FutureGen: A Brief History and
Issues for Congress
Peter Folger
Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy
April 3, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43028
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

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FutureGen: A Brief History and Issues for Congress

Summary
A decade after the George W. Bush Administration announced FutureGen—its signature clean
coal power initiative—the program is still in early development. Since its inception in 2003,
FutureGen has undergone changes in scope and design. As initially conceived, FutureGen would
have been the world’s first coal-fired power plant to integrate carbon capture and sequestration
(CCS) with integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) technologies. FutureGen would have
captured and stored carbon dioxide (CO2) in deep underground saline formations and produced
hydrogen for electricity generation and fuel cell research. Increasing costs of development,
among other considerations, caused the Bush Administration to discontinue the project in 2008.
In 2010, under the Obama Administration, the project was restructured as FutureGen 2.0: a coal-
fired power plant that would integrate oxy-combustion technology to capture CO2. FutureGen 2.0
is the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) most comprehensive CCS demonstration project,
combining all three aspects of CCS technology: capturing and separating CO2 from other gases,
compressing and transporting CO2 to the sequestration site, and injecting CO2 in geologic
formations for permanent storage.
Congressional interest in CCS technology centers on balancing the competing national interests
of fostering low-cost, domestic sources of energy like coal against mitigating the effects of CO2
emissions in the atmosphere. FutureGen would address these interests by demonstrating CCS
technology. Among the challenges to the development of FutureGen 2.0 are rising costs of
production, ongoing issues with project development, lack of incentives for investment from the
private sector, time constraints, and competition with foreign nations. Remaining challenges to
FutureGen’s development include securing private sector funding to meet increasing costs,
purchasing the power plant for the project, obtaining permission from DOE to retrofit the plant,
performing the retrofit, and then meeting the goal of 90% capture of CO2.
The FutureGen project was conceived as a public-private partnership between industry and DOE
with agreements for cost-share and cooperation on development, demonstration, and deployment
of CCS technology. The public-private partnership has been criticized for leading to setbacks in
FutureGen’s development, since the private sector lacks incentives to invest in costly CCS
technology. Regulations, tax credits, or policies such as carbon taxation or cap-and-trade that
increase the price of electricity from conventional power plants may be necessary to make CCS
technology competitive enough for private sector investment. Even then, industry may choose to
forgo coal-fired plants for other sources of energy that emit less CO2, such as natural gas.
A proposed rule by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to limit CO2 emissions from new
fossil-fuel power plants may provide some incentive for industry to invest in CCS technology.
Alternatively, critics of the proposed rule have expressed concern over the loss of American
competitiveness in a global market not subject to similar regulations. These critics point to
China’s increasing CO2 emissions and argue that Chinese industries will surpass American
industries in productive competitiveness and that this will lead to American companies
outsourcing jobs and production. Delays in FutureGen’s project development may have made
full-scale demonstration of CCS technology by 2015—the year that federal stimulus funding for
FutureGen expires—difficult to accomplish.

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FutureGen: A Brief History and Issues for Congress

Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Issues for Congress .......................................................................................................................... 1
DOE CCS Programs .................................................................................................................. 2
Project Costs .............................................................................................................................. 3
Public-Private Partnership ......................................................................................................... 3
Current Status of FutureGen ............................................................................................................ 4
Policy Challenges ............................................................................................................................ 6
Outlook ............................................................................................................................................ 7
Timeline ........................................................................................................................................... 8

Figures
Figure 1. Map Showing the Town of Meredosia, IL, the Proposed Pipeline Route, and the
Proposed CO2 Sequestration Site .................................................................................................. 5

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 12
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 12

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FutureGen: A Brief History and Issues for Congress

Introduction
FutureGen is a clean-coal technology program managed through a public-private partnership
between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the FutureGen Industrial Alliance. The
FutureGen program as originally conceived in 2003 by the George W. Bush Administration had
the intent of constructing a net zero-emission fossil-fueled power plant with carbon capture and
sequestration (CCS) technology.1 CCS is a process envisioned to capture carbon dioxide (CO2)
emitted from burning fossil fuels and store it in deep underground geologic formations, thus
preventing its release into the atmosphere. If widely deployed in the United States, CCS could
decrease the amount of U.S.-emitted CO2, a greenhouse gas associated with climate change. In
2008, DOE withdrew from the FutureGen partnership, citing rising costs of construction as its
reason. Subsequently, DOE restructured the FutureGen program to instead develop two or three
demonstration projects in different power plants around the country. In 2010, the Obama
administration announced another change to the program with the introduction of FutureGen 2.0,
which would retrofit an existing coal-fueled power plant in Illinois with CCS technology.2
Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5), FutureGen
received $1 billion to proceed with the project. The FutureGen Alliance estimated the total cost of
the program to be $1.3 billion, with $730 million used toward retrofitting and repowering Ameren
Corporation’s power plant and $550 million used for the construction of a CO2 pipeline, storage
site, and training and research center. They also estimated that the project would create
approximately 1,000 construction jobs and another 1,000 jobs for suppliers across the state.3 A
history of FutureGen is found at the end of this report.
This report briefly summarizes the history of FutureGen, discusses why it has gained interest and
support from some Members of Congress and the Administration while remaining in initial stages
of development, and offers some policy considerations on barriers that challenge its further
development as a model for a CCS program.
Issues for Congress
Congressional consideration of CCS has focused on balancing competing national interests such
as fostering low-cost domestic sources of energy like coal against reducing greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions in the atmosphere. Legislative proposals during the 109th and 110th Congresses
focused on advancing carbon capture technologies that reduce CO2 emissions to mitigate GHG-
induced global warming. Congress began appropriating funds specifically for FutureGen
beginning in 2005. Previously, DOE had allocated funds under its Clean Coal Power Initiative
(CCPI) program. With the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Congress
appropriated $1 billion for the FutureGen 2.0 project.

1 Congress first appropriated funds specifically for FutureGen in FY2005.
2 U.S. Department of Energy National Energy Technology Laboratory, “Secretary Chu Announces FutureGen 2.0:
Awards $1 Billion in Recovery Act Funding for Carbon Capture and Storage Network in Illinois,” press release,
August 5, 2010, http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/press/2010/10033-Secretary_Chu_Announces_FutureGen_.html.
3 FutureGen Alliance, “FutureGen 2.0,” press release, February 24, 2011, http://www.futuregenalliance.org/pdf/
FutureGenFacts.pdf.
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The revival of FutureGen under the Obama Administration as FutureGen 2.0 has sparked
increased scrutiny of the future of integrated CCS technology on a commercially viable scale.
FutureGen was originally proposed to demonstrate the feasibility of using CCS technology to
mitigate CO2 emissions into the atmosphere. Among the challenges that continue to influence the
development of FutureGen 2.0 are rising costs of production, ongoing issues with project
development, lack of incentives for investment from the private sector, time constraints on project
development, and competition with foreign nations. Despite congressional and Obama
Administration commitments to the FutureGen 2.0 project, particularly the $1.0 billion
appropriation from ARRA, questions remain as to whether or not FutureGen 2.0 will succeed.
The Congressional Budget Office published a report in June 2012 stating that the success of CCS
technology depends on reducing technical costs, ensuring the effectiveness of CCS, and adopting
policies that provide incentives for industry to pursue the high-cost demonstration technologies.4
The report explained that if regulations, tax credits, or policies such as carbon taxation or cap-
and-trade that increase the price of electricity from conventional power plants are adopted, then
CCS technology may become competitive enough for private sector investment. Even then,
industry may choose to forgo coal-fueled plants for natural gas or other sources that emit less CO2
compared to coal.5
DOE CCS Programs
Current scientific thinking associates an increase in atmospheric GHGs (in particular CO2,
methane, and nitrous oxides), which trap heat in the earth’s atmosphere, with the potential for
changing the Earth’s climate. The increase in the atmospheric concentration of CO2 in the 20th
and 21st centuries is due almost entirely to human activities.6 If successful, FutureGen 2.0 would
demonstrate a technology that, if widely deployed, could capture a significant fraction of U.S.
CO2 emissions for geologic sequestration.
DOE’s Office of Fossil Energy directs three major CCS programs: the Clean Coal Power
Initiative (CCPI), Industrial Carbon Capture and Storage (ICCS), and FutureGen 2.0.7 Through its
CCPI program, DOE partners with industry leaders in a cost-share arrangement to develop CCS
technologies. Of the six projects selected under the most recent funding for CCPI, three have
withdrawn, citing concerns over costs and regulations. DOE’s share for the three projects is $881
million, of which $800 million is from ARRA funds. DOE is also partnering with industry for 31
projects in the ICCS program. The combined total DOE share for all the ICCS projects is $1.422
billion, of which 70% is from ARRA funds.

4 Philip Webre and Samuel Wice, Federal Efforts to Reduce Cost of Capturing and Storing Carbon Dioxide,
Congressional Budget Office, June 2012, pp. 14-15, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43357-
06-28CarbonCapture.pdf.
5 Several CRS reports cover the issues of technology and cost of capturing CO2, as well as the challenge of storage
capacity in the United States for captured CO2, regulatory challenges, public acceptance, and others. See CRS Report
R41325, Carbon Capture: A Technology Assessment, by Peter Folger; CRS Report R42532, Carbon Capture and
Sequestration (CCS): A Primer, by Peter Folger; CRS Report RL34601, Community Acceptance of Carbon Capture
and Sequestration Infrastructure: Siting Challenges, by Paul W. Parfomak, and others.
6 For a more detailed examination of the science of climate change, see CRS Report RL34513, Climate Change:
Current Issues and Policy Tools, by Jane A. Leggett.
7 For a more detailed examination of DOE’s CCS program, see CRS Report R42496, Carbon Capture and
Sequestration: Research, Development, and Demonstration at the U.S. Department of Energy, by Peter Folger.
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FutureGen 2.0 is DOE’s most comprehensive CCS demonstration project, combining all three
aspects of CCS technology: capturing and separating CO2 from other gases, compressing and
transporting CO2 to the sequestration site, and injecting CO2 in geologic formations.
Project Costs
Increasing projected costs have posed significant problems to FutureGen’s development since
2003. When Secretary of Energy Steven Chu announced the new FutureGen 2.0 in 2010, the cost
was estimated at $1.3 billion, with the DOE covering 80% of costs and industry partners
contributing the remaining 20% of the total. FutureGen 2.0 was to be implemented through two
separate cooperative agreements, with $590 million of ARRA funds allocated to Ameren
Corporation to retrofit a power plant8 and $459 million to the FutureGen Industrial Alliance to
implement a pipeline and regional CO2 storage reservoir project.9
Since 2010, the estimated price of the project has increased from $1.3 billion to $1.65 billion.10
The Alliance was expected to cover the additional cost. Confronted with increasing projected
costs in 2008, DOE under the George W. Bush Administration first restructured FutureGen, then
postponed the program when cost projections rose from $950 million to $1.8 billion. Rising costs
of production may continue to be a challenge to the project’s development.
Public-Private Partnership
The partnership between the federal government and the private sector in funding and developing
FutureGen has been marked by a series of setbacks and challenges. Some critics of the public-
private partnership attribute the project’s decade-long stasis to a lack of incentives for industry
leaders to invest seriously in clean coal technologies. A report released by the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology in 2008 stated that government investment and leadership in carbon
capture technologies are necessary. “Given the technical uncertainty and the current absence of a
carbon charge, there is no economic incentive for private firms to undertake such projects.”11
Since the MIT report was published, Congress has appropriated over $6 billion in CCS research
and development (R&D), including FutureGen; however, Congress has not enacted any form of a
“carbon charge,” through either a cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax.
Ameren Corporation, which partnered with DOE to retrofit a power plant for FutureGen 2.0,
discontinued its cooperative agreement, stating that it could no longer afford to implement the

8 DOE partnered with Ameren to retrofit the corporation’s obsolete 200 MW power plant in Meredosia, IL, with oxy-
combustion technology. The plans are for the retrofitted power plant to capture 90% of emitted carbon dioxide and
transport it from Meredosia to a storage site in Morgan County, IL, to store up 1.3 million tons of carbon dioxide per
year.
9 U.S. Department of Energy National Energy Technology Laboratory, FutureGen 2.0, Project Facts, June 2011,
http://www.netl.doe.gov. Funds apportioned from the DOE to the FutureGen Alliance include $405 million from
ARRA funds and $53.6 million from prior year appropriations toward the FutureGen project through the Office of
Fossil Energy.
10 Steve Daniels, “Soaring prices of FutureGen clean-coal plant could singe Illinois consumers,” Crain’s Chicago
Business, September 5, 2011, http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20110903/ISSUE01/309039980/soaring-price-
of-futuregen-clean-coal-plant-could-singe-illinois.
11 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Future of Coal: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study (2007), p. xiii.
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new air pollution rules set forth by the EPA in July 2011.12 In addition to the FutureGen project,
DOE partnered with industry for six other commercial-scale CCS projects through its Clean Coal
Power Initiative (CCPI) program.13 The 2010 DOE Strategic Plan report predicted that at least
five of DOE’s major CCS projects would become operational by 2016.14 Since the report was
released, three of the six industry partners of CCPI projects have pulled out of agreements with
DOE. The departure of several industry leaders from contracts with DOE demonstrates the
volatility of the public-private partnership model.
Current Status of FutureGen
In October 2010, FutureGen 2.0 developers began working on Phase 1 of the project with the Pre-
Front End Engineering Design (Pre-FEED) report, which included plant design, estimated project
cost, and basis for applying for NEPA and other state and local permits.15 The report showed that
the estimated price for FutureGen 2.0 had increased from $1.3 billion to $1.65 billion.
Subsequently, cost reduction measures were identified and implemented, including establishing
the plant gross output at 168 MW (the steam turbine is nominally rated at 200 MW), and using a
combination of 60% Illinois coal and 40% Powder River Basin (PRB) coal to reduce sulfur and
chlorine emissions.16 Furthermore, when Ameren announced it was closing its power plant in
Meredosia, Illinois, and discontinuing its cooperative agreement with DOE, the project was
redesigned to reflect that the Alliance would take control of the capture process as well as the
transportation and storage site. The Alliance is currently negotiating the purchase of parts of
the Meredosia Energy Center from Ameren to continue with project development. Figure 1
shows the location of the town of Meredosia, Illinois, the proposed pipeline route, and the
proposed carbon sequestration site where the captured CO2 would be injected underground
and stored.
The Alliance has submitted a proposal to DOE to begin work on Phase 2 of the project, which
includes a detailed engineering design, schedule and cost analysis, and environmental studies.
Throughout the summer and fall of 2012 the project continued to confront rising cost
estimates as well as challenges in negotiating a long-term power purchasing agreement with
the state of Illinois.17 In late December 2012, the Illinois Commerce Commission voted 3-2 to
approve a power procurement plan for the state that requires utilities to purchase all the electricity
generated by the FutureGen 2.0 facility for 20 years. That decision clears a major hurdle for

12 Ameren Energy Resources Company, LLC, “Two Ameren Merchant Generating Company Energy Centers to Cease
Operations,” press release, October 4, 2011, http://ameren.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=981.
13 CRS Report R42496, Carbon Capture and Sequestration: Research, Development, and Demonstration at the U.S.
Department of Energy, by Peter Folger.
14 Steve Koonin, DOE Strategic Plan, U.S. Department of Energy, December 8, 2010, p. 8, http://efcog.org/library/
council_meeting/SAMtg.120810/Presentations/Koonin,%20Steve.pdf.
15 D. K. McDonald, M. Estopinal, and H. Mualim, “FutureGen 2.0: Where Are We Now?,” (Technical Paper, Babcock
& Wilcox Power Generation Group, Inc., 2012), pp. 2-3, http://www.babcock.com/library/pdf/BR-1870.pdf.
(Hereinafter referred to as McDonald.) Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Group is a technology provider for
FutureGen 2.0 carbon capture project.
16 McDonald, p. 4.
17 “At the Major CCS Projects: HECA, FutureGen,” GHG Reduction Technologies Monitor, July 20, 2012,
http://ghgnews.com/index.cfm/at-the-major-ccs-projects-futuregen-20-heca/?mobileFormat=false. (Hereinafter referred
to as GHG ReductionTechnologies Monitor, July 20, 2012.)
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FutureGen 2.0, and the decision allows Commonwealth Edison and Ameren Illinois to collect
costs for the project from the state’s alternative retail electric suppliers.18 Opposition to the power
procurement proposal stemmed primarily from those opposed to its potential to raise costs for
retail customers.19
Current projections for FutureGen predict construction on the power plant, pipeline, and storage
facility will conclude by 2017.20 The project faced delays while it was being redesigned following
the release of the Pre-FEED report, so that demonstrating CCS technology at full-scale by
December 31, 201521—the date when ARRA funding expires—may be difficult.
Figure 1. Map Showing the Town of Meredosia, IL, the Proposed Pipeline Route, and
the Proposed CO2 Sequestration Site

Source: The FutureGen Alliance, http://www.futuregenalliance.org/futuregen-2-0-project/pipeline/.

18 Tamar Hallerman, “Ill. Regulators Approve 20-Year Power Contract for FutureGen,” GHG Reduction Technologies
Monitor, December 21, 2012, http://ghgnews.com/index.cfm/ill-regulators-approve-20-year-power-contract-for-
futuregen/. (Hereinafter referred to as GHG Reduction Technologies Monitor, December 21, 2012.)
19 GHG Reduction Technologies Monitor, December 21, 2012.
20 McDonald, p. 4.
21 GHG Reduction Technologies Monitor, July 20, 2012.
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Policy Challenges
The FutureGen project was originally conceived as a cost-share between the federal government,
which would cover 76% of the cost, and the private sector, which would provide the remaining
24%. Between FY2004 and FY2008, Congress appropriated $174 million to the original
FutureGen project. DOE obligated $44 million and expended $42 million between FY2005 and
FY2010 toward the project.22
Under the Obama Administration, Congress appropriated another $1 billion in ARRA funds for
FutureGen. Since FY2010, DOE has spent nearly $34 million from the ARRA funds toward
FutureGen 2.0. Furthermore, DOE has obligated nearly $60 million and spent $2 million from
regular appropriations to FutureGen 2.0 since FY2010.23
After DOE announced in March 2008 that it was canceling FutureGen in Mattoon, IL, in favor of
a restructured FutureGen project, Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development
Chairman Byron Dorgan recommended postponing a decision on FutureGen until the next
administration.24 The subcommittee ultimately made the decision in July 2008 to divert $156
million in funding requested for FutureGen to DOE’s Clean Coal Power Initiative and to maintain
$134 million in prior-year appropriations for FutureGen until the next administration took
office.25 In March 2009, the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, House Science
Committee, held a hearing about DOE’s decision to restructure FutureGen and the future of CCS
technology deployment under the new administration.26
Since EPA proposed a new rule regulating GHG emissions from power plants that would likely
require CCS, Congress has considered legislation to block the new regulations. The
Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee
held a hearing on June 19, 2012, where opponents of the new rule, including FutureGen Alliance
Chairman Steven E. Winberg, criticized the regulations. “In effect, EPA’s rule will eliminate any
new coal for years to come because EPA is requiring new coal-fueled power plants to meet a
natural gas equivalent CO2 standard, before CCS technology is commercially available.”27
Multiple analyses indicate that there will be retirements of coal-fired capacity; however, virtually
all analyses agree that coal will continue to play a substantial role in electricity generation for
decades. How many retirements will take place and the role of EPA regulations in causing them
are matters of dispute.28 The huge increases in the U.S. domestic supply of natural gas, due

22 Email correspondence with Jeff Hoffman of the Office of Major Demonstrations in the Department of Energy’s
National Energy Technology Laboratory.
23 Ibid.
24 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
Department of Energy’s Decision to Restructure the FutureGen Program, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., May 8, 2008, 110-
826, pp. 1-3.
25 Katherine Ling, “Senate panel freezes funding for restructured FutureGen,” Environment & Energy, July 8, 2008,
http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/climate_change/2008/07/08/3.
26 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment,
FutureGen and the Department of Energy’s Advanced Coal Programs, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 11, 2009.
27 The American Energy Initiative: A Focus on EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Regulations, p. 6.
28 For a detailed discussion of the EPA’s regulation of coal, see CRS Report R41914, EPA’s Regulation of Coal-Fired
Power: Is a “Train Wreck” Coming?, by James E. McCarthy and Claudia Copeland.
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largely to the exploitation of unconventional shale gas reservoirs through the use of hydraulic
fracturing, has also led to a shift to natural gas for electricity production.29
In addition to the rapid increase in the domestic natural gas supply as an alternative to coal,
regulating CO2 emissions may lead electricity producers to invest in natural gas-fired plants,
which emit approximately half the amount of CO2 per unit of electricity produced compared to
coal-fired plants. Furthermore, power plants enhanced with CCS technology would likely be
more costly to construct and operate than plants without CO2 capture.30 Consequently, regulations
that limit CO2 emissions and prompt switching to natural gas may raise questions about the
rationale for CCS demonstration projects like FutureGen. Alternatively, GHG regulations may
provide the necessary incentives for the industry to accelerate CCS development and deployment.
Outlook
Nearly ten years and two restructuring efforts since FutureGen’s inception, the project is still in
its early development stages. Although the Alliance completed drilling a characterization well at
the storage site in Morgan County, IL, and installed a service rig over the well for further geologic
analysis, issues with the power plant itself have not yet been resolved. Among the remaining
challenges are securing private sector funding to meet increasing costs, purchasing the Meredosia
power plant from Ameren, obtaining permission from the DOE to retrofit the plant, performing
the retrofit, and then meeting the goal of 90% capture of CO2.
Alternatively, coal-based power plants may be replaced by natural gas-fueled plants that emit less
CO2 as regulations on carbon emissions are implemented. Electricity generation from natural gas
is expected to grow through 2035 because of the relatively low cost of natural gas-fired
generation as compared with that of coal.31 With more stringent emission regulations—including
the proposal by EPA to limit coal-fired power plant emissions of hazardous air pollutants—the
cost of coal-fired power plants may no longer be competitive with lower-cost natural gas plants.
Consequently, the electricity industry may increasingly shift construction toward natural gas-fired
power plants, which cost less and emit approximately half the CO2 of coal-fired power plants per
unit electricity generated. Such a shift would likely affect the coal industry and DOE’s CCS
program, including FutureGen.
A further challenge for Congress to consider is the international ramifications of American
leadership in developing and deploying CCS technology. Recently proposed regulation of coal-
fired power plants that emit hazardous air pollutants has been criticized for possibly harming
American electricity generating capacity and causing job losses.32 Critics of these regulations
express concern over the loss of American competitiveness as a result of increased economic
burdens on coal-based industries while technologies that can mitigate emissions—like CCS—

29 For a detailed discussion of how natural gas is affecting electric power generation, see CRS Report R42814, Natural
Gas in the U.S. Economy: Opportunities for Growth, by Robert Pirog and Michael Ratner.
30 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Future of Coal: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study (2007), p. 147.
31 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Outlook 2012 with Projections to 2035,” June 12, 2012,
86-88, http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo.
32 For a more detailed examination of recent EPA regulations, see CRS Report R41914, EPA’s Regulation of Coal-
Fired Power: Is a “Train Wreck” Coming?, by James E. McCarthy and Claudia Copeland.
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have not yet been successfully developed.33 They argue that Chinese industries, which emit twice
as much CO2 as American industries, will surpass the United States in productive competitiveness
and that this will lead to American industries shipping more jobs and production overseas.34
While U.S. policies and regulations call into question the utilization of coal for electricity
generation at current levels, the United States continues its international financial assistance to
foreign nations like China for their development of global climate change initiatives.35
Effectively, the United States is helping to develop CCS technologies in foreign countries while
domestic CCS projects, including FutureGen, are still in their early stages of construction. An
important question policymakers may consider is whether the United States should continue to
fund foreign CCS technologies while decreasing domestic coal production and utilization through
new regulations.
Timeline
Since its inception, FutureGen has been restructured twice and has undergone changes in funding,
technology, location, and scope. The timeline that follows shows a chronology of the history of
FutureGen since 2003.

33 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and Power, The American
Energy Initiative: A Focus on EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Regulations, Steven E. Winberg testimony, 112th Cong., 2nd
sess., June 19, 2012, 4-5.
34 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, EPA’S Anti-Industrial Policy: “Threatening
Jobs and America’s Manufacturing Base, Minority staff report on EPA regulations, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., September
28, 2010, pp. 14-16.
35 For a more detailed examination of the most recent administrative funding for global climate change initiatives, see
CRS Report R41845, The Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI): Budget Authority and Request, FY2010-FY2013,
by Richard K. Lattanzio.
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Sources: Information for the FutureGen Timeline has been acquired from the fol owing sources.
Articles from the St. Louis Business Journal between April 22, 2003 and December 7, 2011 by various authors,
http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/search/results?q=FutureGen.
Christa Marshall, “FutureGen Carbon Capture Project Affirms Main Storage Site,” Environment & Energy, July 18,
2012, http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/print/2012/07/18/6.
D.K. McDonald, M. Estopinal, and H. Mualim, “FutureGen 2.0: Where Are We Now?”, (Technical Paper,
Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Group, Inc., 2012), http://www.babcock.com/library/pdf/BR-1870.pdf.
Heartland Coalfield Al iance, “FutureGen 2.0 June Scoping Meetings,” press release, June 2, 2011,
http://heartlandcoalfieldal iance.org/futuregen-2-0-scoping-june-meetings/.
John Reynolds, “Ameren power plant closures: Fewer jobs, cleaner air.,” The State Journal Register, October 4,
2011, http://www.sj-r.com/breaking/x432920643/Ameren-cites-EPA-rules-in-closure-of-2-Illinois-plants?zc_p=0.
Katherine Ling, “Senate panel freezes funding for restructured FutureGen,” Environment & Energy, July 8, 2008,
http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/climate_change/2008/07/08/3.
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Mark Chediak and Katarzyna Klimasinska, “AEP, Southern Withdraw From FutureGen Coal Project (Update2),”
Bloomberg.com, June 24, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aBeVHVGtr7KE.
Press Releases from The FutureGen Alliance between September 13, 2005 and July 17, 2012,
http://www.futuregenalliance.org/news/press-releases/.
Russell Gold, “Taking Lumps: Futuregen Backers Back Out.,” Wall Street Journal, June 5, 2009,
http://blogs.wsj.com/environmentalcapital/2009/06/25/taking-lumps-futuregen-backers-back-out/.
The text of the Illinois Finance Authority Board Meeting on January 12, 2010 regarding,” Resolution Number
2010-01-09 “A Resolution in Support of the Non-Profit Clean Coal FutureGen Project in Mattoon, Illinois” can
be viewed at http://www.il-fa.com/public/boardbooks/media-1-12-10.pdf.
The text of Illinois S.B. 1821 can be viewed at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?Name=097-
0534.
The text of Illinois S.B. 2062 can be viewed at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/97/097-0618.htm.
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment,
FutureGen and the Department of Energy’s Advanced Coal Programs, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 11, 2009.
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
Department of Energy’s Decision to Restructure the FutureGen Program, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., May 8, 2008, 110-826.
U.S. Department of Energy Office of Fossil Energy, FutureGen Integrated Hydrogen, Electric Power Production
and Carbon Sequestration Research Initiative: Energy Independence through Carbon Sequestration and
Hydrogen from Coal, Report to Congress, March 4, 2004, http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/coalpower/
fuelcel s/publications/fuelcel /fc-cleanup/futuregen_report_march_04.pdf.
U.S. Department of Energy Fossil Energy Techline, “Department of Energy Formally Commits $1 Billion in
Recovery Act Funding to FutureGen 2.0,” press release, September 28, 2010, http://www.fossil.energy.gov/news/
techlines/2010/10048-DOE_Formal y_Commits_%241_Billion_to.html.
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Clean Coal DOE’s Decision to Restructure FutureGen Should Be Based on a
Comprehensive Analysis of Costs, Benefits, and Risks, GAO-09-248, February 13, 2009.
Tamar Hallerman, “Ill. Regulators Approve 20-Year Power Contract for FutureGen,” GHG Reduction Technologies
Monitor, December 21, 2012, http://ghgnews.com/index.cfm/il -regulators-approve-20-year-power-contract-for-
futuregen/.


Author Contact Information
Peter Folger
Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy
pfolger@crs.loc.gov, 7-1517

Acknowledgments
The bulk of the research and writing of this report was undertaken by Ester Cross, an intern with CRS
during the summer of 2012. Ms. Cross is a Dartmouth College undergraduate student and her work on this
and other projects is greatly appreciated.
Congressional Research Service
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