Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
March 29, 2013
Congressional Research Service
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Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy

Summary
Kuwait was pivotal to two decades of U.S. efforts to end a strategic threat posed by Iraq, because
of its location, its role as the object of past Iraqi aggression, and its close cooperation with the
United States. Kuwait is a key to the U.S. ability to act militarily, if necessary, in the northern
Persian Gulf region now that all U.S. forces have left Iraq. Kuwait’s relations with the post-
Saddam government in Iraq have been hampered by long-standing territorial, economic, and
political issues unresolved from the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but those issues have been
narrowed significantly since 2011. Kuwait is increasingly suspicious of Iranian intentions in the
Gulf, aligning Kuwait with U.S. efforts to contain Iranian power in the Gulf and prevent Iran
from exerting undue influence in post-withdrawal Iraq. Still, Kuwait maintains relatively normal
economic and political relations with Iran so as not to provoke Iran militarily or prompt it to try to
empower pro-Iranian elements in Kuwait.
Although Kuwait’s foreign policy fluctuates little, its political system has been in turmoil since
2006, and has deteriorated significantly since late 2012. Previously, political disputes in Kuwait
had consisted of opposition within the elected National Assembly to the political dominance of
the Al Sabah family. These disputes aggravated—and been aggravated by—schisms within rival
branches of the ruling Al Sabah. The disputes produced five dissolutions of the National
Assembly and new elections since 2006, the latest of which occurred on October 8, 2012,
requiring new elections that were held on December 1, 2012.
During 2011-2012, there were relatively small demonstrations in Kuwait by opposition groups
over official corruption, security force brutality, citizenship eligibility, and other issues. However,
protests expanded significantly in late 2012 to challenge Sabah regime efforts to shape the
December 1, 2012 elections to its advantage. Most oppositionists boycotted the December 1
elections, lowering the turnout but producing an overwhelmingly pro-government Assembly.
Since the election, the opposition has continued its battle to reduce Sabah power through public
protests, but the demonstrations sometimes are suspended after compromises with the
government.
Even though opposition to Sabah rule has grown, the opposition still largely confines its demands
to limiting Sabah power rather than ending the family’s rule. And, Kuwait remains a relatively
wealthy society where most citizens do not want to risk their economic well-being to try to bring
about the downfall of Al Sabah rule through violence. To try to contain the unrest, the
government has used financial largesse—budgets loaded with subsidies and salary increases—as
well as some repressive measures, including beatings and imprisonments. But, the many years of
political paralysis have led to some economic stagnation as well, because parliamentary approval
for several major investment projects, such as development of major oil fields in northern Kuwait,
has been held up due to the infighting. The lack of economic vibrancy led to strikes in several
economic sectors in 2012.
On other regional issues, in part because of its leadership turmoil, Kuwait tends to defer to
consensus positions within the Gulf Cooperation Council; this deference is evident in Kuwait’s
stances on the Israel-Palestinian dispute as well as on the uprisings in Yemen and Syria. On the
uprising in Bahrain, in March 2011, Kuwait joined a Gulf Cooperation Council intervention on
the side of the government, but unlike Saudi Arabia and UAE, Kuwait sent naval and not ground
forces.
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Contents
Kuwaiti Government Changes and Political Reform ....................................................................... 1
The National Assembly and Disputes With the Ruling Family ................................................. 1
Assembly Authorities .......................................................................................................... 1
Political Factions ................................................................................................................. 2
The Franchise ...................................................................................................................... 3
Post-2006 Political Crises: Assembly Suspensions and Elections ............................................ 3
June 2006 Election .............................................................................................................. 3
May 2008 Election .............................................................................................................. 3
May 2009 Election .............................................................................................................. 4
The Fall of Another Government and February 2012 Election ........................................... 6
No Abatement of the Crisis and Second Election in 2012 .................................................. 7
U.S. Responses and Implications for U.S. Interests ............................................................ 9
Broader Human Rights Issues ................................................................................................. 10
Women’s Rights ................................................................................................................ 10
Trafficking in Persons ....................................................................................................... 11
Status of “Bidoons” ........................................................................................................... 11
Freedom of Expression and Media Freedoms ................................................................... 11
Labor Rights ...................................................................................................................... 12
Religious Freedom ............................................................................................................ 12
U.S.-Kuwait Relations and Defense Cooperation .......................................................................... 13
Assistance in Addressing the Threat from Iraq ........................................................................ 13
Bilateral Defense Pact ....................................................................................................... 13
The Iraq Containment Era ................................................................................................. 14
Supporting the U.S.-Led Effort to Militarily Oust Saddam/Major Non-NATO Ally
Designation .................................................................................................................... 14
Helping U.S. Efforts to Stabilize Post-Saddam Iraq ......................................................... 14
Kuwait’s Role in Long-Term Gulf Security ............................................................................ 15
U.S. Security Assistance .......................................................................................................... 16
Arms Sales ........................................................................................................................ 16
International Military Education and Training (IMET)..................................................... 17
Foreign Policy Issues ..................................................................................................................... 18
Outstanding Bilateral Issues With Iraq .................................................................................... 18
Residual Issues from the 1990 Iraqi Invasion and Occupation ......................................... 18
Iran ........................................................................................................................................... 21
Arab-Israeli Dispute ................................................................................................................ 21
Positions and Actions on 2011 Uprisings Elsewhere in the Region ........................................ 22
Kuwaiti Cooperation Against Islamic Militancy ..................................................................... 23
Kuwaiti Economic Policy .............................................................................................................. 23

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Kuwait................................................................................................................ 25

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Tables
Table 1. Composition of the National Assembly: 2008–2012 ......................................................... 9
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Kuwait and Purposes ..................................................................................... 17
Table 3.Some Basic Facts .............................................................................................................. 25

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 26

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Kuwaiti Government Changes and Political Reform1
Kuwait’s optimism after the 2003 fall of its nemesis, Saddam Hussein, soured after the January
15, 2006, death of Amir (ruler) Jabir Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah. Since then, Kuwait has lurched
from one political crisis to the next, producing a sense of economic and political stagnation. At
the time of Amir Jabir’s death, his successor, Shaykh Sa’ad bin Abdullah Al Sabah, was very ill
(he later died), and a brief succession dispute among rival branches of the ruling Al Sabah family
ensued. It was resolved with Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah becoming
Amir on January 29, 2006; about 83, he is the younger brother of the late Amir. The succession
dispute was unprecedented in Kuwait and the broader Gulf region for the first use of an elected
legislature’s constitutional ability to formally remove a leader.
Although the leadership question was resolved, it produced a suspension of the tacit agreement to
alternate succession between the Jabir and Salem branches of the family. Amir Sabah appointed
two members of his Jabir branch as crown prince/heir apparent and as prime minister (Shaykh
Nawwaf al-Ahmad Al Sabah and Shaykh Nasser al Muhammad al-Ahmad Al Sabah
respectively). The highest-ranking member of the Salem branch in the government was Dr.
Mohammad Al Sabah, deputy prime minister and foreign minister until his resignation on
October 18, 2011.
Tensions between the two branches of the family have since simmered, and no permanent
alternative mechanism has been agreed to replace the previous power-sharing pact between them.
The governmental infighting has provided rationale and additional political space for various
youth and other reform-oriented groups inspired by the Arab uprisings that began in early 2011,
and some in the ruling family have sided with the political opposition.
The National Assembly and Disputes With the Ruling Family
The National Assembly, established by Kuwait’s November 1962 constitution, is the longest-
serving all-elected body among the Gulf monarchies. Fifty seats are elected, and up to 15
members of the cabinet—which is limited by the constitution to 16 members—serve in it ex-
officio. Amirs of Kuwait have, on several occasions (1976-1981, 1986-1992, 2003, 2006, 2008,
2009, 2011, and 2012), used their constitutional authority to dissolve the Assembly when it
aggressively challenged the government—an action that mandates new elections within 60 days.
Assembly Authorities
While Kuwait’s constitution enshrines the hereditary monarchy, the Kuwait National Assembly
has more scope of authority than any legislative or consultative body in the Persian Gulf. It can
introduce legislation as well as consider and vote on government-introduced legislation. The
Assembly does not have the power to confirm cabinet nominees (individually or en bloc), but it
can, by simple majority of elected members, vote “no confidence” and remove individual

1 Much of this section is from the State Department’s country report on human rights practices for 2011 (released May
24, 2012), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dynamic_load_id=186434#wrapper ; the
International Religious Freedom Report for 2011 (July 30, 2012),
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htmand the Trafficking in Persons Report for 2012 (June 19,
2012), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/192596.pdf.
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ministers. When the Assembly takes that step, it generally does so after parliamentary questioning
of that minister, referred to as “grilling.” The Assembly can vote no confidence in the prime
minister by voting “inability to cooperate with the government,” and it can veto government
decrees issued during periods of Assembly suspension.
Those opposing the government have tended to seek greater authority for the Assembly and a
limitation of the powers of the government and by extension, limitations of the political and
economic power of the Al Sabah. The opposition, in general, seeks a constitutional monarchy in
which the Assembly, or an elected majority faction within the Assembly, names a Prime Minister
who in turn assembles a cabinet. The opposition is described below.
Political Factions
Political parties are still not permitted, but factions are organized and compete as “currents,”
“trends,” or “political societies.” Many of these factions meet and plan their strategies at a
parallel Kuwaiti tradition called diwaniyyas—informal social gatherings, held at night, held by
elites of all political ideologies and backgrounds. There are a growing number of diwaniyyas
organized by women.
Factions in Kuwait are often fluid, but in general they group as follows:
The “Opposition”
• “Liberals.” Highly educated elites who tend to form the core of the opposition to
the government. Many of the liberals had been part of Arab nationalist
movements in the 1960s and 1970s, and in many cases have studied abroad. In
prior years they had operated under the banner “Kuwait Democratic Forum.”
Some liberal Kuwaitis often side with the government.
• Sunni Islamists. They are generally opposed to the government. Within this broad
category, there are two major groupings: those linked to the Muslim
Brotherhood, and harder line Sunnis called Salafists. Those linked to the Muslim
Brotherhood have often operated under a banner called the Islamic Constitutional
Movement (ICM).
• Youths and Intellectuals. At the popular level, the opposition includes youth and
intellectuals, many of whom have become more active since the Arab uprisings
began in early 2011 but have been active in Kuwait far longer than that. Since
2008, these groups have sometimes organized during election campaigns to
support liberal deputies, using such names as the “Orange Movement” or “Fifth
Fence.”
Government Supporters
• “Tribalists.” Generally less educated but who dominate two out of the five
electoral districts and tend to support the government, although not universally.
At times, some tribalists in the Assembly have grouped into a faction widely
referred to as “service deputies”—Assembly members primarily focused on
steering government largesse and patronage to their constituents.
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• Shiites. Most in the Assembly are Islamists, assembled in a bloc called the
National Islamic Alliance. They tend to side with the government, perhaps out of
greater concern about Sunni Islamists.
• Women. When in the Assembly, women, both Shiite and Sunni, have tended to
align with the government. Many women outside the Assembly, however, have
participated in opposition demonstrations.
The Franchise
For at least two decades, the extent of the franchise has been a closely watched indicator of
Kuwait’s political liberalization, and there has been clear progress. The government has expanded
the electorate gradually, first by extending the franchise to sons of naturalized Kuwaitis and
Kuwaitis naturalized for at least 20 (as opposed to 30) years. The long deadlock on female
suffrage began to break in May 2004, after the government submitted to the Assembly a bill to
give women the right to vote and run. (A government attempt in May 1999 to institute female
suffrage by decree was vetoed by the Assembly.) In May 2005, then Prime Minister Shaykh
Sabah (now Amir) pressed the Assembly to adopt the government bill, which it did on May 16,
2005 (35-23); the bill was effective as of the 2006 National Assembly elections.
Post-2006 Political Crises: Assembly Suspensions and Elections
The post-2006 political deadlock has manifested as repeated Assembly suspensions and
subsequent elections, none of which has resolved differences over the fundamental power
balances between the executive and the legislature. Only five months after becoming leader, Amir
Sabah suspended the Assembly in May 2006 when 29 opposition members demanded to question
the prime minister over the government’s refusal to endorse a proposal to reduce the number of
electoral districts to 5, from 25. The opposition wanted to increase the size of each district so that
it would be more difficult to influence the outcome through alleged “vote buying” or tribal
politics.
June 2006 Election
In the June 29, 2006, election, the opposition, which attracted youth support under the “Orange”
banner, won 34 out of the 50 seats. The election was the first in which women could vote or run,
but none of the 27 female candidates (out of 249) won. The amir did, however, ultimately accept
the opposition’s demand to reduce the number of electoral districts to five; a law to implement
that went into effect.
May 2008 Election
The schisms between the opposition and the government produced another crisis in March 2008
when the Assembly insisted on pay raises for state employees as a response to spiraling inflation.
The government refused, the cabinet resigned, and the amir dissolved the Assembly and set new
elections for May 17, 2008. With the compression to 5 electoral districts implemented, Sunni
Islamists and conservative tribal leaders won a total of 24 seats—an increase of 4. Their allies—
the so-called “liberals”—won seven seats. Shiites increased their representation by one, to a total
of five seats. Pro-government and other independent tribalists held the remaining 14 seats. As in
the 2006 election, none of the 27 women candidates was elected.
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Almost immediately after the 2008 elections and related cabinet appointments, Islamists agitated
unsuccessfully against the appointment of two women to the cabinet. The two female cabinet
members were Nuriya al-Sebih, who was reappointed as the education minister (after surviving a
January 2008 no-confidence vote), and Mudhi al-Humoud, a liberal academic, who was
appointed as state minister for two positions: housing affairs and development affairs. Another
woman, Ms. Masouma Mubarak, who was the first female minister ever in Kuwait, had resigned
in September 2007 after some members of parliament blamed her for mismanagement.
Sunni-Shiite tensions added to the dissension within the Kuwaiti elite. Possibly as a spillover of
sectarian tensions in post-Saddam Iraq, recriminations flared in February 2008 after several Shiite
politicians attended a public ceremony commemorating the killing earlier that month of Lebanese
Hezbollah militant Imad Mughniyah. The sectarian tensions erupted even though the Shiite
representation in the cabinet was expanded to two ministers, up from one that was customary. In
November 2008, the cabinet resigned when three Sunni Assembly deputies requested to question
the prime minister over corruption allegations and his decision to permit the visit of an Iranian
Shiite cleric who was perceived as having slighted Sunnis. On December 1, 2008, the Amir
reappointed Shaykh Nasser as prime minister, pending formation of a new cabinet, but he did not
suspend the Assembly.
May 2009 Election
The power struggle between the government and opposition deputies in the Assembly resumed in
March 2009, when the Assembly insisted on questioning the prime minister over his management
of the global financial crisis and alleged misuse of public funds. The disputes had held up passage
of a proposed $5 billion fiscal stimulus and financial guarantees program. On March 19, 2009, the
Amir again suspended the Assembly, triggering new elections by May 19, 2009, under the
constitution (60 days from suspension). They were held on May 16, 2009; turnout was relatively
light at about 55% of the 385,000 eligible voters, and produced more than 20 new
parliamentarians, including 4 women—the first to be elected. They included Masouma Mubarak,
mentioned above (a Shiite); Rola Dashti, who had been narrowly defeated in 2006; and professors
Aseel al-Awadhi and Salwa al-Jassar.
Perhaps reflecting the strengthened government position, immediately after the election, the Amir
reappointed Shaykh Nasser as prime minister. There had been pre-election speculation that the
Amir would appoint the crown prince, Shaykh Nawwaf, as prime minister, concurrently, because
the Assembly is not able, constitutionally, to question the crown prince. The move would have
restored the tradition of appointing one official to hold the two positions, a tradition which was
adhered to until July 2003.
The election of the women, and the setback for Sunni Islamists, signaled to some that Kuwaiti
voters wanted an Assembly that would work with the government. However, those hopes were
dashed in November 2009, when Assembly members filed motions to question four ministers,
including the defense minister, for alleged corruption in the arms sale process. The Assembly also
demanded to question Prime Minister Nasser for corruption in the 2008 elections. On December
8, 2009, the prime minister agreed to the questioning, marking the first time in the Gulf region
that a head of government had been successfully summoned by an elected body. A motion by 10
members cited the prime minister for “noncooperation” with the Assembly, but, on December 17,
2009, a new election was avoided when deputies voted 35-13 on a separate motion to express
confidence in the prime minister.
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Yet, the political deadlock did not break. After the session of parliament opened on October 26,
2010, government allies were appointed to key permanent committees 2 and opposition deputies
threatened to question Interior Minister Jabir for his release from custody of two Iranian drug
traffickers. Others sought to question why the government was slow to implement a privatization
law passed in the winter-spring 2010 session, but which entered into force in September 2010.
The tensions that built throughout 2010 carried over into 2011. A demonstration by
parliamentarians and civil society activists on December 8, 2010, protesting what they asserted
were government attempts to limit National Assembly powers, was broken up by security forces.
That incident sparked another call to formally question the prime minister on December 28, 2010,
(the eighth time he appeared before the Assembly) and a date of January 5, 2011, was set for a no-
confidence motion. Of the 50 elected Assembly members, 22 supported the no-confidence motion
and 25 opposed it, with 1 abstention, and 2 not voting.3 Some saw the vote as indicating that the
government is losing support among tribal deputies mainly from the outer districts of Kuwait
City, which are inhabited by generally less affluent, naturalized citizens.4
2011: Broader Arab Uprisings Add to Kuwait’s Political Crises
The January 5, 2011, no-confidence vote did not resolve the conflict between the government and
opposition deputies. Concurrently, the broader Arab uprisings affected the schisms within Kuwait
by bringing broader opposition elements in society into the political struggles in Kuwait.
Opposition deputies, supported by youths under a banner called the “Fifth Fence,” and who were
inspired by the Arab uprisings that began in January 2011, called for the resignation of Interior
Minister Jabir al-Khalid Al Sabah for failing to prevent the alleged torturing to death of a man in
custody for illegal liquor sales. February 8, 2011, was set for a public protest—the same day the
interior minister was to be questioned by the Assembly. However, in advance of the questioning,
the minister resigned and was replaced by Shaykh Ahmad al Humud Al Sabah, and the Fifth
Fence postponed the protest until March 8, 2011. The protest was held but attracted only a few
hundred participants.
Popular protests did not broaden substantially, suggesting that popular frustration with
governance in Kuwait was not as broad as in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, where leaders were
toppled by unrest. However, the crisis within the elite continued. On March 31, 2011, Shiite
parliamentarian Saleh Ashour asked to question the foreign minister about Kuwait’s sending of
naval forces as part of a Gulf Cooperation Council military intervention to assist Bahrain’s
government against the Shiite opposition there. Many of Kuwait’s Shiites opposed that decision
as unjustly supporting the Sunni Bahraini monarchy. Rather than face questioning on the Bahrain
issue, the cabinet resigned. Prime Minister Nasser was re-appointed to a caretaker government,
and a new cabinet, with few changes, was formed on May 8, 2011—the seventh cabinet formed
by Shaykh Nasser since he became prime minister in 2006. (Only the ministers for oil and for
commerce were changed.) Two days later, two National Assembly deputies asked to question the
prime minister over economic issues, although the Assembly voted, on May 17, 2011 (37 out of
47 members presented), to put off the questioning for one year.

2 “Govt Controls Key Assembly Panels.” Kuwait Times, October 27, 2010.
3 “Kuwait’s Prime Minister Survives Parliament Vote.” Al Jazeera TV, January 5, 2011.
4 Kristin Smith Diwan, “Kuwait: Too Much Politics, or Not Enough?,” Foreign Policy online, January 10, 2011.
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After a few months of relative quiet, the government came under renewed popular pressure in
September 2011 following reports that two of Kuwait’s largest banks had deposited $92 million
into the accounts of two National Assembly members—suggesting that the government had
sought to buy the loyalty of parliamentarians. The transfers, and those to seven other
parliamentarians, were placed under government investigation. The corruption case caused
thousands of Kuwait protesters to take to the streets on September 21, 2011, to call for the
resignation of the prime minister. On October 18, 2011, Deputy Prime and Foreign Minister Dr.
Mohammad Al Sabah, discussed earlier, resigned in protest of the alleged corruption. Two days
later, what many called the biggest demonstration in Kuwait of the year (an estimated 10,000)
demanded the prime minister’s resignation. Probably as a direct response to the allegations, on
September 25, 2011, the cabinet adopted an anti-corruption draft law.
The protests were accompanied by strikes in the oil industry and the state-run banking and health
care industry in September 2011. However, these job actions did not appear directly related to the
political disputes, but rather to disputes over pay, benefits, and working conditions.
The Fall of Another Government and February 2012 Election
On October 26, 2011, the prime minister opened the 2011-2012 National Assembly session by
blaming the parliamentary opposition for the lack of progress on key issues, but the challenges
did not abate. Opposition deputies boycotted committee meetings, and moderate liberals defected
and joined with opposition deputies, giving the opposition enough votes for a successful no-
confidence motion against the prime minister. On November 16, 2011, opposition deputies and
oppositionists in the public, including the Fifth Fence, forced their way into the Assembly
building and demanded the prime minister’s resignation. The Amir issued a decree tightening
security at the building, but the political pressure continued and on November 28, 2011, Prime
Minister Nasser resigned.
Amir Switches Prime Ministers
Rather than again reappointing Shaykh Nasser as a caretaker, the Amir appointed another royal
family member, then Defense Minister Shaykh Jabir al-Mubarak Al Sabah, as prime minister. He
was sworn in, but without first naming a new cabinet, on December 4, 2011. Two days later, on
December 6, 2011, he recommended (and the Amir concurred with) dissolution of the National
Assembly and new elections. Although some questioned the constitutionality of the dissolution
because a new government had not been fully formed, the dissolution was accepted by major
political blocs and the country started preparing for Assembly elections within the constitutionally
mandated 60 days. The election was set for February 2, 2012.
Subsequently, opposition deputies began nominating themselves as candidates. Primary elections
are formally banned, although some tribes hold informal “tribal primaries” to determine who their
candidate will be. On December 6, 2011, a group of 20 opposition deputies announced they
would compete as one “Opposition Bloc.” Opposition youth leaders announced they would back
opposition deputies who would push for a fully elected government in which the prime minister is
selected by the Assembly, legalization of political parties, and election law changes. Such
announcements confirmed the fears of the royal family that dissolving the Assembly and holding
new elections would empower oppositionists sympathetic to the 2011 Arab uprisings. However,
refusing to call a new election would have portrayed the government as attempting to cover up its
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own alleged corruption. Some secular oppositionists feared that a new election would increase the
ranks of Islamist deputies, who are well organized.
February 2, 2012, Election Results
Many of the mainstream predictions appeared to be realized in the February 2, 2012, election. As
shown in Table 1 below, groups opposed to the government won at least 32 of the 50 seats.
Islamist groups increased their influence markedly and they and their allies who oppose the
government took control of the Assembly’s agenda. They benefitted at the expense of the pro-
government independent deputies who were defeated decisively, many of whom were the
Assembly members alleged to have received government funds in the scandal discussed above.
Kuwaiti liberals lost support and, in a blow to secular Kuwaitis, none of the 19 women who ran,
including the 4 incumbents, was elected. Turnout was about 62%, up from the 58% of the 2009
election. A leading opposition figure, Ahmad al-Sadun, a previous speaker (1985-1999), returned
to that post when the Assembly convened in February 2012, replacing the relatively pro-
government Jassim Al-Khurafi, a major figure in Kuwait’s merchant community.
The new government formed after the election was again headed by Prime Minister Shaykh Jabir
al-Mubarak Al Sabah. He appointed about 10 new ministers and retained the remainder. No
women were appointed. And, the government refused opposition demands to appoint
oppositionists to at least 9 of the 16 cabinet positions—the government only appointed 4 such
ministers, contributing to the Assembly’s assertiveness in challenging the government.
No Abatement of the Crisis and Second Election in 2012
Almost immediately after a new cabinet took over, the seeming intractability of the political crisis
was reaffirmed. In March 2012, Shiite deputy Ashour filed a successful motion to question the
prime minister about alleged failure to fully investigate official corruption allegations—an issue
that had caused the Central Bank governor to resign in February 2012. The prime minister was
questioned on March 28, 2012, but opponents did not file a vote of no-confidence motion. In May
2012, the finance minister resigned after a parliamentary “grilling,” and, on June 12, 2012, the
minister of social affairs and labor resigned rather than face parliamentary grilling on the issue of
rising food prices.
With the Assembly insisting on grilling the interior minister, on June 18, 2012, the Amir exercised
his prerogative under Article 106 of the constitution to suspend the Assembly for one month—a
temporary suspension renewable for another two months (but with the concurrence of the
Assembly). The suspension extended nearly to the holy month of Ramadan, at which time the
Assembly is not in session anyway, meaning the Assembly would be closed until October 2012.
Court Reinstates 2009 Assembly
That attempt to reduce tensions was thrown into disarray on June 20, 2012, when a constitutional
court ruled that the December 2012 suspension was not conducted in accordance with the
constitution, on the grounds that a new cabinet had not been sworn in before the suspension was
ordered. The court ordered the previous (2009) Assembly reinstated. Although the reinstated
Assembly was, by composition, less confrontational to the government than the one elected in
February 2012, the matter was unsettled. The previous Assembly questioned the court’s voiding
of the election, and the reinstated Assembly did not meet at all.
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New Elections Set
The government, for its part, requested the court revisit the number of election districts—a
motion that its critics said was a prelude to gerrymandering districts to ensure a pro-government
majority emerges from subsequent elections. The court ruled against the government on
September 26, 2012, and, on October 8, 2012, the Amir formally disbanded the National
Assembly under the constitution, requiring new elections within 60 days. On October 19, 2012,
the Amir announced an election date of December 1, 2012, along with a decree altering the
election law to allow voters in each district to vote for only one candidate—not the four per
district in prior law. The Amir’s decision—announced as an effort to avoid chaos produced by the
continued government-Assembly power struggle—was seen as likely to produce a pro-
government Assembly because it complicates opposition efforts to forge alliances in each district.
Some observers said the Amir’s election decree did not necessarily favor any side—in part
because the opposition could benefit from “one man one vote” just as easily as the government
could. According to many observers, opposition anger at the decree was fueled mainly by the
perception of arbitrary exercise of power by the Amir.
The opposition rallied against the revised election rules—on October 21, 2012, it held an
unprecedented demonstration, consisting of an estimated 50,000-150,000 Kuwaitis marching
toward the iconic Kuwait Towers landmark. The demonstration was suppressed by security
forces; there were injuries reported, but no deaths, and some parliamentarians and even some
younger members of the Sabah family were arrested. Smaller demonstrations took place
subsequently and up until the December 1 election, including on October 31, 2012, to call for the
freeing of outspoken oppositionist Musallam al-Barrak, a former parliamentarian who was
arrested on October 15, 2012, for alleged insults to the Amir. On November 2, 2012, following a
night of clashes between protesters and security forces, the government announced it would act to
enforce an October 2012 ban on gatherings of over 20 persons.
Election Held, Results, and Implications
In concert with its demonstrations, the opposition announced it would boycott the December 1
elections. It formed “boycott committees” to try to persuade Kuwaitis not to run or to vote. Still,
the government went forward with the vote, under the Amir’s election decree. The government
reported turnout was about 40% of the approximately 400,000 eligible voters. The vote produced
an Assembly that is overwhelming—almost entirely—“pro-government” and consisting of many
new members because 38 out of the 50 incumbents did not run for re-election. Seventeen
Shiites— including five Islamist Shiites of the National Islamic Alliance—were elected,
approximately double the highest total the Shiites have ever had in the Assembly. Three females,
including Masouma Mubarak, were elected. Some Sunni Islamists were elected, but—with the
exception of two in the Salafi grouping—they were generally not affiliated with the Sunni
Islamist political societies that have been present in the Assembly for decades.
On December 5, 2012, the Amir asked the previous Prime Minister, Shaykh Jabir Mubarak, to
form a new cabinet. The opposition has continued demonstrating to try to force change on the Al
Sabah. However, the government, has tried to move forward on long stalled legislation with a
solidly supportive Assembly. One bill that was enacted by the Assembly on March 20, 2013,
gives about 4,000 “bidoons” (stateless residents, discussed below) citizenship.
Although the government has sought to use its overwhelming majority in the Assembly to move
forward on legislation, the political crisis in Kuwait has expanded from what was mainly a
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dispute among elites into an broader struggle between the regime and many segments of the
population. Demonstrations are now a regular occurrence in Kuwait, and some of them are large.
There has not been the use of violence by demonstrators, but some experts express concern that
the political situation in Kuwait could evolve into an all-out uprising.
On the other hand, opposition demands continue to remain relatively confined to calls for a
constitutional monarchy, in which the elected parliament selects the cabinet. Kuwaiti diplomats
say that some demonstrations have been called off after talks with the government, and that the
opposition is committed to nonviolence. Kuwait’s long tradition of electoral politics and political
openness will help the government avoid a call for outright regime replacement. And, many
experts say, the general economic well-being in Kuwait means that Kuwaitis have a lot to lose if
the society splits outright, and these concerns are dividing and weakening the opposition. On the
other hand, those assessments might change if the government uses excessive force against
protests and there are substantial protester deaths.
Some experts are concerned that the UAE and Saudi Arabia, among other Gulf states, might be
encouraging the Sabah family to initiate a firm crackdown that might only stoke opposition
activity further. The increase in government arrests of activists who criticize the Amir on social
media might support those taking this view.

Table 1. Composition of the National Assembly: 2008–2012

Post-Feb. 2012
Post December
Ideology/Affiliation
Post-2008 Election
Post-2009 Vote
Vote
2012 Vote
Sunni Islamist (Muslim Brotherhood and
24 14 23 4
Salafi, including tribalists. generally opposes
the government)
Liberals (general y opposition)
7
8
5
1
Popular Action Bloc (general y opposition)
0
2
4
0
Shi te (general y pro-government)
5
9
7
17
Sunni Independents (includes tribalists,
14 17 11
28
pro-business deputies and women).
Generally pro-government
Women (general y pro-government)
0 4 0
3
Included in categories above
Source: CRS, based on articles and analysis from various observers.
Note: Some members of the National Assembly might span several different categories and several sources
often disagree on precise categorizations of the members of the Assembly.
U.S. Responses and Implications for U.S. Interests
Perhaps because the unrest in Kuwait was relatively minor until late 2012, and conducted within a
constitutional framework, the Obama Administration has made few comments on it. However,
apparently concerned that the situation might be deteriorating, on October 23, 2012—following
the large protest discussed above—the State Department said the United States “call[s] on all
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sides to exercise restraint.” The statement indirectly criticized the government’s ban on large
public gatherings. Still, there has been no overall alteration of the U.S.-Kuwait relationship as a
result of Kuwait’s handling of the unrest, although some U.S. officials are concerned that a
deteriorating situation in Kuwait could complicate U.S. efforts to maintain a capable military
presence in the northern Persian Gulf region. Other U.S. officials reportedly are concerned that
prolonged unrest in Kuwait could help Islamist extremist there gain strength, as has happened in
other countries in the Middle East since the Arab uprisings began in 2011.
As an example of potential implications for the United States, in September 2012 some Kuwaiti
Islamist parliamentarians called for a demonstration outside the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait to
condemn the “Innocence of Muslims” video produced privately in the United States. The
parliamentarians who attended the September 13, 2012 protest withdrew from it after some
demonstrators called for storming the Embassy. Kuwaiti forces pushed protesters from the
Embassy grounds and the Embassy was not attacked. Anti-U.S. sentiment among oppositionists
in Kuwait, currently relatively muted, could increase substantially if the opposition-government
confrontation accelerates.
The unrest has not caused a suspension of U.S. democracy programs in Kuwait, including
discussions with Kuwaiti leaders, public diplomacy, and building civil society using funds from
the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and other accounts. In Kuwait, MEPI funds have
been used to enhance the capabilities of the media, to promote women’s rights, to support
democracy initiatives, and to provide a broad spectrum of educational opportunities.
Broader Human Rights Issues
On broader human rights issues, the latest State Department Country Report on Human Rights
Practices for 2011, released May 24, 2012, reiterated comments in previous reports that there are
limitations in citizens’ rights to change their government, and that authorities restrict freedom of
speech and assembly. On May 10, 2011, Kuwait took over Syria’s bid for a seat on the U.N.
Human Rights Council when Syria, violently suppressing serious popular unrest, decided to
compete for the seat in 2013 instead of 2011.
Women’s Rights
Women have made significant strides in achieving their rights in Kuwait over the past several
years, as exemplified by their running and winning election to the National Assembly. However,
the election of women has not translated into an expansion of women in the cabinet; there was
only one in the 2011 cabinet—Dr. Amani Khalid Burisli, who served as minister of commerce
and industry. No women were elected in the February 2, 2012, election—although that election
was overturned and the women in the prior Assembly were technically reseated—and none was
appointed to the cabinet that took office in February 2012. In mid-September 2012, the Higher
Judicial Council decided to appoint seven women as public prosecutors—a decision that drew
strong criticism from Kuwaiti Islamists.
More broadly, women in Kuwait can drive, unlike their counterparts in neighboring Saudi Arabia,
and there are several nongovernmental organizations run by Kuwaiti women, such as the Kuwait
Women’s Cultural and Social Society, that are dedicated to improving rights for women and to
agitating on several different issues unrelated to gender. Still, women are subject to a broad array
of discriminatory practices and abuses. For many years, successive State Department human
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rights reports have noted that violence against women, particularly expatriate women working in
domestic service roles, is allegedly frequent. Kuwaiti law, for example, does not specifically
prohibit domestic violence. A New York Times investigative report of August 2, 2010, described
difficulties faced by expatriate female domestic workers in Kuwait, including nonpayment of
wages, physical or sexual abuse, and withholding of passports.5
Trafficking in Persons
Kuwait was, for the sixth year in a row, designated by the State Department’s Trafficking in
Persons report for 2012 (issued June 19, 2012, cited earlier) as a “Tier Three” (worst level)
country. The Tier Three designation has been maintained because, according to the 2012 report,
Kuwait is “not making sufficient efforts” to comply with minimum standards for the elimination
of trafficking. The report emphasizes that the National Assembly still has not enacted a
comprehensive draft anti-trafficking law that has been on its agenda since November 2009.
Status of “Bidoons”
Non-Gulf Arabs and Asians, and approximately 106,000 stateless residents (known as “bidoons”)
continue to face discrimination. On October 26, 2010, Prime Minister Nasser said the government
would soon implement a plan to resolve the legal and economic status of the bidoons, although
the lack of resolution contributed to the March 11, 2011, demonstration discussed above.
Following that demonstration, the government set up a “Central System for Remedying the Status
of Illegal Residents,” with a mandate to resolve the status of the bidoons within five years. During
2011, the government granted citizenship to several hundred bidoons but 80,000 bidoon
citizenship requests were pending at the end of 2011. As noted above, legislation was passed by
the National Assembly in March 2013 to give 4,000 bidoons citizenship.
Still, the issue of citizenship and immigration policy remains at issue. On September 20, 2012,
security forces raided a suburb of Kuwait City and arrested over 2,100 persons. The detainees
were alleged violators of residency laws, mostly Asians.
Freedom of Expression and Media Freedoms
Official press censorship ended in 1992, assisting the growth of a vibrant press, but successive
State Department human rights reports have asserted that the government does not always respect
the constitutional provisions for freedom of speech and the press. The government monitors
Internet communications for defamation and security reasons. And, by law, newspaper publishers
must be licensed by the Ministry of Information. The law also prohibits material that insults
Islam, the amir, the constitution, or the judicial system.
As noted, Government attempts to monitor and act against critics has increased as government-
opposition tensions have increased in recent years. One case of alleged repression against a
journalist and blogger, Mohammad Abd al Qadir al-Jasem, attracted attention from human rights
groups and some Kuwait parliamentarians. Al-Jasem was arrested in 2009 and then arrested again
on May 10, 2010, for allegedly “instigating to overthrow the regime” by slandering the prime
minister at a diwaniyya. Supporters say his treatment reflected unwarranted and unconstitutional

5 Fahim, Kareem. “Away From Home, Fleeing Domestic Life.” New York Times, August 2, 2010.
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repression against a government critic, and Al-Jasem reportedly conducted a hunger strike while
in jail. A Kuwaiti judge ordered his release on bail on June 28, 2010. He was sentenced to one
year in jail in November 2010 but was released in February 2011.
Arrests and prosecutions have increased since the Arab uprisings began. In June 2011, two people
were arrested in Kuwait for Internet postings critical of the Kuwaiti and Bahraini leadership. In
April 2011, security officers arrested and deported 21 Egyptian nationals resident in Kuwait for
attending meetings in support of Egyptian opposition figure Dr. Mohammad El Baradei. In March
2012, a Kuwaiti court suspended the Kuwaiti newspaper Al Dar for allegedly publishing articles
that insulted Shiites and could incite sectarian strife. In April 2012, Kuwaiti writer Mohammad al-
Mulaifi was sentenced to seven years in prison for writing on Twitter about sectarian divisions in
Kuwait. Since 2012, the Public Prosecution Office has charged 35 Kuwaitis with offending the
Amir for criticizing him on Twitter, Facebook, or other media. However, suggesting that some in
Kuwait do not want to impinge on free expression as a reaction to the unrest, in February 2013
courts acquitted five persons charged with offending the Amir.
Labor Rights
The government allows one trade union per occupation, but the only legal trade federation is the
Kuwait Trade Union Federation (KTUF). Foreign workers, with the exception of domestic
workers, are allowed to join unions, and the government has tended not to impede strikes. As
mentioned above, on October 26, 2011, the prime minister criticized the strikes in key sectors in
September and October 2011 as “tantamount to attacks on the state’s status, sovereignty, its
interests, and its citizens,” and “cannot be tolerated.”
Religious Freedom
On religious freedom, the State Department religious freedom report for July-December 2010
(released September 13, 2011) reported “no change” in the status of respect for religious freedom
by the Kuwaiti government during the reporting period. Shiite Muslims (about 30% of Kuwait’s
population) continue to report official discrimination, including limited access to religious
education and the perceived government unwillingness to permit the building of new Shiite
mosques. Unlike in Bahrain, Shiites are well represented in the police force and the
military/security apparatus, although they generally are not offered leadership positions in those
institutions. On the other hand, in early April 2012, the Kuwaiti ministry that oversees houses of
worship said it will begin monitoring Shiite mourning houses known as Husseiniyas, but it also
stated that it is considering providing state funds to Shiite mosques, as it does for Sunni mosques.
On June 6, 2012, the amir refused to sign (vetoed) a National Assembly bill stipulating the death
penalty for those who curse the major figures and symbols of Islam, including the Quran.
Kuwait has seven officially recognized Christian churches to serve the approximately 450,000
Christians (mostly foreign residents) in Kuwait. However, press reports in April 2012 said that
Islamists in the Kuwaiti National Assembly, empowered by the results of the February 2012
elections, announced that they would introduce legislation to prevent the building of new
churches in Kuwait.6 Members of religions not sanctioned in the Quran—including Baha’i’s,

6 Middle East Media Research Institute. “In Kuwait, Public Debate Over Demand to Demolish Churches,” April 10,
2012.
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Buddhists, Hindus, and Sikhs—are not allowed to operate official places of worship, but they are
allowed to worship in their homes. These religions are practiced mostly by the South Asian and
East Asian workers resident in Kuwait.
U.S.-Kuwait Relations and Defense Cooperation
Kuwait has been a pivotal partner of the United States through three Gulf wars: the Iran-Iraq War,
the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom (overthrow of Saddam Hussein). In all
three cases, Kuwait’s security was directly at stake, but U.S. officials stress that Kuwait went to
extraordinary lengths to support U.S. policy and operations. As a result of the complete U.S.
troops withdrawal from Iraq at the end of 2011, Kuwait’s cooperation could become even more
crucial to U.S. efforts to ensure Iraq’s stability.
A U.S. consulate was opened in Kuwait in October 1951; it was elevated to an embassy upon
Kuwait’s independence from Britain in 1961. Kuwait, the first Gulf state to establish relations
with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, was not particularly close to the United States until the Iran-
Iraq War (1980-1988). Kuwait and the United States grew politically and militarily close during
that war because of its spillover to Kuwait. Through intimidation, Iran sought to compel Kuwait
not to support Iraq in that war. Iran fired at and struck some Kuwaiti oil facilities, including the Al
Ahmadi terminal, with Silkworm surface-to-surface missiles. In 1987-1988, the United States
established a U.S. naval escort and tanker reflagging program to protect Kuwaiti and international
shipping from Iranian naval attacks (Operation Earnest Will). As part of the skirmishes between
the United States and Iran in the course of that operation, Iran attacked a Kuwaiti oil installation
(Sea Island terminal).
Assistance in Addressing the Threat from Iraq
Believing Saddam Hussein would reward Kuwait for assisting Iraq financially and logistically
during the Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait’s leaders were shaken by the August 1990 Iraqi invasion. Iraq’s
public justification was an accusation that Kuwait was overproducing oil and thereby harming
Iraq’s ability to repay its debts and recover economically from the long war with Iran. However,
most experts believe that the invasion was a result of Saddam’s intent to dominate the Persian
Gulf politically, economically, and militarily. Kuwait was liberated by the U.S.-led January 16-
February 28, 1991, “Desert Storm” offensive that expelled Iraqi troops, and its leaders, who spent
the occupation period in exile in Saudi Arabia, were restored to power in Kuwait.
Bilateral Defense Pact
The U.S.-led expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in the 1991 Persian Gulf War led to a
deepening of the U.S.-Kuwait security relationship, the cornerstone of which was a broad 10-year
defense pact signed on September 19, 1991. Although the text is classified, the pact reportedly
provides for mutual discussions in the event of a crisis; joint military exercises; U.S. evaluation
of, advice to, and training of Kuwaiti forces; U.S. arms sales; prepositioning of U.S. military
equipment (armor for a U.S. brigade); and U.S. access to a range of Kuwaiti facilities, such as Ali
al-Salem Air Base, Camp Arifjan, and Camp Buehring.7 A related Status of Forces Agreement

7 Hajjar, Sami. U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects. U.S. Army War College, Strategic
(continued...)
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(SOFA) provides that U.S. forces in Kuwait be subject to U.S. rather than Kuwaiti law—a
common feature of such arrangements. In September 2001, the pact was renewed for another 10
years, and it was widely assumed among experts on Kuwait that renewal in September 2011
would be a formality. However, neither the Defense of the State Department has announced
whether this presumed renewal schedule is operative, raising the possibility that it had earlier
been extended beyond September 2011.8
The Iraq Containment Era
Efforts to contain Saddam Hussein after the 1991 war depended heavily on Kuwait. Kuwait
contributed materially to the 1991 war and subsequent Iraq containment efforts—it paid $16.059
billion to offset the costs of Desert Shield/Desert Storm and funded two-thirds of the $51 million
per year U.N. budget for the 1991-2003 Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) that
monitored the Iraq-Kuwait border. Kuwait also contributed about $350 million per year for U.S.
military costs of Kuwait-based Iraq containment operations, including the 1992-2003
enforcement of a “no fly zone” over southern Iraq (Operation Southern Watch), involving 1,000
Kuwait-based U.S. Air Force personnel. During the 1990s, the United States prepositioned
enough armor in Kuwait to outfit one combat brigade, and there were generally about 4,000 or
more U.S. troops stationed there at any given time. Kuwait hosted an additional 5,000 U.S. forces
during the major combat phases of Operation Enduring Freedom, which ousted the Taliban from
power in Afghanistan.
Supporting the U.S.-Led Effort to Militarily Oust Saddam/Major Non-NATO
Ally Designation
Given that Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait, Kuwait enthusiastically supported, although
quietly, the Bush Administration’s decision to militarily overthrow Saddam Hussein (Operation
Iraqi Freedom [OIF]). It hosted the vast bulk of the U.S. invasion force of about 250,000 forces,
as well as the other coalition troops that entered Iraq. To secure that force, Kuwait closed off its
entire northern half for weeks before the invasion. It also allowed U.S. use of two air bases, its
international airport, and sea ports; and provided $266 million in burden sharing support to the
combat, including base support, personnel support, and supplies such as food and fuel.
Recognizing Kuwait’s consistent and multi-faceted cooperation, particularly with U.S. operations
in Iraq, on April 1, 2004, the Bush Administration designated Kuwait as a “major non-NATO ally
(MNNA),” a designation held by only one other Gulf state (Bahrain). Afghanistan obtained that
designation in 2012.
Helping U.S. Efforts to Stabilize Post-Saddam Iraq
During 2003-2011, when U.S. troops were in Iraq, there were an average of 25,000 U.S. troops
based in Kuwait (not including those rotating into Iraq) at a given time, primarily supporting the

(...continued)
Studies Institute. p. 27.
8 The executive branch has not provided CRS with requested information on the current status of the pact, including its
duration and whether it has been modified in recent years.
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U.S. forces moving into or out of Iraq. The main U.S. staging facility in Kuwait is Camp Arifjan
and a desert firing range facility, Camp Buehring; it is at these locations that equipment from the
Iraq battlefield has been cleaned, repaired, and packed up for return to the United States or stored
in regional prepositioning sites. U.S. forces vacated Camp Doha, the headquarters for U.S. forces
in Kuwait during the 1990s, in December 2005.
In order to promote Iraqi stability after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Kuwait took a number of
major steps: it built a water line into Iraq, and it ran a humanitarian operation center (HOC) that
gave over $550 million in assistance to Iraqis from 2003-2011. A Kuwaiti company, First Kuwaiti
General Trading and Contracting, was lead contractor on the large U.S. embassy in Iraq that
opened in January 2009. On April 22, 2008, Kuwait hosted a regional conference on Iraq’s
stability, which included the United States, Iran, and other neighboring countries. On July 18,
2008, Kuwait named its first ambassador to Iraq since the 1990 Iraqi invasion—Ali al Momen, a
retired general. Momen is a Shiite Muslim, and his appointment signaled Kuwait’s acceptance
that Iraq is dominated politically by Shiites.
According to Defense Department budget documents, Kuwait contributed about $210 million per
year in similar in-kind support to help defray the costs incurred by U.S. military personnel that
have rotated through Kuwait into or out of Iraq for operations in Iraq. For FY2012, Kuwait
contributed $350 million for these purposes, according to the FY2012 Consolidated
Appropriation (P.L. 112-74). Kuwaiti contributions ran higher in FY2012 than in prior years
because of the work that was done in Kuwait to clean, store, and return to the United States
weapons and equipment withdrawn from Iraq.
Kuwait served as the key exit route for U.S. troops as they implemented President Obama’s
February 27, 2009, drawdown plan and then his October 21, 2011, announcement that all U.S.
troops would be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. The United States and Iraq discussed retaining
3,000—15, 000 U.S. troops in Iraq beyond 2011 to continue training Iraqi forces. However, Iraq
and the United States were unable to agree on a legal status framework for retaining U.S. troops,
and the last U.S. troops left Iraq on December 18, 2011.
Kuwait’s Role in Long-Term Gulf Security
Prior to the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, there was discussion that the United States might build up
forces in Kuwait, with potential to intervene in Iraq if the Iraqi Security Forces run into
difficulty.9 A substantial U.S. force in Kuwait would also presumably add to U.S. capabilities to
confront Iran if disputes with the United States over its nuclear program and its role in the Middle
East and Persian Gulf were to escalate.
Even though violence in Iraq has continued, including some multi-locations high profile attacks
in July and August 2012, there has been no significant increase in U.S. forces in Kuwait. At the
time of the withdrawal, deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes told journalists that “There
are not really plans to have any substantial increases in any other parts of the Gulf as this war
winds down.”10 A staff report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee published June 19,

9 http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2011/me_iraq1201_09_26.asp; Thom Shanker and Steven Lee
Myers. “U.S. Is Planning Buildup in Gulf After Iraq Exit.” New York Times, October 30, 2011; Pauline Jelinek,
“Kuwait, U.S. Still Talking About Troop Plan.” Associated Press, November 7, 2011.
10 “The Cable: Foreign Policy’s Josh Rogin.” Washington Post, December 22, 2011. p. 17.
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2012, said that the United States will keep about 13,500 troops in Kuwait indefinitely —
somewhat less than the 25,000 there during the U.S. presence in Iraq. The Defense Secretary
Leon Panetta noted, in his last trip to Kuwait in that post in December 2012, that there were about
13,500 U.S. troops in Kuwait.11
The troops assigned to Kuwait during the Iraq mission were mostly support forces. Some of the
U.S. forces stationed in Kuwait since the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq are combat troops, not purely
support forces.12 This altered mix of U.S. forces in Kuwait indicates that the United States wants
to retain combat power in close proximity to both Iraq and Iran. On the other hand, the Defense
Department closed a logistics hub in Kuwait in late 2012, suggesting that the Department is not as
dependent on a Kuwait presence as it was when U.S. troops were in Iraq.
Possibly signaling that Kuwait wants to be fully integrated into post-U.S. withdrawal security
structures, including with other U.S. partners, it was reported in December 2011 that NATO is
discussing with Kuwait opening a center in Kuwait City. This is a follow-on to a decision taken in
Istanbul in June 2004 under the “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).” Kuwait joined the ICI in
December 2004. The NATO center in Kuwait has not opened, to date.
U.S. Security Assistance
Although the threat from Iraq is low compared to what it was during the Saddam era, the United
States continues to bolster Kuwait’s defense capabilities. U.S. officials say that the U.S.-Kuwait
defense relationship, enhanced by the small amounts of U.S. assistance shown in Table 2 below,
has improved the quality of the Kuwaiti military, particularly the air force. Kuwait receives very
small amounts of U.S. assistance because of its ability to fund its own security requirements and,
as noted above, Kuwait has been mainly a donor to U.S. operations rather than a recipient of U.S.
funds. As a result of Kuwaiti recruitment efforts, its military has now nearly regained its pre-Iraq
invasion strength of 17,000. In 2008, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) established in Kuwait
a permanent platform for “full spectrum operations” in 27 countries in the region—among its
objectives is to help Kuwait establish a more capable navy.
Arms Sales
U.S. arms sales have sought to enhance Kuwait’s capability. In 2010, Kuwait agreed to purchase
$1.6 billion in U.S. defense articles and services through the Foreign Military Sales Program.
U.S. sales to Kuwait are intended to comport with the overall goals of the “Gulf Security
Dialogue” program designed to contain Iran by enhancing the individual and joint capabilities of
the Gulf states. Kuwait is not eligible to receive U.S. excess defense articles. Major post-1991
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) include the following:
• 218 M1A2 tanks at a value of $1.9 billion in 1993. Delivery was completed in
1998.
• A 1992 sale of 5 Patriot anti-missile fire units, including 25 launchers and 210
Patriot missiles, valued at about $800 million. Delivery was completed by 1998.

11 Thom Shanker. “In Kuwait, Panetta Affirms U.S. Commitment to Middle East. New York Times, December 11,
2012.
12 Michelle Tan. “15,000 in Kuwait, At Least For Now.” Army Times, January 16, 2012.
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Some of them were used to intercept Iraqi short-range missiles launched at
Kuwait in the 2003 war.
• A 1992 sale of 40 FA-18 combat aircraft (purchase of an additional 10 is under
consideration).
• A September 2002 sale of 16 AH-64 (Apache) helicopters equipped with the
Longbow fire-control system, valued at about $940 million.
• A December 4, 2007, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notification
to Congress reported a sale to Kuwait of 80 PAC-3 (Patriot) missiles and 60
PAC-2 missiles and upgrades, valued at about $1.3 billion.
• On September 9, 2008, DSCA notified a sale of 120 AIM-120C-7 Advanced
Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), along with equipment and
services, with a total value of $178 million.
• On August 11, 2010, the Administration notified Congress of another potential
Patriot-related sale—of 209 Patriot “Guidance Enhanced Missile-T” (GEM-T)
missiles valued at $900 million. The prime contractor for that system is
Raytheon.
• On February 27, 2012, the Administration notified Congress of a potential sale of
80 AIM-9X-2 SIDEWINDER missiles, and associated parts and support, with an
estimated value of $105 million. The sale, if completed, would help Kuwait
modernize its fighter aircraft and enhance interoperability with U.S. aircraft.
• On July 20, 2012, the Administration notified a potential sale of 60 Patriot
missiles and 20 Patriot launching stations, plus associated equipment. The total
value of the sale could reach $4.2 billion.
International Military Education and Training (IMET)
As noted in Table 2 below, in recent years Kuwait has received very small amounts of funding
under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. However, Kuwait
sends military students to U.S. military institutions to study intelligence, pilot training, and other
disciplines. In FY2010, Kuwait spent about $9.7 million to provide such education for 216
Kuwaiti military students. IMET funding that has been provided to Kuwait has been primarily to
get Kuwait a discount for Kuwait-funded trainees in U.S. programs.
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Kuwait and Purposes
(dollars in thousands)

FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013
International Military
- 19
14
0 10
0 0 0
Training and Education
(IMET).
Non-Proliferation,
628 1,025
0
0
0
0
0
0
Anti-Terrorism, De-
Mining and Related
(NADR).

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Foreign Policy Issues
Kuwait and the United States largely share a common threat perception and cooperate on a wide
range of regional issues. After the United States, Kuwait’s most important security alliance is with
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which consists of fellow Gulf monarchies. However, the
GCC is not perceived as able to provide Kuwait, or any of its members, with as extensive a
security umbrella as can the United States. In May 2012, Saudi Arabia proposed a close political
union among the GCC states—a position that ran into opposition from several GCC states,
including Kuwait, and was not adopted. Kuwait has a much longer experience with elections and
parliamentary process than does Saudi Arabia or the other GCC states, and most Kuwaitis are
perceived as fearful of backsliding on democracy were there to be such a GCC union.
Outstanding Bilateral Issues With Iraq
Even though Iraq no longer poses a strategic threat to Kuwait, Iraq’s stability and the bilateral
Iraq-Kuwait relationship remain paramount Kuwaiti foreign policy concerns. As noted, Kuwait
has tried to build political ties to the dominant Iraqi factions in order to ensure there is no repeat
of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or the Iraqi Shiite-led violence that rocked Kuwait in the
1980s. Iraq’s U.S.-built post-Saddam military is judged insufficiently strong to commit
aggression against a neighbor. The presence of U.S. forces in Kuwait further diminishes the
possibility of conventional military conflict between Iraq and Kuwait.
Violence emanating from extremist groups in Iraq is a more viable threat to Kuwait. The
December 1983 bombings of the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait and an attempted
assassination of the Amir in May 1985 were attributed to the Iran-inspired Iraqi Da’wa (Islamic
Call) Party. This is the party that Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki heads, although the party no
longer has a militia wing. Seventeen Da’wa activists were arrested for these attacks, and Da’wa
activists hijacked a Kuwait Airlines plane in 1987. In July 2011, an Iraqi Shiite militia supported
by Iran (the militia of cleric Moqtada Al Sadr) rocketed Kuwait’s embassy in Iraq and caused
Kuwait to temporarily bring its diplomats back to Kuwait. In July 2011, another Iraqi Shiite
militia, Khata’ib Hezbollah, threatened to attack workers building the Mubarak the Great port
(named after a past ruler) on Bubiyan Island, as discussed below. These and other Iraqi Shiite
militias continue to operate in southern Iraq, and a munition was fired into Kuwaiti territory in
August 2011, but these Shiite groups are said to be evolving into political movements and de-
emphasizing their armed wings.
Residual Issues from the 1990 Iraqi Invasion and Occupation
The Kuwait-Iraq relationship remains colored by the August 2, 1990 Iraqi invasion and
occupation of Kuwait, which lasted until U.S.-led forces in “Operation Desert Storm” expelled
Iraqi forces by February 28,1991. Relations remained frozen during the rest of Saddam Hussein’s
rule, and Kuwait remained wary of the post-Saddam Iraqi governments that were dominated by
Shiite Muslims.
The potential for a major breakthrough in Iraq-Kuwait relations occurred on January 12, 2011,
when then Prime Minister Nasser became the first Kuwait prime minister to visit Iraq since the
Iraqi invasion. Kuwaiti leaders reportedly appreciated the statement by Iraqi Prime Minister
Maliki, a few days before the visit, that Iraq’s former ambitions against Kuwait “have gone
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forever and will never return again.”13 These statements paved the way for Iraqi Prime Minister
Nuri al-Maliki’s first visit to Kuwait on February 16, 2011.
By July 2011, some of the mutual suspicions and recriminations began to resurface. On July 23,
2011, Iraqi parliamentarians called on Kuwait to suspend construction for its Mubarak the Great
port because it would impinge on Iraq’s attempts to expand its access to the Persian Gulf at the tip
of the Faw peninsula. Other parliamentarians alleged that Kuwait was slant drilling in the area
and therefore stealing oil from Iraq. The disputes were reminiscent of the arguments made by
Saddam Hussein to try to justify his invasion of Kuwait in 1990; he claimed that Kuwait sought
to economically strangle Iraq.
These recriminations ceased, paving the way for some bilateral issues to be resolved during a
March 15, 2012, Maliki visit to Kuwait. The visit paved the way for Amir Sabah’s attendance at
the March 27-29, 2012, Arab League summit in Baghdad—an event Iraq considered crucial to its
efforts to return to the Arab fold after decades of isolation. In August 2012, the Iraqi government
said “Iraq will end all pending issues with Kuwait before the start of [2013].” Still, the Iraqi
statement could be intended not necessarily as a bilateral overture to Kuwait, but rather to garner
support for the U.N. Security Council to remove any remaining “Chapter 7” (of the U.N. Charter)
mandates on Iraq stemming from the 1990 invasion.
Kuwait’s Prime Minister Jaber is expected to visit Iraq in April 2013 to discuss overall relations
and whether Kuwait will concur in new mechanisms to replace those below, which have been in
effect since the 1991 war under Chapter 7. A U.N. Secretary General’s report of December 14,
2012 (U.N. Document S/2012/931) indicated some possible mechanisms, including: retaining
existing mechanisms; transferring the issues to the mandate of the U.N. Assistance Mission—Iraq
(UNAMI)—an option said to be favored by Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and generally
acceptable to both Iraq and Kuwait; or adopting new mechanisms under Chapter VI of the U.N.
Charter, which does not carry enforcement mechanisms as those adopted under Chapter VII.
However, the U.N. Security Council did not alter the existing resolutions mechanisms at its
December 2012 meeting, and will not take up alternative options again until June 2013.
The outstanding issues are discussed below.
Reparations Payments Continue. Kuwait has to date refused to drop its insistence on full U.N.-
supervised reparations by Iraq for damages caused from the 1990 invasion. Iraq wants the
reparations issue closed out to cease the deduction of 5% of all its revenue that is used to pay
compensation to the victims of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. As of December 2012, the U.N.
Compensation Commission (UNCC) created by the post-Desert Storm U.N. resolutions has paid
out over $38 billion to over 100 governments, encompassing nearly 1.5 million claimants.
However, about $13.6 billion is still owed to Kuwaiti claimants, and the U.N. Secretary General’s
December 14, 2012 report says it expects to complete the compensation process by April 2015.
On December 15, 2010, the U.N. Security Council passed three resolutions—1956, 1957, and
1958 that ended Saddam-era sanctions against Iraq, but the resolutions did not end the “Chapter
7” U.N. mandate on Iraq and continued the 5% automatic revenue deductions.
Missing Kuwaitis and Kuwaiti National Archives. The U.N. resolutions adopted December 15,
2010, also continued the effort, required under post-1991 war U.N. resolutions (most notably

13 “No Claim on Sovereign Kuwait, Iraqi Ambitions Gone Forever.” Arab Times (Kuwait). January 9, 2011.
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687), to resolve the fate of the 605 Kuwaitis and third party nationals missing and presumed dead
from the 1991 war, as well as that of the missing Kuwaiti national archives. A special U.N. envoy,
Gennady Tarasov, was U.N. High-Level Coordinator for these issues. In September 2011 and in
June 2012, Iraq called for an end to the mandate of Tarasov and for Iraq and Kuwait to pursue the
issue bilaterally, but the U.N. Security Council did not act on those requests. Tarasov retired on
December 31, 2012 and, in the absence of Security Council action on an alternative mechanism,
the U.N. Secretary General appointed Victor Poliakov to assume Tarasov’s duties pending future
Security Council action on the High-Level Coordinator concept.
To date, the process has resulted in finding the remains of 236 Kuwaitis. The cases of 369
Kuwaitis remain unresolved. In 2010, Kuwait made a $1 million grant to the Iraqi Ministry of
Human Rights, which is the lead Iraqi agency trying to determine the fate of the Kuwaitis. A
Tripartite Commission on the issue (Kuwait, Iraq, International Committee of the Red Cross) met
on May 18, 2011, for the first time in many years. To date, more than 10,000 trenches have been
dug to search for remains and jailed members of the Saddam regime have been interviewed.
However, the December 14, 2012 U.N. report says no progress has been made recently, and
Kuwaiti officials realize that the High-Level Coordinator mandate probably cannot be continued
until all remains are located.
As far as the Kuwaiti National Archives, the U.N. December 14, 2012 reports says there has been
no progress locating the archives. However, Iraq has agreed to place ads in its media asking Iraqis
for information on their whereabouts. In June 2012, Iraq did return to Kuwait numerous boxes of
recovered tapes from Kuwait’s state radio, as well as books belonging to Kuwait University, and
keys to Kuwait’s Central Bank—items removed from Kuwait during the Iraqi occupation.
Kuwait-Iraq Border. There has also been a dispute over the Iraq-Kuwait border. Under post-1991
Gulf war U.N. Security Council Resolution 833, the Council accepted the U.N.-demarcated
border between them. Kuwait has sought that the post-Saddam government in Iraq formally
acknowledge its commitments under the resolution to pay some of the costs of border markings
and signs. Kuwait’s foreign minister again called on Iraq to fulfill these commitments, at the U.N.
General Assembly meetings in September 2011. In July 2010, Kuwait gave preliminary approval
to open a special border crossing into Iraq that would facilitate the work of international oil
companies working in Iraq. And, as a consequence of the March 15, 2012, Maliki visit to Kuwait,
Iraq agreed to pay its portion of the costs of maintaining the border markings. Still, the issue of
the sea border markings and other issues remain outstanding, and Kuwait has insisted that all
border marking issues be resolved before Kuwait agrees to terminate the mandate of the High-
Level Coordinator, discussed above.
Other Outstanding Bilateral Disputes/Iraqi Airways. Among other residual issues from the
Saddam era, in 2004, Kuwait reportedly pledged to forgive a substantial portion of the $25 billion
Saddam era debt, but it has not written off the debt to date. Iraq is hoping that the April 2013 visit
of Kuwait’s Prime Minister will yield agreement on that issue.
Another major dispute concerned Kuwait Airways’ lawsuits alleging that Iraq owed Kuwait $1.2
billion for planes and parts stolen during the Iraqi invasion; the actions led to the long-term
impoundment of Iraqi Airways jets. The March 15, 2012, Maliki visit resolved the issue with
agreement for Iraq to pay Kuwait $300 million in compensation, and to invest $200 million in an
Iraq-Kuwait joint venture to form a small new airline. Subsequent to the visit, Iraq-Kuwait direct
flights resumed.
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Iran
For the years after the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait supported Iran as a potential counterweight to
Saddam Hussein. Kuwait often hosted pro-Iranian Iraqi Shiite oppositionists against Saddam,
even though these same Shiite groups had conducted attacks in Kuwait in the 1980s.
Since Saddam’s fall, Kuwait has largely joined U.S. efforts to contain Iran and to enact strict
international sanctions to compel it to curb its nuclear program. In December 2009, Kuwait
declined to invite Iran to the GCC summit in Kuwait that month. (Qatar angered some Gulf
leaders by inviting Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the GCC summit in 2007.) In
May 2010, Kuwait confirmed that it had arrested some Kuwaiti civil servants and stateless
residents for allegedly working on behalf of the Qods (Jerusalem) Force of the Revolutionary
Guard Corps of Iran in a plot to blow up Kuwaiti energy facilities.14 The Qods Force, a subject of
U.S. sanctions under several executive orders, is the unit that supports pro-Iranian movements
and conducts espionage in neighboring and other foreign countries. The arrests could suggest that
Iran might be looking to Kuwait to exert leverage on the United States, presumably by
positioning Iran to be able to attack U.S. forces withdrawing from Iraq. In March 2011, a Kuwait
court sentenced two Iranians and a Kuwaiti to death in the alleged plot. Subsequently, Kuwait
expelled three Iranian diplomats, and Iran expelled three Kuwaiti diplomats in response.
However, a visit to Kuwait by Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi on May 19, 2011, partly
calmed tensions; both sides agreed to return their respective ambassadors. In November 2011,
Iran arrested several individuals in Iran who it alleged were “Kuwaiti spies.”
Kuwait also is cooperating with the growing global consensus to sanction Iran. This cooperation
has come despite the comments by the Amir in November 2009 endorsing Iran’s right to purely
peaceful nuclear energy. In July 2010, a U.S. law, P.L. 111-195 (the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010) was enacted that would penalize firms
that supply gasoline to Iran. A Kuwaiti gasoline trading firm, Kuwait’s Independent Petroleum
Group, was reported to be a supplier of gasoline to Iran,15 although the firm has told U.S. officials
it stopped doing so as of September 2010. In September 2012, Kuwaiti naval forces—as well as
those of all the Gulf Cooperation Council states—participated in U.S.-led mine clearing exercises
in the Persian Gulf—exercises apparently intended to signal to Iran the strength of a U.S.-led
coalition to contain Iran.
Arab-Israeli Dispute
For many years after Kuwait’s liberation in 1991, the Iraqi invasion and occupation colored
Kuwait’s foreign relations. On the Arab-Israeli dispute, Kuwait was more critical than were the
other Gulf states of the late Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat because he had opposed war to liberate
Kuwait. Because of Arafat’s stance, Kuwait expelled about 450,000 Palestinian workers after
liberation. Kuwait has maintained consistent ties to Hamas, and in March 2006, pledged $7.5
million per month in aid to the then Hamas-led government. Kuwait has supported Qatari and
Saudi efforts to broker Fatah-Hamas reconciliation and unity governments. At a March 2, 2009,
conference in Cairo, Kuwait pledged $200 million for Gaza reconstruction following the Israel-

14 “Iran Spy Cell Dismantled in Kuwait.” Associated Press, May 6, 2010; “Iran Cell Planned Attacks in Kuwait,
Minister Says. Reuters, April 21, 2011.
15 http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11788115&Itemid=105.
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Hamas War of December 2008-January 2009. Still, possibly because it is distracted by its internal
political crises, Kuwait has not, as have Saudi Arabia and Qatar, stepped forward as a major
mediator in intra-Palestinian disputes, nor has it publicly advanced its own proposals for
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. It supports U.N. recognition of the State of Palestine,
requested formally by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas at the U.N. General
Assembly meetings in September 2011.
During the period of active Gulf-Israel negotiations (1992-1997), Kuwait attended multilateral
working group peace talks with Israel—sessions on arms control, water resources, refugees, and
other issues that were begun as part of the “Oslo Accords process” between Israel and the
Palestinians. However, Kuwait did not host any sessions of the multilaterals. In 1994, Kuwait was
key in persuading the other Gulf monarchies to cease enforcement of the secondary (trade with
firms that deal with Israel) and tertiary (trade with firms that do business with blacklisted firms)
Arab boycotts of Israel. However, Kuwait did not, as did Qatar and Oman, subsequently
exchange trade offices with Israel, amounting to a renunciation of the primary boycott (boycott
on direct trade with Israel).
Positions and Actions on 2011 Uprisings Elsewhere in the Region
Kuwait has acted with other GCC states on the uprisings in the Middle East that began in 2011.
Of the uprisings, Kuwait has paid the closest attention to the situation in Bahrain, which is a
fellow Gulf state. As noted above, Kuwait supported the March 14, 2011, intervention of the
GCC’s “Peninsula Shield” unit to assist Bahraini security forces’ suppression of unrest there.
However, the nearly 2,000 GCC forces that entered Bahrain were Saudi troops and UAE police,
and Kuwait sent only a naval unit ostensibly to help Bahrain protect its maritime boundaries. The
naval unit returned to Kuwait in July 2011 following the end of the state of emergency and
beginning of a national dialogue between the Bahrain government and its opposition. The GCC
intervention was at odds with the United States, which supports dialogue between Bahrain’s
government and protesters, and not repression. It also, as noted, put the Kuwaiti government
somewhat at odds with many Kuwaiti Shiites. At the risk of Kuwaiti Shiite criticism, then Prime
Minister Nasser visited Bahrain during July 9, 2011.
On Libya, Kuwait supported the Arab League position in favor of U.N.-mandated intervention to
protect civilians but, initially, it stopped short of recognizing the Transitional National Council
(TNC) as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people (an action that Qatar and the UAE
have taken). In April 2011, it did pledge about $177 million in financial aid to the TNC. It
recognized the TNC as the sole legitimate representative after the fall of Tripoli in August 2011.
As a GCC state, Kuwait cooperated with developing and implementing the GCC plan for a
peaceful transition of power in Yemen. That effort bore fruit with the departure of President Ali
Abdullah Saleh in January 2012 and the subsequent presidential elections in March 2012.
Because Syria is aligned with Iran, Kuwait and the other GCC states are hoping that Bashar Al
Assad of Syria will be brought down—an outcome that would likely bring Sunni Muslims to
power instead of the Alawite community and weaken Iran’s strategic position in the region. Along
with its GCC partners, Kuwait has criticized Syria’s extensive use of force against peaceful
protesters in the uprising there in 2011 and, along with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, withdrew its
ambassador from Damascus in August 2011. In November 2011, all the GCC countries voted
with other Arab League countries to suspend Syria’s membership in that body. Following
escalation of violence in February-March 2012, all the GCC states closed their embassies in
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Damascus. In April 2012, the GCC states proposed provided $100 million in funding to the armed
opposition, and Kuwait is reported to be contributing funds to the Syrian rebels. Some of the
GCC states—reportedly not including Kuwait—are also providing arms to the rebels. On January
30, 2013, Kuwait hosted a major donors’ meeting to aid Syrian civilian victims of the conflict;
$1.5 billion was pledged at that meeting, including $300 million from Kuwait.
Kuwait has not contributed troops to the U.S. and NATO stabilization operation in Afghanistan.
Other GCC states Bahrain and UAE have contributed forces or police to that mission. In July
2011, Kuwait contributed $1 million to help relieve the effects of drought in Somalia.
Kuwaiti Cooperation Against Islamic Militancy16
The State Department report on global terrorism for 2011 (released July 31, 2012) credited
Kuwaiti leaders with attempting to counter terrorism and violent extremism, despite Kuwait’s
lack of a clear legal framework for prosecuting terrorism-related crimes. A draft law submitted to
the National Assembly in December 2009 that strengthens laws against terrorism financing has
not been enacted to date. On the other hand, in April 2011 Kuwait introduced biometric
fingerprinting at Kuwait International Airport and plans to extend that system to land and sea
entry points. On November 27, 2011, security services arrested three Kuwaiti military officials on
suspicion of links with a terrorist cell plotting to attack locations in Bahrain and Qatar.
The State Department terrorism report also repeats praise for Kuwait’s programs to encourage
moderation in Islam in Kuwait. The NADR funds shown above have been used, in large part, to
assist Kuwait with counterterrorism efforts, border control, and export controls.
Some Kuwait-based organizations have proved problematic in the past. On June 13, 2008, the
Treasury Department froze the assets of a Kuwaiti charity with alleged links to Al Qaeda—the
Revival of Islamic Heritage Society—under Executive Order 13224.
Kuwaiti Economic Policy
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 caused unrest in Kuwait over falling stock prices and the
effects of lower oil prices. As noted above, executive-legislative disputes delayed passage of
stimulus measures to address the crisis. However, as the crisis abated, the Assembly passed
legislation, which took effect September 2010, to privatize major sectors of the Kuwait economy.
The planned privatization of Kuwait Airways is reportedly moving forward as well. However,
some Kuwaitis, particularly those newly naturalized and less affluent than longtime citizens, fear
that privatization will bring higher unemployment.
Still, the IMF and other observers say that Kuwait has underinvested in capital infrastructure, and
overspent on public sector salaries and subsidies. The Kuwaiti budgets in 2011 and 2012 appear
intended to calm or avoid unrest rather than to set Kuwait up for long-term growth. In August
2012, the Ministry of Finance released data showing that it has a budget surplus of about $47
billion—primarily because the political crisis has stalled capital investment. In addition, the
political deadlock in Kuwait has caused foreign direct investment in Kuwait to lag that of its

16 For the 2011 State Department country report on terrorism, see: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195544.htm.
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neighbors significantly. Only $800 million has been invested in Kuwait in the past 10 years. In
contrast, in the same time period, $10 billion was invested in Bahrain, $73 billion in UAE, and
$130 billion in Saudi Arabia.17
The government-Assembly political deadlock has prevented movement on several major
initiatives, the most prominent of which is Project Kuwait. The project, backed by the Kuwaiti
government, would open Kuwait’s northern oil fields to foreign investment to generate about
500,000 barrels per day of extra production. The Assembly has blocked the $8.5 billion project
for over a decade because of concerns about Kuwait’s sovereignty, and observers say no
compromise is in sight. As far as a project to build a fourth oil refinery, estimated to cost $8
billion, the Assembly blocked the project in 2008 by alleging that the contracts awarded by the
state oil company did not comply with procedures set out by Kuwait’s Central Tenders
Committee, which handles all public sector contracts. It has not advanced.
The economic stagnation since 2006 has led to ever-increasing labor unrest. On October 10, 2011,
about 3,000 customs officers went on strike demanding higher wages and better working
conditions; the action caused a temporary halt to Kuwaiti oil exports. In early 2012, strikes briefly
grounded state-owned Kuwait Airways.
The 2008 financial crisis, coupled with the political infighting, also caused Kuwait to shelve the
formation of a joint venture with Dow Chemical to form the largest maker of polyethylene. On
December 29, 2008, in the face of National Assembly opposition to the project, the government
cancelled the venture. It was to have required a Kuwaiti investment of $7.5 billion by state-run
Petrochemical Industries Co. Kuwait and Dow Chemical had finalized the joint venture
agreement in November 2008, and Dow Chemical expressed surprise at Kuwait’s cancellation
only four weeks later. Dow had planned to use the proceeds of the investment to fund its purchase
of the Rohm and Haas chemical firm, although that deal ultimately went through anyway.
The state-owned oil industry still accounts for 75% of government income and 90% of export
earnings. The United States imports about 260,000 barrels per day in crude oil from Kuwait
(about 3% of U.S. oil imports). Total U.S. exports to Kuwait were about $2.7 billion in 2011,
roughly the same as the few preceding years, consisting mostly of foods, industrial equipment,
and automobiles. Total U.S. imports from Kuwait in 2011 were about $7.8 billion.
Like other Gulf states, Kuwait sees peaceful uses of nuclear energy as important to its economy,
although doing so always raises fears among some in the United States, Israel, and elsewhere
about the ultimate intentions of developing a nuclear program. Kuwait is cooperating with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure international oversight of any nuclear
work in Kuwait.
There are ongoing discussions about reviving the project. In 1994, Kuwait became a founding
member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In February 2004, the United States and
Kuwait signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), often viewed as a prelude
to a free trade agreement (FTA), which Kuwait has said it seeks. Kuwait gave $500 million worth
of oil to U.S. states affected by Hurricane Katrina.


17 “Kuwait in Crisis As Ruling Family Splits, MP’s Rebel.” Reuters, June 7, 2011.
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Table 3.Some Basic Facts
Leadership
Amir: Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah. Crown Prince/heir
apparent: Shaykh Nawwaf al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah. Prime Minister:
Shaykh Jabir al-Mubarak Al Sabah
Population
About 2.7 million, of which 1.4 million are citizens.
GDP (purchasing power parity, PPP)
$166 billion (2012)
Religions
Muslim 85% (Sunni 70%, Shi te 30%); other (Christian, Hindu, Parsi)
15%
GDP per capita (PPP)
$43,800/yr (2012)
GDP growth rate
6.3% (2012)
Inflation 3.2%
(2012)
Oil (proven reserves)
102 billion barrels (7% of world proven reserves)
Oil exports
2.15 million barrels per day (mbd)
Source: CRS; CIA, The World Factbook reports, IMF Public Information Notice, June 15, 2012.


Figure 1. Map of Kuwait

Source: CRS.

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Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612

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