North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear
Diplomacy, and Internal Situation
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Ian E. Rinehart
Analyst in Asian Affairs
April 5, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41259
CRS Report for Congress
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epared for Members and Committees of Congress
North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation
Summary
North Korea has been among the most vexing and persistent problems in U.S. foreign policy in
the post-Cold War period. The United States has never had formal diplomatic relations with the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (the official name for North Korea). Negotiations over
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program have consumed the past three U.S. administrations, even
as some analysts anticipated a collapse of the isolated authoritarian regime. North Korea has been
the recipient of well over $1 billion in U.S. aid and the target of dozens of U.S. sanctions.
This report provides background information on the negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear
weapons program that began in the early 1990s under the Clinton Administration. As U.S. policy
toward Pyongyang evolved through the George W. Bush and Obama presidencies, the
negotiations moved from mostly bilateral to the multilateral Six-Party Talks (made up of China,
Japan, Russia, North Korea, South Korea, and the United States). Although the negotiations have
reached some key agreements that lay out deals for aid and recognition to North Korea in
exchange for denuclearization, major problems with implementation have persisted. With Six-
Party Talks suspended since 2009, concern about proliferation to other actors has grown.
After Kim Jong-il’s sudden death in December 2011, his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, has steadily
consolidated his authority as supreme leader. Bilateral agreements with the United States in
February 2012 involving the provision of aid and freezing some nuclear activities fell apart after
Pyongyang launched a rocket in April 2012. Prospects for further negotiations dimmed further
after another, more successful, launch in December 2012 and a third nuclear test in February
2013. In response to new U.N. sanctions, Pyongyang sharply escalated its rhetoric and took a
number of provocative steps. The U.S. reaction included muscular displays of its military
commitments to defend South Korea and moves to bolster its missile defense capabilities.
North Korea’s actions present renewed questions for the Obama Administration. Does the nuclear
test, along with a successful missile launch last year, fundamentally change the strategic calculus?
Has North Korea’s capacity to hurt U.S. interests, up to and including a strike on the United
States itself, increased to the point that military options will be considered more carefully? Is
returning to the Six-Party Talks, dormant since 2008, still a goal? Relatedly, does the United
States need a strategy that relies less on Beijing’s willingness to punish Pyongyang? Do North
Korea’s advances mean that the policy of “strategic patience” is too risky to continue? More
broadly, to what degree should the United States attempt to isolate the regime diplomatically and
financially? Should those efforts be balanced with engagement initiatives that continue to push
for steps toward denuclearization? Have the North’s nuclear and missile tests and attacks on
South Korea demonstrated that regime change is the only way to peaceful resolution?
Although the primary focus of U.S. policy toward North Korea is the nuclear weapons program,
there are a host of other issues, including Pyongyang’s missile programs, illicit activities, and
abysmal human rights record. Modest attempts at engaging North Korea remain suspended along
with the nuclear negotiations.
This report will be updated periodically. (This report covers the overall U.S.-North Korea
relationship, with an emphasis on the diplomacy of the Six-Party Talks. For information on the
technical issues involved in North Korea’s weapons programs and delivery systems, as well as the
steps involved in denuclearization, please see the companion piece to this report, CRS Report
RL34256, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, by Mary Beth Nikitin. Please refer
to the list at the end of this report for CRS reports focusing on other North Korean issues.)
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North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation
Contents
Latest Developments........................................................................................................................ 1
Overview ................................................................................................................................... 1
Nuclear Test and U.N. Reaction ................................................................................................ 1
North Korea’s Flurry of Provocative Steps and Harsh Rhetoric ............................................... 2
China’s Approach ...................................................................................................................... 2
U.S. and South Korean Response .............................................................................................. 2
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 5
Overview of Past U.S. Policy on North Korea .......................................................................... 5
Obama Administration North Korea Policy ..................................................................................... 6
Food Aid Debate Within U.S. Government ............................................................................... 8
North Korean Behavior During Obama Administration ............................................................ 8
Pattern of Conciliation and Provocations ............................................................................ 9
String of Provocations in 2010 ............................................................................................ 9
Renewed Engagement, “Leap Day Agreement,” and Satellite Launches ......................... 10
Third Nuclear Test ............................................................................................................. 10
Background: History of Nuclear Negotiations .............................................................................. 11
Six-Party Talks ........................................................................................................................ 11
China’s Role ............................................................................................................................ 12
North Korea’s Internal Situation .................................................................................................... 13
Succession Process .................................................................................................................. 13
The First Year Under Kim Jong-un ......................................................................................... 14
Leadership and State Institutions ............................................................................................. 14
Expanding Sphere of Information ........................................................................................... 15
Relations with China ............................................................................................................... 15
Other U.S. Concerns with North Korea ......................................................................................... 16
North Korea’s Missile Programs ............................................................................................. 16
Foreign Connections ......................................................................................................... 17
Regional Missile Defense Systems.......................................................................................... 18
North Korea’s Human Rights Record ...................................................................................... 18
North Korean Refugees ..................................................................................................... 20
The North Korean Human Rights Act ............................................................................... 20
North Korea’s Illicit Activities ................................................................................................ 22
U.S. Engagement Activities with North Korea .............................................................................. 22
U.S. Assistance to North Korea ............................................................................................... 22
POW-MIA Recovery Operations in North Korea .................................................................... 23
Potential for Establishing a Liaison Office in North Korea ..................................................... 23
Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities ......................................................................... 24
List of Other CRS Reports on North Korea ................................................................................... 25
Archived Reports for Background ........................................................................................... 25
Figures
Figure 1. Korean Peninsula .............................................................................................................. 4
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Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 26
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 26
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Latest Developments
Overview
Since December 2012, North Korea has initiated a string of provocations that dimmed any hopes
that new leader Kim Jong-un would lead his country in a new direction. After launching a long-
range rocket in December—the second in 2012—Pyongyang conducted a nuclear test in February
2013 and amplified its rhetoric against South Korea and the United States to include the threat of
pre-emptive nuclear strikes. In the weeks since the nuclear test, tensions have continued to ratchet
up on the Korean Peninsula as North Korea issues a steady stream of threats and hostile
measures. South Korea, under new President Park Geun-hye, and the United States have in turn
indicated their resolve to defend their interests and respond to any new attack. Although few of
the moves by either side are without precedent, the pace and intensity of the exchange is at a pitch
that increases the chances for a confrontation, particularly with the presence of Kim Jong-un, a
young, new leader at North Korea’s helm. In addition, South Korea has declared new policies of
pre-empting an imminent attack or retaliating more forcefully against an attack.
Analysts believe that North Korea’s behavior is likely driven by two main factors: Kim Jong-un’s
domestic standing and pressuring other countries (particularly the United States) to return to
negotiations. Pyongyang may be calculating that it can gain concessions from other countries,
despite the international condemnation and increasing isolation of the reclusive nation.
North Korea’s actions present renewed questions for the Obama Administration. Does the nuclear
test, along with a successful missile launch last year, fundamentally change the strategic calculus?
Has North Korea’s capacity to hurt U.S. interests, up to and including a strike on the United
States itself, increased to the point that military options will be considered more carefully? Is
returning to the Six-Party Talks1 over North Korea’s nuclear program, dormant since 2008, still a
goal? Relatedly, does the United States need a strategy that relies less on Beijing’s willingness to
punish Pyongyang? Do North Korea’s advances mean that the Administration’s policy of
“strategic patience” is too risky to continue?
Nuclear Test and U.N. Reaction
On February 12, 2013, North Korea conducted its third nuclear test.2 Pyongyang had threatened
to do so since early 2013. North Korean authorities proclaimed that the test used a “miniaturized
lighter nuclear device with greater explosive force.” Nuclear experts have not been able to
determine the explosive force of the nuclear weapon, nor whether it used uranium or plutonium,
but the seismic magnitude of the test indicates that the North Koreans appear to be closer to their
objective. Many analysts believe that North Korea’s goal is to develop a nuclear warhead small
enough to mount on their medium- and long-range ballistic missiles. The missile tests conducted
in 2012 under the guise of satellite launches displayed the increasing capability of Pyongyang’s
long-range missile program, although the tests fell short of demonstrating the ability to strike
distant targets accurately.
1 The Six-Party Talks are multilateral negotiations that include the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China,
Russia, and Japan.
2 For details on the test, please see CRS Report RL34256, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, by Mary
Beth Nikitin.
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After the February 12 test, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution that
condemned the test and imposed a new round of sanctions on North Korea. It is significant that
China assented to the new sanctions, which tighten existing restrictions on North Korean banking
and commerce and add enforcement measures. The resolution particularly targeted cash transfers
that are believed to fund North Korea’s weapons programs and luxury items favored by the ruling
elite.
North Korea’s Flurry of Provocative Steps and Harsh Rhetoric
North Korea responded to the imposition of new sanctions with another round of escalatory
measures. Pyongyang pledged to improve and expand its missile programs to gain the ability to
hit U.S. territory; announced that it was nullifying the 1953 armistice that halted fighting during
the Korean War; cut off the last existing military hotline that existed with South Korea; declared
that it was restarting its Yongbyon plutonium reactor to increase its nuclear weapons arsenal; and
blocked South Korean workers from crossing the border for work at the Kaesong industrial
complex, the last remaining cooperative economic project between the two Koreas.
On March 20, 2013, cyberattacks paralyzed the computer networks of three major South Korean
banks and two television networks. Officials from South Korea and the United States did not
identify a culprit, as the investigations may take weeks or longer, but many analysts suspect that
North Korea was behind the attacks. Just five days earlier, North Korea had blamed the United
States and South Korea for an internet shutdown in Pyongyang that occurred March 10-11, 2013.
In a seemingly incongruous move, in April the Kim government reappointed Pak Pong-ju as
premier; Pak was removed from this post in 2007 after he proposed a U.S.-style wage system and
is known as an advocate of economic reform. Since becoming supreme leader, Kim’s government
has made a number of announcements that it would try to encourage more foreign investment and
some economic changes. However, few if any North Korea-watchers believe that these moves
represent fundamental economic reforms.
China’s Approach
China’s willingness to sign on to the UNSC resolution reportedly conveyed Beijing’s frustration
with Pyongyang. Enhancing the effectiveness of the existing sanctions relies almost entirely on
Chinese enforcement. China accounts for roughly 60% of North Korea’s trade and in the past has
taken a minimalist approach to implementing sanctions. However, despite China’s agreement on
the new restrictions, subsequent statements by Chinese leaders indicated that they had not altered
their fundamental stance toward North Korea. To Beijing, a collapse of the Pyongyang
government conjures a dire scenario: a destabilizing flood of refugees across its border and the
possibility of a U.S.-allied united Korean Peninsula.
Some observers have expressed hope that new Chinese leader Xi Jinping may be reconsidering
China’s North Korea policy. Shortly after the North’s test, a prominent editor of a Chinese
Communist Party journal wrote in an article for the Financial Times that Beijing’s alliance with
North Korea was “outdated” and that China should consider abandoning Pyongyang. However,
the editor was later suspended from his post as a consequence.
U.S. and South Korean Response
As North Korea intensified its rhetoric, the United States and South Korea carried out previously
scheduled joint military exercises, further raising Pyongyang’s ire. The United States sent a B-2
stealth bomber on a practice sortie over South Korea, as well as B-52 bombers and F-22 fighters,
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underscoring its commitment to protecting South Korea under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella.”
National Security Advisor Tom Donilon emphasized in a prominent speech that the United States
would draw upon its full range of capabilities to defend U.S. and allied interests against North
Korean threats. U.S. and South Korean military officials announced new contingency plans that
defined how U.S. and Korean forces would react to further provocations from North Korea. The
Pentagon announced that the United States would increase the number of interceptors at its
missile defense facilities on the West Coast and that it would deploy an advanced missile defense
system to Guam ahead of schedule to counter the growing threat from North Korea.
The U.S. moves and announcements may have been designed to both reassure Japan and South
Korea of the American security guarantee as well as to send a strong signal to China. North
Korea’s threats encourage more advanced military cooperation between the United States and its
allies, particularly on ballistic missile defense, that many Chinese see as contrary to their national
security interests.
As South Korean President Park Geun-hye has established her administration, she has both
responded firmly to the threat of an attack from the North and followed through on her campaign
promise to reach out to Pyongyang through a “trust-building” policy. While she ordered her
military to be prepared to respond with force to any provocation, her government also said she
would de-link humanitarian concerns from the nuclear program in the initial phase of reaching
out to the Kim regime.
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Figure 1. Korean Peninsula
Sources: Prepared by CRS based on ESRI Data and Maps 9.3.1; IHS World Data.
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Introduction
An impoverished nation of about 23 million people, North Korea has been among the most
vexing and persistent problems in U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. The United
States has never had formal diplomatic relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK, the official name for North Korea). Negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear weapons
program have consumed the past three administrations, even as some analysts anticipated a
collapse of the isolated authoritarian regime in Pyongyang. North Korea has been both the
recipient of billions of dollars of U.S. aid and the target of dozens of U.S. sanctions. Once
considered a relic of the Cold War, the divided Korean peninsula has become an arena of more
subtle strategic and economic competition among the region’s powers.
U.S. interests in North Korea encompass crucial security, political, and human rights concerns.
Bilateral military alliances with the Republic of Korea (ROK, the official name for South Korea)
and Japan obligate the United States to defend these allies from any attack from the North. Tens
of thousands of U.S. troops occupying the largest U.S. military bases in the Pacific are stationed
within proven striking range of North Korean missiles. An outbreak of conflict on the Korean
peninsula or the collapse of the government in Pyongyang would have severe implications for the
regional—if not global—economy. Negotiations and diplomacy surrounding North Korea’s
nuclear weapons program influence U.S. relations with all the major powers in the region and
have become a particularly complicating factor for Sino-U.S. ties.
At the center of this complicated intersection of geostrategic interests is the task of dealing with
an isolated authoritarian regime, now under the additional pressure of executing a transfer of
power following the death of leader Kim Jong-il in December 2011. Unfettered by many of the
norms that govern international diplomacy, the leadership in Pyongyang, now headed by its
dynastic “Great Successor” Kim Jong-un, is unpredictable and opaque. So little is known about
the new leader that the uncertainty surrounding policymaking in Pyongyang may be more murky
than it was under Kim Jong-il. U.S. policymakers face a daunting challenge in navigating a
course toward a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue with a rogue actor.
In the long run, the ideal outcome remains, presumably, reunification of the Korean peninsula
under stable democratic rule. At this point, however, the road to that result appears fraught with
risks. If the Pyongyang regime falls due to internal or external forces, the potential for major
strategic consequences (including competition for control of the North’s nuclear arsenal) and a
massive humanitarian crisis, not to mention long-term economic and social repercussions, loom
large. In the interim, policymakers face deep challenges in even defining achievable objectives,
let alone reaching them.
Overview of Past U.S. Policy on North Korea
Over the past decade, U.S. policy toward North Korea has ranged from direct bilateral
engagement to labeling Pyongyang as part of an “axis of evil.” Despite repeated provocations
from the North, since 1994 there is no publicly available evidence that any U.S. administration
has seriously considered a direct military strike or an explicit policy of regime change due to the
threat of a devastating war on the peninsula. Although there have been periodic efforts to
negotiate a “grand bargain” that addresses the full range of concerns with Pyongyang’s behavior
and activities, North Korea’s nuclear program has usually been prioritized above North Korea’s
human rights record, its missile program, and its illicit and criminal dealings.
Even as the strategic and economic landscape of East Asia has undergone dramatic changes,
North Korea has endured as a major U.S. foreign policy challenge. Washington shifted from a
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primarily bilateral approach for addressing North Korea during the Clinton Administration to a
mostly multilateral framework during the Bush Administration. As the chair of the Six-Party
Talks and North Korea’s only ally, the centrality of China’s role in dealing with Pyongyang has
become increasingly pronounced. North Korea is dependent on China’s economic aid and
diplomatic support for its survival. (See “China’s Role” section below.) Cooperation on North
Korea has competed with other U.S. policy priorities with Beijing such as Iran, currency
adjustment, climate change, and human rights.
Relations with other countries, particularly Japan and South Korea, also influence U.S. policy
toward North Korea. In recent years, Japan’s approach to North Korea has been harder-line than
that of other Six-Party participants, because of stalled progress on resolving the issue of abducted
Japanese citizens. Lee Myung-bak, President of South Korea from 2008 to 2013, was seen as
more hawkish on Pyongyang than his recent predecessors, particularly since the sinking of the
Cheonan in March 2010.
Identifying patterns in North Korean behavior is challenging, as Pyongyang often weaves
together different approaches to the outside world. North Korean behavior has vacillated between
limited cooperation and overt provocations, including testing several ballistic missiles over the
last 15 years and three nuclear devices in 2006, 2009, and 2013. Pyongyang’s willingness to
negotiate has often appeared to be driven by its internal conditions: food shortages or economic
desperation can push North Korea to re-engage in talks, usually to extract more aid from China
or, in the past, from South Korea. North Korea has proven skillful at exploiting divisions among
the other five parties and taking advantage of political transitions in Washington to stall the Six-
Party Talks negotiating process.
At the core of the North Korean issue is the question of what Pyongyang’s leadership ultimately
seeks. As North Korea continues to reject diplomatic solutions to denuclearizing the peninsula,
analysts have begun to coalesce around the consensus that Pyongyang is committed to
maintaining a minimum number of nuclear weapons as a security guarantor. However, debate
rages on the proper strategic response, with options ranging from trying to squeeze the
dictatorship to the point of collapse to buying time and trying to prevent proliferation and other
severely destabilizing events.
Obama Administration North Korea Policy
In his presidential campaign and inaugural address, President Obama indicated a willingness to
engage with “rogue” governments. Even as North Korea carried out a series of provocative acts,
the Obama Administration has maintained a policy toward North Korea known as “strategic
patience,” which essentially waits for North Korea to come back to the negotiating table while
maintaining pressure on the regime. The main elements of the policy involve insisting that
Pyongyang commit to steps toward denuclearization and mend relations with Seoul as a prelude
to returning to the Six-Party Talks; attempting to convince China to take a tougher line on North
Korea; and applying pressure on Pyongyang through arms interdictions and sanctions. U.S.
officials have stated that, under the right conditions, they seek a comprehensive package deal for
North Korea’s complete denuclearization in return for normalization of relations and significant
aid. This policy has been closely coordinated with South Korea and accompanied by large-scale
military exercises designed to demonstrate the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance.
The Administration has formulated its approach to North Korea against the backdrop of its global
nonproliferation agenda. After pledging to work toward a world free of nuclear weapons in an
April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama has taken steps to further that goal, including
signing a new nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia, convening a global leaders’ summit to
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secure stockpiles of nuclear materials, and releasing a new Nuclear Posture Review that outlines
new U.S. guidelines on the use of nuclear weapons. In April 2012, South Korea hosted the second
Nuclear Security Summit, which drew a sharp contrast with North Korea’s destabilizing nuclear
program.
The collapse of the denuclearization talks has intensified concerns about proliferation. Critics
claim that the “strategic patience” approach has allowed Pyongyang to control the situation and
steadily improve its missile and nuclear programs. Because of North Korea’s dire economic
situation, there is a strong fear that it will sell its nuclear technology to another rogue regime or a
non-state actor. Evidence of some cooperation with Syria, Iran, and potentially Burma has
alarmed national security experts. The Israeli bombing of a nuclear facility in Syria in 2007 raised
concern about North Korean collaboration on a nuclear reactor with the Syrians. Reports surface
periodically that established commercial relationships in conventional arms sales between
Pyongyang and several Middle Eastern countries may have expanded into the nuclear realm as
well.3
Despite the overtures for engagement after Obama took office, a series of provocations from
Pyongyang halted progress on furthering negotiations. These violations of international law
initiated a periodic cycle of action and reaction, in which the United States focused on building
consensus at the UNSC and punishing North Korea through enhanced multilateral sanctions. The
long-range ballistic missile test conducted by Pyongyang in May 2009 impelled the UNSC to
issue a rebuke. North Korea followed the missile test with its second nuclear test in November
2009. In response, the United States coordinated passage of UNSC Resolution 1874, which
outlines a series of sanctions to deny financial benefits to the Kim regime. Three years later, this
cycle repeated itself: North Korea launched two long-range missiles in 2012, the UNSC
responded with rebukes, North Korea tested a nuclear device in February 2013, and the United
States again wrangled yet harsher sanctions through the UNSC (Resolutions 2087 and 2094). This
approach to discouraging North Korea’s provocative acts appears to emphasize the participation
and support of China, the country with the greatest leverage on North Korea.
Trilateral coordination of North Korea policy between Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo has been
unprecedented, with ministerial-level meetings in 2011 and 2012. The Cheonan sinking and
Yeonpyeong Island shelling (see “North Korean Behavior During Obama Administration” section
below) elicited a new round of unilateral American sanctions and drew the United States even
closer to its regional allies, South Korea and Japan.4 American and South Korean policies appear
in complete alignment, with both governments insisting that North Korea demonstrate a serious
commitment to implementing the denuclearization aspects of the 2005 Six-Party Talks agreement.
U.S.-South Korean cooperation has been underscored by a series of military exercises in the
waters surrounding the peninsula, as well as symbolic gestures such as the state visit of President
Lee Myung-bak to the White House in October 2011. North-South relations took very modest
steps forward in 2011 through some bilateral meetings, enabling U.S. officials to pursue further
negotiations.
The major exception to the pattern of mutual recrimination occurred in late 2011, shortly before
Kim Jong-il’s death, when the Obama Administration launched bilateral discussions with the
North Koreans to restart negotiations about denuclearization. After Kim’s death, talks stalled, but
3 For more information, see CRS Report RL33590, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by
Larry A. Niksch.
4 For more information, see CRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions, by
Dianne E. Rennack.
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later resumed and resulted in the “Leap Day Agreement” announced on February 29, 2012.
Actually two separate agreements, the deal committed North Korea to a moratorium on nuclear
tests, long-range missile launches, and uranium enrichment activities at the Yongbyon nuclear
facility, as well as the readmission of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors.
The Obama Administration pledged 240,000 metric tons of “nutritional assistance” and steps to
increase cultural and people-to-people exchanges with North Korea. Administration officials
characterized the deal as modest in scope and cautioned that a return to the multilateral Six-Party
talks would still be months away, at best. North Korea scuttled the deal only two months later by
launching a long-range rocket.
Food Aid Debate Within U.S. Government
In early 2011, North Korea issued an appeal for international food aid. A subsequent World Food
Program (WFP) assessment reported in March that a quarter of the North Korean population
nation was facing severe food shortages. A U.S. delegation, led by Special Envoy for Human
Rights in North Korea Ambassador Robert King, visited the nation in May 2011 to carry out its
own assessment. The United States maintains that its food aid policy follows three criteria:
demonstrated need, severity of need compared to other countries, and satisfactory monitoring
systems to ensure food is reaching the most vulnerable. Strong concerns about diversion of aid to
the military and elite exist, although assistance provided in 2008-2009 had operated under an
improved system of monitoring and access negotiated by the Bush Administration. Obama
Administration officials were reportedly divided on whether to authorize new humanitarian
assistance for North Korea, but ultimately decided to offer 240,000 metric tons of food aid as a
confidence building measure within the Leap Day Agreement. Several Members of Congress
have spoken out against the provision of any assistance to Pyongyang because of concerns about
supporting the regime. Yet no aid has been delivered, because U.S. officials are not convinced
that North Korea will respect the monitoring arrangements. In June 2012, a United Nations
evaluation team confirmed that over 60% of the population continues to suffer from chronic food
insecurity.
North Korean Behavior During Obama Administration
Since President Obama took office, North Korea has emphasized two main demands: that it be
recognized as a nuclear weapons state and that a peace treaty with the United States must be a
prerequisite to denuclearization. The former demand presents a diplomatic and semantic
dilemma: despite repeatedly acknowledging that North Korea has produced nuclear weapons,
U.S. officials have insisted that this situation is “unacceptable.” According to statements from
Pyongyang, the latter demand is an issue of building trust between the United States and North
Korea.
After years of observing North Korea’s negotiating behavior, many analysts believe that such
demands are simply tactical moves by Pyongyang and that North Korea has no intention of giving
up its nuclear weapons in exchange for aid and recognition. The Western intervention in Libya,
which abandoned its nuclear weapon program in exchange for the removal of sanctions, had the
undesirable side effect of reinforcing the perceived value of nuclear arms for regime security. In
April 2010, North Korea reiterated its demand to be recognized as an official nuclear weapons
state and said it would increase and modernize its nuclear deterrent. On April 13, 2012, the same
day as the failed rocket launch, the North Korean constitution was revised to describe the country
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as a “nuclear-armed nation.” In March 2013, North Korea declared that its nuclear weapons are
“not a bargaining chip” and would not be relinquished even for “billions of dollars.”5
Pattern of Conciliation and Provocations
North Korea’s behavior has been erratic since the Obama Administration took office. After an
initial string of provocations in 2009, most prominently the May 2009 nuclear test, North Korea
appeared to adjust its approach and launched what some dubbed a “charm offensive” strategy. In
August 2009, Kim Jong-il received former U.S. President Bill Clinton, after which North Korea
released two American journalists who had been held for five months after allegedly crossing the
border into North Korea. The following month, meetings with Chinese officials yielded
encouraging statements about Pyongyang’s willingness to rejoin multilateral talks. A North
Korean delegation traveled to Seoul for the funeral of former South Korean President Kim Dae-
jung and met with President Lee Myung-bak. In early 2010, Pyongyang called for an end to
hostilities with the United States and South Korea. Some observers saw this approach as a
product of deteriorating conditions within North Korea. The impact of international sanctions,
anxiety surrounding the anticipated leadership succession, and reports of rare social unrest in
reaction to a botched attempt at currency reform appeared to be driving Pyongyang’s conciliatory
gestures. (See “North Korea’s Internal Situation” section below.)
String of Provocations in 2010
Expectations of an impending return to multilateral negotiations were altered by the dramatic
sinking of the South Korean navy corvette Cheonan on March 26, taking the lives of 46 sailors on
board. A multinational investigation team led by South Korea determined that the ship was sunk
by a torpedo from a North Korean submarine. The Obama Administration expressed staunch
support for Seoul and embarked on a series of military exercises to demonstrate its commitment.
According to some analysts, the torpedo attack may have been an effort to bolster Kim Jong-il’s
credibility as a strong leader confronting the South, and therefore his authority to select his son,
Kim Jong-un, as successor.6
After the Cheonan incident, Pyongyang initiated further provocations. In November, North Korea
invited a group of U.S. nuclear experts to the Yongbyon nuclear complex to reveal early
construction of an experimental light-water reactor and a small gas centrifuge uranium
enrichment facility. The revelations of possible progress toward another path to a nuclear weapon
prompted speculation that North Korea was attempting to strengthen its bargaining position if the
talks resumed, or perhaps trying to advertise its goods to potential customers. Further, the
sophistication of the uranium enrichment plant took many observers by surprise and renewed
concerns about Pyongyang’s capabilities and deftness in avoiding sanctions to develop its nuclear
programs.
On November 23, shortly after announcing its new nuclear facilities, North Korea fired over 170
artillery rounds toward Yeonpyeong Island in the Yellow Sea, killing two South Korean Marines
and two civilians, injuring many more and damaging multiple structures. The artillery attack,
which the North said was a response to South Korean military exercises, was the first since the
Korean War to strike South Korean territory directly and inflict civilian casualties. Again, the
U.S. military joined the ROK for military exercises, this time deploying the USS George
5 Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Vows to Keep Nuclear Arms and Fix Economy,” New York Times, March 31, 2013.
6 “U.S. Implicates North Korean Leader in Attack,” New York Times. May 22, 2010.
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Washington aircraft carrier to the Yellow Sea. Despite Pyongyang’s threats of retaliation, South
Korea staged previously scheduled live fire exercises near Yeonpyeong Island, prompting an
emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council amid fear of the outbreak of war.
Perhaps due to Chinese pressure, the North refrained from responding.
Renewed Engagement, “Leap Day Agreement,” and Satellite Launches
In early 2011, Pyongyang appeared to be re-launching a diplomatic offensive and ceased to
initiate more provocations, presumably to secure new economic assistance and food aid.
Pyongyang welcomed foreign delegations, including the Elders group led by former U.S.
President Jimmy Carter and a U.S. team led by Human Rights Envoy Robert King. Leader Kim
Jong-il visited China four times in his last 20 months with his itineraries heavy on stops that
showcase Chinese economic development. China had urged Kim to embrace economic reform for
years; some analysts saw the repeated trips as an indication that he sought further aid and support
from Beijing, as well as perhaps to secure support for his successor. Although rhetoric toward the
South remained harsh, Pyongyang engaged in some initial North-South dialogue sessions.
A series of U.S.-DPRK bilateral meetings in late 2011 and early 2012 led to the February 29,
2012, “Leap Day Agreement,” which held out the promise of diplomatic progress. U.S.
negotiators verbally warned their North Korean counterparts that any missile testing, including
under the guise of a peaceful satellite launch, would violate the terms of the agreement, but this
message was not received or was ignored by Pyongyang. In response to the March 16, 2012,
announcement that North Korea would launch a satellite to honor the 100th anniversary of the
birth of Kim Il-sung, the United States declared the agreement to be nullified. On April 13, 2012,
a Taepodong-2 missile (called Unha-3 by North Korea) took off from a launch site in western
North Korea. U.S. military commands tracking the rocket reported that the first stage fell into the
sea about 165 kilometers west of Seoul, and “the remaining stages were assessed to have failed
and no debris fell on land. At no time were the missile or the resultant debris a threat.”7 (See
“North Korea’s Missile Programs” section below.)
In a break from past precedent, North Korea followed the failed rocket launch with another
launch eight months later, on December 12, 2012, and this time succeeded in putting what it
called an “earth observation satellite” into orbit. The exact timing appeared to catch most
countries by surprise, as reports indicated that North Korea had disassembled parts of the rocket
for repairs just two days before. This fourth launch of a Taepodong-2 missile again earned
Pyongyang near-universal condemnation, including an unusually pointed statement of “regret”
from an official Chinese spokesperson. The scientific community believes that the satellite is
likely not following the intended orbit nor is it transmitting information back to Earth, but it will
remain in orbit for at least several years.8
Third Nuclear Test
On February 12, 2013, Pyongyang announced a successful underground nuclear detonation,
which seismic monitors confirmed. North Korea claimed that the test was to develop a “smaller
and light” warhead with “diverse materials.” Most analysts interpret the “diverse materials” to
mean the use of uranium. Observers from the United States and other countries did not detect
7 NORAD and USNORTHCOM Acknowledge Missile Launch, NORAD News, April 12, 2012, Peterson Air Force
Base, Colorado.
8 “Crippled N. Korean probe Could Orbit for Years,” Korea Herald, December 18, 2012; William Broad and Choe
Sang-hun, “Astronomers Say North Korea Satellite Is Most Likely Dead,” New York Times, December 17, 2012.
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evidence from test emissions that might reveal whether the North Koreans tested a uranium or
plutonium device, or a combination of the two materials. Some believe that the test will
contribute to North Korea’s ability to miniaturize a warhead, though additional nuclear and
missile tests are probably necessary for an operationally reliable capability.
Most analysts believe that the dominant reason North Korea launched missiles and tested a
nuclear device was to bolster Kim Jong-un’s legitimacy and authority among the North Korean
people and elites. The Kim regime and/or some powerful North Korean “hard liners” may have
wished to use the tests to show their continued defiance of the rest of the world (in particular to
new leadership in China and the re-elected Obama Administration), to threaten and embarrass the
United States and its allies, to upstage South Korea as the next officially recognized space launch
country, and perhaps to influence the South Korean presidential election on December 19, 2012.9
Background: History of Nuclear Negotiations
North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs have concerned the United States for nearly three
decades. In the 1980s, U.S. intelligence detected new construction of a nuclear reactor at
Yongbyon. In the early 1990s, after agreeing to and then obstructing IAEA inspections, North
Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).10
According to statements by former Clinton Administration officials, a pre-emptive military strike
on the North’s nuclear facilities was seriously considered as the crisis developed.11 Discussion of
sanctions at the United Nations Security Council and a diplomatic mission from former President
Jimmy Carter diffused the tension and eventually led to the 1994 Agreed Framework, an
agreement between the United States and North Korea that essentially would have provided two
light water reactors (LWRs) and heavy fuel oil to North Korea in exchange for a freeze of its
plutonium program. The document also outlined a path toward normalization of diplomatic
relations.
Beset by problems from the start, the agreement faced multiple delays in funding from the U.S.
side and a lack of compliance by the North Koreans. Still, the fundamentals of the agreement
were implemented: North Korea froze its plutonium program, heavy fuel oil was delivered to the
North Koreans, and LWR construction commenced. In 2002, U.S. officials confronted North
Korea about a suspected uranium enrichment program, dealing a further blow to the agreement.
With these new concerns, construction of the LWRs made minimal progress, and the project was
suspended in 2003. After North Korea expelled inspectors from the Yongbyon site and announced
its withdrawal from the NPT, the project was officially terminated in January 2006.
Six-Party Talks
Under the George W. Bush Administration, the negotiations to resolve the North Korean nuclear
issue expanded to include China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. With China playing host, six
rounds of the “Six-Party Talks” from 2003-2007 yielded occasional incremental progress, but
ultimately failed to resolve the fundamental issue of North Korean nuclear arms. The most
promising breakthrough occurred in 2005, with the issuance of a Joint Statement in which North
9 The DPRK attempted a previous test, in 2009, shortly before a scheduled South Korean space launch attempt.
10 Walter Pincus, “Nuclear Conflict Has Deep Roots: 50 Years of Threats and Broken Pacts Culminate in Apparent
Nuclear Test,” Washington Post. October 15, 2006.
11 “Washington was on Brink of War with North Korea 5 Years Ago,” CNN.com. October 4, 1999 and North Korea
Nuclear Crisis, February 1993 - June 1994,” GlobalSecurity.org.
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Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons programs in exchange for aid, a U.S. security
guarantee, and normalization of relations with the United States. Some observers described the
agreement as “Agreed Framework Plus.” Despite the promise of the statement, the process
eventually broke down due to complications over the release of North Korean assets from a bank
in Macau and then degenerated further with North Korea’s test of a nuclear device in October
2006.12
In February 2007, Six-Party Talks negotiators announced an agreement that would provide
economic and diplomatic benefits to North Korea in exchange for a freeze and disablement of
Pyongyang’s nuclear facilities. This was followed by an October 2007 agreement that more
specifically laid out the implementation plans, including the disablement of the Yongbyon facility,
a North Korean declaration of its nuclear programs, and a U.S. promise to lift economic sanctions
on North Korea and remove North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. Under
the leadership of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill,
the Bush Administration pushed ahead for a deal, including removing North Korea from the
terrorism list in October 2008.13 Disagreements over the verification protocol between
Washington and Pyongyang stalled the process until the U.S. presidential election in November
2008, though North Korea did demolish portions of its Yongbyon facility.
Multilateral negotiations on North Korea’s nuclear program have not been held since December
2008. Pyongyang’s continued belligerent actions, its vituperative rhetoric toward South Korean
politicians, and most importantly its failure to fulfill obligations undertaken in previous
agreements has halted efforts to restart the Six-Party Talks.
China’s Role
As host of the Six-Party Talks and as North Korea’s chief benefactor, China plays a crucial role in
the negotiations. Beijing’s decision to host the talks marked China’s most significant foray onto
the international diplomatic stage and was counted as a significant achievement by the Bush
Administration. Formation of the six-nation forum, initiated by the Bush Administration in 2003
and continued under the Obama Administration, confirms the critical importance of China’s role
in U.S. policy toward North Korea. The United States depends on Beijing’s leverage to relay
messages to the North Koreans, push Pyongyang for concessions and attendance at the
negotiations, and, on some occasions, punish the North for its actions. In addition, China’s
permanent seat on the UNSC ensures its influence on any U.N. action directed at North Korea.
In addition to being North Korea’s largest trading partner by far, China also provides considerable
concessional assistance. The large amount of food and energy aid that China supplies is an
essential lifeline for the regime in Pyongyang, especially after the cessation of most aid from
South Korea under the Lee Administration. It is clear that Beijing cannot control Pyongyang’s
behavior—particularly in the cases of provocative nuclear tests and missile launches—but even
temporary cessation of economic and energy aid is significant for North Korea. In September
2006, Chinese trade statistics reflected a temporary cut-off in oil exports to North Korea, in a
period which followed several provocative missile tests by Pyongyang. Although Beijing did not
label the reduction as a punishment, some analysts saw the move as a reflection of China’s
12 For more details on problems with implementation and verification, see CRS Report RL33590, North Korea’s
Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by Larry A. Niksch.
13 For more information on the terrorism list removal, see CRS Report RL30613, North Korea: Back on the Terrorism
List? by Mark E. Manyin.
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displeasure with the North’s actions.14 In instances when the international community wishes to
condemn Pyongyang’s behavior, such as the sanctions imposed in UNSC Resolution 1874,
Beijing’s willingness to punish the regime largely determines how acutely North Korea is
affected.
China’s overriding priority of preventing North Korea’s collapse remains firm.15 Beijing fears the
destabilizing effects of a humanitarian crisis, significant refugee flows over its borders, and the
uncertainty of how other nations, particularly the United States, would assert themselves on the
peninsula in the event of a power vacuum. While focusing on its own economic development,
China favors the maintenance of regional stability over all other concerns. To try to bolster North
Korea’s economy, China is expanding economic ties and supporting joint industrial projects
between China’s northeastern provinces and North Korea’s northern border region. Many Chinese
leaders also see strategic value in having North Korea as a “buffer” between it and the
democratic, U.S.-allied South Korea.
North Korea’s Internal Situation
Kim Jong-un appears to be consolidating power at the apex of the North Korean regime, though
uncertainty remains about the regime’s future. Some observers hold out hope that the young,
European-educated Kim could emerge as a reformer, but most analysts conclude that the North’s
outdated ideology and closed political system make reforms risky, ineffective, and reversible.
Kim’s novice status likely makes him more beholden to established interests in the elite; this
insecurity may have contributed to the decision to test long-range missiles as a means to bolster
his authority and prestige.
Succession Process
Formal evidence of the selection of Kim Jong-un first emerged in 2010, when he was appointed
as a four-star general as well as a vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, a powerful
organ of the Korean Workers Party (KWP). In the weeks after Kim Jong-il’s death in December
2011, the younger Kim was named “Supreme Commander” of the Korean People’s Army and
was described by official state organs as the nation’s “sole national leader.” In April 2012, the
Supreme People’s Assembly awarded him the chairmanship of the National Defense
Commission. These steps completed Kim Jong-un’s public sweep of all major power centers—
party, military, and state—in North Korea. Even as Kim consolidated his authority, there were
loud reminders that his power stemmed from the dynastic succession process embraced by the
regime. The late Kim Jong-il was named “Eternal General Secretary” of the KWP and
“Permanent Chairman” of the National Defense Commission. Analysts point out that the
expectation of intense loyalty to his father and grandfather restrains Kim Jong-un’s power,
particularly in terms of undertaking any serious reforms that might run counter to the ideology set
out by his predecessors.
14 “China Cut Off Exports of Oil to North Korea,” New York Times. October 30, 2006.
15 For more information, please see CRS Report R41043, China-North Korea Relations, by Dick K. Nanto and Mark E.
Manyin.
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The First Year Under Kim Jong-un
Kim Jong-un has displayed a different style of ruling than his father while hewing closely to the
policies established before his appointment as supreme leader. Kim has allowed Western
influences, such as Disney characters and clothing styles, to be displayed in the public sphere, and
he is informal in his frequent public appearances, at times embracing citizens—especially youths.
In a stark change from his father’s era, Kim Jong-un’s wife was introduced to the North Korean
public. Analysts depict these stylistic changes as an attempt to make Kim seem young and
modern and to conjure associations with the revered Kim Il-sung’s “man of the people” image.
Rhetoric from the Kim Jong-un regime has emphasized improving the quality of life for North
Korean citizens, but reforms designed to achieve that stated goal have been slow to emerge. A
focus on improving amusement parks has been one visible outcome. Reportedly, a new policy to
shrink the size of agricultural collectives and increase farmers’ incentives was introduced in pilot
projects.16 Expectations that the regime would pursue this “Chinese-style” agricultural reform on
a national basis have proven incorrect. Meanwhile, there are signs that inflation has become a
serious problem for North Korea.17
Leadership and State Institutions
When Kim first came to power, many observers predicted that he would rule with the aid of
regents coming from his father’s inner circle, especially Kim-Jong-il’s brother-in-law Jang Song-
taek. It is possible that a collective leadership makes national policy decisions while promoting
Kim Jong-un as the visible figurehead of the regime. However, many analysts point to personnel
decisions that seem to portray a strategy to concentrate power in Kim Jong-un’s hands and
sideline influential military leaders: four of the highest-ranking generals in the Korean People’s
Army (KPA) were stripped of their ranks.18 In addition to the purges, a civilian party functionary
was appointed to director of the KPA’s important General Political Department. South Korean
media have cited sources that say Kim is elevating the internal security apparatus as well as those
in charge of propaganda.19
The appointments of Kim Jong-un and others to high-level party positions have led some analysts
to posit that the KWP may be gaining in stature over the military establishment. The emphasis on
the Central Military Commission, the tool through which the Party controls the military, may
indicate that the regime is moving away from the concentrated power in the National Defense
Commission established by Kim Jong-il and instead returning to a Party-centric order, as was the
case under Kim Il-sung. The KWP Central Committee convened a plenary meeting on March 31,
2013, at which Kim Jong-un delivered a major policy address to top officials. The songun, or
“Military First,” policy appears to have remained in place, but Kim Jong-un appears to have
focused on rebuilding many party institutions to establish an alternative power center.20
16 Sang Yong Lee, “6.28 Agriculture Policy on the Back Foot,” Daily NK, November 12, 2012.
17 Marcus Noland, “The Return of Macroeconomic Instability,” North Korea: Witness to Transformation blog, Peterson
Institute for International Economics, September 11, 2012, http://www.piie.com/blogs/nk/?p=7418.
18 Alexandre Mansourov, “Part III: Overhauling the Legacy Government,” 38 North blog, US-Korea Institute at SAIS,
December 21, 2012, http://38north.org/2012/12/amansourov122112/.
19 Luke Herman, “Two Kims. Two Paths,” NK News.Org, October 22, 2012, http://www.nknews.org/2012/
two_paths_two_kim/.
20 Stephan Haggard and Luke Herman, “Information—and Disinformation—on the North Korean Political Scene,”
North Korea: Witness to Transformation blog, Peterson Institution for International Economics. December 18, 2012,
(continued...)
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Expanding Sphere of Information
The North Korean regime remains extraordinarily opaque, but a trickle of news works its way out
through defectors and other channels. These forms of grass-roots information gathering, along
with the public availability of high-quality satellite imagery, have democratized the business of
intelligence on North Korea. In 2011, the Associated Press became the first Western news agency
to open a bureau in Pyongyang, though its reporters are subject to severe restrictions. North
Korea invited international journalists to observe the so-called satellite launch in April 2012.
Previously, South Korean intelligence services had generally provided the bulk of information
known about the North.
Pyongyang appears to be slowly losing its ability to control information flows from the outside
world into North Korea, which may explain the regime’s unprecedented public acknowledgement
of the failed launch in April 2012. Surveys of North Korean defectors reveal that some within
North Korea are growing increasingly wary of government propaganda and turning to outside
sources of news, especially foreign radio broadcasts, which are officially illegal.21 After a short-
lived attempt in 2004, North Korea in 2009 restarted a mobile phone network for the elite, in
cooperation with the Egyptian telecommunications firm Orascom.22 The mobile network
reportedly has over 1 million subscribers.
Relations with China
As North Korea prepared for the end of the Kim Jong-il era and the succession of Kim Jong-un,
the regime appeared to draw closer to China. Beijing reciprocated by resisting appeals from the
United States and other countries to blame North Korea for the sinking of the Cheonan in a
UNSC statement. Following Kim Jong-il’s death in December 2011, Beijing voiced support for
Kim Jong-un in an effort to legitimize the new leader and shore up his regime. Bilateral relations
then cooled in 2012, perhaps as a result of China’s allowing a UNSC statement that reproached
North Korea for its rocket launch in April 2012. Only a handful of high-level delegations traveled
between Pyongyang and Beijing in 2012. Nevertheless, China has resisted imposing new
sanctions or other penalties on North Korea for its violations of international law.
China and North Korea continue to develop their highly complementary trade and investment
ties, though several contradictions hamper deeper engagement. North Korea needs foreign capital
to improve its infrastructure, exploit natural resources, and create productive exporters, but the
multitude of corrupt and self-serving actors within the North Korean system has led to poor
results for Chinese investors.23 China is by far North Korea’s largest trading partner (57% of all
trade in 2011), but North Korea fears dependence on China and exposure to subversive
information from China’s relatively open society. Despite the obstacles, the two countries
(...continued)
http://www.piie.com/blogs/nk/?p=8631.
21 Marcus Noland, “Pyongyang Tipping Point,” Wall Street Journal op-ed. April 12, 2010.
22 Peter Nesbitt, “North Koreans Have Cell Phones: Why Cell Phones Won't Lead to Revolution and Why They
Strengthen the Regime,” Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies: Emerging Voices, vol. 22 (2011).
23 David Stinson, “Chinese Company ‘Shanghaied’ in North Korea,” Confucianism and Trade Imbalances, August 11,
2012, http://theartofeconomicwar.wordpress.com/2012/08/11/chinese-company-shanghaied-in-north-korea/.
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announced their intention to create or revamp several Special Economic Zones in northern North
Korea to facilitate deeper economic linkages.24
Analysts have noted deepening links between the KWP and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Some analysts have identified Beijing’s pursuit of economic cooperation with North Korea—
including the provision of capital and development of natural resources within North Korea—as
channeled through the CCP International Liaison Department, that is, through party-to-party
engagement.25 The apparent increase in the KWP’s power in Pyongyang’s decision-making
process could augment this political and economic relationship.
Both sides have some reservations about becoming too interlinked: Beijing faces condemnation
from the international community and deterioration of relations with an important trade partner in
South Korea for defending North Korea, and Pyongyang seeks to avoid complete dependence on
China to preserve its autonomy. For the time being, both capitals appear to have calculated that
their strategic interests—or, in the case of Pyongyang, survival—depend on the other. However,
since 2010 an increasing number of Chinese academics are calling for a reappraisal of China’s
friendly ties with North Korea, in light of the material and reputational costs to China.
Other U.S. Concerns with North Korea
North Korea’s Missile Programs26
Despite international condemnation and UNSCR prohibitions, North Korea twice in 2012
launched long-range rockets carrying ostensible satellite payloads, demonstrating the importance
that Pyongyang places on continued development of ballistic missiles.27 North Korea has an
arsenal of approximately 700 Soviet-designed short-range ballistic missiles, according to
unofficial estimates, although the inaccuracy of these antiquated missiles obviates their military
effectiveness.28 A U.S. government report said in 2009 that North Korea has deployed small
numbers of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (unofficial estimate: about 100 and
fewer than 30, respectively) that could reach Japan and U.S. bases there, but these missiles have
never been flight-tested.29 North Korea has made slow progress toward developing a reliable
long-range ballistic missile; the December 2012 launch was the first successful space launch after
four consecutive failures in 1998, 2006, 2009, and April 2012.
After its first long-range missile test in 1998, North Korea agreed to a moratorium on long-range
missile tests in exchange for the Clinton Administration’s pledge to lift certain economic
24 Jung-A Yang, “Report: North to Designate 3 More SEZs,” Daily NK, September 23, 2012.
25 John Park, “On the Issues: North Korea’s Leadership Succession: The China Factor,” United States Institute of
Peace, September 28, 2010.
26 For more information, see CRS Report RS21473, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, by
Steven A. Hildreth.
27 North Korea claims that the purpose of these rocket launches is to place a satellite in orbit, and thus it is entitled to
develop space launch vehicles as a peaceful use of space. However, long-range ballistic missiles and space-launch
vehicles use similar technology, and, because of this overlap, the UNSC acted to prohibit any North Korean use of
rocket technology in Resolutions 1718 and 1874.
28 North Korean Security Challenges: A Net Assessment (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
2011), pp. 144-146.
29 National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, NASIC-1031-0985-09, Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base, OH, April 2009, p. 17, and IISS (2011), pp. 131-135, 141-145.
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sanctions. This deal was later abandoned during the Bush Administration, which placed a higher
priority on the North Korean nuclear program. Ballistic missiles have not been on the agenda in
the Six-Party Talks. In 2006, UNSC Resolution 1718 barred North Korea from conducting
missile-related activities. North Korea flouted this resolution with its April 2009 test launch. The
UNSC then responded with Resolution 1874, which further increased restrictions on the DPRK
ballistic missile program. The 2012 Leap Day Agreement included a moratorium on ballistic
missile tests, which North Korea claimed excludes satellite launches.
North Korea’s inconsistent progress toward developing a long-range missile calls into question
the long-standing U.S. National Intelligence Estimate that North Korea could successfully test an
inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) by 2015.30 The author of a 2012 RAND technical report
on the North Korean nuclear missile threat asserts that the Unha-3 rocket, which successfully
lifted an estimated 100 kg satellite payload into orbit in December 2012, is incapable of carrying
a nuclear warhead at inter-continental range. “If [North Koreans] wanted an ICBM, they have to
develop a new rocket, using different technology. This would take a very long time, require a lot
of work, and cost a lot of money.”31 A net assessment by the International Institute for Strategic
Studies concluded in 2011 that a future North Korean ICBM “would almost certainly have to
undergo an extensive flight-test program that includes at least a dozen, if not two dozen, launches
and extends over three to five years.”32 Such a program would make North Korean intentions
obvious to the world. Others argue that North Korea might take a radically different approach and
accept one successful test as sufficient for declaring operational capability.
The North Koreans’ ability to successfully miniaturize nuclear warheads and mount them on
ballistic missiles is a primary concern for the United States. Then-Chief of the KPA General Staff
Ri Yong-Ho reportedly told fellow North Korean officials in 2012 that their long-range missiles
could hit the United States with nuclear weapons, but there is no public evidence that Pyongyang
has progressed in miniaturizing or testing a warhead capable of surviving re-entry at ICBM
range.33 Congressional testimony from senior officials in the intelligence community has not
produced a definitive statement on whether or not North Korea has achieved this critical
capability.
Foreign Connections
North Korea’s proliferation of missile technology and expertise is another serious concern for the
United States. Pyongyang has sold missile parts and/or technology to several countries, including
Egypt, Iran, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.34 Sales of
missiles and telemetric information from missile tests have been a key source of hard currency for
the Kim regime.
30 David Wright, “Questions About the Unha-3 Failure,” 38 North, May 2012, http://38north.org/2012/05/
dwright050412.
31 Evan Ramstad, “After First Glance, North Korea’s Missiles Not As Fearsome,” Wall Street Journal, December 13,
2012, http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2012/12/13/after-first-glance-north-koreas-missiles-not-as-fearsome/.
32 IISS (2011), p. 155.
33 “Ex-N. Korea Army Chief: Rockets Could Be Used to Transport Nukes,” Korean Broadcasting System, December
11, 2012, http://english.kbs.co.kr/News/News/News_view.html?page=1&No=95239&id=Po.
34 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—China and Northeast Asia, January 22, 2010 and IISS (2011), p. 180-181.
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North Korea and Iran have cooperated on the technical aspects of missile development since the
1980s, exchanging information and components.35 Reportedly, scientific advisors from Iran’s
ballistic missile research centers were seen in North Korea leading up to the December 2012
launch and may have been a factor in its success.36 There are also signs that China may be
assisting the North Korean missile program, whether directly or through tacit approval of trade in
sensitive materials. Heavy transport vehicles from Chinese entities were apparently sold to North
Korea and used to showcase missiles in a military parade in April 2012, prompting a U.N.
investigation of sanctions violations.37
Regional Missile Defense Systems
During the 2012 North Korean missile tests, U.S. and allied forces reportedly made ready and
available a number of ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems, in addition to the intelligence
gathering capabilities sent into the region. Japan deployed Patriot interceptor batteries around
Tokyo and on its southwestern islands, in the event of an errant missile or debris headed toward
Japanese territory.38 Aegis BMD ships were reported in the area as well. The Aegis-based
Standard Missile interceptor has a much greater capability than the Patriot system, but no officials
ever clarified whether Aegis (U.S. or Japanese ships) had the capability to shoot down the North
Korean missile if it malfunctioned and threatened allied territory. In response to the heightened
tensions in April 2013, the U.S. military accelerated deployment of a ground-based Theater High
Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) BMD system to Guam, two years ahead of schedule.
As part of the efforts by the United States and its allies to change China’s strategic thinking about
North Korea, the BMD deployments may have had powerful symbolic value. Chinese media
made the Patriot deployments a major part of their coverage of the April 2012 launch. A subtext
to those reports was that North Korea’s actions are feeding military developments in Asia that are
not in China’s interests.39 Many observers, particularly in the United States and Japan, would
argue that continued North Korean ballistic missile development could increase pressure to create
a formally integrated Northeast Asian BMD architecture—comparable to the European Phased
Adaptive Approach—including the United States, South Korea, and Japan.
North Korea’s Human Rights Record
Although the nuclear issue has dominated negotiations with Pyongyang, U.S. officials
periodically voice concerns about North Korea’s abysmal human rights record. The plight of most
North Koreans is dire. The State Department’s annual human rights reports and reports from
35 For more information, see CRS Report R42849, Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs, by Steven A.
Hildreth.
36 Javier Serrat, “North Korea, Iran Highlight Proliferation Risks of Knowledge Transfers,” World Politics Review,
December 10, 2012, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12554/north-korea-iran-highlight-proliferation-risks-
of-knowledge-transfers.
John S. Park, “The Leap in North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Program: The Iran Factor,” National Bureau of Asian
Research, December 19, 2012, http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=638.
37 Peter Enav, “Experts: North Korea Missile Carrier Likely from China,” Associated Press, April 19, 2012.
38 The North Korean rocket trajectory was to have taken it in the upper atmosphere above two small Japanese islands in
the Ryukyu island chain.
39 At the top of the webpage that China’s People’s Daily created for information about the North Korean launch are a
series of photographs of the Japanese Patriot units. See http://world.people.com.cn/GB/8212/191606/240872/
index.html.
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private organizations have portrayed a little-changing pattern of extreme human rights abuses by
the North Korean regime over many years.40 The reports stress a total denial of political, civil,
and religious liberties and say that no dissent or criticism of leadership is allowed. Freedoms of
speech, the press, and assembly do not exist. There is no independent judiciary, and citizens do
not have the right to choose their own government. Reports also document the extensive
ideological indoctrination of North Korean citizens.
Severe physical abuse is meted out to citizens who violate laws and restrictions. Multiple reports
have described a system of prison camps that house up to 200,000 inmates, including many
political prisoners.41 Reports from survivors and escapees from the camps indicate that conditions
in the camps for political prisoners are extremely harsh and that many do not survive. Reports cite
executions and torture of prisoners as a frequent practice. Based on defector testimony and a
study of satellite imagery, Amnesty International concluded in 2011 that the prison camps have
been growing in size.42
A 2011 study of DPRK defectors indicates that in recent years many North Koreans have been
arrested for what would earlier have been deemed ordinary economic activities. North Korea
criminalizes market activities, seeing them as a challenge to the state. Its penal system targets
low-level or misdemeanor crimes, such as unsanctioned trading or violations of travel permits.
Violators face detention in local-level “collection centers” and “labor training centers.” Defectors
have reported starvation, suffered beatings and torture, and witnessed executions in these
centers.43
In addition to the extreme curtailment of rights, many North Koreans face limited access to health
care and significant food shortages. In a recent survey, the World Food Program identified urgent
hunger needs for 3.5 million citizens in North Korea, out of a total population of 24 million.
UNICEF has reported that each year some 40,000 North Korean children under five became
“acutely malnourished,” with 25,000 needing hospital treatment. The food security situation
improved slightly from 2011 to 2012, but 28% of the population reportedly suffers from
stunting.44
During the past decade, the United Nations has been an important forum to recognize human
rights violations in North Korea. Since 2004, the U.N. Human Rights Council has annually
renewed the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in North Korea.
Member states have also addressed the issue through annual resolutions in the U.N. General
Assembly. The most recent Assembly resolution, which was adopted by consensus in December
2012, expresses “deep concern at the significant deterioration of the human rights situation” in
the country. In March 2013, the U.N. Human Rights Council passed a resolution for the first time
to establish a commission to investigate “the systematic, widespread and grave violations of
40 See U.S. Department of State, 2011 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, May 24, 2012, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186491.pdf; and Amnesty
International Annual Report 2011—North Korea, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
country,COI,,,PRK,4562d8cf2,4dce154c3c,0.html.
41 Radio Free Asia, North Korea: “Political Prison Camps Expand,” May 4, 2011, available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/4dd288f128.html.
42 Amnesty International: “Images Reveal Scale of North Korean Political Prison Camps,” May 3, 2011, available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/images-reveal-scale-north-korean-political-prison-camps-2011-05-03.
43 Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Witness to Transformation, Refugee Insights into North Korea (Peterson
Institute for International Economics, 2011), p. 51.
44 UNICEF: “DPRK national nutrition survey released,” December 13, 2012, http://www.unicef.org/media/
media_66756.html.
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human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ... with a view to ensuring full
accountability, in particular where these violations may amount to crimes against humanity.” The
resolution, presented by Japan and the European Union, passed the 47-member council by
consensus.
North Korean Refugees
For two decades, food shortages, persecution, and human rights abuses have prompted perhaps
hundreds of thousands of North Koreans to flee to neighboring China, where they are forced to
evade Chinese security forces and often become victims of further abuse, neglect, and lack of
protection. There is little reliable information on the size and composition of the North Korean
population located in China. Estimates range up to 300,000. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has not been given access to conduct a systematic survey.
Reports indicate that many women and children are the victims of human trafficking, particularly
women lured to China seeking a better life but forced into marriage or prostitution.45 Some of the
refugees who escape to China make their way to Southeast Asia or Mongolia, where they may
seek passage to a third country, usually South Korea. If repatriated, they risk harsh punishment or
execution.
On January 1, 2013, Congress passed the North Korean Child Welfare Act of 2012 (H.R. 1464) to
address the humanitarian challenges faced by North Korean refugee children and the children of
one North Korean parent living outside North Korea. The bill requires the Department of State to
brief Congress on its efforts to advocate for these children, potentially including adoption of
eligible children; develop a strategy to address the many challenges of adoption by American
parents; encourage other countries to resolve the issue of statelessness for these children, where
that is a problem; and to work with the South Korean government on these issues. One target of
the bill appears to be the children of Chinese fathers and North Korean mothers, children who in
some cases are denied citizenship papers and are thus de jure stateless.46 The bill also seeks a
solution to the extremely difficult problem of establishing the eligibility for adoption of refugee
or stateless North Korean children with no documentation and no recourse to civil authorities.
The North Korean Human Rights Act
In 2004, the 108th Congress passed, and President George W. Bush signed, the North Korean
Human Rights Act (H.R. 4011; P.L. 108-333). Among its chief goals are the promotion and
protection of human rights in North Korea and the creation of a “durable humanitarian” option for
its refugees. The North Korean Human Rights Act (NKHRA) authorized new funds to support
human rights efforts and improve the flow of information, and required the President to appoint a
Special Envoy on human rights in North Korea. Under the NKHRA, North Koreans may apply
for asylum in the United States, and the State Department is required to facilitate the submission
of their applications. The bill required that all non-humanitarian assistance must be linked to
improvements in human rights, but provided a waiver if the President deems the aid to be in the
interest of national security.
In 2008, Congress reauthorized NKHRA through 2012 under P.L. 110-346 with the requirement
for additional reporting on U.S. efforts to resettle North Korean refugees in the United States. In
45 United States Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2012—Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of,
June 19, 2012, available at http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2012/index.htm.
46 Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to
China, Washington, DC, 2009.
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August 2012, Congress approved the extension of the act (P.L. 112-172) through 2017. A “Sense
of the Congress” included in the bill calls on China to desist in its forcible repatriation of North
Korean refugees and instructs U.S. diplomats to enhance efforts to resettle North Korean refugees
from third countries. The 2012 NKHRA reauthorization maintained funding at the original levels
of $2 million annually to support human rights and democracy programs and $2 million annually
to promote freedom of information programs for North Koreans, but reduced appropriated
funding to resettle North Korean refugees from $20 million to $5 million annually, reflecting the
actual outlays of the program.
Implementation
Relatively few North Korean refugees have resettled in the United States. According to the State
Department, as of December 2012, 149 North Korean refugees have been resettled in the United
States.47 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that in spite of the U.S.
government’s efforts to expand resettlements, rates did not improve from 2006-2008.48 Several
U.S. agencies were involved in working with other countries to resettle such refuges, but North
Korean applicants face hurdles. Some host countries delay the granting of exit permissions or
limit contacts with U.S. officials. Other host governments are reluctant to antagonize Pyongyang
by admitting North Korean refugees and prefer to avoid making their countries known as a
reliable transit points. Another challenge is educating the North Korean refugee population about
the potential to resettle in the United States, many of whom may not be aware of the program.
Under the NKHRA, Congress authorized $2 million annually to promote freedom of information
programs for North Koreans. It called on the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) to
“facilitate the unhindered dissemination of information in North Korea” by increasing Korean-
language broadcasts of Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Voice of America (VOA).49 A modest amount
has been appropriated to support independent radio broadcasters. The BBG currently broadcasts
to North Korea 10 hours per day using two medium wave frequencies and multiple shortwave
frequencies. RFA has also reached out to an increasing number of cell phone users in North
Korea, including by introducing an iPhone app to listen to RFA.50 Although all North Korean
radios are altered by the government to prevent outside broadcasts, defectors report that many
citizens have illegal radios that receive the programs. There have also been efforts in the past by
the U.S. and South Korean governments to smuggle in radios in order to allow information to
penetrate the closed country.
In 2009, Robert R. King, a long-time aide to the late Representative Tom Lantos, became the
Obama Administration’s Special Envoy on North Korean Human Rights Issues. Before joining
47 CRS email correspondence with U.S. Department of State, December 31, 2012.
48 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Humanitarian Assistance: Status of North Korean Refugee Resettlement
and Asylum in the United States, GAO-10-691, June 24, 2010, available at http://www.gao.gov.
49 Broadcast content includes news briefs, particularly news about the Korean Peninsula; interviews with North Korean
defectors; and international commentary on events occurring in North Korea. The BBG cites a Peterson Institute for
International Economics survey in which North Korean defectors interviewed in China and South Korea indicated that
they had listened to foreign media including RFA. RFA broadcasts five hours a day. VOA broadcasts five hours a day
with three of those hours in prime-time from a medium-wave transmitter in South Korea aimed at North Korea. VOA
also broadcasts from stations in Thailand; the Philippines; and from leased stations in Russia and eastern Mongolia. In
January 2009, the BBG began broadcasting to North Korea from a leased medium-wave facility in South Korea. The
BBG added leased transmission capability to bolster medium-wave service into North Korea in January 2010. RFA
broadcasts from stations in Tinian (Northern Marianas) and Saipan, and leased stations in Russia and Mongolia.
50 Broadcasting Board of Governors FY2013 Budget Request, http://www.bbg.gov/wp-content/media/2012/02/FY-
2013-BBG-Congressional-Budget-Request-FINAL-2-9-12-Small.pdf.
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the Administration, he was involved in the planning of Representative Lantos’ human rights
agenda, visited North Korea and played a role in the passage of the NKHRA. King’s mission to
North Korea to assess humanitarian needs and raise broader human rights issues with North
Korean officials was the first by a Special Envoy on North Korea Human Rights since the
creation of the post under the 2004 law. According to the State Department, King’s office is
closely integrated with the Office of the Special Envoy on North Korea, Glyn Davies.
North Korea’s Illicit Activities
Strong indications exist that the North Korean regime has been involved in the production and
trafficking of illicit drugs, as well as of counterfeit currency, cigarettes, and pharmaceuticals.51
North Korean crime-for-profit activities have reportedly brought in important foreign currency
resources, although recent reports indicate that the scale of these activities has shrunk since the
2000s.52 U.S. policy during the first term of the Bush Administration highlighted these activities,
but they have generally been relegated since to a lower level of priority compared to other issues.
In September 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department identified Banco Delta Asia, located in Macau,
as a bank that distributed North Korean counterfeit currency and allowed for money laundering
for North Korean criminal enterprises. The Treasury Department ordered the freezing of $24
million in North Korean accounts with the bank. This action prompted many other banks to freeze
North Korean accounts and derailed potential progress on the September 2005 Six-Party Talks
agreement. After lengthy negotiations and complicated arrangements, in June 2007 the Bush
Administration agreed to allow the release of the $24 million from Banco Delta Asia accounts
and ceased its campaign to pressure foreign governments and banks to avoid doing business with
North Korea. The UNSC has renewed efforts to pressure Pyongyang through the restriction of
illicit activities following the 2009 and 2012 nuclear tests.
U.S. Engagement Activities with North Korea
U.S. Assistance to North Korea53
Since 1995, the United States has provided North Korea with over $1.2 billion in assistance, of
which about 60% has paid for food aid and about 40% for energy assistance. The United States
has not provided any aid to North Korea since early 2009; the United States provided all of its
share of pledged heavy fuel oil by December 2008. Energy assistance was tied to progress in the
Six-Party Talks, which broke down in 2009. From 2007 to April 2009, the United States also
provided technical assistance to North Korea to help in the nuclear disablement process. In 2008,
Congress took legislative steps to legally enable the President to give expanded assistance for this
purpose. However, following North Korea’s actions in the spring of 2009 when it test-fired a
missile, tested a nuclear device, halted denuclearization activities, and expelled nuclear
inspectors, Congress explicitly rejected the Obama Administration’s requests for funds to
supplement existing resources in the event of a breakthrough in the Six-Party Talks.
51 For more information, see CRS Report RL33885, North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities, by Liana Sun Wyler and
Dick K. Nanto.
52 Marcus Noland, “North Korea Illicit Activities,” North Korea: Witness to Transformation blog, Peterson Institute for
International Economics, March 11, 2013, http://www.piie.com/blogs/nk/?p=9650.
53 For more, see CRS Report R40095, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth Nikitin.
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U.S. food aid, which officially is not linked to diplomatic developments, ended in early 2009 due
to disagreements with Pyongyang over monitoring and access. (The North Korean government
restricts the ability of donors to operate in the country; see “Food Aid Debate Within U.S.
Government” section above.) In 2011, North Korea issued appeals to the international community
for additional support. The abrogated Leap Day Agreement would have provided 240,000 metric
tons of food and nutritional aid intended for young children, pregnant mothers, and the elderly.
Special Envoy Robert King stated on June 8, 2012, that the United States would possibly consider
resumption of food aid in the future, if North Korea can restore confidence in the monitoring and
access conditions.54 An amendment (S.Amdt. 2454) to the FY2013 Agriculture Appropriations
Act would prohibit the United States from providing any food aid to North Korea, except when
the President exercises a national interest waiver.
POW-MIA Recovery Operations in North Korea
In 1994, North Korea invited the U.S. government to conduct joint investigations to recover the
remains of thousands of U.S. servicemen unaccounted for during the Korean War. The United
Nations Military Command (U.N. Command) and the Korean People’s Army conducted 33 joint
investigations from 1996-2005 for these prisoners of war-missing in action (POW-MIAs). In
operations known as “joint field activities” (JFAs), U.S. specialists recovered 229 sets of remains
and successfully identified 78 of those. On May 25, 2005, the Department of Defense announced
that it would suspend all JFAs, citing the “uncertain environment created by North Korea’s
unwillingness to participate in the Six-Party Talks,” its recent declarations regarding its intentions
to develop nuclear weapons, and its withdrawal from the NPT, and the payments of millions of
dollars in cash to the KPA for its help in recovering the remains.55
Talks between the United States and North Korea on the joint recovery program resumed in 2011
and led to an agreement in October 2011. On January 27, 2012, the Department of Defense
announced that it was preparing a mission to return to North Korea in early 2012. However,
Pyongyang’s determination to launch a rocket in contravention of the “Leap Day Agreement” and
UNSC resolutions cast doubt on the credibility of North Korean commitments, and the
Department of Defense suspended the joint mission on March 21, 2012.56 The United States has
not undertaken any JFAs with the KPA since May 2005. The Department of Defense has said that
the recovery of the remains of missing U.S. soldiers is an enduring priority goal of the United
States and that it is committed to achieving the fullest possible accounting for POW-MIAs from
the Korean War.
Potential for Establishing a Liaison Office in North Korea
One prospective step for engagement would be the establishment of a liaison office in
Pyongyang. This issue has waxed and waned over the past 16 years. The Clinton Administration,
as part of the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework, outlined the possibility of full
normalization of political and economic relations. Under the Agreed Framework, the United
States and North Korea would open a liaison office in each other’s capital “following resolution
54 Robert R. King, “Media Roundtable at the U.S. Embassy,” U.S. Department of State, June 8, 2012,
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2012/06/188920.htm.
55“U.S. Halts Search for Its War Dead in North Korea,” New York Times. May 26, 2005.
56 Jim Garamone, “U.S. Suspends MIA Search in North Korea,” American Forces Press Service, March 21, 2012.
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=67639.
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of consular and other technical issues through expert level discussions.”57 Eventually, the
relationship would have been upgraded to “bilateral relations [at] the Ambassadorial level.”
Under the Bush Administration, Ambassador Christopher Hill reportedly discussed an exchange
of liaison offices. This did not lead to an offer of full diplomatic relations pursuant to negotiations
in the Six-Party Talks. In December 2009, following Ambassador Stephen Bosworth’s first visit
as Special Envoy to Pyongyang, press speculation ran high that the United States would offer
relations at the level of liaison offices. The Obama Administration quickly dispelled these
expectations, flatly rejecting claims that Bosworth had carried a message offering liaison
offices.58
Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities
Since the famines in North Korea of the mid-1990s, the largest proportion of aid has come from
government contributions to emergency relief programs administered by international relief
organizations. However, some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are playing smaller roles
in capacity building and people-to-people exchanges, in areas such as health, informal diplomacy,
information science, and education.
The aims of such NGOs are as diverse as the institutions themselves. Some illustrative cases
include NGO “joint ventures” between scientific and academic NGOs and those engaged in
informal diplomacy. Three consortia highlight this cooperation: the Tuberculosis (TB) diagnostics
project, run by Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Stanford Medical School, and Christian Friends of
Korea; the Syracuse University-Kim Chaek University of Technology digital library program; and
the U.S.-DPRK Scientific Engagement Consortium, composed of the Civilian Research and
Development Foundation Global (CRDF Global), the American Association for the Advancement
of Science (AAAS), Syracuse University, and the Korea Society. The following is a sample of
such efforts.
• In 2008, NTI, Stanford Medical School, and Christian Friends identified multiple
drug resistant TB as a serious health threat. By providing North Korean scientists
with the scientific equipment, generators, and other supplies to furnish a national
tuberculosis reference laboratory, they hope to enable North Korean researchers
and physicians to take on this bacterial threat.59 Over the course of 2010, the
partners completed the TB reference laboratory, and installed a high voltage
cable for more regular energy supply.60 In September 2010, North Korea health
representatives signed a grant agreement for a two-year period with the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. The $19 million dollar grant
supported procurement of laboratory supplies as well as vaccines until July 2012.
• In 2001, Syracuse University and Kim Chaek University (Pyongyang) began a
modest program of modifying open-source software for use as library support
and identifying the international standards necessary to catalog information for
the library at Kim Chaek. Over time this expanded to include twin integrated
information technology labs at Kim Chaek and Syracuse and a memorandum to
exchange junior faculty.
57 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework at http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf.
58 “U.S. Has Not Proposed Setting Up Liaison Office in Pyongyang Next Year: White House.” Yonhap, December 19,
2009 (Lexis-Nexis).
59 “New Tuberculosis Lab Hailed as Breakthrough in Health Diplomacy.” Science. March 12, 2010. p. 1312-1313.
60 Christian Friends of Newsletter, November 2010.
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• In 2007, the U.S.-DPRK Scientific Engagement Consortium formed to explore
collaborative science activities between the United States and North Korea in
subjects such as agriculture and information technology. In December 2009, at
the invitation of the North Korean State Academy of Sciences, Consortium
members toured facilities and received briefings from researchers in biology,
alternative energy, information sciences, hydrology, and health. Potential areas
for collaboration include identification of shared research priorities, academic
exchanges, joint workshops on English language, mathematics, biomedical
research methods, renewable energy and digital science libraries, and joint
science publications.
List of Other CRS Reports on North Korea
CRS Report RL34256, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, by Mary Beth Nikitin
CRS Report R41481, U.S.-South Korea Relations, coordinated by Mark E. Manyin
CRS Report R42126, Kim Jong-il’s Death: Implications for North Korea’s Stability and U.S.
Policy, by Mark E. Manyin
CRS Report R40095, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth
Nikitin
CRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E.
Rennack
CRS Report R41160, North Korea’s 2009 Nuclear Test: Containment, Monitoring, Implications,
by Jonathan Medalia
Archived Reports for Background
CRS Report R40684, North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1874, coordinated by Mary Beth Nikitin and Mark E. Manyin
CRS Report RL30613, North Korea: Back on the Terrorism List?, by Mark E. Manyin
CRS Report RL32493, North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis, by Dick K. Nanto
and Emma Chanlett-Avery
CRS Report RL33567, Korea-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, by Larry A. Niksch
CRS Report RL33590, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by Larry
A. Niksch
CRS Report RS22973, Congress and U.S. Policy on North Korean Human Rights and Refugees:
Recent Legislation and Implementation, by Emma Chanlett-Avery
CRS Report RL33324, North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency, by Dick K. Nanto
CRS Report RL31696, North Korea: Economic Sanctions Prior to Removal from Terrorism
Designation, by Dianne E. Rennack
CRS Report R41043, China-North Korea Relations, by Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin
CRS Report RS21473, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, by Steven A.
Hildreth
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Author Contact Information
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Ian E. Rinehart
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Analyst in Asian Affairs
echanlettavery@crs.loc.gov, 7-7748
irinehart@crs.loc.gov, 7-0345
Acknowledgments
Mi Ae Taylor, formerly a Research Associate in Asian Affairs, contributed to the preparation of
this report.
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