U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and
Modernization: Background and Issues
for Congress
Michael A. Miller
US Air Force Fellow
April 23, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43049
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
Summary
The United States’ existing long-range bomber fleet of B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s are at a critical
point in their operational life span. With the average age of each airframe being 50, 28, and 20
years old, respectively, military analysts are beginning to question just how long these aircraft can
physically last and continue to be credible weapon systems. As potential adversaries acquire 21st
century defense systems designed to prevent U.S. access to the global commons (sea, air, space,
and cyberspace) and to limit U.S. forces’ freedom of action within an operational area, the ability
of these Cold War era bombers to get close enough to targets to be effective will continue to
deteriorate. Although the Air Force is committed to the development and acquisition of its
proposed Long-Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B), it is anticipated that flight-testing of the new
bomber will not start until the mid-2020s, with initial operational capability near 2030. With this
timeline in mind, the Air Force has extended the operational lives of the B-52 and B-1 out to 2040
and the B-2 out to 2058. Air Force and aerospace industry experts insist that with sufficient
funding for sustainment and modernization over their expected lifespans, all three of the existing
bombers can physically last and continue to remain credible weapon systems. However,
appropriations decisions made by Congress based on required military capabilities to meet
national security objectives will ultimately determine how long the B-52, B-1, and B-2 will
remain in service.
The central issue for Congress is how much funding should be appropriated for the continued
sustainment and modernization of the B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers over the remainder of their
service lives. Interest in this subject stems from Congress’s authority to approve, reject, or modify
Air Force funding requests for bomber sustainment and modernization as well as its oversight of
the nation’s long-range strike requirements and capabilities. In addition, sustainment,
modernization, and size of the bomber force have been perennial legislative topics since the early
1990s. As the Air Force progresses through development and acquisition of the LRS-B and begins
the gradual phase-out of 50-year-old bombers, it is anticipated Congress will continue dealing
with bomber sustainment and modernization legislation. Congress’s decisions on appropriations
for the bomber force could affect the nation’s long-range strike capabilities and have unintended
consequences on U.S. national security as well as the U.S. aerospace industry.
The context through which Congress will make these decisions includes U.S. national security
and defense strategies and the expectation of the role the B-52, B-1, and B-2 will play in
executing those strategies. Some of the many global and strategic variables that could become
central in Congress’s decision making on the bomber force include the following:
• the Obama Administration’s 2012 rebalance in national security strategy toward
the Asia-Pacific region and the military implications applicable to the bomber
force;
• the expected contribution of bombers in accomplishing the critical missions of
U.S. forces as outlined in the Department of Defense’s strategic guidance,
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense;
• the effectiveness and sustainability of the Air Force’s continuous bomber
presence operation—based in the Pacific at Anderson Air Force Base, Guam—
and corresponding displays of worldwide power projection missions by all three
bombers;
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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
• the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenge presented by potential adversaries
and the developments related to bombers’ employment in an A2/AD threat
environment; and
• the bombers’ role in nuclear deterrent operations and the impact of the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty on the B-52 and B-2.
The starting point for Congress’s debate on bomber modernization and sustainment is the existing
Air Force bomber force, which includes
• 76 B-52H Stratofortress bombers capable of both conventional and nuclear
operations and capable of employing long-range standoff weapons. The B-52H
first entered service on May 9, 1961.
• 63 B-1B Lancer bombers capable of supersonic and low-level flight,
conventional only operations, and employing long-range standoff weapons. The
B-1B became operational in 1986.
• 20 B-2A Spirit, low observable (stealth) bombers capable of both conventional
and nuclear operations. The B-2A entered service in December 1993 and became
fully operational capable (FOC) on December 17, 2003.
Potential congressional oversight and appropriations concerns for the sustainment and
modernization of the U.S. Air Force’s bomber force may include the following:
• the potential for a shortfall in the nation’s long-range strike capabilities as
development of the Air Force’s proposed LRS-B continues;
• the feasibility and affordability of Air Force bomber sustainment and
modernization plans and whether those plans bridge any potential long-range
strike capabilities gap until the LRS-B becomes operational;
• the amount of money Congress and the nation should continue spending on 28-
and 50-year-old bombers;
• the sufficiency of acquisition plans for the 80 to 100 LRS-Bs to backfill U.S.
long-range strike requirements as the legacy bomber force ages out of service;
• the possibility of further delaying development and acquisition of the proposed
LRS-B given sufficient levels of funding for sustainment and modernization of
the current bomber force;
• the modernization, sustainment, and development of the weapons employed by
the bomber force that affect the bombers’ effectiveness and ability to operate in
advanced, 21st century A2/AD threat environment;
• the potential implications of reduced bomber sustainment and modernization, and
subsequent diminishing numbers of airframes, on any future rounds of base
realignment and closure efforts; and
• the ability of the nation’s industrial base to sustain an aging bomber force.
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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 2
United States’ Military Strategy Shift: Do the Bombers’ Capabilities Meet Strategic
Requirements? ........................................................................................................................ 2
Potential Strategic Influence of Bombers on the Administration’s Strategy Shift ..................... 4
Bomber Expectations: Employment in DOD’s Strategic Guidance .......................................... 5
Bomber Contribution to Critical Missions .......................................................................... 5
Forward Deployed Diplomacy: Continuous Bomber Presence and Worldwide
Power Projection .............................................................................................................. 8
Meeting the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenge .............................................. 10
Bomber Employment in an A2/AD Environment ............................................................. 12
Nuclear Deterrent Operations ............................................................................................ 14
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty: Impact on Bombers ............................................ 15
Existing U.S. Bomber Force .................................................................................................... 15
B-52H Stratofortress ................................................................................................................ 16
Current B-52 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts ............................................................ 17
B-1B Lancer ............................................................................................................................ 19
Current B-1 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts .............................................................. 20
B-2A Spirit............................................................................................................................... 22
Current B-2 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts .............................................................. 22
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 25
Potential for Inducing a Shortfall in Long-Range Strike Capabilities ..................................... 25
Will Current Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization Plans Get Us to the
LRS-B? ................................................................................................................................. 26
To Fund or Not to Fund: What Are DOD and Air Force Priorities? ........................................ 27
As Legacy Bombers Phase Out, Are 80-100 LRS-Bs Sufficient? ........................................... 29
If Legacy Bombers are Modernized, Can the Air Force Further Delay Development
of the LRS-B? ....................................................................................................................... 30
Modernization of Bomber-Launched Weapons ....................................................................... 31
Potential Implications of Bomber Modernization on Air Force Basing and any Future
Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC) ............................................................................. 32
Industrial Base Concerns Associated with Bomber Sustainment ............................................ 33
Historical Appropriations for Bomber Sustainment and Modernization, FY2002-2012 ............... 34
Legislative Activity FY2011-FY2013 ........................................................................................... 37
FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383) .................................................. 37
FY2012 Department of Defense Appropriations (H.Rept. 112-331) ....................................... 37
FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81) .................................................... 38
FY2013 Department of Defense Appropriations (S.Rept. 112-196: To accompany
H.R. 5856) ...................................................................................................................... 39
FY2013 Department of Defense Authorizations (P.L. 112-239) ....................................... 39
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 39
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Figures
Figure 1. Joint Operational Access and Air-Sea Battle Concept .................................................... 11
Figure 2. Legacy Bomber Employment in an A2/AD Operating Environment ............................. 13
Figure 3. B-52H Stratofortress ....................................................................................................... 16
Figure 4. B-1B Lancer ................................................................................................................... 19
Figure 5. B-2A Spirit ..................................................................................................................... 22
Figure 6. DOD Planned Long Range Strike Inventories and Funding (Includes B-52H, B-
1B and B-2) ................................................................................................................................ 28
Figure 7. Congressional Authorizations and Appropriations for Bomber Sustainment and
Modernization ............................................................................................................................. 34
Figure 8. B-52, B-1 and B-2 Appropriations Comparison ............................................................. 35
Figure 9. B-52, B-1 and B-2 Appropriations and Average Historical Mission Capable
Rates ........................................................................................................................................... 36
Figure B-1. Graphical Summary of B-52 Sustainment and Modernization Master Plan .............. 50
Figure B-2. Historical Comparison of B-52 Appropriated Funding and the Average
Annual Mission Capable (MC) Rates for the B-52 Fleet ........................................................... 51
Figure C-1. B-1 Strategic Action and Investment Plan, $250 Million/Fiscal Year Funding
Scenario (numbers are in millions of dollars) ............................................................................. 56
Figure C-2. Historical Comparison of B-1 Appropriated Funding and the Average Annual
Mission Capable (MC) Rates for the B-1 fleet ........................................................................... 57
Figure D-1. Graphical Summary of B-2 Sustainment and Modernization Master Plan ................ 62
Figure D-2. Historical Comparison of B-2 Appropriated Funding and the Average Annual
Mission Capable (MC) Rates for the B-2 fleet .......................................................................... 63
Tables
Table 1. Historical Examples of Missions Accomplished by Bombers ........................................... 7
Table 2. Current U.S. Air Force Bomber Force ............................................................................. 16
Table 3. Current B-52 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts .................................................... 18
Table 4. Current B-1 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts ...................................................... 21
Table 5. Current B-2 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts ...................................................... 24
Table 6. DOD Aviation Long Range Strike Aircraft Inventory (Includes B-52H, B-1B,
and B-2) ...................................................................................................................................... 26
Appendixes
Appendix A. Existing Bomber Force ............................................................................................. 41
Appendix B. Plans for B-52H Bomber Sustainment and Modernization ...................................... 47
Appendix C. Plans for B-1 Bomber Sustainment and Modernization ........................................... 52
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Appendix D. Plans for B-2 Sustainment and Modernization......................................................... 58
Appendix E. Legislative Activity FY2011-FY2013 ...................................................................... 64
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 70
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Introduction
The central issue addressed by this report is how much Congress should consider appropriating
for the continued sustainment and modernization of the B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers over the
remainder of their service lives. Many military experts note the advanced age of the United
States’ long-range bomber fleet. The B-52H Stratofortress, B-1B Lancer, and B-2A Spirit are now
about 50, 28, and 20 years old respectively. In fact, Air Force Global Strike Command declared
2012 the “Year of the B-52” in honor of the 50th anniversary of the last delivery of a B-52 and the
60th anniversary of the first test flight of the YB-52.1 The B-1B celebrated its 25th anniversary in
2010. The last B-2 delivery was in 1997. Although the Department of Defense and the Air Force
are committed to the development and fielding of a new Long-Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B),
flight-testing of the new bomber will likely not start until the mid-2020s. Initial development of
the B-2 began in the early 1980s and the first aircraft was delivered on December 17, 1993. If the
B-2 experience is the norm, potential delivery of the first operational LRS-B may be expected
sometime in the 2030 timeframe. With this in mind, can the U.S. Air Force’s B-52Hs, B-1Bs, and
B-2As physically last and continue to be credible weapon systems until the LRS-B is fielded?
More importantly, does the nation’s “legacy” bomber force possess the capabilities required to
meet national security strategy objectives, especially in the face of potential adversaries
possessing advanced, 21st century anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) weapon systems?2 The U.S.
Air Force and aerospace industry’s answer is “yes,” provided sufficient sustainment and
modernization funding is available over the remaining lifespan of these weapon systems.
Without sufficient sustainment and modernization funding, many analysts argue the U.S. bomber
fleet will quickly become a decrepit force ill-suited to the potential challenges posed by 21st
century adversaries. The average age of the bomber force is 33. Because of the physical wear-
and-tear placed on these aircraft from the demands of military flight—compounded by 11 years
of continuous combat—aging airframe structures need reinforcement, engines need to be
replaced, and computer and electronic components need upgrading. Even if corrosion, metal
fatigue, and parts obsolescence do not take their toll on the fleet, military analysts point out that
potential adversaries are acquiring advanced, A2/AD weapon systems that would make it harder
for the bombers to reach their targets, thus relegating them to a “standoff” weapons employment
role.3 But even “standoff” weapons have their limits, especially against deeply buried and/or
hardened targets found in places like North Korea and Iran. Consequently, most experts agree all
three bombers are in need of upgrades to their systems in order to counter A2/AD-equipped
adversaries and require constant operational research and testing to evaluate and incorporate new
and modern weapons into their arsenal.
1 The YB-52 was the second B-52 prototype aircraft built. The aircraft was completed and rolled out for ground testing
on March 15, 1952. The first flight was one month later on April 15. The YB-52 was the first B-52-type to actually fly.
2 Congress found that the 2010 report on the Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review concluded that anti-
access/area denial strategies and weapon systems “seek to deny outside countries the ability to project power into a
region, thereby allowing aggression or other destabilizing actions to be conducted by the anti-access power. Without
dominant capabilities to project power, the integrity of United States alliances and security partnerships could be called
into question, reducing United States security and influence and increasing the possibility of conflict.” P.L. 111-383,
111th Congress, 2nd session, 2011, Section 1238.
3 For example, Lt. Gen. Christopher D. Miller, deputy chief of staff for Air Force strategic plans and programs noted,
“The current fleet [of bombers] has been upgraded over the years with new weapons and electronic warfare systems,
but it is increasingly at risk to modernizing air defenses.” Quoted in John A. Tirpack’s, “Time to Get Started,” Air
Force Magazine, February 2012, 31.
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This report addresses potential congressional oversight and appropriations concerns for the
sustainment and modernization of the U.S. Air Force’s bomber force. It does not address Air
Force efforts to develop and acquire the proposed LRS-B. Congressional interest in this subject
stems from Congress’s authority to approve, reject, or modify Air Force funding requests for
bomber sustainment and modernization, as well as their oversight of the nation’s long-range strike
requirements and capabilities. In addition, sustainment, modernization, and size of the bomber
force have been perennial legislative topics since the early 1990s. As the Air Force progresses
through development and acquisition of the LRS-B and begins the gradual phase-out of 50-year-
old bombers, it is anticipated that Congress will continue dealing with bomber sustainment and
modernization legislation. Congress’s decisions on appropriations for the bomber force could
impact the nation’s long-range strike capabilities and have additional consequences for the U.S.
aerospace industry.
A key issue for Congress is whether to continue providing sustainment and modernization
funding for the Air Force’s B-52H, B-1B, and B-2A bombers, and if so, at what levels. Pertinent
to the discussion is the potential for a shortfall in the nation’s long-range strike capabilities if
Congress or the Air Force chooses to minimize funding for sustainment and upgrades that would
keep these weapon systems viable against A2/AD-equipped adversaries. Also, given Air Force
plans to keep the B-52 and B-1 flying well beyond 2030, Congress may consider whether current
bomber sustainment and modernization plans will meet the nation’s long-range strike
requirements until the LRS-B is operational. Additionally, Congress may also consider whether
the planned 80-100 LRS-Bs will adequately replace the capabilities lost as the legacy bombers
start retiring from service in the 2030s. Congress’s oversight and decisions on these issues could
also have implications for any potential future base realignment and closure (BRAC) decisions as
well as impact the U.S. aircraft manufacturing industrial base. Ultimately, the priority the Air
Force places on bomber sustainment and modernization, and any decisions considered by
Congress, could have potential consequences for future national defense strategies and on U.S.
long-range strike capabilities.
Background
United States’ Military Strategy Shift: Do the Bombers’
Capabilities Meet Strategic Requirements?
The Obama Administration’s 2012 shift in national security and defense strategy towards the
Asia-Pacific region has significant implications for America’s legacy bomber force.4 Stemming
from the growing economic importance of the Asia-Pacific region, China’s growing military
capabilities and its increasing assertiveness of claims to disputed maritime territories, U.S.
concerns with freedom of navigation and the ability to project power in the region, and the end of
U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, President Obama directed the Department of
Defense (DOD) to raise the Asia-Pacific region’s priority in U.S. military planning.5 Many
analysts agree this rebalance has placed renewed emphasis on U.S. naval forces due to the
4 For in-depth analysis of the Obama Administration’s rebalance towards Asia-Pacific, see CRS Report R42448, Pivot
to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia, coordinated by Mark E. Manyin.
5 For in-depth analysis of DOD’s new strategic guidance, see CRS Report R42146, In Brief: Assessing DOD’s New
Strategic Guidance, by Catherine Dale and Pat Towell.
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maritime character of the Pacific theater of operations. However, budgetary pressures and
potential defense cuts may reduce long-term naval procurement plans and planned naval force
levels in the Pacific region.6 Consequently, just as B-17 and B-29 bombers demonstrated the
value of long-range airpower projection in the Pacific Theater during World War II, the U.S. Air
Force may be planning on the current fleet of B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s to provide an essential
complement to U.S. naval forces in the vast geographical expanses of the Asia-Pacific.7
In addition to the Asia-Pacific, the Administration’s new defense strategy also calls for retaining
emphasis on the Middle East while ensuring U.S. defense commitments to European allies. This
aspect of the new strategy may prove the most challenging from a resource perspective as the
DOD is forced to implement automatic spending cuts laid out in the Budget Control Act (BCA) of
2011 (P.L. 112-25/S. 365 of August 2, 2011). The BCA necessitates $55 billion a year in defense
cuts over the nine years from FY2013 to FY2021. Specifically for the bomber force, Air Force
leaders have said that such cuts would result in an 18% reduction in both bomber flying hours and
in bomber sustainment and modernization efforts, resulting in aircraft availability and mission
capable rates falling below standards.8 Some military analysts, consequently, are skeptical as to
whether U.S. force levels will be sufficient to meet multiple, competing priorities in both the
Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, all the while reassuring U.S. commitments in Europe.9
However, some historical examples suggest the current bomber force is capable of balancing
national security priorities among competing geographical regions.
Since 2003, B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s have maintained a continuous bomber presence in the Pacific
with regularly scheduled rotations to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, while simultaneously
participating in continuous combat operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan. An example of
this is the March 2003 deployment of B-52s and B-1s to Guam (in response to North Korean
nuclear weapons activities) while additional B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s participated in the opening
phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom and flew combat sorties in Afghanistan.10 Essentially, this dual
deployment of bombers to two geographical regions demonstrated the United States and the
bomber force’s ability to fight wars in the Middle East and Afghanistan while retaining the
capability to respond to potential crises in the Asia-Pacific.
6 For example, there is considerable concern that long-term Navy budgets will not sustain a Navy of 313 ships, as
called for in recent plans. See, for instance, Jonathan Greenert, “Navy, 2025: Forward Warfighters,” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, December 2011: 20 and 22.
7 Ashton B. Carter, Deputy Secretary of Defense, “The U.S. Strategic Rebalance to Asia: A Defense Perspective”
(speech, The Asia Society, New York, NY, 1 August 2012); and, Tom Vanden Brook, “B-1 bomber mission shifts from
Afghanistan to China, Pacific,” USA Today online, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/military/story/2012-05-11/b-
1-bomber-obama-new-strategy/56097706/1.
8 Department of the U.S. Air Force, Public Affairs Guidance: Sequestration-Final, (Washington, DC: USAF Public
Affairs Office, 7 February 2013).
9 For example, Dan Blumenthal, director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, assesses that the current
U.S. response to China’s military modernization, manifested in the Obama Administration’s rebalance to the Asia-
Pacific and the U.S. military’s operational concept called Air-Sea Battle (ASB), is inadequate in several respects.
Primarily, Blumenthal argues that cuts to the defense budget will make it difficult to resource the Administration’s
“rebalance” and the military’s ASB concept while continuing to address challenges that remain in the Middle East and
Europe. Dan Blumenthal et al., Strategic Asia 2012-13: China’s Military Challenge (Washington, DC: The National
Bureau of Asian Research, 2012), chapter on: The U.S. Response to China’s Military, p 309.
10 Rebecca Grant, “Bomber Diplomacy,” Air Force Magazine, December 2011, 32.
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Potential Strategic Influence of Bombers on the Administration’s
Strategy Shift
The Administration’s strategic guidance identifies three priorities for which the USAF bomber
force could have significant strategic influence. These include reaffirming U.S. commitment to
the security and prosperity of allies in the Asia-Pacific region; ensuring access to the global
commons which facilitate world-wide economic opportunities and guarantee U.S. power
projection capabilities; and ensuring a quick, military response capability to any hostilities from
potential adversaries in the region.
According to former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the U.S. commitment to what she termed
“forward-deployed” diplomacy would include the strengthening of bilateral security alliances
with U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific and necessitate the forging of a broad-based military
presence.11 Forward based bombers, whether deployed on a continuous basis or periodically as
part of training exercises, could play a significant role in reaffirming U.S. commitments to allies
in the Asia-Pacific region. Primarily through regular rotational deployments (such as the
continuous bomber presence rotation at Andersen AFB, Guam) and participation in bilateral and
multilateral training exercises, the visible presence of U.S. bombers abroad could potentially
reinforce the U.S. commitment to deterrence (conventional and nuclear) against any potential
adversary in the region and could provide an economical and effective way to increase U.S.
influence there.12
Freedom of navigation and access to the South China Sea is considered by many analysts vital to
the economy of every nation in North America and East Asia. More than half of the world’s
shipping passes through the South China Sea every year (approximately 70,000 ships carrying
$5.3 trillion worth of goods). Of that, $1.2 trillion worth is trade that directly affects the United
States.13 In addition, over 80% of crude oil supplies to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan flow
through the South China Sea—making these countries especially dependent on South China Sea
shipping routes.14 Any attempt to restrict universal access to this maritime common could impact
the security, political stability, and economic prosperity of the United States and its allies in the
region and potentially inhibit U.S. power projection capabilities by restricting the U.S. Navy’s
ability to patrol and operate in the South China Sea and the Malacca Straits. Long-range bombers,
conducting maritime reconnaissance and capable of anti-shipping operations, could actively and
passively maintain situational awareness of the vast Asia-Pacific maritime region and possibly
keep in check any potential adversary looking to threaten the United States and its allies’ access
to the Asia-Pacific’s commons.
11 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century
12 United States Pacific Command participates in multiple exercises and other engagement activities throughout the
Asia-Pacific region which the bomber force has or could take part in. These bilateral and multilateral exercises include
TALISMAN SABER, a biennial Australia/United States bilateral exercise; COBRA GOLD, a joint/combined exercise
with Thailand; BALIKATAN, a joint exercise with the Republic of the Philippines; KEEN SWORD/KEEN EDGE, a
joint/bilateral exercise with Japan; and, RIM OF THE PACIFIC, a biennial large-scale multinational power projection
and sea control exercise.
13 Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Armed Clash in the South China
Sea: Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14,” http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883,
(accessed 14 February 2013).
14 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress-Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
2008,” pdf p 11, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_08.pdf.
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Finally, the legacy bomber force is one option than can produce a quick, military response to
hostile actions taken by potential adversaries in the region. Unconstrained by the need for a
forward operating location within theater, the capability of bombers to reach anywhere in the
Asia-Pacific, in a relatively short period of time and with a wide array of weapons, could provide
national leaders a viable option for responding to encroachments on U.S. interests in the region
and for honoring defense and security commitments to U.S. allies.
Bomber Expectations: Employment in DOD’s Strategic Guidance
Bomber Contribution to Critical Missions
The Administration’s new strategic guidance emphasizes the military’s need to recalibrate its
capabilities and make selective investments to succeed in a number of missions critical to
achieving national security objectives.15 Any argument for or against any level of funding for
bomber modernization could include an assessment and cost/benefit analysis of those upgrades
and their contribution to accomplishing the expected missions of U.S. forces as defined in the
DOD’s strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense. These missions include:16
• Counter terrorism and irregular warfare;
• deter and defeat aggression;
• project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges;
• counter weapons of mass destruction;
• operate effectively in cyberspace and space;
• maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent;
• provide a stabilizing presence; and,
• conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations.
All three of the nation’s bombers have made, and are expected to continue making, significant
contributions to all of the critical missions set forth in DOD’s strategic guidance. Looking as far
back as 1962 (coinciding with the last B-52 delivery), numerous examples describe one or more
of the current bombers accomplishing these missions (see Table 1). However, with the rising
prevalence of 21st century A2/AD capabilities in several potential adversary countries, even the
U.S. Air Force assesses that modern threat capabilities are outpacing the 20th century capabilities
and abilities of the B-52, B-1 and, in some circumstances, even the B-2, to accomplish these
missions.17 Without funding for critical modernization and sustainment efforts, all three bombers
run the risk of becoming ineffective in the face of A2/AD equipped adversaries.18
15 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012
(Washington, DC), 4-6.
16 Ibid.
17 The U.S. Air Force acknowledges in its 2012 Posture Statement that, “as A2/AD capabilities proliferate, our [U.S.
Air Force] fourth-generation fighter and legacy bomber capability to penetrate contested airspace is increasingly
challenged” and “Procuring a new penetrating bomber is critical to maintaining our [U.S. Air Force] long-range strike
capability in the face of evolving A2/AD environments.” Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force Posture
(continued...)
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(...continued)
Statement, Washington, DC, 2012, 15-16.
18 Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities are meant to frustrate the U.S.’ ability to project substantial military
capability over considerable strategic and operational distances. A2 capabilities are designed to exclude U.S. forces
from a foreign theater or deny effective use and transit of the global commons such as air, maritime, space and
cyberspace. AD capabilities are designed to complicate U.S. force’s ability to establish a presence and effectively
operate in, over, or in range of an adversary’s territory or interests. Twenty-first century AD capabilities can attack U.S.
vulnerabilities in all five key operating domains—air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace.
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Table 1. Historical Examples of Missions Accomplished by Bombers
1962-Present
Counter
Stability/
Terror/Irreg Deter/Defeat
Power
Counter
Operate in
Nuclear
Stabilizing
COIN
Conflict/Crisis Bomber Warfare
Aggression
Projection
WMD
Cyberspace
Deterrent
Presence
Operations
Cold War
B-52,
B-1 X X X X X
1947-1991
Cuban Missile
B-52
X X X
Crisis 1962
Vietnam War
B-52 X
X X
1959-1975
Desert Storm
B-52
X
X
X
1991
Desert Fox 1998
B-52, B-1
X
X
X
Allied Force 1999
B-52, B-1, B-2
X
X
X
Afghanistan 2001-
B-52, B-1, B-2
X
X
X
X
X
present
Iraq 2003-2011
B-52, B-1, B-2
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Source: Prepared by CRS based on analysis of the historical use of bombers by the United States Air Force, 1947 to 2013.
CRS-7
U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
Forward Deployed Diplomacy: Continuous Bomber Presence and Worldwide
Power Projection
With the conclusion of U.S. military involvement in Iraq and U.S. forces drawing down in
Afghanistan, DOD has announced it intends to shift military capacity from the Middle East to the
Asia-Pacific region as part of the Obama Administration’s rebalancing strategy. On multiple
occasions, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter has stated DOD’s intent to begin rotating
B-1 bombers (which have been the only bomber participating in Operation Enduring Freedom
since May 2006) into the Asia-Pacific region to augment B-52s already on continuous rotation
there.19 This continuous rotation—referred to by the DOD as the Continuous Bomber Presence
(CBP)—is based at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, and represents a major investment in
ensuring U.S. security commitments in the Pacific.
Capable of reaching anywhere in the U.S. Pacific Command’s (USPACOM’s) area of
responsibility with weapons ranging from conventional to nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, the CBP
is one way of reassuring allies of the U.S. commitment to their defense and deterring potential
adversaries in the region, including possibly China. The CBP can potentially send the signal that
no naval vessel can patrol the South China Sea and Pacific without coming under the reach of
land-based bombers. According to former Pacific Air Forces commander General Gary L. North,
“Chinese military writings talk a lot about how to extend their power to the second island chain
… the 1,800 mile [factor], which would enable them to prevent other nations’ ability to have
freedom of movement at that great range.”20 Invoking the lessons learned from the Pacific Theater
of World War II, the CBP, and long-range airpower projection in general, could be seen as an
essential complement in dealing with potential adversary naval forces.
Air Force Global Strike Command recently announced B-2s will begin regular worldwide
training deployments to each of the regional U.S. combatant commands’ areas of responsibility
starting in 2013.21 According to 8th Air Force Commander Major General Stephen Wilson, B-2s
will rotate to forward operating locations all over the world in small numbers for a few weeks at a
time, a set number of times a year beginning with a short Pacific deployment in 2013.22 The plan
calls for B-2 deployments to all the geographic combatant commands including those in Central
and South America, Southwest Asia, and Europe in addition to the Asia-Pacific.23 These
worldwide training deployments are an exercise in power projection and meant to demonstrate
U.S. commitments to allies in multiple regions of the world while providing a visible deterrent to
any potential U.S. adversary.
Military analysts point out that engaging in this type of “forward deployed diplomacy” with the
bomber force has the potential to influence the Asia-Pacific region beyond the near-term concern
19 Ashton B. Carter, Deputy Secretary of Defense, “The U.S. Strategic Rebalance to Asia: A Defense Perspective”
(speech, The Asia Society, New York, NY, 1 August 2012) and (address, remarks on China’s Military Challenge,
Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, 3 October 2012).
20 Statement of General Gary L. North, former Pacific Air Forces Commander, in Rebecca Grant’s, “Bomber
Diplomacy,” Air Force Magazine, December 2011, 31.
21 Arie Church, “Spirit World Tour, Coming to a Theater Near You.” Air Force Magazine.com, 9 November 2012,
http://www.airforce-magazine.com/Pages/HomePage.aspx.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
of a rising China. Give the efforts by numerous Asian-Pacific states seeking to increase their
diplomatic, economic, and strategic influence in the region, the potential exists for a number of
regional players to acquire advanced military capabilities that could influence long-term U.S.
interests and/or threaten U.S. access to the region in the future. For example, North Korea’s
continuing efforts to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile capability, along with its nuclear
weapons program, represent a potential direct threat to the United States and threaten to
undermine regional security. South Korea, in an effort to offset its strategic vulnerabilities, has
undergone a vigorous procurement and acquisition of state-of-the-art weaponry and has invested
over $25 billion a year since 2006 on indigenous research and development programs for its local
defense industries.24 Japan, after years of watching its international influence eroded by a slow-
motion economic decline, is attempting to raise its relevance in the region by offering military aid
to regional neighbors and by stepping up training and engagement activities by its own armed
forces in an effort to build regional alliances and shore up other countries’ defenses.25 India, who
until the recent global economic downturn possessed the second-fastest-growing economy in the
world, became the largest weapons importer in the world in March 2011. It is anticipated that
India will spend up to $80 billion on military modernization by 2015, and it is considered by
many analysts to be on the verge of attaining military superpower status.26 Indonesia, supported
by its military leadership and a $16.7 billion budget, is moving forward with a three-year plan to
strengthen and modernize its military arsenal to include $2.5 billion for 10 light frigates, $2
billion for four submarines, and $6 billion for the addition of Russian Sukhoi and U.S. F-16
fighters.27 Taiwan, who is falling rapidly behind the unprecedented Chinese military buildup over
the past decade, conducted tests of a new “carrier killer” anti-ship missile in late 2012. Thought to
be an advanced version of the Hsiung Feng III anti-ship missile, such a weapon could pose a
significant challenge to any naval vessel operating in the Taiwan Straits if developed in sufficient
numbers.28 The point being, there is no doubt that with the enormous amount of economic,
military, and political power concentrated in the Asia-Pacific region, the proliferation of A2/AD
weapon systems could impact the future of U.S. influence and capacity in the region, regardless
of who possesses such capabilities.
CBP rotations and regular B-2 deployments stand to play a long-term role in the United States’
ability to influence and project military power in the Asia-Pacific, provided bomber sustainment
and modernization efforts keep pace with current and evolving A2/AD military capabilities that
24 Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, South Korea’s Unsustainable Military Build-Up, January 28, 2013,
http://journal.georgetown.edu/2013/01/28/south-koreas-unsustainable-military-build-up-by-jeong-lee/
25 Martin Fackler, Japan Is Flexing Its Military Muscle to Counter a Rising China, (The New York Times, November
26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/world/asia/japan-expands-its-regional-military-role.html?
pagewanted=all
26 The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported in March 2011 that India is now the largest
weapons importer in the world, receiving 9% of the volume of international arms transfers during the period 2006 to
2010. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, India world’s largest arms importer according to new SIPRI
data on international arms transfers, 14 March 2011, http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2011/armstransfers,
and, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Current Issues No. 24: India’s Defense Spending and Military
Modernization (3/29/2011), http://csis.org/files/publication/110329_DIIG_Current_Issues_24_Indian_Defense_
Spending.pdf.
27 Michael Johnson, Indonesian Military Plans to Spend $16.7 Billion Through 2015, Asia Pacific Defense Forum,
October 22, 2012, accessed on-line April 10, 2013, http://apdforum.com/en_GB/article/rmiap/articles/online/features/
2012/10/22/indonesia-military-spends
28 Harry Kazianis, To Counter China’s Military Build-up, Taiwan Must Go Asymmetric, World Politics Review, 29
November, 2012, accessed on-line April 10, 2013, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12529/to-counter-
chinas-military-build-up-taiwan-must-go-asymmetric.
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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
are becoming prevalent in the region. However, with such emphasis being placed on military
modernization by many of the major states in the region, it is hard to predict what the strategic
and military landscape of the Asia-Pacific will look like in 20 or 30 years. Such a time frame
could potentially see the B-52, B-1, and B-2 still in service; if so, they will be expected to be
effective weapon systems if employed.
Meeting the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenge
A major challenge in meeting the goals of the Administration’s new strategy is the rising
prevalence of 21st century anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats. Anti-access refers to those
adversary actions and capabilities, usually employed from long ranges, designed to prevent an
opposing force entry to an operational area by restricting its access to the global commons (sea,
air, space, and cyberspace). Area denial refers to those adversary actions and capabilities, usually
of shorter range, designed not to keep an opposing force out, but to limit its freedom of action
within an operational area.29 Although not a new concept, A2/AD is a rising concern due to the
proliferation of technology that places precise, long-range weapons in the hands of potential foes.
Such weapons include ballistic and cruise missiles, integrated air defense systems, anti-ship
missiles, submarines, guided rockets, missiles and artillery, 4th- and 5th-generation combat
aircraft, and space and cyber warfare capabilities. Many of these A2/AD threats are specifically
designed to challenge the U.S. military’s power projection capabilities and potentially threaten
U.S. access to key areas of strategic interest both in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East.
The U.S. military addresses the A2/AD challenge in its Joint Operational Access Concept
(JOAC). Although not enemy- or region-specific, JOAC describes how joint forces will operate in
response to the emerging A2/AD threat. Its central idea hinges on the joint forces’ ability to
leverage cross-domain synergy—the complementary employment of military capabilities across
the sea, air, land, space, and cyberspace domains that enhances the effectiveness of military
operations and compensates for any known weaknesses in U.S. capabilities.30 The Air Force and
Navy have embraced cross-domain synergy and have codified their approach to the A2/AD
challenge in their Air-Sea Battle Concept (ASBC). ASBC seeks to achieve interoperability
between air and naval forces that can execute networked, integrated attacks, in-depth, to disrupt,
destroy, and defeat an adversary’s A2/AD capabilities.31 ASBC and the idea of cross-domain
synergy as an answer to the A2/AD challenge have very real implications for the modernization
and operational employment of the bomber force; primarily, modernization and sustainment
efforts should equip the bomber force with the capabilities necessary to operate in the extreme-,
high-, and low-risk denied regions of the 21st century A2/AD environment.
29 Department of Defense, “Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC),” Version 1.0, 22 November 2011, i.
30 Ibid., ii.
31 General Norton A. Schwartz, USAF and Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, USN, “Air-Sea Battle: Promoting Stability
in an Era of Uncertainty,” (The American Interest, 20 February 2012), http://www.the-american-interest.com/
article.cfm?piece=1212. Stated another way, ASBC seek to integrate and take advantage of the differing capabilities
afforded by a diverse joint force (air, ground and naval forces), armed with the latest in resilient communications
(networked), in order to target and strike (integrated attack) multiple enemy targets and systems (attack-in-depth) that
will reduce or eliminate an enemy’s A2/AD capability thus enabling the U.S. military to operate freely in what was
previously, a highly defended area.
Congressional Research Service
10
Figure 1. Joint Operational Access and Air-Sea Battle Concept
Source: Pentagon briefing, Mr. William Dries, Air Force Air-Sea Battle Team, subject: Air-Sea Battle: A Primer, (lecture, USAF Fellowship Orientation, Pentagon) 31 July
2012.
CRS-11
U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
Bomber Employment in an A2/AD Environment
One of the objectives of an A2/AD adversary is to establish what the military terms extreme-risk
geographic zones in order to deny any advantage to U.S. forces operating in them. In extreme-risk
zones, only the most capable, low-signature (stealthy) forces maintain the ability to survive and
operate effectively using self-defense systems, maneuver and, in some cases, additional support
to do so.32 Due to its stealth and self-defense capabilities, the B-2 is the most capable bomber able
to operate in the extreme-risk zone.
In high-risk zones, the majority of U.S. high-signature (non-stealthy) forces require significant
defense support. For the bombers, this means their defensive countermeasures and maneuvers
will be effective if assisted by mutually supporting forces, but on their own, they may be
operationally ineffective and limited.33 The U.S. bombers most capable of operating in the high-
risk zone are the B-2 (because of its stealth and self-defense capabilities) and the B-1 given its
speed, maneuverability, low-altitude flying capability, and electronic self-defense capabilities.
In the low-risk zone—usually found at extended ranges from the adversary’s borders—all U.S.
forces can generally operate freely, although the adversary can potentially still pose a threat. The
B-1 and B-52 are quite capable of operating in low-risk zones and would most likely employ their
arsenal of long-range, standoff cruise missiles (the B-2 does not carry long-range stand-off cruise
missiles). In the overall Air-Sea Battle Concept, higher-signature forces—such as the B-1 and B-
52—would be teamed with low-signature forces as required—such as the stealthy F-22 fighter—
in order to enhance the effectiveness and compensate for the vulnerabilities of each platform.
Nevertheless, the challenge is that the Air Force’s legacy bombers could have increasing
difficulty operating in A2/AD environments without more modern systems and weapons
capabilities.
32 Mr. William Dries, Air Force Air-Sea Battle Team, “Air-Sea Battle: A Primer,” (lecture, USAF Fellowship
Orientation, Pentagon), 31 July 2012.
33 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
12
Figure 2. Legacy Bomber Employment in an A2/AD Operating Environment
UNCLASSIFIED // FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED
A2/AD Operating Environment
Networked
Integrated
Attack in Depth
Disrupt
Destroy
Defeat
Military / Gov’t
SPACE DOMAIN
Commercial
Coalition
Command & Control
Military / Gov’t
Communications
Command &
Early Warning
Control
Links
Links
Voice
CYBERSPACE
Voice
Comms
Adversary Command
& Control
Comms
Systems
Systems
Command & Control
AIR DOMAIN
Includes Adversary
Anti-Access/Area Denial
Strategies
LAND DOMAIN
Permissive
Contested
Highly Contested
MARITIME DOMAIN
(Low Risk)
UNCLAS
( S
Hi IFIE
gh R D /
isk)/ FOUO
(Extreme Risk)
Source: Pentagon briefing, Mr. William Dries, Air Force Air-Sea Battle Team, subject: Air-Sea Battle: A Primer, (lecture, USAF Fellowship Orientation, Pentagon) 31 July
2012.
CRS-13
U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
Nuclear Deterrent Operations
Under DOD’s strategic guidance, maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent
remains a primary mission for U.S. Armed Forces. Its guidance is coherent with and builds on the
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) which states, “Until such time as the Administration’s
goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is achieved, nuclear capabilities will be maintained as a
core mission of the Department of Defense.”34 Relevant to the bomber force, the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) reaffirmed the enduring contributions and viability of the nuclear strike
capabilities of the B-52 and the B-2 in accomplishing the nuclear deterrent mission (the B-1 is no
longer nuclear capable).35
Proponents argue three principal reasons for retaining and modernizing nuclear-capable, or, more
accurately, dual-capable B-52 and B-2 bombers. First, an air-delivered nuclear capability provides
a rapid and direct hedge against technical challenges with the other legs of the nuclear triad as
well as geopolitical uncertainties.36
Second, nuclear-capable bombers are important to extended deterrence of potential attacks on
U.S. allies and partners. Unlike intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), heavy bombers can be visibly forward deployed, thereby
signaling U.S. resolve and commitment in a crisis.
Finally, not only is the LRS-B not anticipated to start flight testing until the mid-2020s, it is also
yet to be determined if it will initially be nuclear capable once it does. Former Chief of Staff of
the Air Force General Norton Schwartz testified before Congress in November 2011 that the new
LRS-B will be built with nuclear capability but will operate as a conventional strike aircraft
initially. He stressed that although the aircraft will be designed and built with all the hardware for
both nuclear and conventional missions from the outset, “Deferring the new aircraft’s nuclear
certification until the B-52 and B-2 start to retire would help the service manage costs.”37
However, in response to General Schwartz’s testimony, language in the 2013 Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 112-239) stipulates the next-generation LRS-B will be “capable of
carrying strategic nuclear weapons as of the date on which such aircraft achieves initial operating
capability” and will be “certified to use such weapons by not later than two years after such date.”
If the nation wishes to maintain an air-delivered nuclear capability, as stated in the 2010 QDR and
NPR, it is unclear whether the B-52 and B-2 will be the only air-delivery option in the U.S.
nuclear arsenal until the 2030s or whether the LRS-B can be expected to start filling that role in
the late 2020s.
34 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington, DC: February 2010), vi.
35 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, (Washington, DC: April 2010), 24.
36 The U.S. nuclear triad includes the long-range nuclear-capable bomber force (76, B-52s and 20, B-2s), 450
Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and 14 Ohio Class submarines capable of launching 24
Trident II submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) each. Unlike ICBMs and submarine—which are designed to
remain hidden from view of an adversary—the bomber fleet offers a visible way of conveying U.S. resolve. For
example, the president could order the nation’s B-52s and B-2s on alert, put them in the air, and/or deploy them to
forward bases thus providing a visible sign of U.S. resolve with the intent of de-escalating tensions. Many analysts
agree that the visible presence of bombers provides the U.S. an effective tool for overtly demonstrating resolve.
37 David Majumdar, “Schwartz: New Bomber Not Nuke-Capable at First,” Air Force Times Online, 2 November 2011,
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/11/dn-air-force-new-bomber-nuclear-capable-11-211/.
Congressional Research Service
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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty: Impact on Bombers
In accordance with the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (NST) signed in April 2010, the
United States and Russia plan on reducing and limiting ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and
SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber nuclear
armaments. Seven years after entry into force of the treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers,
as counted in accordance with Article II section one of the treaty, will not exceed 700 for
deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers. Also, the total numbers will
not exceed 800 for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed
SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.38 The United States retains the
right to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.39
Consequently, the February 2011 entry-into-force of the New START drives the United States to
convert a number of nuclear-capable B-52 bombers to a conventional-only role. Although a final
force structure decision has not been made to reflect the requirements of New START, Air Force
Global Strike Command (AFGSC) recommended a preferred course of action in the FY13
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and funded through the future years defense program
(FYDP).40 The New START drives no change to the configuration of B-2 force numbers.
In her statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ms. Madelyn Creedon,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, provided testimony on the need for
bomber sustainment and modernization in the context of implementing the New Start Treaty:
The United States will maintain two nuclear capable B-52H strategic bomber wings and one
B-2A wing. Both bombers, however, are aging and sustainment and modernization funding
will have to be provided to ensure they remain operationally effective through the remainder
of their service lives. Funding has been allocated to upgrade these platforms; for example, to
provide the B-2A with survivable communications, a more modern flight control system, and
a new radar. The B-52 will also need various upgrades including for its bomb bay and
survivable communications. These modernization and sustainment programs are needed to
maintain the effectiveness of the current bomber force until the introduction of a new long-
range bomber.41
Existing U.S. Bomber Force
The Air Force’s existing bomber fleet includes 76 B-52H bombers, 63 supersonic B-1B bombers,
and 20 B-2 stealth bombers. Table 2 summarizes the three types of aircraft. Additional
information on the existing bomber force is presented in Appendix A.
38 For in-depth analysis of the New START Treaty, see CRS Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits
and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf.
39 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 8 April 2010.
40 Air Force Global Strike Command, B-52 Bomber Master Plan, June 2012, p 19.
41 Testimony of Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, in Senate, Hearings
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 112th Congress, 2nd Session., 21 June 2012.
Congressional Research Service
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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
Table 2. Current U.S. Air Force Bomber Force
B-52H
B-1B B-2
Number in inventory
76
63a 20
Number combat ready
44
36
16
First flight
1954
1984
1988
Last delivery
1962
1988
1997
Unrefueled range
8,800
7,455
6,000+
Payload 70,000
75,000
40,000+
Crew 5
4
2
Max speed
Mach .86
Mach 1.2 (sea level)
High Subsonic
Source: Prepared by CRS based on Air Force Almanac, May 2012 and U.S. Air Force B-52, B-1, and B-2 Fact
Sheets.
a. Three B-1s were retired as requested by the U.S. Air Force in their 2012 budget request and in accordance
with direction put forth in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81).
B-52H Stratofortress42
Figure 3. B-52H Stratofortress
Source: U.S. Air Force official website, B-52 Stratofortress Factsheet (http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/).
The B-52 is currently the USAF’s only nuclear bomber capable of employing long-range standoff
weapons. It serves both as a nuclear and conventional bomber. It first entered operational service
on June 29, 1955. The B-52’s original service life expectancy was approximately 5,000 hours or
approximately 20 years depending on severity of the flying environment. Of the 744 various
42 Information in this section is taken from Air Force Global Strike Command’s, B-52 Bomber Master Plan, June 2012,
Air Force Almanac, May 2012, and U.S. Air Force B-52 Fact Sheet, 4 December 2012, http://www.af.mil/information/
factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=83.
Congressional Research Service
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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
model B-52s built, 76 B-52H models remain in service today. The B-52H first entered service on
May 9, 1961, with operational aircraft currently stationed at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, and
Minot AFB, North Dakota. The B-52’s life expectancy has been extended beyond original
expectations through numerous modernization efforts. It is now projected to be sustainable into
2040 based on projected average flying hours and severity of the flying environment.
The B-52H program’s challenge is to continue sustainment activities and maintain combat
effectiveness against the nation’s adversaries until the platform is retired, and to approach
modernization efforts effectively by recognizing capability gaps, prioritizing valid requirements,
and investing in material solutions that meet platform and war fighter needs. As plans for
sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization move forward, some argue the B-52 enterprise
should be prepared to make required programmatic and operational adjustments in step with
changes in platform mission taskings and operational plans. The B-52’s strengths lie in its diverse
capabilities, precision, large payload, and long range; however, if these capabilities remain static,
mission effectiveness is likely to erode in the face of 21st century A2/AD threats.
Current B-52 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts43
The following is a list of B-52 sustainment and modernization initiatives in the program of record
(POR) that are either just being completed or are currently in progress. Additional information on
each effort, as well as information on short-term and long-term sustainment and modernization
efforts, can be found in the B-52’s Master Plan summarized in Appendix B.
• Combat network communications technology (CONECT)
• Military-standard-1760 modernization
• B-52 trainer upgrades
• Arms control activities under the New START
• Mode S/5 identification friend or foe (IFF)
• Low cost modifications
• B-52 anti-skid replacement
• B-52 modernization research development test and evaluation efforts
• 1760 internal weapons bay upgrade (IWBU)
Table 3 is the FY2013 budget submission for B-52 procurement and B-52 research, development,
test, and evaluation programs derived from Air Force budget justification books. It summarizes
prior-year and estimated future-year expenditures for B-52 sustainment and modernization
programs.
43 Information for current B-52 sustainment and modernization efforts derived from justification books for Air Force
procurement accounts and Air Force research, development test and evaluation accounts for FY2013 and prior years.
Congressional Research Service
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Table 3. Current B-52 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts
Figure in millions of dollars
Total Cost
Total
Total
Total
Total
All Prior
Cost
Total Cost
Cost
Cost
Total Cost
Total Cost
Cost
Cost To
Total
Procurement Items
Yrs
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
FY2014
FY2015
FY2016
FY2017
Complete
Cost
B-52 CONECT
8.971
6.416
82.531
0.000
0.000
17.519
25.604
23.298
2.543
166.882
MIL-STD-1760
0.000
11.541
0.000
3.238
30.983
6.690
0.000
0.000
0.000
52.452
B-52 Trainers
0.000
2.180
1.656
1.482
1.836
2.375
2.431
2.472
0.000
14.432
B-52 Structures
0.000
0.000
0.100
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.100
System Effectiveness
and Evolutionary
0.000
0.000
0.100
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.100
Requirements
Arms Control
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.500
0.203
0.102
0.203
0.000
1.008
Activities
Mode S/5 IFF
0.000
0.000
8.725
0.000
9.590
12.357
2.557
0.000
0.000
33.229
Low Cost Mods
1.646
0.821
0.785
0.435
0.019
0.604
0.453
0.460
0.000
5.223
B-52 Anti-Skid
0.000
0.000
0.000
4.626
6.737
6.011
0.915
0.930
0.000
19.219
Replacement
Total Cost
Total Cost Total Cost Total Cost
Total Cost
Total Cost Total Cost
Cost To
Total
RDT&E Items
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
FY2014
FY2015
FY2016
FY2017
Complete
Cost
Misc. B-52
Modernization
129.864
93.808
0.065
Continuing Continuing
RDT&E Efforts
1760 Internal Wpns
16.490
11.373
5.653
3.901
Continuing Continuing
Bay Upgrade
Mode S/5 IFF
1.202
Continuing
Continuing
B-52 CONECT
34.700
29.800
Continuing
Continuing
B-52 Anti-Skid
0.751
Continuing
Continuing
Source: Prepared by CRS based on justification books for Air Force procurement accounts and Air Force research, development, test, and evaluation accounts for
FY2013 and prior years.
CRS-18
U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
B-1B Lancer44
Figure 4. B-1B Lancer
Source: U.S. Air Force official website, B-1B Lancer Factsheet (http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/).
The B-1B Lancer was developed by Rockwell International, now Boeing Defense and Space
Group, and became operational in 1986. The B-1B was originally designed to serve as a low-
altitude Cold War supersonic bomber. Its low radar cross-section, variable-geometry wings,
avionics, and afterburning engines made it less vulnerable than the B-52 to enemy surface-to-air
missiles and fighter aircraft. However, following the end of the Cold War, the Air Force ended the
B-1’s nuclear mission in 1992 and began the aircraft’s transition to conventional-only weapons
capability. The Conventional Mission Upgrade Program (CMUP) transformed the B-1B into a
conventional-only bomber capable of employing the latest in conventional weapons to include
Global Positioning System (GPS)-guided Joint Directed Attack Munitions (JDAM) and long-
range standoff Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missiles (JASSM). The B-1B has the largest internal
payload of any current bomber. However, many of the systems on the B-1 are original equipment
and suffer from diminishing manufacturing sources and material shortfalls that impact reliability,
availability, and maintainability.
One hundred B-1Bs were initially built, of which 63 remain in service. The fleet operates from
Dyess AFB, Texas (35 aircraft), and Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota (28 aircraft). It possesses
diverse capabilities: large precision payload, range, speed, and endurance; however, if these
capabilities remain static, mission effectiveness may erode in the face of 21st century A2/AD
threats. The B-1B is expected to be in service until 2040.
44 Information in this section taken from Air Combat Command’s, B-1 Strategic Action and Investment Plan (SAIP), 10
May 2012; CRS Report RL34406, Air Force Next-Generation Bomber: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Jeremiah Gertler; Air Force Almanac, May 2012; and U.S. Air Force B-1 Fact Sheet, 21 May 2012, http://www.af.mil/
information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=81.
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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
Current B-1 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts45
The following is a list of B-1 sustainment and modernization initiatives currently in the program
of record (POR) that are either just completing or are currently in progress. Additional
information on each effort, as well as information on short-term and long-term sustainment and
modernization efforts, can be found in the B-1’s Strategic Action and Investment Plan (SAIP)
summarized in Appendix C.
• Fully integrated data link
• Simulator digital control loading
• Central integrated test system
• Inertial navigation system replacement
• Radar improvement upgrade
• Visual situation display upgrade
• Self-contained attitude indicator
• Gyro stabilization system replacement (GSSR)
• B-1 training support
• Digital communications
• B-1 Link 16 cryptographic materials
• Laptop controlled targeting pod
• Low cost mods
• Miscellaneous B-1 modernization research, development, test, and evaluation
efforts
Table 4 is the FY2013 budget submission for B-1 procurement and B-1 research, development,
test ,and evaluation programs derived from Air Force budget justification books. It summarizes
prior-year and estimated future-year expenditures for B-1 sustainment and modernization
programs.
45 Information for current B-1B sustainment and modernization efforts derived from justification books for Air Force
procurement accounts and Air Force research, development, test, and evaluation accounts for FY2013 and prior years.
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Table 4. Current B-1 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts
Figure in millions of dollars
Total Cost
Total Cost
Total Cost
Total Cost
Total Cost Total Cost
Total Cost
Cost To
Total
Procurement Items
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
FY2014
FY2015
FY2016
FY2017
Complete
Cost
Ful y Integrated Data Link
52.956
58.874
57.073
48.234
37.241
50.017
51.539
97.943
453.877
Simulator Digital
0.000
0.000
2.700
2.800
2.937
0.000
0.000
0.000
8.437
Control Loading
CITS Upgrade
20.933
15.683
17.549
17.834
13.895
16.914
17.054
50.052
169.914
Inertial Navigation System
17.000
35.999
21.447
19.192
2.231
0.000
0.000
0.000
95.869
Radar Improvement Upgrade
59.126
44.302
10.512
1.692
2.586
0.242
0.000
0.000
175.091
Vertical Situation Displays
27.086
33.872
34.429
36.322
29.932
41.621
42.406
107.234
352.902
Self-Contained
Attitude Indicator
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.700
2.025
1.835
1.730
1.367
8.657
Gyro Stabilization System
8.735
4.476
4.526
4.153
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
64.721
B-1 Training Supt
0.394
0.301
0.269
0.333
0.431
0.442
0.450
0.000
3.005
Digital Comms
5.257
1.600
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
34.348
B-1 Link 16 Crypto
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.221
0.325
0.089
0.000
0.000
0.635
Laptop Control ed
Targeting Pod
4.882
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
67.658
Low Cost Mods
1.114
1.900
1.251
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
4.277
Total Cost
Total Cost
Total Cost
Total Cost
Total Cost Total Cost
Total Cost
Cost To
Total
RDT&E Items
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
FY2014
FY2015
FY2016
FY2017
Complete
Cost
Misc. B-1 Modernization
RDT&E Efforts
33.063
33.011
16.265
19.589
11.453
0.087
Continuing
Continuing
Source: Prepared by CRS based on justification books for Air Force procurement accounts and Air Force research, development test and evaluation accounts for
FY2013 and prior years.
CRS-21
U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
B-2A Spirit46
Figure 5. B-2A Spirit
Source: U.S. Air Force official website, B-2 Spirit Factsheet (http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/).
The B-2A is the only long-range, penetrating low observable (LO) bomber operated by the U.S.
Air Force. It serves as both a conventional and nuclear bomber. The aircraft entered service in
December 1993 and is based solely at Whiteman AFB, Missouri. It achieved initial operational
capability (IOC) in April 1997 and achieved full operational capability (FOC) on December 17,
2003. A total procurement of 132 B-2s was envisioned. However, following the Cold War, the
number was reduced to 75, and then to 20. Congress added one more by providing funding to
convert one of the test vehicles into a combat aircraft, for a total of 21, but a B-2 was lost in a
crash during takeoff at Andersen AFB, Guam, in February 2008, reducing the total number to 20.
Its payload weight is more limited than those of the B-1 or B-52. Originally fielded in Block 10
configuration, the current fleet is Block 30.47 Each block upgrade improved stealth characteristics,
expanded weapons employment options, and improved offensive and defensive avionics. Its
preeminent capabilities are precision, range, and stealth.
The B-2 currently experiences parts obsolescence and diminishing manufacturing sources. The B-
2 is also impacted by aging support and test equipment. For the first time since the B-2 aircraft
became fully operational capable, the weapon system’s survivability is in question in the face of
advancing 21st century A2/AD threats. The B-2A’s projected service-life goal is 2058.
Current B-2 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts48
The following is a list of B-2 sustainment and modernization initiatives currently in the program
of record (POR) that are either just completing or are currently in progress. Additional
46 Information in this section taken from Air Force Global Strike Command’s, B-2 Bomber Master Plan, June 2012, Air
Force Almanac, May 2012, and U.S. Air Force B-2 Fact Sheet, 23 April 2010, http://www.af.mil/information/
factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=82.
47 Block refers to essential upgrades to the same model aircraft. Throughout the life of an aircraft, advances in
technology create opportunities to upgrade aircraft beyond their original design. This is referred to as a Block upgrade.
48 Information for current B-1B sustainment and modernization efforts derived from justification books for Air Force
procurement accounts and Air Force research, development test and evaluation accounts for FY2013 and prior years.
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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
information on each effort, as well as information on short-term and long-term sustainment and
modernization efforts, can be found in the B-2’s Master Plan summarized in Appendix D.
• Extremely high frequency satellite communications (EHF SATCOM) and
computer upgrade program
• Massive ordnance penetrator integration
• Low observable signature and supportability modifications (LOSSM) diagnostics
• B-2 trainer system upgrade
• Link-16/center instrument display/in-flight re-planner (CID/IFR)
• Radar modernization program (RMP)
• Low observable signature and supportability modifications (LOSSM) program
structures/materials
• Defensive management system modernization (DMS-M)
• Stores management operational flight program (SMOFP) re-host and mixed
carriage modification
• Common very-low frequency receiver (CVR Increment 1)
• Low-cost engine modifications
• Low-cost modifications
• B-2 modernization research, development, test, and evaluation efforts
• Baseline B-2 support
Table 5 is the FY2013 budget submission for B-2 procurement and B-2 research, development,
test, and evaluation programs derived from Air Force budget justification books. It summarizes
prior-year and estimated future-year expenditures for B-2 sustainment and modernization
programs.
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Table 5. Current B-2 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts
Figure in millions of dollars
Total Cost
Total Cost Total Cost
Total Cost
Total Cost
Total Cost Total Cost
Total Cost
Cost To
Procurement Items
All Prior Yrs
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
FY2014
FY2015
FY2016
FY2017
Complete Total
Cost
EHF SATCOM and Computers
705.523
27.033
29.501
65.037
7.469
8.373
0.000
0.000
0.000
110.380
Massive Ordnance Penetrator
Integration
14.887
7.453
0.000
7.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
29.340
LOSSM-Diagnostics
0.000
0.000
0.000
2.044
0.741
2.405
2.638
2.131
0.000
9.959
B-2 Trainer System Upgrade
32.331
0.000
0.000
4.038
5.006
6.477
6.630
7.776
0.000
62.258
Link 16/CID/IFR
92.446
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.140
0.100
0.060
0.000
0.000
92.746
Radar System Modification
530.378
8.315
1.210
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
539.903
LOS and Support Modifications
30.135
16.120
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
46.255
Defensive Management System
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
310.933
310.933
LOSSM Structures
0.000
0.000
3.304
2.895
4.089
4.659
4.740
4.901
0.000
21.588
LOSSM Materials
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.516
0.901
1.230
1.430
1.920
0.000
5.997
SMOFP Rehost
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
12.100
8.900
0.000
21.000
Common Very Low Frequency
Terminal
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
59.170
12.709
71.879
Low Cost Engine Modifications
6.082
0.599
0.000
0.383
1.631
1.650
1.690
1.718
0.000
13.753
Low Cost Modifications
14.151
1.999
0.000
0.383
2.585
2.615
2.681
2.723
0.000
27.137
B-52 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation: Operational Systems Development
Total Cost
Total Cost Total Cost
Total Cost
Total Cost
Total Cost
Total Cost
Cost To
RDT&E Items
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
FY2014
FY2015
FY2016
FY2017
Complete Total
Cost
B-2 Modernization RDT&E
244.732
27.135
21.759
101.808
101.493
34.544
19.001
Continuing
Continuing
Baseline Support
0.000
9.523
7.875
14.336
16.012
14.032
14.218
Continuing
Continuing
EHF SATCOM and Computer
0.000
202.534
6.336
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Continuing
Continuing
Defensive Management System
0.000
41.127
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Continuing
Continuing
Source: Prepared by CRS based on justification books for Air Force procurement accounts and Air Force research, development, test, and evaluation accounts for
FY2013 and prior years.
CRS-24
U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
Issues for Congress
Potential for Inducing a Shortfall in Long-Range Strike
Capabilities
As the bomber force continues to age and shrink, and development of the LRS-B continues, a
potential oversight issue for Congress is whether failure to sustain and modernize the Air Force’s
legacy bomber fleet will induce a shortfall in the nation’s long-range strike capabilities.
Consistent with prior administrations, the Obama Administration’s strategic guidance requires a
long-range, deep strike capability that is effective in the face of A2/AD threats and is not
constrained by the lack of overseas basing. In addition, under the New START treaty, nuclear-
capable heavy bombers could continue to make up one-third of the U.S. nuclear triad along with
ICBMs and SLBMs.49 With only 20 B-2s, the recent retirement of three B-1s, and the conversion
of a yet-to-be-determined number of B-52s to conventional-only roles, the potential exists for the
total number of bombers to fall below the level necessary to fulfill long-range strike
requirements. Currently, the DOD and the Air Force plan on a bomber force of approximately 156
aircraft out to at least 2022 (see Table 6, below). However, with $487 billion of defense cuts over
the next 10 years as a result of the Budget Control Act of 2011, the potential for additional budget
constraints, and changing defense strategies, these numbers are subject to change. Furthermore,
the potential for shortfall in long-range strike capabilities does not simply lie in the sheer number
of legacy bombers in service.
The more pressing oversight issue is the “capability” of the legacy bomber force. That is, can the
legacy bomber force meet the national security challenges posed by the growing number of
potential A2/AD-equipped adversaries? The ability of the current bomber force to bridge a
potential long-range strike capabilities gap may depend upon the feasibility and cost effectiveness
of sustainment and modernization programs that will make these weapon systems viable in the
21st century A2/AD environment while extending their service lives until the LRS-B becomes
operational in the late 2020s.
Many analysts argue that the Navy’s nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is another, highly flexible
alternative to the bomber and is capable of filling the nation’s long-range strike needs. Indeed, the
aircraft carrier’s ability to dominate the seas and launch its aircraft without the need for a forward
airbase is without question a valuable strategic asset. However, the relatively limited amount of
fuel carried by naval fighters limits their ability to penetrate deeply into enemy territory without
assistance from Air Force tankers.50 Without tanker support, the strategic reach of naval fighters is
limited to the coastal areas of any potential adversary. Furthermore, compared to a bomber, the
weapons load out capability of carrier-based aircraft is limited thus potentially requiring multiple
49 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, p 19.
50 A good example of the challenges faced by carrier aviation is carrier operations during the early stages of Operations
Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2001. Aircraft carriers operating out of the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea supplied most
of the fighter sorties performing close air support and strike missions as well as supporting airlift and bomber missions
during the first few months of the Afghanistan campaign. However, the “short legs” of the naval fighters limited how
far north into Afghanistan they could fly. Those naval fighters that did make it further north relied on Air Force tankers
(as did many of the other platforms operating in Afghanistan) for multiple refueling and arrived at their tasking with
very limited time-on-station and ordinance.
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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
aircraft in order to service a single target. Finally, there is also a potential concern over the
carrier’s survivability and ability to operate in an A2/AD environment. The primary goal of an
adversary employing an anti-access strategy is to deny an outside country the ability to project
power into a region. One way of doing this is with anti-ship weapons. Weapons systems such as
submarines, China’s version of the SS-N-22, SS-N-27, and DF-21D, and Iranian small-boat
swarm tactics are all potential threats that could push a carrier task force even further out to sea,
thus potentially increasing the range at which naval aviation must travel. Although most analysts
will agree the aircraft carrier is an essential element in U.S. long-range strike capabilities, carrier
aviation may be seen as complementary to and not taking the place of the much more powerful
and flexible long-range bomber. While both capabilities are long-range, they are not necessarily
fungible in their military utility.
Table 6. DOD Aviation Long Range Strike Aircraft Inventory
(Includes B-52H, B-1B, and B-2)
FY2013-FY2022
Inventory FY12 FY13 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22
Long Range
159 158 157 156 156 156 156 156 155 154
Strike
Source: Department of Defense, Annual Aviation Inventory and Funding Plan: Fiscal Years (FY) 2013-2042,
March 2012, (pdf p. 8)
Will Current Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization
Plans Get Us to the LRS-B?
Another possible oversight issue for Congress will be the feasibility and affordability of Air Force
bomber sustainment and modernization programs and whether those programs bridge any
potential capabilities gap until the LRS-B becomes operational. Congress requested such
oversight information in the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383),
specifically requesting a report discussing “the cost, schedule, and performance of all planned
efforts to modernize and keep viable the existing B-1, B-2, and B-52 bomber fleets and a
discussion of the forecasted service-life and all sustainment challenges that the Secretary of the
Air Force may confront in keeping those platforms viable until the anticipated retirement of such
aircraft.” This report was submitted to Congress in September 2011. The information in this
report is also contained in Air Force Global Strike Command’s (AFGSC’s) and Air Combat
Command’s (ACC’s) master plan documents for the B-52 and B-2 (AFGSC) and the B-1 (ACC).
Updated on an annual basis, these master plans outline each command’s plans, programs,
requirements, and strategic vision for each platform to meet national security objectives. The
plans also identify timeframes, outline capability needs, and describe the force and technologies
needed for continued system effectiveness and viability while providing guidance on long-range
sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization needs.
The 2012 updates to these plans take into consideration President Obama’s Asia-Pacific rebalance
and DOD strategic direction. Primarily, the plans state that without sufficient sustainment and
modernization funding, each weapon system’s survivability is at risk in the face of 21st century
A2/AD threats. Appendices B thru D provide summaries of each bomber’s sustainment and
modernization master plans.
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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
To Fund or Not to Fund: What Are DOD and Air Force Priorities?
The DOD is challenged with reducing defense spending by $487 billion over the next 10 years,
notwithstanding the possibility of further cuts through possible sequestration. At the same time,
the DOD’s priorities require continued modernization of aging capabilities to address the
proliferation of modern A2/AD threats in that the DOD and Air Force plan on the B-52, B-,1 and
B-2 to operate well into the 2030s, especially in the global strike and nuclear deterrent roles.51
According to DOD’s Annual Aviation Inventory and Funding Plan for FY2013-FY2042:
The enduring need for long-range attack capabilities will be met by a combination of current
and future aircraft and weapons systems. The current fleet of Air Force bombers continues to
be modernized so that it can retain long range strike capabilities through the 2030s.52
The FY12 PB (Presidential Budget) initiated development of the Long-Range Strike-Bomber
(LRS-B), a key component of the LRS Family of Systems.... The current goal is to achieve
an initial capability in the mid-2020s, and to hold down the unit cost to ensure sufficient
production (80 to 100 aircraft) and a sustainable bomber inventory over the long term.
Meanwhile, the Department will invest in upgrades to the B-2 bomber to enhance its
effectiveness and survivability as well as modernize the B-52 fleet with new visual displays
and increased weapons storage capacity. The Air Force also continues to modernize the B-1
and address sustainability issues to ensure the overall health and continued viability of the B-
1 fleet.53
51 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012
(Washington, DC).
52 Department of Defense, Annual Aviation Inventory and Funding Plan: Fiscal Years (FY) 2013-2042, (pdf page 8).
53 Ibid. (pdf page 21).
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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
Figure 6. DOD Planned Long Range Strike Inventories and Funding
(Includes B-52H, B-1B and B-2)
FY2013-FY2022
Source: Department of Defense, Annual Aviation Inventory and Funding Plan: Fiscal Years (FY) 2013—2042,
March 2012, (pdf page 21)
The Air Force’s 2012 Posture Statement presented to the House Armed Services Committee
suggests funding legacy bomber modernization is a priority given the rise of A2/AD threats.
The Air Force’s ability to conduct global strike—to hold any target on the globe at risk—will
be of growing importance in the coming decade. Our conventional strike forces [bombers]
compose a significant portion of the Nation’s deterrent capability, providing national leaders
with a range of crisis response and escalation control options. Our [U.S. Air Force] nuclear
deterrent forces provide two-thirds of the Nation’s nuclear triad competently forming the
foundation of global stability and underwriting our national security and that of our allies.
However, increasingly sophisticated air defenses and long-range missile threats require a
focused modernization effort exemplified by the long-range strike family of systems.54
The posture statement goes on to emphasize that, within the Air Force core functions of Global
Precision Attack and Nuclear Deterrence Operations:
We [the U.S. Air Force] are modernizing conventional bombers to sustain capability while
investing in the Long-Range Strike Family of systems. The bomber fleet was retained at its
current size because we recognized the importance of long range strike in the current and
54 Department of the U.S. Air Force, Fiscal Year 2013 Air Force Posture Statement, Presentation to the Committee on
Armed Services United States House of Representatives, 28 February 2012 (pdf pages 4, 5).
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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
future security environments. The Air Force is enhancing long range strike capabilities by
upgrading the B-2 fleet with an improved Defensive Management System (DMS) and a new
survivable communications system, and is increasing conventional precision guided weapon
capacity within the B-52 fleet. We are investing $191.4 million in modernizing the B-1 to
prevent obsolescence and diminishing manufacturing sources issues and to help sustain the
B-1 to its approximate 2040 service life.55
According to the U.S. Air Force’s FY2013 Budget Overview:
The Air Force will continue bomber modernization and sustainment efforts, to include the B-
2 Defensive Management systems program, the B-2 Very Low Frequency/Low Frequency
communications program, and the B-52 1760 Internal Weapons Bay Upgrades.56
With the February 2011 entry-into-force of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ... the
FY 2013 Budget Request funds compliance activity and force reduction options to meet the
central limits of the treaty. These include ... the conversion of some B-52Hs from nuclear-
capable to conventional-only capability.57
In addition to the development of LRS-B (Long-Range Strike-Bomber), the Air Force will
continue to modernize the B-1B to ensure the fleet remains viable until recapitalization can
be accomplished. The FY2013 Budget Request includes the continuation of the B-1
Integrated Battle Station contract which concurrently procures and installs Vertical situation
display Upgrade (VSDU), Central Integrated Test System (CITS), and Fully Integrated Data
Link (FIDL). VSDU and CITS each address obsolescence and diminishing manufacturing
sources for the B-1 fleet. FIDL provides both the electronic backbone for VSDU and CITS,
as well as a capability enhancement of line-of-sight/beyond line-of-sight Link 16
communications. In addition, the FY2013 Budget Request includes upgrades to flight and
maintenance training devices to ensure continued sustainability and common configuration
with the aircraft fleet. These initiatives will help bridge the gap until the next generation
long-range strike aircraft is operational.58
As Legacy Bombers Phase Out, Are 80-100 LRS-Bs Sufficient?
As the legacy bomber force begins phasing out of service (planned for some time in the mid-
2020s thru the 2040s), Congress may want to reevaluate Air Force acquisition plans for the LRS-
B to ensure a sufficient backfill of U.S. long-range strike capabilities that meet the requirements
of national security objectives. The Air Force and Congress may consider how to balance
modernization and sustainment efforts for all three legacy bombers with their gradual phase-out
while ensuring a sufficient number of LRS-Bs are produced to minimize the effects of any
potential long-range strike capability gap during the transition.
Directly tied to this phase-out/phase-in process will be a final determination by Congress as to the
final number of LRS-Bs ultimately produced. Current Air Force plans call for 80-100 LRS-Bs.
However, since the 1970s, the number of new combat aircraft actually produced in a given
program has rarely come close to the number of aircraft originally planned. In the original 1969
55 Ibid., (pdf page 16).
56 Department of the U.S. Air Force, Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Overview, prepared by the Secretary of the Air Force
Office of Financial Management and Budget, 3 February 2012, p. 35.
57 Ibid., p 36.
58 Ibid., p 50.
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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
stated requirement, the Air Force planned a production run of 250 B-1A bombers as a
replacement for the “then aging” B-52. However, the program was canceled by President Jimmy
Carter in 1977; political support for the B-1A waned due to reduced military spending following
the Vietnam War and problems within the B-1A program itself. After being revived by President
Reagan in 1981, the eventual 100 B-1Bs that were built were the result of an Air Force proposal
that split the original 250 B-1As envisioned between 100 B-1Bs and 132 B-2 stealth bombers.
Thus, the original 1981 B-2 contract proposed to acquire as many as 132 B-2s. That number was
subsequently trimmed to 75 after the end of the Cold War and ultimately only 21 B-2s were built
after the program was cancelled in 1991. In fighter aircraft, the Air Force originally sought to
acquire 381 F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighters in 2006. However, the resulting high cost of the
aircraft ($150 million in FY2009 dollars), a U.S. ban on exports, and the ongoing development of
the potentially cheaper and more versatile F-35 resulted in only 195 aircraft built (8 test aircraft
and 187 combat aircraft). Currently, the Air Force plans on acquiring 1,763 of the new F-35
Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter. It is yet to be determined if that number will withstand the
effects of reductions in defense spending.
Acquisition of anything less than the planned 80-100 LRS-Bs can be expected to drive
corresponding modernization and sustainment decisions for the legacy bomber fleet, resulting in
further life-extension programs and possibly impacting U.S. long-range strike capabilities,
especially in the face of A2/AD equipped adversaries.
If Legacy Bombers are Modernized, Can the Air Force Further
Delay Development of the LRS-B?
Another oversight issue for Congress will be whether development of the LRS-B can be further
delayed given sufficient levels of funding for legacy bomber sustainment and modernization.
Assuming the Air Force makes an effort to keep the B-52 and B-1 operational through 2040 and
the B-2 through 2058, it is fair to ask whether the Air Force can further delay development of the
LRS-B. All three of the legacy bombers receive meticulous care, with every aspect of their
existence recorded and tracked to ensure long-term health and safety of flight. Based on this
meticulous care, as well as ongoing structural fatigue testing and computer modeling, the Air
Force insists all three bombers will meet their extended service life goals.59 However, whether the
Air Force can further delay development of the LRS-B is not simply a matter of the legacy
bombers’ air worthiness. With enough funding and continued life extension programs, all three
bombers could theoretically fly beyond the Air Force’s target dates. Analysts suggest that the real
determinant of whether the development of the LRS-B can be further delayed is the legacy
bombers’ anticipated combat capability over the next 10 to 25 years of operations.
As potential adversaries acquire better and advanced A2/AD defenses, the legacy bombers’ ability
to get close enough to targets to employ weapons will likely continue to deteriorate. Already,
against today’s toughest air defenses, the B-52 and B-1 are largely relegated to standoff roles;
only the B-2 is expected to get through. In the years to come, the Air Force anticipates the B-2’s
ability to penetrate will also decline, even though the Air Force plans to upgrade all three
bombers with new systems and weapons. According to Air Force Lieutenant General Christopher
D. Miller, deputy chief of staff for strategic plans and programs, the current fleet is “increasingly
at risk to modernizing air defenses. We need to start now to replace the aging B-52, and B-1
59 John A. Tirpak, “Time to Get Started,” Air Force Magazine, February 2012, 31.
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bomber inventories.”60 When asked whether the steady advance in A2/AD capabilities around the
world means the Air Force must have the LRS-B ready for service by a specific deadline,
Lieutenant General Miller stated, “I think that decision has been given to us ... Now is the time to
get started.”61 As declining defense budgets are anticipated for the foreseeable future, Congress
will have to remain cognizant of the actual capabilities realized by funding specific legacy
bomber sustainment and modernization efforts with the Air Force’s stated requirement to fund
and begin LRS-B development now.
Modernization of Bomber-Launched Weapons
Another oversight issue for Congress is the modernization, sustainment, and development of the
weapons employed by the legacy bombers—weapons that directly impact their ability to operate
in the A2/AD threat environment. As the non-stealthy B-52 and B-1 are likely to operate in the
permissive (low-threat) and contested (high-risk) A2/AD employment zones, both platforms will
increasingly depend on long-range standoff weapons in order to survive and be effective.
Specifically for the B-52, Congress may consider continued appropriations for the conventional
and nuclear capable AGM-86B/C Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) service life extension
program (SLEP) and development of a new Advanced Cruise Missile. In her statement before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June 2012, Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, testified,
Because the growth of modern air defenses is putting even the bomber stand-off missions
increasingly at risk, DoD is carrying out an analysis of alternatives (AOA), for a follow-on
Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). The final report for the AOA for the new system, the
Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) missile, is due in late 2012. The existing ALCM weapon
system will be sustained until the LRSO can be fielded during the 2020s.62
The AGM-86B/C ALCM started its second SLEP in FY2012 that is intended to extend its service
life to 2030. An initial SLEP will be finalized in FY2013 and includes a service life extension of
the W80 nuclear warhead.63 A total of 129 missiles are currently funded for modification with a
number being converted into conventional missiles. Congress and the Air Force have also
dedicated $887.6 million from FY2011 to FY2016 to the development of a new Advanced Cruise
Missile that will ultimately replace the AGM-86 family of ALCMs. In FY2012, Air Force
research and development funds were transferred from the AGM-86 to “Nuclear Modernization”
to identify viable concepts and solutions to replace the AGM-86.64
For both the B-52 and the B-1, the acquisition, test and evaluation, and fielding of the Miniature
Air Launched Decoy (MALD) and MALD-J (jammer) would enhance the ability of these aircraft
60 Ibid.,
61 Ibid., 35.
62 Testimony of Ms. Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, in Senate, Hearings
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 112th Congress, 2nd Session., 21 June 2012.
63 The W80 is a small thermonuclear warhead with a variable yield of between 5 and 150 kiloton of TNT. It was
designed for deployment on cruise missiles and is the warhead used in the majority of nuclear-armed USAF ALCMs.
64 The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Air Launched Cruise Missile Fact Sheet,
http://armscontrolcenter.org/assets/pdfs/ALCMFactSheet.pdf and United States Air Force, Department of Defense
FY2012 President’s Budget Submission, Missile Procurement, http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/budget/.
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to operate in contested (high-risk) and highly contested (extreme-risk) A2/AD employment zones.
MALD and MALD-J are designed to present a realistic decoy representing penetrating fighter,
attack, and bomber aircraft to enemy integrated air defense systems (IADS). MALD-J
incorporates a jammer while retaining the decoy capabilities. The B-52 is the initial
demonstration platform for this program and is currently undergoing initial operational test and
evaluation with initial operational capability scheduled for early 2013. The B-1 community is
exploring further integration of MALD and MALD-J on the B-1.
For all three legacy bombers, continued acquisition of the AGM-158A Joint Air-Surface Standoff
Missile (JASSM) and the AGM-158B JASSM-ER (extended range) and the development of the
Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) is considered by some analysts essential to their
effectiveness in future A2/AD environments. The JASSM provides a long-range, conventional
air-to-surface, autonomous, precision guided, standoff cruise missile able to attack a variety of
fixed or re-locatable targets. The Air Force plans on procuring 4,900 missiles (2,400 baseline
versions and 2,500 ER) with an estimated program cost of $6.1 billion beyond FY2017.65 In
addition to the JASSM, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), in
partnership with Lockheed Martin, is developing the LRASM. It stems from a 2008 urgent
operational needs statement from the U.S. Pacific Fleet requesting weapons technology to defeat
heavily defended ship targets. LRASM includes a datalink to provide updates as the missile
approaches the target area and an anti-radiation homing capability to detect and identify
emissions from threats to help guide the missile to the target. This long-range, anti-ship capability
dovetails with the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region and may prove invaluable in any
maritime conflict as potential adversaries continue to equip their naval vessels with highly
advanced weapon systems. LRASM is based on the AGM-158B JASSM and has an unclassified
range of 500 nautical miles. Lockheed Martin and the Air Force are planning to test-fire three
LRASM missiles in 2013 from the B-1B.66
Potential Implications of Bomber Modernization on Air Force
Basing and any Future Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC)
Another potential oversight issue is the potential implications of reduced bomber sustainment and
modernization, and subsequent diminishing numbers of airframes, on any future rounds of base
realignment and closure (BRAC) efforts. Although the DOD included two rounds of BRAC in its
2013 budget proposal, Congress did not authorize any closures or realignments. However, as the
DOD continues to look for ways to divest itself of assets in an effort to meet budgetary
challenges, BRAC continues to be a subject of speculation, possibly as early as 2015.67
The legacy bomber force is not getting bigger. The original 744 B-52s built were stationed at
approximately 21 bases across the United States during the height of the Cold War. There are now
76 B-52Hs in service stationed at two bases, Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, and Minot AFB, North
65 United States Air Force, Department of Defense FY2013 President’s Budget Submission, Missile Procurement,
http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-120207-052.pdf, p 49.
66 Grace Jean, Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile Poised for Air Launch Tests, Possible Ship Integration (Defense &
Security Intelligence & Analysis: HIS Jane’s, 20 September 2012), http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-
security-report.aspx?id=1065971576.
67 Henry Cuningham, New BRAC Round Looming, (Fayetteville (N.C.) Observer, 23 December 2012),
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2012/12/23/new-brac-round-looming.html
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Dakota. The original 100 B-1s built in the 1980s were stationed at six bases from 1986 until
2001. Now, there are 63 B-1s stationed at two bases, Dyess AFB, Texas, and Ellsworth AFB,
South Dakota. All four of these bases have excess capacity with the potential to accommodate the
entire B-52 fleet at either Barksdale or Minot and the entire B-1 fleet at Dyess or Ellsworth. If the
current trend of retiring airframes to pay for sustainment and modernization efforts continues (as
was done with the B-1 when 27 aircraft in 2001-2002 and three aircraft in 2012 were retired in
order to use the savings to pay for sustainment and upgrades), the total fleet size of both bombers
may suggest consolidation at one base simply from a cost feasibility perspective.
Ellsworth AFB in South Dakota survived the 2005 BRAC when the federal base-closing
commission voted to keep the base open, despite Pentagon recommendations to close the base
and consolidate the B-1 fleet at Dyess AFB in Texas. Ellsworth employs some 4,000 people and
has an estimated economic impact of $278 million on the local community.68 Although no BRAC
actions were taken for Minot AFB and Barksdale AFB in 2005, Air Force BRAC planners
initially proposed retiring Minot’s 150 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles and
realigning the base. Ultimately, planners decided this idea would not work and the Air Force’s top
BRAC committee, the Base Closure Executive Group, rejected the idea.69 As far as the B-2 is
concerned, all 20 are stationed at Whiteman AFB, Missouri. There has been no public discussion
of potential basing for the LRS-B, if and when it finally hits the flight line in the mid-to-late
2020s.
Industrial Base Concerns Associated with Bomber Sustainment
Another oversight issue is the ability of the nation’s industrial base to sustain the legacy bomber
force. A potential problem with sustaining a fleet of bombers with an average age of 33 years is
that the industrial base that developed and produced these aircraft may no longer possess the
capability to manufacture and supply parts in necessary quantities—if at all—to affordably keep
these aircraft flying. Especially in the case of the B-52 and B-1, many of the original parts
designed and produced in the 1950s (for the B-52) and the 1970s (for the B-1) are simply not
produced anymore. Both airframes struggle with diminishing manufacturing sources and material
shortages in an effort to replace and repair aircraft parts and equipment that the original
manufactures do not make anymore. As the nation’s current budget deficit debate shifts from
taxes towards spending cuts and the debt limit, commentators note the potential for deep defense
cuts may drive the defense industry to streamline and consolidate operations, potentially exit prior
production lines, and undergo internal restructuring in an effort to maintain their existing profit
margins. Consequently, a question to be answered is whether the defense industrial base will even
be capable of meeting the sustainment requirements of America’s legacy bomber force out to
2040 and to what extent Congress should consider this issue when evaluating proposed defense
cuts.
68 Bob Reha, South Dakota’s Ellsworth AFB to Say Open, (Minnesota Public Radio, 26 August 2005),
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2005/08/26_rehab_ellsworthopen/
69 Nicole Gaudiano, Air Force BRAC Planners Nixed Minot Realignment, (Air Force Times, 5 September, 2005),
http://www.airforcetimes.com/legacy/new/0-AIRPAPER-1034249.php
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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
Historical Appropriations for Bomber Sustainment
and Modernization, FY2002-2012
Figure 7 depicts historical authorizations and appropriations for B-52H, B-1B, and B-2
sustainment and modernization. Dollar amounts include funds authorized/appropriated in the
“Procurement” and “Research, Development, Test and Evaluation” sections as well as any funds
authorized/appropriated for sustainment and modernization efforts directly tied to “Overseas
Contingency Operations” provided for in National Defense Authorization and Appropriations acts
from FY2002 to FY2013. Figure 8 is a side-by-side graphical comparison of historical
appropriations for all three bombers.
Figure 9 is an overlay of historical appropriations for all three bombers and their average yearly
mission capable rate. Mission capable rate is defined as the percentage of aircraft in each of the
bomber fleet components that are capable of performing its intended wartime mission.
Figure 7. Congressional Authorizations and Appropriations for Bomber Sustainment
and Modernization
Figure in millions of “then-year” dollars, rounded to nearest tenth
B-52
B-1
B-2
Authorized
Appropriated
Authorized
Appropriated
Authorized
Appropriated
FY02
70.4
110.7
296.4
196.4
281.5
293.1
FY03
65.8
111.5
260.7
276.4
406.2
406.2
FY04
89.8
117.4
194.1
200.9
352.3
329.1
FY05
137.4
188.3
254.4
259.4
408.5
408.5
FY06
241
255.5
226.8
182.4
393.8
387.8
FY07
205.4
204.3
196.1
196.1
450.9
453.2
FY08
138.2
142.7
178.8
187.8
536.2
546.2
FY09
80.4
80.4
168.7
168.7
728.9
728.9
FY10
155.4
163.8
280
261.5
735.9
699.3
FY11
218.6
199.2
248.6
252.1
350.1
350.1
FY12
187.9
187.9
235.8
235.8
371.1
360.8
FY13
63.0
63.0
167.0
167.0
447.0
447.0
Sources: National Defense Authorization Acts, Appropriation Acts, and Committee Reports for Fiscal Years
2002 to 2013. Dol ar amounts include procurement and research, development, test and evaluation funding.
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Figure 8. B-52, B-1 and B-2 Appropriations Comparison
Figure in “then-year” dollars
Sources: National Defense Authorization Acts, Appropriation Acts, and Committee Reports for Fiscal Years
2002 to 2013.
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Figure 9. B-52, B-1 and B-2 Appropriations and Average Historical Mission Capable Rates
Figure in “then-year” dollars and percentage of aircraft in each of the bomber fleet that are capable of performing its intended wartime mission
$800,000,000
100.00%
90.00%
$700,000,000
80.00%
$600,000,000
70.00%
$500,000,000
60.00%
B-52 Appropriated
Funds
B-1 Appropriated
Funds
$400,000,000
50.00%
B-2 Appropriated
Funds
B-52 Average MC
40.00%
Rate
$300,000,000
B-1 Average MC
Rate
B-2 Average MC
30.00%
Rate
$200,000,000
20.00%
$100,000,000
10.00%
$0
0.00%
FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
Source: National Defense Authorization Acts, Appropriation Acts, and Committee Reports for Fiscal Years 2002 to 2013 and mission capable rates as reported to
Headquarters U.S. Air Force by Air Combat Command and Global Strike Command.
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Legislative Activity FY2011-FY2013
The follow is a brief summary of legislative actions involving U.S. Air Force bomber sustainment
and modernization from fiscal years 2011 through 2013. It also highlights Congress’s interest in
the potential threat posed by countries seeking to implement anti-access/area denial capabilities
and strategies. The complete legislative language for each of these efforts can be found in
Appendix E.
FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383)
Section 1056 of P.L. 111-383 directed the Secretary of the Air Force to submit to congressional
defense committees a report concerning bomber modernization, sustainment, and recapitalization
efforts in support of the National Defense Strategy. In the report, the Air Force was to discuss the
cost, schedule, and performance of all planned efforts to modernize and keep viable the existing
B–1, B–2, and B–52 bomber fleets. Congress also requested the forecasted service-life and all
sustainment challenges that the Secretary of the Air Force may confront in keeping those
platforms viable until the anticipated retirement of all three aircraft. As previously discussed, this
report was submitted to Congress in September 2011 and contains similar information as that
found in the Air Force Global Strike Command’s (AFGSC’s) and Air Combat Command’s
(ACC’s) master plan documents for the B-52 and B-2 (AFGSC) and the B-1 (ACC) presented in
Appendixes B through D.
Under Section 1238 of P.L. 111-383, Congress requested an additional report on United States’
efforts to defend against threats posed by the Anti-Access and Area-Denial capabilities of certain
nations-states. This report was requested in response to DOD’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review that concluded ‘‘[a]nti-access strategies seek to deny outside countries the ability to
project power into a region, thereby allowing aggression or other destabilizing actions to be
conducted by the anti-access powers. Without dominant capabilities to project power, the
integrity of United States alliances and security partnerships could be called into question,
reducing United States security and influence and increasing the possibility of conflict.” Congress
also requested an assessment by the Secretary of Defenses on the United States’ efforts to defend
against any potential future threats posed by the anti-access and area-denial capabilities of
potentially hostile nation-states. These reports were submitted to the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees in April 2011.
FY2012 Department of Defense Appropriations (H.Rept. 112-331)
In the DOD’s FY2012 budget request, the Air Force proposed the retirement of six B-1 bombers
with the intent of putting the money saved by retiring these aircraft towards modernization and
sustainment efforts for the remaining 60 B-1 aircraft. In response to this proposal, the House
Appropriations Committee made the following recommendation in their conference report to
accompany H.R. 2055.
The fiscal year 2012 budget request includes a proposal to retire six B–1 bomber aircraft.
The conferees understand that the B– 1 fleet continues to operate almost constantly over
Afghanistan in support of troops on the ground and that the B–1 is a critical component of
the Nation’s long-range strike capabilities. The Air Force proposed to reinvest less than 40
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percent of the savings from aircraft retirements in the B–1 modernization program across the
Future Years Defense Program. The conferees are concerned that premature retirement of six
B–1 aircraft could negatively impact long-range strike capabilities. Therefore, the conferees
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to reinvest a larger portion of savings realized from B–1
aircraft retirements, to the extent authorized by law, in the sustainment and modernization of
the B–1 fleet.
FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81)
Further responding to the Air Force’s proposal to retire six B-1s, Section 132 in P.L. 112-81
sought to clarify the Air Force’s plan by restricting FY2012 funds for the retirement of any B-1
aircraft until the Secretary of the Air Force submitted a plan to congressional defense committees
detailing the following:
• Identification of each B–1 bomber aircraft that will be retired and the disposition
plan for such aircraft;
• an estimate of the savings that will result from the proposed retirement of B–1
bomber aircraft in each calendar year through calendar year 2022;
• an estimate of the amount of the savings that will be reinvested in the
modernization of B–1 bomber aircraft still in service in each calendar year
through calendar year 2022;
• a modernization plan for sustaining the remaining B–1 bomber aircraft through at
least calendar year 2022; and,
• an estimate of the amount of funding required to fully fund the modernization
plan for each calendar year through calendar year 2022.
Language in Section 132 also went on to specify that if retirement of six B-1s was justified, after
subsequently retiring those aircraft, the Secretary of the Air Force will maintain in a common
capability configuration no less than 36 combat-coded B–1 aircraft out to September 30, 2013.70
After that date, no less than 35 combat-coded aircraft until September 30, 2014, then 34 until
September 30, 2015, and finally 33 combat-coded aircraft until September 30, 2016.71
Section 134 of P.L. 112-81 made available certain FY2011 funds for research and development
relating to the B-2 bomber. Specifically, $20 million was made available for FY2012 for research,
development, test and evaluation of a conventional weapons mixed load capability for the B–2. In
addition, Section 135 made available $15 million of FY2011 funds for research, development,
test and evaluation of alternative options for the B-2’s extremely high frequency terminal
Increment 1 program of record.72
70 Combat-coded aircraft is defined as aircraft assigned to meet the primary aircraft authorization to a unit for the
performance of its wartime mission.
71 As of this writing, the Air Force has retired only three of the originally proposed six B-1s.
72 The B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) satellite communications (SATCOM) program supports the replacement
of the B-2’s ultra high-frequency radio terminal set with an EHF SATCOM system that will be compatible with the
military’s legacy MILSTAR I/II satellite constellation and the future AEHF satellite constellation.
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FY2013 Department of Defense Appropriations (S.Rept. 112-196: To accompany
H.R. 5856)
Note: as of this writing, this legislation has not been passed into law.
The FY2013 budget request did not include funds under Aircraft Procurement for the B-52
CONECT program of record due to the Air Force’s decision to terminate the program.73 Instead, it
included $34,700,000 for research, development, test and evaluation for a restructured and
descoped B–52 CONECT program. The committee, however, directed that no funds may be
obligated or expended for the B–52 CONECT program of record post-milestone C acquisition
activities or for a restructured B–52 CONECT program until 30 days after the congressional
defense committees have been briefed on the Air Force’s proposed way ahead.
The committee also addressed the Air Force’s decision to terminate the B-52 Strategic Radar
Replacement [SR2] program. The B-52’s existing APQ-166 radar was produced in the 1960s, has
a 20 to 30 hour mean-time between failure rate, has limited in capabilities, and is costly to operate
and maintain. Although the Air Force conducted a lengthy analysis of alternatives in 2011 and
ultimately terminated the program, the committee encouraged the Secretary of the Air Force to
reconsider this decision.
FY2013 Department of Defense Authorizations (P.L. 112-239)
The subject of retiring B-1 aircraft was addressed again in P.L. 112-239. Section 142 amended
Section 8062 of title 10, United States Code, by adding at the end a new subsection stating,
“Beginning October 1, 2011, the Secretary of the Air Force may not retire more than six B–1
aircraft” and “shall maintain in a common capability configuration not less than 36 B–1 aircraft
as combat-coded aircraft.”
Section 211 addressed concerns over the nuclear certification requirements of the Air Force’s
proposed Next-Generation Bomber by directing the Secretary of the Air Force to ensure the next-
generation long-range strike bomber is capable of carrying nuclear weapons as of the date on
which the aircraft achieves initial operating capability (IOC) and is also certified to use such
weapons no later than two years after IOC.
Conclusion
In the wake of fiscal constraints levied by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25/S. 365)
and the implementation of sequestration on March 1, 2013, Congress and the Air Force will be
faced with difficult decisions regarding fiscal appropriations for bomber sustainment and
modernization. The impacts of these fiscal measures on bomber appropriations can already be
seen with implementation of the FY2013 defense budget. From FY2002 through FY2012, the
sustainment and modernization appropriations for the B-52, B-1, and B-2 averaged $160.15
73 The B-52 Combat Network Communications Technology (CONECT) acquisition program supports
nuclear and conventional operations by upgrading the B-52 fleet with tactical datalink and voice
communications capability along with improved threat and situational awareness to support participation in
network centric operations.
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million, $219.77 million, and $451.2 million per year respectively. For the FY2013 budget,
appropriations for the B-52 were $63 million, down 61% from the prior 11-year average and the
lowest amount appropriated since FY2002. FY2013 appropriations for the B-1 were $167 million,
down 24% from the prior 11-year average and also the lowest amount appropriated since
FY2002. The B-2 was the only bomber not affected by the budget cuts in FY2013 with $447
million appropriated, a drop of only 1% from the prior 11-year average. Meanwhile, potential
foes and long-time allies in the Asia-Pacific are undergoing major (in some cases unprecedented)
expansions of their defense capabilities in order to secure or expand their diplomatic, economic,
and strategic influence in the region. The result is an increase in the proliferation of advanced 21st
century weapon systems and a trend of countries adopting A2/AD strategies to secure their
national interests. Nevertheless, time and time again, the United States turns to its long-range
bomber force as means of flexing its deterrent muscle, as it did most recently in response to
renewed threats of war by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. In March and April of 2013, the
United States sent B-52s and B-2s on short-notice deployments for exercises with South Korean
forces and for shows-of-force over the Korean peninsula as a visible signal to Kim Jong Un that
such threats by the North’s regime will not go unchecked. However, as potential A2/AD equipped
adversaries throughout the world become more prevalent and more capable, the question remains:
will the Air Force’s legacy bomber force keep pace with sustainment and modernization efforts in
order to remain a credible response to such adversaries, or will they become increasingly
irrelevant because the nation cannot afford them? In large part, decisions by Congress will
determine just how much longer the B-52, B-1, and B-2 will remain relevant, and ultimately, will
likely determine the future of the nation’s long-range strike capabilities.
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Appendix A. Existing Bomber Force
This appendix presents additional information on the U.S. Air Force’s existing fleet of B-52H, B-
1B, and B-2 bombers.
52H Stratofortress74
Mission
The B-52H is a long-range, heavy bomber that can perform a variety of missions. The bomber is
capable of flying at high subsonic speeds at altitudes up to 50,000 feet (15,166.6 meters). It can
carry nuclear or precision guided conventional ordnance with worldwide precision navigation
capability.
Features
In a conventional conflict, the B-52H can perform strategic attack, close-air support, air
interdiction, offensive counter-air, and maritime operations. During Desert Storm, B-52s
delivered 40% of all the weapons dropped by coalition forces. It is also capable of ocean
surveillance, and can assist the U.S. Navy in anti-ship and mine-laying operations. Two B-52Hs,
in two hours, can monitor 140,000 square miles (364,000 square kilometers) of ocean surface.
All B-52Hs can be equipped with two electro-optical viewing sensors, a forward-looking infrared
camera, and an advanced targeting pod, to augment targeting, battle assessment, and flight safety.
Pilots wear night vision goggles, or NVGs, to enhance their vision during night operations. Night
vision goggles provide greater safety during night operations by increasing the pilot’s ability to
visually clear terrain, avoid enemy radar, and see other aircraft in a lights-out environment.
Starting in 1989, on-going modifications incorporate the global positioning system, heavy stores
adapter beams for carrying 2,000 pound munitions, and a full array of advance weapons currently
under development.
The use of aerial refueling gives the B-52H a range limited only by crew endurance. It has an
unrefueled combat range in excess of 8,800 miles (14,080 kilometers).
Background
The B-52H is capable of dropping or launching a wide array of weapons. This includes gravity
bombs, cluster bombs, precision guided missiles, and joint direct attack munitions. Updated with
modern technology the B-52H will be capable of delivering the full complement of joint
developed weapons. Current engineering analyses show the B-52H’s life span to extend beyond
the year 2040.
74 Information in this section comes from the U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet for the B-52H Stratofortress, 4 December 2012,
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=83.
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The B-52A first flew in 1954, and the B model entered service in 1955. A total of 744 B-52s were
built with the last, a B-52H, delivered in October 1962. The first of 102 B-52Hs was delivered to
Strategic Air Command in May 1961. The H model can carry up to 20 air launched cruise
missiles. In addition, it can carry the conventional cruise missile that was launched in several
contingencies during the 1990s, starting with Operation Desert Storm and culminating with
Operation Iraqi Freedom.
In Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force, B-52s struck wide-area troop concentrations, fixed
installations and bunkers, and decimated the morale of Iraq’s Republican Guard. On September 2
and 3, 1996, two B-52H’s struck Baghdad power stations and communications facilities with 13
AGM-86C conventional air launched cruise missiles, or CALCMs, as part of Operation Desert
Strike. At the time, this mission was the longest distance flown for a combat mission, involving a
34-hour, 16,000 statute mile, round trip from Barksdale Air Force Base, LA.
In 2001, the B-52H contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom by loitering high above the
battlefield and providing close air support through the use of precision guided munitions.
The B-52H also played a role in Operation Iraqi Freedom. On March 21, 2003, B-52Hs launched
approximately 100 CALCMs during a night mission.
Only the H model is still in the Air Force inventory and is assigned to the 5th Bomb Wing at
Minot AFB, ND, and the 2nd Bomb Wing at Barksdale AFB, LA, which fall under Air Force
Global Strike Command. The aircraft is also assigned to the Air Force Reserve Command’s 307th
Bomb Wing at Barksdale.
General Characteristics
Primary Function: Heavy bomber
Contractor: Boeing Military Airplane Co.
Power plant: Eight Pratt & Whitney engines TF33-P-3/103 turbofan
Thrust: Each engine up to 17,000 pounds
Wingspan: 185 feet (56.4 meters)
Length: 159 feet, 4 inches (48.5 meters)
Height: 40 feet, 8 inches (12.4 meters)
Weight: Approximately 185,000 pounds (83,250 kilograms)
Maximum Takeoff Weight: 488,000 pounds (219,600 kilograms)
Fuel Capacity: 312,197 pounds (141,610 kilograms)
Payload: 70,000 pounds (31,500 kilograms)
Speed: 650 miles per hour (Mach 0.86)
Range: 8,800 miles (7,652 nautical miles)
Ceiling: 50,000 feet (15,151.5 meters)
Armament: Approximately 70,000 pounds (31,500 kilograms) mixed ordnance—bombs,
mines, and missiles. (Modified to carry air-launched cruise missiles)
Crew: Five (aircraft commander, pilot, radar navigator, navigator, and electronic warfare
officer)
Unit Cost: $53.4 million (FY1998 constant dollars)
Initial operating capability: April 1952
Inventory: Active force, 76; ANG, 0; Reserve, 9
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B-1B Lancer75
Mission
Carrying the largest payload of both guided and unguided weapons in the Air Force inventory, the
multi-mission B-1 can rapidly deliver massive quantities of precision and non-precision weapons.
Features
The B-1B’s blended wing and body configuration, variable-geometry wings, and turbofan
afterburning engines combine to provide long range, maneuverability, and high speed while
enhancing survivability. Forward wing settings are used for takeoff, landings, air refueling, and in
some high-altitude weapons employment scenarios. Aft wing sweep settings—the main combat
configuration—are typically used during high subsonic and supersonic flight, enhancing the B-
1B’s maneuverability in the low- and high-altitude regimes. The B-1B’s speed and handling
characteristics, large payload, radar targeting system, long loiter time, and survivability allow it to
integrate with almost any joint/composite strike force.
The B-1B is a multi-mission weapon system. Its synthetic aperture radar is capable of tracking,
targeting, and engaging moving vehicles as well as self-targeting and terrain-following modes. In
addition, an extremely accurate Global Positioning System-aided Inertial Navigation System
enables aircrews to navigate without the aid of ground-based navigation aids as well as engage
targets with a high level of precision. Combat Track II data link radios provide a secure, beyond-
line-of-sight reach back connectivity for command and control and in-flight re-tasking/re-
targeting. In a time sensitive targeting environment, the aircrew can use targeting data from the
Combined Air Operations Center over Combat Track II to strike emerging targets.
The B-1B’s onboard self-protection electronic jamming equipment, radar warning receiver,
expendable countermeasures, and a towed decoy system complement its low-radar cross-section
to form an integrated defense system that supports penetration of hostile airspace. The electronic
countermeasures system detects and identifies adversary threat radars and then applies the
appropriate jamming technique either automatically or through operator inputs.
Current B-1B sustainment and modernization efforts build on this foundation. Radar
sustainability and capability upgrades will provide a more reliable system and may be upgraded
in the future to include an ultra-high-resolution capability and automatic target recognition. The
addition of a fully integrated data link, or FIDL, will add Link-16 line-of-sight data link
communications capability. FIDL combined with associated cockpit upgrades will provide the
crew with a much more flexible, integrated cockpit. Several obsolete and hard to maintain
electronic systems are also being replaced to improve aircraft reliability.
Background
The B-1A was initially developed in the 1970s as a replacement for the B-52. Four prototypes of
this long-range, high speed (Mach 2.2) strategic bomber were developed and tested in the mid-
75 Information in this section comes from the U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet for the B-1B Lancer, 21 May 2012,
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=81.
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1970s, but the program was canceled in 1977 before going into production. Flight testing
continued through 1981.
The B-1B is an improved variant initiated by the Reagan Administration in 1981. Major changes
included the addition of additional structure to increase payload by 74,000 pounds, an improved
radar, and reduction of the aircraft’s radar cross section (RCS) by an order of magnitude. The
engine inlets were extensively modified as part of this RCS reduction, necessitating a reduction in
maximum speed to Mach 1.2.
The first production B-1B flew in October 1984, and the first aircraft was delivered to Dyess Air
Force Base, Texas, in June 1985. Initial operational capability was achieved on October 1, 1986.
The final B-1B was delivered May 2, 1988.
The B-1B was first used in combat in support of operations against Iraq during Operation Desert
Fox in December 1998. In 1999, six B-1Bs were used in Operation Allied Force, delivering more
than 20% of the total ordnance while flying less than 2% of the combat sorties.
During the first six months of Operation Enduring Freedom, eight B-1Bs dropped nearly 40% of
the total tonnage delivered by coalition air forces. This included nearly 3,900 Joint Direct Attack
Munitions (JDAMs), or 67% of the total. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the aircraft flew less than
1% of the combat missions while delivering 43% of the JDAMs used. The B-1 continues to be
deployed today, flying missions daily in support of continuing operations.
General Characteristics
Primary Function: Long-range, multi-role, heavy bomber
Contractor: Boeing, North America (formerly Rockwell International, North American
Aircraft); Offensive avionics, Boeing Military Airplane; defensive avionics, EDO
Corporation
Power plant: Four General Electric F101-GE-102 turbofan engine with afterburner
Thrust: 30,000-plus pounds with afterburner, per engine
Wingspan: 137 feet (41.8 meters) extended forward, 79 feet (24.1 meters) swept aft
Length: 146 feet (44.5 meters)
Height: 34 feet (10.4 meters)
Weight: approximately 190,000 pounds (86,183 kilograms)
Maximum Takeoff Weight: 477,000 pounds (216,634 kilograms)
Fuel Capacity: 265,274 pounds (120,326 kilograms)
Payload: 75,000 pounds ( 34,019 kilograms)
Speed: 900-plus mph (Mach 1.2 at sea level)
Range: Intercontinental
Ceiling: More than 30,000 feet (9,144 meters)
Armament: 84 500-pound Mk-82 or 24 2,000-pound Mk-84 general purpose bombs; up to
84 500-pound Mk-62 or 8 2,000-pound Mk-65 Quick Strike naval mines; 30 cluster
munitions (CBU-87, -89, -97) or 30 Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispensers (CBU-103, -104, -
105); up to 24 2,000-pound GBU-31 or 15 500-pound GBU-38 Joint Direct Attack
Munitions; up to 24 AGM-158A Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles; GBU-54 Laser Joint
Direct Attack Munition
Crew: Four (aircraft commander, copilot, and two weapon systems officers)
Unit Cost: $283.1 million (fiscal 98 constant dollars)
Initial operating capability: October 1986
Inventory: Active force, 63 (test, 2); ANG, 0; Reserve, 0
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B-2 Spirit76
Mission
The B-2 Spirit is a multi-role bomber capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear
munitions.
Features
Along with the B-52H and the B-1B, the B-2 provides the penetrating flexibility and
effectiveness inherent in manned bombers. Its low-observable, or “stealth,” characteristics give it
the ability to penetrate an enemy’s most sophisticated defenses and threaten its most valued, and
heavily defended, targets.
The blending of low-observable technologies with high aerodynamic efficiency and large payload
gives the B-2 important advantages over existing bombers. Its low observability provides it
greater freedom of action at high altitudes, thus increasing its range and providing a better field of
view for the aircraft’s sensors. Its unrefueled range is approximately 6,000 nautical miles (9,600
kilometers).
The B-2’s low observability is derived from a combination of reduced infrared, acoustic,
electromagnetic, visual, and radar signatures. These signatures make it difficult for sophisticated
defensive systems to detect, track, and engage the B-2. Many aspects of the low observability
process remain classified; however, the B-2’s composite materials, special coatings, and flying-
wing design all contribute to its “stealthiness.”
The B-2 has a crew of two pilots: an aircraft commander in the left seat and a mission commander
in the right.
Background
The first B-2 was publicly displayed on November 22, 1988, when it was rolled out of its hangar
at Air Force Plant 42, Palmdale, CA. Its first flight was July 17, 1989. The B-2 Combined Test
Force, Air Force Flight Test Center, Edwards Air Force Base, CA, is responsible for flight testing,
engineering, manufacturing, and development of the B-2.
Whiteman AFB, MO, is the only operational base for the B-2. The first aircraft, Spirit of
Missouri, was delivered December 17, 1993. Depot maintenance responsibility for the B-2 is
performed by Air Force contractor support and is managed at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics
Center at Tinker AFB, OK.
In Operation Allied Force, the B-2 was responsible for destroying 33% of all Serbian targets in
the first eight weeks, by flying nonstop to Kosovo from its home base in Missouri and back. In
support of Operation Enduring Freedom, the B-2 flew one of its longest missions to date from
Whiteman to Afghanistan and back. The B-2 completed its first-ever combat deployment in
76 Information in this section comes from the U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet for the B-2 Spirit, 23 April 2010,
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=82.
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support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, flying 22 sorties from a forward operating location as well as
27 sorties from Whiteman AFB and releasing more than 1.5 million pounds of munitions. The
aircraft received full operational capability status in December 2003. On February 1, 2009, the
Air Force’s newest command, Air Force Global Strike Command, assumed responsibility for the
B-2 from Air Combat Command.
The prime contractor, responsible for overall system design and integration, is Northrop
Grumman Integrated Systems Sector. Boeing Military Airplanes Co., Hughes Radar Systems
Group, General Electric Aircraft Engine Group, and Vought Aircraft Industries, Inc., are key
members of the aircraft contractor team.
General Characteristics
Primary function: Multi-role heavy bomber
Contractor: Northrop Grumman Corp. and Contractor Team: Boeing Military Airplanes
Co., Hughes Radar Systems Group, General Electric Aircraft Engine Group, and Vought
Aircraft Industries, Inc.
Power Plant: Four General Electric F118-GE-100 engines
Thrust: 17,300 pounds each engine
Wingspan: 172 feet (52.12 meters)
Length: 69 feet (20.9 meters)
Height: 17 feet (5.1 meters
Weight: 160,000 pounds (72,575 kilograms)
Maximum Takeoff Weight: 336,500 pounds (152,634 kilograms)
Fuel Capacity: 167,000 pounds (75750 kilograms)
Payload: 40,000 pounds (18,144 kilograms)
Speed: High subsonic
Range: Intercontinental
Ceiling: 50,000 feet (15,240 meters)
Armament: Conventional or nuclear weapons
Crew: Two pilots
Unit cost: Approximately $1.157 billion (fiscal 98 constant dollars)
Initial operating capability: April 1997
Inventory: Active force: 20 (1 test); ANG: 0; Reserve: 0
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Appendix B. Plans for B-52H Bomber Sustainment
and Modernization
B-52H Master Plan and Requirements77
The B-5H2 Bomber Master Plan outlines Air Force Global Strike Command’s (AFGSC’s) plans,
programs, requirements, and strategic vision for the B-52 platform to meet the nation’s airborne
strategic nuclear deterrence and global precision attack mission objectives. Near-term
modernization and sustainment efforts are identified for the time period 2012 to 2018. Far-term
modernization and sustainment efforts are identified as those required in the 2019 to 2032 time
period. AFGSC Director of Plans, Programs and Requirements (HQ AFGSC A5/8) is responsible
for producing and updating the master plan.
Assumptions
The B-52H Bomber Master Plan is based on the following assumptions:
• The B-52H will conduct its assigned nuclear mission through 2040.
• The B-52H will continue to conduct its assigned conventional mission through
2040.
• The B-52H fleet size will consist of not more than 76 airframes through 2040.
• Conversion of a required number of B-52Hs to a conventional-only role by 2018
for New START compliance.
• The current B-52H service life goal is 2040.
• There will be no change to current B-52H basing.
• Unfunded risks and issues require prioritization and validation through the
resource allocation and POM (program objectives memorandum) process.
• The nuclear enterprise will continue to be a top priority for the Air Force and the
primary mission of Air Force Global Strike Command.
Current B-52H Sustainment and Modernization Efforts
The following is a summary of B-52H sustainment and modernization initiatives currently in the
program of record (POR) that are either just being completed or are currently in progress.
(Asterisks denote sustainment and modernization efforts that could be considered essential to the
B-52H’s ability to operate in A2/AD threat environments.)
* Combat Network Communications Technology (CONECT): The B-52 CONECT
acquisition program supports nuclear and conventional operations by upgrading the B-52
77 Information in Appendix B is from Air Force Global Strike Command’s, B-52 Bomber Master Plan, June 2012.
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fleet with tactical datalink and voice communications capability along with improved threat
and situational awareness to support participation in network centric operations.
* Military-Standard-1760 Modernization: Improves the B-52’s conventional warfare
capability with additional MIL-STD-1760 smart weapons and improved weapons carriage
and fully integrates advanced targeting pods with the B-52’s offensive avionics system.
B-52 Trainer Upgrades: Includes modernization upgrades to B-52 training devices to
support aircrew and maintenance training with the latest B-52 capabilities. Upgrades and
modernizations under this program ensure weapons system trainers (simulators) are current
with ongoing B-52 modifications.
Arms Control: Arms control activities under the New START create the need to modify a
number of B-52s to a conventional only role by removing the aircraft’s nuclear Code Enable
Switch and associated equipment. This effort requires a complete design to remove the
equipment from the aircraft and install metal plates prohibiting reinstallation of removed
equipment to comply with treaty protocols.
* Mode S/5 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF): The Mode S/5 program replaces the B-52’s
aging APX-64 IFF transponder with a modern APX-119 transponder. Mode S/5 IFF is
required for flight by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the DOD.
Low Cost Modifications: Miscellaneous, low-cost modernization efforts that stem from the
operation and maintenance of a 50-plus-year-old aircraft, such as parts obsolescence,
diminishing manufacturing resources, and emerging requirements to add or maintain the
existing B-52 capabilities.
B-52 Anti-Skid Replacement: The B-52 anti-skid system is used to maintain control of the
aircraft during landing and taxi operations by preventing aircraft skidding. This modification
replaces the current anti-skid system with an updated system that resolves obsolescence
issues. If not upgraded, the unsupportability of the current anti-skid system is projected to
affect aircraft availability starting in 2015.
* B-52 Modernization Research Development Test and Evaluation Efforts: B-52
modernization RDT&E efforts is a comprehensive program to ensure the B-52’s ability to
perform current and future wartime missions. It includes upgrades to data links, navigation,
sensors, weapons, and electronic warfare and training capabilities.
* 1760 Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade (IWBU): The 1760 IWBU modification allows the
B-52 to carry J-series weapons such as the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), Joint Air-
to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), JASSM-ER (extended range), and Miniature Air
Launched Decoy (MALD) weapons in the B-52’s internal weapons bay.
Future B-52H Sustainment and Modernization Requirements
While the current B-52H weapon system is capable of meeting today’s strategic deterrence and
conventional taskings, it may require continued sustainment and modernization efforts to remain
airworthy and viable against 21st century A2/AD threats. For the B-52H to continue meeting
mission requirements, Air Force Global Strike Command recommends considering the following
modernization and sustainment efforts for future appropriations consideration. These efforts are
organized into five broad categories: airframe, avionics, communications systems, weapons
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interfaces, and supporting infrastructure. A detailed explanation of each category’s specific
recommendations can be found in the B-52H’s Master Plan.
Airframe: The airframe is comprised of structural components, engines, flight controls, and
miscellaneous mechanical systems. Several B-52 airframe subsystems such as the existing B-
52 analog Yaw Electronic Control Unit/Pitch Electronic Control Unit and the Anti-Skid
Control Unit within the Anti-Skid System are becoming unsupportable due to parts
obsolescence, lack of test equipment, specialized tools, troubleshooting guides, and
experienced repair personnel. Continued full funding for these programs could mitigate these
problems.
Avionics Systems: Avionics systems are comprised of defensive systems, offensive systems,
and navigation systems. Several avionics subsystems are suffering from obsolescence and
supportability issues. For example, the current radar antenna was never upgraded, uses 1950s
technology and is projected to become unsupportable in the near future. In addition, the
Electronic Warfare (EW) suite is experiencing parts obsolescence, diminishing
manufacturing sources, and ineffectiveness against the technologically advancing A2/AD
threats.
Communications Systems: Communications systems are comprised of cryptographic,
tactical, emergency, and survivable subsystems. The biggest near-term communications
concern involves the family of advanced beyond line-of-sight terminals. Delays in the
program are putting the Extremely High-Frequency (EHF) program at risk by not meeting
U.S. Strategic Command’s (USSTRATCOM) need dates based on projected Military
Strategic and Tactical Relay Satellite (MILSTAR) Ultra High Frequency Satellite
Communications (UHF SATCOM) end-of-life projections. Further delays will impact the B-
52’s ability to receive Emergency Action Messages (EAMs) and Report-Backs in support of
USSTRATCOM’s nuclear command and control requirements.
Longer-term communications concerns involve the integration of an advanced tactical
datalink and an advanced secure, broadband, beyond line-of-sight datalink for continuous,
survivable command and control coordination, and improved reception of weapons
retargeting data and mission updates.
Weapons Interfaces: Weapons interfaces are systems designed to support, carry,
communicate with and/or launch weapons from the B-52. Near-term needs include the
integration of an Advanced Targeting Pod, on-going Military-Standard-1760 internal
weapons bay upgrades, integrated weapons interface unit (IWIU) integration on external
weapons pylons, and a GPS interface unit/programmable keyboard upgrade to the offensive
avionics system.
Supporting Infrastructure: B-52 supporting infrastructure includes trainers, simulators, test
equipment, aircraft ground equipment, and weapon system testing that support the B-52
platform.
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Figure B-1. Graphical Summary of B-52 Sustainment and Modernization Master
Plan
FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30
AIRFRAME
Structural Components
Engines
Flight Controls
Misc Mechanical
Anti-Skid Replacement
AVIONICS
Proactive Aircraft Defense Technology
Defensive Systems
Electronic Warfare Suite Modernization
Strategic Radar Replacement
Offensive Systems
Engage Moving Targets Technology
New START
IFF Mode S/5
ADS-B Upgrade
GPS-IU/PKB
Navigation Systems
Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum
WAAS & SAASM Compliance with M Code
Glide Slope Modernization
COMM SYSTEMS
Cryptographic
Nuclear Command & Control Processing Technology
Combat Network Comm Technology
Tactical
Evolutionary Data Link
Emergency
Crash-Survivable Flight Data Recorder
Extremely High Frequency
Survivable
Survivable BLOS Communications Path Technology
WEAPONS
INTERFACES
Advanced Targeting Pod
1760 IWBU Inc 1
1760 IWBU Inc 2
1760 IWBU Inc 3
SUPPORTING
INFRASTRUCTURE
B-52 Trainer Systems Management
Trainers
On-Board Training Technology
Centralized Conventional Mission Planning Technology
Simulators
Flexible Nuclear Mission Planning Technology
Test Equipment
AGE
Weapon System
EMP Testing
Testing
OTHER
JMPS
MALD
Nuclear Certification
Funded Program/Effort
Unfunded Program/Effort
Funded Technology Need
Unfunded Technology Need
Source: Air Force Global Strike Command, B-52 Bomber Master Plan, June 2012, p. 10.
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Figure B-2. Historical Comparison of B-52 Appropriated Funding and the Average
Annual Mission Capable (MC) Rates for the B-52 Fleet
$300,000,000
100.00%
90.00%
$250,000,000
80.00%
70.00%
$200,000,000
60.00%
$150,000,000
50.00%
40.00%
$100,000,000
30.00%
20.00%
$50,000,000
10.00%
$0
0.00%
FY 02
FY 03
FY 04
FY 05
FY 06
FY 07
FY 08
FY 09
FY 10
FY 11
FY 12
Fiscal Year
Source: National Defense Authorization Acts, Appropriation Acts, and Committee Reports for Fiscal Years
2002 to 2012 and mission capable rates as reported to Headquarters U.S. Air Force by Global Strike Command.
Note: Mission capable rate is defined as the percentage of aircraft in the fleet that are capable of performing its
intended wartime mission.
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Appendix C. Plans for B-1 Bomber Sustainment and
Modernization
B-1 Strategic Action and Investment Plan (SAIP)78
Similar to the B-52H and B-2’s Master Plans, the B-1 sustainment and modernization plan is
captured in the B-1 Strategic Action and Investment Plan (SAIP). B-1 requirements are managed
by Air Combat Command’s (ACC’s) B-1 Aircraft Branch (ACC/A8A1) within the ACC/A8A
Combat Aircraft Division. In 2011, the B-1 Aircraft Branch contracted with the consulting firm of
Whitney, Bradley & Brown, Inc. to research, study, and develop a cost optimized and time phased
B-1 sustainment and modernization plan. The resulting B-1 SAIP provides detailed analysis and
recommendations for the period 2014 to 2025 and presents optimum B-1 portfolios of
sustainment and modernization efforts for the FY14, FY16, and FY18 Programs Objective
Memorandum (POM). The results of this effort produced three sustainment and modernization
plans designed to maximize the benefit to be received from three, assumed funding levels
dependent on Air Force requested and congressionally provided appropriations.
• Appropriation of $179 million per year (out to 2022) should complete existing
sustainment and modernization programs and fund only those sustainment
programs needed to maintain existing B-1 capabilities. The B-1 SAIP concludes
that $179 million represents the minimum feasible B-1 modernization and
sustainment funding level.
• The B-1 SAIP concluded that appropriations of $250 million per year (out to
2022) is the minimum recommended funding level for B-1 sustainment and
modernization. At this level, several high benefit capabilities could be funded,
which would reduce Air Force ownership costs and potentially increase the B-1’s
operational effectiveness.
• Appropriations of $400 million per year is the highest considered funding profile
recommended by the B-1 SAIP and would be sufficient to fund most of the
recommended B-1 sustainment and modernization efforts out to 2022.
The B-1 SAIP concludes that the Air Force should request at least $250 million per year for B-1
sustainment and modernization. Appropriations at this level and above are anticipated to provide
near-term solutions to weapon system capability gaps and shortfalls while ensuring the B-1 is
capable of supporting national security objectives.
Assumptions
The B-1 Bomber Strategic Action and Investment Plan (SAIP) is based on the following
assumptions:
• There will be a continued requirement to strike fleeting or time sensitive targets.
78 Information in Appendix C is from Air Force Air Combat Command’s, B-1 Strategic Action and Investment Plan
(SAIP), 10 May 2012.
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• The overall force structure within the Air Force will continue to be reduced,
emphasizing the need for availability of existing platforms such as the B-1.
• B-1 force structure will remain steady over the SAIP timeline.
• B-1s may be employed from the continental United States or applicable forward-
deployed locations, as warranted by the scenario and theater requirements.
• Budget pressures dictate that B-1 aircraft be sustained in the most affordable
manner possible.
• Reductions in manpower will continue to highlight the need for efficiencies.
• Irregular Warfare operations will continue throughout the service life of the B-1.
Current B-1 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts
The following is a summary of the major B-1 sustainment and modernization initiatives that are
currently in the program of record (POR) that are either just completing or are currently in
progress. The costs of these PORs were factored into the SAIP’s sustainment and modernization
funding analysis and are reflected in the three assumed funding levels. (Asterisks denote
sustainment and modernization efforts that could be considered essential to the B-1’s ability to
operate in A2/AD threat environments.)
* Fully Integrated Data Link: FIDL will provide the B-1 with Link-16 line-of-sight (LOS)
and Joint Range Extension (JRE) beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) data link capability and
supports machine-to-machine transfer of targeting data to the B-1’s weapons control
computers.
Simulator Digital Control Loading: Simulator digital control loading is a modification to
the B-1’s Weapon System Trainer(s) (WSTs) that will replace the existing hydraulically-
operated control loading system with a digital control loading system. Control loading
provides force feedback for the pilot’s flight control stick and pedals; the WST flight stations
are unusable without a working control loading system. The existing system faces
obsolescence and diminishing manufacturing sources (DMS) issues, with some critical parts
having no spares.
Central Integrated Test System: CITS is the B-1’s fault diagnostic and fault isolation
system. The current CITS processor is at maximum memory/throughput, thus inhibiting fault
detection and isolation for current systems and future B-1 upgrades. This modification
provides a new processor, upgraded displays, and new software that will enhance diagnostic
capabilities, improve aircraft turnaround time, and reduce maintenance costs. This program
will also alleviate the current diminishing manufacturing source issue with this system.
* Inertial Navigation System Replacement: Provides for the replacement of a line
replaceable unit (LRU) in the B-1’s inertial navigation system. The B-1 INS provides
autonomous capability to navigate globally, without the aid of ground-based and global
positioning system navigation aids, as well as engage ground targets with a high level of
precision. The current INS system is plagued with severe diminishing manufacturing source
issues.
* Radar Improvement Upgrade: The B-1B Radar Reliability and Maintainability
Improvement Program (RMIP) consists of the replacement of two high-failure-rate radar
Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) and the supporting software conversion of legacy radar
modes. The Radar RMIP is intended to provide B-1B combat forces with an updated
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offensive radar system that should improve mission capable (MC) rates and eliminate issues
with diminishing manufacturing sources (DMS).
* Visual Situation Display Upgrade: The Vertical Situation Display Upgrade (VSDU) is a
safety-critical program that replaces the B-1’s pilot and co-pilot primary flight displays and
associated flight instruments. The current VSDs are monochrome cathode ray tube displays
and “steam gauge” primary flight instruments which are experiencing severe diminishing
manufacturing source issues with the potential to ground the aircraft. Spares are no longer
procurable due to obsolescence. VSDU installs two 8” x 6” color displays at the pilot and co-
pilot stations to provide primary flight information and backups to meet flight safety
standards.
Self-Contained Attitude Indicator: The SCAI is a backup to the B-1’s primary flight
instruments and provides pilots with indications of aircraft attitude, airspeed, Mach, altitude
and vertical velocity. This development effort will replace the current obsolete legacy SCAI
with a more reliable and supportable off-the-shelf display.
Gyro Stabilization System Replacement (GSSR): This program is procuring and installing
line replaceable units (LRUs) in the B-1’s GSS, which is part of the aircraft’s navigation
system. This modification provides for replacement of the high maintenance/high cost/high
failure rate GSS LRUs with high reliability LRUs.
B-1 Training Support: This effort modifies and replaces computer components in the B-1
aircraft Maintenance Training Devices (MTDs). These MTDs are currently running on
computer systems from the late 1990s and are using nearly 100% of the computer resources
available to them. As such, no excess computer capacity exists to support current updates,
including current B-1 modification efforts. This modification will update the hardware with
modern Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) computer systems and will re-host the software
on the new hardware, allowing these MTDs to accept new upgrades and remain concurrent
with B-1 upgrades.
* Digital Communications: The digital communications upgrade provides for replacement
of a currently installed Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Satellite Communications (SATCOM)
beyond line of sight datalink radio system with a Demand Assigned Multiple Access
(DAMA) compliant, UHF SATCOM radio. The current system, a temporary modification,
was installed in 2002 to support combat operations in Southwest Asia. The current system is
not DAMA compliant, which severely limits accessibility to SATCOM channels. In addition,
the current system utilizes a system unique datalink, which is not interoperable with
standard, joint UHF SATCOM systems.
* B-1 Link 16 Cryptographic Materials: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
Control and Communications (ASD/C3I) directed implementation of the DOD
Cryptographic Modernization Initiative (CMI) on 23 February 2001.79 CJCS Notice
6510/NSA 3-9 directs the modernization of all cryptography in military systems in the US,
NATO and Coalition nations. To prevent information compromise, the National Security
Agency mandate requires Link 16 cryptographic systems to be upgraded.
79 The cryptographic modernization program is a DOD directed, National Security Agency (NSA) Information
Assurance Directorate led effort to transform and modernize all cryptography in military command and control,
communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, information technology, and weapon
systems. The program is a multi-billion dollar, multi-year undertaking that will transform cryptographic security
capabilities for national security systems at all echelons and points of use.
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* Laptop Controlled Targeting Pod: LCTP provides advanced targeting pod control,
display, and information to all B-1 crewmembers. It allows aircrew to derive precision
coordinates for GPS guided weapons, guide laser-guided weapons, and allows aircrew to
conduct inflight re-planning of long-range standoff weapons. This effort permanently installs
three rack mounted computers and removes temporary targeting pod laptops.
Low Cost Mods: These modifications are low cost B-1 upgrades that address safety,
reliability, maintainability, and/or improved system performance issues on the aircraft,
support equipment, and simulators/trainers. These funds are required for mission essential B-
1 low cost modifications to ensure readiness and B-1 operational requirements.
* Miscellaneous B-1 Modernization Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
Efforts: This program provides RDT&E funding for the B-1 modernization program. The
modernization program addresses potential aircraft obsolescent issues due to diminishing
manufacturing sources (DMS) and provides new and improved capabilities to the B-1
weapon system that require significant hardware and software development and testing.
Future B-1 Sustainment and Modernization Requirements
Optimal $250M /Year B-1 Modernization and Sustainment Funding Scenario
Figure C-1 depicts the $250 million/year funding scenario for current programs of record (POR)
and the recommended future B-1 modernization and sustainment requirements. $250 million/year
is the minimum funding level recommended by the B-1 SAIP where 32, high-benefit capabilities
could be funded that could reduce Air Force ownership costs and potentially increase the B-1’s
operational effectiveness. Authors of the B-1 SAIP believe the 32, high-benefit capabilities
represent the optimal combination of future modernization and sustainment needs that could
provide the highest benefit at the $250 million/year funding level and is a point of departure when
considering other funding levels and future requirements. A detailed description of each of the 32
capabilities can be found in the B-1 SAIP.
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Figure C-1. B-1 Strategic Action and Investment Plan, $250 Million/Fiscal Year
Funding Scenario (numbers are in millions of dollars)
B-1 Strategic Action and Investment Plan - $250M Funding Scenario
FY14 FYDP
FY16 FYDP
FY18 FYDP
Modernization
Total Program
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
Program
Cost
16 Carry
36.2
46.6
21.7
22.0
30.0
156.5
2 Color Flare
3.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
23.0
ABS CMS
2.0
6.0
8.0
AESA Inc I&II
9.6
53.8
92.5
139.3
295.2
ALE-50 Tester
1.3
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.3
6.8
ARTS
2.4
23.5
28.5
20.8
3.4
78.6
Auto Wire Test Set
1.4
1.4
Bleed Air Blowers
0.5
1.0
0.6
0.6
0.6
3.3
Def Sys Upgrade
20.0
80.0
50.0
45.0
50.0
50.0
295.0
DR-200
6.9
6.9
5.2
5.2
24.2
EMUX Upgrade
26.0
19.0
11.7
56.7
ETCS
0.7
1.7
2.7
3.3
3.3
3.3
15.0
ETU
15.0
12.0
17.0
2.4
11.2
57.6
FCGMS Upgrade
21.0
16.0
11.7
48.7
FCGMS Wiring
7.0
5.0
5.2
5.2
5.2
5.2
5.2
38.0
Hydro Titanium
0.5
1.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
9.5
ISIS
15.0
11.0
9.1
9.1
5.2
49.4
ITPaC
18.5
25.7
7.0
7.0
58.2
JSOW B III
5.0
10.0
10.0
25.0
LRASM-A
8.0
10.0
18.0
MALD-J
10.0
25.0
38.0
4.0
4.0
81.0
Maritime Int Wpn
0.8
0.8
1.6
MLG
1.5
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.5
3.8
P5 ADL
3.0
7.0
2.0
2.0
14.0
Current PORs
173.6
142.4
146.2
104.5
56.6
623.3
R/EW Test Equip
1.0
1.0
Rdr Altimeter
4.4
14.5
4.8
4.4
4.4
32.5
SCDU
0.5
1.5
2.0
2.0
2.0
8.0
SDB
10.0
40.0
50.0
100.0
Sim for IBS
10.4
14.3
12.0
0.7
0.7
38.1
Weapon Data Link
(WDL)
23.0
23.0
WST DCLS
3.0
3.2
3.3
9.5
Total/FY
242.2
247.9
250.8
247.7
248.6
228.1
246.8
244.4
247.4
2203.9
Source: B-1 Strategic Action and Investment Plan (SAIP), 10 May 2012.
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Figure C-2. Historical Comparison of B-1 Appropriated Funding and the Average
Annual Mission Capable (MC) Rates for the B-1 fleet
Source: National Defense Authorization Acts, Appropriation Acts, and Committee Reports for Fiscal Years
2002 to 2012 and mission capable rates as reported to Headquarters U.S. Air Force by Air Combat Command.
Note: Mission capable rate is defined as the percentage of aircraft in the fleet that are capable of performing its
intended wartime mission.
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Appendix D. Plans for B-2 Sustainment and
Modernization
B-2 Master Plan and Requirements80
The B-2 Bomber Master Plan outlines Air Force Global Strike Command’s (AFGSC’s) plans,
programs, requirements, and strategic vision for the B-2 platform to meet the nation’s airborne
strategic nuclear deterrence and global precision attack mission needs. Near-term modernization
and sustainment efforts are identified for the time period 2012 to 2018. Far-term modernization
and sustainment efforts are identified as those required in the 2019 to 2032 time period. AFGSC
Director of Plans, Programs and Requirements (HQ AFGSC A5/8) is responsible for producing
and updating the master plan.
Assumptions
The B-2 Bomber Master Plan is based on the following assumptions:
• The B-2 will continue to conduct currently assigned nuclear and conventional
missions well into the 2050s.
• The B-2 fleet size will remain at 20 aircraft through 2058.
• The B-2 planned end-of-life will remain 2058.
• There will be no change to current B-2 basing.
• Unfunded risks and issues require prioritization and validation through the
resource allocation and program objective memorandum (POM) process.
• The B-2 will continue to be required to penetrate and employ weapons in highly
defended anti-access/area denial environments well into 2050.
• The B-2 will continue to be a primary component in the USAF Long Range
Strike (LRS) family of systems.
• The B-2 will incorporate all new, applicable air-to-ground weapons including the
new cruise missile and the ability to employ weapons to defeat and destroy
hardened and deeply buried targets.
• The B-52 will incorporate beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) connectivity for
conventional, as well as nuclear taskings [survivable, assured nuclear command
and control].
• Air Force Global Strike Command and Air Combat Command will continue to
work cooperatively on B-2 requirements in accordance with applicable
Memoranda of Agreement.
80 Information Appendix D is from Air Force Global Strike Command’s, B-2 Bomber Master Plan, June 2012.
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Current B-2 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts
The following is a summary of B-2 sustainment and modernization initiatives currently in the
program of record (POR) that are either just completing or are currently in progress. (Asterisks
denote sustainment and modernization efforts that could be considered essential to the B-2’s
ability to operate in A2/AD threat environments.)
* Extremely High Frequency Satellite Communications (EHF SATCOM) and
Computer Upgrade Program: The aging Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Military Satellite
Communications system is being phased out and replaced by the Advanced Extremely High
Frequency (AEHF) Satellite Communications (SATCOM) system. The B-2 Extremely High
Frequency (EHF) SATCOM program supports the replacement of the B-2’s UHF Terminal
Set with an EHF SATCOM system that will be compatible with the legacy MILSTAR I/II
satellite constellation and the future AEHF satellite constellation.
* Massive Ordnance Penetrator Integration: The B-2 is the only anti-access penetrating
platform capable of delivering the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) against hardened,
deeply buried targets. Integration of the 30,000 lb class MOP provides the ability to hold
additional hardened, deeply buried targets at risk beyond those achievable with current
munitions. The MOP integration program will design, develop, integrate, and test hardware
and software required for carriage, jettison, and release of MOP from the B-2.
* Low Observable Signature and Supportability Modifications (LOSSM) Diagnostics:
LOSSM diagnostics equipment projects help reduce low observable (LO) maintenance,
increase aircraft availability and improves the combat ready LO signature for the B-2 fleet.
B-2 Trainer System Upgrade: Trainer system upgrades keep the B-2 family of trainers
current with aircraft system updates while countering equipment obsolescence issues.
Enhancements are provided to the B-2 family of trainers to include the Weapon System
Trainers, Mission Trainer, Cockpit Procedures Trainers, Computerized Maintenance
Training System, Weapon System Training Aids, Weapons Load Trainer, Crew Escape
System Maintenance Trainer, Flight Control System Trainer, instructor-operator station, and
Training System Support Center.
* Link-16/Center Instrument Display/In-Flight Replanner (CID/IFR): Link-16 CID/IFR
allows the B-2 access to theater tactical data links, improving on-board situational awareness
while greatly enhancing the ability of theater commanders to coordinate the B-2 with other
assets. The Center Instrument Display Digital Video Recorder provides the ability to record
video signals from the display to the existing recorders in the cockpit. This capability allows
mission playback, operational assessments and de-briefs, and provides aircrew training.
Radar Modernization Program (RMP): Completed in the third quarter FY12, this program
brought all operational and flight test B-2 aircraft radars into frequency compliance.
* Low Observable Signature and Supportability Modifications (LOSSM) Program
Structures/Materials: This program implements a mix of over 20 improvements to the B-
2’s low observable (LO) support equipment, structures, and materials designed to slow
signature degradation and to improve LO supportability. LOSSM projects decrease low
observable (LO) maintenance, increase aircraft availability, and maintain and improve the
combat-ready LO signature for the B-2 fleet.
* Defensive Management System Modernization (DMS-M): The DMS-M program
addresses capability gaps, obsolescence, and supportability issues associated with the B2’s
legacy DMS system. DMS-M will upgrade the B-2’s self-defense capabilities against
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improved, 21st century A2/AD enemy air defenses. DMS-M is the #1 priority modification
program in the B-2 program office and will resolve the #1obsolescence issue in the B-2 fleet.
* Stores Management Operational Flight Program (SMOFP) Re-host and Mixed
Carriage Modification: This program will re-host the B-2’s stores management operational
flight software onto a larger, more capable processor, enabling the B-2 to carry a mixed
weapons carriage with a Rotary Launcher Assembly (RLA) in one weapons bay and a Smart
Bomb Rack Assembly (SBRA) in the other weapons bay.
* Common Very Low Frequency Receiver (CVR Increment 1): This program provides
the B-2 with a survivable, beyond-line-of-sight communication path for receipt of
Emergency Action Messages (EAMs) to support United States Strategic Command’s
(USSTRATCOM) nuclear command and control requirements.
Low Cost Engine Modifications: B-2 engine improvements include the F118 engine
service life extension program, the extended mission oil tank upgrade, and stage one and
three engine fan blade improvements that will reduce engine changes and increase aircraft
availability.
Low Cost Modifications: These modifications are low cost B-2 upgrades that address
safety, reliability, maintainability, and/or improved system performance issues on the B-2
aircraft, support equipment, and simulators/trainers. These funds are required for mission
essential B-2 low cost modifications to ensure readiness and B-2 operational requirements.
* B-2 Modernization Research, Development, Test and Evaluation efforts: To ensure the
B-2 fleet can accomplish its nuclear and conventional mission in highly defended and anti-
access environments, periodic modernization efforts must be undertaken to upgrade combat
capability as well as improve the viability, supportability, and survivability of the weapon
system. RDT&E funding ensures recent and ongoing investments in necessary avionics,
structures, communications, and weapons upgrades keep the B-2 viable in the immediate
future.
Baseline Support: Baseline Support maintains the B-2 unique flight test aircraft, as well as
obtains, modifies, and operates a flying test bed, developmental hardware/software and test
equipment, to support developmental systems integration and flight test.
Future B-2 Sustainment and Modernization Requirements
While the current B-2 weapons system is capable of meeting today’s strategic deterrence and
conventional taskings, it may require continued sustainment and modernization efforts to remain
airworthy and viable against 21st century anti-access/areal denial (A2/AD) threats. Consequently,
the B-2 will require continued system review and testing, adaptation to emerging technologies
and threats, and attention to facilities and ground support equipment in order for the weapon
system to remain viable out to the 2050s. The following is a brief summary of Air Force Global
Strike Command’s recommendations to support the B-2 from 2012 through 2032. The
recommendations are designed to address sustainment challenges while ensuring future
modernization and acquisition efforts remain integrated and synchronized to meet the B-2’s
operational requirements. The guidance is organized into three broad categories: airframe,
communications systems, and supporting infrastructure. A detailed explanation of each category’s
specific recommendations can be found in the B-2’s Master Plan.
Airframe: The airframe category is comprised of avionics, low-observable, weapons
interfaces, flight controls, engines, and miscellaneous mechanical subsystems. Many issues
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within these systems currently affect viability, availability, and turnaround time of the B-2
weapon system. For example, low-observable maintenance continues to be problematic due
to high repair costs, labor-intensive procedures, supportability issues, and degradation of
aircraft radar signature. The 1980s era Defensive Management System technology suffers
from obsolescence and supportability issues and requires modernization. Mixed weapons
carriage flexibility is constrained due to system limitations such as computer processing,
memory and throughput. These issues should continue to be addressed as they reduce the B-
2’s flexibility to deliver desired effects, its ability to penetrate A2/AD threats, and ultimately,
its combat survivability.
Communications System: The communications system category is comprised of
cryptographic, tactical, emergency and survivable communications subsystems. The
cryptographic system requires modernization due to obsolescence and decertification issues
leading to security and sustainment concerns. Currently, the aircraft’s primary beyond-line-
of-sight (BLOS) communications capability is provided via the UHF Military Strategic and
Tactical Relay Satellite (MILSTAR) system, which has already exceeded its design life and
is nearing life expected end-of-life.
Supporting Infrastructure: The supporting infrastructure category includes—but is not
limited to—depot , trainers, simulators, test equipment, aerospace ground equipment (AGE),
flight testing, and software that support the B-2 weapon system. Test and support equipment
are aging and beginning to suffer from design life, supportability, and parts obsolescence
issues.
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Figure D-1. Graphical Summary of B-2 Sustainment and Modernization Master Plan
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19
FY20
FY21
FY22
FY23
FY24
FY25
FY26
FY27
FY28
FY29
FY30
Airframe
De fe nsive Manage me nt Syste m Mode rniz ation
DMS F3
Multipurpose Display Unit (F3)
Avionics
IFF Mode 5/S/ADS-B
Proactive Aircraft De fe nse Te chnology
O n-Board Training Te chnology
CO TS HEMP Prote ction Te chnology
LO Signature and Supportability Modifications
Aft De ck Form, Fit & Function (ADF3)
Inte grate d Windshie ld
Low
Observable
Alte rnate High Fre que ncy Mate rials Phase II
Alte rnate High Fre que ncy
Mate rials Phase I
Low O bse rvable Te chnology
Store s Mgmt Proce ssor/B61 LEP/Mixe d We apons Carriage
Un iv e rs a l A rm a m e n t In t e rfa c e
Weapons
Interfaces
Autonomous Asse t Te chnology
Engage Moving Targe ts Te chnology
Flight Controls
Aircraft C rash Mishap Mitigation
Engine Low C ost Modifications
Engines
Tailpipe Fire Mishap Mitigation
Prox Se nsor
Misc Mech.
Logic Unit
Comm Systems
C rypto Mode rniz ation
Crypto
Nucle ar C2 Proce ssing Te chnology
Adaptable Comm Suite Incre me nt
Tactical
4
Multi-function Advance d Data Link
EHF SATC O M Incre me nt 1
EHF SATC O M Incre me nt 2
Survivable
EHF SATCO M Incre me nt 3
Ve ry Low Fre que ncy (VLF) Upgrade
Survivable Be yond Line of Sight (BLO S) Communication Path
Te chnology
Supporting
Infrastructure
Programme d De pot Mainte nance (PDM)
De pot Activation
Depot
De pot Mainte nance Te st Equipme nt Sustainme nt
We apon Syste m Support C e nte r - Ground Te st Facility (WSSC -GTF)
Aircre w Training Syste m (ATS) Se rvice Life Upgrade Program (SLUP)/AC S/DMS/Mission Ge ne ration Upgrade s
Trainers
Distribute d Mission O pe rations Training Inte gration
Mission Planning Syste m Upgrade
Mission
Ce ntraliz e d Conve ntional Mission Planning Te chnology
Planning
Fle xible Nucle ar Mission Planning Te chnology
Support/Test
MUSTANG
Equipment
Vipe r Me mory Load Ve rifie r
Flight Test
Base line Flight Te st
Software
Software Mainte nance
Facilities
Consolidate d Ale rt Facility
LEGEND
Funde d Program/Effort
Unfunde d Program/Effort
Funde d Te chnology Ne e d
Unfunde d Te chnology Ne e d
Source: Air Force Global Strike Command, B-2 Bomber Master Plan, June 2012, p 10.
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Figure D-2. Historical Comparison of B-2 Appropriated Funding and the Average
Annual Mission Capable (MC) Rates
for the B-2 fleet
Source: National Defense Authorization Acts, Appropriation Acts, and Committee Reports for Fiscal Years
2002 to 2012 and mission capable rates as reported to Headquarters U.S. Air Force by Global Strike Command.
Note: Mission capable rate is defined as the percentage of aircraft in the fleet that are capable of performing its
intended wartime mission.
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Appendix E. Legislative Activity FY2011-FY2013
FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383)
TITLE 1 - Procurement
Subtitle C - Joint and Multiservice Matters
SEC. 126. INTEGRATION OF SOLID STATE LASER SYSTEMS INTO CERTAIN
AIRCRAFT.
(a) ANALYSIS OF FEASIBILITY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of Defense shall conduct
an analysis of the feasibility of integrating solid state laser systems into the aircraft platforms
specified in subsection (b) for purposes of permitting such aircraft to accomplish their
missions, including to provide close air support.
(b) AIRCRAFT—The aircraft platforms specified in this subsection shall include, at a
minimum, the following:
(1) The C–130 aircraft.
(2) The B–1 bomber aircraft.
(3) The F–35 fighter aircraft.
(c) SCOPE OF ANALYSIS.—The analysis required by subsection (a) shall include a
determination of the following:
(1) The estimated cost per unit of each laser system analyzed.
(2) The estimated cost of operation and maintenance of each aircraft platform specified
in subsection (b) in connection with each laser system analyzed, noting that the fidelity
of such analysis may not be uniform for all aircraft platforms.
TITLE X - General Provisions
Subtitle F - Studies and Reports
SEC. 1056. REQUIRED REPORTS CONCERNING BOMBER MODERNIZATION,
SUSTAINMENT, AND RECAPITALIZATION EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY.
(a) AIR FORCE REPORT.—
(1) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 360 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of the Air Force shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report that includes—
(A) a discussion of the cost, schedule, and performance of all planned efforts to
modernize and keep viable the existing B–1, B–2, and B–52 bomber fleets and a
discussion of the forecasted service-life and all sustainment challenges that the
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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress
Secretary of the Air Force may confront in keeping those platforms viable until the
anticipated retirement of such aircraft;
(B) a discussion, presented in a comparison and contrast type format, of the scope
of the 2007 Next-Generation Long Range Strike Analysis of Alternatives guidance
and subsequent Analysis of Alternatives report tasked by the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in the September 11, 2006,
Acquisition Decision Memorandum, as compared to the scope and directed
guidance of the year 2010 Long Range Strike Study effort currently being
conducted by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office; and
(C) a discussion of the preliminary costs, any development, testing, fielding and
operational employment challenges, capability gaps, limitations, and shortfalls of
the Secretary of Defense’s plan to field a long-range, penetrating, survivable,
persistent and enduring ‘‘family of systems’’ as compared to the preliminary costs,
any development, testing, fielding, and operational employment of a singular
platform that encompasses all the required aforementioned characteristics.
(2) PREPARATION OF REPORT.—The report under paragraph (1) shall be prepared
by a federally funded research and development center selected by the Secretary of the
Air Force and submitted to the Secretary for submittal by the Secretary in accordance
with that paragraph.
(b) COST ANALYSIS AND PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORT.—Not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Cost Analysis and
Program Evaluation of the Office of the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a report that includes—
(1) the assumptions and estimated life-cycle costs of the Department’s long-range,
penetrating, survivable, persistent, and enduring ‘‘family of systems’’ platforms; and
(2) the assumptions and estimated life-cycle costs of the Next Generation Platform
program, as planned, prior to the cancellation of the program on April 6, 2009.
TITLE XII - Matters Relating to Foreign Nations
Subtitle C - Reports and Other Matters
SEC. 1238. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO DEFEND AGAINST
THREATS POSED BY THE ANTI-ACCESS AND AREA-DENIAL CAPABILITIES OF
CERTAIN NATION-STATES.
(a) FINDING.—Congress finds that the 2010 report on the Department of Defense
Quadrennial Defense Review concludes that ‘‘[a]nti-access strategies seek to deny outside
countries the ability to project power into a region, thereby allowing aggression or other
destabilizing actions to be conducted by the anti-access power. Without dominant
capabilities to project power, the integrity of United States alliances and security
partnerships could be called into question, reducing United States security and influence and
increasing the possibility of conflict’’.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that, in light of the finding in subsection
(a), the Secretary of Defense should ensure that the United States has the appropriate
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authorities, capabilities, and force structure to defend against any potential future threats
posed by the anti-access and area-denial capabilities of potentially hostile foreign countries.
(c) REPORT.—Not later than April 1, 2011, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on
United States efforts to defend against any potential future threats posed by the anti-access
and area-denial capabilities of potentially hostile nation-states.
(d) ELEMENTS.—The report required under subsection (c) shall include the following:
(1) An assessment of any potential future threats posed by the anti-access and area-
denial capabilities of potentially hostile foreign countries, including an identification of
the foreign countries with such capabilities, the nature of such capabilities, and the
possible advances in such capabilities over the next 10 years.
(2) A description of any efforts by the Department of Defense to address the potential
future threats posed by the anti-access and area-denial capabilities of potentially hostile
foreign countries.
(3) A description of the authorities, capabilities, and force structure that the United
States may require over the next 10 years to address the threats posed by the anti-access
and area-denial capabilities of potentially hostile foreign countries.
(e) FORM.—The report required under subsection (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
but may contain a classified annex if necessary.
(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—
(1) the term ‘‘anti-access’’, with respect to capabilities, means any action that has the
effect of slowing the deployment of friendly forces into a theater, preventing such forces
from operating from certain locations within that theater, or causing such forces to
operate from distances farther from the locus of conflict than such forces would
normally prefer; and
(2) the term ‘‘area-denial’’, with respect to capabilities, means operations aimed to
prevent freedom of action of friendly forces in the more narrow confines of the area
under a potentially hostile nation-state’s direct control, including actions by an
adversary in the air, on land, and on and under the sea to contest and prevent joint
operations within a defended battlespace.
FY2012 Department of Defense Appropriations (H.Rept. 112-331 to
Accompany H.R. 2055)
Retirement of B-1 Aircraft
The fiscal year 2012 budget request includes a proposal to retire six B–1 bomber aircraft.
The conferees understand that the B– 1 fleet continues to operate almost constantly over
Afghanistan in support of troops on the ground and that the B–1 is a critical component of
the Nation’s long-range strike capabilities. The Air Force proposed to reinvest less than 40
percent of the savings from aircraft retirements in the B–1 modernization program across the
Future Years Defense Program. The conferees are concerned that premature retirement of six
B–1 aircraft could negatively impact long-range strike capabilities. Therefore, the conferees
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to reinvest a larger portion of savings realized from B–1
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aircraft retirements, to the extent authorized by law, in the sustainment and modernization of
the B–1 fleet.
FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81)
TITLE I – Procurement
Subtitle D – Air Force Programs
SEC. 132. LIMITATIONS ON USE OF FUNDS TO RETIRE B–1 BOMBER AIRCRAFT.
(a) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act for fiscal
year 2012 for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended to retire any B–1
bomber aircraft on or before the date on which the Secretary of the Air Force submits to the
congressional defense committees the plan described in subsection (b).
(b) PLAN DESCRIBED.—The plan described in this subsection is a plan for retiring B–1
bomber aircraft that includes the following:
(1) An identification of each B–1 bomber aircraft that will be retired and the disposition
plan for such aircraft.
(2) An estimate of the savings that will result from the proposed retirement of B–1
bomber aircraft in each calendar year through calendar year 2022.
(3) An estimate of the amount of the savings described in paragraph (2) that will be
reinvested in the modernization of B–1 bomber aircraft still in service in each calendar
year through calendar year 2022.
(4) A modernization plan for sustaining the remaining B–1 bomber aircraft through at
least calendar year 2022.
(5) An estimate of the amount of funding required to fully fund the modernization plan
described in paragraph (4) for each calendar year through calendar year 2022.
(c) POST-PLAN B–1 RETIREMENT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—During the period described by paragraph (4), the Secretary of the
Air Force shall maintain in a common capability configuration not less than 36 B–1
aircraft as combat coded aircraft.
(2) FY 2014 AND THEREAFTER.—After the period described in paragraph (4), the
Secretary shall maintain not less than—
(A) 35 B–1 aircraft as combat-coded aircraft in a common capability
configuration until September 30, 2014;
(B) 34 such aircraft as combat-coded aircraft in a common capability
configuration until September 30, 2015; and
(C) 33 such aircraft as combat-coded aircraft in a common capability
configuration until September 30, 2016.
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(3) TOTAL AMOUNT OF RETIRED B–1 AIRCRAFT.—The Secretary may not retire
more than a total of six B–1 aircraft, including the B–1 aircraft retired in accordance
with this subsection.
(4) PERIOD DESCRIBED.—The period described in this paragraph is the period
beginning on the date on which the plan described in subsection (b) is submitted to the
congressional defense committees and ending on September 30, 2013.
(5) COMBAT-CODED AIRCRAFT DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘combat-
coded aircraft’’ means aircraft assigned to meet the primary aircraft authorization to a
unit for the performance of its wartime mission.
SEC. 134. AVAILABILITY OF FISCAL YEAR 2011 FUNDS FOR RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT RELATING TO THE B–2 BOMBER AIRCRAFT. Of the unobligated
balance of amounts appropriated for fiscal year 2011 for the Air Force and available for
procurement of B–2 bomber aircraft modifications, post-production support, and other charges,
$20,000,000 may be available for fiscal year 2012 for research, development, test, and evaluation
with respect to a conventional mixed load capability for the B–2 bomber aircraft.
SEC. 135. AVAILABILITY OF FISCAL YEAR 2011 FUNDS TO SUPPORT
ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS FOR EXTREMELY HIGH FREQUENCY TERMINAL
INCREMENT 1 PROGRAM OF RECORD.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Of the unobligated balance of amounts appropriated for fiscal year
2011 for the Air Force and available for procurement of B–2 bomber aircraft modifications,
post-production support, and other charges, $15,000,000 may be available to support
alternative options for the extremely high frequency terminal Increment 1 program of record.
(b) PLAN TO SECURE PROTECTED COMMUNICATIONS.—Not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Air Force shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a plan to provide an extremely high frequency terminal for
secure protected communications for the B–2 bomber aircraft and other aircraft.
TITLE II – Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
Subtitle B – Program Requirements, Restrictions, and Limitations
SEC. 216. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR INCREMENT 2 OF B–2 BOMBER
AIRCRAFT EXTREMELY HIGH FREQUENCY SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
PROGRAM. Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by section 201 for research,
development, test, and evaluation for the Air Force as specified in the funding table in section
4201 and available for Increment 2 of the B–2 bomber aircraft extremely high frequency satellite
communications program, not more than 40 percent may be obligated or expended until the date
that is 15 days after the date on which the Secretary of the Air Force submits to the congressional
defense committees the following:
(1) The certification of the Secretary that—
(A) the United States Government will own the data rights to any extremely high
frequency active electronically steered array antenna developed for use as part of a
system to support extremely high frequency protected satellite communications for
the B–2 bomber aircraft; and,
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(B) the use of an extremely high frequency active electronically steered array
antenna is the most cost effective and lowest risk option available to support
extremely high frequency satellite Communications for the B–2 bomber aircraft.
(2) A detailed plan setting forth the projected cost and schedule for research,
development, and testing on the extremely high frequency active electronically steered
array antenna.
FY2013 Department of Defense Appropriations (S.Rept. 112-196: To
accompany H.R. 5856)
Note: as of this writing, this legislation has not been passed into law.
Committee Initiatives: B–52 Combat Network Communications Technology
[CONECT].—The fiscal year 2013 budget request includes no funds in Aircraft Procurement,
Air Force for the B–52 CONECT program of record due to the Air Force’s decision to terminate
the program, and $34,700,000 in Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force for a
restructured, descoped B–52 CONECT program. The Committee understands that the Air Force
is reviewing its decision to terminate the program of record in light of potential requirements of
the Global Strike Command. The Committee further understands that should the Air Force
reverse its decision to terminate B–52 CONECT during the fiscal year 2014 budget process, prior
year funds would be available to reinstate the program following approval by the congressional
defense committees. The Committee directs that no funds for B–52 CONECT program of record
post-milestone C activities or a B–52 CONECT restructured program may be obligated or
expended until 30 days after the congressional defense committees have been briefed on the Air
Force’s proposed way ahead, to include certification of full funding of the proposed program.
Committee Recommended Adjustments: B–52 Strategic Radar Replacement [SR2].—The
Committee is aware the Air Force conducted a lengthy analysis of alternatives in 2011 to address
a Strategic Radar Replacement [SR2] for the B–52H. The existing APQ–166 radar was produced
in the 1960s, has a 20 to 30 hour mean-time between failure rate, and capability limitations. The
Committee understands that the current APQ–166 radar is costly to operate and maintain.
Therefore, the Committee encourages the Secretary of the Air Force to reconsider the decision to
terminate the SR2 program.
FY2013 Department of Defense Authorizations (P.L. 112-239)
TITLE I – Procurement
Subtitle D – Air Force Programs
SEC. 142. RETIREMENT OF B–1 BOMBER AIRCRAFT.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 8062 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at
the end the following new subsection:
(h)(1) Beginning October 1, 2011, the Secretary of the Air Force may not retire
more than six B–1 aircraft.
(2) The Secretary shall maintain in a common capability configuration not less than
36 B–1 aircraft as combat-coded aircraft.
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(3) In this subsection, the term ‘combat-coded aircraft’ means aircraft assigned to
meet the primary aircraft authorization to a unit for the performance of its wartime
mission.’’.
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 132 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–81; 125 Stat. 1320) is amended by striking
subsection (c).
In regards to the nuclear certification requirements of the Next-Generation Bomber, SEC. 211.
states;
The Secretary of the Air Force shall ensure that the next-generation long-range strike bomber
is—
capable of carrying strategic nuclear weapons as of the date on which such aircraft achieves
initial operating capability; and
certified to use such weapons by not later than two years after such date.
TITLE II – Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
Subtitle B – Program Requirements, Restrictions, and Limitations
SEC. 211. NEXT-GENERATION LONG-RANGE STRIKE BOMBER AIRCRAFT
NUCLEAR CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT. The Secretary of the Air Force shall
ensure that the next generation long-range strike bomber is—
(1) capable of carrying strategic nuclear weapons as of the date on which such aircraft
achieves initial operating capability; and
(2) certified to use such weapons by not later than two years after such date.
Author Contact Information
Michael A. Miller
US Air Force Fellow
mmiller@crs.loc.gov, 7-0432
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