Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
April 15, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32665
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget requests funding for the procurement of 8 new battle force
ships (i.e., ships that count against the Navy’s goal for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 306
ships). The 8 ships include two Virginia-class attack submarines, one DDG-51 class Aegis
destroyer, four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), and one Mobile Landing Platform/Afloat Forward
Staging Base (MLP/AFSB) ship. The Navy’s proposed FY2014-FY2018 five-year shipbuilding
plan includes a total of 41 ships—the same number as in the Navy’s FY213-FY2017 five-year
shipbuilding plan, and one less than the 42 ships that the Navy planned for FY2014-FY2018
under the FY2013 budget submission.
The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective
affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional
defense committees for the past several years. The Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plans in recent
years have generally not included enough ships to fully support all elements of the Navy’s 306-
ship goal over the long run. The Navy has projected that the fleet would remain below 306 ships
during most of the 30-year period, and experience shortfalls at various points in cruisers-
destroyers, attack submarines, and amphibious ships. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in
recent years has estimated that the 30-year shipbuilding plan would cost more to execute than the
Navy has estimated.
Proposed issues for Congress in reviewing the Navy’s proposed FY2014 shipbuilding budget, its
proposed FY2014-FY20178 five-year shipbuilding plan, and its 30-year shipbuilding plan include
the following:
• the impact on Navy shipbuilding programs of the March 1, 2013, sequester on
FY2013 funding and unobligated funding from prior years;
• the future size and structure of the Navy in light of strategic and budgetary
changes;
• the sufficiency of the 30-year shipbuilding plan; and
• the affordability of the 30-year shipbuilding plan.
Funding levels and legislative activity on individual Navy shipbuilding programs are tracked in
detail in other CRS reports.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Navy’s Ship Force Structure Goal ............................................................................................. 1
January 2013 Goal for Fleet of 306 Ships ........................................................................... 1
306-Ship Goal Reflects 2012 Strategic Guidance and Projected DOD Spending
Shown in FY2013 Budget ................................................................................................ 1
Goal for Fleet of 306 Ships Compared to Earlier Goals ..................................................... 1
Navy’s Five-Year and 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans ................................................................... 3
Five-Year (FY2014-FY2018) Shipbuilding Plan ................................................................ 3
30-Year (FY2014-FY2043) Shipbuilding Plan (Not Yet Submitted) .................................. 5
Navy’s Projected Force Levels Under 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan ............................................ 6
Oversight Issues for Congress for FY2014 ...................................................................................... 8
Potential Impact of March 1, 2013, Sequester ........................................................................... 8
Future Size and Structure of Navy in Light of Strategic and Budgetary Changes .................. 12
Sufficiency of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan ............................................................................... 16
Affordability of FY2013 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan .............................................................. 17
Estimated Ship Procurement Costs ................................................................................... 17
Future Shipbuilding Funding Levels ................................................................................. 18
Legislative Activity for FY2014 .................................................................................................... 18
FY2014 Funding Request ........................................................................................................ 18
CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding Programs ....................... 19
Tables
Table 1. Current 306 Ship Force Structure Goal Compared to Earlier Goals .................................. 2
Table 2. Navy FY2014 Five-Year (FY2014-FY2018) Shipbuilding Plan ....................................... 3
Table 3. Navy FY2013 30-Year (FY2013-FY2042) Shipbuilding Plan .......................................... 5
Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from FY2013 30-Year (FY2013-FY2042)
Shipbuilding Plan ......................................................................................................................... 6
Table 5. Recent Study Group Proposals for Navy Ship Force Structure ....................................... 14
Table 6. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of FY2013 30-Year (FY2013-FY2042)
Shipbuilding Plan ....................................................................................................................... 18
Table C-1. Comparison of Navy’s 306-ship goal, Navy Plan from 1993 BUR, and Navy
Plan from 2010 QDR Review Panel ........................................................................................... 28
Table D-1. Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948 ..................................................... 31
Table D-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2018 ..................................... 32
Appendixes
Appendix A. 2012 Testimony on Size of Navy Needed to Fully Meet COCOM Requests ........... 20
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Appendix B. Comparing Past Ship Force Levels to Current or Potential Future Ship Force
Levels.......................................................................................................................................... 24
Appendix C. Independent Panel Assessment of 2010 QDR .......................................................... 26
Appendix D. Size of the Navy and Navy Shipbuilding Rate ......................................................... 30
Appendix E. February 12, 2013, Navy Testimony on Potential CR and Sequester Impacts ......... 33
Appendix F. February 28, 2013, Department of the Navy Testimony on Potential CR and
Sequester Impacts ....................................................................................................................... 38
Appendix G. March 2, 2013, Navy Message on Navy’s Response to Sequestration ..................... 44
Appendix H. January 25, 2013, Navy Memorandum on Potential CR and Sequester
Impacts........................................................................................................................................ 47
Appendix I. February 15, 2013, Navy Briefing Slides on Potential CR and Sequester
Impacts........................................................................................................................................ 51
Appendix J. February 28, 2013, Navy Briefing Slides on Potential CR and Sequester
Impacts........................................................................................................................................ 63
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 76
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
This report provides background information and presents potential issues for Congress
concerning the Navy’s ship force-structure goals and shipbuilding plans. The planned size of the
Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy’s
shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the
past several years. Decisions that Congress makes on Navy shipbuilding programs can
substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding
industrial base.
Background
Navy’s Ship Force Structure Goal
January 2013 Goal for Fleet of 306 Ships
On January 31, 2013, in response to Section 1015 of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization
Act (H.R. 4310/P.L. 112-239 of January 2, 2013), the Navy submitted to Congress a report
presenting a goal for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 306 ships, consisting of certain types
and quantities of ships.1 The goal for a 306-ship fleet is the result of a force structure assessment
(FSA) that the Navy completed in 2012.
306-Ship Goal Reflects 2012 Strategic Guidance and Projected DOD Spending
Shown in FY2013 Budget
The 2012 FSA and the resulting 306-ship plan reflect the defense strategic guidance document
that the Administration presented in January 20122 and the associated projected levels of
Department of Defense (DOD) spending shown in the FY2013 budget submission. DOD officials
have stated that if planned levels of DOD spending are reduced below what is shown in the
FY2013 budget submission, the defense strategy set forth in the January 2012 strategic guidance
document might need to be changed. Such a change, Navy officials have indicated, could lead to
the replacement of the 306-ship plan of January 2013 with a new plan.
Goal for Fleet of 306 Ships Compared to Earlier Goals
Table 1 compares the 306-ship goal to earlier Navy ship force structure plans.
1 Department of the Navy, Report to Congress [on] Navy Combatant Vessel Force Structure Requirement, January
2013, 3 pp. The cover letters for the report were dated January 31, 2013.
2 For more on this document, see CRS Report R42146, In Brief: Assessing DOD’s New Strategic Guidance, by
Catherine Dale and Pat Towell.
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Table 1. Current 306 Ship Force Structure Goal Compared to Earlier Goals
Changes
Early-2005
2002-
to
Navy plan
2004
2001
Revised
February
February
for fleet of
Navy QDR
306-
~310-
313-ship
2006 313-
2006
260-325
plan
plan
ship
316 ship
plan of
ship plan
Navy
ships
for
for
plan of
plan of
Septem-
announced
plan for
375-
310-
January
March
ber
through
313-ship
260-
325-
ship
ship
Ship type
2013
2012
2011
mid-2011
fleet
ships ships Navya Navy
Ballistic missile submarines
12b
12-14b 12b 12b 14
14
14
14
14
(SSBNs)
Cruise missile submarines
0c
0-4c
4c
0c 4
4
4
4
2
or
(SSGNs)
4d
Attack submarines (SSNs)
48
~48 48 48 48 37
41
55
55
Aircraft carriers
11e
11e 11e 11e 11f 10
11
12
12
Cruisers and destroyers
88
~90 94 94g 88
67
92
104
116
Frigates
0
0 0 0 0
0
0
0
Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs)
52
~55 55 55 55 63
82
56
0
Amphibious ships
33
~32 33 33h 31
17
24
37
36
MPF(F) shipsi
0j
0j
0j
0j 12i 14i 20i
0i
0i
Combat logistics (resupply) ships
29
~29 30 30 30 24
26
42
34
Dedicated mine warfare ships
0
0 0 0 0
0
0
26k 16
Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs)
10l
10l 10l 21l 3
0
0
0
0
Otherm
23
~23 16 24n 17
10
11
25
25
Total battle force ships
306
~310-
313
328
313
260
325
375
310
316
or
312
Sources: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy data.
Note: QDR is Quadrennial Defense Review. The “~” symbol means approximately and signals that the number
in question may be refined as a result of the Naval Force Structure Assessment currently in progress.
a. Initial composition. Composition was subsequently modified.
b. The Navy plans to replace the 14 current Ohio-class SSBNs with a new class of 12 next-generation SSBNs.
For further discussion, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
c. Although the Navy plans to continue operating its four SSGNs until they reach retirement age in the late
2020s, the Navy does not plan to replace these ships when they retire. This situation can be expressed in a
table like this one with either a 4 or a zero.
d. The report on the 2001 QDR did not mention a specific figure for SSGNs. The Administration’s proposed
FY2001 DOD budget requested funding to support the conversion of two available Trident SSBNs into
SSGNs, and the retirement of two other Trident SSBNs. Congress, in marking up this request, supported a
plan to convert all four available SSBNs into SSGNs.
e. With congressional approval, the goal has been temporarily be reduced to 10 carriers for the period
between the retirement of the carrier Enterprise (CVN-65) in December 2012 and entry into service of the
carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), currently scheduled for September 2015.
f.
For a time, the Navy characterized the goal as 11 carriers in the nearer term, and eventually 12 carriers.
g. The 94-ship goal was announced by the Navy in an April 2011 report to Congress on naval force structure
and missile defense.
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h. The Navy acknowledged that meeting a requirement for being able to lift the assault echelons of 2.0 Marine
Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) would require a minimum of 33 amphibious ships rather than the 31 ships
shown in the February 2006 plan. For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious
Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
i.
Today’s Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships are intended primarily to support Marine Corps
operations ashore, rather than Navy combat operations, and thus are not counted as Navy battle force
ships. The planned MPF (Future) ships, however, would have contributed to Navy combat capabilities (for
example, by supporting Navy aircraft operations). For this reason, the ships in the planned MPF(F) squadron
were counted by the Navy as battle force ships. The planned MPF(F) squadron was subsequently
restructured into a different set of initiatives for enhancing the existing MPF squadrons; the Navy no longer
plans to acquire an MPF(F) squadron.
j.
The Navy no longer plans to acquire an MPF(F) squadron. The Navy, however, has procured or plans to
procure some of the ships that were previously planned for the squadron—specifical y, TAKE-1 class cargo
ships, and Mobile Landing Platform (MLP)/Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) ships. These ships are
included in the total shown for “Other” ships.
k. The figure of 26 dedicated mine warfare ships included 10 ships maintained in a reduced mobilization status
cal ed Mobilization Category B. Ships in this status are not readily deployable and thus do not count as
battle force ships. The 375-ship proposal thus implied transferring these 10 ships to a higher readiness
status.
l.
Totals shown include 5 ships transferred from the Army to the Navy and operated by the Navy primarily
for the performance of Army missions.
m. This category includes, among other things, command ships and support ships.
n. The increase in this category from 17 ships under the February 2006 313-ship plan to 24 ships under the
apparent 328-ship goal included the addition of one TAGOS ocean surveillance ship and the transfer into
this category of six ships—three modified TAKE-1 class cargo ships, and three Mobile Landing Platform
(MLP) ships—that were previously intended for the planned (but now canceled) MPF(F) squadron.
Navy’s Five-Year and 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans
Five-Year (FY2014-FY2018) Shipbuilding Plan
Table 2 shows the Navy’s FY2014 five-year (FY2013-FY2018) shipbuilding plan.
Table 2. Navy FY2014 Five-Year (FY2014-FY2018) Shipbuilding Plan
(Battle force ships—i.e., ships that count against 306-ship goal)
Ship type
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
Total
Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier
0
0
0
0
1
1
Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarine
2
2
2
2
2
10
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer
1
2
2
2
2
9
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
4
4
2
2
2
14
LHA(R) amphibious assault ship
0
0
0
1
0
1
Fleet tug (TATF)
0
0
0
2
1
3
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP)/Afloat Forward
1 0 0 0 0 1
Staging Base (AFSB)
TAO(X)
oiler
0 0 1 0 1 2
TOTAL
8
8
7
9
9
41
Source: FY2013 Navy budget submission.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Notes: The MLP/AFSB is a variant of the MLP with additional features permitting it to serve in the role of an
AFSB. The Navy proposes to fund the TATFs and TAO(X)s through the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF)
and the other ships through the Navy’s shipbuilding account, known formally as the Shipbuilding and Conversion,
Navy (SCN) appropriation account.
Observations that can be made about the Navy’s proposed five-year (FY2014-FY2018)
shipbuilding plan include the following:
• Total of 41 ships—about the same as last year. The Navy’s proposed FY2014-
FY2018 five-year shipbuilding plan includes a total of 41 ships—the same
number as in the Navy’s FY213-FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan, and one
less than the 42 ships that the Navy planned for FY2014-FY2018 under the
FY2013 budget submission.
• Average of 8.2 ships per year. The FY2013-FY2017 plan includes an average of
8.2 battle force ships per year. The steady-state replacement rate for a fleet of 306
ships with an average service life of 35 years is about 8.7 ships per year. In light
of how the average shipbuilding rate since FY1993 has been substantially below
8.7 ships per year (see Appendix D), shipbuilding supporters for some time have
wanted to increase the shipbuilding rate to a steady rate of 10 or more battle force
ships per year.
• Second Virginia-class submarine added in FY2014. Compared to the FY2013-
FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan, the FY2014-FY2018 five-year shipbuilding
plan adds a second Virginia-class attack submarine in FY2014. This follows
through on Congress’s action, in marking up the FY2013 budget, to provide
advance procurement funding in FY2013 for a second Virginia-class boat in
FY2014.
• One DDG-51 destroyer in FY2014. The FY2014-FY2018 five-year
shipbuilding plan, like the FY2013-FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan, includes
one DDG-51 destroyer in FY2014. During Congress’s review of the Navy’s
FY2013 budget submission, there was interest in Congress in adding a second
DDG-51 destroyer to FY2014. In final action, Congress instead procured an
additional DDG-51 destroyer in FY2013 (increasing the number of DDG-51s
procured in FY2013 to three, compared to the two that were requested for
FY2013). The third DDG-51 procured in FY2013 might be viewed as the
equivalent of the second DDG-51 that supporters wanted to add to FY2014.
• Start of LX(R) amphibious ship procurement deferred beyond FY2018. The
proposed FY2014-FY2018 five-year shipbuilding plan defers the procurement of
the first LX(R) amphibious ship from FY2018 to a later fiscal year. The FY2013-
FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan had deferred the ship from FY2017 to
FY2018. LX(R)s (previously designated LSD[X]s) are to replace aging LSD-
41/49 class amphibious ships.
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30-Year (FY2014-FY2043) Shipbuilding Plan (Not Yet Submitted)
As of April 15, 2013, the Navy had not yet submitted its FY2014 30-year (FY2014-FY2043)
shipbuilding plan.3
As a placeholder, Table 3 shows the Navy’s FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding
plan, which was submitted to Congress on March 28, 2012.
Table 3. Navy FY2013 30-Year (FY2013-FY2042) Shipbuilding Plan
FY CVN LSC SSC SSN
SSBN
AWS
CLF
Supt Total
13
1 2 4 2
1 10
14
1 4 1
1 7
15
2 4 2
8
16
2 2 2
1
2 9
17
2 2 2
1
7
18
1 2 3 2
1
1
1 11
19
2 3 2
1 8
20
2 3 3
1
1
2 12
21
2 3 2
1
1
9
22
2 3 3
1
1
2 12
23
1 3 3 2
1
3 13
24
2 3 1
1
2
1
2 12
25
3 3 2
1
1 10
26
2 3 1
1
1
1
9
27
3 1
1
1
6
28
1 2 1
1
2
1
1 9
29
3 1
1
1
1
1 8
30
2 1 1
1
1
1
2 9
31
2 1
1
1
1
2 8
32
2 1 1
1
2
1
3 11
33
1 2 1
1
1
2 8
34
2 1 1
1
1
2 8
35
2 1 1
1
5
36
3 2 1
1
7
37
3 3 1
7
38
1 3 4 2
10
39
3 4 1
8
40
3 4 2
2
11
41
3 4 1
8
42
3 2 2
1
8
Source: FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC
= small surface combatants (i.e., Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs]); SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise
3 10 U.S.C. 231, as most recently amended by Section 1011 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R.
1540/ P.L. 112-81 of December 31, 2011), states that “The Secretary of Defense shall include [the 30-year shipbuilding
plan] with the defense budget materials for a fiscal year.... ”
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missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious warfare ships; CLF = combat
logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; Supt = support ships.
In devising a 30-year shipbuilding plan to move the Navy toward its ship force-structure goal, key
assumptions and planning factors include but are not limited to the following:
• ship service lives;
• estimated ship procurement costs;
• projected shipbuilding funding levels; and
• industrial-base considerations.
Navy’s Projected Force Levels Under 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
As mentioned above, as of April 15, 2013, the Navy had not yet submitted its FY2014 30-year
(FY2014-FY2043) shipbuilding plan. As a placeholder, Table 4 shows the Navy’s projection of
force levels for FY2013-FY2042 that would result from implementing the FY2013 30-year
(FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan shown in Table 3.
Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from FY2013 30-Year (FY2013-FY2042)
Shipbuilding Plan
CVN LSC SSC SSN SSGN SSBN AWS CLF Supt Total
306 ship plan
11
88
52
48
0
12
33
29
33
~306
FY13
10 80 35 55 4 14 31 32 24 285
FY14
10 78 30 55 4 14 29 32 27 279
FY15
11 78 26 54 4 14 28 31 30 276
FY16
11 80 30 53 4 14 29 31 32 284
FY17
11 82 32 50 4 14 30 29 33 285
FY18
11 84 35 51 4 14 31 29 33 292
FY19
11 86 39 51 4 14 31 29 35 300
FY20
11 87 37 48 4 14 31 29 34 295
FY21
11 88 38 48 4 14 31 29 33 296
FY22
12 87 40 47 4 14 32 29 33 298
FY23
11 89 39 47 4 14 32 29 35 300
FY24
11 89 41 46 4 14 34 29 35 303
FY25
11 88 43 45 4 14 34 29 33 301
FY26
11 89 46 45 2 14 34 29 32 302
FY27
12 90 49 44 1 13 33 29 33 304
FY28
11 89 52 43 0 12 34 29 33 303
FY29
11 87 55 43 0 11 33 29 33 302
FY30
11 85 55 43 0 11 33 29 33 300
FY31
11 81 55 45 0 11 32 29 33 297
FY32
11 80 55 45 0 10 32 29 33 295
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CVN LSC SSC SSN SSGN SSBN AWS CLF Supt Total
FY33
11 79 55 46 0 10 33 29 33 296
FY34
11 78 55 47 0 10 34 29 33 297
FY35
11 80 55 48 0 10 33 29 33 299
FY36
11 82 55 49 0 10 33 29 33 302
FY37
11 84 55 50 0 10 33 29 33 305
FY38
11 86 55 48 0 10 32 29 34 305
FY39
11 88 55 49 0 10 32 29 33 307
FY40
10 88 55 49 0 10 31 29 33 305
FY41
10 89 55 48 0 11 32 29 33 307
FY42
10 88 55 49 0 12 31 29 33 307
Source: FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan.
Note: Figures for support ships include five JHSVs transferred from the Army to the Navy and operated by the
Navy primarily for the performance of Army missions.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC
= small surface combatants (i.e., frigates, Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs], and mine warfare ships); SSN = attack
submarines; SSGN = cruise missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious
warfare ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; Supt = support ships.
Observations that could be made about the Navy’s FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042)
shipbuilding plan and resulting projected force levels included the following:
• Total of 268 ships; average of about 8.9 per year. The plan includes a total of
268 ships to be procured, compared to 276 ships in the FY2012 30-year
(FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan. The total of 268 ships equates to an
average of about 8.9 ships per year, which is slightly higher than the approximate
average procurement rate (sometimes called the steady-state replacement rate) of
about 8.7 ships per year that would be needed over the long run to achieve and
maintain a fleet of 306 ships, assuming an average life of 35 years for Navy
ships.
• Projected fleet remains below 306 ships. Although the FY2013 30-year plan
includes an average of about 8.9 ships per year, the FY2013 30-year plan, like
previous 30-year plans, results in a fleet that does not fully support all elements
of the Navy’s ship force structure goal. The distribution of the 268 ships over the
30-year period, combined with the ages of the Navy’s existing ships, results in a
projected fleet that would remain below 306 ships during most of the 30-year
period and experience shortfalls in cruisers-destroyers, attack submarines, and
amphibious ships.
• Ballistic missile submarine force to be reduced temporarily to 10 boats. As a
result of the decision in the FY2013 budget to defer the scheduled procurement
of the first Ohio replacement (SSBN[X]) ballistic missile submarine by two
years, from FY2019 to FY2021, the ballistic missile submarine force is projected
to drop to a total of 10 or 11 boats—one or two boats below the 12-boat SSBN
force-level goal—during the period FY2029-FY2041. The Navy says this
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
reduction is acceptable, because none of the 10 boats during these years will be
encumbered by long-term maintenance.4
• Smaller projected shortfalls in cruisers-destroyers and attack submarines.
The cruiser-destroyer and attack submarine shortfalls under the FY2013 30-year
plan are smaller than they were projected to be under the FY2012 30-year plan,
due in part to the reduction in the cruiser-destroyer force-level goal to 88 ships
and the insertion of additional destroyers and attack submarines into the FY2013
30-year plan.
• 18 more destroyers and 2 more attack submarines in plan. The FY2013
30-year shipbuilding plan includes 70 destroyers and 46 attack submarines,
compared to 52 destroyers and 44 attack submarines in the FY2012 30-year
plan. Fifteen of the 18 additional destroyers in the FY2013 plan were added
during the final 20 years of the 30-year plan.
• Cruiser-destroyer force now projected to bottom out at 78 ships. Under
the FY2013 30-year plan, the cruiser-destroyer force is projected to bottom
out in FY2014-FY2015 and FY2034 at 78 ships—10 ships, or 11.3%, less
than the goal of 88 ships. Under the FY2012 30-year plan, the cruiser-
destroyer force was projected to bottom out in FY2034 at 68 ships—26 ships,
or 27.7%, less than the goal under that plan of 94 ships.
• Attack submarine force now projected to bottom out at 43 ships. Under
the FY2013 30-year plan, the attack submarine force is projected to bottom
out in FY2028-FY2030 at 43 ships—5 ships, or 10.4%, less than the goal of
about 48 boats. Under the FY2012 30-year plan, the attack submarine force
was projected to bottom out in FY2030 at 39 boats—9 boats, or 18.8%, less
than the goal of 48 boats.
• Shortfall in amphibious ships. The Navy projects that there will be a shortfall
of one to five amphibious ships (i.e., 3.0% to 15.1% of the goal of 33 ships)
during the first 11 years (FY2013-FY2023) of the 30-year period.
Oversight Issues for Congress for FY2014
Potential Impact of March 1, 2013, Sequester
One potential issue for Congress concerns the impact on Navy shipbuilding programs of the
March 1, 2013, sequester on FY2013 funding implemented under the Budget Control Act of 2011
(S. 365/P.L. 112-25 of August 2, 2011) as amended by American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012
(H.R. 8/P.L. 112-240 of January 2, 2013). Funding levels provided under H.R. 933/P.L. 113-6
have been reduced by this sequester.
4 For further discussion of this issue, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile
Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
A key question regarding the impact of the sequester concerns the third DDG-51 destroyer that
was procured in FY2013; in light of the sequester, the Navy may face challenges executing this
ship.
More generally, at an April 10, 2013, briefing on the Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget, a Navy
official stated that
In [the Navy’s] investment accounts,5 we‘re still in a lot of analysis [regarding the
sequester’s impact on programs]. [What] I will tell you is, there are two items that I have to
fix right away. There is—Mr. Hill6 talked about a reprogramming going on, which is largely
[to address issues in the Navy’s] readiness [accounts], but there are two [investment account]
items [that require attention]. There’s a $28 million reduction against the Burke [i.e., DDG-
51 program] advanced procurement [funding line] for ‘13 [FY2013], which is necessary to
support the [DDG-51] multiyear [procurement contract]. That has been one of the items we
are going to submit as part of that.
And the other one was a [aircraft carrier] reactor core [that] has been sequestered, and it
comes as a lump unit, [the sequester on its funding being] $23 million. I need to get that
restored so I can put the core in order as part of ‘13 [FY2013] to lead the [aircraft carrier
mid-life] refueling overhaul that’s later in the FYDP [in FY2016], but it takes years to build
these core[s].
So those are two [items] I'm going to put on the reprogramming. Many other items we're
going to have to look at. We are sourcing through—essentially as you look at trying to
maintain quantity [i.e., procurement quantities], you have prior-year assets [i.e., prior-year
funding], but the bill [H.R. 933/P.L. 113-6] actually swept up [i.e., rescinded] about $850
million of prior-year dollars for the Navy as they [the authors of the bill] used for a rescind
and re-appropriate [action], to be able to fund the third [DDG-51] ship.7
A February 28, 2013, Navy briefing states that potential impacts of the sequester on FY2013
SCN-funded programs include the following:8
• The Virginia-class submarine program could experience a sequestration of
about $81 million; the Navy would respond to this by deobligating funding for
Virginia-class advance procurement (AP) items.
• The DDG-51 class destroyer program could experience a sequestration of
about $46 million, potentially affecting the Navy’s ability to award a proposed
multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for the program starting in FY2013.
• The DDG-1000 class destroyer program could experience a sequestration of
about $90 million, which could affect the Navy’s ability to award contracts for
mission system equipment and the deckhouse for DDG-1002, the third ship in the
program.
5 The investment accounts, generally speaking, are accounts for procurement, research and development, and military
construction.
6 Mr. Hill is not further identified in the transcript.
7 Source: Transcript of Navy news briefing on the FY2014 defense budget proposal from the Pentagon, Presenter: Rear
Admiral Joseph Mulloy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Budget, accessed April 15, 2013, at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5217.
8 Source: Navy briefing dated February 28, 2013. Sequestration funding figures shown are approximate and subject to
refinement.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
• The Moored Training Ship program could experience a sequestration of about
$28 million, delaying by a year the delivery of the next moored training ship,
which in turn would reduce the throughput of the Navy’s program for training
sailors in the operation of nuclear-powered ships.
At a February 28, 2013, hearing on CR and sequester impacts before the Tactical Air and Land
Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, the Navy testified that
Sequestration will impact our nuclear aircraft carrier force structure and the one-year CR
impacts contract awards for carrier refueling. Specifically, the current CR would delay the
contract award for the next Ford Class carrier, JOHN F. KENNEDY (CVN 79) and
sequestration would further slow construction, which would result in a delivery delay.
Current CR funding limitations would delay the completion of Nuclear Refueling Complex
Overhaul (RCOH) for USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71), the start of RCOHs for
USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN 72), and the defueling of USS ENTERPRISE (CVN
65). Given the short time available between sequential dry-docks, the CVN 72 and CVN 65
delays will also likely cause day-for-day impacts to the follow-on CVN 73 RCOH. The CVN
72 and CVN 73 delays will not be recoverable.9
In a set of briefing slides dated February 15, 2013, the Navy listed potential program actions
resulting from a year-long CR and sequestration (see Appendix H). Potential shipbuilding-related
actions resulting from sequestration that the Navy listed in the briefing included the following:
• The Navy would seek congressional authority to use incremental funding for
the inactivation of the aircraft carrier Enterprise (CVN-65) and apply the
resulting FY2013 savings of about $561 million to mitigate other impacts on
FY2013 Navy programs of a year-long CR and sequester.
• About $46 million in advance procurement funding for the DDG-51
program would be at risk.
• The Navy would defer awarding contracts for about $90 million of work on
DDG-1002, the third Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyer.
At a February 12, 2013, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on potential
impacts on the military services of a year-long CR and sequestration, the Navy testified that:
On top of reductions in operations and maintenance funding, sequestration will reduce FY13
funding for each investment program (about $7.2 billion overall). In some programs, such F-
35C Lightning II, P-8A Poseidon and E-2D Hawkeye, this reduction will compel us to
reduce the number of platforms procured in FY13....
If Congress authorizes the Navy to transfer funds within the FY13 budget, we intend to
restore our most critical operations and maintenance requirements. This will be done by
taking funding from investments such as perhaps the P-8A Poseidon, F-35C Lightning II and
Littoral Combat Ship—resulting in fewer of these platforms being procured in FY13.10
9 Statement of Hon. Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), and
Vice Admiral Allen G. Myers, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations [for] Integration of Capabilities and Resources,
and Lieutenant General John E. Wissler, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources, before the Tactical
Air and Land Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Impacts of a Continuing Resolution
and Sequestration on Department of the Navy Acquisition, Programming & Industrial Base, February 28, 2013, p. 8.
10 Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, before the Senate Armed Services Committee
(continued...)
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
In connection with the above passage, it can be noted that reducing the number of LCSs procured
in FY2013 below the requested quantity of four could compel the Navy to cancel or renegotiate at
least one of the two multiyear block buy contracts that the Navy currently has with the two LCS
builders.11
The above discussion focuses on the potential impact of sequestration on FY2013 Navy
shipbuilding programs. Some observers are using the term sequestration to mean something
broader, namely, a decision to reduce DOD spending (through sequestration or regular
appropriations activity) in FY2013-FY2021 years to levels at or near the lower caps established in
the Budget Control Act of 2011, or BCA (S. 365/P.L. 112-25 of August 2, 2011). Navy officials
state that a decision to reduce DOD’s budget to such levels would eventually lead to a smaller
Navy. At the February 12, 2013, hearing the Navy testified that:
In addition to sequestration for FY13, the BCA also required the lowering of the
discretionary caps for FY14 through FY21. Beyond FY13, if the discretionary cap reductions
are sustained for the full nine years, we would fundamentally change the Navy as currently
organized, trained and equipped. As time allows, we will take a deliberate and
comprehensive approach to this reduction, based on a reevaluation of the Defense Strategic
Guidance. In doing so, I will endeavor to: (1) ensure our people are properly resourced; (2)
protect sufficient current readiness and warfighting capability; (3) sustain some ability to
operate forward by continuing to forward base forces in Japan, Spain, Singapore and
Bahrain, and by using rotational crews; and (4) maintain appropriate research and
development.
As I indicated last year to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), under a set of
fiscal circumstances in sequestration, our Navy may be a fleet of around 230 ships. That
would be a loss of more than 50 ships, including the loss of at least two carrier strike groups.
We would be compelled to retire ships early and reduce procurement of new ships and
aircraft. This would result in a requisite reduction in our end strength. Every program will be
affected and as Secretary Panetta noted in his 2011 letter to Senators McCain and Graham,
programs such as the F-35 Lightning II, next generation ballistic missile submarine and
Littoral Combat Ship might be reduced or terminated.12
(...continued)
on the Impact of Sequestration, February 12, 2013, pp. 7, 8. Although the Navy’s written statement for the hearing is
from Admiral Greenert, the Navy’s testimony at the hearing was actually given by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Mark E. Ferguson III, who was substituting for Admiral Greenert at the hearing. The Navy presented similar
testimony at a similar hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on February 13, 2013.
11 For more on the LCS block buy contracts, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
12 Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, before the Senate Armed Services Committee
on the Impact of Sequestration, February 12, 2013, pp. 8-9. Although the Navy’s written statement for the hearing is
from Admiral Greenert, the Navy’s testimony at the hearing was actually given by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Mark E. Ferguson III, who was substituting for Admiral Greenert at the hearing. The Navy presented similar
testimony at a similar hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on February 13, 2013.
Similarly, on October 22, 2012, Admiral Mark Ferguson, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, stated, “If you project
out 10 years—remember that the budget control act talks about 10 years of [funding] reductions—now you start talking
about a fleet reduced to about 230-235 ships.” (As quoted in David Smalley, “Leaner Navy Looking at Future
Technology, Fleet Size and Sequestration,” Navy News Service, October 23, 2012, accessed October 25, 2012 at
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=70311.) On January 8, 2013, Vice Admiral William Burke, the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems, stated, “As a result of sequestration, what I testified to last
year was we’ll have, if sequestration is fully implemented, we’ll have a force of about 230 ships.... I’m not talking
about what the aviation numbers are, but they’ll go down by a similar amount—a similar amount being 20 percent.”
(continued...)
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Appendix E through Appendix J present Navy materials on the potential impacts of a year-long
continuing resolution (CR) for FY2013. The materials in these appendices predate the enactment
on March 26, 2013, of H.R. 933/P.L. 113-6, which includes the FY2013 DOD Appropriations
Act as Division C, mooting the possibility of a year-long CR for DOD in FY2013. Navy officials
caution that Navy estimates of exact dollar figures for sequester impacts on individual Navy
programs issued prior to March 26, 2013, including estimates shown above, might need to be
revised in light of the enactment of H.R. 933/P.L. 113-6, because those estimates might have
been based on the scenario of a year-long CR for DOD in FY2013 based on FY2012 funding
levels.
Future Size and Structure of Navy in Light of Strategic and
Budgetary Changes
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the planned size and structure of the
Navy. Changes in strategic and budgetary circumstances have led to a broad debate over the
appropriate future size and structure of the military, including the future size and structure of the
Navy. Changes in strategic circumstances include, among other things, the winding down of U.S.
combat operations in Iraq, the planned winding down of such operations in Afghanistan, and the
growth of China’s military capabilities.13 Changes in budgetary circumstances center on
reductions in planned levels of defense spending resulting from the Budget Control Act of 2011,
or BCA (S. 365/P.L. 112-25 of August 2, 2011).
On January 5, 2012, the Administration announced that, in light of the winding down of U.S.
combat operations in Iraq, the planned winding down of such operations in Afghanistan, and
developments in the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. defense strategy in coming years will include a
stronger focus on the Asia-Pacific region.14 Since the Asia-Pacific region is to a significant degree
a maritime and aerospace theater for the United States, this shift in strategic focus is expected by
many observers to result in a shift in the allocation of DOD resources toward the Navy and Air
Force. DOD officials have indicated that efforts to support a stronger focus on the Asia-Pacific
region will be protected if planned levels of DOD spending in future years are reduced as a result
of the BCA or other legislative action.
The Navy’s current goal for a fleet of 306 ships reflects a number of judgments and planning
factors (some of which the Navy receives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense), including
but not limited to the following:
• U.S. interests and the U.S. role in the world, and the U.S. military strategy for
supporting those interests and that role;
(...continued)
(As quoted in Dan Taylor, “Adm. Burke: Navy Needs To Fill $2 Billion Hole When OCO Goes Away,” Inside the
Navy, January 14, 2013. See also Michael Fabey, “U.S. Navy Prioritizes Ship Total Ownership Costs, Maintenance,”
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, January 9, 2013: 3.)
13 For more on the growth in China’s military (particularly naval) capabilities and its potential implications for required
U.S. Navy capabilities, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
14 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, 8 pp.
For more on this document, see CRS Report R42146, In Brief: Assessing DOD’s New Strategic Guidance, by Catherine
Dale and Pat Towell.
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• current and projected Navy missions in support of U.S. military strategy,
including both wartime operations and day-to-day forward-deployed operations;
• current and projected capabilities of potential adversaries, including their anti-
access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities;
• regional combatant commander (COCOM) requests for forward-deployed Navy
forces;
• the individual and networked capabilities of current and future Navy ships and
aircraft;
• basing arrangements for Navy ships, including numbers and locations of ships
homeported in foreign countries;
• maintenance and deployment cycles for Navy ships; and
• fiscal constraints.
With regard to the third point above, Navy officials testified at least three times in 2012 that a
Navy of more than 500 ships would be required to fully meet COCOM requests for forward-
deployed Navy forces (see Appendix A). The difference between a fleet of more than 500 ships
and the current goal for a fleet of 306 ships can be viewed as one measure of the operational risk
associated with the goal of a fleet of 306 ships. A goal for a fleet of more than 500 ships might be
viewed as a fiscally unconstrained goal.
Some study groups have made their own proposals for Navy ship force structure that reflect their
own perspectives on the points listed above (particularly the first three and the final one). Table 5
shows some of these proposals. For purposes of comparison, Table 5 also shows the Navy’s 306-
ship goal of January 2013.
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Table 5. Recent Study Group Proposals for Navy Ship Force Structure
Center for
Center for
Navy’s
Project on
Independent
a New
Strategic
306-
Defense
Panel
American
and
ship
Alternatives
Heritage
Cato
Assessment
Sustainable
Security
Budgetary
goal of
(PDA)
Foundation
Institute
of 2010
Defense
(CNAS)
Assessments
January
(November
(April
(September
QDR
Task Force
(November
(CSBA)
Ship type
2013
2012)
2011)
2010)a
(July 2010)
(June 2010)
2008)
(2008)b
Submarines
SSBN
12 7 14c 6 14 7 14 12
SSGN
0 6-7 4
0
4
4
0
2
SSN
48 42 55 40 55 37 40 41
Aircraft carriers
CVN
11 9 11 8 11 9 8 11
CVE
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Surface combatants
Cruiser
22 n/a
18 14
88 72-74 88
85
Destroyer 65
n/a
56
73
Frigate
0 2-7j
14 n/a 0 0 9e
28d
LCS
52 12j 4
n/a
25
48
55
SSC
0
j 0 0 n/a 0 40 0f
Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF[F]) ships
Amphibious ships
33 >23 37 23 n/a 27 36 33
MPF(F) ships
0 n/a 0
0 n/a n/a 0
3g
LSD station ships
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7h
Other: Mine warfare (MIW) ships; Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships (i.e., at-sea resupply ships), and support ships
MIW
0 14j 14 11 0 0 0 0
CLF ships
29 n/a 33 21 n/a
31
36 40
Support ships
33 n/a 25 27 n/a
31
TOTAL battle
306 230 309 241 346 230 300 326i
force ships
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on the fol owing sources: For Heritage Foundation: A Strong National
Defense[:] The Armed Forces America Needs and What They Will Cost, Heritage Foundation, April 5, 2011, pp. 25-
26. For Cato Institute: Benjamin H. Friedman and Christopher Preble, Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint,
Washington, Cato Institute, September 23, 2010 (Policy Analysis No. 667), pp. 6, 8-10, and additional
information provided by Cato Institute to CRS by e-mail on September 22, 2010. For Independent Panel
Assessment: Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al., The QDR in Perspective: Meeting
America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent
Panel, Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on pages 58-59. For Sustainable Defense Task Force: Debt, Deficits, and
Defense, A Way Forward[:] Report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force, June 11, 2010, pp. 19-20. For CNAS:
Frank Hoffman, From Preponderance to Partnership: American Maritime Power in the 21st Century. Washington,
Center for a New American Security, November 2008. p. 19 (Table 2). For CSBA: Robert O. Work, The US
Navy[:] Charting a Course for Tomorrow’s Fleet. Washington, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
2008. p. 81 (Figure 5). For PDA: Carl Conetta, Reasonable Defense, Project on Defense Alternatives,
November 14, 2012, 31 pp.
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Notes: n/a is not addressed in the report. SSBN is nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine; SSGN is
nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces submarine; SSN is nuclear-powered attack
submarine; CVN is large nuclear-powered aircraft carrier; CVE is medium-sized aircraft carrier; LCS is Littoral
Combat Ship; SSC (an acronym created by CRS for this table) is smal surface combatant of 1,000+ tons
displacement—a ship similar to late-1990s Streetfighter concept; MPF(F) is Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future) ship; LSD is LSD-41/49 class amphibious ship operating as a station ship for a formation like a Global
Fleet Station (GFS); MIW is mine warfare ship; CLF is combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ship.
a. Figures shown are for the year 2020; for subsequent years, reductions from these figures would be
considered.
b. Figures shown are for the year 2028.
c. The report calls for a force of 280 SLBMs, which appears to equate to a force of 14 SSBNs, each with 20
SLBM tubes.
d. The report calls for a force of 28 small surface combatants, and appears to use the term small surface
combatants the same way that the Navy does in the 30-year shipbuilding plan—as a way of collectively
referring to frigates and LCSs. The small surface combatants (SSCs) called for in the November 2008 CNAS
report are separate from and smaller than the LCS.
e. Maritime Security Frigates.
f.
Plan includes 28 patrol craft (PCs) of a few hundred tons displacement each, as wel as 29 boat detachments
and seven riverine squadrons.
g. Plan shows three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships that the Navy currently plans for the MPF(F)
squadron, plus 16 existing current-generation maritime prepositioning force (MPF) ships and 17 existing
prepositioning ships for Army and other service/agency equipment. Plan also shows 67 other DOD sealift
ships.
h. T-LSDs, meaning LSDs operated by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) with a partly civilian crew.
i.
The CSBA report shows a total of 488 units by including 162 additional force units that do not count
toward the 306-ship goal under the battle force ships counting method that has been used since the early
1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy. These 162 additional force units include 16
existing current-generation maritime prepositioning force (MPF) ships and 17 existing prepositioning ships
for Army and other service/agency equipment, 67 other DOD sealift ships, 28 PCs, 29 boat detachments,
and certain other smal -scale units. The CSBA report proposes a new counting method for naval/maritime
forces that includes units such as these in the total count.
j.
The report “prescribes ending procurement of the LCS with the 12 already purchased. The Reasonable
Defense model foresees a future cohort of 28 to 33 smal surface combatants, including a mix of the 12 LCS
that have already been procured, 14 Mine Counter Measure (MCM) ships already in the fleet, and small
frigates or ocean-going corvettes. As the MCM ships age and leave the fleet, the LCS should assume their
role. The would leave a post-MCM requirement for 16 to 21 additional small surface combatants. For this,
the Navy needs a simpler, less expensive alternative to the LCS.”
A potential key question for Congress concerns whether the U.S. Navy in coming years will be
large enough to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime anti-access forces while also
adequately performing other missions of interest to U.S. policymakers around the world. Some
observers are concerned that a combination of growing Chinese naval capabilities and budget-
driven reductions in the size of the U.S. Navy could encourage Chinese military overconfidence
and demoralize U.S. allies and partners in the Pacific, and thereby make it harder for the United
States to defend its interests in the region.15 Potential oversight questions for Congress include the
following:
15 See, for example, Dan Blumenthal and Michael Mazza, “Asia Needs a Larger U.S. Defense Budget,” Wall Street
Journal, July 5, 2011; J. Randy Forbes, “Defence Cuts Imperil US Asia Role,” The Diplomat (http://the-diplomat.com),
October 26, 2011. See also Andrew Krepinevich, “Panetta’s Challenge,” Washington Post, July 15, 2011: 15; Dean
Cheng, Sea Power and the Chinese State: China’s Maritime Ambitions, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2576,
(continued...)
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• Under the Administration’s plans, will the Navy in coming years be large enough
to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime anti-access forces while also
adequately performing other missions of interest to U.S. policymakers around the
world?
• What might be the political and security implications in the Asia-Pacific region
of a combination of growing Chinese naval capabilities and budget-driven
reductions in the size of the U.S. Navy?
• If the Navy is reduced in size and priority is given to maintaining Navy forces in
the Pacific, what will be the impact on Navy force levels in other parts of the
world, such as the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region or the Mediterranean Sea,
and consequently on the Navy’s ability to adequately perform its missions in
those parts of the world?
• To what extent could the operational impacts of a reduction in Navy ship
numbers be mitigated through increased use of forward homeporting, multiple
crewing, and long-duration deployments with crew rotation (i.e., “Sea Swap”)?
How feasible are these options, and what would be their potential costs and
benefits?16
• Particularly in a situation of constrained DOD resources, if enough funding is
allocated to the Navy to permit the Navy in coming years to maintain a fleet of
306 ships including 11 aircraft carriers, how much would other DOD programs
need to be reduced, and what would be the operational implications of those
program reductions in terms of DOD’s overall ability to counter improved
Chinese military forces and perform other missions?17
Sufficiency of 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the sufficiency of the Navy’s 30-year
shipbuilding plan. The Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plans in recent years have generally not
included enough ships to fully support all elements of the Navy’s 306-ship goal over the long run.
The Navy has projected that the fleet would remain below 306 ships during most of the 30-year
period, and experience shortfalls at various points in cruisers-destroyers, attack submarines, and
amphibious ships. In light of these projected shortfalls, policymakers may wish to consider
various options, including but not limited to the following:
• increasing planned procurement quantities of destroyers, attack submarines and
amphibious ships;
• extending, if feasible, the service lives of older destroyers and amphibious ships,
and (if feasible) refueling and extending the service lives of a small number of
older attack submarines; and
(...continued)
July 11, 2011, p. 10.
16 For further discussion of these options, see CRS Report RS21338, Navy Ship Deployments: New Approaches—
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
17 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
• reducing the Navy’s ship force structure goals for destroyers, attack submarines,
and/or amphibious ships.
The first two options would require increased funding for procurement and for operation and
support (O&S) costs, respectively, while the third option could reduce the Navy’s ability to
perform its missions.
Affordability of FY2013 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the prospective affordability of the
Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan. In assessing the prospective affordability of the 30-year plan,
key factors that Congress may consider include estimated ship procurement costs and future
shipbuilding funding levels.
Estimated Ship Procurement Costs
As mentioned earlier, the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan is based on certain assumptions,
including assumptions about ship procurement costs. If one or more Navy ship designs turn out to
be more expensive to build than the Navy estimates, then the projected funding levels shown in
the 30-year shipbuilding plan will not be sufficient to procure all the ships shown in the plan.
Ship designs that can be viewed as posing a risk of being more expensive to build than the Navy
estimates include Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carriers (a program currently
experiencing cost growth), Ohio-replacement (SSBNX) class ballistic missile submarines, the
Flight III version of the DDG-51 destroyer, and the LX(R) amphibious ship.
In recent years, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated that certain Navy ships
would be more expensive to procure than the Navy estimates, and consequently that the Navy’s
30-year shipbuilding plan would cost more to implement than the Navy has estimated. Once the
Navy submits its FY2014 30-year shipbuilding plan, CBO will examine it and issue its estimate
of the cost to implement the plan.
In its July 2012 report on the cost of the FY2013 30-year shipbuilding plan, CBO estimated that
the plan would cost an average of $20.0 billion per year in constant FY2012 dollars to implement,
or about 19% more than the Navy estimated. CBO’s estimate was about 11% higher than the
Navy’s estimate for the first 10 years of the plan, about 13% higher than the Navy’s estimate for
the second 10 years of the plan, and about 33% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the final 10
years of the plan.18 Some of the difference between CBO’s estimate and the Navy’s estimate,
particularly in the latter years of the plan, is due to a difference between CBO and the Navy in
how to treat inflation in Navy shipbuilding. Table 6 summarizes the Navy and CBO estimates of
the FY2013 30-year shipbuilding plan, as presented in the July 2012 CBO report.
18 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2013 Shipbuilding Plan, July 2012, Table 2
(page 11).
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Table 6. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of FY2013 30-Year (FY2013-FY2042)
Shipbuilding Plan
Funding for new-construction ships, in billions of constant FY2012 dollars
First 10 years
Next 10 years
Final 10 years
Entire 30 years
(FY2013-FY2022)
(FY2023-2032)
(FY2033-FY2042)
(FY2013-FY2042)
Navy estimate
15.1
19.5
15.9
16.8
CBO estimate
16.8
22.0
21.2
20.0
% difference
11% 13% 33% 19%
between Navy and
CBO estimates
Source: Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2013 Shipbuilding Plan, July 2012, Table
2 (Page 11).
Future Shipbuilding Funding Levels
As mentioned earlier, the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan is based on certain assumptions,
including assumptions about future shipbuilding funding levels. It has been known for some time
that funding requirements for the Ohio-replacement (SSBN[X]) ballistic missile submarine
program will put considerable pressure on the shipbuilding budget during the middle years of the
30-year plan. Although the FY2013 30-year shipbuilding plan reduces procurement of other types
of ships in the middle years of the plan to help accommodate the SSBN(X) program, the Navy
still projects that the shipbuilding budget would need to be substantially higher during the middle
years of the plan than during the earlier or later years of the plan.
If the “hump” in shipbuilding funding during the middle years of the 30-year plan is not achieved,
numerous ships shown for procurement during the middle years of the plan might not be
procured. A potential oversight question for Congress is whether the Navy has received a
commitment or assurance of some kind from DOD leaders that the Navy will be able to budget
for the “hump” in shipbuilding funding during the middle years of the 30-year plan without
reducing funding for other Navy program priorities.
Legislative Activity for FY2014
FY2014 Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget requests funding for the procurement of 8 new battle force
ships (i.e., ships that count against the 306-ship goal)—two Virginia-class attack submarines, one
DDG-51 class Aegis destroyer, four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), and one Mobile Landing
Platform/Afloat Forward Staging Base (MLP/AFSB) ship. These ships are all funded through the
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account.
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CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding
Programs
For funding levels and legislative activity on individual Navy shipbuilding programs, see the
following CRS reports:
• CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile
Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine
Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Appendix A. 2012 Testimony on Size of Navy
Needed to Fully Meet COCOM Requests
This appendix presents three instances in 2012 when Navy officials testified that a Navy of more
than 500 ships would be required to fully meet combatant commander COCOM requests for
Navy forces.
March 22, 2012, Hearing
At a March 22, 2012, hearing on Navy readiness before the Readiness subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:
REPRESENTATIVE J. RANDY FORBES:
We have a lot of requests for our combatant commanders—of the validated requests that
come from combatant commanders. How many ships would it take in our navy, based on
your estimation, to meet all of the validated requests from our commanders, combatant
commanders?
VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM R. BURKE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
FOR FLEET READINESS AND LOGISTICS:
Let me—give me just a minute on that, sir.
FORBES:
Please. And if you’d like, on any of these questions, if you’d rather take them for the record
and get back I’m OK with that, too.
BURKE:
I’m—no, I'm happy to answer the question. I just want to make sure I elaborate a little to
make sure we get—get the point right.
FORBES:
Please.
BURKE:
The—the combatant commander requests come in to the—to the services, and then the—
there’s a—a very high number of requirements from the services, or from the—the
combatant commanders which are then prioritized and adjudicated by the joint staff.
Essentially, a way to adjudicate supply—a lesser supply and a greater demand. So—so
those—of those requests that come in, some are determined to be more valid than others, if
you will. But to get to your exact question, of those requests that come in from the combatant
commanders, if we ...
(CROSSTALK)
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FORBES:
Admiral, could—could I just—on the nomenclature, just make sure I’m right, too. As they
come in, one of the first weed-out processes is we determine whether they’re validated or
not. In other words, we go through and make sure they’re legal, they don't have the other
asset somewhere. And—and then we stamp them as validated.
And then like you said, they go through a process where we then look at the resources we
have and allocate what we can. And we adjudicate which ones we can give and which ones
we can’t. So I want the top number. The—the ones that we have validated and said, “Yes,
this is legal, it’s a proper request.”
Of those combatant commander requests, approximately how many ships would it take us to
be able to meet those if we had them?
BURKE:
It would take a navy of over 500 ships to meet the combatant commander requests. And, of
course, it would take a similar increase in the aircraft and—and other parts of the—of the
Navy, as well, to meet the combatant commander requests.19
March 29, 2012, Hearing
At a March 29, 2012, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower and Projection
Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:
REPRESENTATIVE DUNCAN D. HUNTER:
If you were to build the amphibs [i.e., amphibious ships] where would you prioritize? I
mean, where would you take money out of to be able to get the Marine Corps to where they
need to be?
VICE ADMIRAL JOHN TERENCE BLAKE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS FOR INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES:
Here’s the issue we deal with: I don’t have the luxury of dealing with any single issue in
isolation; I have to deal with it across the entire...
HUNTER:
Well, we can. That’s why I'm asking.
BLAKE:
Well, we have to deal with it, though, across the entire portfolio.
HUNTER:
Sure.
19 Source: Transcript of hearing.
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BLAKE:
And so what we have to do is we have to balance the requirement for amphibs, the
requirement for surface combatants, the requirement for the carriers, the submarines—every
category of ships that we have. And so when we do that we then have to say, all right, as we
balance across that where are we going to be able to assume more risk? And that’s how we—
that’s how we end up where we are.
HUNTER:
So you’re saying there is less risk but still risk in the Marine Corps being short on amphibs
than there are in the other—the rest of the picture?
BLAKE:
No. I’m saying that we have assumed risk in all areas. The best example I can give you: It
was only a short time ago, if we tried to fill all the COCOM needs we said the number was
around 400 ships we’d need in the fleet. Today—and we see no abatement in that
commitment or the...
HUNTER:
No (inaudible) signal.
BLAKE:
Today we look at it and we see that we would—if we wanted to hit 100 percent of all the
COCOM requirements we’d need in excess of 500 ships. So what we end up having to do is
we go through the—the global management process and we look at it and we say, here are
our highest priorities, these are how we are going to address them, and then we—we have
those units available and we push that...
HUNTER:
I understand.
I’m going to yield back in just one second.
So I would take from your statement, then, that you did go through a prioritization process
and the amphibs are not at the top of that list. And second, when you say that you assume
risk all the way around I would argue that when you do your risk assessment and you
prioritize your needs the fact that the COCOMs wanted more ships and needed more ships
due to the international environment and where we find ourselves with the world today,
going down is probably – it’s going the wrong way.
We all know that, but I—I would—I would argue that your prioritization—I would like to
see that, if you don’t mind, the—the way that you analyzed this and the—and the way that
you said, hey, we’re going to—we’re going to keep them there to make sure that we have
this over here. That’s all I'm asking for.
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BLAKE:
OK. When we put it together we do it across the entire spectrum; we don’t—and by that I
mean, as we look at the entire requirement we say, this is what we need to do in order to be
able to meet the COCOM demand signal.20
April 19, 2012, Hearing
At an April 19, 2012, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower subcommittee
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:
SENATOR ROGER WICKER:
Admiral Burke and General Mills, from an operational perspective, the Navy budget cost for
decreases in large amphibious ships among other categories, in my opening statement, I
mentioned that the requests from combatant commanders for amphibious ships has increased
over 80 percent in the last five years—a very dramatic number. What is the reason for that
and what will be the impact if these requests are—are not met?
VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM R. BURKE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
FOR FLEET READINESS AND LOGISTICS:
Senator, thanks for the question. You're right, the COCOM demand signal has gone up
significantly to the point where if we were to meet their—all their requirements, it would
take a Navy of greater than 500 ships.
So, I certainly am not here to begrudge the COCOM demand signal because they have
challenges that they’re trying to deal with. But—but we can’t meet—meet all their demands.
So there is a process in the—in the Pentagon run by the joint staff called the Global Force
Management process by which they take in the COCOM requirements and adjudicate that
along with the forces we have to come to a reasonable allocation of—of force. And so that’s
the—that’s a process we’re dealing with today. We’ve been using that process for a number
of years, and I would expect we will continue to use that process in the future to—to bridge
the gap between supply and demand.21
20 Source: Transcript of hearing.
21 Source: Transcript of hearing.
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Appendix B. Comparing Past Ship Force Levels to
Current or Potential Future Ship Force Levels
In assessing the appropriateness of the current or potential future number of ships in the Navy,
observers sometimes compare that number to historical figures for total Navy fleet size. Historical
figures for total fleet size, however, can be a problematic yardstick for assessing the
appropriateness of the current or potential future number of ships in the Navy, particularly if the
historical figures are more than a few years old, because
• the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the
Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing
missions all change over time; and
• the number of ships in the fleet in an earlier year might itself have been
inappropriate (i.e., not enough or more than enough) for the meeting the Navy’s
mission requirements in that year.
Regarding the first bullet point above, the Navy, for example, reached a late-Cold War peak of
568 battle force ships at the end of FY1987,22 and as of April 15, 2013, included a total of 283
battle force ships. The FY1987 fleet, however, was intended to meet a set of mission requirements
that focused on countering Soviet naval forces at sea during a potential multi-theater NATO-
Warsaw Pact conflict, while the April 2013 fleet is intended to meet a considerably different set of
mission requirements centered on influencing events ashore by countering both land- and sea-
based military forces of potential regional threats other than Russia, including improved Chinese
military forces and non-state terrorist organizations. In addition, the Navy of FY1987 differed
substantially from the April 2013 fleet in areas such as profusion of precision-guided air-
delivered weapons, numbers of Tomahawk-capable ships, and the sophistication of C4ISR
systems and networking capabilities.23
In coming years, Navy missions may shift again, and the capabilities of Navy ships will likely
have changed further by that time due to developments such as more comprehensive
implementation of networking technology, increased use of ship-based unmanned vehicles, and
the potential fielding of new types of weapons such as lasers or electromagnetic rail guns.
The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing its stated
missions; the 283-ship fleet of April 2013 may or may not be capable of performing its stated
missions; and a fleet years from now with a certain number of ships may or may not be capable of
22 Some publications have stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however,
is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle
force ships figure is the number used in government discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total
number of active ships has been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval History and
Heritage Command (formerly the Naval Historical Center) states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a
total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle
force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships in another
year is thus an apples-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of
ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the
Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
23 C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
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performing its stated missions. Given changes over time in mission requirements, ship mixes, and
technologies, however, these three issues are to a substantial degree independent of one another.
For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a
reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An
increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to
perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be
increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing
number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated
missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly
than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships
are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in
total ship numbers.
Regarding the second of the two bullet points above, it can be noted that comparisons of the size
of the fleet today with the size of the fleet in earlier years rarely appear to consider whether the
fleet was appropriately sized in those earlier years (and therefore potentially suitable as a
yardstick of comparison), even though it is quite possible that the fleet in those earlier years
might not have been appropriately sized, and even though there might have been differences of
opinion among observers at that time regarding that question. Just as it might not be prudent for
observers years from now to tacitly assume that the 283-ship of April 2013 was appropriately
sized for meeting the mission requirements of 2013, even though there currently are differences
of opinion among observers on that question (as reflected, for example, in Table 5), simply
because a figure of 283 ships appears in the historical records for 2013, so, too, might it not be
prudent for observers today to tacitly assume that the number of ships of the Navy in an earlier
year was appropriate for meeting the Navy’s mission requirements that year, even though there
might have been differences of opinion among observers at that time regarding that question,
simply because the size of the Navy in that year appears in a table like Table D-1.
Previous Navy force structure plans, such as those shown in Table 1, might provide some insight
into the potential adequacy of a proposed new force-structure plan, but changes over time in
mission requirements, technologies available to ships for performing missions, and other force-
planning factors, as well as the possibility that earlier force-structure plans might not have been
appropriate for meeting the mission demands of their times, suggest that some caution should be
applied in using past force structure plans for this purpose, particularly if those past force
structure plans are more than a few years old. The Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy, for
example, was designed for a Cold War set of missions focusing on countering Soviet naval forces
at sea, which is not an appropriate basis for planning the Navy today, and there was considerable
debate during those years as to the appropriateness of the 600-ship goal.24
24 Navy force structure plans that predate those shown in Table 1 include the Reagan-era 600-ship plan of the 1980s,
the Base Force fleet of more than 400 ships planned during the final two years of the George H. W. Bush
Administration, the 346-ship fleet from the Clinton Administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (or BUR, sometimes
also called Base Force II), and the 310-ship fleet of the Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR. The table below
summarizes some key features of these plans.
Features of Recent Navy Force Structure Plans
Plan
600-ship
Base Force
1993 BUR
1997 QDR
Total ships
~600 ~450/416a 346
~305/310b
Attack submarines
100 80/~55c 45-55 50/55d
(continued...)
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Appendix C. Independent Panel Assessment of 2010
QDR
The law that requires DOD to perform QDRs once every four years (10 U.S.C. 118) states that
the results of each QDR shall be assessed by an independent panel. The report of the independent
panel that assessed the 2010 QDR was released on July 29, 2010. The independent panel’s report
recommended a Navy of 346 ships, including 11 aircraft carriers and 55 attack submarines.25 The
report stated the following, among other things:
• “The QDR should reflect current commitments, but it must also plan effectively
for potential threats that could arise over the next 20 years.… we believe the
2010 QDR did not accord sufficient priority to the need to counter anti-access
challenges, strengthen homeland defense (including our defense against cyber
threats), and conduct post-conflict stabilization missions.” (Page 54)
• “In this remarkable period of change, global security will still depend upon an
American presence capable of unimpeded access to all international areas of the
Pacific region. In an environment of ‘anti-access strategies,’ and assertions to
create unique ‘economic and security zones of influence,’ America‘s rightful and
historic presence will be critical. To preserve our interests, the United States will
need to retain the ability to transit freely the areas of the Western Pacific for
security and economic reasons. Our allies also depend on us to be fully present in
the Asia-Pacific as a promoter of stability and to ensure the free flow of
commerce. A robust U.S. force structure, largely rooted in maritime strategy but
including other necessary capabilities, will be essential.” (Page 51)
• “The United States will need agile forces capable of operating against the full
range of potential contingencies. However, the need to deal with irregular and
hybrid threats will tend to drive the size and shape of ground forces for years to
(...continued)
Aircraft carriers
15e 12
11+1f 11+1f
Surface combatants
242/228g ~150
~124 116
Amphibious ships
~75h 51i 41i 36i
Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD and U.S. Navy data.
a. Commonly referred to as 450-ship plan, but called for decreasing to 416 ships by end of FY1999.
b. Original total of about 305 ships was increased to about 310 due to increase in number of attack submarines to 55
from 50.
c. Plan originally included 80 attack submarines, but this was later reduced to about 55.
d. Plan originally included 50 attack submarines but this was later increased to 55.
e. Plus one additional aircraft carrier in the service life extension program (SLEP).
f. Eleven active carriers plus one operational reserve carrier.
g. Plan originally included 242 surface combatants but this was later reduced to 228.
h. Number needed to lift assault echelons of one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) plus one Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB).
i. Number needed to lift assault echelons of 2.5 MEBs. Changing numbers needed to meet this goal reflect in part
changes in the design and capabilities of amphibious ships.
25 Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National
Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel,
Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on page 58.
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come, whereas the need to continue to be fully present in Asia and the Pacific and
other areas of interest will do the same for naval and air forces.” (Page 55)
• “The force structure in the Asia-Pacific needs to be increased. In order to
preserve U.S. interests, the United States will need to retain the ability to transit
freely the areas of the Western Pacific for security and economic reasons. The
United States must be fully present in the Asia-Pacific region to protect American
lives and territory, ensure the free flow of commerce, maintain stability, and
defend our allies in the region. A robust U.S. force structure, one that is largely
rooted in maritime strategy and includes other necessary capabilities, will be
essential.” (Page 66)
• “Force structure must be strengthened in a number of areas to address the need to
counter anti-access challenges, strengthen homeland defense (including defense
against cyber threats), and conduct post-conflict stabilization missions: First, as a
Pacific power, the U.S. presence in Asia has underwritten the regional stability
that has enabled India and China to emerge as rising economic powers. The
United States should plan on continuing that role for the indefinite future. The
Panel remains concerned that the QDR force structure may not be sufficient to
assure others that the United States can meet its treaty commitments in the face
of China’s increased military capabilities. Therefore, we recommend an increased
priority on defeating anti-access and area-denial threats. This will involve
acquiring new capabilities, and, as Secretary Gates has urged, developing
innovative concepts for their use. Specifically, we believe the United States must
fully fund the modernization of its surface fleet. We also believe the United
States must be able to deny an adversary sanctuary by providing persistent
surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision strike.
That is why the Panel supports an increase in investment in long-range strike
systems and their associated sensors. In addition, U.S. forces must develop and
demonstrate the ability to operate in an information-denied environment.” (Pages
59-60)
• “To compete effectively, the U.S. military must continue to develop new
conceptual approaches to dealing with operational challenges, like the Capstone
Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). The Navy and Air Force‘s effort to
develop an Air-Sea Battle concept is one example of an approach to deal with the
growing anti-access challenge. It will be necessary to invest in modernized
capabilities to make this happen. The Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of
Staff of the Air Force deserve support in this effort, and the Panel recommends
the other military services be brought into the concept when appropriate.” (Page
51; a similar passage appears on page 67)
In recommending a Navy of 346 ships, the independent panel’s report cited the 1993 Bottom-Up
Review (BUR) of U.S. defense plans and policies. Table C-1 compares the Navy’s 306-ship goal
of March 2012 to the 346-ship Navy recommended in the 1993 BUR (as detailed partly in
subsequent Navy testimony and publications) and the ship force levels recommended in the
independent panel report.
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Table C-1. Comparison of Navy’s 306-ship goal, Navy Plan from 1993 BUR, and Navy
Plan from 2010 QDR Review Panel
2010 QDR
Independent
Navy’s 306-ship goal of
Bottom-Up Review
Review Panel
Ship Type
March 2012
(BUR) (1993)
(July 2010)
SSBNs 12-14
18
14
(SSBN force was later
reduced to 14 as a result of
the 1994 Nuclear Posture
Review)
SSGNs 0-4
0
4
(SSGN program did not yet
exist)
SSNs
~48
45 to 55
55
(55 in FY99, with a long-term
goal of about 45)
Aircraft carriers
11 active
11 active + 1
11 active
operational/reserve
Surface combatants
~145
124
n/a
(114 active + 10 frigates in
Naval Reserve Force; a total
of 110-116 active ships was
also cited)
Cruisers and destroyers
~90
n/a
n/a
Frigates
0
n/a n/a
(to be replaced by LCSs)
LCSs
~55
0
n/a
(LCS program did not exist)
Amphibious ships
~32
41
n/a
(30 operational ships
(Enough to lift 2.5 MEBs)
needed to lift 2.0 MEBs)
Dedicated mine
0
26
n/a
warfare ships
(to be replaced by LCSs)
(LCS program did not exist)
CLF ships
~29
43
n/a
Support ships
~33
22
n/a
TOTAL ships
~306
346
346
(numbers above add to
331-341)a
Source: Table prepared by CRS. Sources for 1993 Bottom-Up Review: Department of Defense, Report on the
Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, Figure 7 on page 28; Department of the Navy, Highlights of the FY 1995
Department of the Navy Budget, February 1994, p. 1; Department of the Navy, Force 2001, A Program Guide to the
U.S. Navy, 1994 edition, p. 15; Statement of VADM T. Joseph Lopez, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements & Assessments), Testimony to the Military Forces and Personnel
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, March 22, 1994, pp. 2-5. Source for independent
panel report: Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al., The QDR in Perspective: Meeting
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America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent
Panel, Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on pages 58-59.
Notes: n/a is not addressed in the report. SSBN is nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine; SSGN is
nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces submarine; SSN is nuclear-powered attack
submarine; LCS is Littoral Combat Ship; MPF(F) is Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ship; CLF is combat
logistics force (i.e., resupply) ship; MEB is Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
a. The Navy testified in 1994 that the planned number was adjusted from 346 to 330 to reflect reductions in
numbers of tenders and early retirements of some older amphibious ships.
In a letter dated August 11, 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates provided his comments on
the independent panel’s report. The letter stated in part:
I completely agree with the Panel that a strong navy is essential; however, I disagree with the
Panel’s recommendation that DoD should establish the 1993 Bottom Up Review’s (BUR’s)
fleet of 346 ships as the objective target. That number was a simple projection of the then-
planned size of [the] Navy in FY 1999, not a reflection of 21st century, steady-state
requirements. The fleet described in the 2010 QDR report, with its overall target of 313 to
321 ships, has roughly the same number of aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered attack
submarines, surface combatants, mine warfare vessels, and amphibious ships as the larger
BUR fleet. The main difference between the two fleets is in the numbers of combat logistics,
mobile logistics, and support ships. Although it is true that the 2010 fleet includes fewer of
these ships, they are all now more efficiently manned and operated by the Military Sealift
Command and meet all of DoD’s requirements….
I agree with the Panel’s general conclusion that DoD ought to enhance its overall posture and
capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region. As I outlined in my speech at the Naval War College
in April 2009, “to carry out the missions we may face in the future… we will need numbers,
speed, and the ability to operate in shallow waters.” So as the Air-Sea battle concept
development reaches maturation, and as DoD’s review of global defense posture continues, I
will be looking for ways to meet plausible security threats while emphasizing sustained
forward presence – particularly in the Pacific.26
26 Letter dated August 11, 2010, from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to the chairmen of the House and Senate
Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, pp. 3 and 4. The ellipsis in the second paragraph appears in the letter.
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Appendix D. Size of the Navy and Navy
Shipbuilding Rate
Size of the Navy
Table D-1 shows the size of the Navy in terms of total number of ships since FY1948; the
numbers shown in the table reflect changes over time in the rules specifying which ships count
toward the total. Differing counting rules result in differing totals, and for certain years, figures
reflecting more than one set of counting rules are available. Figures in the table for FY1978 and
subsequent years reflect the battle force ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules
established in the early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy.
As shown in the table, the total number of battle force ships in the Navy reached a late-Cold War
peak of 568 at the end of FY1987 and began declining thereafter.27 The Navy fell below 300
battle force ships in August 2003 and included 283 battle force ships as of April 15, 2013.
As discussed in Appendix B, historical figures for total fleet size might not be a reliable yardstick
for assessing the appropriateness of proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy,
particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be
performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are
available to Navy ships for performing missions all change over time, and because the number of
ships in the fleet in an earlier year might itself have been inappropriate (i.e., not enough or more
than enough) for the meeting the Navy’s mission requirements in that year.
For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a
reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An
increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to
perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be
increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing
number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated
missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly
than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships
are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in
total ship numbers.
27 Some publications have stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however,
is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle
force ships figure is the number used in government discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total
number of active ships has been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval History and
Heritage Command (formerly the Naval Historical Center) states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a
total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle
force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships in another
year is thus an apples-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of
ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the
Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
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Table D-1. Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948
FYa Number FYa Number FYa Number
1948 737 1970 769 1992 466
1949 690 1971 702 1993 435
1950 634 1972 654 1994 391
1951 980 1973 584 1995 373
1952 1,097 1974 512 1996 356
1953 1,122 1975 496 1997 354
1954 1,113 1976 476 1998 333
1955 1,030 1977 464 1999 317
1956 973 1978 468 2000 318
1957 967 1979 471 2001 316
1958 890 1980 477 2002 313
1959 860 1981 490 2003 297
1960 812 1982 513 2004 291
1961 897 1983 514 2005 282
1962 959 1984 524 2006 281
1963 916 1985 541 2007 279
1964 917 1986 556 2008 282
1965 936 1987 568 2009 285
1966 947 1988 565 2010 288
1967 973 1989 566 2011 284
1968 976 1990 547 2012 287
1969 926 1991 526 2013
Source: Compiled by CRS using U.S. Navy data. Numbers shown reflect changes over time in the rules
specifying which ships count toward the total. Figures for FY1978 and subsequent years reflect the battle force
ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules established in the early 1980s for public policy
discussions of the size of the Navy.
a. Data for earlier years in the table may be for the end of the calendar year (or for some other point during
the year), rather than for the end of the fiscal year.
Shipbuilding Rate
Table D-2 shows past (FY1982-FY2012) and requested (FY2013-FY2017) rates of Navy ship
procurement.
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Table D-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2018
(Procured FY1982-FY2013; requested FY2014-FY2018)
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00
17 14 16 19 20 17 15 19 15 11 11 7 4 4 5 4 5 5 6
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
6 6 5 7 8 4a
5a
3a 8 7 10 11b 11c
8 8 7 9 9
Source: CRS compilation based on Navy budget data and examination of defense authorization and
appropriation committee and conference reports for each fiscal year. The table excludes non-battle force ships
that do not count toward the 306-ship goal, such as certain sealift and prepositioning ships operated by the
Military Sealift Command and oceanographic ships operated by agencies such as the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
a. The totals shown for FY2006, FY2007, and FY2008, reflect the cancel ation two LCSs funded in FY2006,
another two LCSs funded in FY2007, and an LCS funded in FY2008.
b. The total shown for FY2012 includes two JHSVs—one that was included in the Navy’s FY2012 budget
submission, and one that was included in the Army’s FY2012 budget submission. Until FY2012, JHSVs were
being procured by both the Navy and the Army. The Army was to procure its fifth and final JHSV in
FY2012, and this ship was included in the Army’s FY2012 budget submission. In May 2011, the Navy and
Army signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) transferring the Army’s JHSVs to the Navy. In the
FY2012 DOD Appropriations Act (Division A of H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74 of December 23, 2011), the
JHSV that was in the Army’s FY2012 budget submission was funded through the Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation account, along with the JHSV that the Navy had included in its
FY0212 budget submission. The four JHSVs that were procured through the Army’s budget prior to
FY2012, however, are not included in the annual totals shown in this table.
c. Figure shown does not reflect potential quantity reduction resulting from March 1, 2013, sequester on
FY2013 funding.
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Appendix E. February 12, 2013, Navy Testimony on
Potential CR and Sequester Impacts
This appendix presents the full text of the Navy’s written statement for a February 12, 2013,
hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the impact of a year-long CR and
sequestration.28 (Although the Navy’s written statement for the hearing is from Admiral Jonathan
Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Navy’s testimony at the hearing was actually given
by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mark E. Ferguson III, who was substituting for
Admiral Greenert at the hearing.) The Navy presented similar testimony at a similar hearing
before the House Armed Services Committee on February 13, 2013.
The enactment on March 26, 2013, of H.R. 933/P.L. 113-6, which includes the FY2013 DOD
Appropriations Act as Division C, mooted the possibility of a year-long CR for DOD in FY2013.
Navy officials caution that Navy estimates of exact dollar figures for sequester impacts on
individual Navy programs issued prior to March 26, 2013, might need to be revised in light of the
enactment of H.R. 933/P.L. 113-6, because those estimates might have been based on the
scenario of a year-long CR for DOD in FY2013 based on FY2012 funding levels.
The text of the statement is as follows:
Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the Committee,
thank you for holding this hearing and for the opportunity to testify on the impact on our
Navy of sequestration and a full-year Continuing Resolution (CR).
Important qualities of our naval forces are their readiness to respond to crisis and persistent
forward presence. Because they continuously operate overseas at the maritime crossroads,
our Navy and Marine Corps are the first responders to crises such as terrorist attack, military
aggression or natural disaster. Operating forward at strategic maritime crossroads such as the
Straits of Malacca, Hormuz, or Gibraltar, naval forces contain conflict, deter aggression
without escalation, and assure allies and build partnerships.
When I last appeared before you I assessed that our FY13 budget proposal, developed under
the limitations of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA), was not without risk. As I said last
year, senior DoD leaders conducted an assessment of the ability of our force to implement
the new Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). In the Navy we also assessed the capabilities,
training, and the number and type of ships and aircraft required to execute the strategy. We
determined the force supported by the FY13 budget proposal was able to execute the
strategy, but with some risk due to limitations in overall capacity.
There is no question we must get our nation’s fiscal house in order, but we should do so in a
coherent and thoughtful manner to ensure appropriate readiness, warfighting capability and
forward presence – the attributes we depend upon from our Navy. Unless we change course
we will, without proper deliberation, dramatically reduce: our overseas presence; our ability
to respond to crises; our efforts to counter terrorism and illicit trafficking; and our material
readiness across the Navy (afloat and ashore). Perhaps more disconcerting, we may
irreversibly damage the military industrial base we depend on to build and maintain our ships
and aircraft. Over the next decade, the combination of sequestration and the reduced
28 Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, before the Senate Armed Services Committee
on the Impact of Sequestration, February 12, 2013, 10 pp. Emphasis as in original.
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discretionary caps would compel us to dramatically reduce our fleet size. Under these
circumstances, I assess your Navy will be limited in its ability to provide the capability and
capacity called for in the current defense strategy; and unable to fully support the Global
Force Management Allocation Plan for our Combatant Commanders.
Our situation
We face three separate, but linked, budget mechanisms that converge next month and place
at risk our ability to carry out our defense strategy. As a result of the failure of the Joint
Committee established under the BCA to achieve $1.2 trillion in deficit reduction, a
sequestration order will be issued on March 1; in addition, a second sequestration due to a
breach in the FY 2013 discretionary caps is scheduled to be ordered on March 27.
Sequestration will add to a budget shortfall in operating accounts already created by the
Continuing Resolution (CR). Sequestration and the CR render us unable to continue our
current and anticipated level of operations, compel us to cancel some maintenance and
training, and constrain our ability to invest in future capability and capacity.
We will approach this challenge using our enduring tenets, established upon my assuming
the office of CNO, to guide us:
• Warfighting first
• Operate forward
• Be ready
The Navy’s primary mission is to be ready to fight and win today, while building the ability
to win tomorrow; all our efforts will remain grounded in this fundamental responsibility. We
will continue to operate forward, where the Navy is most effective; but at significantly lower
levels. And we will endeavor to remain ready, providing our fleet and Sailors the best
possible training, maintenance, and logistics to assure their confidence and proficiency.
FY13: A readiness crisis in the making
Our immediate concern from the sequestration and the CR is their impact on readiness and
training during this fiscal year. The CR is based on FY12 funding levels and therefore
includes fewer operating dollars than we proposed, and Congress authorized, for FY13.
Extended for the whole fiscal year, the CR would provide the Navy $3.2 billion less in
operations and maintenance funds than requested in the FY13 budget. In addition, we have
incurred $1.4 billion in unplanned costs in FY13 from emergent ship repairs and increased
(and unbudgeted) presence in the Arabian Gulf. The CR also precludes the start of new
projects. If the CR is extended for the whole fiscal year, we will stop work on two aircraft
carrier refueling overhauls (USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN and USS THEODORE
ROOSEVELT), one of which is within four months of completion. The prohibition on “new
starts” under the CR also compels us to defer construction of USS JOHN F. KENNEDY
(CVN-79), USS SOMERSET (LPD-25) and USS AMERICA (LHA-6) and cancel the
planned procurement of an Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer, multiple P-8A
Poseidon aircraft and hundreds of weapons. Similarly, we will not begin about $675 million
in “new start” military construction projects while under the CR.
In addition to the CR funding shortfall in operating accounts, the March 1 sequestration
order would impose significant additional cuts in FY13, which would reduce all of our
accounts by about eight percent. And as mentioned above, second sequestration due to a
breach in the FY 2013 discretionary caps is scheduled to be implemented on March 27. The
Department estimates the combined effects of sequestration will be a nine percent reduction,
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which would result in a $4 billion cut in operations and maintenance funding from current
levels and $11.2 billion in the FY13 budget overall. Taken together, the CR, sequestration
and emergent costs would create an $8.6 billion shortfall in the operations and maintenance
account for FY13. $12.3 billion has already been spent from this account in FY13, and
another $16.4 billion is fixed in existing contracts and safety requirements. Therefore, we
must find $8.6 billion in savings from the remaining $20.2 billion in operations and
maintenance funding – more than a third of the money available in the account.
Therefore, we are compelled to take the following steps:
• Cancel 70% of ship maintenance in private shipyards and all aircraft maintenance
scheduled in the 3rd and 4th quarters of FY13; this affects up to 25 ships and 327 aircraft and
eliminates critical ship and aircraft repair and adds to an existing maintenance backlog
generated by a decade of high-tempo operations – resulting in an overall Navy maintenance
backlog of about $3 billion;
• Reduce by about one-third the number of days at sea and hours of flight operations for
ships and aircraft permanently stationed in the Asia-Pacific; cancel all aircraft deployments
and four of six ship deployments to the region;
• Reduce by half the number of days at sea and by one quarter the hours of flight operations
for ships and aircraft in the Middle East and Arabian Gulf; reduce carrier presence in the
Arabian Gulf to one (the requirement is two carriers);
• Stop Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) deployments to the Middle East / Arabian Gulf in
FY14 after USS BOXER; this loses the nation’s primary response force for crises such as
noncombatant evacuations in Liberia and Lebanon, floods in Pakistan and Thailand and
terrorism threats in Africa – all of which were addressed by ARGs in the past decade.
• Cancel five of six FY13 ship deployments (including USNS COMFORT) and stop all
aircraft deployments to South America, stopping efforts that interdicted hundreds of tons of
illegal drugs into the U.S. in 2012;
• Cancel all ship and aircraft deployments to Africa, halting support to counter-terrorism
operations on the continent during a time when terrorist affiliates are active there;
• Stop training and certification of ballistic missile defense ships, resulting in no new
deployments of these ships to Europe after October 2013;
• Cancel most non-deployed operations including exercises, pre-deployment certification,
and all port visits in the continental U.S.; as a result, the number of ships available for
homeland defense will be reduced and it will take 9-12 months for ships that were not
preparing to deploy to regain certification for Major Combat Operations;
• Stop training and certification for Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) except for the one next to
deploy to the Middle East / Arabian Gulf; We will have only one additional or “surge” CSG
certified for Major Combat Operations in FY13 and throughout FY14 (down from almost
three on average);
• Stop training and certification for Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG), resulting in no
additional or “surge” ARG certified for Major Combat Operations in FY13 and FY14;
• Freeze hiring of civilian workers and release current temporary workers, resulting in a
reduction of about 3,000 people from our shipyard workforce of Navy civilians;
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• Plan to furlough up to about 186,000 civilians for 22 days, resulting in a 20 percent pay
reduction.
On top of reductions in operations and maintenance funding, sequestration will reduce FY13
funding for each investment program (about $7.2 billion overall). In some programs, such F-
35C Lightning II, P-8A Poseidon and E-2D Hawkeye, this reduction will compel us to
reduce the number of platforms procured in FY13.
In addition to these immediate impacts, our actions in FY13 to address reductions from the
CR and sequestration will begin to erode our readiness in four major ways:
Degraded material condition and expected service life of our ships and aircraft. The
cancellation of maintenance for ships and aircraft will reduce their service lives, increase the
likelihood of break downs and force us to pay a higher cost (premium) to make up the
critical maintenance later. Should operations funding eventually become available, some
ships and aircraft will be unavailable to deploy or surge because they need repairs; further,
we will need to realign ship maintenance periods and repairs within an already tight
operational schedule.
Sailors lacking proficiency and confidence. Cancelled training and exercises could result
in some units in the fleet that, by the end of FY13, are not proficient in the basic skills
necessary for effective warfighting operations. To be effective, we need all combatants able
to deploy or surge to a contingency.
A damaged industrial base. Delayed or cancelled ship and aircraft construction, cancelled
maintenance and repair, and reduction of the civilian workforce will immediately impact
private shipyards, aircraft and weapons manufacturers and our military industrial base. The
loss of work in FY13 alone may cause some smaller suppliers and service providers to shut
down.
Increased strain and operational tempo on our Sailors and Civilians. The reduction of
ready forces will put greater stress on the Sailors assigned to ships and squadrons that are
currently deployed or soon to deploy. They will operate at a higher tempo; and we are
already at an extraordinary operational tempo. While military compensation is exempt from
sequestration, there is a cost to the force in having to do more. However, I remain committed
to making sure we provide for our Sailors, Civilians and their Families by funding our most
important missions and deployments, and Family Readiness Programs.
If Congress authorizes the Navy to transfer funds within the FY13 budget, we intend to
restore our most critical operations and maintenance requirements. This will be done by
taking funding from investments such as perhaps the P-8A Poseidon, F-35C Lightning II and
Littoral Combat Ship – resulting in fewer of these platforms being procured in FY13.
Longer-Term Effects: A Different Fleet and a Different Strategy
In addition to sequestration for FY13, the BCA also required the lowering of the
discretionary caps for FY14 through FY21. Beyond FY13, if the discretionary cap reductions
are sustained for the full nine years, we would fundamentally change the Navy as currently
organized, trained and equipped. As time allows, we will take a deliberate and
comprehensive approach to this reduction, based on a reevaluation of the Defense Strategic
Guidance. In doing so, I will endeavor to: (1) ensure our people are properly resourced; (2)
protect sufficient current readiness and warfighting capability; (3) sustain some ability to
operate forward by continuing to forward base forces in Japan, Spain, Singapore and
Bahrain, and by using rotational crews; and (4) maintain appropriate research and
development.
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As I indicated last year to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), under a set of
fiscal circumstances in sequestration, our Navy may be a fleet of around 230 ships. That
would be a loss of more than 50 ships, including the loss of at least two carrier strike groups.
We would be compelled to retire ships early and reduce procurement of new ships and
aircraft. This would result in a requisite reduction in our end strength. Every program will be
affected and as Secretary Panetta noted in his 2011 letter to Senators McCain and Graham,
programs such as the F-35 Lightning II, next generation ballistic missile submarine and
Littoral Combat Ship might be reduced or terminated.
Inevitably, these changes will severely damage our industrial base. Some shipyards will not
be able to sustain steady construction or maintenance operations and may close or be
inactivated. Aviation depots will reduce their operations or become idle. Aircraft and
weapons manufacturers will slow or stop their work entirely. In particular, the small firms
that are often the sole source for particular ship and aircraft components will quickly be
forced to shut down. Once these companies and their engineers and craftspeople move on to
other work, they are hard to reconstitute, sometimes impossible, at a later date when our
national security demands it.
Reducing the Impact of Sequestration and the Continuing Resolution
We ask that this Congress act quickly to replace sequestration with a coherent approach to
deficit reduction that addresses our national security interests. Additionally, the Department
needs the Congress to pass FY13 appropriations legislation that allows the department to
allocate reductions in this fiscal year in a deliberate and coherent manner to sustain current
operations while meeting current obligations.
I am honored to represent about 600,000 Sailors and Civilians serving their country in the
United States Navy. We understand the importance of resolving our fiscal challenges to
ensure our nation’s future prosperity. I look forward to working with the Congress to ensure
our Navy will remain the world’s preeminent maritime force while continuing to protect our
nation’s security and prosperity.
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Appendix F. February 28, 2013, Department of the
Navy Testimony on Potential CR and Sequester
Impacts
This appendix presents the full text of the Department of the Navy’s written statement for a
February 28, 2013, hearing before the Tactical Air and Land Forces subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee on the impact of a year-long CR and sequestration.29
The enactment on March 26, 2013, of H.R. 933/P.L. 113-6, which includes the FY2013 DOD
Appropriations Act as Division C, mooted the possibility of a year-long CR for DOD in FY2013.
Navy officials caution that Navy estimates of exact dollar figures for sequester impacts on
individual Navy programs issued prior to March 26, 2013, might need to be revised in light of the
enactment of H.R. 933/P.L. 113-6, because those estimates might have been based on the
scenario of a year-long CR for DOD in FY2013 based on FY2012 funding levels.
The text of the statement is as follows:
IMPACTS OF A YEAR-LONG CONTINUING RESOLUTION AND
SEQUESTRATION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, and distinguished members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the year-
long Continuing Resolution (CR) and sequestration impacts to the Department of the Navy’s
(DoN) Acquisition Programs, Programming, and the Industrial Base.
The United States is a maritime nation with global responsibilities. Our Navy and Marine
Corps’ persistent presence and multi-mission capability represent U.S. power projection
across the global commons. As you are aware, a sequestration order will be issued on March
1; in addition, a second sequestration due to a breach in the FY 2013 discretionary caps is
scheduled to be ordered on March 27. Sequestration will add to a budget shortfall in
operating accounts already created by the Continuing Resolution. The potential for
sequestration and a year-long CR have already altered virtually every aspect of DoN
planning and our ability to carry out our responsibilities. Without action by Congress, a year-
long CR and sequestration will have immediate as well as long-term negative impacts. In the
near-term, we will be driven to cancel maintenance and training that supports current
readiness and our operational commitments at home and abroad. Long-term, the fiscal
challenges will constrain our ability to invest in future capability and capacity. In short, if a
strict year-long CR and sequestration occur, we will not be able to afford in the future the
Navy and Marine Corps we have today.
In March 2012, Navy and Marine Corps leadership testified to this committee about the
Fiscal Year 2013 budget which was restructured to reflect an updated defense posture as the
29 Statement of Hon. Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), and
Vice Admiral Allen G. Myers, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations [for] Integration of Capabilities and Resources,
and Lieutenant General John E. Wissler, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources, before the Tactical
Air and Land Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Impacts of a Continuing Resolution
and Sequestration on Department of the Navy Acquisition, Programming & Industrial Base, February 28, 2013, 10 pp.
Emphasis as in original.
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wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down with a commensurate reduction of about $500
billion over ten-years. The planned 2013 DoN budget request aligned with the new strategic
guidance for the Department of Defense (DoD) and provided the DoN with the best balance
of naval capabilities.
Currently, the budgetary uncertainty including the CR is driving changes to our force posture
and operational capability absent any major review of strategic priorities and national
security objectives. As the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps testified to the House Armed Services Committee earlier this month, there is no
question we must get our nation’s fiscal house in order. But we should do so in a coherent
and thoughtful manner to ensure we have the weapon systems needed to project power and
maintain appropriate readiness levels. Unless we change course, we may, without proper
deliberation, dramatically impact our global presence and our material readiness (afloat and
ashore). Further, we risk damaging the military industrial base we depend upon to build and
maintain our weapon systems and rely upon to surge to meet urgent operational needs.
A restrictive year-long CR and nine years of reduced budgets triggered by sequestration will
leave ships in ports, aircraft grounded for want of necessary maintenance, reduced flying
hours, units only partially trained, and a force reset via new acquisition and modernization
programs delayed, restructured, or canceled. Our concern is we will not have the ready forces
when it matters and where it matters most to respond to crisis, assure allies, build
partnerships, deter aggression, and contain conflict.
PERSONNEL/ACQUISITION/INDUSTRIAL BASE IMPACTS
National Economy/Employment Impacts:
The DoN $7.8 billion dollar sequestration investment reduction would potentially impact
over 100,000 private sector jobs across the nation considering direct and indirect impacts to
the economy.
DoN Personnel Impacts:
The DoN relies on a ‘total force’ of military (active and reserve) and civilian personnel to
execute its mission. While military personnel accounts are exempt from sequestration in
Fiscal Year 2013, the uncertainty of this year’s fiscal action has already had a tangible effect
on our civilian workforce as well as intangible effects on military personnel. Due to the
possibility of the current CR being extended to a full year, the Navy has implemented an
across the board hiring freeze for civilian positions and released many temporary employees.
The Navy also started planning for civilian furloughs in case sequestration and full year CR
were to occur.
Hiring Freeze: We estimate that the hiring freeze has already impacted over 1,000 Navy-
wide vacancies. With an average Navy-wide civilian personnel attrition rate of
approximately 350 per week, or approximately 18,000 vacancies per year, the impacts to the
workforce are severe. The Marine Corps, which is not immediately implementing an across-
the-board hiring freeze because it instituted hiring freezes in 2011 and 2012, is limiting
expenditures on civilian labor resulting in approximately 400 full-time equivalents below
2010 levels.
Temporary Civilian Employees: In total, the Navy is planning to release more than 650
temporary civilian employees representing approximately 25 percent of this workforce.
Furloughs: In accordance with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) guidance, the
DoN is continuing to review the implications of sequestration-driven furloughs of up to
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195,000 civilian employees. Furloughs will affect all fifty states and our internationally
based workforce. We assess the impact of a 22 work day furlough in the latter half of this
fiscal year will result in an approximate 20 percent pay reduction for affected employees
during this period. With Congressional Notification provided on February 20, 2013, we
anticipate furloughs could commence in the April 2013 timeframe. Consequently, the
impacts to the civilian workforce are detrimental not to only the affected employees – but to
their families, the DoN mission, and local economies.
In addition to the direct loss of labor hours, the workforce impacts of a year-long CR and
sequestration will also lead to inefficiencies caused by loss of learning; productivity losses;
cost increases driven by lengthening schedules; increased burdens on military personnel; and
lower morale – all of which translates to reduced readiness. For example, the civilian hiring
freeze and overtime restrictions in Naval Shipyards have already caused non-recoverable
impacts to the shipyards’ ability to execute many assigned workloads and nuclear submarine
availabilities while threatening to impact Docking Planned Incremental Availabilities for the
USS EISENHOWER (CVN 69) and the USS JOHN C. STENNIS (CVN 74).
Major Acquisition Programs
The combined effects of a full-year CR, including the current prohibition on new starts and
increases in rates of production, and a reduction of about $8 billion in DoN Fiscal Year 2013
investment accounts due to sequestration are far reaching – with impacts to naval aviation,
ground-warfare systems, strike weapons, research & development, shipbuilding and the
associated support, training, and outfitting required for current and future readiness.
The impact of sequestration in Fiscal Year 2013 would result in a loss of more than $1.0
billion in aircraft production. The reductions will affect the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, H-1
Huey and Cobra Rotary-Wing Aircraft, P-8 Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft, E-2D
Hawkeye Surveillance Aircraft, Vertical Take-Off Unmanned Aerial Aircraft (VTUAV), and
the Small Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle production lines. Further, the Department
would delay the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of VTUAV Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance in support of Special Operations Forces. We also expect to see unit price
increases in current and future single-year procurements for tactical, surveillance, rotary-
wing, and unmanned systems. An additional $1.0 billion dollar impact will affect aviation
supporting elements impacting trainers and simulators, stand-up of the MV-22 Osprey depot-
level maintenance capability, ground support equipment, and spare parts for all for all
aircraft types/models/series. These supporting elements are key contributors to maintaining
the readiness of operational aircraft and aircrews.
Examples of the impacts due to a strict year-long CR include the inability to transition to an
MV-22 multi-year procurement, resulting in approximately $1.1 billion in additional
program cost to deliver the same number of aircraft; the inability to execute new starts for
KC-130J, which extends their delivery schedule; delayed development of the multi-
intelligence sensor causing a one-year delivery delay to MQ-4C Triton unmanned aircraft;
and delays in fielding radar and infra-red search and track upgrades for F/A-18 aircraft.
Current CR restrictions and potential sequestration-driven decreases to naval aviation
readiness would impact Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRS), reduce rotary-wing readiness
in support of swarming boat defense, airborne mine counter-measures and anti-submarine
warfare, and cancel aircraft and engine depot inductions in the 3rd/4th quarter of Fiscal Year
2013. Depot cancellations jeopardize planned aircraft modernization, mission system
software capability improvements, fatigue-life management, depot support, and our flight
hour program.
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Aviation depot maintenance is critical to the long-term health of the force and our ability to
meet mission tasking for both the Navy and Marine Corps. The combined impacts of full-
year CR restrictions and sequestration on the operation and maintenance of Navy aircraft will
be to degrade mission readiness, both to our Carrier Air Wings and other critical tactical
helicopter and maritime patrol aircraft. The cancelling of depot engine and engine module
inductions during the 3rd/4th quarter will impact engine and engine module inventories
necessary for flight-line aircraft, spare parts, and war-time reserve.
Similarly, Marine Corps readiness will be degraded. Beyond twelve-months, we project
impact to all Marine Corps home-station fixed-wing units. Specifically, USMC F/A-18
fixed-wing squadrons will have, on average, approximately only five of twelve assigned
aircraft on the ramp due to aviation depot shutdowns. Causing further concern is that an
extended CR, combined with sequestration, could impact our ‘next-to-deploy’ and some
deployed forces. Across the DoN, there will be a total of 327 aircraft and over 1,200 engine
modules that will miss induction in the 3rd/4th quarter of Fiscal Year 2013 due to CR and
sequestration, with several years required to recover the backlog. If the forecast impacts were
to occur, we would not be able to recover in a timely manner, even if funding were restored.
Our flight hour program is critical to maintaining our near-term ability to safely and
effectively meet tasking. Decreasing flight hours raises the risk to flight safety and aircrew
proficiency. For example, in non-deployed Marine Corps F/A-18 squadrons, pilots will
average seven flight hours per month, well below the historically proven average of fifteen
flight hours per pilot required to maintain safe flight and minimum aircrew proficiency.
The entirety of the Marine Corps Fiscal Year 2013 ground material modernization
investment is only $2.5 billion, comprising 12 percent of the baseline budget. Further
reductions in ground investment accounts, although proportional to the other services in
terms of a percentage reduction, will have disproportional impact on Marine Corps
modernization and readiness, particularly after a decade of increased operational tempo. The
impending sequestration will cause a cut of over $850 million dollars and delay efforts of
multiple ground programs directly impacting delivery of future capabilities. Examples
include reduced procurement and installation of safety and force protection modification kits
on both the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement and Logistics Vehicle System
Replacement trucks which will decrease overall fleet capability. Program delays to the
Amphibious Combat Vehicle will result in the Marines being required to operate and
maintain the already 40-year old Assault Amphibious Vehicle for at least the next decade.
Due to sequestration our weapons and ammo procurement accounts will be reduced by
approximately $450 million dollars. Impacts will occur to sea-strike and sea-shield weapons
procurement that include a reduction of over 200 air-launched weapons for air-to-air and air-
to-ground combat; more than 50 sea-launched weapons, including our front-line, deep-strike
land-attack weapons; and nearly all of our ammo and direct attack munitions accounts. Since
many of our weapons programs are already at minimum sustaining rates, further quantity
reductions will jeopardize the supplier base and drive higher unit production costs.
Additionally, we will reduce procurement of acoustic device countermeasure systems
impacting ship torpedo defense and reduce systems engineering and technical assistance
oversight of our Mobile User Objective System (MUOS).
Early research, development, test and evaluation is integral to weapon system development.
These efforts will be impacted by sequestration, resulting in reductions totaling more than
$1.6 billion dollars. Cuts will occur in university research initiatives, applied research, in-
house laboratories, and the research and development for major acquisition programs.
Acquisition program impacts include:
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• Delays in Joint Strike Fighter at-sea testing due to postponement of required ship
modifications, air-ship integration activities, and reduced progress on development of a
deployable Autonomous Logistics Information System;
• A two-year delay in the MQ-4/Triton Unmanned Air System;
• Delays in CH-53K development; and
• Delays in the Multi-Stage Supersonic Target impacting completion of operational testing
for Nuclear Aircraft Carriers, Standard Missile-2, Rolling Airframe Missile, Evolved Sea
Sparrow Missile, Ship Self Defense System, Littoral Combat Ship, Amphibious Assault
Ships (LHA), and DDG 1000.
All of these delays drive cost increases into the programs and result in less capability
delivered for each defense dollar spent.
Sequestration will impact our nuclear aircraft carrier force structure and the one-year CR
impacts contract awards for carrier refueling. Specifically, the current CR would delay the
contract award for the next Ford Class carrier, JOHN F. KENNEDY (CVN 79) and
sequestration would further slow construction, which would result in a delivery delay.
Current CR funding limitations would delay the completion of Nuclear Refueling Complex
Overhaul (RCOH) for USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71), the start of RCOHs for
USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN 72), and the defueling of USS ENTERPRISE (CVN
65). Given the short time available between sequential dry-docks, the CVN 72 and CVN 65
delays will also likely cause day-for-day impacts to the follow-on CVN 73 RCOH. The CVN
72 and CVN 73 delays will not be recoverable.
Industrial Base
Sequestration’s shadow engenders large uncertainties for the DoN as a whole and in
particular our defense industrial base. We have observed prior disruptions to industry
resulting in a loss of talent, a loss of learning, and a reduction to quality.
As Secretary Panetta has stated, sequestration also puts at risk a defense strategy established,
in part, to ensure the United States maintains its industrial base and is not driven to contract
with overseas companies to keep its technological edge.
For the DoN, sequestration will impact all 50 states – from prime contractors, to the supplier
base, and to the scientific, engineering, and technical services sectors. Assuming a nine-
percent sequestration reduction for the March 1 and March 27 potential orders combined, we
project industry contract awards will be reduced by approximately $6.7B in Fiscal Year
2013.
Delayed weapon system production and cancelled maintenance and repair will immediately
impact aircraft, missile, and land system manufacturers and our military industrial supplier
base. The projected loss of work in Fiscal Year 2013 alone will further stress smaller
businesses that provide supplies and services to major manufacturers which have already
been negatively impacted due to the general downward trend in defense spending. Many
small businesses, which are often the sole-source for aircraft, missile, and land-system
components, may be driven to shut down if meaningful disruptions to planned workload
occur. Once these companies, their engineers and skilled workers move on to other work,
they are hard and sometimes impossible to reconstitute, even if our national security requires
it. With many weapon systems already at minimum sustaining rates and extended production
runs, we are continually faced with the challenges of parts obsolescence that will be further
exacerbated by sequestration and year-long CR disruptions.
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What cannot be measured is the percentage of the supplier base that has decided, or will
decide, that it is no longer in their economic best interests to participate in the defense sector
due to business base uncertainties driven by frequent CRs, sequestration, and the prospect of
nine years of continuing budget uncertainty. When suppliers determine that they can no
longer rely on future work, or conclude that the regulatory and contractual environment is
unavailing to a reasonably predictable business base, they will adapt and may turn to other
economic sectors.
SUMMARY
We ask that Congress act quickly to eliminate the threats posed by sequestration and a year-
long CR by developing a coherent, balanced approach to deficit reduction that addresses our
national security interests. The Department requests Congress pass a Fiscal Year 2013
Defense Appropriations bill and eliminate sequestration. If that course of action proves
untenable, we request Congress at least act quickly to modify the CR to help us get the funds
in the correct accounts, and allow for new starts, rate increases, and quantity variations that
address our Fiscal Year 2013 CR-related readiness shortfalls and acquisition requirements.
Such actions related to the CR; however, will do little to mitigate the significant cuts
required by sequestration.
We understand the importance of resolving our fiscal challenges to ensure our nation’s
security and future prosperity and look forward to working with Congress to ensure our
Navy and Marine Corps remain the world’s preeminent maritime and expeditionary force.
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Appendix G. March 2, 2013, Navy Message on
Navy’s Response to Sequestration
This appendix reprints the text of a March 2, 2013, Secretary of the Navy message to Navy
personnel on the Navy’s response to sequestration.30
The enactment on March 26, 2013, of H.R. 933/P.L. 113-6, which includes the FY2013 DOD
Appropriations Act as Division C, mooted the possibility of a year-long CR for DOD in FY2013.
Navy officials caution that Navy estimates of exact dollar figures for sequester impacts on
individual Navy programs issued prior to March 26, 2013, might need to be revised in light of the
enactment of H.R. 933/P.L. 113-6, because those estimates might have been based on the
scenario of a year-long CR for DOD in FY2013 based on FY2012 funding levels.
The text of the message is as follows:
DTG 022300Z Mar 13
FM SECNAV WASHINGTON DC
TO ALNAV
INFO SECNAV WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
BT
UNCLAS
ALNAV 014/13
MSGID/GENADMIN/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC/-/MAR//
SUBJ/DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY RESPONSE TO SEQUESTRATION//
RMKS/1. LAST NIGHT, BECAUSE NO BUDGET DEAL HAD BEEN REACHED, THE
BUDGET CONTROL ACT REQUIRED SETTING IN MOTION THE AUTOMATIC,
GOVERNMENT-WIDE CUTS KNOWN AS SEQUESTRATION. GIVEN THAT
REALITY AND THE ASSOCIATED IMPACT OF BUDGETARY UNCERTAINTY
IMPOSED BY AN INDEFINITE CONTINUING RESOLUTION, THE DEPARTMENT
OF THE NAVY INTENDS TO COMMENCE SOME REDUCTIONS IMMEDIATELY.
2. NAVY PLANS TO:
30 The text of the message was posted at InsideDefense.com (subscription required) on March 3, 2013, and at other web
sites.
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A. SHUT DOWN CARRIER AIR WING TWO (CVW-2) IN APRIL. THIS WILL
INITIATE THE PREPARATIONS TO GRADUALLY STAND-DOWN FLYING IN AT
LEAST THREE ADDITIONAL AIR WINGS WITH TWO MORE AIR WINGS BEING
REDUCED TO MINIMUM SAFE FLYING LEVELS BY THE END OF THE YEAR; B.
DEFER USNS COMFORT HUMANITARIAN DEPLOYMENT TO CENTRAL AND
SOUTH AMERICA, $B!H(JCONTINUING PROMISE 2013$B!m(J, INCLUDING
SUPPORTING SHIPS, SEABEES, AND MEDICAL UNITS; C. CANCEL OR DEFER
THE DEPLOYMENTS OF UP TO SIX SHIPS TO VARIOUS AORS THROUGHOUT
THE MONTH OF APRIL; D. LAY UP FOUR COMBAT LOGISTICS FORCE (CLF)
UNITS IN PACOM STARTING IN APRIL; E. RETURN USS SHOUP (DDG 86) TO
HOMEPORT EARLY AND NOT PROCEED AS USS NIMITZ (CVN 68) ESCORT TO
CENTCOM; F. RETURN USS THACH (FFG 43) TO HOMEPORT EARLY FROM
DEPLOYMENT TO SOUTHCOM.
3. WE WILL ALSO IMMEDIATELY:
A. BEGIN NEGOTIATING CONTRACT MODIFICATIONS TO DE-OBLIGATE
EFFORTS FOR ANY INVESTMENT PROGRAMS FOR WHICH THE REMAINING
UNOBLIGATED BALANCE WILL BE INSUFFICIENT AFTER THE
SEQUESTRATION REDUCTION IS APPLIED. MAJOR PROGRAMS AFFECTED
INCLUDE VIRGINIA-CLASS SSN ADVANCE PROCUREMENT, REACTOR POWER
UNITS AND JOINT HIGH SPEED VESSEL (JHSV 10); B. COMMENCE FINAL
PLANNING TO SLOW MARINE CORPS DEPOT MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES,
INCLUDING REDUCTIONS IN THE NON-PERMANENT WORKFORCE; C. CANCEL
MARCH INTRODUCTORY FLIGHT SCREENING FOR FUTURE PILOTS/NFOS; D.
ANNOUNCE INTENT TO CANCEL BLUE ANGELS SHOWS SCHEDULED FOR
APRIL 2013 [FOUR SHOWS: MACDILL AFB (TAMPA, FL), NAS CORPUS CHRISTI
TX, VIDALIA GA, MCAS BEAUFORT SC]; E. CEASE NEW USMC ENROLLMENTS
IN VOLUNTARY EDUCATION TUITION ASSISTANCE; F. CANCEL MARCH NAVY
RECRUITING MEDIA SUPPORT AND REDUCE THE MAJORITY OF ADVERTISING
CONTRACTS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE UNDER CONTRACTUAL CONDITIONS.
4. THESE ACTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN TO PRESERVE SUPPORT FOR THOSE
FORCES STATIONED OVERSEAS AND CURRENTLY FORWARD-DEPLOYED.
REDUCTIONS IN LOWER-PRIORITY FORWARD OPERATIONS, AND SIGNIFICANT
REDUCTIONS IN ALL OTHER OPERATIONS, TRAINING, AND MAINTENANCE
ARE THE RESULTS OF THIS SELECTION PROCESS. WE MADE THESE CHOICES
CAREFULLY, WHILE TRYING TO PRESERVE OUR ABILITY TO REVERSE OR
QUICKLY RESTORE NEGATIVE EFFECTS IF AND WHEN FUNDING IS RESTORED.
5. ACTIONS WE HAVE TAKEN TO DATE WILL CONTINUE, TO INCLUDE THOSE
AFFECTING THE DEFERRAL OF MAINTENANCE FOR USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN
(CVN 72); THE DEFERRAL OF REPAIR WORK FOR USS MIAMI (SSN 755) AND USS
PORTER (DDG 78); THE DELAYED DEPLOYMENT OF USS HARRY S TRUMAN
(CVN 75) AND USS GETTYSBURG (CG 64); THE CIVILIAN HIRING FREEZE; THE
PLANNING FOR CIVILIAN FURLOUGHS; AND THE REDUCTION OF ALL
TRAINING NOT RELATED TO THE READINESS OF DEPLOYED OR NEXT-TO-
DEPLOY FORCES.
6. NAVY DEPARTMENT LEADERSHIP UNDERSTANDS THE UNCERTAINTY THAT
THESE AND OTHER DECISIONS CREATE BOTH AMONGST OUR PEOPLE AND IN
THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY UPON WHICH WE RELY. THE LACK OF A
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO AVOID SEQUESTRATION IS DEEPLY
REGRETTABLE. THAT SAID, WE MUST ENDEAVOR TO DEAL WITH THE
SITUATION AS WE FACE IT, NOT AS WE WISH IT COULD OTHERWISE BE. WE
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WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP THE SAFETY AND WELL-BEING OF OUR PEOPLE
FOREMOST IN MIND, EVEN AS WE TRY HARD TO KEEP WHOLE THE FORCE
STRUCTURE WHICH SUPPORTS THEM. WE WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO KEEP THE
FLEET AND FLEET MARINE FORCE FULLY INFORMED AS FOLLOW-ON
DECISIONS ARE MADE.
7. RELEASED BY RAY MABUS, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.// BT
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Appendix H. January 25, 2013, Navy Memorandum
on Potential CR and Sequester Impacts
This appendix reprints a January 25, 2013, Navy memorandum on potential impacts of a year-
long continuing resolution (CR) and sequestration.31
The enactment on March 26, 2013, of H.R. 933/P.L. 113-6, which includes the FY2013 DOD
Appropriations Act as Division C, mooted the possibility of a year-long CR for DOD in FY2013.
Navy officials caution that Navy estimates of exact dollar figures for sequester impacts on
individual Navy programs issued prior to March 26, 2013, might need to be revised in light of the
enactment of H.R. 933/P.L. 113-6, because those estimates might have been based on the
scenario of a year-long CR for DOD in FY2013 based on FY2012 funding levels.
The memorandum begins on the next page.
31 The memorandum was posted at InsideDefense.com (subscription required) and other internet sites.
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Appendix I. February 15, 2013, Navy Briefing Slides
on Potential CR and Sequester Impacts
This appendix reprints February 15, 2013, Navy briefing slides on potential impacts of a year-
long continuing resolution (CR) and sequestration.32
The enactment on March 26, 2013, of H.R. 933/P.L. 113-6, which includes the FY2013 DOD
Appropriations Act as Division C, mooted the possibility of a year-long CR for DOD in FY2013.
Navy officials caution that Navy estimates of exact dollar figures for sequester impacts on
individual Navy programs issued prior to March 26, 2013, might need to be revised in light of the
enactment of H.R. 933/P.L. 113-6, because those estimates might have been based on the
scenario of a year-long CR for DOD in FY2013 based on FY2012 funding levels.
The briefing slides begin on the next page.
32 The briefing slides were posted at InsideDefense.com (subscription required).
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CRS-52
CRS-53
CRS-54
CRS-55
CRS-56
CRS-57
CRS-58
CRS-59
CRS-60
CRS-61
CRS-62
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Appendix J. February 28, 2013, Navy Briefing Slides
on Potential CR and Sequester Impacts
This appendix reprints February 28, 2013, Navy briefing slides on potential impacts of a year-
long continuing resolution (CR) and sequestration.33
The enactment on March 26, 2013, of H.R. 933/P.L. 113-6, which includes the FY2013 DOD
Appropriations Act as Division C, mooted the possibility of a year-long CR for DOD in FY2013.
Navy officials caution that Navy estimates of exact dollar figures for sequester impacts on
individual Navy programs issued prior to March 26, 2013, might need to be revised in light of the
enactment of H.R. 933/P.L. 113-6, because those estimates might have been based on the
scenario of a year-long CR for DOD in FY2013 based on FY2012 funding levels.
The briefing slides begin on the next page.
33 The briefing slides were posted at InsideDefense.com (subscription required).
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CRS-64
CRS-65
CRS-66
CRS-67
CRS-68
CRS-69
CRS-70
CRS-71
CRS-72
CRS-73
CRS-74
CRS-75
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
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