place as other countries, such as
Canada, Russia, and Norway, are examining the potential implications for their military forces of
diminished Arctic sea ice, and taking or contemplating steps to increase their own navy and coast
guard presence and operations in the region.231 Defense officials in the United States and other
countries view issues such as sovereignty, freedom of navigation, and energy exploration as
creating a potential in the Arctic for military cooperation, competition, or conflict, depending on
how these issues are handled.232
DOD in General
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) report on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),
submitted to Congress in February 2010, states:
228 “A New Security Architecture for the Arctic: An American Perspective,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), January 2012, p. 37.
229 This section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division.
230 For a recent article concerning Soviet submarine operations in the Arctic during the Cold War, see Bob Weber,
“Russian Maps Suggest Soviet Subs Cruised Canadian Arctic,” The Globe and Mail (www.theglobeandmail.com),
December 6, 2011.
231 See, for example, Associated Press, “Military Powers Beef Up Arctic Presence,” The Korea Times
(www.koreatimes.co.kr), April 17, 2012, accessed June 15, 2012 at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/tech/2012/
06/129_109145.html; Alan Cullison, “Russia To Deploy Troops To Defend Interests In Arctic,” Wall Street Journal,
July 2, 2011: 2; David Pugliese, “[Canadian] Senators: Arm [Canadian] Coast Guard Patrols in Canada’s Arctic,”
Defense News, January 18, 2010: 12.
232 See, for example, John Vandiver, “NATO Commander Sees Arctic Seabed As Cooperative Zone,” Mideast Stars
and Stripes, October 10, 2009; Tom Coghlan, “Nato Commander Warns Of Conflict With Russia In Arctic Circle,”
London Times, October 3, 2009; Gerard O’Dwyer, “Danish Report: Conflicts Coming Over Arctic,” Defense News,
September 28, 2009: 18; Gerard O’Dwyer, “Russia Warns Denmark Over Arctic Arms Race,” Defense News, August
3, 2009: 13; Gerrard Cowen, “Russia and NATO Look to Co-operation In Arctic,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 8,
2009: 12; David Scutro, “Thawing Arctic Seas May Bring Security Risk,” NavyTimes.com, January 29, 2009.
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The effect of changing climate on the Department’s operating environment is evident in the
maritime commons of the Arctic. The opening of the Arctic waters in the decades ahead[,]
which will permit seasonal commerce and transit[,] presents a unique opportunity to work
collaboratively in multilateral forums to promote a balanced approach to improving human
and environmental security in the region. In that effort, DoD must work with the Coast
Guard and the Department of Homeland Security to address gaps in Arctic communications,
domain awareness, search and rescue, and environmental observation and forecasting
capabilities to support both current and future planning and operations. To support
cooperative engagement in the Arctic, DoD strongly supports accession to the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.233
The report also states:
The Department of Defense and its interagency partners must be able to more
comprehensively monitor the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains for potential
direct threats to the United States. Such monitoring provides the U.S. homeland with an
extended, layered in depth defense. This effort includes enhanced coordination with Canada
for the defense of North America as well as assisting Mexico and Caribbean partners in
developing air and maritime domain awareness capacities. Special attention is required to
develop domain awareness tools for the Arctic approaches as well. In coordination with
domestic and international partners, DoD will explore technologies that have the potential to
detect, track, and identify threats in these spheres to ensure that capabilities can be deployed
to counter them in a timely fashion.234
The report further states:
Central to the security of the United States is a strong transatlantic partnership, which is
underpinned by the bilateral relationships between the United States and the governments of
Europe. We will continue to work with this community of like-minded nations, whether by
engaging with allies still shaping their democracies after decades of living in the shadow of
the Soviet Union, building on the benefits of French reintegration into NATO’s military
structure, or addressing new security issues such as those arising in the Arctic region.235
The report states: “We will seek out opportunities to work with Moscow on emerging issues, such
as the future of the Arctic” and that DOD “will also enhance defense relationships and continue to
work with Canada in the context of regional security, increased interaction in the Arctic, and
combat operations in Afghanistan.”236
April 2011 Change to Unified Command Plan
In April 2011, it was reported that
Changes made to the U.S. military’s Unified Command Plan shift geographic boundaries and
stress the growing importance of the Arctic, officials said.
President Barack Obama signed the document yesterday [April 6].
233 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 86.
234 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 19.
235 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 57.
236 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 62.
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The biggest change to the plan assigns U.S. Northern Command responsibility for the Arctic.
U.S. European Command and U.S. Pacific Command shared responsibility with U.S.
Northern Command for the region under the last change published in December 2008. It also
places responsibility for Alaska under Northern Command. The previous plan had Northern
Command and U.S. Pacific Command sharing responsibility for the state and adjacent
waters.
“Northcom was given advocacy responsibility for Arctic capabilities primarily due to having
the only U.S. Arctic territory within its area of operations,” a Pentagon spokesman said.
Northern Command also already works closely with Canada and “has a habitual relationship
with the Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Coast Guard,” the spokesman
continued. “These relationships are key to human and environmental safety and security.”…
The Unified Command Plan is the responsibility of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and is reviewed every two years. The Joint Staff coordinates input from the combatant
commanders, the service chiefs and Defense Department leadership. The chairman, Navy
Adm. Mike Mullen, submitted his recommendations through Defense Secretary Robert M.
Gates to Obama.237
May 2011 Report to Congress
A May 2011 DOD report to Congress on Arctic operations and the Northwest Passage that was
done at congressional direction238 stated:
The Arctic is warming on average twice as fast as the rest of the planet, resulting in increased
human activity in the region. Although some perceive that competition for resources and
boundary disputes may result in conflict in the Arctic, the opening of the Arctic also presents
opportunities to work collaboratively in multilateral forums to promote a balanced approach
to improving human and environmental security in the region.
Strategic guidance on the Arctic is articulated in National Security Presidential Directive
(NSPD) 66 / Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 25, Arctic Region Policy.
Additional guidance is found in the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2010
237 Jim Garamone, “Unified Command Plan Reflects Arctic’s Importance,” American Forces Press Service, April 7,
2011.
238 The direction was contained in the House Armed Services Committee’s report (H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010)
on H.R. 5136, the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act, which stated that
the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the congressional defense
committees by May 30, 2011, that includes the following:
(1) An assessment of the strategic national security objectives and restrictions in the Arctic Region;
(2) An assessment on mission capabilities required to support the strategic national security
objectives and a timeline to obtain such capabilities;
(3) An assessment of an amended unified command plan that addresses opportunities of obtaining
continuity of effort in the Arctic Ocean by a single combatant commander;
(4) An assessment of the basing infrastructure required to support Arctic strategic objectives,
including the need for a deep-water port in the Arctic; and
(5) An assessment of the status of and need for icebreakers to determine whether icebreakers
provide important or required mission capabilities to support Arctic strategic national security
objectives, and an assessment of the minimum and optimal number of icebreakers that may be
needed. (Page 337)
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Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The overarching strategic national security objective is
a stable and secure region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded and the U.S.
homeland is protected. This objective is consistent with a regional policy that reflects the
relatively low level of threat in a region bounded by nation states that have not only publicly
committed to working within a common framework of international law and diplomatic
engagement, but also demonstrated ability and commitment to doing so over the last fifty
years.
DoD will take responsible steps to anticipate and prepare for the Arctic operations of the
near-(2010-2020), mid- (2020-2030), and far-term (beyond 2030). Capabilities will need to
be reevaluated as conditions change, and gaps must be addressed in order to be prepared to
operate in a more accessible Arctic. Key challenges include: shortfalls in ice and weather
reporting and forecasting; limitations in command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) due to lack of assets and harsh
environmental conditions; limited inventory of ice-capable vessels; and limited shore-based
infrastructure. The key will be to address needs in step with the rate at which activity in the
Arctic increases, and balance potential investments in these capabilities with other national
priorities. The United States has a vital Arctic neighbor and partner in Canada, with its
shared values and interests in the region. DoD will work with the Canadian Department of
National Defence (DND) to ensure common Arctic interests are addressed in a
complementary manner.
Although having multiple Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) in the Arctic Ocean makes
coordination more challenging, having too few would leave out key stakeholders, diminish
longstanding relationships, and potentially alienate important partners. There are now two
CCDRs with Arctic responsibilities: Commander, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM),
and Commander, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), each responsible for a
portion of the Arctic Ocean aligned with adjacent land boundaries, an arrangement judged
best suited to achieve continuity of effort with key regional partners.
Existing DoD posture in the region is adequate to meet near- to mid-term U.S. defense needs.
DoD does not currently anticipate a need for the construction of a deep-draft port in Alaska
between now and 2020. Given the long lead times for construction of major infrastructure in
the region, DoD will periodically re-evaluate this assessment as the Combatant Commanders
update their regional plans on a regular basis.
The United States needs assured Arctic access to support national interests in the Arctic. This
access can be provided by a variety of proven capabilities, including submarines and aircraft,
but only U.S.-flagged ice-capable ships provide visible U.S. sovereign maritime presence
throughout the Arctic region. This need could potentially be met by either icebreakers or ice-
strengthened surface vessels, none of which are in the U.S. Navy current surface combatant
inventory, but which do exist in U.S. Coast Guard’s inventory in limited numbers.
Finally, significant uncertainty remains about the rate and extent of climate change in the
Arctic and the pace at which human activity will increase. The challenge is to balance the
risk of being late-to-need with the opportunity cost of making premature Arctic investments.
Not only does early investment take resources from other pressing needs, but the capabilities
would be later in their lifecycle when finally employed. Given the many competing demands
on DoD’s resources in the current fiscal environment, the Department believes that further
evaluation of the future operating environment is required before entertaining significant
investments in infrastructure or capabilities.239
239 Department of Defense, Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage, OUSD (Policy), May
(continued...)
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January 2012 GAO Report Reviewing May 2011 DOD Report
A January 2012, congressionally directed240 GAO report reviewing the May 2011 DOD report
above stated the following:
While DOD has undertaken some efforts to assess the capabilities needed to meet national
security objectives in the Arctic, it is unclear whether DOD will be in a position to provide
needed capabilities in a timely and efficient manner because it lacks a risk-based investment
strategy for addressing near-term needs and a collaborative forum with the Coast Guard for
addressing long-term capability needs. DOD’s [May 2011] Arctic Report acknowledges that
it has some near-term gaps in key capabilities needed to communicate, navigate, and
maintain awareness of activity in the region. However, DOD has not yet evaluated, selected,
or implemented alternatives for prioritizing and addressing near-term Arctic capability needs.
In addition, DOD and the Coast Guard have established a working group to identify potential
collaborative efforts to enhance U.S. Arctic capabilities. This working group is focused on
identifying potential near-term investments but not longer-term needs, and it is currently
expected to be dissolved in January 2012. Uncertainty involving the rate of Arctic climate
change necessitates careful planning to ensure efficient use of resources in developing Arctic
needs such as basing infrastructure and icebreakers, which require long lead times to develop
and are expensive to build and maintain. Without taking steps to meet near- and long-term
Arctic capability needs, DOD risks making premature Arctic investments, being late in
obtaining needed capabilities, or missing opportunities to minimize costs by collaborating on
investments with the Coast Guard....
DOD has several efforts under way to assess the capabilities needed to support U.S. strategic
objectives in the Arctic. However, it has not yet developed a comprehensive approach to
addressing Arctic capabilities that would include steps such as developing a risk-based
investment strategy and timeline to address near-term needs and establishing a collaborative
forum with the Coast Guard to identify long-term Arctic investments....
According to DOD’s Arctic Report, capabilities will need to be reassessed as conditions
change, and gaps will need to be addressed to be prepared to operate in a more accessible
Arctic. Other stakeholders have also assessed Arctic capability gaps. Examples of these
efforts include the following:
• U.S. Northern Command initiated a commander’s estimate for the Arctic in December
2010 that, according to officials, will establish the commander’s intent and missions in
the Arctic and identify capability shortfalls. In addition, Northern Command identified
two Arctic-specific capability gaps (communications and maritime domain awareness)
in its fiscal years 2013 through 2017 integrated priority list, which defines the
combatant command’s highest-priority capability gaps for the near-term, including
shortfalls that may adversely affect missions.
• U.S. European Command completed an Arctic Strategic Assessment in April 2011 that,
among other things, identified Arctic capability gaps in the areas of environmental
protection, maritime domain awareness, cooperative development of environmental
awareness technology, sharing of environmental data, and lessons learned on
(...continued)
2011. pp 2-4 (executive summary). See also Christopher J. Castelli, “Report: ‘Significant’ Gap Undermines DOD
Tracking Of Ships In Arctic,” Inside the Pentagon, June 16, 2011.
240 The direction was contained on page 291 of in the House Armed Services Committee’s report (H.Rept. 112-78 of
May 17, 2011) on H.R. 1540, the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act.
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infrastructure development. In addition, it recommended that the command conduct a
more detailed mission analysis for potential Arctic missions, complete a detailed
capability estimate for Arctic operations, and work in conjunction with Northern
Command and the Departments of the Navy and Air Force to conduct a comprehensive
capabilities-based assessment for the Arctic.
• DOD and DHS established the Capabilities Assessment Working Group (working
group) in May 2011 to identify shared Arctic capability gaps as well as opportunities
and approaches to overcome them, to include making recommendations for near-term
investments. The working group was directed by its Terms of Reference to focus on four
primary capability areas when identifying potential collaborative efforts to enhance
Arctic capabilities, including near-term investments. Those capability areas include
maritime domain awareness, communications, infrastructure, and presence. The
working group was also directed to identify overlaps and redundancies in established
and emerging DOD and DHS Arctic requirements. As the advocate for Arctic
capabilities, Northern Command was assigned lead responsibility for DOD in the
working group, while the Coast Guard was assigned lead responsibility for DHS. The
establishment of the working group—which, among other things, is to identify
opportunities for bi-departmental action to close Arctic capability gaps and issue
recommendations for near-term investments—helps to ensure that collaboration
between the Coast Guard and DOD is taking place to identify near-term capabilities
needed to support current planning and operations. Although the working group is
developing a paper with its recommendations, officials indicated that additional
assessments would be required to address those recommendations.
• U.S. Navy completed its first Arctic capabilities-based assessment in September 2011
and is developing a second capabilities-based assessment focused on observing,
mapping, and environmental prediction capabilities in the Arctic, which officials expect
to be completed in the spring of 2012. The Navy’s first Arctic capabilities-based
assessment identified three critical capability gaps as the highest priorities, including the
capabilities to provide environmental information; maneuver safely on the sea surface;
and conduct training, exercise, and education. This assessment recommended several
near-term actions to address these gaps....
Even though DOD has made preliminary efforts to identify Arctic capability gaps and assess
strategic objectives, constraints, and risks in the Arctic, DOD has not yet evaluated, selected,
or implemented alternatives for prioritizing and addressing near-term Arctic capability
needs....
Given that the opening in the Arctic presents a wide range of challenges for DOD, a risk-
based investment strategy and timeline can help DOD develop the capabilities needed to
meet national security interests in the region. Without a risk-based investment strategy and
timeline for prioritizing and addressing near-term Arctic capability gaps and challenges,
which is periodically updated to reflect evolving needs, DOD could be slow to develop
needed capabilities, potentially facing operational risk and higher costs if the need arises to
execute plans rapidly. Conversely, DOD could move too early, making premature Arctic
investments that take resources from other, more pressing needs or producing capabilities
that could be outdated before they are used.
While DOD and DHS have established the working group to identify shared near-term
Arctic capability gaps, this collaborative forum is not intended to address long-term Arctic
capability gaps or identify opportunities for joint investments over the longer-term. DOD
acknowledged the importance of collaboration with the Coast Guard over the long-term in its
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, which states that the department must work with the
Coast Guard and DHS to develop Arctic capabilities to support both current and future
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planning and operations. According to DOD and Coast Guard officials, although the working
group is primarily focused on near-term investments, it has discussed some mid- to long-
term capability needs. However, DOD and Coast Guard officials stated that after the
completion of the working group’s paper, expected in January 2012, the working group will
have completed the tasks detailed in the Terms of Reference and will be dissolved.
Consequently, no forum will exist to further address any mid- to long-term capability
needs....
After the working group completes its tasks in January 2012, there will be no DOD and
Coast Guard organization focused specifically on reducing overlap and redundancies or
collaborating to address Arctic capability gaps in support of future planning and operations,
as is directed by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.
While Northern Command officials stated they have plans for periodic reassessment of long-
term capability needs, such as icebreakers or basing infrastructure including a deep-water
port, it is not clear how those plans consider collaboration with the Coast Guard. For
example, officials stated the biennial review of Northern Command’s Theater Campaign
Plan and Strategic Infrastructure Master Plan will consider long-term capability and
infrastructure needs. They added that the commander’s Arctic Estimate is reviewed annually
and also considers long-term priorities, such as identifying a need for icebreakers. However,
the officials stated that the Arctic Estimate does not identify how DOD would acquire those
icebreakers or how it would coordinate with the Coast Guard—the operator of the nation’s
icebreakers—to reconstruct existing or build new icebreakers....
Without specific plans for a collaborative forum between DOD and the Coast Guard to
address long-term Arctic capability gaps and to identify opportunities for joint investments
over the longer-term, DOD may miss opportunities to leverage resources with the Coast
Guard to enhance future Arctic capabilities.
At this time, significant DOD investments in Arctic capabilities may not be needed, but that
does not preclude taking steps to anticipate and prepare for Arctic operations in the future.
Addressing near-term gaps is essential for DOD to have the key enabling capabilities it needs
to communicate, navigate, and maintain awareness of activity in the region. An investment
strategy that identifies and prioritizes near-term Arctic capability needs and identifies a
timeline to address them would be useful for decision makers in planning and budgeting.
Without taking deliberate steps to analyze risks in the Arctic and prioritize related resource
and operational requirements, DOD could later find itself faced with urgent needs, resulting
in higher costs that could have been avoided.
In addition, unless DOD and DHS continue to collaborate to identify opportunities for
interagency action to close Arctic capability gaps, DOD could miss out on opportunities to
work with the Coast Guard to leverage resources for shared needs. DOD may choose to
create a new collaborative forum or incorporate this collaboration into an existing forum or
process. Given the different missions and associated timelines of DOD and the Coast Guard
for developing Arctic capabilities, it is important that the two agencies work together to
avoid fragmented efforts and reduce unaffordable overlap and redundancies while addressing
Arctic capability gaps in support of future planning and operations.
To more effectively leverage federal investments in Arctic capabilities in a resource-
constrained environment and ensure needed capabilities are developed in a timely way, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, take the following two actions:
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• develop a risk-based investment strategy that: 1) identifies and prioritizes near-term
Arctic capability needs, 2) develops a timeline for addressing them, and 3) is updated as
appropriate; and
• establish a collaborative forum with the Coast Guard to fully leverage federal
investments and help avoid overlap and redundancies in addressing long-term Arctic
capability needs.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DHS concurred with both of our
recommendations. For its part, DOD partially concurred with both of our recommendations.
It generally agreed that the department needed to take action to address the issues we raised
but indicated it is already taking initial steps to address them.241
June 2012 Senate Armed Services Committee Report Language
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 112-173 of June 4, 2012) on S.
3254, the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act, stated:
Arctic region
The committee recognizes the continued importance of the Arctic region to our broader
national strategy. Declining ice cover continues to open the Arctic region and a concerted,
systematic, and immediate effort should be undertaken to adequately protect the United
States’ security, environmental, energy, economic, and natural resource interests in the
Arctic.
The committee commends the Department of Defense (DOD) and, in particular, U.S.
Northern Command and the Department of the Navy, and other federal agencies, such as the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of
Commerce, through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the U.S.
Arctic Research Commission, for their progress thus far in studying the region and defining
the capabilities required to effectively operate in and protect the domain.
International and interagency collaboration is also needed to develop the necessary mapping
and charting resources required for safe navigation and to promote security and economic
interests. As sea ice recedes, timely weather forecasts and disaster warnings along with more
baseline data will be required to conduct successful search and rescue missions. Search and
rescue coordination, planning, and training for the Arctic should be thoroughly analyzed and
developed to ensure forces can successfully operate in the domain.
The committee recognizes the importance of DOD’s involvement in interagency and
international efforts to protect national security interests in the region and, accordingly, urges
DOD to continue to work in concert with DHS to establish a formal chartered working group
to pursue increasing Arctic capabilities in the areas of communications, maritime domain
awareness, infrastructure, and presence, as was recommended by U.S. Northern Command
and the U.S. Coast Guard in a joint White Paper dated March 13, 2012. The committee also
urges the agencies to develop an investment strategy for funding emerging requirements in
balance with a resource constrained environment. (Pages 194-195)
241 Government Accountability Office, Arctic Capabilities[:]DOD Addressed Many Specified Reporting Elements in Its
2011 Arctic Report but Should Take Steps to Meet Near- and Long-term Needs, GAO-12-180, January 2012, Summary
page and pp. 12-18.
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Navy and Coast Guard
The Navy and Coast Guard are exploring the potential implications that increased surface ship
and aircraft operations in the Arctic may have for required numbers of ships and aircraft, ship and
aircraft characteristics, new or enlarged Arctic bases, and supporting systems, such as navigation
and communication systems. The Navy and Coast Guard have sponsored or participated in
studies and conferences to explore these implications, the Coast Guard has deployed boats and
aircraft into the region to better understand the implications of operating such units there,242 and
Navy sailors have ridden on Canadian Navy ships deploying to Arctic waters for similar
reasons.243
Points or themes that have emerged in studies, conferences, and deployments regarding the
potential implications for the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard of diminished Arctic sea ice include but
are not limited to the following:
• The diminishment of Arctic ice is creating potential new operating areas in the
Arctic for Navy surface ships and Coast Guard cutters.
• U.S. national security interests in the Arctic include “such matters as missile
defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic
sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations;
and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight.”244
• A mission of potential particular interest for expanded surface ship operations in
the Arctic would be defending the U.S. (and European Union) claim that the
Northern Sea Route running along Russia’s north coast and the Northwest
Passage running through Canada’s northern archipelago constitute international
straits which allow right of innocent passage.
• Search and rescue in the Arctic is a mission of increasing importance, particularly
for the Coast Guard, and one that poses potentially significant operational
challenges (see “Search and Rescue” above).
• More complete and detailed information on the Arctic is needed to more properly
support expanded Navy and Coast Guard ship and aircraft operations in the
Arctic.
• The Navy and the Coast Guard currently have limited infrastructure in place in
the Arctic to support expanded ship and aircraft operations in the Arctic.245
242 See Susan Gvozdas, “U.S. Coast Guard Preps For Open Arctic Waters,” Defense News, September 7, 2009: 40; John
C. Marcario, “Return to the Arctic,” Seapower, August 2009: 26-27; John C. Marcario, “Coming Into Focus,”
Seapower, March 2009: 42, 44; John C. Marcario, “Arctic Presence,” Seapower, August 2008: 32-33; Emelie
Rutherford, “Coast Guard To Test How Ships and Aircraft Operate in Arctic,” Inside the Navy, January 21, 2008;
Philip Ewiing, “Allen: CG Expedition To Assess Arctic Waters,” NavyTimes.com, January 17, 2009; Patricia Kime,
“North Pole Flyover A First For Coast Guard,” NavyTimes.com, October 25, 2007.
243 Andrew Scutro, “Navy Preps For Uncharted Arctic Waters,” NavyTimes.com, November 24, 2009.
244 NSPD 66/HSPD 25, Section III B.
245 Regarding infrastructure in the Arctic, an October 2009 press report stated:
A big challenge will be logistics support since the only [U.S.] supply base currently available is the
town of Barrow, Alaska. [Rear Admiral Dave] Titley [the Oceanographer of the Navy] explained
that the Arctic region is roughly the size of the United States. By way of illustration Titley said:
“Think of trying to conduct operations through the entire U.S., and your one logistics base is the
(continued...)
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• Expanded ship and aircraft operations in the Arctic may require altering ship and
aircraft designs and operating methods.246
• Cooperation with other Arctic countries will be valuable in achieving defense and
homeland security goals.
Navy in General
In a February 2009 journal article, the Oceanographer of the Navy stated:
Competing claims dealing with the Arctic are often political in nature and have important
implications. For example, in the summer of 2008 Canada announced that it would increase
its military presence in the region, begin construction of a deep-water port on Baffin Island,
establish a cold weather training base at Resolute Bay, and build six new ice-hardened ships
to patrol the Northwest Passage. During the same period, Russia conducted strategic bomber
flights over the area for the first time since the end of the Cold War....
Preserving freedom of navigation in the region is an important tenet of U.S. policy. The NSR
[Northern Sea Route], however, is a contested waterway, with Russian claims of sovereignty
competing against U.S. and European Union insistence that it is an international strait
available to all nations, subject to mutually recognized terms. Another potential [Arctic]
transoceanic shipping route may be the Northwest Passage, which extends from the Atlantic
through Baffin Bay and the Canadian Archipelago and into the Pacific by way of the Bering
Strait. Canada claims sovereignty over the waters of the Canadian Archipelago, although the
United States and the European Union claim that the Northwest Passage also constitutes an
international strait which allows right of innocent passage....
Aside from access and right of passage, the Navy and Coast Guard, in particular, must also
be concerned with strategic choke points such as the Bering Strait, Canada’s Queen
Elizabeth Islands in the Northwest Passage, and Russia’s Severnaya Zemlya and New
Siberian Islands in the Northern Sea Route. These narrow passages offer some protection
from persistent ice blockage, but they are also vulnerable to control or blockade by
adversaries that would significantly disrupt potential commercial shipping and oil
transport....
U.S. naval interests will face new challenges in an increasingly ice-free Arctic with a
strategic objective to understand potential threats to the United States from the maritime
domain. As throughout the global commons, the U.S. Navy must be aware of activities that
could be harmful to national security interests in a region that will, no doubt, see fewer
(...continued)
size of San Clemente Island [an island off the coast of Southern California]. That is roughly the size
of Barrow.”
(Bob Freeman, “Conference Addresses Navy’s Role in a Changing Arctic,” Navy New Service, October 4, 2009. See
also Zachary M. Peterson, “As A Result of Melting Ice, Navy Study Need For Base in Far North,” Inside the Navy,
December 29, 2009; Patricia Kime, “CG Boss Calls For Forward Bases In The Arctic,” NavyTimes.com, September 28,
2007.)
246 For articles discussing potential changes to ship and aircraft designs, see Dan Taylor, “Roughead: Navy Will Have
To Design Ships To Better Handle Arctic,” Inside the Navy, November 26, 2009; Rebekah Gordon, “Coast Guard OPC
[Offshore Patrol Cutter] Modifications For Varied Environments A Possibility,” Inside the Navy, August 24, 2009;
Andrew Scutro, “Arctic Forces Fleet to Look North,” NavyTimes.com, February 23, 2009; Amy McCullough,
“Stronger Hulls Could Help Fill Icebreaker Gap,” NavyTimes.com, February 22, 2009; Rebekah Gordon, “Coast Guard
Evaluating Effects of Increased Arctic Operations on Fleet,” Inside the Navy, February 9, 2009.
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barriers to access by potential adversaries in the future. National and homeland security
interests pertinent to the U.S. Navy in the region would include early warning/missile
defense; maritime presence and security; and freedom of navigation and over-flight....
The region is primarily a maritime domain and the U.S. Navy of the future must be prepared
to protect sea lines of communication supporting maritime commerce and other national
interests—including national security—there. In addition to thinking through how we adjust
our shipbuilding emphasis to support such operations, the Navy should also be thinking
strategically about building the necessary infrastructure to provide logistic support for Arctic
patrols, search and rescue capabilities, and shore-based support activities.
To ensure complete maritime domain awareness in the region, and to provide our forces a
competitive advantage, it will be necessary to have comprehensive knowledge of the
physical environment. Data must be obtained by a suite of remote sensors (satellites, radars),
autonomous sensors (data buoys, unmanned vehicles), and manned sensors (shipboard,
coastal observing stations). Computer-based ocean and atmospheric models must be adjusted
to the geophysical peculiarities of high latitudes. Communication lines for data exchange and
reach-back processing at high-performance computing production centers must be robust and
reliable. To ensure safety of navigation, we will also need to conduct more high-resolution
bottom surveys and increase the scrutiny we place on sea ice conditions.
The Navy relies on its international and interagency partners for assistance to ensure success
of maritime domain awareness and maritime security missions. To meet the demands of
national security in the changing northern environment, strengthening mechanisms for
cooperation among the regional nations and U.S. agencies must remain a high priority. Like
everywhere else in the world, sound national security in the Arctic will require strategic
access, military mobility, safe navigation, unimpeded maritime transportation, improved
homeland security, and responsible, sustainable use of ocean and coastal resources.
International and interagency agreements and partnerships are vital to incorporating these
essential elements into a viable national security policy and will be critical for resolving
future naval challenges of a changing Arctic.247
In a spring 2010 journal article, the Oceanographer of the Navy (the successor to the officer who
authored the above journal article) and a coauthor stated that “Navy surface vessels are able to
operate up to the marginal ice zone but will require ice-strengthening to operate in higher ice
conditions; Navy aircraft are capable of operating in the Arctic, but the lack of divert fields limits
their duration and range.”248 The article also stated:
While the Navy has a rich history in the Arctic, several challenges must be met to ensure
successful operations in the future. These include the lack of support infrastructure and
logistics support, environmental hazards such as drifting sea ice and icing on exposed
surfaces, and communications difficulties. Antiquated nautical charts, drifting ice, low
visibility, and the paucity of electronic and visual navigation aids hinder safety of navigation.
A lack of coastal installations also contributes to the difficulty of search and rescue (SAR)
operations. The only American-owned deepwater port near the Arctic basin is Dutch Harbor,
in the Aleutian Islands.249
247 David Grove, “Arctic Melt: Reopening a Naval Frontier?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 2009: 16-21.
248 David W. Titley and Courtney C. St. John, “Arctic Security Considerations and the U.S. Navy’s Roadmap for the
Arctic,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2010: 41.
249 David W. Titley and Courtney C. St. John, “Arctic Security Considerations and the U.S. Navy’s Roadmap for the
Arctic,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2010: 42.
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On June 16, 2011, in remarks at a seminar on the Arctic, Admiral Gary Roughead, the Chief of
Naval Operations, stated:
Well in my mind, there is a phenomenal event taking place on the planet today, and that is
what I call the opening of the Fifth Ocean; that’s the Arctic Ocean. We haven’t had an ocean
open on this planet since the end of the Ice Age. So if this is not a significant change that
requires new, and I would submit, brave thinking on the topic, I don’t know what other sort
of physical event could produce that.
We in the Navy a couple of years ago began to look at how we as a Navy serve the nation....
So as we began to look at the planet, we realized that there were significant changes taking
place; opening of the Fifth Ocean; physical changes; changes in population as they
compressed into the littoral areas.
And so we established, I established something that I call Task Force Climate Change.
Primarily focused on the Arctic because of the massive changes that are taking place up
there, but it also takes into account what is happening on the rest of the planet and where we
as a Navy think we have to be in the future. And then from that Task Force Climate Change,
we developed what we call the Arctic road map....
The way we see things taking place is the first of moves, which will largely be in the area of
resources. Fishing stocks will move with the water temperature, they will start to drift farther
north, that will take fishing fleets farther north and there is a set of responsibilities that we
have with other nations on making sure that that activity is taking place lawfully.
Then we believe the next step will be the extraction of resources. So what do we have to be
prepared to do as a Navy, as a military particularly aligned closely with the Coast Guard on
this.
And then in about 20 years time, 25 years time, the Arctic becomes a profitable sea route
from Asia to Europe over the top of the planet. If you look at some of the estimates from
shippers, some may actually be here. That is about a million dollars a trip someone saves.
That is not insignificant. And so it will become a busy place as transportation starts to take
place. That is how we envision the changes that are taking place, how we are looking at
them, and the road map that we put in place is based on the best science as we know today.
And we are committed to providing the resources the nation needs from the naval
perspective to meet our needs.250
Four days later, in remarks to a symposium on the impacts on naval and maritime operations of
an ice-diminishing Arctic, Admiral Roughead stated:
Since this forum began in 2001, our Navy has benefitted from the development and the
discussion of the Arctic Symposium, as it has improved our appreciation greatly for an ice-
diminished Arctic and the security implications that will follow from that physical change
that will take place.
This broader examination is something that we’ve endeavored to focus on systematically
since we stood up our Task Force Climate Change in May 2009, and issued our Arctic
Roadmap that same year. And rather than all the answers, what our efforts have given us is
250 Source: Text of remarks of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead at Active in the Arctic Seminar,
June 16, 2011.
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an appreciation of just how dynamic the study of the region is and surely will be in the
future....
... at a fundamental level, the trends point undeniably towards a new venue of operations and
responsibility for our global Navy – for preserving American interests in free and fair access
there – and in light of this we remain committed to preparing exhaustively for the challenges
and especially for the opportunities that are going to exist in an ice-diminishing Arctic.
The U.S. Navy’s interests in the Arctic are not new, of course. We have many decades of
experience with exploration and, indeed, episodic operations in the waters of the Arctic
Circle....
But never has our interest encountered the confluence of trends, as projected by the U.S.
Geological Survey in 2008 and the National Research Council this past March, that promises
to change the Arctic so pervasively, and in so doing affect the global environment for which
we plan and program our future fleet....
In projecting the impact of climate change in the northern latitudes, however, I’m reminded
of what Dr. Lubchenco observed just this past March, when she said, “what happens in the
Arctic does not stay there.” The trends we discuss here, in a similar timeframe, promise more
disruption and disorder in a world whose population is growing rapidly, and moving to
megacities on or near the coasts of almost every continent. The prospects of sea level rise,
for some megacities, or the coral islands of the Maldives, are similarly daunting. We also
have to consider the likely frictions that arise as fishing stocks migrate with changing sea
temperatures, and the very real possibility that conflicts in the future will be fought over
access to dwindling natural supplies of fresh water.
It is because of these projections that our Navy is preparing for increased demand, both in the
region - where we will maintain our access and uphold the freedom of navigation as a global
good - and beyond, where we expect developments to expose the costs of our national
reluctance on the Law of the Sea convention and to test our present understanding of
customary legal guarantees to the very freedoms behind our global operations today. We are
considering the technical requirements for polar operations to support our strategic objective
of a safe, stable, and secure Arctic region where our national interests are safeguarded –
namely, how and when to build forces capable and competent for the harsh northern climes.
We also remain well aware of how important maritime partnerships will be in addressing
capacity concerns as we seek to reinforce universal values in the global commons. Some
speak of a changing Arctic in terms of either a race or a zero-sum game. As far as the U.S.
Navy is concerned, it is neither. Rather, we see it as an opportunity to extend to the ‘Fifth
Ocean’ the principles that have benefitted all peaceful nations in the other four. Secretary of
State Clinton’s attendance at the meeting of Arctic Council ministers last month in Nuuk,
Greenland, signals the United States‟ level of interest in the region, as well as our belief in
the power of international cooperation to advance mutual interests in the free use of the
maritime domain. It was also inherently practical in that it forged the much-needed
agreement among Arctic states to improve our coordination on search and rescue.
As we stated in our Arctic Roadmap, the Navy will continue to pursue cooperative
relationships around such areas of common interest, whether mission enablers like Maritime
Domain Awareness, core naval capabilities such as humanitarian assistance and disaster
response, or intra-governmental relationships like defense support to civil authorities.
Exercises such as the Canadian Navy’s ‘Operation Nanook,’ which we observed in 2009 and
had the privilege of participating in last August alongside our Coast Guard counterparts,
enhance our preparedness in several of these areas, and lay the basis from which we might
extend the same maritime partnership and interoperability we have come to value so highly
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in our global operations. Joint exercises such as the U.S. Pacific Command’s ‘Northern
Edge’ – which started just outside of the Arctic Circle one week ago today and will continue
throughout this week – ensure that we as a Navy remain ready to partner at the high end of
operations as required.251
An April 28, 2012, press report states:
As global warming opens the Arctic Ocean to commercial and industrial traffic, the U.S.
Navy is pushing to catch up with Russia, Canada and even Denmark in its Arctic ability. If a
crisis were to happen now, the Navy lacks the ability to act in the Arctic without the help of
one of those countries or the Coast Guard.
Last year, the Navy asked the War Gaming Department of the U.S. Naval War College to
find out what the Navy needs for sustained operations in the Arctic.
In the resulting 2011 Fleet Arctic Operations Game, the Navy learned how big its Arctic
shortcomings are. As a force, the Navy lacks everything from bases and Arctic-capable ships
to reliable communications and cold-weather clothing....
The game’s conclusions: the Navy is not adequately prepared to conduct long-term maritime
Arctic operations; Arctic weather conditions increase the risk of failure; and most critically,
to operate in the Arctic, the Navy will need to lean on the U.S. Coast Guard, countries like
Russia or Canada, or tribal and industrial partners.
To sustain operations in the Arctic, the Navy needs ice-capable equipment, accurate and
timely environmental data, personnel trained to operate in extreme weather, and better
communications systems. Much of the environmental data will come from other Arctic
nations....
Navy officials understand the need to conduct exercises in the Arctic so they can get ready
for the real thing, but they don't have a strategy.
“We are the only Arctic nation without an Arctic strategy,” said U.S. Navy Cmdr. Blake
McBride, Arctic Affairs officer for Task Force Climate Change. “The Coast Guard and
Department of Defense are working on a strategy to help answer the issue, and advocate for
capabilities.”
Aside from signing National Security Presidential Directive 66, which requires the U.S. to
have a presence in the Arctic, the Arctic hasn't been a priority for the U.S. government,
largely because there isn't an immediate military threat.
“It’s becoming a higher priority, but we don't make our own priorities,” McBride said. “We
don’t foresee a military threat in the Arctic, but it doesn't mean we will not need to be able to
operate there.”
The Navy’s future plans to conduct operations in the Arctic largely depend on the budget.
251 Source: Text of remarks of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead at the 4th Symposium on the Impacts
of an Ice-Diminishing Arctic on Naval & Maritime Operations, June 20, 2011. See also Christopher J. Castelli,
“Roughead: International Approach Needed To Fix Arctic-Awareness Gap,” Inside the Navy, June 27, 2011.
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“It’s all about the money,” McBride said. “If you don't have the budget or funds to invest in
manpower and equipment then you don't have anything.”252
2009 Navy Arctic Roadmap
The Navy examined issues and concerns relating to climate change at a May 15, 2009, meeting of
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Executive Board. Following this meeting, the Navy
decided to establish a Navy group led by the Oceanographer of the Navy called Task Force
Climate Change (TFCC), and to develop Navy roadmaps first for the Arctic, and later for more
general responses to global climate change.
The Navy issued its Arctic roadmap on November 10, 2009.253 The document, which is dated
October 2009 and co-sponsored by TFCC and the Oceanographer of the Navy,254 is intended to
guide the service’s activities regarding the Arctic for the period FY2010-FY2014. The November
10 cover memo states that the document is to remain in effect until the completion of the report
on the FY2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), at which time it will be reviewed and
revised to incorporate guidance from that QDR.
August 2011 Navy Arctic Environmental Assessment and Outlook Report
In August 2011, the Navy released an Arctic environment assessment and outlook report.255 The
report states that it
addresses Action Item 5.7 of the U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap - to produce an Arctic
Environmental Assessment and Outlook Report. This first biennial report provides a
comprehensive assessment of the state of the Arctic environment, including the
oceanography, hydrography, meteorology, fisheries, ice-extent, and climatic trends. This is
important because the IPCC [reporting] refresh rate is too long to meet the budget POM
[Program Objective Memorandum] cycle,256 so this assessment will periodically synthesize
existing scientific reports to inform POMs, specifically POM-[FY20]14; this allows the
Navy’s decisions to be based on sound science, and not use one source only, but a consensus
of accepted sources….
As the Arctic environment continues to change and human activity increases, the U.S. Navy
must be prepared to operate in this region. It is important to note that even though the Arctic
is opening up, it will continue to be a harsh and challenging environment for the foreseeable
future due to hazardous sea ice, freezing temperatures and extreme weather. Although the
Navy submarine fleet has decades of experience operating in the Arctic, the surface fleet, air
assets, and U.S. Marine Corps ground troops have limited experience there. The Navy must
252 Nicole Klauss, “War Games Find U.S. Navy Ability Lacking In Acrtic,” Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, April 28,
2012.
253 Memorandum for Distribution dated November 10, 2009, from Admiral J. W. Greenert, Vice Chief of Naval
Operations, on the subject of the Navy Arctic Roadmap. The document was posted on InsideDefense.com (subscription
required).
254 U.S. Navy, U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap, Washington, 2009, 29 pp. (October 2009, sponsored by Task Force Climate
Change [and] Oceanographer of the Navy.) The document was posted on InsideDefense.com (subscription required).
255 Department of the Navy, Arctic Environmental Assessment and Outlook Report, August 2011, 25 pp. Accessed at
http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/files/2011/08/U.S.-Navy-Arctic-Environmental-Assessment.pdf.
256 The POM is an internal DOD document that guides the development of DOD’s annual budget submissions to
Congress.
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now consider the Arctic in terms of future policy, strategy, force structure, and
investments.257
An April 28, 2012, press report states:
Navy officials have done the work called for in phase one and two of the [Arctic] roadmap,
which largely consisted of developing research, assessing fleet readiness, completing
capabilities-based assessments like the Fleet Arctic Operations Game, and formalizing
cooperative agreements.
The biggest hurdle comes in the next phase, which calls for funding equipment and Arctic
training. Navy officials say they are drafting a budget request to address those items.258
Coast Guard High Latitude Study Provided to Congress in July 2011
In July 2011, the Coast Guard provided to Congress a study on the Coast Guard’s missions and
capabilities for operations in high-latitude (i.e., polar) areas. The study, commonly known as the
High Latitude Study, is dated July 2010 on its cover. The High Latitude Study concluded the
following:
[The study] concludes that future [Coast Guard] capability and capacity gaps will
significantly impact four [Coast Guard] mission areas in the Arctic: Defense Readiness, Ice
Operations, Marine Environmental Protection, and Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security.
These mission areas address the protection of important national interests in a geographic
area where other nations are actively pursuing their own national goals. U.S. national policy
and laws define the requirements to assert the nation’s jurisdiction over its territory and
interests; to ensure the security of its people and critical infrastructure; to participate fully in
the collection of scientific knowledge; to support commercial enterprises with public utility;
and to ensure that the Arctic environment is not degraded by increased human activity.
The Coast Guard’s ability to support Defense Readiness mission requirements in the Arctic
is closely linked to DoD responsibilities. The Coast Guard presently possesses the only
surface vessels capable of operating in ice-covered and ice-diminished waters. The Coast
Guard supports (1) DoD missions such as the resupply of Thule Air Base in Greenland and
logistics support (backup) for McMurdo Station in Antarctica and (2) Department of State
(DoS) directed Freedom of Navigation Operations. These unique Coast Guard capabilities
have been noted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Navy’s Task Force Climate Change, and the
recently issued Naval Operations Concept 2010.
The common and dominant contributor to these significant mission impacts is the gap in
polar icebreaking capability....259
Other capability gaps contributing to the impact on Coast Guard ability to carry out its
missions in the Arctic include:
• Communications System Capability – Continuous coverage along Alaska’s West Coast,
the Bering Strait, and throughout the North Slope is required for exchanging voice and
257 Department of the Navy, Arctic Environmental Assessment and Outlook Report, August 2011, p. v.
258 Nicole Klauss, “War Games Find U.S. Navy Ability Lacking In Acrtic,” Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, April 28,
2012.
259 For additional discussion, see “Polar Icebreaking”.
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data communications with Coast Guard units and other government and commercial
platforms offshore.
• Forward Operating Locations - No suitable facilities currently exist on the North Slope
or near the Bering Strait with facilities sufficient to support extended aircraft servicing
and maintenance. Aircraft must travel long distances and expend significant time
transiting to and from adequate facilities. This gap reduces on-scene presence and
capability to support sustained operations in the region.
• Environmental response in ice-covered waters - The technology and procedures for
assessment and mitigation measures for oil spills in ice-covered waters are not fully
developed or tested.
Capability gaps in the Arctic region have moderate impacts on [the Coast Guard’s] Aids to
Navigation (AtoN), Search and Rescue (SAR), and Other Law Enforcement (OLE) missions.
Both AtoN and SAR involve the safety of mariners and will gain more importance not only
as commerce and tourism cause an increase in maritime traffic, but as U.S. citizens in
northern Alaska face more unpredictable conditions. Performance of OLE will be
increasingly necessary to ensure the integrity of U.S. living marine resources from outside
pressures....
In addition to the assessment of polar icebreaking needs, the Arctic mission analysis
examined a set of theoretical mixes (force packages) of Coast Guard assets consisting of
icebreakers, their embarked helicopters, and deployment alternatives using aviation forward
operating locations in Arctic Alaska....
All [six] of the force mixes [considered in the study] add assets to the existing Coast Guard
Alaska Patrol consisting of (1) a high-endurance cutter (not an icebreaker) deployed in the
Bering Sea carrying a short range recovery helicopter, and (2) medium range recovery
helicopters located at Kodiak in the Gulf of Alaska, and seasonally deployed to locations in
Cold Bay and St. Paul Island....
These force packages and associated risk assessment provide a framework for acquisition
planning as the Coast Guard implements a strategy for closing the capability gaps. By first
recapitalizing the aging icebreakers, the Coast Guard provides a foundation for buildout of
these force mixes. In addition to the cost of the icebreakers, the force packages require
investment in forward operating locations and in medium range helicopters. The mission
analysis reports developed rough order-of-magnitude cost estimates for forward operating
locations at approximately $36M [million] each and for helicopters at $9M each....
The analysis shows that the current Coast Guard deployment posture is not capable of
effective response in northern Alaska and that response may be improved through a mix of
deployed cutters, aircraft, and supporting infrastructure including forward operating locations
and communications/navigation systems.260
260 United States Coast Guard High Latitude Region Mission Analysis Capstone Summary, July 2010, pp. 10-11, 13-15.
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February 2013 Announcement of New Coast Guard Arctic Strategy
The Coast Guard announced on February 27, 2013, that it will soon release a new Arctic strategy
that will focus on three elements: improving Arctic awareness, modernizing governance of the
region, and broadening partnerships.261
U.S.-Canadian Military Cooperation
In December 2009, it was reported that “U.S. and Canadian defense officials are studying
emerging gaps in their awareness of Arctic activities, seeking to boost North American Aerospace
Defense [NORAD] Command’s maritime-warning mission and crafting a new threat assessment
for the region.” The effort would reportedly involve both NORAD and a Canadian-American
advisory board called the Permanent Joint Board on Defense.262
In May 2010, it was reported that “American and Canadian defense officials are bolstering
collaboration on military exercises, investment plans and technology development related to the
Arctic.” The report stated that “U.S. and Canadian intelligence officials have created a classified
joint “utilization” assessment for the Arctic looking out to 2020, which will be continuously
updated.” It also stated that “American and Canadian defense officials have just started
implementing a new five-year work plan that contains specific initiatives and requires concrete
deliverables, Stockton said, noting the Arctic received special attention in the plan. The plan also
covers defense critical infrastructure protection, defense support to civil agencies and defense
cooperation in the Americas.”263
In December 2012, the commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM and the commander of the
Canadian Joint Operations Command signed two documents on Arctic cooperation. A December
11, 2012, statement issued by NORAD and USNORTHCOM on the signing of the documents
stated in part:
Army Gen. Charles Jacoby, Jr., commander of NORAD and U.S. Northern Command, and
Lt.-Gen. Stuart Beare, Canadian Joint Operations Command commander, signed two
significant documents today—the Tri Command Framework for Arctic Cooperation and the
Tri-Command Training and Exercise Statement of Intent—during the 230th meeting of the
Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defense in Colorado Springs, Colo.
The Tri-Command Framework for Arctic Cooperation acknowledges the Arctic is not a
region of conflict and the Canadian and U.S. militaries will support other departments and
agencies in response to threats and hazards in the region when requested and directed. In that
context, the goal of the Framework is to promote enhanced military cooperation in the Arctic
and identify specific areas of potential Tri-Command cooperation in the preparation for and
conduct of safety, security and defense operations. It strengthens an already unique and
mature partnership where coordination and cooperation occurs on a regular basis. The Tri-
261 Calvin Biesecker, “Coast Guard Set To Release Arctic Strategy As Activity In Region Increases,” Defense Daily,
February 28, 2013: 10; Michael Fabey, “U.S. Coast Guard Previews Arctic Strategy,” Aerospace Daily & Defense
Report, March 1, 2013: 6.
262 Christopher J. Castelli, “DOD, Canada Aim TO Develop Arctic Policy Options By Early 2010,” Inside the Navy,
December 7, 2009.
263 Christopher J. Castelli, “American, Canadian Defense Officials Tighten Ties On Arctic Issues,” Inside the Navy,
May 3, 2010.
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Command Framework for Arctic Cooperation document is not a plan but rather outlines a
process that supports the identification of opportunities for potential cooperation in the
Arctic. Areas that continue to be improved, particularly in the Arctic, include planning,
domain awareness, information-sharing, training and exercises, operations, capability
development, and science and technology....
The second document, the Tri Command Training and Exercise Statement of Intent, is aimed
at enhancing joint and combined readiness in support of safety, security and defence
missions through combined training and exercises and reinforcing partnerships and
collaboration among the Commands. The Tri-Command Training and Exercise Directive
will help to ensure a timely and coordinated response to safety, security and defence
challenges to North America.
The signing of the Tri Command Framework for Arctic Cooperation and the Tri-Command
Training and Exercise Statement of Intent follows on a Tri Command Strategy that spells out
a series of shared tasks designed to strengthen working relationships with all Tri-Command
defense and security partners.264
January 2009 Arctic Policy Directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25)
As noted earlier (see “January 2009 Arctic Policy Directive” in “Background”), the Obama
Administration is currently operating under the January 2009 Arctic region policy directive
(NSPD 66/HSPD 25) issued by the George W. Bush Administration.265 Potential oversight
questions include but not are limited to the following:
• Is NSPD 66/HSPD 25 a suitable statement of U.S. policy for the Arctic region?266
• Although the Obama Administration is currently operating under NSPD
66/HSPD 25, does the Obama Administration fully agree with all parts of it? If
not, with which parts does it not fully agree?
• Does the Obama Administration intend to eventually conduct a review of NSDP
66/HSPD 25? If so, what is the Administration’s schedule for conducting and
releasing the results of that review?
In connection with the above questions, a March 2013 report from the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) on U.S. interests and U.S. government actors in the Arctic stated:
264 NORAD news release, “NORAD, USNORTHCOM and Canadian Joint Operations Commmand Commander Sign
Cooperative U.S./Canada Documents,” December 11, 2012, accessed December 21, 2012, at http://www.norad.mil/
News/2012/121112a.html.
265 CRS communication with State Department official, October 8, 2010.
266 On this question, a January 19, 2009, press article about the new directive stated:
The new policy directive covers several key areas, including national security, energy exploration
and the environment, but it does not specify whether any should take precedence over others.
That led Jeremy Rabkin, a professor at George Mason University Law School, to comment: “It’s
really a list of all the things we’re concerned about; that’s not policy. I don’t see anything here that
helps you decide what gets priority.”
(Juliet Eilperin and Spencer S. Hsu, “White House Directive Guides Policy On Arctic,”
Washington Post, January 19, 2009: 2.)
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NSPD-66/HSPD-25 contains a rigorous implementation schedule for the federal government.
Yet, as this directive passes its fourth anniversary, many implementation strategies have not
been put into effect. That said, several of the policy priorities and implementation strategies
are redundant. For example, to meet U.S. security interests in the Arctic, an interagency
group under the leadership of the departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security is
requested to “develop greater capabilities and capacity [ ... ] to protect U.S. air, land and sea
borders” and “increase Arctic maritime domain awareness.” Under maritime transportation,
these same agencies, with the departments of Transportation and Commerce, are to
“determine basing and logistics support requirements, including necessary airlift and
icebreaking capabilities; and improve plans and cooperative agreements for search and
rescue.” These overlapping mandates raise the question whether this strategy is a security
function, an act of commerce—or both—and who ultimately is accountable for
implementing the strategy.
Such policy overlap and redundancy accurately reflects U.S. Arctic policymaking today and
unfortunately reflects poorly on the interagency process following the release of NSPD-66.
A successful future policy demands a more streamlined and prioritized process.
It is time to update NSPD-66. Other Arctic coastal states emerged with Arctic policy
statements around the same time as the United States did, in the 2007 to 2009 timeframe.
Since issuing these statements, however, most other Arctic nations have updated and further
refined their whole-of-government strategies. Unfortunately, the United States has failed to
do so. Separate federal agencies and departments have developed, or will be developing,
their own separate strategies based on NSPD-66, but this effort has been uneven at best....
The Department of Defense report on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage was
congressionally mandated by the fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act.
However, there is no such mandate for other U.S. government agencies and, consequently,
most other agencies have yet to develop their own implementation strategy stemming from
NSPD-66.
What would an updated U.S. Arctic strategy require? The seven policy areas identified in
NSPD-66 remain relevant, but these areas must be defined more clearly.
First and foremost, the United States must create a long-term economic strategy for the
American Arctic. The first component of an Arctic economic strategy must be an energy,
mineral resource, and infrastructure strategy. NSPD-66 states that “Energy development in
the Arctic region will play an important role in meeting growing global energy demand.”
How large a role? At present, U.S. energy strategy consists of a five-year offshore licensing
and permitting plan that ends in 2017. The government needs to define its long-term offshore
and onshore energy strategy for Alaska, answering such questions as whether America’s
Arctic energy resources are intended to meet U.S. demand or to be exported to Asian
markets. Other questions in need of answers include the status of port, pipeline, and liquid
natural gas infrastructure; whether methane hydrates are viable; and whether energy
development can be pursued in an environmentally sustainable way in such a fragile
environment.
Based on the answers to these questions, America’s Arctic economic strategy must also
include a detailed maritime transportation and infrastructure strategy. This strategy would
ideally be built around ecosystem-based management. It is clear that a future U.S. Arctic
maritime or infrastructure strategy will likely be a public-private partnership, as the private
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sector will provide significantly more financial and physical resources than will the U.S.
government.267
CRS Reports on Specific Arctic-Related Issues
CRS Report RL34266, Climate Change: Science Highlights, by Jane A. Leggett
CRS Report RS21890, The U.N. Law of the Sea Convention and the United States: Developments
Since October 2003, by Marjorie Ann Browne
CRS Report RL32838, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR): Votes and Legislative Actions
Since the 95th Congress, by M. Lynne Corn and Beth A. Roberts
CRS Report RL34547, Possible Federal Revenue from Oil Development of ANWR and Nearby
Areas, by Salvatore Lazzari
CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills in U.S. Coastal Waters: Background and Governance, by
Jonathan L. Ramseur
CRS Report RL33941, Polar Bears: Listing Under the Endangered Species Act, by Eugene H.
Buck, M. Lynne Corn, and Kristina Alexander
CRS Report RL34573, Does the Endangered Species Act Listing Provide More Protection of the
Polar Bear?, by Kristina Alexander
CRS Report RS22906, Use of the Polar Bear Listing to Force Reduction of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions: The Legal Arguments, by Robert Meltz
CRS Report RL34391, Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
CRS Report RL34342, Homeland Security: Roles and Missions for United States Northern
Command, by William Knight
267 Heather A. Conley, et al, The New Foreign Policy Frontier[:] U.S. Interests and Actors in the Arctic, Washington,
Center for Strategic & International Studies, March 2013, pp. 21-22.
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Appendix A. Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA)
of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373)
The text of the Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July 31,
1984)268 is as follows:
TITLE I – ARCTIC RESEARCH AND POLICY
SHORT TITLE
SEC. 101. This title may be cited as the “Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984”.
FINDINGS AND PURPOSES
SEC. 102. (a) The Congress finds and declares that-
(1) the Arctic, onshore and offshore, contains vital energy resources that can reduce the
Nation’s dependence on foreign oil and improve the national balance of payments;
(2) as the Nation’s only common border with the Soviet Union, the Arctic is critical to
national defense;
(3) the renewable resources of the Arctic, specifically fish and other seafood, represent one
of the Nation’s greatest commercial assets;
(4) Arctic conditions directly affect global weather patterns and must be understood in order
to promote better agricultural management throughout the United States;
(5) industrial pollution not originating in the Arctic region collects in the polar air mass, has
the potential to disrupt global weather patterns, and must be controlled through international
cooperation and consultation;
(6) the Arctic is a natural laboratory for research into human health and adaptation, physical
and psychological, to climates of extreme cold and isolation and may provide information
crucial for future defense needs;
(7) atmospheric conditions peculiar to the Arctic make the Arctic a unique testing ground for
research into high latitude communications, which is likely to be crucial for future defense
needs;
(8) Arctic marine technology is critical to cost-effective recovery and transportation of
energy resources and to the national defense;
(9) the United States has important security, economic, and environmental interests in
developing and maintaining a fleet of icebreaking vessels capable of operating effectively in
the heavy ice regions of the Arctic;
268 Title II of P.L. 98-373 is the National Critical Materials Act of 1984.
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(10) most Arctic-rim countries, particularly the Soviet Union, possess Arctic technologies far
more advanced than those currently available in the United States;
(11) Federal Arctic research is fragmented and uncoordinated at the present time, leading to
the neglect of certain areas of research and to unnecessary duplication of effort in other areas
of research;
(12) improved logistical coordination and support for Arctic research and better
dissemination of research data and information is necessary to increase the efficiency and
utility of national Arctic research efforts;
(13) a comprehensive national policy and program plan to organize and fund currently
neglected scientific research with respect to the Arctic is necessary to fulfill national
objectives in Arctic research;
(14) the Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, should focus
its efforts on the collection and characterization of basic data related to biological, materials,
geophysical, social, and behavioral phenomena in the Arctic;
(15) research into the long-range health, environmental, and social effects of development in
the Arctic is necessary to mitigate the adverse consequences of that development to the land
and its residents;
(16) Arctic research expands knowledge of the Arctic, which can enhance the lives of Arctic
residents, increase opportunities for international cooperation among Arctic-rim countries,
and facilitate the formulation of national policy for the Arctic; and
(17) the Alaskan Arctic provides an essential habitat for marine mammals, migratory
waterfowl, and other forms of wildlife which are important to the Nation and which are
essential to Arctic residents.
(b) The purposes of this title are-
(1) to establish national policy, priorities, and goals and to provide a Federal program plan
for basic and applied scientific research with respect to the Arctic, including natural
resources and materials, physical, biological and health sciences, and social and behavioral
sciences;
(2) to establish an Arctic Research Commission to promote Arctic research and to
recommend Arctic research policy;
(3) to designate the National Science Foundation as the lead agency responsible for
implementing Arctic research policy; and
(4) to establish an Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee to develop a national
Arctic research policy and a five year plan to implement that policy.
ARCTIC RESEARCH COMMISSION
SEC. 103. (a) The President shall establish an Arctic Research Commission (hereafter
referred to as the “Commission”).
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(b)(1) The Commission shall be composed of five members appointed by the President, with
the Director of the National Science Foundation serving as a nonvoting, ex officio member.
The members appointed by the President shall include-
(A) three members appointed from among individuals from academic or other research
institutions with expertise in areas of research relating to the Arctic, including the physical,
biological, health, environmental, social, and behavioral sciences;
(B) one member appointed from among indigenous residents of the Arctic who are
representative of the needs and interests of Arctic residents and who live in areas directly
affected by Arctic resource development; and
(C) one member appointed from among individuals familiar with the Arctic and
representative of the needs and interests of private industry undertaking resource
development in the Arctic.
(2) The President shall designate one of the appointed members of the Commission to be
chairperson of the Commission.
(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the term of office of each
member of the Commission appointed under subsection (b)(1) shall be four years.
(2) Of the members of the Commission originally appointed under subsection (b)(1)-
(A) one shall be appointed for a term of two years;
(B) two shall be appointed for a term of three years; and
(C) two shall be appointed for a term of four years.
(3) Any vacancy occurring in the membership of the Commission shall be filled, after notice
of the vacancy is published in the Federal Register, in the manner provided by the preceding
provisions of this section, for the remainder of the unexpired term.
(4) A member may serve after the expiration of the member’s term of office until the
President appoints a successor.
(5) A member may serve consecutive terms beyond the member’s original appointment.
(d)(1) Members of the Commission may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in
lieu of subsistence, as authorized by section 5703 of title 5, United States Code. A member
of the Commission not presently employed for compensation shall be compensated at a rate
equal to the daily equivalent of the rate for GS-16 of the General Schedule under section
5332 of title 5, United States Code, for each day the member is engaged in the actual
performance of his duties as a member of the Commission, not to exceed 90 days of service
each year. Except for the purposes of chapter 81 of title 5 (relating to compensation for work
injuries) and chapter 171 of title 28 (relating to tort claims), a member of the Commission
shall not be considered an employee of the United States for any purpose.
(2) The Commission shall meet at the call of its Chairman or a majority of its members.
(3) Each Federal agency referred to in section 107(b) may designate a representative to
participate as an observer with the Commission.
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These representatives shall report to and advise the Commission on the activities relating to
Arctic research of their agencies.
(4) The Commission shall conduct at least one public meeting in the State of Alaska
annually.
DUTIES OF COMMISSION
SEC. 104. (a) The Commission shall-
(1) develop and recommend an integrated national Arctic research policy;
(2) in cooperation with the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee established under
section 107, assist in establishing a national Arctic research program plan to implement the
Arctic research policy;
(3) facilitate cooperation between the Federal Government and State and local governments
with respect to Arctic research;
(4) review Federal research programs in the Arctic and suggest improvements in
coordination among programs;
(5) recommend methods to improve logistical planning and support for Arctic research as
may be appropriate and in accordance with the findings and purposes of this title;
(6) suggest methods for improving efficient sharing and dissemination of data and
information on the Arctic among interested public and private institutions;
(7) offer other recommendations and advice to the Interagency Committee established under
section 107 as it may find appropriate; and
(8) cooperate with the Governor of the State of Alaska and with agencies and organizations
of that State which the Governor may designate with respect to the formulation of Arctic
research policy.
(b) Not later than January 31 of each year, the Commission shall-
(1) publish a statement of goals and objectives with respect to Arctic research to guide the
Interagency Committee established under section 107 in the performance of its duties; and
(2) submit to the President and to the Congress a report describing the activities and
accomplishments of the Commission during the immediately preceding fiscal year.
COOPERATION WITH THE COMMISSION
SEC. 105. (a)(1) The Commission may acquire from the head of any Federal agency
unclassified data, reports, and other nonproprietary information with respect to Arctic
research in the possession of the agency which the Commission considers useful in the
discharge of its duties.
(2) Each agency shall cooperate with the Commission and furnish all data, reports, and other
information requested by the Commission to the extent permitted by law; except that no
agency need furnish any information which it is permitted to withhold under section 552 of
title 5, United States Code.
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(b) With the consent of the appropriate agency head, the Commission may utilize the
facilities and services of any Federal agency to the extent that the facilities and services are
needed for the establishment and development of an Arctic research policy, upon
reimbursement to be agreed upon by the Commission and the agency head and taking every
feasible step to avoid duplication of effort.
(c) All Federal agencies shall consult with the Commission before undertaking major Federal
actions relating to Arctic research.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE COMMISSION
SEC. 106. The Commission may-
(1) in accordance with the civil service laws and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5,
United States Code, appoint and fix the compensation of an Executive Director and
necessary additional staff personnel, but not to exceed a total of seven compensated
personnel;
(2) procure temporary and intermittent services as authorized by section 3109 of title 5,
United States Code;
(3) enter into contracts and procure supplies, services, and personal property; and
(4) enter into agreements with the General Services Administration for the procurement of
necessary financial and administrative services, for which payment shall be made by
reimbursement from funds of the Commission in amounts to be agreed upon by the
Commission and the Administrator of the General Services Administration.
LEAD AGENCY AND INTERAGENCY ARCTIC RESEARCH POLICY
COMMITTEE
SEC. 107. (a) The National Science Foundation is designated as the lead agency responsible
for implementing Arctic research policy, and the Director of the National Science
Foundation shall insure that the requirements of section 108 are fulfilled.
(b)(1) The President shall establish an Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee
(hereinafter referred to as the “Interagency Committee”).
(2) The Interagency Committee shall be composed of representatives of the following
Federal agencies or offices:
(A) the National Science Foundation;
(B) the Department of Commerce;
(C) the Department of Defense;
(D) the Department of Energy;
(E) the Department of the Interior;
(F) the Department of State;
(G) the Department of Transportation;
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(H) the Department of Health and Human Services;
(I) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration;
(J) the Environmental Protection Agency; and
(K) any other agency or office deemed appropriate.
(3) The representative of the National Science Foundation shall serve as the Chairperson of
the Interagency Committee.
DUTIES OF THE INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE
SEC. 108. (a) The Interagency Committee shall-
(1) survey Arctic research conducted by Federal, State, and local agencies, universities, and
other public and private institutions to help determine priorities for future Arctic research,
including natural resources and materials, physical and biological sciences, and social and
behavioral sciences;
(2) work with the Commission to develop and establish an integrated national Arctic
research policy that will guide Federal agencies in developing and implementing their
research programs in the Arctic;
(3) consult with the Commission on-
(A) the development of the national Arctic research policy and the 5-year plan implementing
the policy;
(B) Arctic research programs of Federal agencies;
(C) recommendations of the Commission on future Arctic research; and
(D) guidelines for Federal agencies for awarding and administering Arctic research grants;
(4) develop a 5-year plan to implement the national policy, as provided for in section 109;
(5) provide the necessary coordination, data, and assistance for the preparation of a single
integrated, coherent, and multiagency budget request for Arctic research as provided for in
section 110;
(6) facilitate cooperation between the Federal Government and State and local governments
in Arctic research, and recommend the undertaking of neglected areas of research in
accordance with the findings and purposes of this title;
(7) coordinate and promote cooperative Arctic scientific research programs with other
nations, subject to the foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State;
(8) cooperate with the Governor of the State of Alaska in fulfilling its responsibilities under
this title;
(9) promote Federal interagency coordination of all Arctic research activities, including-
(A) logistical planning and coordination; and
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(B) the sharing of data and information associated with Arctic research, subject to section
552 of title 5, United States Code; and
(10) provide public notice of its meetings and an opportunity for the public to participate in
the development and implementation of national Arctic research policy.
(b) Not later than January 31, 1986, and biennially thereafter, the Interagency Committee
shall submit to the Congress through the President, a brief, concise report containing-
(1) a statement of the activities and accomplishments of the Interagency Committee since its
last report; and
(2) a description of the activities of the Commission, detailing with particularity the
recommendations of the Commission with respect to Federal activities in Arctic research.
5-YEAR ARCTIC RESEARCH PLAN
SEC. 109. (a) The Interagency Committee, in consultation with the Commission, the
Governor of the State of Alaska, the residents of the Arctic, the private sector, and public
interest groups, shall prepare a comprehensive 5-year program plan (hereinafter referred to as
the “Plan”) for the overall Federal effort in Arctic research. The Plan shall be prepared and
submitted to the President for transmittal to the Congress within one year after the enactment
of this Act and shall be revised biennially thereafter.
(b) The Plan shall contain but need not be limited to the following elements:
(1) an assessment of national needs and problems regarding the Arctic and the research
necessary to address those needs or problems;
(2) a statement of the goals and objectives of the Interagency Committee for national Arctic
research;
(3) a detailed listing of all existing Federal programs relating to Arctic research, including
the existing goals, funding levels for each of the 5 following fiscal years, and the funds
currently being expended to conduct the programs;
(4) recommendations for necessary program changes and other proposals to meet the
requirements of the policy and goals as set forth by the Commission and in the Plan as
currently in effect; and
(5) a description of the actions taken by the Interagency Committee to coordinate the budget
review process in order to ensure interagency coordination and cooperation in (A) carrying
out Federal Arctic research programs, and (B) eliminating unnecessary duplication of effort
among these programs.
COORDINATION AND REVIEW OF BUDGET REQUESTS
SEC. 110. (a) The Office of Science and Technology Policy shall-
(1) review all agency and department budget requests related to the Arctic transmitted
pursuant to section 108(a)(5), in accordance with the national Arctic research policy and the
5-year program under section 108(a)(2) and section 109, respectively; and
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(2) consult closely with the Interagency Committee and the Commission to guide the Office
of Science and Technology Policy’s efforts.
(b)(1) The Office of Management and Budget shall consider all Federal agency requests for
research related to the Arctic as one integrated, coherent, and multiagency request which
shall be reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget prior to submission of the
President’s annual budget request for its adherence to the Plan. The Commission shall, after
submission of the President’s annual budget request, review the request and report to
Congress on adherence to the Plan.
(2) The Office of Management and Budget shall seek to facilitate planning for the design,
procurement, maintenance, deployment, and operations of icebreakers needed to provide a
platform for Arctic research by allocating all funds necessary to support icebreaking
operations, except for recurring incremental costs associated with specific projects, to the
Coast Guard.
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS; NEW SPENDING AUTHORITY
SEC. 111. (a) There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for
carrying out this title.
(b) Any new spending authority (within the meaning of section 401 of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974) which is provided under this title shall be effective for any fiscal year
only to such extent or in such amounts as may be provided in appropriation Acts.
DEFINITION
SEC. 112. As used in this title, the term “Arctic” means all United States and foreign
territory north of the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north and west of the
boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas,
including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian
chain.
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Appendix B. P.L. 101-609 of 1990, Amending Arctic
Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984
The Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (see Appendix A) was amended by P.L.
101-609 of November 16, 1990. The text of P.L. 101-609 is as follows:
SECTION 1. Except as specifically provided in this Act, whenever in this Act an amendment
or repeal is expressed as an amendment to, or repeal of a provision, the reference shall be
deemed to be made to the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984.
SEC. 2. Section 103(b)(1) (15 U.S.C. 4102(b)(1)) is amended—
(1) in the text above clause (A), by striking out `five’ and inserting in lieu thereof `seven’;
(2) in clause (A), by striking out `three’ and inserting in lieu thereof `four’; and
(3) in clause (C), by striking out `one member’ and inserting in lieu thereof `two members’.
SEC. 3. Section 103(d)(1) (15 U.S.C. 4102(d)(1)) is amended by striking out `GS-16’ and
inserting in lieu thereof `GS-18’.
SEC. 4. (a) Section 104(a) (15 U.S.C. 4102(a)) is amended—
(1) in paragraph (4), by striking out `suggest’ and inserting in lieu thereof `recommend’;
(2) in paragraph (6), by striking out `suggest’ and inserting in lieu thereof `recommend’;
(3) in paragraph (7), by striking out `and’ at the end thereof;
(4) in paragraph (8), by striking out the period and inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon; and
(5) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraphs:
`(9) recommend to the Interagency Committee the means for developing international
scientific cooperation in the Arctic; and
`(10) not later than January 31, 1991, and every 2 years thereafter, publish a statement of
goals and objectives with respect to Arctic research to guide the Interagency Committee
established under section 107 in the performance of its duties.’.
(b) Section 104(b) is amended to read as follows:
`(b) Not later than January 31 of each year, the Commission shall submit to the President and
to the Congress a report describing the activities and accomplishments of the Commission
during the immediately preceding fiscal year.’.
SEC. 5. Section 106 (15 U.S.C. 4105) is amended—
(1) in paragraph (3), by striking out `and’ at the end thereof;
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(2) in paragraph (4), by striking out the period at the end thereof and inserting in lieu thereof
`; and’; and
(3) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
`(5) appoint, and accept without compensation the services of, scientists and engineering
specialists to be advisors to the Commission. Each advisor may be allowed travel expenses,
including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by section 5703 of title 5, United
States Code. Except for the purposes of chapter 81 of title 5 (relating to compensation for
work injuries) and chapter 171 of title 28 (relating to tort claims) of the United States Code,
an advisor appointed under this paragraph shall not be considered an employee of the United
States for any purpose.’.
SEC. 6. Subsection (b)(2) of section 108 (15 U.S.C. 4107(b)(2)) is amended to read as
follows:
`(2) a statement detailing with particularity the recommendations of the Commission with
respect to Federal interagency activities in Arctic research and the disposition and responses
to those recommendations.’.
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Appendix C. January 2009 Arctic Policy Directive
(NSPD 66/HSPD 25)
On January 12, 2009, the George W. Bush Administration released a presidential directive
establishing a new U.S. policy for the Arctic region. The directive, dated January 9, 2009, was
issued as National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25
(NSPD 66/HSPD 25). The text of NSPD 66/HSPD 25 is as follows:
SUBJECT: Arctic Region Policy
I. PURPOSE
A. This directive establishes the policy of the United States with respect to the Arctic region
and directs related implementation actions. This directive supersedes Presidential Decision
Directive/NSC-26 (PDD-26; issued 1994) with respect to Arctic policy but not Antarctic
policy; PDD-26 remains in effect for Antarctic policy only.
B. This directive shall be implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution and laws
of the United States, with the obligations of the United States under the treaties and other
international agreements to which the United States is a party, and with customary
international law as recognized by the United States, including with respect to the law of the
sea.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The United States is an Arctic nation, with varied and compelling interests in that region.
This directive takes into account several developments, including, among others:
1. Altered national policies on homeland security and defense;
2. The effects of climate change and increasing human activity in the Arctic region;
3. The establishment and ongoing work of the Arctic Council; and
4. A growing awareness that the Arctic region is both fragile and rich in resources.
III. POLICY
A. It is the policy of the United States to:
1. Meet national security and homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region;
2. Protect the Arctic environment and conserve its biological resources;
3. Ensure that natural resource management and economic development in the region are
environmentally sustainable;
4. Strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations (the United
States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, and Sweden);
5. Involve the Arctic’s indigenous communities in decisions that affect them; and
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6. Enhance scientific monitoring and research into local, regional, and global
environmental issues.
B. National Security and Homeland Security Interests in the Arctic
1. The United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic
region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to
safeguard these interests. These interests include such matters as missile defense and early
warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence,
maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation
and overflight.
2. The United States also has fundamental homeland security interests in preventing
terrorist attacks and mitigating those criminal or hostile acts that could increase the United
States vulnerability to terrorism in the Arctic region.
3. The Arctic region is primarily a maritime domain; as such, existing policies and
authorities relating to maritime areas continue to apply, including those relating to law
enforcement.[1] Human activity in the Arctic region is increasing and is projected to increase
further in coming years. This requires the United States to assert a more active and
influential national presence to protect its Arctic interests and to project sea power
throughout the region.
4. The United States exercises authority in accordance with lawful claims of United States
sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the Arctic region, including sovereignty
within the territorial sea, sovereign rights and jurisdiction within the United States exclusive
economic zone and on the continental shelf, and appropriate control in the United States
contiguous zone.
5. Freedom of the seas is a top national priority. The Northwest Passage is a strait used for
international navigation, and the Northern Sea Route includes straits used for international
navigation; the regime of transit passage applies to passage through those straits. Preserving
the rights and duties relating to navigation and overflight in the Arctic region supports our
ability to exercise these rights throughout the world, including through strategic straits.
6. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to national security and
homeland security interests in the Arctic, the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland
Security, in coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies,
shall:
a. Develop greater capabilities and capacity, as necessary, to protect United States air,
land, and sea borders in the Arctic region;
b. Increase Arctic maritime domain awareness in order to protect maritime commerce,
critical infrastructure, and key resources;
c. Preserve the global mobility of United States military and civilian vessels and aircraft
throughout the Arctic region;
d. Project a sovereign United States maritime presence in the Arctic in support of essential
United States interests; and
e. Encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes in the Arctic region.
C. International Governance
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1. The United States participates in a variety of fora, international organizations, and
bilateral contacts that promote United States interests in the Arctic. These include the Arctic
Council, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), wildlife conservation and
management agreements, and many other mechanisms. As the Arctic changes and human
activity in the region increases, the United States and other governments should consider, as
appropriate, new international arrangements or enhancements to existing arrangements.
2. The Arctic Council has produced positive results for the United States by working
within its limited mandate of environmental protection and sustainable development. Its
subsidiary bodies, with help from many United States agencies, have developed and
undertaken projects on a wide range of topics. The Council also provides a beneficial venue
for interaction with indigenous groups. It is the position of the United States that the Arctic
Council should remain a high-level forum devoted to issues within its current mandate and
not be transformed into a formal international organization, particularly one with assessed
contributions. The United States is nevertheless open to updating the structure of the
Council, including consolidation of, or making operational changes to, its subsidiary bodies,
to the extent such changes can clearly improve the Council’s work and are consistent with
the general mandate of the Council.
3. The geopolitical circumstances of the Arctic region differ sufficiently from those of the
Antarctic region such that an “Arctic Treaty” of broad scope—along the lines of the
Antarctic Treaty—is not appropriate or necessary.
4. The Senate should act favorably on U.S. accession to the U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea promptly, to protect and advance U.S. interests, including with respect to the
Arctic. Joining will serve the national security interests of the United States, including the
maritime mobility of our Armed Forces worldwide. It will secure U.S. sovereign rights over
extensive marine areas, including the valuable natural resources they contain. Accession will
promote U.S. interests in the environmental health of the oceans. And it will give the United
States a seat at the table when the rights that are vital to our interests are debated and
interpreted.
5. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to international governance, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments and
agencies, shall:
a. Continue to cooperate with other countries on Arctic issues through the United Nations
(U.N.) and its specialized agencies, as well as through treaties such as the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air
Pollution and its protocols, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer;
b. Consider, as appropriate, new or enhanced international arrangements for the Arctic to
address issues likely to arise from expected increases in human activity in that region,
including shipping, local development and subsistence, exploitation of living marine
resources, development of energy and other resources, and tourism;
c. Review Arctic Council policy recommendations developed within the ambit of the
Council’s scientific reviews and ensure the policy recommendations are subject to review by
Arctic governments; and
d. Continue to seek advice and consent of the United States Senate to accede to the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention.
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D. Extended Continental Shelf and Boundary Issues
1. Defining with certainty the area of the Arctic seabed and subsoil in which the United
States may exercise its sovereign rights over natural resources such as oil, natural gas,
methane hydrates, minerals, and living marine species is critical to our national interests in
energy security, resource management, and environmental protection. The most effective
way to achieve international recognition and legal certainty for our extended continental
shelf is through the procedure available to States Parties to the U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea.
2. The United States and Canada have an unresolved boundary in the Beaufort Sea. United
States policy recognizes a boundary in this area based on equidistance. The United States
recognizes that the boundary area may contain oil, natural gas, and other resources.
3. The United States and Russia are abiding by the terms of a maritime boundary treaty
concluded in 1990, pending its entry into force. The United States is prepared to enter the
agreement into force once ratified by the Russian Federation.
4. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to extended continental shelf and
boundary issues, the Secretary of State, in coordination with heads of other relevant
executive departments and agencies, shall:
a. Take all actions necessary to establish the outer limit of the continental shelf
appertaining to the United States, in the Arctic and in other regions, to the fullest extent
permitted under international law;
b. Consider the conservation and management of natural resources during the process of
delimiting the extended continental shelf; and
c. Continue to urge the Russian Federation to ratify the 1990 United States-Russia
maritime boundary agreement.
E. Promoting International Scientific Cooperation
1. Scientific research is vital for the promotion of United States interests in the Arctic
region. Successful conduct of U.S. research in the Arctic region requires access throughout
the Arctic Ocean and to terrestrial sites, as well as viable international mechanisms for
sharing access to research platforms and timely exchange of samples, data, and analyses.
Better coordination with the Russian Federation, facilitating access to its domain, is
particularly important.
2. The United States promotes the sharing of Arctic research platforms with other countries
in support of collaborative research that advances fundamental understanding of the Arctic
region in general and potential Arctic change in particular. This could include collaboration
with bodies such as the Nordic Council and the European Polar Consortium, as well as with
individual nations.
3. Accurate prediction of future environmental and climate change on a regional basis, and
the delivery of near real-time information to end-users, requires obtaining, analyzing, and
disseminating accurate data from the entire Arctic region, including both paleoclimatic data
and observational data. The United States has made significant investments in the
infrastructure needed to collect environmental data in the Arctic region, including the
establishment of portions of an Arctic circumpolar observing network through a partnership
among United States agencies, academic collaborators, and Arctic residents. The United
States promotes active involvement of all Arctic nations in these efforts in order to advance
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scientific understanding that could provide the basis for assessing future impacts and
proposed response strategies.
4. United States platforms capable of supporting forefront research in the Arctic Ocean,
including portions expected to be ice-covered for the foreseeable future, as well as seasonally
ice-free regions, should work with those of other nations through the establishment of an
Arctic circumpolar observing network. All Arctic nations are members of the Group on Earth
Observations partnership, which provides a framework for organizing an international
approach to environmental observations in the region. In addition, the United States
recognizes that academic and research institutions are vital partners in promoting and
conducting Arctic research.
5. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to promoting scientific
international cooperation, the Secretaries of State, the Interior, and Commerce and the
Director of the National Science Foundation, in coordination with heads of other relevant
executive departments and agencies, shall:
a. Continue to play a leadership role in research throughout the Arctic region;
b. Actively promote full and appropriate access by scientists to Arctic research sites
through bilateral and multilateral measures and by other means;
c. Lead the effort to establish an effective Arctic circumpolar observing network with
broad partnership from other relevant nations;
d. Promote regular meetings of Arctic science ministers or research council heads to share
information concerning scientific research opportunities and to improve coordination of
international Arctic research programs;
e. Work with the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC) to promote
research that is strategically linked to U.S. policies articulated in this directive, with input
from the Arctic Research Commission; and
f. Strengthen partnerships with academic and research institutions and build upon the
relationships these institutions have with their counterparts in other nations.
F. Maritime Transportation in the Arctic Region
1. The United States priorities for maritime transportation in the Arctic region are:
a. To facilitate safe, secure, and reliable navigation;
b. To protect maritime commerce; and
c. To protect the environment.
2. Safe, secure, and environmentally sound maritime commerce in the Arctic region
depends on infrastructure to support shipping activity, search and rescue capabilities, short-
and long-range aids to navigation, high-risk area vessel-traffic management, iceberg
warnings and other sea ice information, effective shipping standards, and measures to protect
the marine environment. In addition, effective search and rescue in the Arctic will require
local, State, Federal, tribal, commercial, volunteer, scientific, and multinational cooperation.
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3. Working through the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United States
promotes strengthening existing measures and, as necessary, developing new measures to
improve the safety and security of maritime transportation, as well as to protect the marine
environment in the Arctic region. These measures may include ship routing and reporting
systems, such as traffic separation and vessel traffic management schemes in Arctic
chokepoints; updating and strengthening of the Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-
Covered Waters; underwater noise standards for commercial shipping; a review of shipping
insurance issues; oil and other hazardous material pollution response agreements; and
environmental standards.
4. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to maritime transportation in the
Arctic region, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Transportation, Commerce, and Homeland
Security, in coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies,
shall:
a. Develop additional measures, in cooperation with other nations, to address issues that
are likely to arise from expected increases in shipping into, out of, and through the Arctic
region;
b. Commensurate with the level of human activity in the region, establish a risk-based
capability to address hazards in the Arctic environment. Such efforts shall advance work on
pollution prevention and response standards; determine basing and logistics support
requirements, including necessary airlift and icebreaking capabilities; and improve plans and
cooperative agreements for search and rescue;
c. Develop Arctic waterways management regimes in accordance with accepted
international standards, including vessel traffic-monitoring and routing; safe navigation
standards; accurate and standardized charts; and accurate and timely environmental and
navigational information; and
d. Evaluate the feasibility of using access through the Arctic for strategic sealift and
humanitarian aid and disaster relief.
G. Economic Issues, Including Energy
1. Sustainable development in the Arctic region poses particular challenges. Stakeholder
input will inform key decisions as the United States seeks to promote economic and energy
security. Climate change and other factors are significantly affecting the lives of Arctic
inhabitants, particularly indigenous communities. The United States affirms the importance
to Arctic communities of adapting to climate change, given their particular vulnerabilities.
2. Energy development in the Arctic region will play an important role in meeting growing
global energy demand as the area is thought to contain a substantial portion of the world’s
undiscovered energy resources. The United States seeks to ensure that energy development
throughout the Arctic occurs in an environmentally sound manner, taking into account the
interests of indigenous and local communities, as well as open and transparent market
principles. The United States seeks to balance access to, and development of, energy and
other natural resources with the protection of the Arctic environment by ensuring that
continental shelf resources are managed in a responsible manner and by continuing to work
closely with other Arctic nations.
3. The United States recognizes the value and effectiveness of existing fora, such as the
Arctic Council, the International Regulators Forum, and the International Standards
Organization.
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4. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to economic issues, including
energy, the Secretaries of State, the Interior, Commerce, and Energy, in coordination with
heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall:
a. Seek to increase efforts, including those in the Arctic Council, to study changing climate
conditions, with a view to preserving and enhancing economic opportunity in the Arctic
region. Such efforts shall include inventories and assessments of villages, indigenous
communities, subsistence opportunities, public facilities, infrastructure, oil and gas
development projects, alternative energy development opportunities, forestry, cultural and
other sites, living marine resources, and other elements of the Arctic’s socioeconomic
composition;
b. Work with other Arctic nations to ensure that hydrocarbon and other development in the
Arctic region is carried out in accordance with accepted best practices and internationally
recognized standards and the 2006 Group of Eight (G-8) Global Energy Security Principles;
c. Consult with other Arctic nations to discuss issues related to exploration, production,
environmental and socioeconomic impacts, including drilling conduct, facility sharing, the
sharing of environmental data, impact assessments, compatible monitoring programs, and
reservoir management in areas with potentially shared resources;
d. Protect United States interests with respect to hydrocarbon reservoirs that may overlap
boundaries to mitigate adverse environmental and economic consequences related to their
development;
e. Identify opportunities for international cooperation on methane hydrate issues, North
Slope hydrology, and other matters;
f. Explore whether there is a need for additional fora for informing decisions on
hydrocarbon leasing, exploration, development, production, and transportation, as well as
shared support activities, including infrastructure projects; and
g. Continue to emphasize cooperative mechanisms with nations operating in the region to
address shared concerns, recognizing that most known Arctic oil and gas resources are
located outside of United States jurisdiction.
H. Environmental Protection and Conservation of Natural Resources
1. The Arctic environment is unique and changing. Increased human activity is expected to
bring additional stressors to the Arctic environment, with potentially serious consequences
for Arctic communities and ecosystems.
2. Despite a growing body of research, the Arctic environment remains poorly understood.
Sea ice and glaciers are in retreat. Permafrost is thawing and coasts are eroding. Pollutants
from within and outside the Arctic are contaminating the region. Basic data are lacking in
many fields. High levels of uncertainty remain concerning the effects of climate change and
increased human activity in the Arctic. Given the need for decisions to be based on sound
scientific and socioeconomic information, Arctic environmental research, monitoring, and
vulnerability assessments are top priorities. For example, an understanding of the probable
consequences of global climate variability and change on Arctic ecosystems is essential to
guide the effective long-term management of Arctic natural resources and to address
socioeconomic impacts of changing patterns in the use of natural resources.
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3. Taking into account the limitations in existing data, United States efforts to protect the
Arctic environment and to conserve its natural resources must be risk-based and proceed on
the basis of the best available information.
4. The United States supports the application in the Arctic region of the general principles
of international fisheries management outlined in the 1995 Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of
December 10, 1982, relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and similar instruments. The United States endorses the
protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems in the Arctic from destructive fishing practices
and seeks to ensure an adequate enforcement presence to safeguard Arctic living marine
resources.
5. With temperature increases in the Arctic region, contaminants currently locked in the ice
and soils will be released into the air, water, and land. This trend, along with increased
human activity within and below the Arctic, will result in increased introduction of
contaminants into the Arctic, including both persistent pollutants (e.g., persistent organic
pollutants and mercury) and airborne pollutants (e.g., soot).
6. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to environmental protection and
conservation of natural resources, the Secretaries of State, the Interior, Commerce, and
Homeland Security and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, in
coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall:
a. In cooperation with other nations, respond effectively to increased pollutants and other
environmental challenges;
b. Continue to identify ways to conserve, protect, and sustainably manage Arctic species
and ensure adequate enforcement presence to safeguard living marine resources, taking
account of the changing ranges or distribution of some species in the Arctic. For species
whose range includes areas both within and beyond United States jurisdiction, the United
States shall continue to collaborate with other governments to ensure effective conservation
and management;
c. Seek to develop ways to address changing and expanding commercial fisheries in the
Arctic, including through consideration of international agreements or organizations to
govern future Arctic fisheries;
d. Pursue marine ecosystem-based management in the Arctic; and
e. Intensify efforts to develop scientific information on the adverse effects of pollutants on
human health and the environment and work with other nations to reduce the introduction of
key pollutants into the Arctic.
IV. Resources and Assets
A. Implementing a number of the policy elements directed above will require appropriate
resources and assets. These elements shall be implemented consistent with applicable law
and authorities of agencies, or heads of agencies, vested by law, and subject to the
availability of appropriations. The heads of executive departments and agencies with
responsibilities relating to the Arctic region shall work to identify future budget,
administrative, personnel, or legislative proposal requirements to implement the elements of
this directive.
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[1] These policies and authorities include Freedom of Navigation (PDD/NSC-32), the U.S.
Policy on Protecting the Ocean Environment (PDD/NSC-36), Maritime Security Policy
(NSPD-41/HSPD-13), and the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS).269
Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke, Coordinator
John Frittelli
Specialist in Naval Affairs
Specialist in Transportation Policy
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
jfrittelli@crs.loc.gov, 7-7033
Marjorie Ann Browne
Curry L. Hagerty
Specialist in International Relations
Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy
mbrowne@crs.loc.gov, 7-7695
chagerty@crs.loc.gov, 7-7738
Eugene H. Buck
Marc Humphries
Specialist in Natural Resources Policy
Specialist in Energy Policy
gbuck@crs.loc.gov, 7-7262
mhumphries@crs.loc.gov, 7-7264
M. Lynne Corn
Jane A. Leggett
Specialist in Natural Resources Policy
Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy
lcorn@crs.loc.gov, 7-7267
jaleggett@crs.loc.gov, 7-9525
Carl Ek
Jonathan L. Ramseur
Specialist in International Relations
Specialist in Environmental Policy
cek@crs.loc.gov, 7-7286
jramseur@crs.loc.gov, 7-7919
Peter Folger
Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy
pfolger@crs.loc.gov, 7-1517
269 Source for text: http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm. The text is also available online at http://www.nsf.gov/
od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf.
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