Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206”
Background and Issues for Congress
Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security Affairs
April 19, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS22855
CRS Report for Congress
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epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006, as
amended and regularly extended, provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and
equip foreign military forces for two specified purposes—counterterrorism and stability
operations—and foreign maritime security forces for counterterrorism operations. The
Department of Defense (DOD) values this authority as an important tool to train and equip
military partners. Funds may be obligated only with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.
Through 2009, DOD used Section 1206 authority primarily to provide counterterrorism (CT)
support. Since FY2010, Section 1206 authority has also been used to provide significant
assistance to train and equip foreign military forces for military and stability operations in which
U.S. forces participate. Currently, there is a cap of $350 million on Section 1206 obligations per
fiscal year. This authority will expire in FY2014, unless extended.
Section 1206 allocations or notifications for the first seven years, FY2006-FY2012, have totaled
nearly $1.8 billion. During this period, Section 1206 supported bilateral programs in 41 countries,
15 multilateral programs, and a global human rights program.
The FY2013 programs notified to Congress thus far total $163.5 million. These provide
assistance to enable 10 European countries to participate in the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, as well as assistance to five African countries.
Some Members have been concerned with several issues related to Section 1206 authority, both
narrow and broad. Specific current concerns have included whether Section 1206 funds are being
used appropriately and effectively. Some of these concerns have been partially addressed. For
instance, DOD has created a new assessment mechanism and a new delivery process for Section
1206 programs. Congress, through the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-
239, Section 1201), for the first time permits small-scale military construction assistance that
some analysts view as crucial to improving sustainability.
Overarching issues include whether the authority should be expanded to provide training not only
to military forces but also to a wide range of foreign security forces (currently, Section 1206
limits security force training to maritime security forces) and whether Congress should place
Section 1206 train and equip (T&E) authority under the State Department with other T&E
authorities. (Members have thus far refrained from codifying Section 1206 in permanent law, as
requested by DOD.) Finally, some Members may wish to examine the status of Section 1206 in
the context of broader security assistance reform.
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 2
Section 1206 in Action ..................................................................................................................... 5
Purpose, Scope, and Funding .................................................................................................... 5
Conditions on Section 1206 Programs ...................................................................................... 9
Joint DOD-State Department Selection and Approval Process ................................................. 9
Funding Provisions ........................................................................................................................ 11
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 11
Are Section 1206 Funds Being Used Effectively? .................................................................. 11
Assessing Accomplishments ............................................................................................. 11
Timeliness of Deliveries .................................................................................................... 12
Sustainability ..................................................................................................................... 14
Should DOD Retain Section 1206 Train and Equip Authority? .............................................. 16
Should Congress Broaden Section 1206 Authority to Include T&E for Security
Forces? ................................................................................................................................. 18
Should Congress Consider Broader Security Assistance Reform? .......................................... 19
Tables
Table 1. FY2011-FY2012 Section 1206 Recipients Grouped by Magnitude of
Funds Received ............................................................................................................................. 6
Table 2. Section 1206 Funding: FY2011-FY2012, by Country and Program ................................. 7
Table A-1. Countries/Group/Institution Grouped by Magnitude of Funds Received, Based
on FY2006-FY2009 Allocations and FY2010 Congressional Notifications .............................. 25
Table A-2. Section 1206 Funding: FY2006-FY2009 Allocations and FY2010 Approved
Notifications ............................................................................................................................... 26
Appendixes
Appendix A. FY2006-FY2010 Recipients and Funding ................................................................ 22
Appendix B. Evolution of Section 1206 Legislation: FY2005-FY2010 ....................................... 33
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 39
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
mong the issues related to U.S. assistance to foreign military and security forces that may
be of interest to the 113th Congress is the status of Section 1206 of the FY2006 National
ADefense Authorization Act (NDAA ), P.L. 109-163, as amended. This statute provides the
Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military forces and foreign
maritime security forces for two specified purposes:
• To enable foreign military forces, as well as foreign maritime security forces,
to perform counterterrorism (CT) operations. (Nearly all Section 1206
assistance from FY2006 to FY2009 was for CT training and equipment.)
• To enable foreign military forces to participate in or to support military and
stability operations in which U.S. armed forces are participating. (A significant
portion of FY2010 funds is being provided for such assistance.)
Enacted in 2005 as a temporary authority, “Section 1206” authority, as it is known, has been
regularly extended. The FY2013 NDAA (P.L. 112-239, Section 1201) extends the authority
through FY2014.
Section 1206 is the first major Department of Defense (DOD) authority to be used expressly for
the purpose of training and equipping the national military forces of foreign countries. For almost
the past half-century, DOD generally has trained and equipped foreign military forces under State
Department Title 22 authority and through State Department programs. On occasion, Congress
has given DOD authority to train and equip specified countries, and over the years Congress has
provided DOD with specific Title 10 authorities or DOD funding to provide foreign military
forces with opportunities to attend military schools, but Section 1206 is the first DOD global
train-and-equip authority since the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which placed
oversight for military assistance with the Secretary of State.
Congress’s decision to grant DOD Section 1206 authority has been controversial. Some Members
have stressed the need for a DOD authority that combatant commanders can use to respond to
emerging threats that put the well-being of U.S. military personnel at risk or might eventually
require robust, and costly, U.S. military action. But others have questioned whether Section 1206
funds are being used appropriately and effectively, and, above all, whether providing DOD with
its own train-and-equip (T&E) authorities undermines the Secretary of State’s statutory
responsibility to ensure coherence of U.S. foreign policy.
While no other single DOD security assistance authority has generated as much controversy as
Section 1206, some analysts have been concerned with the addition of a few new DOD security
assistance authorities after the September 11, 2001 (9/11), terrorist attacks on the United States, as
well as the perceived expansion of pre-9/11 DOD security assistance and other foreign assistance-
type activities. Of particular concern to some Members is Section 1208 of the FY2005 NDAA, an
authorization to provide support to “foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals” that
assist or facilitate U.S. military operations conducted by special operations forces (SOF) to
combat terrorism.1 Two other post 9/11 security assistance authorities of concern are the Regional
1 This authority was established by Section 1208 of the FY2005 NDAA, P.L. 108-375, entitled Support of Military
Operations to Combat Terrorism, and is often referred to as “Section 1208” authority. The initial authorization was
extended and amended several times. The authority is now in effect through FY20013. Amendments raised the
spending limit from $25 million to $40 million, added a requirement for Chief of Mission concurrence(Section 1208,
FY2009 NDAA, P.L. 110-417), and subjected the authority to more detailed reporting requirements (Section 1202,
FY2010 NDAA, P.L. 111-84). Information concerning this program is classified.
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), which funds foreign military officers and
defense and security officials to attend U.S. military educational institutions, regional centers, and
conferences and later made permanent law, and the Coalition Support Fund (CSF), which funds
countries assisting in U.S. military operations. The former is viewed by some analysts as
overlapping with the State Department International Military and Education Training (IMET)
program, the latter is viewed by some as performing the same function as the State Department
Economic Support Fund (ESF).2 Because of these overlapping functions, divided between
agencies, some analysts judge that U.S. government-wide security assistance funding and
programs are not sufficiently coordinated at all levels (strategy-making, planning, and
implementation).
This report provides background on the pre-Section 1206 status of security assistance authorities
and the factors contributing to the enactment of Section 1206. It then sets out the purposes of the
legislation and scope of its activities, restrictions on its use, the DOD-State Department planning
process, and funding. It concludes with a discussion of issues for Congress. Appendix A provides
details on FY2006-FY2010 funding. Appendix B provides a descriptive legislative history of the
bill and evolving congressional committee attitudes towards the appropriate division of labor
between the Department of Defense and the State Department regarding Section 1206 authority.
Background
For nearly 50 years, since the enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended
(FAA), the Secretary of State has exercised the leadership role for foreign assistance, including
military assistance, specifically military education and training.3 With the exception of a period
from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s inclusive of the Vietnam War, major foreign military
assistance programs have been carried out under State Department authority, oversight and
guidance,4 with a DOD agency responsible for implementation.5 “Traditionally the State
2 Other DOD foreign assistance-type accounts of concern are two post-9/11 authorities, the Commander’s Emergency
Response Program (CERP), used by military commanders in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines for small-scale
humanitarian or development projects, and the Security and Stabilization fund (“Section 1207”) through which DOD
transfers funds to the State Department for stabilization and reconstruction activities, mostly outside of Iraq and
Afghanistan.
3 As now stated in the FAA of 1961, as amended, Section 622(c) (22 U.S.C. 2382) states that the Secretary of State,
under the direction of the President, “shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of
economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs, including but not limited to
determining whether there shall be a military assistance (including civic action) or a military education and training
program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and
abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby.”
4 Before the FAA, the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (P.L. 82-165, 65 Stat. 373) created a Mutual Security Agency in the
Executive Office of the President, whose Director was responsible for the “continuous supervision, general direction,
and coordination of all foreign aid—military, economic, and technical assistance.” U.S. Congress, House. U.S. Foreign
Aid: Its Purposes, Scope, Administration and Related Information, prepared by the Legislative Reference Service,
Library of Congress. 86th Congress, 1st Session, House Document No. 116, Washington: USGPO, June 11, 1959, p. 69.
During part of the 1950s, DOD administered the military assistance programs under the White House’s policy direction
and guidance. Congress subsequently moved responsibility for non-military aid to the State Department (P.L. 81-329,
63 Stat. 714). Two lower-ranking State Department officials were charged (consecutively) with coordinating with DOD
regarding military aid before the responsibility was finally bestowed on the Secretary of State. For more detail on the
further evolution of Military Assistance Authority, see CRS Report RL34639, The Department of Defense Role in
Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress, coordinated by Nina M. Serafino.
5 The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), under the DOD Under Secretary for Policy, and its predecessor
(continued...)
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Department plans, budgets and oversees security assistance programs and is the lead agency in
charge of all U.S. foreign policy and global engagement,” according to a recent report co-
sponsored by The American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center. “The
DOD has supported overall foreign and national security policy by implementing these programs.
This relationship was designed to ensure that security assistance was aligned with general U.S.
foreign policy goals.”6
For many years, DOD had little interest in security assistance activities, as they were regarded
neither as a military mission nor as an activity of more than marginal value to ensuring national
security. In particular, training foreign military forces was not considered a task for general
purpose military forces, and until recently limited training was most often conducted by U.S.
SOF, often under State Department authority.7
DOD perspectives on training foreign military forces slowly began to change after the terrorist
attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Defense officials began to regard the
defeat of terrorist groups in the countries where they train and prepare as essential to U.S.
national security. But some realized that these groups could not be disrupted and defeated solely
with U.S. forces employed under existing U.S. arrangements. U.S. military forces lacked the
language, country knowledge and cultural sensitivity to conduct effective counterterrorist (CT)
activities in many countries where threats could be expected to emerge. Some DOD officials
realized that foreign military and security forces would have to take the lead in conducting such
activities, and would need training to assume that role. At the same time, DOD officials
considered the State Department as lacking the necessary expertise and capabilities to carry out
an effective counterterrorism program. DOD officials also viewed the State Department’s
planning and implementation processes under authorities for traditional T&E programs8 as too
slow and cumbersome to meet emerging threats.
In the mid-2000s, DOD officials developed a proposal for a “Global Train and Equip” authority
to increase U.S. support for foreign military and security forces in order to disrupt terrorist
networks, to build the capacity of legitimate states to provide security within their sovereign
territory to prevent terrorists from establishing footholds, and to build the capacity of legitimate
states to participate in U.N., regional, and U.S. coalition military missions. This proposal called
for a DOD lead, but also required State Department concurrence. Although this proposal was
(...continued)
agency. While the original language in 1961 applied specifically to assistance authorized under the FAA, a 1976
amendment deleted this restriction.
6 The American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center, A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future:
Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness, Ambassador Thomas Boyatt, Project Chairman, October 2008, p. 22.
Hereinafter referred to as A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future.
7 Special Operations Forces also train together with foreign troops under a DOD authority, Title 10 U.S.C. Section
2011, Special Operations Forces: training with friendly foreign forces. The primary purpose of the Joint Combined
Exchange Training program, conducted under this authority, is to provide training for the U.S. forces.
8 State Department programs under which foreign military forces are trained are the International Military Education
and Training (IMET) and the Expanded IMET (E-IMET) programs. Equipment is provided to foreign governments
through the State Department Foreign Military Sales/Foreign Military Financing (FMS/FMF) programs. According to
DOD, this “traditional security assistance takes three to four years from concept to execution,” while “Global Train and
Equip authority allows a response to emergent threats or opportunities in six months or less.” U.S. Department of
Defense, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification, February 4, 2008, p. 103. Hereinafter referred to as
FY2009 DOD Summary Justification. In practice, however, the time frame for a Section 1206 response is sometimes
considerably longer than six months; see the section below on “Timeliness.”
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
initially resisted by certain sectors at both DOD and the State Department, it won the support of
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and the
enthusiastic endorsement of geographic Combatant Commanders, according to one DOD official
who promoted the legislation.9
At the same time, perspectives on the use of U.S. military forces to train foreign military forces
began to evolve. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has asserted that training foreign forces is a
military mission for U.S. general purpose forces.10
In early 2005, DOD requested, and Congress granted, Section 1206 as a special contingency
authority. Nevertheless, the armed services committees repeatedly expressed hesitation about
conceding this authority to DOD and cautioned that it was to be regarded as a pilot program. (See
Appendix B for a legislative history of Section 1206, FY2005-FY2010.)
In April 2008 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee that still stands as the DOD
position on Section 1206, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described this authority as “a
means to fill long-standing gaps in an effort to help other nations build and sustain capable
military forces.... ” Explaining DOD’s need to carry out such activities, Secretary Gates stated
that after the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 (9/11), “building partner
capacity is a vital and enduring military requirement” for DOD to fulfill its national security
mission. The “security of America’s partners is essential to America’s own security,” according to
Gates, and Section 1206 is a preventive tool through which the United States helps allies and
partners to “confront extremists and other potential sources of global instability within their
borders ... before festering problems and threats become crises requiring U.S. military
intervention.”
At the same time, Secretary Gates dismissed the idea that Section 1206 duplicates or could be
viewed as a substitute for State Department Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs.
(However, other government personnel state that Section 1206 has been used as a substitute for
FMF, especially in the early years, given what many analysts believe is a shortage of FMF funds
to meet legitimate foreign defense equipment needs.
According to the Obama Administration’s FY2010 Budget Request Summary Justification
Document accompanying DOD’s May 2009 budget request, U.S. Combatant Commanders
consider the Section 1206 program “the single most important tool for the Department to shape
the environment and counter terrorism.”11 According to that document, the Section 1206 program
is important because it allows the United States to train and equip foreign military forces to
respond to “urgent and emergent threats,” and because it “provides opportunities to solve
problems before they become crises.... ”12
9 Jeffrey (Jeb) Nadaner, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations.
10 See, for instance: Robert M. Gates. A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age. Foreign
Affairs, January/February 2009. In this article, Gates worries that the military personnel and promotions system is not
able “to reflect the importance of advising, training, and equipping foreign troops—something still not considered a
career-enhancing path for the best and brightest officers.”
11 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request Summary Justification, May 2009, pp. 1-13.
12 Ibid.
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Section 1206 in Action
Purpose, Scope, and Funding
As noted above, Congress provided Section 1206 authority for two purposes. One is to enable
foreign military forces, as well as foreign maritime security forces, to perform counterterrorism
(CT) operations. The other is to enable foreign military forces to participate in or to support
military and stability operations in which U.S. armed forces are participating. Despite Section
1206’s dual purpose, through FY2009, almost all Section 1206 funding was used to provide
counterterrorism equipment and related training. The types of equipment provided include radios
and communications systems; surveillance and reconnaissance systems; trucks, ambulances,
boats, and other vehicles; small arms and rifles; night vision goggles and sights; and clothing.
From FY2010 on, Section 1206 has also provided considerable funding to train and equip foreign
military forces for stability operations, in particular to support the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Currently, there is a cap of $350 million on Section 1206
funding per fiscal year.
Section 1206 Programs and Funding, FY2013
The FY2013 programs notified to Congress thus far total $163.5 million. The FY2012 programs
notified thus far include assistance to enable 10 European countries to participate in the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, as well as assistance to five
African countries.
Recipients in Greater Europe are Bulgaria ($7.6 million); Croatia ($6.1 million); Czech Republic
($16.9 million); Estonia ($6.5 million); Hungary ($8.6 million); Latvia ($5.2 million); Lithuania
($8.6 million); Poland ($11.1 million); Romania ($12.8 million); and Slovakia ($11.6 million). In
Africa, recipients are Bukina Faso ($5.9 million); Kenya ($22.7 million); Mauritania ($22.5
million); and Uganda ($4.9 million).
Section 1206 Programs and Funding, FY2006-FY2012
Section 1206 funding over its first seven years (FY2006-FY2012) totaled some $1.78 billion.
During this period, Section 1206 funding supported bilateral programs in 41 countries, 15
multilateral programs, and an associated global human rights program. (For a breakdown of
FY2006-FY2010 funding by magnitude and by country and program, see Table A-1 and Table A-
2 in Appendix A; for a breakdown of FY2011-FY2012 funding by country and program, see
Tables 1 and 2, below.)
The largest recipient over that period has been Yemen, which received a total of $290 million in
five of the seven years, including FY2012. Pakistan ($203.4 million) and Lebanon ($128.5
million) are the next largest recipients overall, but did not receive funding in FY2011 or FY2012.
The fourth largest recipient, the Philippines, has received funding—in all but the first year—
totaling $102.3 million.
FY2012 funding allocations totaled $209 million, and FY2011 funding totaled $248 million. Both
years were significantly below the $350 million cap on Section 1206 funding. By region, total
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FY2011 and FY2012 funding was as follows: Africa, $158 million; Greater Europe, $167.7
million; Middle East and South Asia, $71 million; and Asia/Pacific, $33 million.
During the FY2011-FY2012 period, several countries rose to the top tier. The largest recipients in
that period—all receiving over $20 million—were Mauritania, Yemen, Uganda and Burundi
(jointly), Romania, Tunisia, Georgia, and Bangladesh. These eight countries received over half of
the total FY2011-FY2012 funding. In that period, Mauritania (which had received only $6.4
million in previous years) was the largest recipient, with $37.7 million. Although Yemen
remained a prominent recipient, it was in second place during the FY2011-FY2012 period, with
$37.4 million. Among the large recipients in this period were Uganda and Burundi, neither of
which had received Section 1206 funding before; they jointly received $63.6 million for a two-
country program (with Uganda receiving another $4.4 million for a bilateral program). Other
large recipients were Romania ($28.6 million), Tunisia ($27.8 million), Georgia ($25.6 million),
and Bangladesh ($22.7). Despite receiving $19.5 million, the Philippines was not among the top
recipients in FY2011-FY2012.
Thirteen of the 22 recipients during this period were Central and Eastern European countries
participating in the International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, with
Romania and Georgia the largest recipients among them. Others receiving between $18.9 million
and $0.6 million were (in descending order) Lithuania, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia,
Croatia, Poland, Bulgaria, Albania, Slovenia, and Slovakia.
Table 1. FY2011-FY2012 Section 1206 Recipients Grouped by Magnitude of
Funds Received
(U.S. Millions, Allocations)
Top Tier
Upper Middle Tier
Lower Middle Tier
Bottom Tier
(Over $25 million)
($15-$25 million)
($4-$10 million)
(Under $4 million)
Uganda and Burundi $63.6
Bangladesh $22.7
Kenya $12.1
Malaysia $1.1
jointly)
Philippines $19.5
Maldives $12.1
Mali $1.0
Mauritania $37.7
Lithuania $18.9
Niger $11.7
Albania $0.9
Yemen $37.4
Hungary $16.8
Latvia $11.6
Oman $0.9
Tunisia $27.8
Czech Republic $15.0
Azerbaijan $10.0
Slovenia $0.7
Georgia $25.6
Estonia $9.5
Slovakia $0.6
Romania $25.5
Malta $9.3
Croatia $5.3
Poland $5.1
Bulgaria $4.7
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, SO/LIC.
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Table 2. Section 1206 Funding: FY2011-FY2012, by Country and Program
($U.S. Millions, Allocations)
Totals
FY2011-
Recipient(s) Program FY2011
FY2012
FY2012
Total HR/RCA Training (amounts disclosed and not otherwise
1.6
1.1
1.7
included in country/regional allocations)
AFRICA
Kenya
Helicopter Rebuild/ Upgrade/Training for CT
12.1
12.1
Mali
Mine Detector Equipment
1.0
1.0
Fixed-Wing aircraft, Modernization, and
22.6
Associated Equipment
Mauritania
37.7
Forward Operating Location for CT Operations
8.1
Logistics Support Package for CT
7.0
Niger
Air Logistics and Communications Enhancement
11.7
11.7
Equipment to improve maritime mobility for CT
8.0
Helicopter upgrade for CT
4.4
Tunisia
27.8
Vehicles to build mobility for CT
8.5
Maritime Security Capability
6.9
Uganda
Counter Lord’s Resistance Army Program
4.4
4.4
Uganda and
44.8 18.8 63.6
Burundi
CT Support for Deployment to Somalia
Total Africa
113.9
44.4
158.3
GREATER EUROPE
Albania
Training for ISAF Deployments
0.3
0.9
1.2
Training for ISAF Deployments
0.2
1.1
Operational Training and Ammunition for ISAF
0.4
Bulgaria
4.7
Deployments
ISAF Deployment Enhancement
3.2
Training for ISAF Deployments
0.5
0.1
OMLAT Training Capability vehicles, radio and
5.2
Croatia
communications equipment; weapons ammunition,
5.8
and accessories
Operations Mentor and Liaison for Afghanistan
5.2
Rotary-wing Enhancement for SOF Operations
11.7
Czech
(helicopter upgrades and ground support
Republic
equipment)
15.0
Counter-IED enhancement for ISAF participation.
3.3
Counter-IED enhancement for ISAF participation
3.5
ISAF Deployment Enhancement
3.9
Estonia
9.5
SOF Deployment Enhancement
1.8
Training for ISAF Deployments
0.2
0.1
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
Totals
FY2011-
Recipient(s) Program FY2011
FY2012
FY2012
Build military force capacity to support ISAF
21.9
Georgia
25.7
Infantry Battalion Deployment to ISAF
3.8
Joint Tactical Air Comptroller for ISAF
2.9
13.3
Hungary
16.8
Training for ISAF Deployments
0.2
0.4
Build military force capacity to support ISAF
8.5
2.9
Latvia
11.6
Training for ISAF Deployments
0.1
0.1
Build military force capacity to support ISAF
5.7
Lithuania
SOF Deployment Enhancement Program
12.8
18.9
Training for ISAF Deployments
0.4
Malta
Maritime and Intelligence Capability Enhancement
4.7
4.6
9.3
ISAF Deployment Enhancement, including
2.9
14.0
Poland
operational training and equipment
19.1
Training for ISAF Deployments
2.2
ISAF Deployment Enhancement, including
7.3
13.2
Romania
operational training and equipment
25.5
Training for ISAF Deployments
5.0
Slovakia
Training for ISAF Deployments
0.3
0.3
0.6
Slovenia
Training for ISAF Deployments
0.4
0.3
0.7
Total Greater Europe
70.7
92.0
162.7
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
Radar Installation
0.9
Malaysia
1.1
Deployment Enhancement for ISAF
0.2
Maldives
Maritime Security Capability
12.1
12.1
Inshore Riverine Capability
12.0
Philippines
19.5
Insertion and Extraction Capability
7.5
Total Asia and the Pacific
24.9
7.7
32.6
MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Maritime CT Capability Enhancement, including
10.0
Azerbaijan
small boats, operational training, dive gear and
10.0
other equipment
Joint Land and Maritime CT Capability
8.3
Bangladesh
22.7
Ministry of Defense-Ministry of Home Affairs
14.4
Interoperability
Oman
Border Security Biometrics Capability
0.9
0.9
SOF CT Enhancement
14.0
23.4
Yemen
Fixed-Wing and Rotary-Wing Aircraft and Related
37.4
Items and Support to Enable Yemeni National
Military to Support CT Units
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Totals
FY2011-
Recipient(s) Program FY2011
FY2012
FY2012
Total Middle East and South Asia
19.2
51.8
71.0
Total Western Hemisphere
0
0
0
Transportation and Pre-Shipment Consolidation Costs
12.0
12..0
36.0
Totals
248.3
208.9
457.2
Conditions on Section 1206 Programs
Section 1206 of the FY2006 NDAA requires that programs conducted under its authority observe
and respect human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the “legitimate civilian authority within that
country.” The authority may not be used to provide any type of assistance that is otherwise
prohibited by any provision of law. It also may not be used to provide assistance to any country
that is otherwise prohibited from receiving such assistance under any other provision of law. The
legislation also requires a 15-day advance notification to the congressional defense, foreign
affairs, and appropriations committees before initiating each program. This notification must
specify, among other things, the program country, budget, and completion date, as well as the
source and planned expenditure of funds.
Joint DOD-State Department Selection and Approval Process13
Section 1206 programs are developed and selected under a “dual-key” process that culminates
with the signature of both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. As modified by the
FY2007 John Warner NDAA, Section 1206 authority permits the Secretary of Defense to provide
Section 1206 support with the “concurrence” of the Secretary of State. According to DOD and
State Department officials, that term has been interpreted to mean the Secretary of State’s
approval. Section 1206 also requires both secretaries to jointly formulate any program and
coordinate in its implementation. Coordination for the first year programs in FY2006 was
reported to be spotty,14 but since then DOD and the State Department agencies have developed an
extensive joint review process.
Early in the fiscal year, the DOD Joint Staff and the State Department’s Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs (PM) kick off the process with a call for proposals issued with identical guidance.
Most recommendations originate at the field level, where geographic Combatant Commands
(COCOMs) and U.S. embassy country teams jointly formulate proposals, although the degree of
collaboration may vary. For proposals originated by the military, the COCOM forwards the
proposal to Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. For proposals originated in
13 A joint report by the DOD and State Department Inspectors General dedicates Chapter 2 to the approval process and
recommends several changes intended to strengthen and formalize the process. Inspectors General U.S. Department of
Defense and U.S. Department of State, Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Program,
Department of Defense and Department of State, Department of Defense Report No. IE-2009-007 and Department of
State Report No. ISP-I-09-69, August 31, 2009, pp. 9-15, http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/129491.pdf.
Hereinafter referred to as Inspectors General Report.
14 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Section 1206 Security Assistance Program—Findings on Criteria,
Coordination, and Implementation, GAO-07-416R, February 28, 2007. See p. 3.
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
State Department channels, the Embassy forwards it to the State Department. The relevant
Ambassador and Combatant Commander each must personally sign off on a proposal.
At the Pentagon and the State Department, staff conduct an extensive review process to prioritize
the many proposals (they have numbered in the hundreds in recent years). The OSD Office of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Capabilities and Counterterrorim15
takes the DOD lead. It coordinates reviews for feasibility, political-military considerations, and
legal status with OSD and Joint Staff regional and functional offices. At the State Department, the
Bureau for Political-Military affairs consults with the Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism (S/CT), the regional bureaus, and the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign
Assistance (F), and then forwards proposals to the State Department legal and congressional
liaison offices for vetting. The offices of the Deputy Secretaries of Defense and of State may also
indicate their priorities. Selection criteria include the urgency of the threat, the ability of the host
nation to address that threat from its own resources, the ability of the host nation to sustain the
capability, either from its own resources or through FMF funding, and the risks of inaction.16
Once prioritized within each agency, the DOD and State lead offices convene a joint DOD-State
review board to select those proposals that will be recommended to the Secretaries. Either
Secretary can veto a project.
Once program memoranda are signed by both secretaries, DOD sends congressional notifications
to the armed services, foreign affairs, and appropriations committees. No funds can be obligated
until 15 days after these committees are notified and given the opportunity to review the projects.
A DOD document described this joint review process in 2008 as the “gold standard” for
interagency planning and cooperation.17 Nonetheless, some participants have described their
experiences with the process as competitive and time-consuming, absorbing staff hours that are
needed for other priorities. Some have expressed frustration that considerable time can be spent
developing projects that are not approved. (Hundreds more proposals have been developed than
approved, according to some participants.) Some participants state that the process has improved
as those involved in developing projects get a better of understanding of the intended purposes of
Section 1206 and do not offer inappropriate projects. A recent Senate Foreign Relations
Committee report recommends that the Combatant Commands, after consultation with the State
Department, should appraise Embassy staff whether a project is likely to be approved before
Embassy staff invest too much time in developing it.18
15 This office is located under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and International Cooperation (SO/LIC&IC).
16 Author’s interviews with Department of State officials, September 2009, and e-mail exchanges with DOD and State
Department officials, October and November 2009.
17 FY2009 DOD Summary Justification, p. 103.
18 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Following the Money in Yemen and Lebanon: Maximizing
the Effectiveness of U.S. Security Assistance and International Financial Institution Lending, committee print, 111th
Cong., 1st sess., January 5, 2010, S. Prt. 111-38 (Washington: GPO, 2010), pp. 13 and 24. Hereinafter cited as
Following the Money.
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
Funding Provisions
Section 1206 programs are funded from the DOD operations and maintenance (O&M) account.
During the first two years of the program, DOD transferred funds from lower-priority missions to
fund activities under Section 1206, according to the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Policy
(OSD/P). Since then, Congress has appropriated funds under the defense-wide O&M account.
The current authorized limit for Section 1206 spending is $350 million.
Issues for Congress
Congress established Section 1206 as a flexible funding mechanism in order to provide the U.S.
government with a means to respond rapidly to emerging (and some would say urgent) threats to
U.S. security, including threats to the security of U.S. military forces, that would pose too great a
risk if left unattended. First established as a “pilot program,” Section 1206 authority is subject to
continuous congressional scrutiny. Issues range from the specific questions about the
effectiveness of Section 1206 programs and whether it should be expanded or limited to the
broader questions of whether DOD should retain its own T&E authority and whether it should be
reconsidered in the context of broader security assistance reform.
Are Section 1206 Funds Being Used Effectively?
With Section 1206 is in its seventh funding, a major question is whether Section 1206 programs
are effective. An April 2010 GAO report cast Section 1206 response timeframes, overall, as an
improvement over other equipping programs, stating that Section 1206 funds enabled DOD and
State “to respond to urgent and emergent needs more quickly than they have been able to do with
FMF and other security assistance programs.” GAO found that these agencies “have often
formulated and begun implementing projects within 1 fiscal year, while FMF projects have
usually required up to 3 years of planning.”19 Nevertheless, Members have had a number of
concerns about effectiveness, centering on the need for a means to assess the degree to which
programs were accomplishing their objectives, to improve the timeliness of deliveries, and to
ensure that the capabilities put in place by Section 1206 programs are sustained. Over the past
few years, DOD has put in place several new measures to address these concerns.
Assessing Accomplishments
Concerns of some Members have centered on the lack of criteria for determining program results.
In the late 2000s, several reports were generally positive, but two of them also urged the
development of metrics or other evaluation tools.20 There was some skepticism that a useful
19 GAO-10-431, p. 4.
20A July 2008 assessment of Section 1206 assistance to four countries was generally positive, citing improvements in
operational capacity, greater information-sharing and cooperation, and troop morale, but also noting problems in two of
those recipients. CNA Corporation Assessments. The recipient countries were Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, and Sao
Tome and Principe. The study was conducted in response to a request from the OSD Global Security Affairs Office.
The report noted that in some cases it relied on secondary source reporting. See the Executive Summary, pp. 1-4.
Likewise, an August 2009 joint report by the DOD and State Department inspectors general found the projects that it
(continued...)
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
measure of accomplishments could be developed, as some analysts noted that establishing the
outcomes of programs that are essentially preventive in nature is impossible, not unlike trying to
prove a negative. Some, however, suggested that a possible indicator of utility would be an
estimate of the cost to the U.S. military of compensating for the lack of the capability provided
under Section 1206 or of carrying out that function itself.
In mid-February 2013, DOD presented its congressional oversight committees with a new
assessment framework for evaluating Section 1206 programs. According to DOD, the purpose of
the assessments is to measure implementation of 1206 programs, assess the quality and timeliness
of program implementation, measure the effects of programs, and estimate the return on
investment. Assessments are qualitative, built on in-depth interviews with personnel from the
units receiving assistance as well as with U.S. government personnel. From its first round of
assessment conducted over the past year, DOD concludes that the programs selected for
assessment “have generally enhanced the capability of the recipients to conduct CT or stability
operations” and that equipment proved for Section 1206 programs “for the most part” has been
“used for appropriate purposes.”21 A few countries were not willing to participate in the
assessment, however. Among the lessons learned were that “program design often lacks
appreciation for operational conditions or understanding of complete system,” that partner nation
absorptive capacity varies, and that sustainment “is always a challenge,” both in putting in place
processes for maintenance and in securing funds for maintenance and spare parts.
Timeliness of Deliveries
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA),22 which implements many security
cooperation programs, including Section 1206, has taken steps to improve the timeliness of
Section 1206 deliveries. Although a primary rationale for Section 1206 funding was that it would
enable the U.S. government to respond more quickly to emerging needs than possible under the
FMF process, the delivery of Section 1206 equipment has not always proved as expeditious as
originally expected. DOD stated in a FY2009 budget request document that Section 1206
(...continued)
examined in eight countries (all conducted with FY2006 funds, as noted above) to be “effective in building partner
nation capacity for counterterrorist and military or stability operations and helped those nations increase control over
their borders and ungoverned spaces and counter terrorism.”20 Nevertheless, this same report recommended that the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, together with Joint Staff and Combatant Commands “should develop metrics of
effectiveness for building Section 1206 partnership capacity and establish clearly defined outputs and outcomes.”
Inspectors General Report, p. iv, Recommendation 9. In an April 2010 report, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) found that Section 1206 authority offers a unique and more timely mechanism than the State Department’s
FMF for responding to U.S. military priorities that require training and equipping foreign military forces, but expressed
concerns about the extent of monitoring and evaluation, as well as program sustainability. According to that GAO
report, DOD and State “have conducted little monitoring and evaluation” of Section 1206 programs, with reporting
consisting generally of anecdotal information, and “have not consistently defined performance measures for their
Section 1206 projects.” United States Government Accountability Office, DOD and State Need to Improve Sustainment
Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 Assistance Programs, GAO-10-431, Washington,
D.C., April 15, 2010, pp. 5, 32. Accessible through http://www.gao.gov. Hereinafter referred to as GAO-10-431.
21 Department of Defense, 1206 Assessment Process, December 2012. Quotes in this paragraph taken from DOD
briefing slides.
22 The DSCA is a defense agency (under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) that administers and implements a
wide variety of security assistance programs, including Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales,
International Military Education and Training, Excess Defense Articles, and drawdowns, as well as Section 1206. More
information on the DSCA is available at http://www.dsca.mil.
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
authority “allows a response to urgent and emergent threats or opportunities in six months or
less,”23 Nevertheless, especially in Section 1206’s first several years, the actual delivery time for
much equipment has in some situations been much longer.24
There have been multiple causes for such delays, not all of which can be remedied. In some cases,
such as night vision goggles, the problem is the shortage of readily available equipment because
of high demand and a small number of U.S. producers. In other cases, however, the causes have
been systematic processing problems at DSCA and at the military services contracting offices,
which affect Section 1206 timelines. Some analysts also identify an insufficient number of DSCA
staff to handle the agency’s workload and time-consuming DSCA procedures as key factors.
Some analysts point out that these same factors affect deliveries of FMF-provided equipment.
Within recent years, DSCA has improved Section 1206 processing by giving a higher priority to
Section 1206 deliveries and instituting new delivery mechanisms. Because of the relatively small
amount of Section 1206 funding and the temporary nature of the authority, Section 1206
deliveries had been low-priority cases. As described by DOD officials, contracting for defense
items is a time-consuming and labor-intensive process, particularly for non-traditional accounts
such as Section 1206. Contracting for defense items and services provided as security assistance
to foreign countries is carried out by the military services—for Section 1206 items predominantly
the Army, but also the Navy and the Air Force—and generally Section 1206 orders are added to
existing contracts processed by the military services’ contracting personnel. These personnel
handled Section 1206 cases as low-priority “other duties assigned.” Because of a lack of
permanent Section 1206 authority, DSCA did not provide permanent staffing to manage Section
1206 cases, according to CRS interviews, although more man-hours were dedicated to Section
1206 cases beginning sometime in 2010. Nonetheless, some analysts state that DSCA continues
to rely on temporary solutions and has yet to put in place the number of permanent personnel
necessary to properly implement the program.
Another change has been DSCA’s institution of a centralized delivery system created especially
for Section 1206 deliveries to Pakistan in 2008 and then extended to the entire Section 1206
program in 2010. As of 2006, when the Section 1206 program commenced, the existing delivery
system had been designed for large items purchased by or provided to foreign countries under the
Foreign Military Sales/Foreign Military Financing Program, which largely depended on the
recipient country or a commercial firm to handle delivery. This system was problematic for
Section 1206 deliveries because they consist largely of smaller and more numerous items than
FMS/FMF deliveries and they rely on U.S. personnel in recipient countries to receive and account
for the articles. Now, instead of shipping items individually as they become available, most types
of Section 1206 items25 are delivered to a central shipping depot or “consolidation point,” where
23 FY 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification, p. 103.
24 A January 2009 DOD letter to certain Members of Congress states that “Section 1206 authority can provide training
and equipment in one to two years, or less.”A copy of the letter was provided by DOD, with the permission of a
congressional recipient. It is signed by the former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric S Edelman, who
occupied that post as of the date of the letter, January 16, 2009. Hereinafter referred to as OSD letter of January 16,
2009 responding to Members of Congress. An August 2009 joint report of the DOD and State Department
Inspectors General indicated a 6- to 18-month timeline for delivery of Section 1206 equipment and supplies provided
through FY2006 funds and stated that DSCA agency actions were needed to reduce procurement and shipping delays to
respond more quickly to actual or emerging terrorist threats, and to ensure all approved case funds are obligated before
funding authorization expires. Inspectors General Report, pp. ii and iv (Recommendation 3).
25 Among the types of items not shipped from the consolidation point are arms, ammunition, and patrol boats.
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
they are bundled into larger shipments, which are easier to track, for surface or air transport.26
This has provided greater accountability and predictability, according to those interviewed.
Some analysts believe there are a variety of options to further improve the delivery process.
Noting that some articles for FY2012 programs arrived in somewhat under six months and others
in just over nine months, some analysts argue that Section 1206 programs could meet a six-month
timeline for many items on a regular basis. With the new delivery process in place, what is now
lacking to regularly meet a six- to nine-month goal is additional resources for DSCA to provide
adequate staffing, according to these analysts.
Some analysts believe that making Section 1206 a permanent authority might provide an impetus
to greater commitment. Others, however, perceive the DSCA and the military services as
inevitably prioritizing the delivery of items for the big-ticket and enduring programs that they
regard as their core security assistance mission.
Other proposed options would address the “fourth quarter” problem (i.e., the difficulties in
completing timely deliveries when programs are notified late in the fiscal year). This leaves
DSCA and the military services little time to complete the contracting process, greatly straining
the system. In at least one case, it meant that a program could not be completed in the fiscal year.
Some suggest that Congressional Notifications be presented earlier in the fiscal year, to alleviate
this problem. Others suggest that legislation be adopted that allows funding for a program
notified in one fiscal year to be obligated in the next fiscal year.
In a related area, a 2009 DOD and State Department Inspectors General report indicated that
consistent information on Section 1206 expenditures and deliveries was not available to U.S.
Embassy country team members; it recommended that DOD develop a periodic report to track
actual obligations and expenditures of funds and other data.27 Similarly, a January 2010 Senate
Foreign Relations Committee report recommended that the Administration “develop a centralized
information management system, with appropriate checks and balances for accuracy, to
accurately track the status of all Section 1206 assistance.”28 DSCA has instituted a new internal
tracking system. In 2012, it established a new online Security Cooperation Management Suite
(SCMS) to track funds, including Section 1206 funds, for payments to vendors, as well as a web
portal to share Section 1206 data.
Sustainability
For Section 1206 CT programs to be effective, most believe that they must be sustained over the
long run. Sustainment includes the ability to maintain equipment in working condition as well as
to provide appropriate personnel to operate it. The GAO flagged sustainment as a major issue in
its April 2010 report: “The long-term impact of Section 1206 projects is at risk because U.S.
agencies have not fully addressed how to sustain these projects,” according to the GAO.29
26 U.S. carriers are preferred. Generally surface transport is less expensive but slower, while air transport is more
expensive but faster. Large items like Humvees are put on surface transport, while air transport is preferred for
sensitive items such as communications equipment, night vision equipment, and lasers.
27 Inspectors General Report, p. iv (Recommendation 4), and pp. 21-23.
28 Follow the Money, p. 21.
29 GAO-10-431, p. 4. Pointing out that 76% of Section 1206 projects are in low- to lower-middle income countries, the
GAO judged these projects to be “potentially threatened: by the unwillingness or limited means” of recipient countries
(continued...)
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
Some policymakers have expressed concern that recipient countries will not continue to provide
support to sustain capabilities put in place by Section 1206 programs when Section 1206 funding
ends. (Because Section 1206 authority established to meet immediate needs, Section 1206 must
cease when a threat is no longer “emerging,” however that may be defined.) The 2009 joint State
Department and DOD Inspectors General report recommends that, during the planning process,
host nation governments commit to a program and demonstrate the capability to sustain it.30
According to DOD’s January 2009 letter to Members of Congress, mentioned above, DOD and
the State Department determine that the ability of recipient governments to sustain programs is
taken into account in program planning, and at times programs have been cut back to ensure a
recipient government could sustain the program. In addition, Section 1206 programs all provide
“two-year spare parts packages and training to operate and sustain equipment, including train-the-
trainer support.”
Nevertheless, some analysts have urged that more could be done to help recipient countries
sustain and maintain Section 1206 capabilities. One change Section 1206 authority enacted in
2012 by Section 1201(a) of the FY2013 NDAA (P.L. 112-239) responds to this perception by
adding small-scale military construction to the list of allowable expenditures (formerly
equipment, supplies, and training). Section 1201(a)(2) permits small-scale military construction
of up to $750,000 per program and up to $25 million for all programs for each fiscal year. Such
funds can be used, for instance, for the construction of small boat houses to shelter (and thus help
maintain) patrol boats and other watercraft supplied by Section 1206 funding.
Some analysts also propose that Section 1206 provide short-term sustainment assistance by
designating a certain percentage of each fiscal year’s funding to sustain prior year programs.
Some analysts also would use the State Department’s FMF account for sustainment funding, as
has been done on occasion in the past. GAO has cautioned, however, that “U.S. law potentially
limits the availability of FMF funds for sustainment,”31 and the FY2012 appropriations report
language stated that FMF funds were not to be used to maintain Section 1206 projects without the
approval of the congressional appropriations committees.32 (This restriction continues to apply
under the FY2013 continuing resolution [P.L. 112-175] which expires March 27, 2013.)
(...continued)
to sustain them. “Only 35 (26 percent ) of the 135 approved project proposals we reviewed explicitly address the
recipient countries’ ability to sustain the projects, and 9 (7 percent) of those 135 proposals provided specific estimates
of the costs involved,” the GAO reported. GAO-10-431, p. 4.
30 Inspectors General Report, p. iii (Recommendation 1) and p. iv (Recommendation 8). Recommendation 1 suggests
that DOD and the State Department revise the Section 1206 proposal submission template to require a statement
describing the actual or potential terrorist threat in detail, as well as the “bilateral consultation and coordination process
for formulating the proposal” and the “partner nation’s commitment and capability to sustain project implementation.”
Recommendation 8 states that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “in coordination with the Director of the Joint
Staff and Department of State’s Bureau of Political Military Affairs, should direct Security Cooperation Officers to
work with partner nations to develop a full Concept of Operations by the final approval of the project.”
31 GAO-10-431, p. 4.
32 The Consolidated Appropriation Act, 2012, P.L. 112-74, Title IV, under the heading Foreign Military Financing
Program, states that “none of the funds made available under this heading shall be made available to support or
continue any program initially funded under the authority of section 1206 ... unless the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, has justified such program to the Committees on Appropriations.... ”
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
Should DOD Retain Section 1206 Train and Equip Authority?
Because Congress has bestowed responsibility on the Secretary of State for the oversight of all
foreign assistance, including military education and training programs, and for ensuring foreign
policy coherence,33 many analysts argue that Section 1206 authority should be transferred to the
Department of State, perhaps as a subset of FMF authority. On the other hand, those who believe
DOD should retain Section 1206 authority, and even that Congress should make it a permanent
DOD authority under Title 10 (Armed Services) of the U.S. Code, argue that Section 1206 serves
very different purposes than FMF or Title 22 (Foreign Assistance) military education and training.
Those who believe DOD should retain Section 1206 authority emphasize its perceived
importance as a military tool, as explained above, and differentiate the general purposes of
Section 1206 and FMF. According to many accounts, defense and military officials, including
geographic combatant commanders, have come to regard Section 1206 funding as vital to the
U.S. defense efforts.34 The January 2009 letter from the Under Secretary of Defense to Members
of Congress (cited above) states that Section 1206 funds meet the military needs determined by
the geographic Combatant Commanders “for tools to build capable, reliable, and interoperable
partners as they prepare for—and seek to minimize the necessity for—military missions in the
AORs [Areas of Responsibility].” Section 1206, according to the letter, is a flexible, strategic tool
“to meet urgent and emergent threats and opportunities to build partner capacity... [and] ... to
address critical counterterrorism needs as defined by the U.S. Government.”
In contrast, the DOD letter presents FMF as a political tool “critical ... for executing our foreign
policy” and “key to improving bilateral relationships, encouraging behavior in the U.S. interest,
increasing access and influence, and building capacity where host-nation and U.S. interests
align.” While Section 1206 responds to needs identified by the U.S. government, FMF is often
used to meet the security needs of foreign countries as perceived by their governments or military
institutions. “Because many countries rely on FMF as a major resource for their military
procurement budgets,” FMF allocations are “affected by host-nation preferences and political
engagement,” the letter states.
One indicator of differing uses of Section 1206 and FMF assistance, at least in some regions, may
be the relative size of funds spent in Sub-Saharan Africa, a region whose insecure borders and
ungoverned spaces present, many argue, an ideal habitat for terrorist groups and thus a threat to
U.S. military forces and U.S. national security. Estimated FY2009 FMF obligations in Africa
were less than 2% of total obligations ($8.3 million compared to $4.6 billion overall). Section
1206 allocations for Africa were relatively greater, representing some 14% of total FY2009
allocations ($48.7 million of $339.9 million).
33 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), Section 622(c)(22 U.S.C. 2382), states that the Secretary of
State, under the direction of the President, “shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of
economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs, including but not limited to
determining whether there shall be a military assistance (including civic action) or a military education and training
program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and
abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby.” The Armed Export Control Act, which as of
1968 authorizes the FMS/FMF program, similarly mandates that the Secretary of State, under the direction of the
President, be responsible for “the continuous supervision and general direction of sales, leases, financing, cooperative
projects, and exports under this chapter.... ” (P.L. 90-629, as amended, Chapter 1, Section 2(b), 22 U.S.C. 2752).
34 According to a DOD document, the “geographic Combatant Commanders consider global train and equip authority
the Department’s single most important tool for building partner operational capacity, shaping the environment, and
countering terrorism outside Iraq and Afghanistan.” FY2009 Budget Request Summary Justification, p. 102.
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
In the letter, DOD denied that Section 1206 programs are “as some have claimed, programs
historically conducted by the State Department.... ” The United States “has not conducted
programs like this before.”
On the other hand, some analysts have questioned whether the purposes for which FMF and
Section 1206 can be used are as different as described by DOD. Some also wonder whether items
provided under Section 1206 assistance could not just as well be provided through FMF, a State
Department fund, if that pot of money were increased. These critics view Section 1206 as one of
a number of programs that signal the “militarization” of U.S. foreign assistance,35 which they
judge detrimental to U.S. relations with foreign governments and damaging to the U.S. image
with foreign populations.
Advocates of placing Section 1206 under the State Department’s authority and budget see an
inevitable difference of perspective between a military commander and those vested with
authority for foreign policy. A military commander, they argue, rightfully focuses on the
objectives of the current mission, without necessarily taking into account the long-term
implications for foreign relations. Providing DOD with authority and funding for Section 1206
and other foreign assistance-type activities outside of active combat zones gives DOD undue
influence over shaping and conducting foreign relations and U.S. diplomacy, which are the
responsibility of the Ambassador and the State Department, proponents argue. Some also state
that DOD Section 1206 authority “weakens congressional oversight, including human rights
protections.”36
Several foreign policy research institutions have advocated placing Section 1206 programs under
State Department authority and the oversight of the Secretary of State.
• The American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center argue
that “the Secretary of State has and should have responsibility for assuring that
all foreign and security assistance is carried out in accord with U.S. foreign
policy, including setting overall policy, approving countries to receive
assistance, and setting the budget for such assistance.”37 The authors of this
report, drawing on a panel comprised of former Ambassadors and other State
Department personnel, stated that to do otherwise would undermine the
Secretary of State’s responsibility for the “fundamental direction of U.S.
foreign policy.”38
• The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Task Force on
Nontraditional Security Assistance, while recognizing Section 1206’s
importance to DOD, nevertheless voiced concern that Section 1206 “has the
potential to impinge on State Department leadership in U.S. foreign policy and
35 I.e., Congress’s grant to DOD of several new or expanded DOD authorities and funding accounts such as the
Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), the Commander’s Emergency Response Program
(CERP),
36 Adam Isacson, The Pentagon’s military aid role grows, on the Just the Facts website http://justf.org/blog, January 26,
2010.
37 A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future, p. 23.
38 A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future, p. 12.
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
the authorities given the secretary of state under the Foreign Assistance Act
(FAA).”39
• A Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) report expresses concrete
concerns regarding coherence, transparency, and fiscal discipline. Authors
Cindy Williams and Gordon Adams argue that authority for Section 1206 (as
well as for other security assistance programs) should be vested in the State
Department “in order to ensure that security assistance does not drive or
conflict with overall U.S. international engagement.”40 They view Section
1206 and other recent security assistance authorities as generally parallel to or
duplicating State Department’s traditional security assistance programs.41 “The
risks in this parallel system of authorities and programs are that security
assistance becomes more complex and confusing, that it is disconnected from
overall, long-term U.S. diplomacy and national security strategy, and that
money is wasted through overlapping, uncoordinated, or conflicting efforts,”
they wrote.42
Despite this widespread perception, some may argue that there may be ways in which DOD-
controlled Section 1206 assistance can benefit U.S. interests. For instance, recipients may
perceive DOD assistance as representing a serious, enduring U.S. security interest in that country,
facilitating military-to-military contacts.
Should Congress Broaden Section 1206 Authority to Include T&E
for Security Forces?
For several years, DOD has argued for authority to train and equip a variety of counterterrorism
security forces outside the military structure. DOD’s original proposal included “armies, guard,
border security, civil defense, infrastructure protection, and police forces,” but the initial Section
1206 legislation restricted the use of funds to military forces. Subsequent requests by DOD (in
2007 and 2008) proposed expanding Section 1206 authority to include other security forces.
DOD’s FY2009 NDAA proposal requested that a wide range of police and security forces be
included, specifically gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil
defense, homeland defense, coast guard, border protection, and counterterrorism forces. In 2008,
Congress amended Section 1206 authority to include only non-military maritime security forces,
such as coast guards,43 a category not named in the DOD request.
39 Representative Robert Andrews and Representative Mark Kirk, co-chairs, Integrating 21st Century Development and
Security Assistance: Final Report of the Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, January 2008, p. 7. (On the same page, the report further notes: “A number of legislators on
Capitol Hill have expressed fear that Section 1206 could undermine the coherence of U.S. foreign policy, by allowing
combatant commanders to assist foreign security forces without taking account of broader U.S. considerations at stake
in bilateral and regional relationships.”) Hereinafter referred to as Integrating 21st Century Development and Security
Assistance.
40 Cindy Williams and Gordon Adams, Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource
Allocation, MIT Security Studies Program Occasional Paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 2008, p. 21.
Hereinafter referred to as Strengthening Statecraft and Security.
41 Other DOD security assistance authorities specifically discussed in this report are Coalition Support Funds, CERP,
and CTFP.
42Strengthening Statecraft and Security, p. 70.
43 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, P.L. 110-417, Section 1206.
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Because foreign counterterrorism units sometimes are configured as civilian forces under foreign
Ministries of the Interior rather than as military forces, some analysts argue that the lack of
authority to train and equip foreign security forces impedes the United States’ ability to build
foreign capacity for counterterrorism. In January 2008, the final report of the Task Force on
Nontraditional Security Assistance at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
recommended the expansion of 1206 authority to include non-military security forces because of
“the operational necessity of working with foreign security forces to advance key
counterterrorism objects.... ”44
However, some analysts argue that Congress should reserve funding for civilian security force
training to the State Department. Some argue that there are fundamental differences in training
civilian and military personnel and U.S. military forces are suited solely for training the latter.
Some stress that the use of U.S. military forces to train civilian police and other security forces
conveys an undesirable blurring of police and military roles and functions. In some countries,
where there may be tensions between military and police forces, such a blurring may cause
resentments and complicate bilateral relations. In addition, DOD training of police personnel can
put a military face on U.S. assistance in a sensitive area, undermining the concept that civilians
should be in the lead on internal security affairs. In some countries, where there may be tensions
between military and police forces, such a blurring may complicate bilateral relations.
This concern was reflected in House action on its initial version of FY2011 NDAA, H.R. 5136.
Under Section 1203 of this bill, the House would have provided Section 1206 funding to train and
equip Yemen’s Ministry of Interior (MOI) CT forces, with the stipulation that the funds be
transferred to the Department of State, which would assume responsibility for the program.45 The
SASC version of the bill, S. 3454, would have provided a new, separate, and discrete authority for
DOD to train and equip the Yemini MOI CT forces. The House version of the revised FY2011
NDAA, H.R. 6523, would also have provided a discrete authority. In the end, the conference
version of the final FY2011 Ike Skelton NDAA (H.R. 6523, P.L. 111-383) provided a separate
authority in Section 1205 for the Secretary of Defense to provide, with the concurrence of the
Secretary of State, up to $75 million of funds available for operations and maintenance in FY2011
for the Yemen MOI CT forces to conduct CT operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula and its affiliates.
Should Congress Consider Broader Security Assistance Reform?
Discussion about Section 1206 often takes place in the context of a perceived need for broad
security assistance reform. Section 1206 represents a significant part of the security assistance
package, but many analysts are concerned with the problems involving the whole gamut of
security assistance programs under both State Department and DOD authorities.46 Indeed, some
44 Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance, p. 10.
45 The House action followed the lead of the Obama Administration’s February 1, 2010, FY2011 budget request, which
transferred three controversial DOD assistance programs to the Department of State budget: Iraq Police Training, crisis
reaction funding for reconstruction, security and stabilization activities (formerly funded under DOD “Section 1207,”
(P.L. 109-163 as amended) authority, and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). (DOD retains an
account with a similar name and acronym, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund or PCF.) In its budget request, the
Department of State stated that the transfer of these programs would “begin to rebalance the roles between DOD and
State.”
46 According to the report by the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center, one of “the most
striking trends during the past two decades has been the growing role of the Defense Department in providing foreign
(continued...)
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relate the establishment of Section 1206, as well as perceived problems with it, to problems
experienced with traditional State Department authorities: “The current [State Department]
mechanisms, some of which reflect statutory requirements, are antiquated and slow to respond to
changing security threats, one of the explanations for DOD’s expanded assistance portfolio in
recent years,” according to one report.47 Some analysts question whether Section 1206 authority
would be needed at all if the systems carrying out traditional security assistance authorities were
provided sufficient funds and personnel, and were reorganized to operate more efficiently.
Several recent reports have reviewed current security assistance programs, authorities, and
resources, and recommended substantial reform. The MIT report mentioned in a section above
advocates the creation of “a new architecture that is agile, flexible and adequately funded to deal
with the new security challenges” and that “can and should make ample use of DOD’s
capabilities.... ”48 Specific recommendations call for changes that would improve strategic
planning, policy coherence, interagency coordination, budgeting procedures, transparency, and
discipline, and congressional oversight. Among their suggestions where Congress has a direct role
are the following:49
• Restructure security assistance authorities by grouping State Department and
DOD authorities to create new programs.
• Expand contingency authority for all security assistance, and provide multiyear
funding in order to provide the State Department and DOD with broader
discretion to reallocate and target funds as requirements change.
• Consolidate security assistance budgets, with the executive branch agencies
presenting a single, multiagency, security assistance budget. (Some would
emphasize the need for a single counterterrorism budget.)50
• Undertake reforms within the State Department to “right-size” the Bureau of
Political Military (PM) Affairs, as well as the Office of the Director of Foreign
Assistance, to enable the State Department to oversee budgeting for security
assistance programs.51
(...continued)
assistance under its own statutory authorities.....by the end of the 1990s ... DOD was directly managing 15 security
assistance programs accounting for well over $1 billion annually.” A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future, p. 22.
47 A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future, p. 23.
48 Strengthening Statecraft and Security, p. 71. This recommendation would place the new architecture under State
Department authority, however.
49 This section draws principally on specific recommendations made in three reports: Strengthening Statecraft and
Security, A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future, and Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance,
although other reports may have similar proposals. Related proposals are contained in Beyond Assistance: The HELP
Commission Report on Foreign Assistance Reform, December, 2007, and Project on National Security Reform,
Forging a New Shield, November 2008, as well as other publications.
50 See Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance, p. 38, which recommends that “DOD, State and
USAID present relevant congressional committees with a joint CT security assistance budget as part of a broader effort
to require executive branch transparency on how State, USAID, and DOD budgets fit together.” (p. 38)
51 Strengthening Statecraft and Security, p. 73. In A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future, the American Academy of
Diplomacy and the Stimson Center also express concerned about State Department staffing levels for security
assistance, in particular the number of foreign service personnel who specialize in political-military affairs. (p. 23)
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• Review the DSCA structure and processes to “to right-size its bureaucracy and
reduce inflexibility.”52
• Consider joint congressional hearings on security assistance programs,
involving both defense and foreign policy authorization and appropriations
committees.53
Recommendations for systemic reforms that are largely within the purview of the executive
branch include
• Provide White House oversight of security assistance by establishing a
permanent interagency group under the National Security Council (NSC);54
and
• Provide for stronger State/DOD joint strategic planning and coordination at the
regional level.
In line with the State Department/USAID QDDR report of December 2010, which proposed as a
pilot project an integrated interagency pooled fund for security and related assistance to address
emerging needs, Congress authorized a Department of State-DOD Global Security Contingency
Fund (GSCF) in the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81, Section 1207).
Some see this as a possible successor to Section 1206 authority. (For more on the GSCF, see CRS
Report R42641, Global Security Contingency Fund: Summary and Issue Overview, by Nina M.
Serafino.)
52 Strengthening Statecraft and Security suggests creating three new programs: (1) a more flexible train and equip
program combining FMF, Section 1206, and the State Department’s peacekeeping account (PKO); (2) a more coherent
foreign military education program by combining IMET and the DOD Counterterrorism Fellowship Program; and (3) a
revamped support program combining the coalition support and the economic support (CSF and ESF) funds. It also
suggests redistributing responsibility for activities carried out under the Commander’s Emergency Response Program
(CERP) and other DOD ‘foreign assistance” programs, assigning responsibility for longer-term governance and
development programs to the State Department and USAID, and reserving to DOD responsibility for shorter-term,
urgent projects closely related to combat needs or to operations in insecure areas. (p.74)
53 Strengthening Statecraft and Security, p. 75.
54 Strengthening Statecraft and Security recommends that this group be co-chaired by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) in order to ensure “the integration of security assistance policies and programs into the broader national
security strategy,” to resolve “policy and program disagreements between the Departments of State and Defense,” and
to provide “overarching policy guidance to improve consistency with overall national security strategy... .” (pp. 72-73).
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Appendix A. FY2006-FY2010 Recipients
and Funding
The $1.3 billion in FY2006-FY2010 Section 1206 funding was divided among more than 34
bilateral recipients and 14 multilateral groups of 2-15 members. Of these, three—Yemen,
Pakistan, and Lebanon—received 44% of total Section 1206 assistance for these years. The top
seven recipients (i.e., the top three recipients plus the Philippines, Indonesia, Bahrain, and
Malaysia) received 63%, or a bit short of two-thirds of total Section 1206 funding. These seven
countries constituent one-fifth of all bilateral recipients. Over half the bilateral and multilateral
recipients received under $15 million in Section 1206 assistance.
Yemen was the largest recipient during this period. The $252.6 million it received from FY2006
through FY20010 constituted almost a fifth of total Section 1206 funding during this period. Over
60% of Section 1206 assistance to Yemen during this period was provided with FY2010 funds,
most used to supply small airplanes and helicopters and other aircraft support to the Yemeni air
force, to enable it to support Yemeni CT units, and the rest to enhance the CT capability of
Yemeni SOF.
Over a quarter of Section 1206 aid to Yemen was provided through FY2009 funding. This
assistance included not only trucks, radio systems (with operation and maintenance training), and
body armor to help the Yemeni Border Security Force deter, detect, and detain terrorists along the
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Oman borders, but also equipment for the Yemeni Coast Guard (patrol
boats and accessories, and shipboard radios) and for the Yemini Air Force (helicopter spare parts
and surveillance cameras) to enhance CT capability. FY2009 funds also supported Yemen’s
Ministry of Defense with an explosive ordnance disposal program. Section 1206 assistance to
Yemen started in FY2006 with a relatively small package of equipment (small arms and
ammunition, computers, radios and their installation, and light tactical vehicles) to aid the Yemeni
Armed Forces in preventing cross-border arms trafficking. Significantly more FY2007 funds,
about 10% of the current total, were devoted to enhance Yemen’s border security CT capability,
with vehicles of various types (as well as maintenance training and support), spare parts, crisis
action center equipment, and transportation
Pakistan, the second-largest recipient with $203.4 million, or about 15% of total Section 1206
funding, did not receive funds in FY2010. Some $113.5 million, or over half Pakistan’s funding,
was provided in FY2009. Most Section 1206 funding to Pakistan provided equipment and
training to increase the government’s ability to counter terrorism threats emanating from the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
• A central feature was helicopter support. In FY2006, Section 1206 assistance
was first used to address spare part shortages that limited availability from
Pakistan’s “impressive inventory of helicopters.”55 These funds provided spare
parts for Mi-17 and Cobra helicopters, as well as aviation body armor, night
vision goggles, and limited visibility training for pilots. FY2008 and FY2009
funds also have provided the means, technical support, and training to repair,
55 CNA Corporation, Assessments of the Impact of 1206-Funded Projects in Selected Countries: Lebanon, Pakistan,
Yemen, Sao Tome and Principe, by Eric Thompson and Patricio Asfura-Heim, CRM D0017988.A4/1Rev. July 2008, p.
25, http://www.cna.org/documents/D0017988.A4.pdf. Hereinafter referred to as CNA Corporation Assessments.
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maintain, shelter, and operate Pakistan’s helicopters for use in FATA
operations. FY2009 funds supply four Mi-17 helicopters and spare parts for
use along Pakistan’s western border.
• Support to Pakistan’s Special Services Group (SSG), a special forces unit, to
operate more effectively in the FATA has included a variety of equipment in
FY2007, FY2008, and FY2009. Equipment contracted during those fiscal
years included radios and other communications equipment, targeting systems,
sniper rifles, ammunition, night vision goggles, global positioning systems
units, lifesaver kits, body armor, and other field gear. In FY2007 it included
training for conducting nighttime raids from helicopters (FY2007). In FY2008,
equipment was also provided to the Pakistan Army Aviation 21st reaction
squadron.
• Additional FY2009 aid included support to build a ground-based intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capability for counterterrorism operations to
support Pakistan Army counterterrorism operations in the FATA, and kits to
assist the Pakistan Army and Navy effectively investigate improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) and other explosives used in terrorism operations.
Lebanon received almost 10% of total Section 1206 funding during these years.56 The $128.5
million it received was disbursed over each of Section 1206’s five funding years in amounts
ranging from a low of $10.5 million in FY2006 to a high of $49.3 million in FY2009. Section
1206 assistance first focused on helping the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to bring order to
southern Lebanon and secure the country’s northern border in the wake of the July 2006 Israel
strikes against Hizbullah in Lebanon. FY2006 assistance bought spare parts for trucks, armored
personnel carriers, and helicopters. FY2007 assistance purchased trucks, secure communications
equipment, vehicles and helicopter spare parts, spare parts for guns, and soldier equipment,
including night vision goggles and body armor. FY2008 and FY2009 assistance focused on
equipment for Lebanese . FY2008 items included secure communications equipment, as well as
vehicles, night vision sights, Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, vehicles and
ambulances, small arms, clothing, textiles, and individual equipment. FY2009 Urban Solider
Equipment items were intended to help Lebanese force conduct CT operations in an urban
environment. This package included bulldozers, Humvee ambulances, tactical armor vests, rifles,
and night vision device rifle scopes. FY2009 funds also supplied four Cessna Caravan aircraft, as
well as related spare parts and training. FY2010 funds were used to provide weapons,
ammunition, and vehicles to enable LAF SOF conduct missions in various tactical situations,
particularly urban settings.
Bilateral assistance to the Philippines, Indonesia, Bahrain, and Malaysia comprised 19%, or just
under a fifth of total Section 1206 FY2006-FY2010 funding (Philippines, $82.8 million;
Indonesia, $80.0 million; Bahrain, $50.3 million; and Malaysia. $43.8 million). Of these, only the
Philippines and Indonesia received FY2010 assistance. FY2010 assistance for the Philippines
provided a precision guided missile capability to assist Philippine armed forces’ CT efforts in
southern regions to combat the activities of the Jimaah Islamijah and Abu Sayyuf Group ($18.4
million), and weapons and equipment to build the Philippines’ Marine Corps Force
Reconnaissance Battalion’s CT capacity ($9.3 million). For Indonesia, FY2010 funding provided
support for maritime SOF counterterrorism activities ($10.8 million), including 12 rigid hull
56 For more on security assistance to Lebanon, see CRS Report R40485, U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon.
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inflatable boats and related equipment and training, as well as equipment and training to improve
day and night CT air missions ($11.8 million).
Most of the FY2006-FY2009 Section 1206 funding to the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia
focused on controlling the Celebes Sea (also known as the Sulawesi Sea), which provides a water
border for all three countries, as well as the adjoining Molucca Sea and Sulu Sea. Assistance to
these countries consisted of various coastal and maritime surveillance and detection systems and
items, communications systems and equipment, aircraft equipment and training, and maritime
interdiction packages. For Bahrain, Section 1206 focused on maritime assistance, providing
coastal patrol crafts and related equipment and upgrading Bahrain’s coastal surveillance system,
as well as building the Bahrain Navy’s special forces CT capability. Section 1206 assistance also
helped to equip Bahrain’s Defense Force special operations personnel for rapid deployment to
rugged areas.
The remaining allocations, all under $40 million each and comprising about 37% of the total,
supported 27 bilateral programs, 14 multilateral programs, and the DIILS program. Most of these
were CT programs focused on controlling adjacent maritime waters and on securing land and
maritime borders. About 14% of all funding to date is divided between bilateral and multilateral
programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, much of it for surveillance and control of maritime and land
borders.
Funding to support partner nations’ contributions to military and stability operations rose
sharply in FY2010. Through FY2009, very little Section 1206 funding supported partner nations’
contributions to stability operations. FY2007 funds provided stability operations training and
equipment to Kazakhstan and to a group of four countries (Albania, Macedonia, Georgia, and
Ukraine) to enable their current and future participation in NATO and/or U.S. led stability
operations. Of the FY2010 funding, $74 million has been provided to 12 European countries to
assist their preparations for deployment to or participation in the NATO International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Of this dozen, nine received funding on a bilateral basis.
As notified to Congress, this funding was distributed as follows (by magnitude): Georgia ($20.5
million), Romania ($11.1 million), Hungary ($10 million), Poland ($9.9 million), Estonia, ($9.1
million), Croatia ($5.8 million), Latvia ($2.5 million), Lithuania ($2.3 million), and Bulgaria
($1.6 million). Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania also received, with Albania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
and Ukraine, a total of $2.8 million in funding to train military forces in those countries to
counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs). FY2010 appropriations language specified that no
more than $75 million is to be spent on such activities.
Table A-1, directly below, groups programs by magnitude of funding. For details, see Table A-2,
below.
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Table A-1. Countries/Group/Institution Grouped by Magnitude of Funds Received,
Based on FY2006-FY2009 Allocations and FY2010 Congressional Notifications
($ U.S. millions, as of February 9, 2011)
Upper Middle Tier
Lower Middle Tier
Top Tier
($15 million-
($10 million-
Bottom Tier
(Over $40 million)
$40 million)
$15 million)
(under $10 million)
Yemen: 252.6
Georgia: 38.5
DR/Panama: 14.4
Poland: 9.9
Pakistan: 203.4
Kenya: 34.3
EARSI: 14.2
West & Central Africa
Maritime Equip: 9.8
Lebanon: 128.5
Kazakhstan: 31.8
Mexico: 13.9
Caribbean Basin CT unit:
Philippines: 82.8
Djibouti: 26.8
Albania: 12.0
9.3
Indonesia: 80.0
Ethiopia: 25.5
Ukraine: 12.0
Estonia: 9.1
Bahrain: 50.3
Caribbean Basin I: 23.4
Romania: 11.1
South East Africa Maritime
Malaysia: 43.8
Bangladesh: 22.7
Caribbean Basin II: 11.1
Security: 8.4
Kyrgyzstan: 21.2
West Africa Maritime
Nigeria and Sao Tome: 6.8
Capability: 10.9
Tunisia: 18.6
Mauritania: 6.4
Hungary: 10.0
Sri Lanka: 18.2
Chad and Nigeria: 6.2
Africa Maritime
Awareness/ Territorial
Water Threat Response:
5.8
Croatia: 5.8
Mali: 5.1
Defense Institute for
International Legal Studies
(DIILS): 3.9
Maldives: 3.9
TSCP Support: 3.4
Macedonia: 3.0
Coalition Support to
Counter IEDs: 2.8
Latvia: 2.5
Lithuania: 2.3
Nigeria: 2.3
Azerbaijan: 1.7
Chad: 1.7
Bulgaria: 1.6
Africa Intelligence Aid: 1.1
Source: Based on data provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and compiled from more detailed
information provided in Appendix B, below.
Notes: DR = Dominican Republic. Sao Tome = Sao Tome and Principe. EARSI = East Africa Regional Security
Initiative. TSCP = TransSahara Counterterrorism Partnership. IEDs = Improvised Explosive Devices.
Recipients in groups are as follows: 5 in Caribbean Basin I (Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, and
Nicaragua); 4 in EARSI (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania); 4 in Caribbean Basin CT unit (Belize, Guyana,
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Honduras, and Suriname); 5 in West and Central Africa Maritime Capability (Cameroon, Gabon, Senegal, Sierra
Leone); 6 in Caribbean Basin II (Bahamas, Belize, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, and Panama); 8 in
West & Central Africa Maritime Equip (Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Gabon, Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe,
Senegal, Togo); 15 in Africa Maritime Awareness/Response (Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Republic of
the Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome
and Principe); 4 in TSCT Support (Chad, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Senegal); 7 in Coalition Support to Counter
IEDs (Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine); and 8 in Africa Intelligence Aid
(Algeria, Niger, Chad, Morocco, Senegal, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Mali).
Table A-2. Section 1206 Funding: FY2006-FY2009 Allocations and FY2010 Approved
Notifications
($ U.S. Millions)
FY2006 -
FY2006 -
FY2010 by
FY2010 by
Recipient(s) Program
program
country
Total HR/RCA Training (amounts disclosed and not otherwise included in
3.9
country/regional allocations)
AFRICA
Chad
Tactical Airlift Capacity Training
1.7
1.7
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Response,
26.8
Interdiction, and Coastal Security Enhancement
8.0
Counterterrorist (CT) Communications Package
5.1
Djibouti
CT Capabilities Package
3.3
Regional Maritime Awareness Capability
10.4
CT Communications and Combat Engineering
13.3
25.5
Capability
Ethiopia
Night Vision Capability Package
1.9
Regiment and Platoon CT Initiative
10.3
Border Security Initiative
4.1
34.3
Border and Coastal Security Enhancement
6.6
Kenya
Maritime Security Initiative
15.2
Border CT Security
8.5
Light infantry Equipment for CT (Redirected
5.1
Mali
FY2007 Mauritania aid and additional storage and
5.1
transportation costs charged in FY2009.)
Mauritania
Logistics CT Support
6.4
6.4
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FY2006 -
FY2006 -
FY2010 by
FY2010 by
Recipient(s) Program
program
country
CT Capacity Building for Military Forces
1.5
2.3
Nigeria
Light infantry Vehicles, Communications
Equipment, and other equipment (Equipment
0.8
redirected from Chad FY2007 program.)
Suppressing Trans-Border Terrorist Activity
10.0
18.6
Tunisia
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
8.6
Capability to secure borders.
Chad, Mauritania, Nigeria
Civil-Military Operations Training in Support of
3.4
and Senegal
the TransSahara CT Program
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya,
East Africa Regional Security Initiative
14.2
Tanzania
Nigeria and Sao Tome and
Gulf of Guinea Regional Maritime Awareness
6.8
Principe
Capability Aid
Chad and Nigeria
Multinational Information-sharing Network Aid
6.2
Algeria, Chad, Mali,
Mauritania, Morocco,
Partner Nation Intelligence Capability Aid
1.1
Niger and Senegal
Algeria, Benin, Cameroon,
Cape Verde, Republic of
the Congo, Gabon, Ghana,
Gambia, Guinea, Liberia,
MDA and Territorial Water Threat Response
5.8
Morocco, Mozambique,
Capability Establishment
Senegal, Sierra Leone, and
Sao Tome and Principe
Benin, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Gabon, Ghana, Sao
West and Central Africa Maritime Equipment
Tome & Principe, Senegal,
Package
9.8
Togo
Cameroon, Gabon,
Senegal, Sierra Leone
West Africa Maritime Security Capability
(Guinea deleted due to the Enhancement
10.9
Dec. 2008 coup d’etat.)
Mozambique, Tanzania,
Mauritius, Seychelles
South East African Maritime Security Initiative
8.4
Total Africa
187.4
GREATER EUROPE
Albania
CT Capability Aid
6.7
12.0
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FY2006 -
FY2006 -
FY2010 by
FY2010 by
Recipient(s) Program
program
country
Maritime Coastal Patrol CT Capability
Enhancement
5.3
Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams
1.6
Bulgaria
(OMLTs)
1.6
Build capacity of military forces to support the
5.8
Croatia
NATO International Security Assistance Force in
5.8
Afghanistan (ISAF)
Estonia
Build capacity of military forces to support ISAF
9.1
9.1
CT Capability Aid
6.5
38.5
Georgia
Special Forces T&E
11.5
Build capacity of military forces to support ISAF
20.5
Hungary
Build capacity of military forces to support ISAF
10.0
10.0
Latvia
Build capacity of military forces to support ISAF
2.5
2.5
Lithuania
Build capacity of military forces to support ISAF
2.3
2.3
Macedonia
CT Capability Aid
3.0
3.0
Poland UAV
Capability
9.9
9.9
Romania
Equipment for Special Operations Forces (SOF)
11.1
11.1
participating in ISAF
Ukraine
CT Capability Aid
12.0
12.0
Albania, Bulgaria, Poland,
Counter-IED (Improvised Explosive Devices)
Romania, Slovakia,
Training for units scheduled to deploy to
1.8
Slovenia, Ukraine
Afghanistan
Total Greater Europe
119.0a
ASIA AND PACIFIC
Integrated Maritime Surveillance System
18.4
80.0
Eastern Fleet Regional Command Center
3.8
Indonesia
Eastern Fleet Maritime Equipment
7.3
Celebes Sea and Malacca Strait Network
6.1
Coastal Surveillance Stations
15.9
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FY2006 -
FY2006 -
FY2010 by
FY2010 by
Recipient(s) Program
program
country
Western Fleet Command and Control (C2)
Center and HQ
2.0
Command, Control, Communications and
Computers (C4) Surveillance and Reconnaissance
4.0
Maritime SOF CT
10.8
Aviation CT Interdiction
11.8
Coalition CT and Stability Operations Capacity Aid 19.3
31.8
Kazakhstan
Caspian Security
12.5
Increasing Armed Forces CT Capabilities
11.6
21.2
Kyrgyzstan
CT Forces Support
9.6
Eastern Sabah MDA Radars
13.6
43.8
Strait of Malacca MDA Support
2.2
MDA Package
11.5
Malaysia
CENTRIX Stations
0.5
C2 Center for Joint Forces Sabah HQ
7.1
Maritime Interdiction Package
9.0
Maldives
SOF CT and Intelligence
3.9
3.9
Maritime T&E for Interdiction Purposes
3.0
82.8
Coast Watch South High Frequency Radios
(FY07)/
12.9
Radars for Sulu Archipelago (FY08)
Maritime Interdiction Capability
6.4
Philippines
Interdiction and Offensive Capabilities
4.4
Improvement (of UH-1 Huey helicopters)
Border Control Interdiction
5.8
Coast Watch South (CWS) Radars for Eastern
14.5
Mindanao and adjacent border surveillance
CWS Intelligence – Operations CT Capability
8.1
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FY2006 -
FY2006 -
FY2010 by
FY2010 by
Recipient(s) Program
program
country
Precision Guided Missile Capability to Conduct CT
Operations
18.4
Marine Strike Capability
9.3
Maritime Security T&E for Interdiction Purposes
10.8
18.2
Sri Lanka
Aircraft C2 Integration
6.0
Maritime Security and Navy Interdiction Capability
1.4
Total Asia and the Pacific
281.7
MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Azerbaijan
Naval Commando CT Training
1.7
1.7
Patrol Boats
50.3
5.3
(Value of equipment redirected from cancel ed
Thailand program)
Coastal Patrol Capability Development
24.6
Bahrain
Defense Force Counterintelligence Analysis
0.04
Center Development
Defense Force Special Operations T&E
4.3
Coastal Surveillance System Upgrade
16.1
Maritime Patrol and Interdiction Initiative
7.2
22.7
Bangladesh
Naval Special Forces CT T&E
8.5
Maritime CT
7.0
Military Assistance to Lebanese Armed Forces
41.1
128.5
SOF T&E
7.2
Secure Communications for SOF
7.9
Lebanon
Urban Soldier Equipment
21.5
Cessna Caravan
27.8
SOF T&E
23.0
Pakistan
Border Area T&E/ Marines T&E
29.0
203.4
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FY2006 -
FY2006 -
FY2010 by
FY2010 by
Recipient(s) Program
program
country
Enhance Shared MDA and Cooperative Maritime
Security Aid
8.1
Helicopter CT Capability
20.9
Special Services Group COIN Kick Start Initiative
14.9
Mi-17 Support
17.0
Mi-17 Helicopters
80.0
Aviation Maintenance Shelters in Federally
3.1
Administered Tribal Areas
Army and Navy Capability Building to Investigate
Explosives
0.6
SOF CT Package
17.0
Ground-Based Intelligence S&R Capability
12.8
Cross Border Security and CT Aid
4.3
252.6
Yemeni Special Operations Capacity Development
to Enhance Border Security
26.0
Air Force Aerial Surveillance Initiative
5.9
Coast Guard Maritime Security Initiative
29.9
Yemen
Increased Border Security CT Initiative
25.4
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Initiative
5.8
SOF CT Enhancement Package
34.5
Fixed-Wing Aircraft and Other CT supports
120.9
Total Middle East and South Asia
659.2
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
CT Capabilities (FY07)/ CT Capability Package
13.9
Mexico
(FY08)
13.9
Dominican Republic and
Joint Maritime CT Capability Aid
14.4
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FY2006 -
FY2006 -
FY2010 by
FY2010 by
Recipient(s) Program
program
country
Panama
Bahamas, Dominican
Republic, Honduras,
Caribbean Basin Maritime Security Aid (radios and
23.4
Jamaica, and Nicaragua
boats)
Bahamas, Belize,
Dominican Republic,
Honduras, Jamaica, and
Caribbean Basin Capability Enhancements
11.1
Panama
Belize, Guyana, Honduras,
CT Unit T&E for participation in Operation
9.3
and Suriname
Enduring Freedom
Total Western Hemisphere
72.1
Additional Transportation Expenses for items obligated during FY06-FY08
3.1
but delivered later.
Totals 1,326.5
Source: Based on data provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, FY2006-FY2009 allocations provided
October 13, 2009. In one case, as noted, the figure is the amount notified to Congress. FY2010 figures are
congressional notifications provided February 9, 2011.
Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding.
a. In the case of Greater Europe FY2010 funding, totals do not add due to the early re-notification of parts of
Estonia and Georgia funding for Bulgaria. Because al other FY2010 numbers represent congressional
notifications rather than allocations, the Estonia and Georgia numbers were kept as notifications for
consistency.
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
Appendix B. Evolution of Section 1206 Legislation:
FY2005-FY2010
The George W. Bush Administration’s proposed National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006
contained a provision for a new partnership capacity-building authority. As submitted to
Congress, the DOD-proposed authorization legislation differed in several important respects from
the “Section 1206” legislation that was eventually passed.
DOD’s proposed authorization bill would have vested new authority with the President to
“authorize building the capacity of partner nations’ military or security forces to disrupt or
destroy terrorist networks, close safe havens, or participate in or support United States, coalition,
or international military or stability operations.” The proposed legislation provided the Secretary
of Defense the lead on implementation, but gave a veto power to the Secretary of State: “The
Secretary of Defense may, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, implement partnership
security capacity building.... ” DOD could implement capacity building projects on its own, or by
transferring DOD funds to the Department of State or to any other federal agency. The
presidential and agency roles changed in subsequent versions.
DOD’s proposed authorization language would have allowed assistance to build up foreign
military and security forces for purposes similar to but more specific than those ultimately
enacted into law (Section 1206, P.L. 109-163). The types of forces that could be assisted were
much broader, and included “armies, guard, border security, civil defense, infrastructure
protection, and police forces.” The proposed annual cap on such assistance was $750 million,
much greater than that eventually approved.
DOD’s proposed appropriations language would have provided for the appropriation of up to
$750 million of funds from operations and maintenance accounts to provide assistance to military
or security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and provide assistance to other military forces in
friendly nations in the nearby region to enhance their capability to combat terrorism and to
support U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Secretary of Defense could use
those funds only with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.
Congressional Action in 2005
Congressional action in 2005 on the DOD proposals started with Senate approval of a floor
amendment to the Senate version of the FY2006 NDAA (S. 1042). The legislation that emerged
from conference committee action on the conference version of the bill (H.R. 1815) and was
signed into law on January 6, 2006 (P.L. 109-163) differed significantly from the DOD proposals.
Not one of the armed services or appropriations committees included the DOD proposals for a
global train and equip authority or appropriation in legislation they reported that year.
Congressional action began when Senator Inhofe introduced a modified version of the DOD
authorization proposal as a floor amendment (S.Amdt. 2432) to S. 1042. On November 8, 2005,
the Senate approved an amended version of that amendment, supported by Senator Lugar. Both
would provide authority for the purposes requested by DOD. Each version of the Inhofe
amendment progressively strengthened the State Department role compared to the DOD proposal.
Conference committee negotiators made further changes, however, strengthening the DOD role,
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diminishing the State Department role, restricting the types of forces that could be supported, and
lowering the funding cap.
The Inhofe amendment introduced on November 4, 2005, was similar to the DOD authorization
request in that it would have conferred authority on the President to build partnership security
capacity of foreign military and security forces on the President and authorized the use of up to
$750 million a year in DOD funds for the same purposes as the original DOD authorization
request. A major difference was the role of the State Department. The Inhofe amendment made a
request by the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense the trigger to initiate DOD support, a
seemingly stronger role than that of the DOD proposed legislation which required the Secretary
of Defense to seek the concurrence of the Secretary of State for any support. Like the DOD
proposal, however, the Inhofe amendment left DOD free to implement programs itself, or to
transfer funds to the Department of State or any other federal agency for implementation. (These
funds would remain available until expended.) In introducing the amendment, Senator Inhofe
indicated that the purpose of the new authority was to expedite train and equip assistance, and
expressed displeasure with then-current arrangements for train and equip programs conducted
through the State Department. For instance, he noted that assistance to train and equip Georgia
forces for counterterrorism required that “Seven different authorities for funding and sources ...
be stitched together” in a process that took eight months.57
The revised Inhofe amendment further strengthened the Secretary of State’s role by making three
changes. One change eliminated DOD’s ability to implement proposals on its own. Another
eliminated DOD’s ability to transfer funds to any civilian agency other than the State Department.
In short, the Secretary of Defense could provide partnership support only by transferring DOD
funds to the Department of State. A third change made such support subject to the authorities and
limitations in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and the FY2006 Foreign Operations bill.
In a November 8, 2006 floor statement, Senator Lugar stated that “the amendment as now written
leaves the authority for deciding which countries, and when, how, and why foreign assistance
should be provided, in the hands of the Secretary of State. The amendment does not provide
statutory authority to the Secretary of Defense to establish a new foreign aid program outside the
purview of the Secretary of State. It does authorize the Secretary of Defense to provide funding to
the State Department for a new train and equip foreign assistance program.... ”58 At the same
time, Senator Lugar acknowledged DOD concerns that the “State Department oversight of these
kinds of programs [is] cumbersome and slow.” He stated: “These obstacles need to be overcome.
State Department procedures should be streamlined and the two Departments should develop
plans to push these important programs forward efficiently and quickly.” (Congressional Record,
Senate, S12495.)
57 Senator James Inhofe, Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, November 4, 2005, p. S12395.
58 Senator Lugar further stated that “The Secretary of State should retain full authority over decisions as to which
countries should receive assistance, the timing of its provision, and the way in which it should be provided. The
Department of Defense should continue implementing train and equip programs under the purview of the Secretary of
State.” He concluded: “All foreign assistance programs need to take place within a foreign policy context, with
consideration of the traditional concerns—the recipient country’s treatment of its own people, potential reactions from
neighboring sates in the region, and the overall bilateral relationship with the recipient country, including the assistance
in the war against terrorism. It is the Secretary of State’s job to weigh such foreign policy issues and make
recommendations to the President that strike the right balance for American interests. The amendment as now written
meets the concerns I had and I would request that I be listed as a co-sponsor.” (Congressional Record, Senate, S12495.)
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A distinct final version, as mentioned above, emerged from the conference committee. There
were four important changes from the Senate version. First, the conference committee version of
H.R. 1815 stripped the leadership role from the Secretary of State and bestowed it on the
Secretary of Defense. Section 1206 broadened DOD’s role by providing authority for the
President to direct the Secretary of Defense to conduct or support a program to build the capacity
of a foreign military forces. It reduced the Secretary of State’s role by providing that the
Secretaries of Defense and State were to “jointly formulate any program directed by the
President” and the Secretary of Defense was to “coordinate with the Secretary of State in the
implementation of any program directed by the President.... ” Second, the conference committee
version did not provide authority to assist security forces of any type. Third, it lowered the annual
funding cap considerably, to $200 million. And fourth, it broadened the purpose of the
counterterrorism element of the assistance from enabling foreign forces to disrupt or destroy
terrorist networks and to close safe havens to enabling them to conduct counterterrorist
operations.
In their explanatory statement (H.Rept. 109-360, accompanying H.R. 1815), the conferees
described Section 1206 as a two-year pilot program, which would be reviewed at the end of that
period. They noted that “under current law, foreign military training programs are conducted
exclusively under the authority of the Secretary of State.” The conferees signaled the importance
of ensuring that any changes in statutory authorities for foreign military assistance do not have
unintended consequences for the effective coordination of U.S. foreign policy writ large, nor
detract from DOD’s focus on core responsibilities, particularly warfighting tasks.
Congressional Action for FY2006-FY2009
Congress made further changes to Section 1206 authority through amendments in subsequent
NDAAs. Most important among them was the 2007 modification elevating the State
Department’s role while, at the same time, vesting authority for the program in the Secretary of
Defense. Section 1206 of the John Warner NDAA for FY2007 (P.L. 109-364) amended Section
1206 by eliminating the President’s role in directing the Secretary of Defense to conduct or
support such programs. Instead, it authorized “the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of
the Secretary of State” to conduct or support those programs. Other changes in that legislation
raised the authorized amount to $300 million, and it extended the authority through FY2008.59
This amendment was the result of a conference committee compromise over a proposed Senate
amendment that would have extended Section 1206 authority to combatant commanders. In their
explanatory statement, the conferees stated that “the authorities provided in this section are
provided in the spirit of a pilot program.... The conferees believe it will be important to
demonstrate through experience that these expanded authorities can and will be exercised
consistent with the effective coordination of U.S. foreign policy writ large. Furthermore, the
59 The DOD proposal for FY2007 NDAA authorization language had requested that authority to direct Section 1206
programs be vested in the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, rather than the
President, in order to “increase responsiveness by relieving the President of having to approve each Section 1206
program personally, while preserving important roles of both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State in
authorizing capacity-building programs under this provision. This would enable the Department of Defense, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of State, to pursue time-sensitive opportunities to build capacity of partner nations.” DOD
also requested the expansion of the types of forces that could be assisted to include security forces (“specifically
gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil defense, border protection, and
counterterrorism forces ... ”), and an increase in the spending cap to $750 million.
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
conferees strongly believe that foreign assistance programs are more appropriately funded
through the foreign assistance accounts, as administered by the Department of State, and urge the
administration to request sufficient funding for foreign military assistance in those accounts in
future years budget requests.”60
For FY2008, Congress appropriated $300 million for Section 1206 in the DOD Appropriations
Act, 2008 (also known as the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, P.L. 110-116).
In 2008, the Bush Administration requested that Section 1206 authority be made permanent law
under Title 10 (Armed Services) of the United States Code. It also asked that spending authority
be increased to $750 million, but in its FY2009 budget request asked for $500 million in
appropriations for that year. Congress denied the Bush Administration’s requests. Instead, through
the enactment of the Duncan Hunter NDAA for FY2009 (P.L. 110-417), Congress extended
Section 1206 temporary authority for three years (i.e., through FY2011). P.L. 110-417 also
expanded Section 1206 authority to include the provision of assistance to maritime security
forces,61 and raised the spending cap to $350 million. In the same bill, Congress also provided
authority for funds to be used in consecutive fiscal years (i.e., funds made available for a program
begun in one fiscal year may also be used for that program in the next fiscal year).
In their respective reports on the FY2009 NDAA, both the House and the Senate armed services
committees expressed concern about whether Section 1206 funds were being appropriately used.
• The Senate Armed Services Committee report reiterated the committee’s
earlier position that Section 1206 was intended as a pilot program, “not
intended to duplicate or substitute for other foreign assistance authorities, nor
... intended to sustain train and equip programs over multiple years.” It
expressed the committee’s concerns that Section 1206 funds were “being used
for programs, particularly in countries where the terrorist threat is currently
low, that primarily serve to build counter-narcotics capabilities.”62
60 These changes were the result of a conference committee compromise on a Senate amendment to Section 1206 in S.
2766, its version of the FY2007 NDAA. See H.Rept. 109-702, the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007,
Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 5152.
The Senate amendment would have permitted the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State,
to authorize commanders of the geographic combatant commands “to respond to unanticipated changes in a security
environment” within their area of responsibility (AOR) to spend up to $50 million per year per commander for Section
1206 purposes, with total spending limited to $200 million. In addition, the Senate Amendment would have permitted
the Secretary of Defense to authorize geographic combatant commanders “to respond to urgent and unanticipated
humanitarian relief or reconstruction requirements in a foreign country within the commander’s AOR” if the
commander determined that such assistance would promote the security interest of the United States and the recipient
country, up to a total of $200 million “in any country in a fiscal year.” In response, the House, which had no similar
provision, offered the amendment which was adopted. Although the proposed section to provide combatant
commanders with funding for existing Section 1206 purposes was deleted, elsewhere in the bill the conferees included
a provision to expand authority under the Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund to provide urgent and unanticipated
humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance.
61 As passed by the Senate, S. 3001 would have extended Section 1206 authority to security forces, specifically “a
foreign country’s coast guard, border protection, and other security forces engaged primarily in counterterrorism
missions in order for that country to conduct counterterrorism operations.” The Administration had requested authority
to train and equip a wide spectrum of security forces, including gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense,
infrastructure protection, civil defense, homeland defense, coast guard, border protection, and counterterrorism forces.
62 S.Rept. 110-335 continued: “While recognizing a degree of overlap between counterterrorism and counternarcotics
capabilities, the committee urges the Department of Defense to fund programs to build counter-narcotics capabilities
using funds and authorities intended to support counter-narcotics activities, and if appropriate, seek any necessary
(continued...)
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• The House Armed Services Committee report stated DOD had “pushed beyond
the clearly articulated limits of this authority” in the case of Panama, raising
concern “about the responsible execution of this authority in the future.” In the
report, the committee expressed its belief “that capable foreign partners play a
vital role in the international security environment but remain unconvinced that
this authority should reside permanently with the Department of Defense. The
committee expects that, over the long-term, these ‘train and equip’-type
authorities, which appear to be migrating to the Department of Defense, might
better remain within the Department of State’s jurisdiction.”63
Congressional Action for FY2010
DOD Appropriations Action
The FY2010 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 3326) contained the full Obama Administration
request of $345 million, despite House appropriations action to cut that amount. As reported by
the House Appropriations Committee (July 16, 2009, H.Rept. 111-230) and passed by the House
(July 22, 2009), the House version of the DOD appropriations act would have appropriated $195
million for Section 1206 funding. The Senate Appropriations Committee version (reported
September 10, 2009, S.Rept. 111-74) approved the full $345 million requested by the Obama
Administration; no change was made by the Senate in approving the bill on October 6, 2009. As
signed into law on December 19, 2009, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010
(P.L. 111-118), contains $345 million for Section 1206 Global Train and Equip programs. (The
amount is not specified in the act itself but is included under the total appropriated to the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency under the Operations and Maintenance [O&M] Defense-wide
budget.)
DOD Authorization Action
In action on the proposed FY2010 NDAA (H.R. 2647/S. 1390), HASC set forth its evolving
views on whether Congress should move Section 1206 authority from DOD to the State
Department and SASC proposed new stipulations on Section 1206 use. As signed into law in
October 2009 (P.L. 111-34), the FY2010 NDAA retains the $350 authorized funding level but
introduces a new funding provision by specifying that up to $75 million could be used to train the
military troops of coalition partners in each FY2010 and FY2011.
As marked up by the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on June 10, and reported to the
House on June 18 (H.R. 2647), the FY2010 NDAA would have authorized $350 million for
Section 1206, according to the HASC press release. The committee report accompanying the bill
(H.Rept. 111-166) noted an evolution of the HASC position on Section 1206 funding.
(...continued)
modifications to existing counter-narcotics authorities to support these activities.” The committee also indicated that it
viewed U.S. Africa Command AOR counterterrorism needs as a priority for Section 1206 assistance.
63 H.Rept. 110-652 also encouraged DOD “to use members of the United States military to conduct the training
provided under this authority whenever possible.”
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
In discussing Section 1206, HASC stated that while it previously had regarded Section 1206 “as
part of the foreign assistance family of authorities that has traditionally resided within the
Department of State’s purview” in order to assist foreign countries meet their own security needs
as part of a U.S. foreign policy framework, it now views Section 1206 as a “new type of
authority” to meet a perceived need “to build certain capacities in partner nations to satisfy
specific theater security requirements.” (p. 411) While not discounting the idea that the authority
might better be placed at the Department of State than at DOD, HASC reflects that wherever the
authority ultimately lies, the need for projects responding to a DOD-led assessment of U.S.
national security needs means that the “Secretary of Defense must play a primary role in
generating requirements.” (p 412)
As reported July 2, 2009, the Senate Armed Services Committee version of the FY2011 NDAA
(S. 1390) would have permitted the use of up to $75 million (of the total $350 authorized for
Section 1206) on programs to build the capacity of foreign military forces to participate in or
support military and stability operations in which the U.S. armed forces are a participant. This
limitation would pertain to programs that begin on or after October 1, 2009, and be effective for
FY2010 and FY2011. Previously, there was no specification regarding the amount that could be
spent for either of Section 1206’s two stated purpose. (As noted elsewhere, little funding had been
spent through FY2009 on building capacity other than counterterrorism capacity.)
As described in the SASC report (S.Rept. 111-35), this limitation was made in response to DOD’s
request for new authorities to build the capacity of a foreign country’s national military forces
preparing to support a coalition operation conducted as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, or by the NATO International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and to build the capacity of NATO and partner SOF to
support NATO or coalition special operations conducted as part of OIF or OEF in Afghanistan, or
by the NATO ISAF.
SASC stated that “both these activities can be conducted within the existing authority of section
1206” and that the committee “would be open to considering proposals to use the authority under
this section to help build the capacity of NATO and other coalition partners whose ability to
contribute to ongoing military or stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan would otherwise be
limited.” Nevertheless, SASC explains the cap as a means to ensure that Section 1206 funding
serves its intended purpose (i.e., to provide a means to address emerging needs) and not as
substitute for security assistance under the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
authority. As expressed in the report accompanying its bill, DOD’s “stated desire to conduct
sustained capacity building to prepare special operations to deploy for coalition operations
suggests that it intends to establish multi-year programs with respect to certain recipient
countries.” The $75 million limit is intended to reduce “the potential impact of such multi-year
programs on the section 1206 program as a whole.”
The SASC report emphasized the temporary nature of Section 1206 authority. It also urged the
Obama Administration to review existing DOD and State Department security assistance
authorities in order “to reconcile, de-conflict, and improve the effectiveness of these authorities.”
As signed into law on October 28, 2009 (P.L. 111-84), the FY2010 NDAA put in place a
temporary $75 million limit for FY2010 and FY2011 on Section 1206 funds used to train military
troops of coalition partners to participate in or support military and stability operations.
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
Foreign Relations Authorization Action
Congressional concerns regarding the appropriate agency to exercise responsibility for security
assistance programs emerged in House action on the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
FY2010-FY2011 (H.R. 2410). In that bill, the House Foreign Affairs Committee proposed a new
“Security Assistance Contingency Fund” for the State Department with purposes that would
overlap with Section 1206. The House passed H.R. 2410 with that proposal intact in June 2009.
No Senate action occurred on H.R. 2410, received by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(SFRC) on June 22, 2009. No corresponding Senate bill was introduced.
H.R. 2410, Section 841, as reported to the House on June 4 (H.Rept. 111-136) and passed by the
House on June 10, would authorize the Secretary of State “to conduct a program to respond to
contingencies in foreign countries or regions by providing training, procurement, and capacity-
building of a foreign country’s military forces and dedicated counterterrorism forces in order for
that country to (1) conduct counterterrorist operations; or (2) participate in or support military and
stability operations in which the United States is a participant.” Section 841 would authorize the
appropriation of $25 million in each FY2010 and FY2011 for these purposes, as well as the use of
up to $25 million in Foreign Military Financing funds in each of those fiscal years for the same
purposes. Funds would remain available until expended.
Like Section 1206, this authority could not be used to provide any type of assistance otherwise
prohibited by law nor used to assist any foreign country otherwise prohibited from receiving such
type of assistance under any provision of law. Unlike Section 1206, this authority would be
exercised by the Secretary of State, with the only coordination requirement being that the
Secretary “shall consult with the head of any other appropriate department or agency in the
formulation and execution” of programs conducted under this authority. Section 841 would
require a 15-day notification to congressional foreign affairs and appropriations committees
before funds are obligated.
The 111th Congress took no further action on this bill.
Author Contact Information
Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security Affairs
nserafino@crs.loc.gov, 7-7667
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