U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
Trade Facilitation, Enforcement, and Security
Vivian C. Jones
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Marc R. Rosenblum
Specialist in Immigration Policy
March 22, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43014
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Trade Facilitation, Enforcement, and Security
Summary
International trade is a critical component of the U.S. economy, with U.S. merchandise imports
and exports amounting to $2.2 trillion and $1.5 trillion in 2011, respectively. The efficient flow of
legally traded goods in and out of the United States is thus a vital element of the country’s
economic security.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
is the primary agency charged with ensuring the smooth flow of trade through U.S. ports of entry
(POEs). CBP’s policies with regard to U.S. imports are designed to (1) facilitate the smooth flow
of imported cargo through U.S. ports of entry; (2) enforce trade and customs laws designed to
protect U.S. consumers and business and to collect customs revenue; and (3) enforce import
security laws designed to prevent weapons of mass destruction, illegal drugs, and other
contraband from entering the United States—a complex and difficult mission. Congress has a
direct role in organizing, authorizing, and defining CBP’s international trade functions, as well as
appropriating funding for and conducting oversight of its programs. The 113th Congress may
consider legislation to reauthorize CBP’s trade functions.
Laws currently authorizing the trade facilitation and enforcement functions of CBP (as outlined in
the Customs Modernization and Informed Compliance Act, Title VI of P.L. 103-182) emphasize a
balanced relationship between CBP and the trade community based on the principles of “shared
responsibility,” “reasonable care,” and “informed compliance.” Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks of
2001, Congress has placed greater emphasis on import security and CBP’s role in preventing
terrorist attacks at the border. Legislation addressing customs procedures and import security
includes the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), the Security and Accountability for
Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-347), and the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53).
CBP’s current import strategy emphasizes a risk management approach that segments importers
into higher and lower risk pools and focuses trade enforcement and import security procedures on
higher-risk imports, while expediting lower-risk flows. CBP’s “multi-layered approach” means
that security screening and enforcement occur at multiple points in the import process, beginning
before goods are loaded in foreign ports (pre-entry) and continuing long after the time goods have
been admitted into the United States (post-entry).
How effectively CBP has performed its import policy mission is a matter of some debate. Some
participants in CBP’s “trusted trader” programs argue that the concessions CBP provides at the
border do not adequately justify the effort and expense participants undergo to certify their supply
chains with CBP. Questions have also been raised about CBP’s management of trade facilitation,
especially the “customs modernization” process through which the Automated Commercial
System (ACS) trade data management system is being phased out in favor of the newer
Automated Commercial Environment (ACE). Some critics also assert that CBP has not
adequately fulfilled its trade enforcement role, especially its duties for preventing illegal
transshipments, protecting U.S. intellectual property rights, and collecting duties. Still others
criticize CBP’s performance of its security functions, especially because it does not yet physically
scan 100% of maritime cargo as mandated by the SAFE Port Act of 2006, as amended.
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U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Trade Facilitation, Enforcement, and Security
Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Overarching Import Policy Goals .................................................................................................... 2
Legislative History of U.S. Customs and Import Security Policies ................................................. 5
The “Mod Act” of 1993 (Title VI of P.L. 103-182) ................................................................... 5
Post-9/11 Import Security Legislation ....................................................................................... 6
Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210) ........................................................................................ 6
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-295) ........................................... 7
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) .................................................................. 8
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-293) .............................. 9
Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-347) .............. 9
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-
53) .................................................................................................................................. 12
The Import Process ........................................................................................................................ 12
Pre-Entry: Advanced Cargo Screening, Scanning, and Inspections ........................................ 13
Trusted Trader Programs ................................................................................................... 14
Advance Electronic Cargo Information ............................................................................ 16
Automated Targeting System ............................................................................................ 17
Import Security Scanning and Inspections Abroad ........................................................... 17
Import Processing At Ports of Entry ........................................................................................ 18
Import Security and Trade Enforcement at U.S. Ports ...................................................... 19
Trade Facilitation .............................................................................................................. 23
Post-Entry: Continued Trade Enforcement .............................................................................. 25
Liquidation ........................................................................................................................ 26
Recordkeeping and Post-Entry Audits .............................................................................. 26
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 27
Trade Facilitation ..................................................................................................................... 27
Authorization of Existing CBP Trade Facilitation Programs ............................................ 28
Trusted Trader Program Benefits ...................................................................................... 28
Wait Times at Land Ports of Entry .................................................................................... 29
Trade Enforcement .................................................................................................................. 31
Import Security ........................................................................................................................ 31
100% Scanning Requirement ............................................................................................ 32
Transportation Worker Identity Credential (TWIC) Card Readers ................................... 34
Customs Modernization ........................................................................................................... 34
Interagency Coordination ........................................................................................................ 35
Concluding Comments .................................................................................................................. 36
Figures
Figure 1. The U.S. Import Process ................................................................................................. 13
Figure 2. CBP Enforcement Staffing, FY2004-FY2012 ................................................................ 30
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Tables
Table 1. Primary and Secondary Inspections of U.S. Containerized Imports,
FY2005-FY2011 ......................................................................................................................... 20
Table 2. Trade Enforcement at U.S. Ports, FY2005-FY2012 ........................................................ 22
Table B-1. U.S. Merchandise Trade by Mode of Transportation, 2005-2011 ................................ 39
Table B-2. U.S. Gross Domestic Product and International Trade, 2005-2011 ............................. 39
Table C-1. Estimated Expenditures, Selected Cargo Security Programs, FY2004-
FY2012 ....................................................................................................................................... 40
Appendixes
Appendix A. Glossary of Trade-Related Acronyms ...................................................................... 38
Appendix B. Selected Trade Statistics ........................................................................................... 39
Appendix C. Estimated Expenditures for Selected Cargo Security Programs, FY2004-
FY2012 ....................................................................................................................................... 40
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 40
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 40
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U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Trade Facilitation, Enforcement, and Security
Introduction
International trade is a critical component of the U.S. economy, with U.S. merchandise imports
amounting to $2.2 trillion and merchandise exports to $1.5 trillion, so that total U.S. merchandise
trade amounted to about $3.7 trillion in 2011 (see Appendix B). The efficient flow of legally
traded goods (i.e., cargo) in and out of the United States is thus a vital element of the country’s
economic security. While U.S. trade in imports depends on the smooth flow of legal cargo
through U.S. ports of entry (POE), the goal of trade facilitation often competes with two
additional goals: enforcement of U.S. trade laws and import security. How to strike the
appropriate balance among these three goals is a fundamental question at the heart of U.S. import
policies.
How to balance competing goals in import policy is an especially difficult question in light of the
volume and complexity of trade inflows. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the agency
charged with managing the import process at the border, admits about 30 million trade entries1
per year through 329 POEs, with a value of about $2.2 trillion (imports only).2 The largest
volume of imports comes through land (truck and rail) and sea flows, which together account for
over 20 million shipping containers per year.3
Congress has a direct role in organizing, authorizing, and defining CBP’s international trade
functions, as well as appropriating funding for and conducting oversight of its programs. Two
bills were introduced at the end of the 112th Congress to reauthorize CBP’s trade functions, but
saw no further legislative action—H.R. 6642, the Customs Trade Facilitation and Enforcement
Act of 2012, and H.R. 6656, the Customs Enhanced Enforcement and Trade Facilitation Act of
2012—and Members may consider similar legislation during the 113th Congress.
This report describes and analyzes import policy and CBP’s role in the U.S. import process. (The
report does not cover CBP’s role in the U.S. export control system.) The first section of the report
describes the three overarching goals of U.S. import policy and the tension among them. Second,
the report provides a legislative history of customs laws, followed by an overview of the U.S.
import process as it operates today. Third, the import process and CBP’s role in it are discussed.
The final section highlights several policy issues that Congress may consider in its oversight role
or as part of customs or trade legislation, including measures seeking to provide additional trade
facilitation benefits to importers and others enrolled in “trusted trader” programs, to improve
enforcement of intellectual property and trade remedy laws, to strengthen cargo scanning
1 “Entry” is the process of, and documentation required for, securing the release of imported merchandise from CBP.
2 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (hereinafter U.S. CBP), p. 17 U.S. CBP, Import Trade Trends, FY2011 Year-End
Report, Washington, DC, 2012, p. 17, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/trade_programs/trade_trends/
fy11_yearend.ctt/fy11_yearend.pdf.
3 CRS calculations for FY2005-FY2011, based on data presented in Table 1. With air cargo mainly consisting of high
value, low-weight goods, however, the value of imports is about evenly divided among sea (34%), air (31%), and land
(35%) inflows, according to CRS calculations for FY2005-FY2011 based on data presented in Table B-1. Although
certain issues raised in this report apply to the import process in general, this report focuses on containerized (as
opposed to bulk) goods, and does not address imports and exports in foreign trade zones. This report also does not
address the Transportation Security Administration’s role in air cargo security, which is discussed in CRS Report
RL33512, Transportation Security: Issues for the 113th Congress, by David Randall Peterman, Bart Elias, and John
Frittelli, and CRS Report R41515, Screening and Securing Air Cargo: Background and Issues for Congress, by Bart
Elias.
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practices, and/or to promote modernization of customs data systems, among other issues. A list of
trade-related acronyms used in the report is provided in Appendix A.
Overarching Import Policy Goals
U.S. import policy seeks to balance three overarching policy goals. First, import policy promotes
trade facilitation. Trade facilitation refers to efforts to simplify and streamline international trade
procedures to allow for the easier flow of legitimate goods across international boundaries and
thereby to reduce the costs of trade.4 Trade facilitation includes the availability of advanced
customs rulings, transparent and efficient procedures, elimination of “red tape,” clear
information, effective communications, and cooperation between border agencies, among other
provisions.5
Trade facilitation is a priority for CBP and the trade community because trade represents a key
component of the U.S. economy. International trade accounts for about a quarter of the U.S.
economy, with merchandise trade (i.e., cargo) accounting for more than three-quarters of all U.S.
trade flows.6 Most economic research finds that while international trade may impose short-term
costs on certain sectors and industries that compete with imports, in the long run, trade promotes
efficiency, reduces costs to consumers, and increases economic growth due to competitive
advantage.7 With the production of goods increasingly organized into global supply chains, in
which the manufacture and final product assembly often occur in two or more countries,
intermediate components during the manufacturing process are a significant percentage of total
exports in most countries, and a wide variety of U.S. manufacturers depend on the efficient
import and export of these inputs.8
Partly for this reason, trade facilitation has been a priority issue for the United States and its
international partners in organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the
World Customs Organization (WCO), and in free trade agreement negotiations (FTAs).Within the
WTO Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations, for example, the United States
has pursued “the shared objective of a rules-based, transparent, and efficient approach to goods
crossing the border.”9Although most elements of the Doha agenda have stalled, WTO members
are actively conducting negotiations on trade facilitation and may seek to conclude a trade
facilitation agreement in 2013.10 The United States is also pursuing an agreement on trade
facilitation as part of Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) FTA negotiations. Similarly, the United
4 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) definition, http://www.oecd.org.
5 Moïsé, E., T. Orliac and P. Minor (2011), “Trade Facilitation Indicators: The Impact on Trade Costs,” OECD Trade
Policy Working Papers, No. 118, OECD Publishing.
6 U.S. merchandise imports and exports totaled $3.7 trillion in 2011, with trade in services (including international
tourism) totaling $1.1 trillion. The overall U.S. gross domestic product was $15.1 trillion. See U.S. Census, “U.S. Trade
in Goods and Services,” http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/historical/gands.txt.
7 See for example, CRS Report RL31932, Trade Agreements: Impact on the U.S. Economy, by James K. Jackson.
8 Beltramello, A., K. De Backer and L. Moussiegt (2012), “The Export Performance of Countries within Global Value
Chains (GVCs),” OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, 2012/02, OECD Publishing.
9 World Trade Organization, Introduction to Proposals by the United States of America, Communication from the
United States, TN/TF/W/11, February 2005.
10 World Trade Organization, “Lamy Cites ACP’s ‘Instrumental Role’ in Moving the Trade Debate Forward,” press
release, October 24, 2012. For more information on the WTO Doha Round, see CRS Report RL32060, World Trade
Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda, by Ian F. Fergusson.
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States and other WCO members are actively engaging in trade facilitation efforts, especially
through encouraging the use of electronic systems to expedite the clearance of merchandise
entries and to ensure effective customs controls.11 U.S. officials are leading international efforts to
implement WCO-developed best practices such as “single window” data systems so that
importers can enter data, and multiple cross-border regulatory agencies can use the “window” to
clear merchandise entries, as well as transportation carriers, equipment, and workers (see
“Interagency Coordination”).12
There is an inherent tension between efforts to promote efficient trade flows, and a second goal of
U.S. import policy: the enforcement of trade laws designed to protect U.S. consumers and
business against illegal imports and to collect customs revenue. In general, U.S. trade laws seeks
to protect U.S. consumers by enforcing health and safety standards, and to protect U.S. businesses
by enforcing patent, trademark and copyright laws and by collecting anti-dumping and
countervailing duties (AD/CVD).13 Trade enforcement policies also govern the collection of
tariffs, fees, and taxes; CBP generated more than $37 billion in revenue in FY2011, including
more than $30 billion in customs duties.14
The third overarching goal of U.S. import policy is import security, or preventing the entry of
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and related material; illegal
drugs; and other contraband. While customs agencies have always played a role in protecting
public safety, including through narcotics enforcement in particular, the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 (9/11), caused many Americans to place even greater emphasis on
transportation and port security. Thus, security measures enacted after 9/11 placed additional
responsibilities on customs officials to pro-actively prevent weapons of mass destruction and
other threats to the homeland from entering the United States and have made import security a
central feature of U.S. trade policy (see “Post-9/11 Import Security Legislation”). Import security
also has become an important feature of international efforts, and the United States and its
partners in the WCO have adopted new security protocols for tracking, inspecting, and screening
containerized imports and exports.15
Trade facilitation is in tension with trade enforcement and import security because trade
facilitation involves promoting faster and more efficient trade flows, while trade enforcement and
import security involve identifying and preventing illegal flows—tasks that often involve slower
cargo flows and reduced efficiency. These competing pressures make the implementation of
import policy a complex and difficult task, which CBP addresses through a process of risk
management, as described below (see “The Import Process”).
Many policy questions with respect to the import process concern how Congress and CBP
balance these three goals. Some U.S. importers and some in Congress have criticized CBP for
neglecting trade facilitation in favor of import security and trade enforcement. For example, some
11 Ibid. The United States is one of 178 member countries participating in the World Customs Organization (WCO), an
organization dedicated to enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of members’ customs administrations.
Collectively, WCO members process about 98% of world trade, http://www.wcoomd.org/home.htm.
12 Ibid.
13 For an overview of U.S. trade laws, see CRS Report RL32371, Trade Remedies: A Primer, by Vivian C. Jones.
14 U.S. CBP, Import Trade Trends: Fiscal Year 2011, Washington, DC, 2012.
15 Joann Peterson and Alan Treat, “The Post-9/11 Global Framework for Cargo Security,” Journal of International
Commerce and Economics, March 2008.
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in the trade community view the paperwork and reporting requirements imposed on U.S.
importers as burdensome, and they assert that these requirements run counter to U.S. interests by
threatening America’s economic security.16 Others argue that scanning and inspections at land
ports of entry result in unacceptably long and unpredictable border wait times. Delays have been
described as particularly onerous at the U.S.-Mexico border, where trade has increased nearly
fourfold since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was implemented in 1994.17
Several studies have estimated the economic consequences of border crossing delays, including a
2008 draft report by the Department of Commerce that estimated that crossing delays at the U.S.-
Mexico border resulted in $5.8 billion in lost economic output, $1.4 billion in lost wages, 26,000
lost jobs, and $600 million in lost tax revenues—and would result in losses twice this size by
2017.18 A review of nine additional studies concluded that “one message comes through quite
clearly—long and unpredictable wait times at the POEs are costing the United States and
Mexican economies many billions of dollars each year.”19
Others assert that the United States may remain vulnerable to a terrorist attack against a port of
entry—with potentially catastrophic results—and that CBP should place greater emphasis on
import security, even if the economic costs are high. Some Members have expressed frustration,
for example, that the great majority of cargo containers are not scanned or physically inspected
prior to arrival at a U.S. port.20 Similarly, some manufacturers have alleged that CBP has not
adequately investigated allegations of duty evasion, product mislabeling, fraudulent country of
origin declarations, or deliberate misclassification of shipments;21 and some assert that their
intellectual property rights (IPR) have been violated by ever growing imports of counterfeit
goods, and that CBP efforts in collaboration with the private sector in identifying and enforcing
IPR violations have been inadequate.22 In short, how Congress and CBP balance trade facilitation,
trade law enforcement, and import security has important implications for homeland security,
public safety, and virtually every sector of the U.S. economy. To varying degrees, this tension
underlies most aspects of U.S. import policymaking.
16 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade, Customs Trade Facilitation and
Enforcement in a Secure Environment, 111th Cong., 2nd sess. May 20, 2010, Testimony of Frank Vargo, National
Association of Manufacturers.
17 US Department of Commerce, Draft Report: Improving Economic Outcomes by Reducing Border Delays,
Facilitating the Vital Flow of Commercial Traffic Across the US-Mexican Border, Washington, DC, 2008,
http://grijalva.house.gov/uploads/
Draft%20Commerce%20Department%20Report%20on%20Reducing%20Border%20Delays%20Findings%20and%20
Options%20March%202008.pdf.
18 Ibid.
19 Erik Lee and Christopher E. Wilson, “The State of Trade, Competitiveness, and Economic Well-Being in the U.S.-
Mexican Border Region,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and El Colegio de la Frontera Norte,
Working Paper Series on the State of the U.S.-Mexico Border, Washington, DC, June 2012,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/State_of_Border_Trade_Economy_0.pdf, p. 10.
20 See, for example, Border and Maritime Security Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Committee, U.S. House,
hearing “Balancing Maritime Security and Trade Facilitation: Protecting our Ports, Increasing Commerce and Securing
the Supply Chain - Part I,” February 7, 2012.
21 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade, Supporting Economic Growth and
Job Creation through Customs Trade Modernization, Facilitation, and Enforcement, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., May 17,
2012. For example, see Testimony of Mr. John Williams, Executive Director, Southern Shrimp Alliance.
22 U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security,
Hearing on H.R. 4223, the “Safe Doses Act”; H.R. 3668, the “Counterfeit Drug Penalty Enhancement Act of 2011;
and H.R. 4216, the “Foreign Counterfeit Prevention Act”, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., March 28, 2012, Testimony of Mr.
Travis D. Johnson.
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Legislative History of U.S. Customs and
Import Security Policies
The U.S. Customs Service (USCS),23 the agency historically responsible for trade facilitation and
enforcement, was established by an act of Congress on July 31, 1789 (1 Stat. 29), and on
September 2, 1789, was placed under the Secretary of the Treasury.24 At that time, the primary
role of the service was to collect U.S. customs tariffs, which were the major revenue source for
the U.S. Government until federal income tax was established in 1913. Key laws establishing and
authorizing the trade functions of the USCS included provisions in the Tariff Act of 1930,25 the
Customs Simplification Act of 1953,26 and the Reorganization Plan of 1965.27
The last time that the then-USCS’s trade functions were fundamentally reorganized was in 1993,
in Title VI of the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (P.L. 103-182), also
known as the Customs Modernization and Informed Compliance Act, or “Mod Act.” Following
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296) placed all or some part of 22
different federal departments and agencies, including the USCS, into the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS).28 DHS’s bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has been
the lead agency on import policy since 2003, and a series of additional laws have expanded
CBP’s import security functions.
The “Mod Act” of 1993 (Title VI of P.L. 103-182)
The Mod Act, implemented on December 8, 1993, amended many sections of the Tariff Act of
1930 that applied to USCS’s role in trade enforcement. The law was the culmination of a multi-
year effort among Congress, the USCS, and the Joint Industry Group (a coalition of private-sector
firms involved in international trade), to develop legislation on Customs modernization.29 While
the main purpose of the law was to streamline, automate and modernize USCS’s commercial
operations, the law was also intended to improve compliance with U.S. customs laws, and to
provide safeguards, uniformity, and due process rights for importers.30
23 In this report, the U.S. Customs Service or USCS is used to refer to the legacy customs agency (before the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 and the subsequent reorganization modification plan changed the name of the agency). When
referring to legislation after 2002, Customs and Border Protection, or CBP, is used.
24 National Archives, Records of the United States Customs Service, 1749-1997.
25 46 Stat. 590, June 17, 1930.
26 68 Stat. 1136, September 1, 1954.
27 79 Stat. 1317, May 25, 1965.
28 On the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), see archived CRS Report RL31751, Homeland
Security: Department Organization and Management—Implementation Phase, by Harold C. Relyea; and archived CRS
Report RL31549, Department of Homeland Security: Consolidation of Border and Transportation Security Agencies,
by Jennifer E. Lake.
29 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade, Customs Modernization and
Informed Compliance Act, Hearing on H.R. 3935, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., March 10, 1992, Serial 102-85 (Washington:
GPO, 1992), p. 86.
30 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act,
report to accompany H.R. 3450, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., November 15, 1993, H. Rept. 103-361(I) (Washington: GPO,
1993), p. 106, (hereinafter NAFTA Report).
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The Mod Act addressed the tension between trade facilitation and trade enforcement by replacing
the historical “agency-centric” model of trade enforcement with a “shared responsibility”
approach.31 Thus, whereas USCS previously had monitored imports and determined the level of
customs duties owed by each importer, under the shared responsibility approach USCS (now
CBP) is required to inform importers of their rights and responsibilities under the customs
regulations and related laws; and importers of record are required to be aware of their legal
obligations and to make their own duty determinations through the concept of “informed
compliance.”32 Importers are also required to exercise “reasonable care” when classifying and
determining the value of imported merchandise. If importers have questions about the country of
origin, classification, or valuation of merchandise, they may apply to CBP for a binding
determination (known as a customs ruling) prior to importation.33
The Mod Act placed a greater administrative burden on the importer, and shifted USCS’s focus to
the collection of data and post-entry enforcement (i.e., audits) to ensure that all legal requirements
have been met.34 By reducing USCS’s role in duty determination, the act freed up agency assets
to modernize the import process and improve post-entry enforcement.35 Private industry
stakeholders accepted these increased responsibilities because the law also provided for a quicker
and more transparent import process through streamlined and automated customs operations.
Post-9/11 Import Security Legislation
While the Mod Act focused on the tension between trade facilitation and enforcement, the 9/11
attacks focused America’s attention on homeland security. With the attacks having been executed
by foreign nationals traveling on commercial aircraft, an immediate priority was to reorganize
existing law enforcement resources related to immigration, transportation, trade, and border
security into a new federal Department of Homeland Security (DHS). At least six laws enacted
between 2002-2007 included provisions related to the trade process and made import security a
central feature of U.S. trade policy.
Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210)
Customs reauthorization legislation in the Trade Act of 2002 (Title III of P.L. 107-210, the
Customs Border Security Act of 2002) authorized appropriations for a number of noncommercial
and commercial CBP programs as well as CBP’s air and marine interdiction program. Funds were
also authorized to be appropriated for the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE; see “Pre-
Entry: Advanced Cargo Screening, Scanning, and Inspections”), for equipment and programs for
31 The previous model employed by USCS resembled utility companies’ billing model, which measures usage and
sends customers a statement; while the current model resembles tax collection by the Internal Revenue Service, which
requires businesses and individuals to estimate their own tax liabilities.
32 NAFTA Report, p. 106. In meeting the “reasonable care” standard, House lawmakers suggested that importers
consider using assistance when bringing products into the United States. These aids could include seeking advance
rulings from Customs, consulting with a customs broker or trade attorney, using in-house employees with a knowledge
of customs laws, or obtaining analyses from accredited labs (NAFTA Report, p. 120).
33 19 U.S.C. 1625, as amended. U.S. CBP, What Every Member of the Trade Community Should Know About: U.S.
Customs and Border Protection Rulings Program, CBP Informed Compliance Publication series, http://www.cbp.gov.
34 19 U.S.C. 1509, as amended. U.S. CBP, Preface to Informed Compliance Publication series maintained by CBP,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/legal/informed_compliance_pubs/.
35 19 U.S.C. 1411ff.
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drug enforcement, and for the detection of terrorists and illicit narcotics along the U.S borders
with Mexico and Canada , and in Florida and Gulf Coast seaports.
The Trade Act also included one of the most significant additions to the customs clearance
process since 9/11: a requirement that importers and exporters submit advance cargo manifest
information prior to cargo arriving at a U.S. port of entry (POE). The law authorized the Secretary
of the Treasury to publish regulations requiring the submission of this information, and directed
the Secretary to consult with a broad range of import and export stakeholders and to base the
regulations on the Secretary’s determination of what is “reasonably necessary to ensure aviation,
maritime, and surface transportation safety and security.”36 CBP uses this advance cargo
information to conduct risk-based targeting through the Automated Targeting System (ATS; see
“Automated Targeting System”).
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-295)
The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA, P.L. 107-295) expanded DHS’s
authority under the Trade Act of 2002 to collect and share advance cargo data, and took several
steps to strengthen port security. 37 Section 102 of the MTSA established a new chapter of the
U.S. Code (46 U.S.C. 701) to establish DHS’s overall role in port security. Among other things,
the law required DHS to assess vessel and port security and to develop national and regional
maritime transportation security plans,38 required certain ports and vessels to develop security and
incident response plans to be approved by DHS,39 and established a Department of Transportation
grant program to help ports implement their security plans.40
The MTSA also established new security requirements for U.S. and foreign ports and for ships
operating in U.S. waters. Within the United States, the law required DHS to establish regulations
to prevent individuals from entering secure areas of vessels or ports unless the individuals hold
security cards. The port security cards are known as Transportation Worker Identity Credential
(TWIC) cards, and are administered by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) along
with the U.S. Coast Guard.41 With respect to foreign ports (where Congress has no direct
authority), the law required DHS to assess port security at foreign ports and to notify foreign
ports if they are found to lack appropriate counter-terrorism measures.42 DHS is authorized to
restrict the entry of vessels arriving from foreign ports that fail to maintain effective counter-
terrorism measures.43 With respect to ships and other vessels operating in U.S. waters, the law
required that certain vessels be equipped with an automatic identification system while operating
36 P.L. 107-210, sec. 343(a), 19 U.S.C. 2071 note.
37 On the Maritime Transportation Security Act, see archived CRS Report RL31733, Port and Maritime Security:
Background and Issues for Congress, by John Frittelli; also see U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO),
Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime Transportation Security Act, GAO-12-1009T,
September 11, 2012.
38 Sec. 102 of P.L. 107-295; 46 U.S.C.70103(a).
39 Sec. 102 of P.L. 107-295; 46 U.S.C. 70103(b).
40 Sec. 102 of P.L. 107-295; 46 U.S.C. 70103(c).
41 Sec. 102 of P.L. 107-295; 46 U.S.C. 70105. See Transportation Worker Identity Card (TWIC) regulations at 33
C.F.R. §§ 101 – 106 and 49 C.F.R. §§ 1515, 1540, 1570, and 1572.
42 Sec. 102 of P.L. 107-295; 46 U.S.C. 70108.
43 Sec. 102 of P.L. 107-295; 46 U.S.C. 70110.
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in U.S. waters, and that DHS also develop and implement a long-range automated vessel tracking
system for certain vessels.44
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296)
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA, P.L. 107-296) created a framework for the transfer of
all or part of 22 different federal departments into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
including the USCS and the U.S. Coast Guard.45
Title IV of the act created within DHS a Directorate of Homeland Security headed by the Under
Secretary for Border and Transportation Security.46 The Directorate was given responsibility for
preventing the entry of terrorists and the instruments of terrorism into the United States, and for
ensuring the speedy, orderly, and efficient flow of lawful traffic and commerce, among other
things. Title IV also established the U.S. Customs Service and the office of the Commissioner of
Customs within DHS.47 The act specified that certain customs revenue functions would be
retained by the Secretary of the Treasury, who may delegate the authority to the Secretary of
Homeland Security.48 Although the customs inspection and enforcement authority of the former
USCS were transferred to CBP, Section 412(b) of the HSA mandated that DHS could not
“consolidate, discontinue, or diminish” the trade and customs revenue functions of the USCS, or
reduce staffing levels or the resources attributable to these functions.49
The HSA directed the President, no later than 60 days after enactment of the act, to transmit to the
appropriate congressional committees a reorganization plan for the transfer of agencies,
personnel, assets, and obligations to the new Department of Homeland Security.50 The President
submitted an initial plan on November 25, 2002,51 and modified the plan shortly thereafter
following consultation with then Secretary of Homeland Security designate Tom Ridge.52 In the
modification plan, the USCS was renamed the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
44 Sec. 102 of P.L. 107-295; 46 U.S.C. 70114.
45 On the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, see archived CRS Report RL31549, Department of
Homeland Security: Consolidation of Border and Transportation Security Agencies, by Jennifer E. Lake; and archived
CRS Report RL31493, Homeland Security: Department Organization And Management—Legislative Phase, by Harold
C. Relyea.
46 Sec. 401 of P.L. 107-296; 6 U.S.C. 201.
47 Sec. 411 of P.L. 107-296; 6. U.S.C. 211.
48 Sec. 412 of P.L. 107-296, 6 U.S.C. 212. In Treasury Department Order No. 100-16 (set out as an appendix 10 19
C.F.R. § 0), the Secretary of the Treasury transferred the customs revenue functions of U.S. Customs Service to the
Secretary of Homeland Security, but in some cases retained sole authority to issue regulations concerning these
functions. This document, along with 19 C.F.R. §0, outlines the framework by which the authorities of Secretaries of
the Treasury and Homeland Security are divided with regard to customs revenue functions and enforcement.
49 Ibid.
50 Sec. 1502 of P.L. 107-296; 6 U.S.C. 502.
51. See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Reorganization Plan for the Department of Homeland
Security, Communication from the President of the United States, House Document 108-16, 108th Cong., 1st sess.,
January 7, 2003, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-108hdoc16/pdf/CDOC-108hdoc16.pdf.
52. See U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Homeland Security, Reorganization Plan Modification for the Department
of Homeland Security, Communication from the President of the United States, House Document 108-32, 108th Cong.,
1st sess., February 3, 2003, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-108hdoc32/pdf/CDOC-108hdoc32.pdf.
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and the Bureau of Border Security was renamed the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE).53
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-293)
The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-293) contained a number of
maritime security provisions that amended the MTSA. Title VIII of the law added security
requirements to the import process provisions, including amendments to certain long-range vessel
tracking system requirements.54 DHS was also required to submit a plan for implementation of a
maritime intelligence system (previously authorized in the MTSA) to incorporate information on
vessel movements and assign incoming vessels a terrorism risk rating.55
Section 808 of the law required the Department of Transportation to “conduct investigations, fund
pilot programs, and award grants” to examine and develop certain equipment to enhance the
investigative ability of CBP, including equipment to accurately detect nuclear, chemical or
biological materials; and tags and seals equipped with sensors that are able to track marine
containers throughout their supply chains and to detect hazardous and radioactive materials
within containers.56
The law also required DHS to report on several cargo import security issues, including the costs
to the government of vessel and container inspections, plans for implementing secure systems of
transportation, progress on the installation of radiation detectors at all major U.S. seaports, the
willingness of foreign seaports to utilize non-intrusive inspection (NII) techniques to inspect
cargo bound for the United States, and evaluation of the existing cargo inspection targeting
system for international intermodal cargo containers.57
Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-347)
On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11
Commission) published its report on the circumstances surrounding the 9/11 attacks and made
recommendations to guard against future attacks. The report expressed concern that the United
States lacked “a forward-looking strategic plan” that devoted adequate attention to maritime and
surface transportation.58
53 Ibid. The reorganization plan consolidated customs, immigration, and agricultural inspection functions within CBP,
merging certain USCS, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
functions within the new agency; USCS and INS officers previously had been cross-designated to perform both
customs and immigration functions.
54 Sec. 803 of P.L. 108-293. The long-range identification and tracking (LRIT) of ships applies to all passenger ships
including high-speed craft, cargo ships including high-speed craft of 300 gross tonnage and above, and mobile offshore
drilling units. The U.S. requirements conform to an international system adopted by the International Maritime
Organization (IMO).
55 §803 of P.L. 108-293, 46 U.S.C. 70113, as amended.
56 §808 of P.L. 108-293, 46 U.S.C. 70107, as amended.
57 §809 of P.L. 108-293.
58 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 2004), p. 391.
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Congress responded by passing the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006
(SAFE Port Act, P.L. 109-347) and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007 (The 9/11 Act, P.L. 110-53). Title I of the SAFE Port Act focused on port security.
The act updated several deadlines from previous legislation, including a deadline of April 1, 2007
for DHS to implement a long-range vessel tracking system,59 and a deadline of January 1, 2009
for issuing TWIC cards and for all ports to implement TWIC readers.60 In addition, the act
required by December 31, 2008 that all containers entering U.S. ports be subject to radiation
detection scanning.61
Title II focused on international supply chain security, defined by Section 2 of the act as the “end-
to-end process for shipping goods to or from the United States beginning at the point of origin
(including manufacturer, supplier, or vendor) through a point of distribution to the destination.”
The Title includes five main provisions with respect to maritime cargo security, which are
summarized here and discussed in greater detail below:
• Section 203, authorized cargo to be screened through CBP’s Automated
Targeting System (ATS; see “Automated Targeting System”) and further
authorized DHS to require advanced electronic cargo data (see “Advanced
Electronic Cargo Information”) as needed to improve ATS targeting.62
• Section 205 authorized the Container Security Initiative (CSI; see “Import
Security Scanning and Inspections”), designed “to identify and examine or search
maritime containers that pose a security risk before loading such containers in a
foreign port for shipment to the United States.” The section authorized DHS to
designate particular foreign seaports to participate in the CSI, and directed DHS
to establish criteria and procedures for nonintrusive inspection (NII) and for
nuclear and radiological detection systems at CSI ports. 63
• Sections 211-223 authorized the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
(C-TPAT; see “Trusted Trader Programs”) and set forth C-TPAT program
parameters. C-TPAT is a voluntary program that allows certain trade-related
firms to be certified by CBP as having secured the integrity of their supply
chains. The law established three tiers of C-TPAT membership, and described
potential membership benefits associated with each.64
59 Sec. 107 of P.L. 109-347; 46 U.S.C. 70105 note. The U.S. Coast Guard issued a final rule in April 2008 concerning
long-range vessel tracking. See 73 Federal Register 23310; also see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Maritime
Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed,
GAO-09-337, March 2009.
60 Sec. 104 of P.L. 109-347; 46 U.S.C. 70105. DHS tested a TWIC card reader pilot program in seven ports between
August 2008 and May 2011. As of August 2012, DHS has published a final report on the TWIC card reader pilot
program, but has not published final regulations governing TWIC card readers. The Coast Guard reportedly will
publish regulations concerning TWIC card readers in the fall of 2012; see Mickey McCarter, “Coast Guard Soon to
Publish Overdue Rule for TWIC Card Readers,” Homeland Security Today, September 14, 2012.
61 Sec. 121 of P.L. 109-347; 6 U.S.C. 921.
62 Sec. 203 of P.L. 109-347; 6. U.S.C. 943.The Automated Targeting System (ATS) already was operational in 2006 as
a pilot program without formal congressional authorization.
63 Sec. 205 of P.L. 109-347; 6 U.S.C. 945.The Container Security Initiative (CSI) was already operational in 2006 as a
pilot program without formal congressional authorization.
64 Sec. 211ff of P.L. 109-347; 6 U.S.C. 961ff.The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) already
was operational in 2006 as a pilot program without formal congressional authorization.
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• Section 231 directed DHS to establish pilot programs in three foreign seaports to
conduct NII and radiation detection scanning of cargo containers. Beginning one
year after enactment of the act (i.e., by October 2007), the section required that
DHS scan 100% of containers destined for the United States loaded in the three
pilot ports and that questionable or high-risk cargo be identified for further
inspection. 65 The program is known as the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI; see
“Import Security Scanning and Inspections”).
• Section 232 required that 100% of cargo containers originating outside the
United States and imported into the United States be screened by DHS to identify
high-risk containers. As enacted, the section required DHS to ensure that
containers identified as high risk during the screening process also be scanned
through NII and radiation detection equipment before they arrive in the United
States (see “100% Scanning Requirement”).66
Import Security and Trade Enforcement Terminology and Procedures
As discussed throughout this report, cargo being imported to the United States may be subject to multiple and varied
types of import security and trade enforcement reviews, including the fol owing:
•
Screening: A risk assessment based on an analysis of data elements (e.g., cargo manifest, country of origin,
shipper and consignee information) provided by an importer or carrier.
•
Scanning: An analysis of container contents based on non-intrusive inspection (NII) technologies, including
x-ray and gamma ray imaging systems and other technologies. NII scanning produces a high-resolution image of
container contents that is reviewed by law enforcement officers to detect hidden cargo and other anomalies that
suggest container contents do not match reported manifest data. If an officer detects an abnormality, containers
may be “cracked open” for a physical examination. Scanning may also refer to radiation detection.
•
Radiation detection: An analysis of container contents based on radiation portal monitors, handheld radiation
detection monitors, and/or other radiation detection technology to detect nuclear material that may be part of a
nuclear weapon or dirty bomb.
•
Examination: A physical examination of container contents (requires that the container be opened and, in
some cases, unpacked).
•
Primary inspection: A review of entry documents to determine whether cargo may be admissible to the
United States.
•
Secondary inspection: A review of container contents to confirm that cargo is admissible to the United
States. Secondary inspections may include NII scanning and/or a physical examination of container contents.
•
Liquidation: The final assessment of import-related taxes and fees; typically occurs a year or more after cargo
enters the United States.
Source: CRS analysis of the SAFE Port Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-347) and CBP briefing materials.
65 Sec. 231 of P.L. 109-347; 6 U.S.C. 981.
66 Sec. 232 of P.L. 109-347; 6 U.S.C. 982.
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Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
(P.L. 110-53)
The 9/11 Act of 2007 included two provisions with respect to the import process. Section 1602 of
the 9/11 Act required, by August 3, 2010, that 100% of air cargo bound for the United States or
traveling within the United States be subject to scanning or inspection commensurate with
standards established for passenger checked baggage.67
Section 1701 of the 9/11 Act amended the SAFE Port Act to require by July 1, 2012, that 100% of
maritime containers imported to the United States—that is, whether or not they are identified as
high-risk during the ATS screening process—be scanned by NII and radiation detection
equipment before being loaded onto a vessel in a foreign port. The act authorized the secretary of
DHS to extend the deadline by two years, and in additional two-year increments, by certifying
that scanning systems are not available, are insufficiently accurate, cannot be installed, cannot be
integrated with existing systems, will significantly impact trade and the flow of cargo, and/or do
not provide adequate notification of questionable or high-risk cargo (see “100% Scanning
Requirement”).68
The Import Process
Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) as amended in 2003, CBP is the lead
agency charged with enforcing the trade laws under the Mod Act and the security measures under
the MTSA, the SAFE Port Act, and the other post-9/11 laws. CBP’s trade strategy emphasizes
risk management, which means that CBP collects information about shippers, importers, and
cargo to evaluate cargo for potential import security and trade enforcement risks, and focuses
enforcement efforts primarily on cargo and shippers identified as relatively high risk.69
Conversely, those deemed lower-risk imports (including, e.g., shipments of “trusted traders”) are
less likely to be targeted for CBP enforcement and may be eligible for expedited processing—
thus advancing CBP’s trade facilitation goal and freeing up resources for targeting higher-risk
imports.
CBP’s trade strategy also emphasizes layered enforcement, meaning that risk assessment and risk-
based enforcement happen at a number of different points in the import process, beginning well
before cargo arrives at a U.S. port of entry, and continuing long after cargo has been formally
admitted to the United States. CBP attempts to target high-risk flows as early as possible in the
import process, but its ability to conduct enforcement activities at different stages of the import
process is designed to create multiple opportunities to interdict illegal imports.
The import process includes three main stages, as illustrated in Figure 1. First, prior to entry at a
U.S. POE, importers and carriers file paperwork and provide advance electronic cargo
information, and all imports are subject to risk-based screening. Based on the results of this
screening, certain goods are subject to import security scanning and inspection in foreign ports
67 Sec. 1602 of P.L. 110-53; 49 U.S.C. 44901, as amended. On air cargo security, see CRS Report R41515, Screening
and Securing Air Cargo: Background and Issues for Congress, by Bart Elias.
68 Sec. 1701 of P.L. 110-53; 6 U.S.C. 982(b) as amended. The Secretary must certify to Congress that at least two of
these conditions exist in order to extend the 100% scanning deadline.
69 See U.S. CBP, CBP Trade Strategy: Fiscal Years 2009-2013, Washington, DC, 2009.
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and/or upon arrival at a U.S. port. Second, importers file “entry documents” when cargo reaches a
U.S. port, and cargo may be subject to additional scanning and inspection for import security and
trade enforcement purposes. Admissible cargo is released from the port, and importers file an
additional set of “entry summary” documents, which CBP uses to calculate customs duties and to
make an initial assessment of taxes, fees, and duties owed. Third, following cargo entry, importers
may challenge the assessment for up to a year, or longer under certain circumstances, until the
final assessment of taxes and fees, a process known as liquidation. Trade enforcement activities
may continue through audits and other post-entry investigations.
Figure 1. The U.S. Import Process
Source: CRS presentation of information provided by CBP.
Notes: Import security includes screening, scanning, and inspections to detect chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, il egal drugs, and other contraband; trade enforcement includes screening,
scanning and inspections to detect trademark and copyright violations, unsafe products, and illegal agricultural
products, and to ensure proper collection of tariffs, fees, and anti-dumping and countervailing duties (AD/CVD).
Pre-Entry: Advanced Cargo Screening, Scanning, and Inspections
The import process begins well before cargo arrives at a U.S. port of entry (POE). During the pre-
entry stage of the import process, importers of record submit electronic cargo manifests and other
shipment data to CBP. This information may be submitted through CBP’s Automated Customs
System or its Automated Customs Environment (see “Text Box: CBP’s Data Management
Systems”). CBP uses this advanced filing data to pre-clear cargo for admission, facilitate inflows,
and target certain cargo for import security and trade enforcement. Cargo may be subject to
import security scanning and inspections in foreign ports prior to being loaded on U.S.-bound
ships and/or upon arrival at a U.S. port of entry (POE).
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CBP’s Data Management Systems
Each stage of the import process involves an ongoing exchange of information between CBP and importers. CBP
manages two systems for tracking this information and for managing the col ection of import duties and other trade-
related fees: the Automated Commercial System (ACS) and the Automated Commercial Environment
(ACE). Both of these systems serve as data management systems for CBP and as contact points for trade partners to
submit electronic data to CBP, to receive information about the status of their shipments, and to make payments and
manage customs accounts.
The ACS began operating in 1984 and relies on mainframe computer hardware and software that are considered at
least a generation out of date, factors which reportedly limit ACS functionality and reliability. The U.S. Customs
Service created ACE in 2001 to begin replacing ACS, a transition known as “customs modernization.” The challenge
in the customs modernization process is to create a new data management system that meets all of CBP’s trade
enforcement and import security needs, while supporting a streamlined import process for legitimate importers, and
to test and implement the new system without disrupting trade flows during the transition period.
To this end, CBP has initiated ACE as a series of modules that encompass discrete phases of the import process. In
general, as new ACE modules are introduced, importers initially are permitted to use either ACS or ACE for the
affected task; and once the new ACE component has been tested and proven effective, importers are required to use
the ACE components as certain ACS functions are disabled. CBP’s eventual goal is to eliminate the ACS, and for ACE
to provide a single point-of-access and data management system covering the entire trade process for al U.S.
importers.
According to CBP’s office of legislative affairs, importers, brokers, and carriers had established about 20,600 ACE
trade user accounts as of July 2012; and more than 68% of import duties and fees are col ected through ACE monthly
statements. Trade users may use their ACE accounts to pay duties and fees and to generate 125 downloadable and
customized reports. As of March 2012, electronic manifest data for truck, rail, and ocean shipments may be filed
through ACE at al U.S. POEs. Air and multi-modal integration is anticipated, but not yet planned. On September 29,
2012, ACE became the only CBP-approved Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) for submitting rail and sea manifests.
Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Automated Commercial Environment/International Trade Data
System (ACE/ITDS) “ACEopedia”, October 2012, see also 77 Federal Register 19030-19032, March 29, 2012.
Trusted Trader Programs
One of CBP’s primary tools for risk management is the use of trusted trader programs, including
the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), which was established in November
2001, after the 9/11 attacks, and subsequently authorized as part of the SAFE Port Act of 2006
(see “Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-347)”). Trusted
trader programs are voluntary public-private partnership programs that permit certain import-
related businesses to register with CBP, follow instructions prescribed by the agency to secure
their supply chains, and thereby become recognized as low-risk actors and become eligible for
expedited processing and other benefits. These programs are described in greater detail in the text
box below.
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CBP Trusted Trader Programs
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
•
C-TPAT is open to U.S. importers, customs brokers, port and terminal operators; Mexican and Canadian
manufacturers and certain other foreign manufacturers; rail, sea, air, and truck carriers; and U.S. consolidators
and certain other logistics providers.
•
Businesses may apply to join C-TPAT by filling out an on-line application and submitting a supply chain security
profile that meets or exceeds minimum standards established by CBP. The security profile includes a narrative
description of measures in place to ensure the security of cargo at all stages of the company’s supply chain,
including procurement, production, packing, storage, loading, and transportation of goods for import. CBP
reviews profiles within 90 days and reviews company compliance histories. Upon a favorable review, the
company is certified as a Tier I C-TPAT partner.
•
Within one year of a C-TPAT partner being certified, CBP conducts a physical examination of the company’s
supply chain to validate that the security measures described in the profile are in place. Companies that meet
minimum security criteria are validated as Tier II C-TPAT partners, and companies that show a sustained
commitment beyond minimal security expectations are validated as Tier III partners.
•
Membership in C-TPAT reduces an importer’s ATS risk score, with greater reductions for Tier II and Tier III
members. C-TPAT members are less likely than non-members to be selected for security or trade related
scanning.
•
Certified C-TPAT members are also eligible for expedited processing at POEs and for expedited treatment when
containers are selected for scanning or inspection. C-TPAT permits stratified exams, so that if an entry with
multiple line items is selected for secondary inspection, only the selected container(s) are detained for
inspection, minimizing importers’ storage costs. (For non-C-TPAT members, multiple containers may be delayed
when a single container must be examined.) CBP’s business-resumption plans also cal for C-TPAT members to
have front-of-the-line privileges in the event of a future port closure.
•
As of August 2012, over 10,300 trade partners were certified as C-TPAT members, according to CBP.
Free and Secure Trade System (FAST)
•
FAST is open to commercial truck drivers who have completed background checks and fulfill eligibility
requirements and whose imports have supply chains that are fully C-TPAT certified.
•
FAST members are eligible to use dedicated FAST lanes at certain land POEs. FAST lanes generally have shorter
wait times and faster processing.
•
As of 2011, more than 78,000 commercial drivers were enrol ed in the FAST program, and 34 FAST lanes were
in operation, evenly divided between the Northern and Southwest borders. About 20% of truck cargo entering
the United States in 2011 passed through FAST lanes (1.5 million out of 7.4 million containers), according to data
provided to CRS by CBP.
Importer Self-Assessment Program (ISA)
•
The ISA is open to C-TPAT members who are residents of the United States, have a two-year import history,
and are known importers that have businesses physical y established, located, and managed within the United
States.
•
Importers must demonstrate a willingness to maintain an ongoing, mutually beneficial trade relationship with
CBP, the ability to manage and monitor their ongoing compliance with trade laws through self-assessment, and
the willingness to demonstrate an ongoing compliance through internal controls and annual risk assessments.
•
Accepted ISA importers are assigned a National Account Manager who serves as a liaison between CBP and the
importer, and identifies and resolves issues through consultation.
•
ISA members receive guidance from CBP upon request and are exempted from the comprehensive audit pool
known as Focused Assessment Audit (single issue audits may be conducted to address specific concerns).
•
As of March 13, 2013, CBP reports that 257 companies participate in the Importer Self-Assessment Program,
accounting for 24% of U.S. imports by value.
Mutual Recognition Arrangements
•
As of August 1, 2012, CBP has established mutual recognition arrangements with Canada, the European Union,
Japan, Jordan, Korea, and New Zealand; the arrangements allow C-TPAT members and trusted traders in the
partner countries to receive similar benefits in the United States and the partner countries.
Sources: CBP Office of Legislative Affairs, CBP, “C-TPAT Overview,” “C-TPAT: A Guide to Program Benefits,”
“FAST Fact Sheet,” and “Importer Self-Assessment Program.”
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Advance Electronic Cargo Information
Under the Trade Act of 2002, as amended, importers and carriers seeking to import goods to the
United States must provide DHS with electronic manifest and other data prior to arrival in U.S.
ports. Carriers are required to provide names and addresses of shippers and consignees, detailed
descriptions of the goods being imported, information about the carrier, and information about the
day, time, and port of arrival. Specific filing requirements differ by mode of entry (truck, rail,
maritime, or air) and in some cases by country of origin (see text box below).
Deadlines for Submission of Electronic
Manifests and Other Shipping Data
Air Cargo (North America, Caribbean, Central America, and South America north of equator): Prior to aircraft
departure bound for the United States (wheels up)
Air Cargo (Other countries of origin): 4 hours prior to arrival
Rail Cargo: 2 hours prior to arrival
Truck Cargo: 1 hour prior to arrival, or 30 minutes prior to arrival for C-TPAT members
Maritime Cargo: Importer data due 24 hours before cargo is loaded on vessel bound for the United States; carrier
data due 24 hours prior to loading in a foreign port for containerized and break-bulk cargo or 24 hours prior to
arrival at the first U.S. port for bulk cargo, with updates as they occur.
Source: 19 C.F.R. §§ 4, 122-123.
Maritime Cargo: 10 + 2 Importer Security Filing
Maritime cargo is subject to additional reporting requirements under Section 203 of the SAFE
Ports Act and an interim final rule published by CBP on November 25, 2008.70 Under the rule,
maritime vessels must submit Importer Security Filings (ISF) and Additional Carrier
Requirements known collectively as “10 + 2” filings—so-called because they include ten data
elements to be submitted by importers of record, plus two data elements to be submitted by
carriers. The ten71 data elements supplied by importers are:
1. importer of record number;
2. consignee number;
3. seller name and address;
4. buyer name and address;
5. ship-to party name and address;
6. manufacturer (supplier) name and address;
7. country of origin;
8. Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) 6-digit classification;
70 P.L. 109-347 §203; 19 C.F.R. §§4.7 – 4.7d; also see 73 Federal Register 71730.
71 Ten data elements are required for all maritime cargo destined for U.S. entry. If cargo is transiting through the United
States, only five elements are required: booking party name/address; ship to party; harmonized tariff schedule (HTS)
classification; foreign port of unlading; and place of delivery.
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9. container stuffing location, and
10. consolidator (stuffer) name and address.
The two data elements provided by carriers are:
1. the vessel stow plan; and
2. daily messages with information about any changes in container status.72
The first eight importer data elements must be provided 24 hours prior to lading of the
goods on a vessel. Information on the stuffing location and the consolidator must be filed
as soon as possible, but no later than 24 hours before arrival in the United States.
Regarding the carrier data, the vessel stow plan must be provided no later than 48 hours
after departure, and container status messages must begin within 24 hours of creation or
receipt of the container.
Automated Targeting System
Electronic manifests and other advanced data elements (including the 10+2 data elements
mentioned above) are forwarded to CBP’s Automated Targeting System (ATS). CBP officers
screen imports by comparing cargo and conveyance information against intelligence from CBP’s
National Targeting Center (NTC) and other intelligence and law enforcement databases. The ATS
assigns every incoming container a risk-based score related to weapons of mass destruction,
narcotics and other contraband, as well as for the potential for commercial fraud, and other
customs violations.73 The rule-sets for assigning risk scores are designed to identify suspicious
activity or behavior and are updated on an ongoing basis in response to changes in intelligence
and previous enforcement records.
Import Security Scanning and Inspections Abroad
The SAFE Port Act of 2006 authorizes a pair of programs to conduct radiation detection and NII
scanning in foreign ports: the Secure Freight Initiative and the Container Security Initiative.
Secure Freight Initiative (SFI)
The Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) is a pilot program to test CBP’s ability, working with
international partners, to conduct radiation detection and NII scanning of 100% of cargo
containers being loaded on U.S.-bound ships in certain ports. The SFI employs an integrated
scanning system consisting of radiation portal monitors (provided by the Department of Energy)
and NII imaging systems (provided by CBP) in a single location. CBP officers review the
72 U.S.CBP, “Fact Sheet: New Cargo Security Requirements for Maritime Carriers and Importers,” November 24,
2008. Also see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Supply Chain Security: CBP Has Made Progress in Assisting
the Trade Industry in Implementing the New Importer Security Filing Requirements, but Some Challenges Remain,
GAO-10-841, September 2010, http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/311023.pdf.
73 The ATS includes modules for inbound cargo and conveyances; outbound cargo and conveyances; air, ship, and rail
passengers; private vehicle land passengers; international cargo outside the United States; and a trend analytic module.
Only the inbound cargo and conveyance module is discussed in this report, though some features of the ATS are
common to more than one module.
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scanning data to determine which containers should be subject to secondary inspections.
Secondary inspections, when called for, are conducted by host-state law enforcement agencies.
Beginning in 2007, as required by the SAFE Port Act, the program operated in three foreign
ports: Port Qasim in Pakistan, Puerto Cortes in Honduras, and Southampton in the United
Kingdom. The pilot was also subsequently implemented on a limited basis in the larger ports of
Port Salalah in Oman, Port Busan in South Korea, and Singapore. Following DHS’s evaluation of
the program, however, the program was scaled back and currently operates only in Port Qasim.74
Container Security Initiative (CSI)
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is a partnership program among CBP, ICE, and law
enforcement agencies in CSI countries. Under the program, CBP officers and other federal agents
at the National Targeting Center–Cargo (NTC-C) in Herndon, Virginia review advanced cargo
data and identify high-risk containers. High-risk containers are targeted for radiation detection
and NII scanning within CSI ports. Host state law enforcement agents typically conduct physical
scans in the foreign ports, and CBP personnel located in the port or in the United States evaluate
the scan results. When an abnormality is detected, host state law enforcement agents conduct a
physical inspection before the container is loaded on a U.S.-bound ship. CBP officers and ICE
agents participate in such inspections either remotely or as partners within foreign ports.
As of August 2012, the CSI was operational in 58 ports in 30 countries; these ports account for
about 80% of incoming cargo flows. About 1% of all cargo passing through CSI ports bound for
the United States is scanned using radiation detection technology and NII scanning prior to being
shipped to the United States (also see “100% Scanning Requirement”).75
Import Processing At Ports of Entry
Imported goods are not legally entered until after the shipment has arrived within the port of
entry, entry of the merchandise has been authorized by CBP, and all estimated duties have been
paid.76 The importer of record (i.e., the owner, purchaser, or a licensed customs broker) has the
option to enter goods for consumption, enter for warehouse at the port of entry, or for
transportation in-bond to another port of entry for processing.
If goods are being entered for consumption (e.g., going directly into U.S. commerce) importers
are typically required to file entry documents within 15 calendar days of a shipment arriving at a
U.S. port of entry. These documents may include an entry manifest or other form of merchandise
release, evidence of the right to make entry, commercial invoices, packing lists, and other
documents necessary to determine admissibility. Since most cargo is released electronically,
however, packing lists and invoices are rarely requested.
74 U.S. CBP, Report to Congress on Integrated Scanning System Pilots (Security and Accountability for Every Port Act
of 2006, Section 231). Also see DHS, Congressional Budget Justification – CBP Salaries and Expenses, FY2013, p. 48.
75 CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, August 23, 2012.
76 U.S. CBP, Importing into the United States: A Guide for Commercial Importers, updated May 2011,
http://www.cbp.gov/.
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Importers also must provide evidence that a bond has been posted with CBP to cover estimated
duties, taxes, and charges that may accrue. If the goods are to be released from CBP custody, an
entry summary must be filed and estimated duties deposited at the port within 10 days of the
entry of the merchandise.
Based on screening of the cargo and a review of the entry documents, CBP officers at the port
make a preliminary determination about cargo admissibility and either release or challenge the
shipment. For cargo that is challenged, importers may be required to provide additional
documents or take other steps to prove admissibility.
Import Security and Trade Enforcement at U.S. Ports
Radiation Scanning
The SAFE Port Act77 requires that 100% of cargo containers passing through U.S. POEs be
scanned for radioactive material prior to being released from the port. Containers typically pass
through drive-through portals at about five miles per hour, and radiation detection requires a few
seconds per container, apart from congestion.78 Portals are often placed at natural choke-points,
including near port exits or entrances to facilitate 100% radiation scanning. A radiation alarm may
be triggered by naturally occurring radiation found in granite and other stone or by radioactive
medical or scientific materials. When radiation is detected, further tests are conducted, including
more sophisticated scanning or physical inspection, to match the radioactive profile detected
against known radioactive materials in the shipment, or to identify and remove illegal radioactive
material.
As of August 2012, CBP reported that 100% of containerized cargo entering through Northern
and Southwest border land ports and 99.8% of containerized sea cargo is scanned through
radiation portal monitors (RPMs).79 According to a 2012 GAO report, however, radiation
scanning of international rail cargo mainly is conducted with less powerful portable, hand-held
scanners; and scanning may only be triggered when NII scanning indicate a cause for alarm.80
Another GAO report found that CBP’s radiation portal monitors may not detect certain nuclear
materials when they are lightly shielded, and that such shielding may not be detected in the
absence of NII scanning.81 GAO also has identified problems with the acquisition of RPMs by
CBP and by DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.82
77 Sec. 121 of P.L. 109-347; 6 U.S.C. 921.
78 Maritime containers may be scanned prior to being loaded onto U.S.-bound ships, and are also scanned after being
removed from a cargo ship onto a truck or train, but before exiting a U.S. POE.
79 CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, August 23, 2012.
80 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Combatting Nuclear Smuggling; DHS Has Developed Plans for Its Global
Nuclear Architecture, but Challenges Remain in Deploying Equipment, GAO-12-941T, July 26, 2012, p. 5,
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593027.pdf.
81 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Supply Chain Security: Container Security Programs Have Matured, but
Uncertainty Persists over the Future of 100 Percent Scanning, GAO-12-422T, February 7, 2012, pp. 10-12,
http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588253.pdf. See also CRS Report R40154, Detection of Nuclear Weapons and
Materials: Science, Technologies, Observations, by Jonathan Medalia, for a more comprehensive discussion of nuclear
detection technologies.
82 Ibid; see also U.S. Government Accountability Office, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Inadequate Communication
and Oversight Hampered DHS Efforts to Develop an Advanced Radiography System to Detect Nuclear Materials,
(continued...)
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Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) and Secondary Inspections in U.S. Ports
Within each port, officers in CBP’s Advanced Targeting Unit use the ATS to select containers at a
high risk for weapons of mass destruction, drugs, or other contraband for NII scanning.
Containers with risk scores above a certain threshold are automatically selected for such scans,
and officers also may select additional containers for NII scanning and/or physical inspection.
Table 1 lists the number of rail, truck, and maritime cargo containers inspected by CBP between
FY2005-FY2011 (i.e., the total number processed for admission), and the number subject to
secondary inspection, including NII scanning, physical inspection, or both.
Table 1. Primary and Secondary Inspections of U.S. Containerized Imports,
FY2005-FY2011
Number of Cargo Containers
Fiscal
year
Rail Truck
Maritime
Primary
Secondary % Primary
Secondary % Primary
Secondary %
2005 2,658,764 2,090,687 79 11,323,070 2,641,877 23 11,342,493 569,308 5
2006 2,735,335 2,277,447 83 11,593,554 2,771,266 24 11,621,658 578,628 5
2007 2,737,149 2,444,479 89 11,250,482 2,843,730 25 11,702,610 441,414 4
2008 2,747,259 2,499,399 91 11,012,928 2,773,995 25 11,357,442 354,908 3
2009 2,178,604 2,017,851 93 9,237,649 2,794,256 30 9,854,337
447,616 5
2010 2,430,873 2,305,656 95 10,002,606 3,279,851 33 11,116,791 489,340 4
2011 2,636,781 2,519,856 96 10,114,167 3,130,647 30 11,515,475 475,569 4
Total 18,124,765 16,155,375 89 74,534,456 20,235,622 27 78,510,806 3,356,783 4
Source: CBP Office of Legislative Affairs, August 23, 2012.
Notes: Data include inspections of empty and full containers. Secondary inspection includes non-intrusive
imaging (NII) scanning and/or opening a cargo container for physical inspection.
As Table 1 indicates, the great majority of cargo containers between FY2005 and FY2011 entered
by ship (about 79 million out of 171 million containers, or 46%) or by truck (about 75 million, or
44%), with the remainder entering by rail (about 18 million, or 10%). Secondary inspection rates
vary greatly by mode of entry, with 89% of all rail containers being scanned or inspected, versus
27% of truck-mounted containers, and 4% of maritime containers. Overall, about 25% of all
incoming containers (6.1 million out of 24.3 million) were subject to secondary inspection in
FY2011.
The different NII scanning percentages may reflect differences in port infrastructure and the
shipping process, among other factors. While land ports are naturally structured as choke points
with a relatively limited number of trucking or rail lanes, sea ports are larger facilities, and
containers from any given ship may flow in multiple directions before being placed on another
ship, rail, or truck conveyance. Truck and rail cargo also may be more regular than maritime
cargo (i.e., one type of good per container), whereas maritime containers may be more likely to
(...continued)
GAO-10-1041T, September 15, 2010.
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include multiple shipments bundled into a single container, making NII scanning more time
consuming. The flow of maritime shipping is also less regular than land-based modes. Whereas
truck and rail traffic arrives in a relatively steady stream at ports of entry, maritime cargo arrives
in surges, with each incoming ship containing hundreds or thousands of containers that must
quickly be processed.
Some Members have expressed frustration that most cargo is not scanned before entering the
United States, including the great majority of maritime cargo. On the other hand, while NII scans
take less than one minute per container, evaluating NII images and comparing them to declared
manifests is a labor-intensive process that may involve multiple officers and may require up to
several minutes per container, depending on the complexity of the cargo. Thus, to substantially
increase the proportion of cargo scanned likely would be resource-intensive, and could slow the
flow of goods in and out of the United States. Moreover, CBP estimates that the overwhelming
majority of cargo entries are lawful,83 so that increased scanning may be of limited practical
benefit (also see “100% Scanning Requirement”).
Trade Enforcement Inspections
CBP trade specialists at POEs also target certain containers for trade enforcement inspections
based on ATS risk scores along with other intelligence and local enforcement considerations.
Goods may be selected for trade enforcement examinations related to concerns about product
safety, intellectual property violations (copyright or trademark infringement), counterfeit goods,
labeling violations, or anti-dumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) circumvention, among
other considerations. Trade enforcement inspections ensure that goods are correctly classified and
accurately weighed for duty assessment, and administrative corrections are made as necessary.
Trade specialists also look for evidence of trade-related fraud (e.g., false rules of origin labeling
or valuation of merchandise), which may trigger an investigation by CBP trade specialists, ICE
investigators, or other federal agents.
Trade enforcement examinations can be a time-consuming procedure, especially in the case of
containers with diverse contents, as CBP officers must physically unpack the container and
examine all of its contents or a sample of contents. In some cases, such as when containers
include certain food, plant, or animal products, CBP officers may be required to bring in
representatives from other federal agencies (e.g., the U.S. Department of Agriculture) to assist
with examinations and to determine whether or not a good may be admitted or how it should be
classified. Importers are responsible for covering any storage and transportation costs associated
with trade enforcement examinations, which may occur outside the port at a centralized
examination station. As noted, one benefit of C-TPAT membership is that large shipments subject
to secondary inspection may be eligible for stratified exams, minimizing storage costs in these
cases (see “Text Box: CBP Trusted Trader Programs”).
83 CBP projected the trade compliance rate (measured against transactional discrepancies) to be 98.9% in FY2012, and
the compliance rate averaged 98.0% for FY2006-FY2012; see U.S. CBP, Import Trade Trends: FY2011 Year End
Report, Washington, DC 2012, p. 17. Similarly, CBP’s audit of travelers at ports of entry found that about 99% of
travelers at air and land ports in FY2006 were in compliance with all relevant rules, laws, and regulations; see GAO,
Border security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry, GAO-08-
219, November 2007, p. 47. And in FY2007-FY2010, CBP’s Office of Field Operations made a total of 168,504 drug
seizures at ports of entry—a figure which amounts to less than 0.2% of all cargo entries, and less than 0.01% of all
cargo and travelers entering through POEs; see DHS Office of Inspector General, CBP’s Efficacy of Controls Over
Drugs Seizures, OIG-11-57, March 2011, p. 3.
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As Table 2 indicates, about 2% (3.2 million out of 140.5 million) of all cargo containers seeking
admission to the United States were physically examined at a POE in FY2005-FY2012; and
slightly less than half (1.5 million out of 3.2 million) of physical examinations were trade-related
(as opposed to security-related). These examinations resulted in a total of 157,905 trade-related
seizures during this period, meaning that seizures occurred in about 10% of examined containers.
Most seizures were related to intellectual property violations (122,355 cases; 77% of trade-related
seizures) and import safety violations (24,503 cases; 16% of trade-related seizures).
Table 2. Trade Enforcement at U.S. Ports, FY2005-FY2012
Number of Cargo Containers
Fiscal
Primary
Examinations Trade-Related
Seizures
Year
Inspections
Trade-
Intellectual
Import
Total
Related
Total
Property
Safety
2005 25,324,327
473,726
100,350
12,476
8,022
NA
2006 25,950,547
515,740
201,000
17,600
14,700
1,000
2007 25,690,241
400,805
219,064
17,195
13,656
1,296
2008 25,117,629
404,497
228,445
18,421
14,992
2,677
2009 21,270,590
376,256
178,204
19,218
14,839
2,744
2010 23,550,270
393,106
199,461
23,687
19,962
4,477
2011 24,266,423
384,226
200,916
30,911
24,823
6,607
2012
NA
228,015
194,121
18,397
11,361
5,702
Total 171,170,027 3,176,371
1,521,561 157,905 122,355
24,503
Source: CBP Office of Legislative Affairs March 2, 2012 and May 17, 2012.
Notes: 2012 data are as of March 31, 2012. Total inspections include the total number of loaded truck, rail, and
maritime cargo containers inspected. Examinations include cases in which cargo containers were opened and
their contents physically inspected.
Cargo Release
Cargo that is found to be admissible and cleared through security and trade enforcement
inspections is formally released into the United States. In these cases, importers must file
additional entry summary documentation within 10 days to provide detailed information about the
shipment (including customs classification, weight, and duty rates) that CBP will use to determine
that all import requirements have been satisfied.84 Importers must pay storage and transportation
costs during the cargo release period, and must pay initial customs duties and fees assessed prior
to taking possession of imported goods.
84 In certain cases, including certain produce and other merchandise from Mexico and Canada, shipments consigned to
the U.S. government, and articles for a trade fair, shipments may be delivered immediately to the consignee, rather than
being held between formal entry and delivery as in the standard procedure described above. In these cases, importers
file entry documents and entry summary documents and pay estimated duties at the same time within 10 working days
of the cargo’s release.
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Trade Facilitation
Several CBP programs are in place that are designed to facilitate lawful trade during and after the
entry process, including CBP “Simplified Entry” process, its Centers of Excellence and Expertise
(CEE), and the in-bond transportation system. These programs are discussed in this section.
Simplified Entry
In April 2011, CBP established a joint industry-CBP working group to establish a simplified entry
process intended to reduce the administrative burden for importers, while providing the necessary
documentation needed by CBP officials to do their jobs of identifying risks and collecting tariffs,
taxes, and fees. The “Simplified Entry” process proposes to reduce the number of duplicative data
elements required to obtain release of products for cargo. The process allows filers to submit a
streamlined data submission of 12 required and three optional data elements. These data may be
filed early in the import process to allow an expanded window of opportunity to identify potential
risks. Filers may also update entry information throughout the import process to provide CBP
more accurate data.85
In December 2011, CPB began a simplified entry pilot program for air cargo, CBP selected 9
customs brokers (out of 40 applicants) operating out of three POEs (Chicago, Atlanta, and the
Indianapolis Express Consignment Operation). As of August 10, 2012, 7,914 simplified entries
had been filed; and on August 15, 2012, CBP announced plans to expand the simplified entry
pilot to at least ten additional airports and to additional importer participants.86
Centers of Excellence and Expertise
To facilitate post-entry processing, CBP has launched four Centers of Excellence and Expertise
(CEEs or Centers) since October 2011 to serve as industry-specific single points of post-entry
processing for certain businesses enrolled in the C-TPAT and ISA trusted trader programs.87 The
Centers are designed as “one-stop shops” to align customs practices with the demands of modern
business and to facilitate trade in the targeted industries. CBP integrated staff in the Centers
process entry summaries, post-entry amendment and correction reviews, protests, and other
administrative work.88
The four CEEs currently operating are:
85 U.S. CBP, Simplified Entry Overview, May 2012, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/trade_transformation/
simplified_entry/. For trade facilitation initiatives, see also meeting announcements of the Advisory Committee on
Commercial Operations of Customs and Border Protection (COAC), 76 Federal Register, 17143, 76 Federal Register
46312, and 76 Federal Register 58030.
86 In addition to the three original airports, the pilot was expanded to Seattle, San Francisco, Oakland, Los Angeles,
Dallas/Ft. Worth, Houston, Miami, JFK, Newark and Boston; and in November it was expanded to Detroit, Memphis,
and Anchorage. See U.S. CBP, “Acting Commissioner Announces Expansion of Simplified Entry/Cargo Release
Pilot,” press release, October 24, 2012.
87 The first two CEEs began as pilot programs in November 2010 when CBP established an Information Technology
and Consumer Electronics CEE in Los Angeles and a Pharmaceuticals, Health and Chemicals CEE in New York. After
evaluation, these CEEs were established permanently in October 2011. On May 10, 2012, CBP announced the creation
of two additional Centers: Automotive and Aerospace in Detroit, and Petroleum, Natural Gas, and Minerals in Houston.
88 U.S. CBP website, Centers of Excellence and Expertise, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/trade_transformation/
industry_int/.
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• Electronics in Los Angeles;
• Pharmaceuticals, Health and Chemicals in New York;
• Automotive and Aerospace in Detroit; and
• Petroleum, Natural Gas, and Minerals in Houston.
The Centers were designed so that the industries would receive fewer cargo delays, reduce costs,
and enjoy greater predictability, while CBP would be able to shift its emphasis at the ports of
entry to address higher-risk shipments and focus on trade enforcement issues. On a similar track,
an Account Executive (AE) pilot was established to work with selected trusted partners in the
electronics industry. At the end of these pilots, the two concepts were combined. The Centers also
support improved information sharing between industry representatives and CBP staff to lead to
more focused trade enforcement efforts.89
In November 2012, CBP announced that six new CEEs would be established in 2013. These are:
• Agriculture and Prepared Products in Miami;
• Apparel, Footwear, and Textiles in San Francisco;
• Base Metals in Chicago;
• Consumer Products and Mass Merchandising in Atlanta;
• Industrial and Manufacturing Materials in Buffalo; and
• Machinery in Laredo.90
In-bond Transportation
In-bond transportation facilitates the efficient flow of goods trade into the United States by
allowing imported merchandise to arrive at one U.S. POE and be transported by a bonded carrier
to another U.S. POE, where it officially enters into U.S. commerce (duties are paid upon entry), is
exported out of the United States (duty payment is not required), enters a bonded warehouse
(duties are paid upon release), or is brought into a free trade zone for further processing (duties
are paid on the finished product upon entry).91 According to CBP, the four field offices that
process the most in-bond shipments are Los Angeles, New York, Miami, and Seattle.
Many in the trade community value the flexibility provided by the in-bond system as a way to
avoid congestion and delays at U.S. seaports, but a 2007 GAO report raised concerns that CBP
collects little information on in-bond shipments, does not know exactly how often the system was
used, and performs limited analysis on in-bond flows. 92 As a result, CBP is reportedly unable to
89 U.S. CBP website, Trade Intelligence, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/trade_transformation/trade_intell/
90 “CBP Announces Six New Centers of Excellence and Expertise,” CBP Press Release, November 28, 2012.
91 See also CRS Report R42686, U.S. Foreign-Trade Zones: Background and Issues for Congress, by Mary Jane Bolle
and Brock R. Williams.
92 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Persistent Weaknesses in the In Bond Cargo System in Peak Customs and
Border Protection’s Ability to Address Revenue, Trade, and Security Concerns, GAO-07-561, April 2007, p. 12,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-561. In-bond shipments are allowed by various amendments to the Tariff Act of
1930, including 19 U.S.C. § 1552-1553. Regulations are found in 19 C.F. R. parts 18, 122, and 123.
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identify systemic risks that could lead to revenue losses or to implement appropriate compliance
measures to mitigate such risks. 93 GAO also found that many in-bound cargo shipments remained
unreconciled, and that regulatory flexibility that benefited the trade community created challenges
for CBP’s efforts to track in-bond shipments.94 Some in the trade community have also
commented that vulnerabilities in the in-bond system may allow the entry of contraband goods,
such as illegal apparel shipments or goods that violate international property rights laws.95
On February 22, 2012, CPB proposed regulatory changes to the in-bond process. Among other
things, the proposed changes would require electronic filing of in-bond applications, that
applications contain 6-digit Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) classification of all in-bond
merchandise, a 30-day maximum arrival time for all in-bond shipments (except for pipelines),
and the disclosure of any information relevant to the safety and security of the shipment.96 As of
this writing, CBP had not made any announcements regarding the adoption or implementation of
these proposed rules.
Post-Entry: Continued Trade Enforcement
CBP responsibilities do not end when a product has entered the United States. Importers have up
to 180 days from the date of liquidation to challenge CBP’s assessment of duties owed, after
which CBP makes a final determination of the rate and amount of duty owed, a process known as
liquidation, and importers pay additional duties or receive refunds to reconcile any differences
between estimated and final duties owed.97 CBP trade specialists and other federal agencies
involved in trade enforcement may conduct additional trade enforcement activities in the period
after cargo enters the United States, including audits of importers’ records to ensure compliance
with U.S. trade laws.
CBP’s trade enforcement efforts focus on five priority trade issues (PTIs), or “high risk areas that
can cause significant revenue loss, hurt the U.S. economy, or threaten the health and safety of the
American people.”98 The five issues are: antidumping and countervailing duties; import safety;
intellectual property rights;; textiles; and trade agreements.99 According to CBP, these PTIs serve
as the core of CBP’s trade enforcement strategy, and CBP focuses considerable resources and
personnel on them. CBP’s Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2011 reported
gains in identifying “threats, challenges, and vulnerabilities in each step” of the duty collection
process, and in targeting textile and apparel manufacturers overseas whose trade preference
claims could not be substantiated. In addition, a new “non-textile” PTI was implemented in
FY2011 for goods other than textiles and apparel, and CPB announced that it was increasing its
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid. These regulations, for example, allow 15 to 60 days for the in-bond cargo to reach its destination, depending on
mode of transportation, and allow the ultimate destination of the shipment to be changed in transport (19 CFR § 18.2
and 18.5).
95 James Giermanski, “In-bond Shipments: The Trojan Horse,” Journal of Commerce, March 9, 2008.
96 U.S. CBP, “Changes to the In-Bond Process,” 77 Federal Register 10622, February 22, 2012. On July 26, 2012, CBP
issued a correction to the notice, after officials noted that the complete Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA)
was not posted on the regulations.gov website. CBP subsequently posted the IRFA, and requested comments prior to
August 27, 2012; see 77 Federal Register 43740.
97 See 19 C.F.R. § 174, 19 U.S.C. 1514 (c)(3) as amended.
98 U.S. CBP website, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/priority_trade/.
99 Ibid.
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work with domestic and international stakeholders to “identify areas of significant non-
compliance and develop an appropriate enforcement plan to address these risks.”100
Liquidation
Liquidation is “the final computation or ascertainment of duties on entries for consumption or
drawback entries.”101 In most cases, the liquidation must take place within one year of the
merchandise entry, but may be extended if: (1) CBP does not have the proper documentation for
proper appraisement, classification, or to ensure compliance with trade laws; or (2) the importer
requests an extension and shows good cause. Liquidation also may be suspended (meaning the
final assessment of duties is held open) in certain cases, including cases in which merchandise is
affected by a pending court case, products are suspected to be prohibited, or merchandise has not
been completely withdrawn from a customs warehouse or otherwise accounted for.102
Liquidation is suspended, for example, if imported merchandise is the subject of an ongoing
antidumping (AD) or countervailing duty (CVD) investigation.103 In AD and CVD investigations,
the suspension of liquidation begins as soon as the ITA makes an affirmative preliminary
determination of dumping or subsidies. Suspensions end, and final duties are collected, after an
administrative review of the investigation is conducted. In a Government Accountability Office
(GAO) investigation regarding CBP ‘s collection of AD/CVD duties, GAO investigators noted
that the long lag time between cash deposit of estimated duties and the collection of the final
duties assessed (on average 3.3 years, and in many cases much longer) made it difficult for CBP
to collect the duties. In fact, the longer the lag time and larger the amount of duty owed, the
greater the likelihood that CBP would be unable to collect the duties owed.104
Recordkeeping and Post-Entry Audits
As a general rule, CBP requires that all records regarding imports of merchandise be kept for a
period of five years after the date of entry.105 These documents must be made available to CBP
officials if they request an audit to determine if any additional duties, fees, and taxes are owed, or
to insure that the importer is in compliance with laws administered by CBP.106
100 U.S. CBP, Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2011, 2012, p. 33, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/
cgov/newsroom/publications/admin/fy2011_par.ctt/fy2011_par.pdf.
101 19 C.F.R. § 159.1.
102 19 C.F.R. §§ 159.52-159.57.
103 AD and CVD laws authorize the imposition of duties if (1) the International Trade Administration of the
Department of Commerce (ITA) determines that foreign merchandise is being, or likely to be, sold in the United States
at less than fair value or a foreign country or public entity has subsidized the merchandise; and (2) the U.S.
International Trade Commission (USITC) determines that an industry in the United States is materially injured or
threatened with material injury, or that the establishment of an industry is materially retarded, due to imports of that
merchandise. For a fuller discussion of AD and CVD issues, see CRS Report RL32371, Trade Remedies: A Primer, by
Vivian C. Jones.
104 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Antidumping and Countervailing Duties: Congress and Agencies
Should Take Additional Steps to Reduce Substantial Shortfalls in Duty Collection, GAO-08-391, March 26, 2008.
105 19 U.S. C. § 1304(i).
106 19 U.S. C. § 1509.
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Regulatory Audits
CBP conducts two main types of regulatory audits. 107 First, focused assessment (FA) audits are
risk-based evaluations of a company’s CBP transactions. FAs begin with an assessment of the
company’s internal controls in order to identify system strengths and weaknesses and help predict
future compliance. If certain risk areas are identified, CBP auditors examine those areas. Second,
quick response audits (QRA) are single-issue audits narrowly focused to address a specific
objective within a short period of time. Examples of QRA could include an audit of an importer’s
operations to determine if unlawful transshipments may have occurred, or an audit of a
company’s internal controls on intellectual property rights.108 Both types of audits may result in
enforcement action and penalties if discrepancies are found.
Prior Disclosure
Any party who may have violated U.S. trade laws (including undervaluation, inaccurate
description of merchandise, AD/CVD duty evasion, or improper country of origin declarations or
markings) may choose to make a prior disclosure of the violation and thereby become eligible for
reduced penalties.109 In order to receive reduced penalties, the party must make a complete
disclosure before, or without knowledge of, a formal CBP investigation.110
Issues for Congress
Reauthorization of CBP’s trade, enforcement, and security functions has been the subject of
several hearings and legislative proposals since 9/11. This section reviews selected issues
addressed in previous legislation and hearings related to import policy involving customs issues,
including policies related to the competing goals of trade facilitation, trade enforcement, and
import security, along with customs modernization and interagency coordination.
Trade Facilitation
Some in Congress have identified trade facilitation as a top priority with respect to U.S. customs
law and CBP’s import policies.111 Recent legislative attention has focused on the possible
authorization of existing CBP trade facilitation programs, on trusted trader program benefits, and
107 CBP audit procedures are regulated in 19 C.F.R. § 163.11. Members of the Importer Self-Assessment (ISA) trusted
trader program work with CBP to monitor their own trade compliance and conduct annual risk assessments, and they
are exempt from most types of enforcement-related audits (see “Text Box: CBP Trusted Trader Programs”).
108 U.S. CBP, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/trade_programs/audits/quick_response.xml.
109 See 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c)(4). If the merchandise is unliquidated and there is no fraud involved, the party receives no
penalty. If the goods have been liquidated and no fraud is involved, the penalty is reduced is reduced from the normal
assessment of the domestic value of the goods to one times the duty loss, or if there is no duty assessed, 10% of the
dutiable value of the merchandise. See also U.S. Customs and Border Protection, The ABC’s of Prior Disclosure,
Informed Compliance Publication, April 2004, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/legal/
informed_compliance_pubs/icp028r2.ctt/icp028r2.pdf.
110 Ibid.
111 See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, Customs Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act
of 2009, 111th Cong., 1st sess., October 20, 2009, Opening Statement of Hon. Max Baucus, A Senator from Montana,
Chairman, Committee on Finance.
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on proposals to reduce wait times at ports-of-entry, including through increases in CBP port-of-
entry staffing.
Authorization of Existing CBP Trade Facilitation Programs
Several CBP trade facilitation efforts have been initiated as pilot programs without explicit
legislative authorization. Examples include the Simplified Entry program (see “Simplified
Entry”) and the Centers of Excellence and Expertise (see “Centers of Excellence and Expertise”).
A customs reauthorization bill may include provisions to codify and authorize funding for these
programs, which appear to be supported by import-related businesses. However, some Members
may assert that these programs align CBP too closely with industry partners, and therefore, might
call into question CBP’s import security and trade enforcement functions.112
Trusted Trader Program Benefits
CBP’s risk management approach to import policy emphasizes the use of trusted trader programs,
such as C-TPAT and FAST, in part, to identify and facilitate the entry of low-risk importers and
cargo, while focusing enforcement efforts on higher-risk flows . For this reason, some in
Congress and some CBP officials support maximizing participation in C-TPAT and related
programs. Yet, some businesses have described the benefits received by C-TPAT members as
inadequate, especially in light of the time and financial investments required to become certified
as C-TPAT members. In congressional testimony, some industry representatives have described
their constituents as “particularly unsatisfied” by CBP’s “one-size-fits-all approach” to risk
management.113 And while it appears that many large import-related businesses have joined C-
TPAT, CRS estimates, based on CBP data, that only about 6% of all import-related businesses and
about 8% of customs brokers have joined the program.114
One issue for Congress is whether to increase C-TPAT benefits or initiate other steps to
strengthen trusted trader programs in an effort to increase C-TPAT participation and to facilitate
trade flows.115
112 H.R. 6642 (introduced December 7, 2012) and H.R. 6656 (introduced December 26, 2012), introduced in the 112th
Congress, contained language that would have authorized DHS to establish and operate the Centers of Excellence and
Expertise. Both bills also would have directed CBP to set priorities and performance standards to measure the
development and level of achievement in customs modernization, trade facilitation, and trade enforcement programs.
113 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade, Customs Trade Facilitation and
Enforcement in a Secure Environment, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., May 20, 2010, Testimony of Frank Vargo, National
Association of Manufacturers.
114 As of August 22, 2012, CBP reported that 10,337 businesses had joined C-TPAT, including 845 customs brokers,
according to data provided by CBP Office of Legislative Affairs, August 24, 2012. By comparison, U.S. Census data
indicates that there were 181,648 U.S. importers in 2010 and CBP data indicate that there were 11,000 customs
brokers; see U.S. Census, “A Profile of U.S. Importing and Exporting Companies, 2009-2010,” http://www.census.gov/
foreign-trade/Press-Release/edb/2010/edbrel.pdf; and CBP, “Becoming a Customs Broker,” http://www.cbp.gov/xp/
cgov/trade/trade_programs/broker/brokers.xml. Nonetheless, data from the CBP Office of Legislative Affairs also
indicate that C-TPAT members account for 50-56% of all imports by value.
115 Certain C-TPAT benefits are described in statute under §§ 213-216 of the SAFE Port Act of 2006. During the 112th
Congress, the SAFE Port Act Reauthorization Act (S. 832, introduced April 14, 2011) and the Securing Maritime
Activities through Risk-Based Targeting (SMART) Port Security Act (H.R. 4251, passed House, June 28, 2012), for
example, would have directed CBP to provide additional incentives to joining C-TPAT by promoting an information
sharing program with certain C-TPAT members regarding potential supply chain vulnerabilities.
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In practice, however, it may be difficult to substantially expand C-TPAT benefits. In the case of
land ports, the primary benefit of C-TPAT/FAST membership is access to dedicated lanes where
wait times may be shorter and more predictable. However, CBP may have limited capacity to add
lanes because many ports are located in urban areas with limited space for expansion.116 And even
if new lanes can be added at the border, carriers may confront ingress and egress bottlenecks that
limit the benefits of such investments. In the case of maritime imports, the primary benefit of C-
TPAT membership is that low ATS scores reduce the likelihood of an inspection. But with just 4%
of all maritime containers selected for secondary inspection (see Table 2), C-TPAT membership
may offer little practical advantage in this regard. In addition, some CBP officials have told CRS
that further reductions in C-TPAT inspections may raise security risks because smugglers may
establish clean companies and join the program in order to game the system.117 For these reasons,
the best way to encourage C-TPAT membership may be to increase enforcement against non-
members, thereby increasing the relative benefits of C-TPAT membership.
Wait Times at Land Ports of Entry
Some in Congress have expressed concern about delays and unpredictable wait times at land ports
of entry, particularly on the U.S.-Mexico border.118 Several governmental and non-governmental
groups have examined this issue and recommended strategies for reducing wait times. A draft
Commerce Department report, for example, identifies three main strategies: (1) optimizing the
dispersal of demand across available capacity; (2) improving throughput within the existing
system through trusted trader programs and risk-management; and expanding capacity by adding
crossing lanes (physical infrastructure); and (3) increasing staffing and operating hours.119
Similarly, a Department of Homeland Security Southwest Border Task Force made 10
recommendations in 2009 for improving U.S.-Mexico commerce, including enhanced trusted
trader programs and risk management systems, faster throughput through improved scanning
systems and document reviews, expanded POE infrastructure, and additional POE officers.120 A
third set of taskforce recommendations presented in 2011 included a recommendation that CBP
take the lead on adopting best practices related to border inspections, including use of automated
risk management, establishing an automated release process, and developing a “single window”
approach so that all importers and customs brokers to provide all of the necessary data elements
at one U.S. government portal.121
116 See U.S. Department of Commerce, Draft Report: Improving Economic Outcomes by Reducing Border Delays,
Facilitating the Vital Flow of Commercial Traffic Across the US-Mexican Border, Washington , DC, 2008.
117 CRS interview with CBP port officials, April 10, 2012. Also see Tony Payan, The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars:
Drugs, Immigration, and Homeland Security (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), pp. 34-36.
118 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime
Security, Using Technology to Facilitate Trade and Enhance Security at Our Ports of Entry, 112th Cong., 2nd sess.,
May 1, 2012.
119 U.S. Department of Commerce, Draft Report: Improving Economic Outcomes by Reducing Border Delays,
Facilitating the Vital Flow of Commercial Traffic Across the US-Mexican Border, Washington, DC, 2008, p. 5.
120 Department of Homeland Security Advisory Council, Southwest Border Task Force, Recommendations,
Washington, DC, September 2009, pp. 3-5, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
hsac_southwest_border_task_force_recommendations_september_2009.pdf.
121 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Advisory Council, Southwest Border Task Force Report,
Third Set of Recommendations, 2011, p. p. 11, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac-southwest-border-task-
force.pdf..
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While many strategies for promoting faster throughput may be in tension with security and trade
enforcement goals (i.e., because faster throughput means less time reviewing each case),
increasing port of entry personnel levels may speed flows while also increasing enforcement
capacity. 122 Moreover, as Figure 2 illustrates, while staffing for enforcement between ports of
entry more than doubled between FY2004 and FY2012 (increasing from 10,819 to 21,394),
DHS’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) staffing at ports of entry increased just 20% during this
period (from 18,110 to 21,790), even as enforcement responsibilities increased substantially in the
post-9/11 period.
Figure 2. CBP Enforcement Staffing, FY2004-FY2012
Source: Data provided by CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, January 9, 2013.
On the other hand, some Members have expressed skepticism about CBP’s staffing model, and
may oppose efforts to increase OFO personnel.123 Some have also encouraged CBP to make better
use of technology and risk management (i.e., trusted trader programs), among other strategies, to
reduce border wait times.124
122 The 112th Congress considered, but did not enact, proposals to increase the number of port-of-entry personnel,
particularly at peak hours, as a way to reduce border wait times. Proposals to increase CBP port of entry personnel in
the 112th Congress included the Border Security Enforcement Act of 2011 (S. 803/H.R. 1507), the Border
Infrastructure and Jobs Act of 2011 (H.R. 3049) and the Putting Our Resources Toward Security (PORTS) Act (H.R.
1561). Also see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Budget
Hearing—Customs and Border Protection, 112th Cong., 2nd sess. February 29, 2012, Testimony of Colleen M. Kelly,
National Treasury Employees Union.
123 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security,
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2013, Report to accompany H.R. 5855, 112th Cong., 2nd sess.,
May 23, 2012, pp. 30-31.
124 Ibid.; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Using Technology to Facilitate Trade and Enhance Security at Our Ports of Entry, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., May 1, 2012.
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Trade Enforcement
CBP’s role in trade enforcement has been the subject of congressional attention, especially as it
relates to CBP’s collection of tariffs and fees and its enforcement of trade laws including
antidumping (AD) and countervailing (CVD) duty orders, U.S. intellectual property (IPR) laws,
textile and apparel trade violations (e.g., transshipment), and import safety regulations. Some in
Congress and some U.S. businesses assert that CBP does not adequately enforce these laws. Some
manufacturers also allege that CBP has not adequately investigated allegations of duty evasion,
product mislabeling, fraudulent country of origin declarations, or deliberate misclassification of
shipments.125 And some assert that their intellectual property rights have been violated by
growing imports of counterfeit goods, and that CBP collaboration with the private sector to
identify and enforce IPR violations has been inadequate.126 Manufacturers also have asserted that
CBP has not actively investigated alleged violations. CBP officials have responded that although
CBP would like to be as transparent as possible, that the agency must also honor due process
requirements, which may require confidentiality.127
Bills in the 112th Congress related to trade enforcement would have addressed AD and CVD
enforcement, either by establishing a new trade remedy enforcement division, or by instituting
tight deadlines for investigations.128 Other legislation would have focused on textile and apparel
trade violations by providing CBP with additional enforcement authority and personnel.129 A third
enforcement issue addressed in the 112th Congress would have allowed CBP to provide
information and samples of counterfeit goods to owners of the copyrights or trademarks.130
Import Security
The overarching policy question with respect to import security is how CBP can minimize the
risk that chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, illegal drugs, and other
contraband will enter through U.S. POEs, while also limiting the costs and delays associated with
such enforcement.131
125 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade, Supporting Economic Growth and
Job Creation through Customs Trade Modernization, Facilitation, and Enforcement, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., May 17,
2012. For example, see Testimony of Mr. John Williams, Executive Director, Southern Shrimp Alliance.
126 U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security,
Hearing on H.R. 4223, the “Safe Doses Act”; H.R. 3668, the “Counterfeit Drug Penalty Enhancement Act of 2011;
and H.R. 4216, the “Foreign Counterfeit Prevention Act”, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., March 28, 2012, Testimony of Mr.
Travis D. Johnson.
127 Remarks of Assistant Commissioner of International Trade Allen Gina at November 28 press conference following
the CBP East Coast Trade Symposium, “CBP Official Says Anti-Evasion Bills Should Not Set Deadlines for
Response,” Inside U.S. Trade, November 29, 2012.
128 Bills in the 112th Congress included the Enforcing Orders and Reducing Customs Evasion Act of 2012 (H.R. 3057,
S. 3524) and the Preventing Recurring Trade Evasion and Circumvention Act (H.R. 5708).
129 Bills in the 112th Congress included the Textile Enforcement and Security Act of 2011 (H.R. 2754/S. 1683).
130 Bills in the 112th Congress included the Foreign Counterfeit Prevention Act (S. 1683).
131 In the 112th Congress, discussion of import security mainly focused on CBP’s incomplete implementation of the
SAFE Port Act’s 100% scanning requirement and the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) incomplete
implementation of the MTSA’s provisions related to TWIC cards.
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100% Scanning Requirement
The SAFE Port Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-347), as amended, requires as of July 1, 2012 that 100% of
maritime cargo containers admitted into the United States be scanned through non-intrusive
inspection (NII) and radiation detection equipment in a foreign port prior to being loaded on a
U.S.-bound ship, unless the Secretary of DHS extends this deadline.132 On May 2, 2012,
Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano notified Congress that she would exercise her authority
to extend the 100% scanning deadline.133 With just 1% of cargo scanned before being loaded on
U.S.-bound ships—and only about 5% of cargo subject to NII scanning at any point (see Table
1)—some Members have expressed frustration that DHS has made little progress toward
implementing 100% scanning, and questioned the department about plans to increase the
percentage of cargo scanned.134
The decision to delay implementation of the 100% scanning program partly reflects the
department’s findings from the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) 100% scanning pilot program. In
its final report to Congress on the program, CBP identified three main obstacles to implementing
100% scanning at all foreign ports.135 First, 100% scanning requires significant host state and
private sector cooperation, but some foreign governments and business groups do not fully
support 100% scanning. Second, 100% scanning would be logistically difficult. Initial pilots were
deployed in relatively low-volume ports with natural chokepoints, but many cargo containers pass
through large volume ports with more varied port architectures. Logistical challenges are
particularly burdensome given the priority that the modern shipping industry places on the rapid
and efficient movement of goods. Third, 100% scanning would be costly. In February 2012, the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that implementing 100% scanning at foreign ports
would cost an average of $8 million per shipping lane, or a total of $16.8 billion to implement
100% scanning for all U.S.-bound containers.136 Port operators and foreign partners also absorb
costs associated with fuel and utilities, staffing, and related expenses.
132 This provision in P.L. 109-347, was amended by P.L. 110-53, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007.
133 Letter from Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, to Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Senator, May 2, 2012.
In her notification to Congress, Secretary Napolitano cites “diplomatic, financial, and logistical” obstacles to
implementing a 100% scanning system. Pursuant to § 232(b)(4) of the SAFE Port Act, as amended, Secretary
Napolitano identified two conditions which necessitated the deadline extension: that the use of systems to scan
containers would have significant and negative impact on trade capacity and cargo flows, and that systems to scan
containers cannot be purchased, deployed, or operated at overseas ports due to limited physical infrastructure.
134 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime
Security, Balancing Maritime Security and Trade Facilitation: Protecting Our Ports, Increasing Commerce, and
Securing the Supply Chain - Part I, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., February 7, 2012.
135 See U.S. CBP, Report to Congress on Integrated Scanning System Pilots (Security and Accountability for Every
Port Act of 2006, Section 231). Also see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Supply Chain Security: Container
Secuirty Programs Have Matured, but Uncertainty Persists over the Future of 100 Percent Scanning, GAO-12-422T,
February 7, 2012, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588253.pdf.
136 Testimony of Kevin McAleenan, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. CBP, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, before the Border and Maritime Security Subcommittee of the Homeland Security
Committee, U.S. House, hearing “Balancing Maritime Security and Trade Facilitation: Protecting our Ports, Increasing
Commerce and Securing the Supply Chain - Part I,” February 7, 2012. CBP reports that the U.S. government spent a
total of about $120 million during the first three years of the Secure Freight Initiative; U.S. CBP, Report to Congress
on Integrated Scanning System Pilots, p. 13.
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100% Scanning Versus Risk-Based Scanning
In light of these challenges, Congress may wish to consider provisions to allow DHS to scan less
than 100% of U.S.-bound cargo. Two reasons to scan less than 100% of incoming cargo are to
reduce the costs of enforcement and to speed processing time. Some assert that the costs of 100%
scanning may be great enough to shift certain trade flows away from U.S. markets, potentially
harming the U.S. economy.
More generally, 100% scanning conflicts with DHS’s general approach to risk management,
which seeks to focus scarce inspection resources on the highest-risk containers.137 By scanning a
smaller number of containers, DHS may be able to devote additional resources to each individual
scan. This consideration is important because NII is labor- intensive, and scanning fewer
containers may allow DHS to subject individual scans to greater scrutiny, and to maintain a lower
threshold for opening containers with questionable NII images.
If illicit cargo is estimated to be limited to less than 1% of incoming containers, as CBP believes
to be the case, focusing enforcement on the likeliest containers may be the most effective
enforcement strategy. According to this line of thinking, rather than focus on 100% scanning,
people concerned about import security may emphasize risk-based scanning along with
investment in CBP intelligence to improve targeting, and/or increased CBP personnel, which
would allow ports to conduct a larger number of targeted special enforcement operations.138
Scanning Abroad Versus Scanning in U.S. POEs
If Congress were to revisit the 100% scanning requirement, a second question may where security
scanning takes place. While the SAFE Port Act, as amended, requires cargo containers to be
scanned in foreign ports, most NII scanning now occurs within U.S. ports, where CBP and DHS
grant programs have supported investments in scanning equipment, and where Congress has
direct authority to impose scanning requirements. Efforts to implement 100% scanning abroad
may be difficult for the reasons discussed above.
With respect to radiation scanning to defend against a WMD attack, however, scanning cargo
within U.S. ports may come too late in the process to prevent an attack—that is, the threat that a
nuclear weapon or dirty bomb would be detonated within a port prior to being scanned. Given
that several major ports are located close to population centers, and given the costs that would be
associated with a significant disruption in port activities, a case can be made for conducting
radiation detection scanning in foreign ports, before cargo is shipped to the United States.139
Scanning within foreign ports may be a less urgent priority with respect to NII scanning to detect
drugs and other contraband. In this case, detection at any point prior to cargo being released from
a U.S. POE may still accomplish the enforcement goals of detection and interdiction.
137 See U.S. CBP, “CBP Trade Strategy: Fiscal Years 2009-2013,” Washington, DC: 2009.
138 Under a purely risk-based scanning system, DHS would scan only those containers identified as high risk. Although
such a system may offer the greatest cost savings and efficiency (i.e., would offer the greatest reduction in the number
of scans conducted), it also would be vulnerable to smugglers who study the scanning protocols or otherwise learn
about DHS’s risk modeling and intentionally adopt “low risk” profiles in order to avoid being scanned. Thus, any risk-
based scanning system may also require some amount of random scanning.
139 On the potential consequences of a weapon of mass destruction being detonated in a U.S. port, see Charles Meade
and Roger C. Molader, Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack, RAND Center for Terrorirsm Risk
Management Policy, Santa Monica, CA, 2006, http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR391.pdf.
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Transportation Worker Identity Credential (TWIC) Card Readers
Some Members have expressed frustration that DHS has not yet published regulations governing
card readers for the Transportation Worker Identity Credential (TWIC) program.140 One issue for
Congress is whether to encourage DHS through legislation to move ahead more quickly with
regulations to require that ports use TWIC card readers to restrict access to secure areas.141
Yet Congress may also want to consider the overall effectiveness of the TWIC program. In 2011,
a GAO report identified several weaknesses with the TWIC program, including that internal
controls in the enrollment process and background checks may not limit cards to eligible
individuals or insure that they maintain their eligibility after cards are issued, that facilities were
vulnerable to security breaches in GAO’s covert testing, and that DHS has not adequately
assessed TWIC program effectiveness.142 DHS’s report on its TWIC pilot program also identified
strengths and weaknesses of the program, which may have contributed to the delay in publishing
regulations. On one hand, DHS found that TWIC readers functioned properly when installed and
operated in a manner that was consistent with a port’s operational needs, and that certain TWIC
readers verified card-holders’ credentials more efficiently than visual inspections by security
personnel. On the other hand, DHS also identified a number of problems that limited the overall
success of the pilot programs. In particular, some card readers were less efficient than visual
inspections; TWIC systems required more training than anticipated; some cards and card readers
malfunctioned; some facilities had problems installing TWIC readers; some readers had problems
scanning cards under certain environmental conditions; and some operators did not use the TWIC
readers correctly or consistently.143
Customs Modernization
Customs modernization refers to the transition from CBP’s Automated Commercial System
(ACS) to its Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) for managing trade-related data (see
“Pre-Entry: Advanced Cargo Screening, Scanning, and Inspections”). This transition to ACE has
taken longer than expected and has substantially exceeded its original cost predictions,144 and not
all import-related businesses have established ACE accounts.145 Some Members of Congress and
140 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, A Review of the Delays
and Problems Associated with TSA’s Transportation Worker Identification Credential, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., June 28,
2012. Pursuant to the SAFE Port Act, DHS tested a TWIC card reader pilot program in seven ports between August
2008 and May 2011, and published a final report on the TWIC card reader pilot program in August 2012.
141 In June 2012, for example, during the 112th session of Congress, the House passed the SMART Port Security Act
(H.R. 4251), which would direct DHS to publish a final regulation for the installation of TWIC readers.
142 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Transportation Worker Identification Credential: Internal Control
Weaknesses Need to be Corrected to Help Achieve Security Objectives, GAO-11-657, May 2011, http://www.gao.gov/
assets/320/318123.pdf.
143 DHS Transportation Security Administration, “Transportation Worker Identification Credential Reader Pilot
Program: Final Report,” February 27, 2012, http://chsdemocrats.house.gov/sitedocuments/twicreaderreport.pdf.
144 The U.S. Customs Service initiated the transition to ACE in 1994, and initially estimated that implementation of the
new system would cost $150 million over a ten-year period. Five years later, in 1999, the GAO reported that that the
life-cycle cost had grown to $1.05 billion, over a 15-year life cycle; see General Accounting Office, Customs Service
Modernization: Actions Initiated to Correct ACE Management and Technical Weaknesses, GAO/T-AIMD-99-186,
May 13, 1999, pp. 1-2. According to CBP’s Office of Legislative Affairs, Congress appropriated $3.2 billion between
2001 and May 2012 for the development of ACE.
145 According to CBP’s Office of Legislative Affairs, 20,600 ACE accounts have been established as of August 2012.
By comparison, there were 181,648 U.S. importers in 2010 and 11,000 customs brokers; see U.S. Census Bureau, “A
(continued...)
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some business groups have expressed frustration that ACE development lags behind
expectations,146 however, CBP officials report that most have expressed support for plans that
CBP has developed in conjunction with DHS to develop the remaining core ACE processes in
three years.147
In its FY2013 budget request, CBP describes ACE as being in an operations and maintenance
phase. CBP reportedly believes that it has sufficient funds for ACE through FY2014, but that the
agency will need to pursue other funding to make up expected shortfalls in FY2015 and 2016. .148
Congress may continue to monitor the modernization process and ACE funding through its
oversight function, during the appropriations process, and/or by passing additional legislation in
this area.149
Interagency Coordination
CBP is one of 47 federal government agencies that play a role in trade enforcement, but CBP and
its partner government agencies have different missions and do not always collaborate
successfully to implement U.S. import policies. For example, with respect to import security,
important partners include the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which takes the
lead on air cargo scanning and TWIC cards, and the Coast Guard, which also plays a role on
security and TWIC card enforcement. With respect to trade enforcement, CBP officers rely on the
Food and Drug Administration and the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce, in certain
cases, to identify all possible health and safety violations, or to rule on other complex import
questions. Similarly, while CBP conducts border enforcement of intellectual property rights at the
port of entry, CBP relies on partnerships with ICE and other federal agencies to conduct criminal
investigations and prosecute intellectual property theft and other trade violations. In this case,
CBP’s primary mission to detect and prevent illegal entries may conflict, to some degree, with
ICE and other agencies’ efforts to gather evidence and build cases against suspected trade
violators. A DHS Office of the Inspector General report in 2012 found that CBP and ICE do not
always share information and intelligence related to investigations, and that their data systems are
not designed to allow efficient information sharing.150
(...continued)
Profile of U.S. Importing and Exporting Companies, 2009-2010,” http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/
edb/2010/edbrel.pdf; and CBP, “Becoming a Customs Broker,” http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/trade_programs/
broker/brokers.xml. Thus, CRS calculates that about 11% of eligible import-related business had established ACE
accounts. This calculation excludes freight carriers, so the actual percentage of eligible ACE account holders may be
somewhat less than 11%. On the other hand, as with C-TPAT membership, it appears that most large-scale importers
have established ACE accounts, as two-thirds of all customs duties and fees are collected through ACE.
146 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade, Supporting
Economic Growth and Job Creation Through Customs Trade Modernization, Facilitation, and Enforcement, 112th
Cong., 2nd sess., May 17, 2012.
147 E-mail from CBP officials, March 15, 2013.
148 DHS, Congressional Budget Justification – CBP Automation Modernization FY2013.
149 In the 112th Congress, H.R. 6642 and H.R. 6656 would have authorized about $138.8 million through 2015 for
completion of the ACE system, and require CBP and GAO to issue reports regarding the progress of its
implementation.
150 DHS Office of Inspector General, Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security, OIG-12-39,
Washington, DC, February 2012; see also U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security, Eleven Years Later – Preventing Terrorists from Coming to America, 112th Cong., 2nd
sess. September 11, 2012, Testimony of Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General, DHS.
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CBP and its partner agencies are attempting to advance interagency cooperation, in part, through
the Border Interagency Executive Council (BIEC), created in January 2010. The BIEC is
comprised of agency leaders at the Assistant Administrator and Assistant Commissioner level and
serves as an advisory board on interagency import safety issues. The BIEC also works in
collaboration with CBP’s Advisory Committee on Commercial Operations (COAC), the
International Trade Data System (ITDS), and the National Strategy for Global Supply Chain
Security.151
The ITDS, which is being implemented through ACE, is one tool for improving interagency
coordination. . ITDS is an intergovernmental project to coordinate and standardize the collection
of trade enforcement data by all federal government agencies that play a role in trade
enforcement. The goal is to build a “single window” for the electronic collection and distribution
of standard government-wide import and export data for the use of government agencies with a
role in trade enforcement. Under section 405 of the SAFE Port Act, all federal agencies that
require documentation related to the importation or exportation of cargo are required to
participate in the ACE once ITDS is fully operational. As of August 2012, 47 government
agencies were involved in ITDS implementation, with the Treasury Department coordinating
interagency participation and CBP responsible for building and managing ITDS.152
Some in Congress may favor efforts to require other agencies to work more closely with CBP at
various stages of the trade enforcement process. One option might be to require that each agency
with responsibility for cargo clearance use the ITDS exclusively for authorizing the
documentation, clearing, or licensing of cargo. On the other hand, some Members may be
reluctant to delegate additional enforcement powers to CBP because doing so may dilute the
enforcement authority of other federal agencies, potentially undermining their own missions.
Concluding Comments
An overarching goal of U.S. trade policy is to facilitate the efficient flow of goods in and out of
the United States, but there is an inherent tension between the commercial interest in trade
facilitation and the often competing goals of enforcing trade laws and import security measures.
The Mod Act of 1993 (Title VI of P.L. 103-182) sought to address this tension, to a degree, by
replacing the previous model of trade enforcement, in which the then-U.S. Customs Service
(USCS) was responsible for the classification of goods and assessment of duties, with a “shared
responsibility” approach, in which importers make their own duty determinations and the customs
agency is primarily responsible for revenue collection and oversight of importers. In theory,
robust post-entry audits and high penalties for non-compliance should act as a deterrent, and
shared responsibility may facilitate legal flows without compromising trade enforcement.
The tension is more profound when it comes to import security, however, because post-entry
enforcement may be too late to prevent a significant security breach. Post-entry enforcement also
may be problematic for certain trade issues, such as consumer safety laws, and in AD/CVD cases
151 Communication from CBP officials, March 13, 2013.
152 CBP Office of Congressional Affairs August 23, 2012; also see International Trade Data System, “Report to
Congress on the International Trade Data System: December 2011,” http://www.itds.gov/linkhandler/itds/toolbox/
library/resource_documents/2011_itds_report.ctt/2011_itds_report.pdf.
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where irreparable harm may be done to U.S. industries. Thus, while C-TPAT follows a similar
logic as the Mod Act by “outsourcing” certain security functions from CBP to trusted industry
partners, post-9/11 security concerns may limit the benefits that may be offered to trusted
traders—a fact that has been a source of frustration to importers who play by the rules but still
confront burdensome trade procedures. On the other hand, DHS also may confront declining
returns to certain trade enforcement and import security practices—a fact which may contribute
to the agency’s reluctance to implement the SAFE Port Act’s 100% scanning requirement, for
example.
At the same time, certain programs may strengthen the overall import process without forcing
such facilitation-versus-enforcement dynamics. Transition to the Automated Commercial
Environment (ACE), for example, should streamline the import process while also enhancing
enforcement efforts through the International Trade Data System (ITDS). Similarly, improving
POE infrastructure and expanding POE personnel may speed trade flows while also making more
resources available for inspections. Yet these types of win-win programs often are expensive to
implement, and Congress may be reluctant to make such investments at this time.
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Appendix A. Glossary of Trade-Related Acronyms
Glossary
ABI
Automated Broker Interface. A computer interface, based on the Automated Commercial System
(ACS), that permits qualified customs brokers to file customs import data electronically
ACE
Automated Commercial Environment. The newer interface system being created (and currently in use)
for electronic filing of import data on goods entering the United States
ACS
Automated Commercial System. The older interface system being used by CBP for electronic filing of
import data on goods entering the United States
ATS
Automated Targeting System. A CBP program to screen inbound and certain outbound cargo and
persons and to assign risk-based scores for the purpose of targeting, identifying, and preventing
potential terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States and to identify other
violations of U.S. trade and immigration laws
AD
Antidumping. Antidumping (AD) laws (19 U.S.C. §1673 et seq.) authorize the imposition of duties if (1)
the International Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce (ITA) determines that foreign
merchandise is being, or likely to be, sold in the United States at less than fair value, and (2) the U.S.
International Trade Commission (USITC) determines that an industry in the United States is materially
injured or threatened with material injury, or that the establishment of an industry is materially
retarded, due to imports of that merchandise
CBP
U.S Customs and Border Protection. Located within the Department of Homeland Security, CBP is the
lead federal agency charged with enforcing U.S. customs and import security laws at ports of entry.
CEE
Center of Excellence and Expertise. A CBP trade facilitation program through which trusted traders of
certain merchandise (e.g. , electronics or motor vehicles) can receive CBP assistance and information in
one location.
CSI
Container Security Initiative. A process by which CBP and related agencies identify high-risk containers
by pre-screening them before they enter the United States.
C-TPAT
Customs –Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. A CBP trusted trader program.
CVD
Countervailing Duties. U.S. countervailing duty laws (19 U.S.C. §1671 et seq.) authorize the imposition
of countervailing duties (CVD) if the ITA finds that the government of a country or any public entity has
provided a subsidy on the manufacture, production, or export of the merchandise, and the USITC
determines injury or threat thereof.
FA
Focused Assessment. A type of CBP regulatory audit that begins with assessing a company’s internal
controls for the ability to comply with U.S. trade laws.
ICE
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. A CBP sister agency in the Department of Homeland Security,
ICE’s mission is to enforce federal laws relating to border control, customs, trade, and immigration.
ITDS
International Trade Data System. The computer interface that assists CBP participating government
agencies (PGAs) to perform their international trade enforcement activities.
NII
Non-Intrusive Inspection. Scanning of cargo containers to produce a high-resolution image of a
container’s contents.
POE
Port of entry. An air, land, or sea port of entry for goods and people entering the United States.
PTI
Priority Trade Issue. High-risk areas that CBP has selected for intensive resource investment because
they could cause significant revenue loss, injure the economy, or threaten health and safety.
SFI
Secure Freight Initiative. A pilot program to test CBP’s ability, working with international partners, to
conduct radiation detection and NII scanning on 100% of containers being loaded on U.S.-bound ships in
certain ports.
TWIC
Transportation Worker Identification Credential. Individuals needing unescorted access to U.S.
regulated vessels and facilities (i.e., ports of entry) must obtain this credential.
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Appendix B. Selected Trade Statistics
Table B-1. U.S. Merchandise Trade by Mode of Transportation, 2005-2011
Annual Data, Mil ions of Current U.S. Dol ars
Exports
Imports
Total Sea Air Land Total Sea Air Land
2005
904,380 261,519 292,970 349,891
1,670,940 859,440 359,120 452,380
2006 1,037,143 308,356 336,536 392,251
1,855,119 971,100 394,458 489,562
2007 1,162,708 375,152 365,965 421,591
1,953,699
1,023,796 415,261 514,641
2008 1,300,136 471,536 388,347 440,253
2,100,141
1,152,328 417,227 530,587
2009 1,056,932 367,520 334,444 354,968
1,557,876 795,279 366,938 395,659
2010 1,277,504 455,460 392,635 429,409
1,912,092 978,799 444,319 488,974
2011 1,480,665 570,286 424,265 486,114
2,206,956
1,159,096 493,038 554,822
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Merchandise Trade, Selected Highlights.
Notes: Data on imports and exports by land are CRS calculations based on Census data on total flows and
flows by air and sea. 2012 Data are through March 31, 2012.
Table B-2. U.S. Gross Domestic Product and International Trade, 2005-2011
U.S Trade in Goods and Services, Billions of Current U.S. Dollars
Total
Gross Domestic
Trade as %
Year
Product
Exports Imports
Total
Trade
of GDP
2005
12,623.0
1,287.40
1,996.1
3,283.5
26%
2006
13,377.2
1,459.80
2,213.2
3,673.0
27%
2007
14,028.7
1,654.60
2,351.3
4,005.9
29%
2008
14,291.5
1,842.70
2,541.0
4,383.7
31%
2009
13,973.7
1,578.90
1,958.1
3,537.0
25%
2010
14,498.9
1,842.60
2,337.2
4,179.8
29%
2011
15,075.7
2,103.40
2,263.2
4,366.6
29%
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Appendix C. Estimated Expenditures for
Selected Cargo Security Programs, FY2004-FY2012
Table C-1. Estimated Expenditures, Selected Cargo Security Programs,
FY2004-FY2012
Millions of Current U.S. Dollars
Transportation
Worker
Customs-Trade
Identification
Automated
Container
Partnership
Year
Credential
Targeting System
Security Initiative
against Terrorism
2003
$25.0 NA NA NA
2004 $49.7
NA
$61.4 $14.0
2005 $5.0 $29.8 $126.1 $37.8
2006 $15.0
$27.9 $138.0 $67.4
2007 $18.6
$26.8 $138.5 $49.7
2008 $50.6
$26.8 $145.9 $57.4
2009 $109.3
$32.5 $148.9
$52.4
2010 $45.0
$32.6 $145.5 $46.5
2011 $45.0
$32.4 $106.9 $44.5
2012
$30.2 $7.7 $51.6 $23.6
Total
$393.4 $216.5
$1,06.8 $393.5
Source: GAO, Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime Transportation Security Act,
GAO-12-1009T.
Notes: Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) data are for total funding authority, including
reprogramming, adjustments, and TWIC fee authority. Container Security Initiative funding includes funding for
Secure Freight Initiative. FY2012 data for the Automated Targeting System, Container Security Initiative, and
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism are through May 2012.
Author Contact Information
Vivian C. Jones
Marc R. Rosenblum
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Specialist in Immigration Policy
vcjones@crs.loc.gov, 7-7823
mrosenblum@crs.loc.gov, 7-7360
Acknowledgments
CRS Graphics Specialist Amber Hope Wilhelm prepared the figures for this report.
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