Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
March 19, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21922
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Summary
The capacity and transparency of Afghan governance are considered crucial to Afghan stability
after U.S.-led NATO forces turn over the security mission to Afghan leadership by the end of
2014. The size and capability of the Afghan governing structure has increased significantly since
the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but it remains weak and rampant with governmental
corruption. Even as the government has struggled to widen its writ, President Hamid Karzai has
tried to concentrate authority in Kabul through his constitutional powers of appointment at all
levels. Karzai has repeatedly denied that he wants to stay in office beyond the 2014 expiration of
his second term, but there are concerns he plans to use state election machinery to support the
election of a successor. International efforts to curb fraud in two successive elections (for
president in 2009 and parliament in 2010) largely failed, but Afghan efforts to improve election
oversight for the April 5, 2014 presidential and provincial elections are taking shape. Opposition
parties and civil society organizations are working to try to ensure a fair election.
Fears about the election process are fanned by the scant progress in reducing widespread
nepotism and other forms of corruption. President Karzai has accepted U.S. help to build
emerging anti-corruption institutions, but these same bodies have faltered from lack of support at
senior Afghan government levels. At a donors’ conference in Tokyo on July 8, 2012, donors
pledged to aid Afghanistan’s economy through at least 2017, on the condition that Afghanistan
takes concrete, verifiable action to rein in corruption.
No matter how the Afghan leadership succession process works out, there is concern among
many observers that governance will founder as the United States and its partners wind down
their involvement in Afghanistan at the end of 2014. The informal power structure consisting of
regional and ethnic leaders—who have always been at least as significant a factor in governance
as the formal power structure—is already beginning to assert itself in anticipation of the 2014
international drawdown. Many Afghans are looking to the faction leaders, rather than to the
government, to protect them from possible civil conflict with the Taliban after 2014. But, an
increase in the influence of faction leaders could produce even more corruption and arbitrary
administration of justice than is the case now. President Karzai is seeking to establish himself as a
nationalist leader and perhaps to attract Taliban support to rejoin Afghan politics by asserting
Afghan sovereignty as the United States draws down troops. Leaders of factions outside Karzai’s
ethnic Pashtun base criticize Karzai as too willing to make concessions to insurgent leaders in
search of a settlement. Afghan civil society activists, particularly women’s groups, assert that a
full reintegration of the Taliban into Afghan politics—a development increasingly likely as talks
between relatively moderate Taliban figures and Afghan political leaders proliferate—could
further set back human and women’s rights.
Broader issues of human rights often vary depending on the security environment in particular
regions, although some trends prevail nationwide. Women, media professionals, and civil society
groups have made substantial gains since the fall of the Taliban, but traditional attitudes
contribute to the judicial and political system’s continued toleration of child marriages,
imprisonment of women who flee domestic violence, judgments against converts from Islam to
Christianity, and curbs on the sale of alcohol and Western-oriented programming in the Afghan
media. See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S.
Policy
, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and
Justice Sector Assistance
, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman.
Congressional Research Service

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Contents
Overview: Historic Patterns of Afghan Authority and Politics ........................................................ 1
Afghan Ethnicities, Communities, and Their Relationships...................................................... 2
Pashtuns ............................................................................................................................... 2
Tajiks ................................................................................................................................... 2
Hazaras ................................................................................................................................ 3
Uzbeks ................................................................................................................................. 4
Ethnic and Factional Cooperation in the Security Sector .................................................... 4
The Role of Political Parties ...................................................................................................... 5
Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape ............................................................................. 6
Establishment of the Formal Afghan Government Structure: Elected but Centralized
Leadership .............................................................................................................................. 6
December 2001 Bonn Agreement ....................................................................................... 7
Permanent Constitution Adopted, Sets Up Presidential System ......................................... 7
National Assembly (Parliament) Formation, Powers, and Assertion of Powers ................. 8
The Judiciary and Rule of Law ......................................................................................... 10
Rivalries Within and Outside Governing Institutions .............................................................. 12
Karzai’s Presidential Leadership, His Close Advisers, and Staff ...................................... 12
The Political Opposition: The “Northern Alliance,” Dr. Abdullah, and Others ................ 17
The Informal Power Structure: Other Power Brokers, “Warlords,” and Local Faction
Leaders ................................................................................................................................. 19
Traditional Decision-Making Processes Of the Informal Power Structure ....................... 24
Emerging Power Centers: Civil Society and “Independent” Activists .................................... 25
Elections in 2009 and 2010 Harmed Confidence in the Electoral Process and Widened
Political Schisms .................................................................................................................. 26
2009 Presidential Election ................................................................................................. 26
September 18, 2010, Parliamentary Elections ................................................................... 29
April 5, 2014 Presidential and Provincial Elections: Credibility Still in Doubt ................ 34
Afghan Governing Capacity and Performance .............................................................................. 37
Expanding Central Government Capacity ............................................................................... 38
The Afghan Civil Service .................................................................................................. 39
The Afghan Budget Process .............................................................................................. 39
Expanding Local (Subnational) Governance ........................................................................... 41
The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) ............................................ 42
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils ................................................................. 42
District-Level Governance ................................................................................................ 43
Municipal and Village Level Authority ............................................................................. 44
Reforming Afghan Governance: Curbing Corruption ............................................................. 44
High Level Corruption, Nepotism, and Cronyism ............................................................ 45
Lower-Level Corruption.................................................................................................... 45
Administration Views and Policy on Corruption .............................................................. 46
Anti-Corruption Initiatives ................................................................................................ 46
Kabul Bank Scandal and Continuing Difficulties ............................................................. 50
Moves to Penalize Lack of Progress on Corruption .......................................................... 52
Promoting Human Rights and Civil Society ........................................................................... 53
Institution-Building: The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
(AIHRC) and Outside Human Rights Organizations ..................................................... 53
Congressional Research Service

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Religious Influence on Society: National Ulema Council ................................................ 54
Religious Freedom ............................................................................................................ 55
Media and Freedom of Expression/Social Freedoms ........................................................ 56
Harsh Punishments ............................................................................................................ 57
Human Trafficking ............................................................................................................ 57
Advancement of Women ................................................................................................... 58
Democracy, Human Rights, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues .......................... 62
Effects of a Settlement with the Taliban .................................................................................. 62

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Afghan Ethnicities ............................................................................................. 65

Tables
Table 1. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations .............................................................................. 63

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 65
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 65

Congressional Research Service

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Overview: Historic Patterns of Afghan Authority
and Politics

Through differing regimes of widely varying ideologies, Afghanistan’s governing structure has
historically consisted of weak central government unwilling or unable to enforce significant
financial or administrative mandates on all of Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic communities or on the
80% of Afghans who live in rural areas. These communities, many of which are separated by
mountains and wide expanses, have often looked to local faction leaders for their governance. At
the same time, there has always been a struggle between urban, educated “modernizers” and the
rural, lesser-educated traditionalists who adhere to strict Islamic customs. The Taliban
government (1996-2001) opposed modernization, but there has been substantial modernization
and urbanization since the Taliban were ousted—factors that might help Afghanistan remain
stable after the international security mission in Afghanistan winds down at the end of 2014.
At the national level, Afghanistan had few, if any, Western-style democratic institutions prior to
the international intervention that took place after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United
States. Under the constitution of 1964, King Zahir Shah was to be a constitutional monarch, and
an elected lower house and appointed upper house were set up. The parliament during that era
never reached the expectation of becoming a significant check on the king’s power, although the
period from 1964 until the seizure of power by Mohammad Daoud in a 1973 military coup was
considered a flowering of Afghan democracy. The last lower house elections during that period
were held in 1969. The parliament was suspended outright following the April 1978 Communist
seizure of power. The elected institutions and the 2004 adoption of a constitution were part of a
post-Taliban transition roadmap established by a United Nations-sponsored agreement of major
Afghan factions signed in Bonn, Germany, on December 5, 2001 (“Bonn Agreement”),1 after the
Taliban had fallen. Karzai is the first directly elected Afghan president.
Since the fall of the Taliban, there has also been the growth of civil society, populated largely by
educated Afghans, many of whom returned to Afghanistan from exile when the Taliban fell.
Organizations and groups centered on various issues, including women’s rights, law and justice,
media freedoms, economics and business issues, the environment, and others, have proliferated.
U.S. and partner policy has been to try to empower these groups as a check on government power
and as a guarantor that Afghan democracy will become entrenched.
These newly emerging interest groups have still not been able to displace—or even necessarily
substantially influence—the informal power structure of ethnic, regional, tribal, clan, village, and
district structures that exercise authority at all levels. At the local level, these structures governed
and secured Afghanistan until the late 1970s but were weakened by decades of subsequent war
and Taliban rule. Some traditional local authority figures fled or were killed; others were
displaced by mujahedin commanders, militia leaders, Taliban militants, and others. The local
power brokers who displaced some of the tribal structures are far less popular and are widely
accused of selectively applying Afghan law and of using their authority to enrich themselves.
Some of the traditional tribal councils, which are widely respected but highly conservative in
orientation, remained intact. Some of them continue to exercise their writ rather than accept the
authority of the central government or even local government appointees. Still other community

1 For text, see http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm.
Congressional Research Service
1

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

authorities prefer to accommodate local insurgents, whom they often see as potentially
reconcilable members of the community, rather than help the government secure their areas.
Afghan Ethnicities, Communities, and Their Relationships
Even though post-Taliban Afghanistan, particularly in urban areas, is modernizing politically and
economically, patterns of political affiliation by family, clan, tribe, village, ethnicity, region, and
comradeship in past battles often supersede relationships based on ideology or views. These
patterns have been evident in every post-Taliban Afghan election. Candidates, including at the
national level, often pursue campaign strategies designed primarily to assemble blocs of ethnic
and geographic votes, although some candidates have sought to advance specific new programs
and ideas. The traditional patterns have been even more pronounced in province-based campaigns
such as those for provincial councils and the parliament. In these cases, electorates (the eligible
voters of a specific province) are small and candidates can easily exploit clan and familial
relationships.
While Afghans continue to follow traditional patterns of affiliation, there has been a sense among
Afghans that their country now welcomes members of all political and ethnic groups and factions.
There have been very few incidents of ethnic-based violence since the fall of the Taliban, but
jealousies over relative economic and political positions of the different ethnic communities have
sporadically manifested as clashes or political disputes. The major groups are discussed below.
Pashtuns
Ethnic Pashtuns (pronounced POSH-toons, sometimes referred to as Pathans—pah-TAHNS), as
the largest single ethnicity, have historically asserted a “right to rule” Afghanistan. Pashtuns are
about 42% of the population and, with few exceptions, have governed Afghanistan. The sentiment
of the “right to rule” is particularly strong among Pashtuns of the Durrani tribal confederation,
which predominates in the south and is a rival to the Ghilzai confederation, which predominates
in the east and has historically close ties to Pakistan. The Pashtuns speak Pashtu (or Pashto), but
most in the government also speak Dari, a language akin to Persian. The Pashtuns are represented
within the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) at roughly the same proportion as they
are in the population.
Karzai is a Durrani Pashtun. His cabinet and inner advisory circle has come to be progressively
dominated by Pashtuns, both Ghilzai and Durrani, which has largely minimized the advisory
input of the non-Pashtun communities. However, Karzai is credited by some observers for
consulting with other communities, particularly the Tajiks, before issuing decrees or reaching
decisions. The Taliban is composed almost completely of Pashtuns; they oppose Karzai on the
grounds that his government does not enforce all aspects of Islamic law and is supported by
international forces. A table on major Pashtun clans is provided below (see Table 1), as is a map
showing the distribution of Afghan ethnicities (see Figure 1).
Tajiks
Tajiks, who speak Dari, are the second-most numerous and second-most powerful community in
Afghanistan. Tajiks are an estimated 25% of the population and constitute a percentage slightly
greater than that (about 35%) of the ANSF officer corps. Tajiks are the core of the “Northern
Alliance” politico-military coalition that often opposes Karzai and his Pashtun inner circle but yet
Congressional Research Service
2

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

works with him in the governing structure. Karzai’s first Vice President is Muhammad Fahim, a
Tajik, and the Defense Minister, Bismillah Khan Mohammedi, is a Tajik as well; his previous post
was Interior Minister.
During the anti-Soviet war and Taliban period, Tajik leaders were centered around the legendary
mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masoud and belonged to the Jamiat Islami (Islamic Society)
mujahedin political party led by Burhanuddin Rabbani (assassinated September 20, 2011).
Rabbani was technically Masoud’s political leader although Masoud was generally perceived as
having a larger following than Rabbani. Tajiks have ruled Afghanistan on only a few occasions,
and Rabbani served as president during the mujahedin government (1992-1996), and served
briefly again as Afghanistan’s leader during November-December 2001, before Karzai was
inaugurated as interim leader.
Some refer to Tajik leaders as “Panjshiris” because many of them are, like Masoud, from the
Panjshir Valley north of Kabul. Masoud, who became legendary for preventing Soviet occupation
forces from conquering the Panjshir Valley, was killed by Al Qaeda supporters two days before
the September 11 attacks on the United States, possibly in conjunction with that plot. Many Tajik
leaders, such as Dr. Abdullah Abdullah and former parliament speaker Yunus Qanooni, have
prospered politically because of their close association with the slain commander. Masoud and the
other Tajiks allied with other non-Pashtun groups to constitute the “Northern Alliance” that
fought the Taliban and remains active informally today. The Tajiks and the Northern Alliance are
discussed extensively in this paper.
Karzai has tried to increase his popularity with the Tajiks by praising their leaders. In September
2012, he commemorated the first anniversary of the Rabbani assassination by renaming Kabul
Education University as “The Martyr of Peace Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani University. He
simultaneously renamed a major street in Kabul and the airport and Qandahar after Rabbani. The
university renaming sparked clashes at the university between Tajik students supporting the
renaming and Pashtun and Hazara students opposing it.
Hazaras
Many Pashtuns are said to be increasingly resentful of the Hazara Shiite minority (about 10% of
the population) that is advancing economically and politically through education. The Hazaras
have historically been looked down upon by the Pashtuns, who have tended to employ Hazaras as
domestic workers and other lower and lower middle class occupations. Observers report that
many Hazaras, including Hazara women, are earning degrees or pursuing training in information
technology, medical, and other highly skilled professions and that they are becoming dominant in
many of these higher paying sectors of the Afghan economy.2 Hazaras are slightly
underrepresented in the ANSF officer corps (about 7%) as of September 2012.
Jealousy of Hazara advancement could have been a factor in the December 6, 2011, bombings of
Hazaras in three cities, killing 60, while they were visiting their mosques to celebrate the Shiite
holy day of Ashura. Pakistan-based militant group, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi—generally allied to the
almost purely Pashtun Taliban, claimed responsibility—possibly in an effort to stir up sectarian
conflict in Afghanistan.

2 Oppel, Richard Jr. and Abdul Waheed Wafa, “Hazara Minority Hustles to Head of the Class in Afghanistan,” New
York Times
, January 4, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
3

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

There are also tensions between the Hazaras and the Tajiks, even though both oppose Pashtun
dominance. A clash took place between the two communities on September 9, 2012, when a car
in procession of Tajiks commemorating the September 9, 2001, death of their historic leader
Ahmad Shah Masoud ran over a Hazara bicyclist. The clash was said to reflect lingering Hazara
resentment of Masoud’s 1993 offensive against then Hazara rivals during the 1992-1996 period of
internecine warfare that preceded the accession of the Taliban regime. In late November 2012,
Pashtun students at four universities in Kabul attacked Hazara students who were trying to
commemorate the Shiite day of mourning (Ashura), prompting the temporary closing of the
universities. The clashes occurred even though Shiite public observance of the holy month of
Muharram has become progressively more prominent as religious freedom has expanded.
Uzbeks
Uzbeks, like the Hazaras, are about 10%. The Uzbek community is Sunni Muslim and speaks a
language akin to Turkish. Most Uzbeks speak Dari as well. The most well-known Uzbek leader in
Afghanistan is Abdul Rashid Dostam, who was allied with Soviet occupation forces but later
defected and helped bring down the Communist regime in Afghanistan in April 1992. He heads a
faction called “Junbush Melli” (National Front), although it does not compete as a separate party
in Afghan elections. Because of their alliance with the Soviet Union during the occupation period,
many Uzbeks in Afghanistan are leftwing and highly secular. Uzbeks are slightly
underrepresented in the ANSF officer corps—about 4.5% as of September 2012.
Ethnic and Factional Cooperation in the Security Sector
The security organs are considered an arena where all the ethnicities have worked together
relatively well. Karzai has tended to place members of different ethnicities to head or be top
deputy in the three main security ministries—the defense ministry, interior ministry, and the
National Directorate for Security (NDS, the intelligence directorate). Still, some believe the NDS
is dominated by Tajiks assisted by a mix of personnel that served during the Soviet occupation era
(the service was then called Khad), and in the mujahedin government of 1992-1996. During
2002-2007, the Central Intelligence Agency reportedly paid for all of the NDS budget.3
As noted above, the overall composition of the ANSF has been brought broadly into line with the
population. However, the Tajiks continue to control many of the command ranks of the Afghan
security institutions and Pashtuns from the south (Durranis) remain underrepresented, in part
because of the fears that insurgents might target their relatives if they join the security forces.
Many of the Pashtuns in the security forces are from the east, particularly the Jalalabad area, and
are of the Ghilzai Pashtun tribal confederation that is prevalent in the east.
Ethnic balance also has been retained in the senior security leadership. In August 2012, the
National Assembly removed from office the long service Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak
(a Pashtun), as well as Interior Minister Bismillah Khan Mohammedi (a Tajik). On September 3,
Karzai nominated Bismillah Khan Mohammedi, a prominent Tajik, as defense minister; General
Ghulam Mujtaba Patang, a Pashtun, to be interior minister; and Minister of Tribal and Border
Affairs Asadullah Khalid, a Pashtun, to become head of the National Directorate of Security

3 Filkins, Dexter, and Mark Mazzetti. “Key Karzai Aide in Graft Inquiry is Linked to C.I.A.” New York Times, August
26, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
4

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

(intelligence directorate). On September 16, 2012, the National Assembly approved all three
security posts overwhelmingly. Khalid, previously governor of Qandahar, has emerged as a
powerful intermediary for Karzai in that province, particularly after the 2011 assassination of
Karzai’s brother Ahmad Wali. Khalid was wounded in an assassination attempt on December 6,
2012, and is undergoing rehabilitation treatment in the United States. Patang formerly headed the
Afghan Public Protection Force, which is taking over security for diplomats and development
projects from private security forces. He became the first professional police officer to rise to the
post of interior minister. Wardak was subsequently made a largely honorific “senior adviser.”
The Role of Political Parties
During the era of the Soviet occupation and the 1992-96 civil war, many of the mujahedin parties
were based on ethnicities, loyal to major ethnic and factional commanders. And, these parties
were largely funded and armed by outside powers. As a result, there has been a popular aversion
to formal political parties in post-Taliban Afghanistan, and parties have been slow to develop.
Since 2009, there apparently has been some evolution in these attitudes and parties and electoral
coalitions have strengthened. Even though many parties still are relatively homogenous
ethnically, they do not advertise themselves as “ethnic” parties per se, because Article 35 of the
Afghan constitution bans parties based on ethnicity or religious sect.
Prior to September 2009, when a new political party’s law was adopted, there were 110 registered
political parties. A September 2009 law required all parties to reregister and to submit 10,000
signatures, spanning at least 22 provinces, to verify their support. By the time of the September
18, 2010, parliamentary election, only five parties had completed the new registration process. By
late 2011, 38 parties had completed the process, and a total of 21 parties are represented in the
lower house of parliament. A July 11, 2012, regulation apparently eased registration rules
somewhat by requiring parties to have offices in at least 20 provinces in order to register.
Partly because parties are viewed with suspicion, President Hamid Karzai has not formed his own
party. However, many of his supporters in the National Assembly (parliament) belong to a
moderate faction of Hizb-e-Islam—composed almost totally of fellow Pashtuns—that is
committed to working within the political system. Hizb-e-Islam is the only one of the mujahedin
parties that is a formally registered party. It is led by Minister of Economy Abdul Hadi
Arghandiwal, whose leadership was reaffirmed at a party conference during October 3-4, 2012.
The militant wing of Hizb-e-Islam is loyal to pro-Taliban insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar;
it is called Hizb-e-Islam Gulbuddin (HIG). The other mujahedin parties have mostly merged into
broader coalitions, as discussed below. Another mostly Pashtun party is Afghan Millat (Afghan
Nation), which was headed until October 2012 by the current Minister of Commerce Anwar ul-
Haq Ahady; he was displaced at an October 4, 2012, party congress by its secretary-general Stana
Gul Sherzad.
It was hoped that post-Taliban Afghanistan would produce a substantial number of secular, pan-
ethnic democratic parties. That process has evolved only gradually, but has accelerated since the
flawed 2009 presidential election. Since 2004, Dr. Abdullah has formed several parties in
succession, although generally composed of other ethnic Tajiks, and rival Tajiks have formed
their own parties. However, these mostly Tajik groupings are increasingly working with other
parties of varying ethnicities and ideologies to increase government accountability. One
prominent secular, pan-ethnic party, the Rights and Justice Party, was formed by ex-Interior
Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar and other allies in October 2011; it is discussed further below.
Congressional Research Service
5

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Another party, the Coalition for Reform and Development, formed in early 2012 to try to ensure
that the presidential election in 2014 is fair.
Prior to 2011, the secular parties were mainly small and received little national attention—often
centered around the personalities of their founders rather than enduring ideas. These parties
include the Afghanistan Labour and Development Party, the National Solidarity Party of
Afghanistan’s Youth, the Republican Party, and the National Congress Party of Afghanistan led
by Abdul Latif Pedram. Other secular parties are left wing, such as the National United Party of
Afghanistan, led by former parliamentarian Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, who was in the Communist era
military. However, some believe that all the smaller, idea-based parties remain weak because the
Single, Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system—in which each voter casts a ballot for only one
candidate—favors candidates running as independents rather than as members of parties.
Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape
U.S. policy since 2001 has been to help expand the capacity of formal Afghan governing
institutions, most of which were nearly nonexistent during Taliban rule. However, the formal
governing structure continues to compete, often unsuccessfully, with the traditional power
structures discussed above.
Establishment of the Formal Afghan Government Structure:
Elected but Centralized Leadership

The ouster of the Taliban government paved the way for the success of a long-stalled U.N. effort
to form a broad-based Afghan government and for the international community to help
Afghanistan build legitimate governing institutions. During Taliban rule (1996-2001),
Afghanistan was run by a small, Qandahar-based group (“Shura”) of Pashtun clerics loyal to
Mullah Mohammad Umar, who remained there. No parliament was functioning, and Government
offices were minimally staffed and without modern equipment. There were virtually no formal
processes to review Mullah Omar’s decision to host Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan.
In the formation of the first post-Taliban transition government, the United Nations was viewed
as a credible mediator by all sides largely because of its role in ending the Soviet occupation.
During the 1990s, a succession of U.N. mediators adopted many of former King Zahir Shah’s
proposals for a government to be selected by a traditional assembly, or loya jirga. However, U.N.-
mediated cease-fires between warring factions did not hold. Non-U.N. initiatives made little
progress, particularly the “Six Plus Two” multilateral contact group, which began meeting in
1997 (the United States, Russia, and the six states bordering Afghanistan: Iran, China, Pakistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). Other failed efforts included a “Geneva group” (Italy,
Germany, Iran, and the United States) formed in 2000; an Organization of Islamic Conference
(OIC) contact group; and prominent Afghan exile efforts, including discussion groups launched
by Hamid Karzai and his clan, former mujahedin commander Abd al-Haq, and Zahir Shah
(“Rome process”). The sections below discuss the formation of the post-Taliban governing
structure of Afghanistan.
Congressional Research Service
6

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

December 2001 Bonn Agreement
Immediately after the September 11 attacks, former U.N. mediator Lakhdar Brahimi was brought
back (he had resigned in frustration in October 1999). U.N. Security Council Resolution 1378
(November 14, 2001) called for a “central” role for the United Nations in establishing a
transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote
stability and aid delivery. After the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the United Nations invited
major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern Alliance and that of the former King—but
not the Taliban—to an international conference in Bonn, Germany.
On December 5, 2001, the factions signed the “Bonn Agreement.”4 It was endorsed by U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001). The agreement was reportedly forged
with substantial Iranian diplomatic help because Iran had supported the military efforts of the
Northern Alliance faction and had leverage to persuade temporary caretaker Rabbani and the
Northern Alliance to cede the top leadership to Hamid Karzai as leader of an interim
administration. Other provisions of the agreement:
• authorized an international peace keeping force to maintain security in Kabul,
and Northern Alliance forces were directed to withdraw from the capital. Security
Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001, and renewed yearly thereafter)
gave formal Security Council authorization for the international peacekeeping
force (International Security Assistance Force, ISAF);
• referred to the need to cooperate with the international community on counter
narcotics, crime, and terrorism; and
• applied the constitution of 1964 until a permanent constitution could be drafted.5
On December 5, 2011, there was an international conference on Afghanistan in Bonn, marking
the 10th anniversary since the 2001 Bonn Conference. The meeting, in part, evaluated governance
progress in Afghanistan since the original convention.
Permanent Constitution Adopted, Sets Up Presidential System
A June 2002 “emergency” loya jirga put a representative imprimatur on the transition; it was
attended by 1,550 delegates (including about 200 women). Subsequently, a 35-member
constitutional commission drafted the constitution, unveiling it in November 2003. It was debated
by 502 delegates, selected in U.N.-run caucuses, at a “constitutional loya jirga (CLJ)” during
December 13, 2003-January 4, 2004. The CLJ, chaired by prominent Islamic scholar and former
interim Afghan leader Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, approved the draft constitution with minor
changes.
The constitution set up a presidential system, with an elected president having relatively broad
powers and a separately elected National Assembly (parliament). Opposing too great a
centralization of power (which would favor Pashtuns), the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance

4 Text of Bonn agreement is at http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/files/petersberg.htm.
5 The last pre-Karzai loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a constitution.
Najibullah convened a loya jirga in 1987 to approve pro-Moscow policies, but that gathering was widely viewed by
Afghans as illegitimate.
Congressional Research Service
7

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

failed in its effort to set up a prime ministership in which the elected parliament would select a
prime minister who would run the day-to-day workings of government. In such a system, the
president’s powers would be limited. In the constitution, the faction did achieve some limitation
to presidential powers by assigning major authorities to the parliament, as discussed below. The
Northern Alliance assumed that, in a prime ministerial system, the post of elected president would
be held by a Pashtun but, in a tradition of power sharing, the prime minister post would be held
by a Tajik or other ethnic minority. The constitution and election system (a two round election if
no majority is achieved in the first round) strongly favor the likelihood that an ethnic Pashtun will
be president of Afghanistan.
The president serves a five-year term, with a two-term limit (Article 62). There are two vice
presidents. The president has broad powers. Under article 64, he has the power to appoint all
“high-ranking officials,” which has been interpreted by Karzai to include not only cabinet
ministers but also members of the Supreme Court, judges, provincial governors and district
governors, local security chiefs, and members of supposedly independent commissions such as
the Independent Election Commission and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
(AIHRC). However, these appointments are constitutionally subject to confirmation by the
National Assembly. The president also is commander-in-chief of the Afghan armed forces. At the
CLJ, the opposition did not achieve the right of elected provincial and district councils to choose
their governors—an outcome the opposition continues to seek to reverse.
The constitution made former King Zahir Shah honorary “Father of the Nation,” a title that was
not heritable; Zahir Shah died on July 23, 2007.6 It (Article 58) also set up the Afghanistan
Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) to refer cases of human rights violations to
“the legal authorities.” (See further below on this commission.)
Karzai Elected in First Post-Taliban Presidential Elections in 2004
Security conditions precluded the holding of the first post-Taliban elections simultaneously. The
first election, for president, was held on October 9, 2004, missing a June constitutional deadline.
Turnout was about 80%. On November 3, 2004, Karzai was declared winner (55.4% of the vote)
over his 17 challengers on the first round, avoiding a runoff. He was sworn in to office in
December 2004, about one year before the swearing in of an elected National Assembly; he ruled
by decree during that one year period.
National Assembly (Parliament) Formation, Powers, and Assertion of Powers
The National Assembly outlined by the constitution consists of a 249 all-elected lower house
(Wolesi Jirga, House of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper house (Meshrano Jirga, House
of Elders). The upper house is selected as follows: one-third, or 34 seats, appointed by the
president (for a five-year term); one-third appointed by the elected provincial councils (four-year
term); and one-third appointed by elected district councils (for a three-year term). Of the
president’s appointments, half (17) are mandated to be women.7

6 Text of constitution is at http://arabic.cnn.com/afghanistan/ConstitutionAfghanistan.pdf.
7 The size of the two bodies is slightly smaller than the size of the same two bodies provided for in the 1964
constitution (214 members in the Wolesi Jirga and 84 members in the Meshrano Jirga, of which one-third were
appointed by the King, one-third appointed by the provincial councils, and one-third directly elected.
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
8

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Because of the difficulty in confirming voter registration rolls and determining district
boundaries, formal elections for the 364 district councils have not been held to date. Each district
boundary is likely to be contentious because it will inevitably separate tribes and clans. Until
there are elected district councils, two-thirds of the Meshrano Jirga are selected by the provincial
councils for four year terms. The lower house is mandated to be at least 28% female (68 people),
an average of two for each of the 34 provinces.
Parliamentary and provincial council elections, which were to establish the National Assembly
and the provincial councils, were originally intended for April-May 2005 but were delayed until
September 18, 2005. The elections were based on a “Single Non-Transferable Vote” System;
candidates stood as individuals, not part of a party list. Voting was for one candidate only,
although the number of representatives varied by province, ranging from 2 (Panjshir Province) to
33 (Kabul Province). Other examples include Herat, 17; Nangahar, 14; Qandahar, Balkh, and
Ghazni, 11 seats each.
Powers of the National Assembly
The National Assembly has become the key formal institution for non-Pashtuns and political
independents to express political opposition to and to exert influence on Karzai. The Assembly
has been set up by the constitution as a relatively powerful body that can, to some extent, check
the powers of the president, although the Northern Alliance and other Karzai critics say it has
insufficient power to brake presidential authority.
The lower house has the power to vote no-confidence against ministers (Article 92)—based on a
proposal by 10% of the lower house membership, or 25 parliamentarians. Both the upper and
lower houses are required to pass laws. Under Article 98 of the constitution, the national budget is
taken up by the Meshrano Jirga first and then passed to the Wolesi Jirga for its consideration.
Both houses of parliament, whose budgets are controlled by the Ministry of Finance, are staffed
by about 275 Afghans, reporting to a National Assembly “secretariat.” There are 18 oversight
committees, a research unit, and a library. USAID has helped the Afghanistan National Assembly
build its capabilities with a program called the Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistance Project (
(APAP). The program assists the Assembly’s outreach efforts, communications, information
technology use, and advises on legislative reform and national budget review.
The National Assembly has, at times, asserted institutional strength since it was first inaugurated
on December 19, 2005. It is the Assembly’s younger, more technocratic independent bloc that has
consistently pushed for the Assembly to assert its authority. One of its first tasks was to review,
and either endorse, amend, or void, the decrees Karzai had issued prior to the formation of the
National Assembly. In March 2006, it achieved a vote to require Karzai’s cabinet to be approved
individually, rather than en bloc, increasing opposition leverage. However, Karzai was able to
obtain confirmation for all but five of his first twenty five nominees. In May 2006, the opposition
within the Assembly compelled Karzai to change the nine-member Supreme Court, the highest
judicial body, including ousting 74-year-old Islamic conservative Fazl Hadi Shinwari as chief
justice. The proximate justification for the ouster was Shinwari’s age, which was beyond the
official retirement age of 65. He was succeeded as chief justice by Abdul Salam Azimi. (Shinwari
later headed the Ulema Council, Afghanistan’s highest religious body, until his death in 2011.)

(...continued)

Congressional Research Service
9

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

The process of confirming Karzai’s second-term cabinet—in which many of Karzai’s nominees
were voted down in several nomination rounds during 2010—again demonstrated the Assembly’s
institutional strength.
The Assembly again asserted itself on August 4, 2012 by voting to oust Defense Minister Abdul
Rahim Wardak and Interior Minister Bismillah Khan Mohammedi. The move was ostensibly on
the grounds of their failure to reduce alleged corruption in their ministries, or to prevent shelling
of northeastern Afghanistan from the Pakistan side of the border. However, some asserted the
move was an effort to ensure that security contracts were opened to a broader range of bidders.
Karzai bowed to the Assembly vote, although, as noted, he subsequently appointed Khan as
defense minister.
The Judiciary and Rule of Law
The Afghan constitution provides for an independent judiciary, led by a nine-member Supreme
Court. The members are appointed by the president, but subject to confirmation by the lower
house of the National Assembly. Of the nine, three judges are appointed to 10-year terms; three
are appointed for seven years, and three are appointed for four years. All nine of the current court
were appointed in May 2006, when the National Assembly insisted the appointment cycle start
anew. The current chief justice, Abdul Salaam Azimi, was appointed to a four-year term; this
term, as well as that of another justice, technically expired in April 2010. They await re-
nomination or replacement. The terms of another three justices will expire in July 2013.
As the highest body in the judiciary, the Supreme Court appoints judges at the provincial and
district level. In mid-2012, the Supreme Court swore in 181 judges, many of whom were women,
and leaving only 38 out of Afghanistan’s 364 districts lacking an assigned judge. Some female
judicial officials, for example Maria Bashir—chief prosecutor in Herat Province (the only female
chief prosecutor in the country)—have been criticized by some groups for enforcing laws that are
heavily skewed against women.8
Still, there is broad international agreement that the Afghan judicial system remains weak and its
independence is questionable. The Afghan government has completed few of the benchmarks for
judicial reform agreed at the July 20, 2010, Kabul conference. Among them, the Afghan
government committed to:
• Enact its draft Criminal Procedure Code into law within six months. This is one
of the 37 laws the Afghans pledged at the Kabul Conference would be enacted. A
draft of a new code was presented to the National Assembly on June 30, 2012,
and debate began in the Wolesi Jirga in late 2012. However, the code has not
been enacted to date. On October 13, 2012, the Wolesi Jirga adopted a law on the
structure and authority of the Attorney General’s Office.
• Improve legal aid services within the next 12 months. A December 10, 2010,
U.N. report said that the Ministry of Justice had opened legal aid offices in some
provinces. However, the “Tokyo Framework,” of reforms, agreed at the Tokyo
donor’s conference of July 8, 2012, requires Afghanistan to “improve access to

8 Graham Bowley. “Afghan Prosecutor Faces Criticism for Her Pursuit of “Moral Crimes.” New York Times, December
29, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
10

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

justice for all”—suggesting that implementation on this issue has been
insufficient.
• Strengthen judicial capabilities to facilitate the return of illegally seized lands.
This commitment was made partly to address the ability of well-connected
individuals to appropriated land—either through the legal process or through
force—for their homes and projects. USAID provided $56 million during
FY2005-2009 to facilitate property registration. An additional $140 million is
being provided from FY2010-2014 to inform citizens of land processes and
procedures, and to establish a legal and regulatory framework for land
administration.
• Align strategy toward the informal justice sector with the National Justice Sector
Strategy.
As a result of the Tokyo conference, Afghanistan committed to present donors with plans to
depoliticize the judiciary and assure rule of law—elements of a National Priority Program (NPP).
In mid-October 2012, the EU judged that not enough progress had been made, and has withheld
about $26 million in aid slated for judiciary reform.
Some institutional barriers to the independence of the judiciary will be difficult to overcome. On
matters involving interpreting the constitution, the Supreme Court has sparred with a rival
institution, a constitutionally mandated “Independent Commission for the Supervision of the
Implementation of the Constitution (ICSIC).” The ICSIC consists of seven commissioners
appointed by the president, subject to confirmation by the lower house of the National Assembly.
To date, two of the required seats remain unfilled.
Informal Justice System
Despite the international focus on the formal justice sector, some estimates say that 80% of cases
are decided in the informal justice system. Many Afghans view the formal sector as riddled with
corruption and unfairness, and continue to use local, informal mechanisms (shuras, jirgas) to
adjudicate disputes—particularly with cases involving local property, familial or local disputes, or
personal status issues In the informal sector, Afghans can usually expect traditional practices of
dispute resolution to prevail, including the traditional Pashtun code of conduct known as
Pashtunwali. Some of these customs include traditional forms of apology (“nanawati” and
shamana”) and compensation for wrongs done.9
However, the informal justice system is dominated almost exclusively by males. For example,
some disputes are resolved by families’ offering to make young girls available to marry older men
from the family that is the counter-party to the dispute, resulting in numerous forced marriages
and child marriages. This practice is known as baad.
Some informal justice shuras take place in Taliban-controlled territory, and some Afghans may
prefer Taliban-run shuras when doing so means they will be judged by members of their own
tribe or tribal confederation. U.S. officials say they do not oppose the widespread use of the
informal justice sector as such, but they do oppose it when it is administered by Taliban members
because of the Taliban’s often extreme interpretations of Islamic law.

9 http://www.khyber.org/articles/2004/JirgaRestorativeJustice.shtml.
Congressional Research Service
11

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

One concern is how deeply the international community should become involved in the informal
justice sector. U.S. programs have focused primarily on the formal justice system, but there has
been increasing attention to the informal system because its use is so prevalent.
U.S. and Other Help for the Formal Judicial Sector
As of July 2010, the U.S. Embassy has an Ambassador rank official heading a “Rule of Law
Directorate.” U.S. funding supports training and mentoring for Afghan justice officials, direct
assistance to the Afghan government to expand efforts on judicial security, legal aid and public
defense, gender justice and awareness, and expansion of justice in the provinces. USAID’s “Rule
of Law Stabilization Program” has trained over 700 Afghan judges. The program also expanded
the Afghan Supreme Court’s training for new judges. Some observers say that Afghanistan’s
counter-narcotics courts have demonstrated particular progress in achieving a steady stream of
convictions of drug traffickers.
USAID also has implemented programs to link the formal and informal justice sector. As part of a
program begun in 2011, USAID has assisted local shuras (informal justice sector) in four districts
to establish a system to transmit their judicial rulings, in writing, to the district government. The
rule of law issue is discussed in depth in CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and
Justice Sector Assistance
, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman.
Rivalries Within and Outside Governing Institutions
As discussed above, many intersecting factors—ethnicity, tribal affiliation, geography, economic
interests, and ideologies—determine politics in Afghanistan. These splits manifest within as well
as outside Afghan governing institutions. Although they largely accept that a Pashtun is most
likely to hold the top slot in the Afghan government, non-Pashtuns insist on being—and are—
represented at all levels of the central government. Ethnic minorities have demanded, and have
achieved, a large measure of control over how government programs are implemented in their
geographic regions. Although Karzai has the power to appoint provincial and district governors,
in practice he has not generally appointed governors of a different ethnicity than the majority of
residents of particular provinces and districts. One possible exception is the governor of Herat,
Daud Shah Saba, appointed in 2011; he is a Pashtun in a province whose major city, Herat, is
overwhelmingly Tajik—although many districts of the province outside the city are majority
Pashtun. The Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), which recommends to the
presidential palace local appointments, often consults notables of a province on local
appointments.
Karzai’s Presidential Leadership, His Close Advisers, and Staff
As president, Karzai is advised by what some observers believe is a narrow spectrum of Pashtuns
in the cabinet and in his presidential office. Many of them are considered hardline Pashtuns who
want to assert Afghan sovereignty; some observers say their advice has contributed to the stream
of Karzai statements in 2012 and 2013 accusing the United States of causing excessive civilian
casualties, committing human rights abuses of Afghans, and impinging on Afghan sovereignty
through continued holding of Afghan detainees. Some of these statements occurred in the context
of Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel’s visit to Afghanistan during March 9-11, 2013. Some see in
these statements an effort by Karzai to establish his legacy as a nationalist leader and parry
criticism by many Afghans (and the Taliban) that he is a “puppet.” Opposition figures have
Congressional Research Service
12

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

distanced themselves from the Karzai statements, saying he is jeopardizing the key relationship
with the United States.
Some Karzai advisers are former members of the moderate wing of the Islamist party Hezb-e-
Islam. Among his top aides are his chief of staff, former Minister of Information and Culture
Abdul Karim Kurram, who was appointed in April 2011; he serves as key gatekeeper of access to
Karzai. He replaced Mohammad Umar Daudzai, an Islamic conservative who fought during the
anti-Soviet war in more radical Hezb-e-Islam faction of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and was said to be
a skeptic of Western/U.S. influence over Afghan decision making.10 Another top palace aide is
minister-counselor Tajj Ayubi.
Some of Karzai’s top advisers are well-educated and Westernized. For example, Karzai trusts
such professionals as French-educated physician—now foreign minister—Zalmay Rassoul and
National Security Adviser Rangin Spanta. Both are Pashtuns. Spanta, who served in the
government during the Soviet occupation era, was foreign minister during March 2006-February
2010, and is said to retain some leftwing views. The National Security Council, headed by
Spanta, is located in the presidential palace complex and heavily populated by ethnic Pashtuns.
Two other trusted NSC officials (both Pashtuns) are first deputy NSC Adviser Ibrahim Spinzada
(a Karzai brother-in-law), and Shaida Mohammad Abdali, the second deputy NSC adviser.
Karzai also surrounds himself with Pashtun tribal and faction leaders from southern Afghanistan,
such as Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh, the former governor of Helmand (until 2005). These
personalities reflect Karzai’s attempts to exert direct control over his home province of Qandahar
and the neighboring large province of Helmand.
Some observers assert that the apparatus around Karzai require improved focus and organization.
One idea that surfaced in 2009, and which some Afghans still raise, is to prod Karzai to create a
new position akin to a “chief administration officer” who can break through administrative
bottlenecks. One of Karzai’s 2009 election challengers, Ashaf Ghani, was not formally given this
role but advises Karzai on government reform and institution building, and manages the transition
from the United States and NATO to Afghan lead. Ghani has been part of Karzai’s advisory team
for all recent major international conferences on Afghanistan, including the December 5, 2011,
Bonn Conference. Ghani is considered a top contender for president in 2014. Another close
Karzai confidant, “Senior Minister” Hedayat Amin Arsala, heads government reform efforts.
Office of Administrative Affairs/General Administrative Office
An administrative unit that has attracted increasing international attention as a center of organized
policymaking is the Office of Administrative Affairs (OAA), referred to by some as the General
Administrative Office (GAO). Some experts say that, particularly under its current head, a Hazara
Shiite named Sadiq Mudabir, it is primarily administrative, and without any policy coordination
role. However, some say it has taken on an informal judicial role by assessing the legitimacy of
citizen, group, and corporate petitions and forwarding those to the relevant ministries for follow-
up action. It is a holdover from the Communist era, and contains many longtime bureaucrats.
During the 1990s it may have had as many as 1,800 personnel, but has been trimmed during the

10 On October 23, 2010, The New York Times asserted that Daudzai was the presidential office’s liaison with Iran for
accepting the approximately $2 million per year in Iranian assistance that is provided as cash. Karzai acknowledged
this financial arrangement. Daudzai was appointed Ambassador to Pakistan in April 2011.
Congressional Research Service
13

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Karzai era to about 700 staff members. The operations of the unit are funded primarily by the
United Kingdom, but U.S. military and civilian officials have been assigned to provide advice
and assistance to the office as well.
Karzai’s Allies in the Lower House of the National Assembly
In addition to his aides in the presidential palace and allies in the government writ large, as of
2012 Karzai has about 70—80 supporters, mostly Pashtuns, in the Wolesi Jirga. Karzai and his
aides hoped to but failed to increase the president’s support base to over 100 in the September 18,
2010, elections, but instead the results caused Karzai’s base to shrink slightly. Of his lower house
supporters, about half are former members of the Hizb-e-Islam party, and many others are
followers of Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, a prominent Pashtun Islamic conservative mujahedin era
party leader.11 Karzai was unable to engineer the selection of Sayyaf to become lower house
speaker in 2011 and displace Yunus Qanooni (Tajik). Neither Sayyaf nor Qanooni was unable to
obtain enough votes to become speaker, instead losing to a compromise candidate, Abdul Raouf
Ibrahimi, an Uzbek who is perceived as weak.
Many of Karzai’s supporters in the lower house are from Qandahar, Karzai’s home province, and
from Helmand province. For example, one pro-Karzai Pashtun who was reelected in the 2010
elections is former militia leader Hazrat Ali (Nangarhar Province), who led the Afghan
component of the failed assault on Osama bin Laden’s purported redoubt at Tora Bora in
December 2001. On the other hand, the 2010 elections resulted in the loss in parliament of Karzai
cousin Jamil Karzai, and Pacha Khan Zadran (Paktia) who, by some accounts, helped Osama bin
Laden escape Tora Bora.
Karzai Support Significant in the Upper House
Karzai has relatively fewer critics in the 102-seat Meshrano Jirga (House of Elder, upper house),
partly because of his bloc of 34 appointments (one-third of that body). In 2005, he engineered the
appointment of an ally as speaker: Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, a noted Islamic scholar and former
mujahedin party leader (Afghanistan National Liberation Front, ANLF), who headed the post-
Communist mujahedin government for one month (May 1992). Mojadeddi resigned in February
2010 and was replaced by another Karzai ally, then deputy speaker Fazl Hadi Muslim Yaar.
Because it is composed of more elderly, established, notable Afghans who are traditionalist in
their political outlook, the Meshrano Jirga has tended to be more Islamist conservative than the
lower house, advocating a legal system that accords with Islamic law, and restrictions on press
and Westernized media broadcasts.
Karzai also has used his bloc of appointments to the upper house to co-opt potential antagonists
or reward his friends. In 2006, he appointed Northern Alliance military leader Muhammad Fahim
to the upper body, although he resigned after a few months. He was Karzai’s primary running
mate in the 2009 elections and is now first vice president. In 2006, Karzai also named a key ally,
former Helmand Governor Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh, to the body.
Karzai was scheduled to make his 34 new upper house appointments (five year terms) prior to the
January 26, 2011, seating of the 2011-2015 parliament. However, Karzai delayed naming his

11 Sayyaf led the Ittihad Islami (Islamic Union) mujahedin party during the war against the Soviet occupation.
Congressional Research Service
14

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

choices while the 2010 election remained in dispute. Because two-thirds of the body serve four-
year terms—and the provincial councils that were elected in 2009 were able to appoint their 68
members of the upper house—the body continued to operate even though Karzai had not
submitted his 34 appointments. On January 27, 2011, the body reaffirmed Muslim Yaar as upper
house speaker. On February 19, 2011, Karzai made his 34 selections, reappointing 18 incumbents
and appointing 16 new members to the body. In line with the constitution, 17 of Karzai’s
appointments are women.
Congressional Research Service
15

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Hamid Karzai, born December 24, 1957, was selected to lead Afghanistan at the Bonn Conference because he was a
prominent Pashtun leader who had been involved in Taliban-era political talks among exiled Afghans and was viewed
as a compromiser rather than a “strongman.” However, some observers consider his compromises as Afghanistan’s
leader a sign of weakness and criticize him for indulging members of his clan and other allies with appointments. His
term expires in 2014 and he is constitutionally barred from running again; he told parliamentarians in August 2011
that he would abide by the constitutional requirement to step down at that time.
From Karz village in Qandahar Province, Karzai has led the powerful Popolzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns since 1999,
when his father was assassinated, allegedly by Taliban agents, in Quetta, Pakistan. Karzai’s grandfather was head of the
consultative National Council during King Zahir Shah’s reign. He attended university in India and supported the
mujahidin party of Sibghatullah Mojadeddi (still a very close ally) during the anti-Soviet war. He was deputy foreign
minister in the mujahidin government of Rabbani during 1992-1995, but he left the government and supported the
Taliban as a Pashtun alternative to Rabbani. He broke with the Taliban as its excesses unfolded and forged alliances
with other anti-Taliban factions, including the Northern Alliance. Karzai entered Afghanistan after the September 11
attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the Taliban, supported by U.S. Special Forces. He became central to U.S.
efforts after Pashtun commander Abdul Haq entered Afghanistan in October 2001 without U.S. support and was
captured and hung by the Taliban. Karzai was slightly injured by an errant U.S. bomb in late 2001.
With heavy protection, Karzai has survived several assassination attempts since taking office, including rocket fire or
gunfire at or near his appearances. His wife, Dr. Zenat Karzai, is a gynecologist by profession. They have two children.
Family Dealings
Controversy has surrounded his siblings for allegedly profiting from Karza’is presidency. His half brother, Ahmad Wali
Karzai, was the most powerful political figure in Qandahar Province until his assassination on July 12, 2011. He was
key to President Karzai’s information network in Qandahar. Ahmad Wali was widely accused of involvement in or
tolerating narcotics trafficking, but reportedly also was a paid informant for the CIA; some of his property has been
used by U.S. Special Forces. After Ahmad Wali’s death, Karzai appointed another brother, Shah Wali Karzai, as
Popolzai chief, and he reputedly has become involved in business dealings in Qandahar that have run him afoul of
another brother, Mahmoud Karzai. Mahmoud is reportedly under U.S. Justice Department investigation for al eged
corruption. He has wide business interests in Qandahar and Kabul, including auto dealerships, a coal mine, a cement
factory, a large gated housing development in Qandahar cal ed Ayno Maina, and had borrowed from Kabul Bank (see
below). Another brother, Qayyum Karzai, served in parliament during 2005-2008 but resigned in October 2008 for
health reasons. He has reportedly been involved in negotiations with Taliban figures on a political settlement. Other
Karzai relatives have profited extensively from international contracts, including a $2.2 billion U.S. “Host Nation
Trucking” contract. The United States banned contracts to one such firm, Watan Risk Management, as of January 6,
2011; the firm is co-owned by two Karzai second cousins—Rashid and Rateb Popal. The Popal brothers reorganized
the company as Watan Group and this firm is the local partner of China National Petroleum Company on a $3 billion
investment, awarded in 2012, to develop oil fields in northern Afghanistan.
U.S.-Karzai Relations
Karzai has periodical y lashed out at what he sees as U.S. and international pressure on him to reduce corruption and
ensure electoral fairness. On April 4, 2010, Karzai suggested that Western meddling in Afghanistan was fueling
support for the Taliban as a legitimate resistance to foreign occupation.12 In October 2011, Karzai said that
Afghanistan would side with Pakistan in the event of a war between Pakistan and the United States. Karzai, as recently
as March 2013, has criticized U.S. military raids, airstrikes, control of detention policies, and U.S. negotiations with
Taliban representatives that bypass the Afghan government, although U.S. policy on many of these issues have often
adjusted toward Karzai’s views. At each downturn in the relationship, top Administration officials have sought to
restore the relationship by muting criticism of his statements and reassuring Karzai of U.S. support—a main example
of which is the May 1, 2012, Strategic Partnership Agreement.13 Karzai visited Washington, DC, the week of January
7, 2013, focused on securing Afghanistan after the international security mission winds down at the end of 2014.
Source: CRS.

12 An exact English translation of his April 4 comments, in which he purportedly said that even he might consider
joining the Taliban if U.S. pressure on him continues, is not available.
13 Dreazen, Yochi, and Sarah Lynch. “U.S. Seeks to Repair Karzai Tie.” Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
16

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

The Political Opposition: The “Northern Alliance,” Dr. Abdullah, and Others
Broadly, the political opposition to Karzai consists mainly of ethnic minorities (Tajik, Uzbek, and
Hazara) who fought the Taliban in a politico-military coalition called the “Northern Alliance,”
discussed above. Since the constitution was adopted in 2004, Northern Alliance figures have
advocated amending it to give more power to parliament and to empower the elected provincial
councils (instead of the president) to select governors and mayors. Such steps would ensure
maximum autonomy from Kabul for non-Pashtun areas, and serve as a check and balance on
Pashtun dominance of the central government. The leaders of these factions tend to be
vehemently anti-Pakistan, which they see as supporting Taliban and other insurgent groups to
broaden their influence in future Afghan governments.
On the other hand, the Northern Alliance figures and their allies have differences among
themselves that has rendered them relatively ineffective as an opposition to Karzai. Many
“opposition” figures have often joined Karzai’s government in exchange for autonomy or a share
of business interests. A key example is Vice President Muhammad Fahim, discussed further
below. Another example is the late President Rabbani, who agreed to chair the 70-member High
Peace Council that is leading Karzai’s effort to reconcile with insurgent leaders. Rabbani was
assassinated by an alleged Taliban operative in September 2011, and was succeeded as High
Peace Council chair by his son, Salahuddin. The Karzai strategy of giving high-level
appointments to his critics has, to date, proved somewhat successful in keeping his opposition
divided.
The Opposition Parties Led by Dr. Abdullah
Although Rabbani was the elder statesman of the Northern Alliance, he was largely displaced in
recent years by harder line Tajiks such as the overall “leader of the opposition”—former Foreign
Minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. Abdullah is about 54 years old; his mother is Tajik and father is
Pashtun but his identity as the foreign envoy of the late Ahmad Shah Masoud gives him Tajik
political identity. He was dismissed from his foreign minister post by Karzai in a March 2006
cabinet reshuffle, causing his political break with Karzai, and, aside from his political activities,
Abdullah heads a private foundation named after Masoud.
Abdullah emerged as Afghanistan’s opposition leader after his unsuccessful challenge against
Karzai for president in the August 2009 election in which widespread fraud was demonstrated. He
is not in parliament but he works to promote his agenda through public statements, in direct
meetings with Karzai, and through allies in the lower house, as discussed below. The cornerstone
of his ideology is to establish a parliamentary system in which the National Assembly would
select a powerful prime minister, although Karzai often accuses him of simply seeking to bring
the Tajiks to ultimate power in Afghanistan. He visited Washington, DC, one week after Karzai’s
May 10-14, 2010, visit, criticizing Karzai’s governance at think tank appearances. He visited
Washington, DC, again in April 2011 and held several meetings with the Obama Administration,
while using several think-tank appearances to criticize Karzai’s governance. Some of Dr.
Abdullah’s representatives say he is likely to run for president again in 2014, but others familiar
with his thinking say he is undecided.
The Northern Alliance bloc in parliament has gone through several iterations. During 2007-2009,
the bloc called itself the United Front (UF), although some accounts refer to it as the “National
Front” or “United National Front.” It was formed in April 2007 by then Wolesi Jirga speaker
Yunus Qanooni (former adviser to Masoud and Northern Alliance stalwart; he was Karzai’s main
Congressional Research Service
17

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

challenger in the 2004 presidential election) and former President Rabbani. The United Front
included some Pashtuns, such as Soviet-occupation era security figures Sayed Muhammad
Gulabzoi and Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, head of the National United Party. Ulumi was not reelected to
parliament in 2010.
The United Front bloc underwent changes during 2009-2010 as Abdullah emerged as the main
national opposition figure. In late May 2010, Abdullah created a formal, national democratic
opposition party called the “Hope and Change Movement” that ran in the September 18, 2010,
elections under that name. Abdullah supporters sought to increase their numbers in the new
Assembly and hold a commanding position that would enable them to block Karzai initiatives or
achieve passage of its own alternative proposals. The 2010 elections results suggest this objective
was not achieved—Abdullah supporters number about 60—roughly the same as in the previous
Assembly. This is also a bloc slightly smaller to Karzai’s core support base. The Hope and
Change Movement represented an example of the growing willingness of Afghan leaders to
identify with and compete as formal political parties.
Splits in the Northern Alliance: The National Coalition and the National Front
On December 22, 2011, Dr. Abdullah assembled 10 political parties to launch the National
Coalition of Afghanistan,
under his leadership. However, this masked a split in Dr. Abdullah’s
Northern Alliance support base. Some Northern Alliance figures are, if not challenging Abdullah
for opposition leadership, at least emerging as strong voices. In June 2011, several key Northern
Alliance leaders, including Dostam and Hazara figure Mohammad Mohaqiq (see below) joined
with former Vice President Ahmad Zia Masoud (Ahmad Shah Masoud’s brother) to announce a
new opposition group—the National Front of Afghanistan.
The National Front of Afghanistan advocates “federalism”—a high degree of autonomy for
Afghan provinces, including appointment of provincial governors by elected provincial councils.
This differs from the Dr. Abdullah/National Coalition platform of pressing for a parliamentary
system. The National Front grouping also is more skeptical of a peace agreement with the Taliban
than is Dr. Abdullah and his allies. Even before this new opposition was formed, Ahmad Zia
Masoud, as well as ousted intelligence leader Amrollah Saleh, a key Tajik, were increasingly
outspoken against a potential settlement with the Taliban.
In the 112th Congress, legislation introduced October 5, 2011, by Representative Dana
Rohrabacher supported the Northern Alliance view of decentralized governance by urging that it
be U.S. policy to support a decentralized, federal political system that “shifts more power to
regions, provinces, and districts and away from a corrupt presidency” and support constitutional
reform that provides for election of mayors, police chiefs, and governors.
Truth and Justice Party Forms
Abdullah and his allies also face a challenge from a party not affiliated with Northern Alliance.
On November 4, 2011, a new party called the Truth and Justice Party formed, proclaiming itself a
reformist party consisting of leaders of all of Afghanistan’s various ethnicities. It represents
opposition to both Karzai and Dr. Abdullah. Major figures behind it include Karzai’s previous
Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar (a Pashtun), who was dismissed by Karzai in 2010, as
well as Uzbek leader Dostam (retaining his membership in the National Front as well) and
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) Chairwoman Sima Simar, an
Congressional Research Service
18

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

ethnic Hazara. Taliban era Deputy Justice Minister Jalaluddin Shinwari joined the party as well.
This party is strongly in favor of reconciliation with the Taliban.
The Informal Power Structure: Other Power Brokers, “Warlords,”
and Local Faction Leaders

An informal power structure exists outside the formal governing institutions—it consists mainly
of locally popular and often well-armed faction leaders. This power structure has begun to re-
emerge in anticipation of the departure of most international forces in 2014, as Afghan
constituencies look for protection from potential civil war or a Taliban comeback. Karzai has
been compelled to work with this informal power structure even while heading the formal power
structure; he argues that confronting faction leaders outright would likely cause their followers to
go into armed rebellion. Some faction leaders, both Northern Alliance figures and Pashtun
leaders, operate in both spheres—holding official positions while also exercising informal
influence their home provinces. In order to stabilize Afghanistan, the United States and its
partners have forged working relations with the informal power structure—often causing
resentment among emerging civil society activists and other Afghan modernizers. A number of
faction leaders own or have investments in Afghan security or other firms that have won business
from U.S. and other donors and fuel allegations of nepotism and other corruption.
Some argue that U.S. policy since 2007 has further empowered local faction leaders or even
created new factions and militias that never existed before. A variety of expedient local security
initiatives undertaken since 2007, including the Afghan Public Protection Program, its successor
the Afghan Local Police Program, Village Stability Operations, and the Critical Infrastructure
Police, have created new security organs that sometimes operate outside the full control of central
security authority. These programs are said by critics to have revived the militia concept that was
being dismantled by the international community during 2001-2006. Some Afghans, particularly
the Northern Alliance, believe that the international community’s original strategy of dismantling
local power structures in favor of a monopoly of central government control over armed force—
which often targeted Northern Alliance militias for demobilization—caused the security
deterioration in 2006-2011.
In February 2007, both houses of parliament passed a law (officially titled the National
Reconciliation, General Amnesty, and National Stability Law) giving amnesty to faction leaders
and others who committed abuses during Afghanistan’s past wars. Karzai sent back to parliament
an altered draft to give victims the right to seek justice for any abuses. Even though the revised
draft contained that amendment, Karzai did not sign the final version in May 2007, leaving the
status unclear. However, in December 2009, the Afghan government published the law in the
official gazette (a process known as “gazetting”), giving it the force of law.
The following sections analyze some of the main faction leaders.
Vice President Muhammad Fahim
Karzai’s choice of Northern Alliance figure Muhammad Fahim as his first vice presidential
running mate in the August 2009 elections reflected Karzai’s reliance on faction leaders as well as
his effort to divide the Northern Alliance. Fahim is a Tajik from the Panjshir Valley region who
was named military chief of the Northern Alliance/UF faction after Ahmad Shah Masoud’s death.
However, the Fahim choice as vice president was criticized by human rights and other groups
Congressional Research Service
19

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

because of Fahim’s long identity as a mujahedin commander/militia faction leader. During 2002-
2007, he reportedly withheld turning over some heavy weapons to U.N. disarmament officials
who have been trying to reduce the influence of local strongmen such as Fahim. In September
2012, he said that the mujahedin—presumably referring to the Northern Alliance fighters—
should reorganize after 2014 if Afghan forces alone prove unable to keep the Taliban at bay.
The Obama Administration officials have not limited their dealings with Fahim as vice president.
Similarly, the Bush Administration continued to deal with Fahim when he was defense minister
(2001-2004) despite reports that he was involved in facilitating narcotics trafficking in northern
Afghanistan, according to a New York Times story of August 27, 2009. Other allegations suggest
he has engineered property confiscations and other benefits to feed his and his faction’s business
interests.Fahim’s brother, Abdul Hussain Fahim, was a beneficiary of concessionary loans from
Kabul Bank, a major bank that has faced major losses due to its lending practices, as discussed
below. The Fahim brother has also partnered with Mahmoud Karzai on coal mining and cement
manufacturing ventures. In August 2010, Fahim was treated in Germany for heart problems.
Abdul Rashid Dostam: Uzbeks Leader in Northern Afghanistan
Some observers have cited Karzai’s handling of prominent Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam as
inconsistent. Dostam, who is discussed above in his political role as a Northern Alliance figure,
commands numerous partisans in his redoubt in northern Afghanistan (Jowzjan, Faryab, Balkh,
and Sar-I-Pol provinces). There, during the Soviet and Taliban years, he was widely accused of
human rights abuses of political opponents. To try to separate him from his armed followers, in
2005 Karzai appointed him to the post of chief of staff of the armed forces. On February 4, 2008,
Afghan police surrounded Dostam’s villa in Kabul in response to reports that he attacked an
ethnic Turkmen rival, but Karzai did not order his arrest for fear of stirring unrest among
Dostam’s followers. To try to resolve the issue without stirring unrest, in December 2008 Karzai
purportedly reached an agreement with Dostam under which he resigned as chief of staff and
went into exile in Turkey in exchange for the dropping of any case against him.14
Dostam returned to Afghanistan on August 16, 2009, and subsequently held a pro-Karzai election
rally in his home city of Shebergan. Part of his intent in supporting Karzai was to limit the
influence of a strong rival figure in the north, Balkh Province Governor Atta Mohammad Noor,
see below. Noor is a Tajik but, under a 2005 compromise with Karzai, is in control of a province
that is inhabited by many Uzbeks. Dostam’s support apparently helped Karzai carry several
provinces in the north in the 2009 election, including Jowzjan, Sar-i-Pol, and Faryab. In January
2010, he was restored to his previous, primarily honorary, position as a senior military advisor to
Karzai. Although Dostam was not nominated to a cabinet post in 2010, two members of his
Junbush Melli faction were; they were voted down by the National Assembly because the
Assembly did not want to confirm partisan activists in the cabinet.
Dostam’s failure to secure posts for his allies could account for his decision to again break with
Karzai and join the opposition National Front of Afghanistan and Truth and Justice Party, as
discussed above. In June 2012, the Karzai government launched a prosecution of Dostam for
allegedly insisting the China National Petroleum Co. (CNPC) hire Dostam loyalists to security
and other jobs on their oil development project in northern Afghanistan. However, Dostam and
those close to him alleged that the prosecution was a Karzai effort to favor his relatives’ firm,

14 CRS email conversation with a then-National Security aide to President Karzai, December 2008.
Congressional Research Service
20

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Watan Group, which is the partner of CNPC on the project and which is therefore in line to
provide security and other services to the development. Dostam continues to alternate his time
between Afghanistan and Turkey; he is said to be suffering from health problems.
Dostam’s reputation is further clouded by his actions during the U.S.-backed war against the
Taliban. On July 11, 2009, the New York Times reported that allegations that Dostam had caused
the death of several hundred Taliban prisoners during the major combat phase of OEF (late 2001)
were not investigated by the Bush Administration. In responding to assertions that there was no
investigation of the Dasht-e-Laili massacre because Dostam was a U.S. ally,15 President Obama
said any allegations of violations of laws of war need to be investigated. Dostam responded to
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (which carried the story) that only 200 Taliban prisoners died
and primarily because of combat and disease, not intentional actions of his forces.
Atta Mohammad Noor: Balkh Province
Atta Mohammad Noor, another figure generally considered part of the Northern Alliance, has
been the governor of Balkh Province, whose capital is the vibrant city of Mazar-e-Sharif, since
2005. He is an ethnic Tajik and former mujahedin commander who openly endorsed Dr. Abdullah
in the 2009 presidential election. However, Karzai has kept Noor in place because he has kept the
province secure, allowing Mazar-e-Sharif to become a major trading hub, and because displacing
him could cause ethnic unrest. Mazar-e-Sharif is one of the four cities transitioned to Afghan
security leadership in June 2011. It is unique in that 60% of the residents of the city have access
to electricity 24 hours per day, a far higher percentage than most other cities in Afghanistan, and
higher even than Kabul. His critics say that Noor exemplifies the local potentate, brokering local
security and business arrangements that enrich Noor and his allies while ensuring stability and
prosperity.16 Some reports say that he commands two private militias in the province that, in at
least two districts (Chimtal and Charbolak), outnumber official Afghan police, and which prompt
complaints of abuses (land seizures) by the province’s Pashtuns. Some press reports say Atta
Mohammad is considering running for president in 2014, although others say his mulling of a
candidacy is intended primarily to ensure his continued autonomy after 2014.
Mohammed Mohaqiq: Hazara Stalwart
Another faction leader is Mohammad Mohaqiq, a Hazara leader. During the war against the
Soviet Union and then Taliban, Mohaqiq was a commander of Hazara fighters in and around
Bamiyan Province, and a major figure in the Hazara Shiite Islamist party Hezb-e-Wahdat (Unity
Party). The party was supported by Iran during those periods.
Currently, Mohaqiq is aligned with Dostam and hardline Tajik figures in the National Front of
Afghanistan party. In July 2012, Mohaqiq demanded Karzai fire the head of the Academy of
Sciences for publishing a new national almanac that Mohaqiq said overstated the percentage of
Pashtuns in Afghanistan at 60%. Karzai fired the Academy head and three others at that
institution. Another major Hazara figure, Karim Khalili, tends to work with Karzai and has served
as his second vice president through Karzai’s two terms as president.

15 This is the name of the area where the Taliban prisoners purportedly died and were buried in a mass grave.
16 Gall, Carlotta, “In Afghanistan’s North, Ex-Warlord Offers Security.” New York Times, May 17, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
21

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Isma’il Khan: Western Afghanistan/Herat
Another Northern Alliance strongman that Karzai has sought to both engage and weaken is
prominent Tajik political leader and former Herat Governor Ismail Khan. Herat is one of the four
cities that was transitioned to Afghan security leadership in July 2011 and is generally considered
secure and economically vibrant. In 2006, Karzai appointed Khan minister of energy and water,
taking him away from his political base in the west. However, Khan remains influential in
western Afghanistan, and maintaining ties to Khan helped Karzai win Herat Province in the 2009
election. Still, Khan is said to have several opponents in Herat, and a bombing there on
September 26, 2009, narrowly missed his car.
Despite U.S. concerns about Khan, Karzai renominated him in his ministry post on December 19,
2009. The renomination was initially voted down by the National Assembly, but he remained in
an acting capacity and was ultimately re-confirmed in March 2012. In October 2010, Karzai
appointed him to the High Peace Council that is the main body overseeing the reconciliation
process with Taliban leaders. In November 2010, Afghan television broadcast audio files
purporting to contain Khan insisting that election officials alter the results of the September 18,
2010, parliamentary elections.17
U.S. concerns about Khan’s continuing role as a faction leader—and a sign of the re-emergence
of traditional authority forms—were reinforced in November 2012. Anticipating greater Taliban
strength after the international forces draw down at the end of 2014, Khan rallied thousands of his
followers in the desert outside Heart, calling on them to reactivate their networks to prepare for
possible eventual battle with the Taliban. He reportedly has begun enlisting new recruits for a
reviving militia force. Karzai’s office criticized the gathering and Khan’s efforts as contrary to
government policy.18 Khan may have been trying to reassure the Herat business community,
which reportedly has grown nervous about the international pullout in 2014, that the city and its
economic prospects will be secure in any scenario. On the other hand, his comments included
criticisms of U.S. forces for bringing in “American girls” to Afghanistan and revived memories of
Khan’s role in the March 1979 in killing 50 Soviet advisors in western Afghanistan. Then a
captain in the Afghan military, the attack by military personnel loyal to Khan marked the start of
the mujahedin uprising that triggered the December 1979 Soviet invasion.
Helmand Province Power Brokers
Karzai’s relationship with a Pashtun strongman, Sher Mohammad Akhundzadeh, demonstrates
the dilemmas facing Karzai in governing Afghanistan. Akhunzadeh was a close associate of
Karzai when they were in exile in Quetta, Pakistan, during Taliban rule. Karzai appointed him
governor of Helmand after the fall of the Taliban, but in 2005, Britain demanded he be removed
for his abuses and reputed facilitation of drug trafficking, as a condition of Britain taking security
control of Helmand. Karzai acceded to the demand, even though he subsequently asserted that
Akhundzadeh was more successful against militants in Helmand using his local militiamen than
Britain has been with its more than 9,000 troops there. Akhunzadeh attempted to deliver large
numbers of votes for Karzai in Helmand in the 2009 election, although turnout in that province
was light partly due to Taliban intimidation of voters. Akhunzadeh and other traditional Helmand

17 Partlow, Joshua, “Audio Files Raise New Questions About Afghan Elections.” Washington Post, November 11,
2010.
18 Graham Bowley. “Afghan Warlord’s Call to Arms Rattles Officials.” New York Times, November 13, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
22

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

leaders apparently won their power struggle with Helmand governor Ghulab Mangal, who is from
eastern Afghanistan, when Karzai replaced Mangal on September 20, 2012.
An Akhunzadeh ally, Abdul Wali Khan (nicknamed “Koka”), was similarly removed by British
pressure in 2006 as police chief of Musa Qala district of Helmand. However, the Afghan
government insisted on—and obtained—his reinstatement a few years later and his militia
followers subsequently became the core of the police force in the district. Koka is mentioned in a
congressional report as accepting payments from security contractors who are working under the
U.S. Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) “Host National Trucking” contract that secures U.S.
equipment convoys. Koka allegedly agreed to secure the convoys in exchange for the payments.19
Karzai Family: Qandahar Province
Governing Qandahar, a province of about 2 million, of whom about half live in Qandahar city, is
a sensitive issue in Kabul because of President Karzai’s active political interest in his home
province. Qandahar governance is particularly crucial to ongoing U.S. military-led operations to
increase security in surrounding districts, giving the July 12, 2011, assassination of Karzai’s half
brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, crucial significance.
Ahmad Wali was chair of the Qandahar provincial council, a post with relatively limited formal
power, but he was always more powerful than any appointed governor of Qandahar. President
Karzai frequently rotated the governors of Qandahar to ensure that none of them would impinge
on Ahmad Wali’s authority. Perceiving him as the key power broker in the province, many
constituents and interest groups met him each day to request his interventions on their behalf.
Qandahar governance suffered an additional blow on July 27, 2011, when the appointed mayor of
Qandahar city, Ghulam Haider Hamidi, was assassinated. Hamidi was an Afghan American
accountant by training.
Before Ahmad Wali’s assassination, U.S. officials had been trying to bolster the clout of the
appointed Qandahar governor, Tooryalai Wesa by supporting Wesa’s efforts to equitably distribute
development funds and build local governing structures.20 Karzai had appointed Wesa—a
Canadian-Afghan academic—in December 2008, perhaps hoping that his ties to Canada would
convince Canada to continue its mission in Qandahar beyond 2011. That did not succeed.
The international community expected, and hoped, that the death of Ahmad Wali Karzai would
further empower Governor Wesa. However, Karzai installed another of his brothers, Shah Wali
Karzai, as head of the Popolzai clan after Ahmad Wali’s death. Shah Wali at first lacked the
acumen and clout of Ahmad Wali, but reports since mid-2012 say he has become highly
influential, while also becoming involved in significant business dealings that continue to cast
aspersions on the Karzai family. Prior to appointing him intelligence director in September 2012,
Karzai used former Qandahar governor Asadullah Khalid as an informal envoy in the province.

19 House of Representatives. Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform. “Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan.” Report
of the Majority Staff, June 2010.
20 Partlow, Joshua, “U.S. Seeks to Bolster Kandahar Governor, Upend Power Balance,” Washington Post, April 29,
2010.
Congressional Research Service
23

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Another power center is Qandahar’s police chief, Colonel Abdul Razziq. He is perceived as
having increasing weight, as well as a reputation for corruption, including siphoning off customs
revenues at the key Spin Boldak crossing from Pakistan. He was appointed to his current post in
March 2011 when his predecessor was killed in an insurgent attack. Razziq’s convoy was
attacked in September 2012, and he was injured, but not severely.
Ghul Agha Shirzai: Eastern Afghanistan/Nangarhar
A key gubernatorial appointment has been Ghul Agha Shirzai as governor of Nangarhar. He is a
Pashtun from the powerful Barakzai clan based in Qandahar Province, previously serving as
governor of that province, where he reportedly continued to exercise influence in competition
with Ahmad Wali Karzai. As noted above, Shirzai had considered running against Karzai in 2009
but then opted not to run as part of a reported “deal” that yielded unspecified political and other
benefits for Shirzai. He has said he will run in 2014.
In Nangarhar, Shirzai is generally viewed as an interloper. But, much as has Noor in Balkh,
Shirzai has exercised relatively effective leadership, particularly in curbing poppy cultivation
there. However, Shirzai is also widely accused of arbitrary action against political or other
opponents, and he reportedly does not remit all the customs duties collected at the Khyber
Pass/Torkham crossing to the central government. U.S. officials say that he has kept some of the
funds, and moves substantial funds around in cash rather than the Afghan banking system. He
was briefly questioned in July 2012 in Germany about several suitcases of cash he was carrying,
but was allowed to proceed. His supporters say he uses much of the funds—deposited in an
account called the “Shirzai Fund”—for the benefit of the province, not trusting that funds
remitted to Kabul would be spent in the province. A Kabul effort to stop the illicit fund siphoning
is discussed in the section on corruption below. Some U.S. reports say he has intervened in the
province’s judicial process to win freedom for Taliban suspects with whom he might have
commercial ties. Shirzai denies the allegations.21 The allegations are said to have soured U.S.
officials on his leadership in light of purported security deterioration in the province in 2012.
Traditional Decision-Making Processes Of the Informal Power Structure
The informal power structure has decision-making bodies and processes that do not approximate
Western-style democracy but yet have participatory and representative elements. Meetings called
shuras, or jirgas (consultative councils),22 often composed of designated notables, are key
mechanisms for making or endorsing authoritative decisions or dispensing justice. Some of these
mechanisms are practiced by Taliban insurgents in areas under their control or influence. On the
other hand, some see the traditional patterns as competing with and detracting from the
development of the post-Taliban formal power structure—a structure that, with Western guidance,
has generally tried to meet international standards of democratic governance.

21 Nathan Hodge. “U.S. Finds Graft by Favored Afghan Leader.” Wall Street Journal, November 3, 2012.
22 Shura is the term used by non-Pashtuns to characterize the traditional assembly concept. Jirga is the Pashtun term.
The Afghan constitution provides for a constitutional loya jirga as the highest decision-making body, and specifies the
institutions that must be represented at the jirga. If a constitutional jirga cannot be held or is blocked, a traditional jirga
can be convened by the president to discuss major issues, although its ability to render binding decisions on proposals
is unclear.
Congressional Research Service
24

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

At the national level, one traditional mechanism has carried over into the post-Taliban governing
structure. The convening of a loya jirga, an assembly usually consisting of about 1,500 delegates
from all over Afghanistan, has been used on several occasions. Under the constitution, decisions
of a loya jirga supersede decisions made under any other process, including cabinet meetings or
even elections. In the post-Taliban period, loya jirgas have been convened to endorse Karzai’s
leadership, to adopt a constitution, and to discuss a long-term defense relationship with the United
States. A special loya jirga, called a peace jirga, was held on June 2-4, 2010, to review
government plans to offer incentives for insurgent fighters to end their armed struggle and rejoin
society. Another loya jirga was held during November 16-19, 2011, to endorse proposed Afghan
government conditions on a Strategic Partnership Agreement between Afghanistan and the United
States. However, the constitution specifies who should be delegates at a constitutional loya jirga,
and, in the absence of elected district councils (whose members are mandated to be included), all
of Afghanistan’s post-2004 loya jirgas have been traditional loya jirgas.
Emerging Power Centers: Civil Society and
“Independent” Activists

The fall of the Taliban and international intervention has enabled an entire new center of
influence to emerge—a power center with the potential to sustain modernization and progress
after the 2014 transition. Civil society activists and “independents” in the National Assembly and
other institutions—such as the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, various women’s
groups, intellectuals, and a variety of watchdog groups focused on human rights, the
environment, corruption, and other issues—are a growing force in Afghan politics. They are
familiar with and have easy access to media outlets. Some own new media outlets: the Mohseni
family that owns Moby Media (Tolo Television); the Mohsenis are said to be close to the Karzai
administration but have often criticized its performance as well as restrictions on media content.
However, civil society activists continue to struggle against traditional faction leaders—many of
whom are willing to use their armed factions to intimidate opponents—to exert influence over
policy. U.S.-based International Republican Institute (IRI) has helped train the independents in
the National Assembly; the National Democratic Institute (NDI) has assisted the more established
factions.
Of the independents that were present in the 2005-2010 parliament, one, the 45-year-old Malalai
Joya (Farah Province), was a leading critic of war-era faction leaders. In May 2007 the lower
house voted to suspend her for this criticism for the duration of her term and she did not seek
reelection in 2010. Ms. Fawzia Koofi, at one time a deputy lower house speaker and declared
presidential candidate for 2014, also remains in the Assembly and an outspoken leader on Afghan
women’s rights.
Others in this independent camp have included Ms. Fauzia Gailani (Herat Province, not returned
to parliament in 2010); Ms. Shukria Barekzai, chairwoman of the lower house Defense
Committee during 2011; and Mr. Ramazan Bashardost, a former Karzai minister who champions
parliamentary powers and has established a “complaints tent” near the parliament building to
highlight and combat official corruption. (He ran for president in the 2009 elections on an anti-
corruption platform and drew an unexpectedly large amount of votes.) Bashardost was returned to
parliament in the September 2010 election and may run again in 2014.
Some other leading independents are present in the 2011-2015 lower house. They include Rafiq
Shahir from Herat, a well-known civil-society activist; Dr. Saleh Seljuki; and Ahmad Behzad (all
Congressional Research Service
25

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

from Herat). Other independents reelected include Shakiba Hashemi and Khalid Pashtun, both
from Qandahar.
Elections in 2009 and 2010 Harmed Confidence in the Electoral
Process and Widened Political Schisms

Elections are widely considered a key harbinger of the durability and extent of Afghanistan’s
political development—and a barometer of the degree to which factional, political, ethnic, and
sectarian rivalries can be reduced. The 2009 presidential and provincial elections were the first
post-Taliban elections run by the Afghan government itself in the form of the Afghanistan
Independent Electoral Commission. Both it and the September 2010 National Assembly elections
were flawed, as discussed below, and it is not clear that the structural flaws will be corrected by
the time of the presidential and provincial elections in April 2014.
2009 Presidential Election
The 2009 election was plagued, from the start, by assertions of a lack of credibility of the
Independent Elections Commission. Its commissioners, including then-Chairman Azizullah
Ludin, were selected by, and many were politically close to, Karzai. As a check and balance to
ensure electoral credibility, there was also a U.N.-appointed Elections Complaints Commission
(ECC) that reviewed fraud complaints. Under the 2005 election law, there were three ECC seats
for foreign nationals, appointed by the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General/head
of U.N. Assistance Mission–Afghanistan, UNAMA. The two Afghans on the ECC governing
council23 were appointed by the Supreme Court and Afghanistan Independent Human Rights
Commission, respectively.
Disputes first erupted over the election date. On February 3, 2009, Afghanistan’s Independent
Election Commission (IEC) set August 20, 2009, as the election date (a change from a date
mandated by Article 61 of the Constitution as April 21, 2009, in order to allow at least 30 days
before Karzai’s term expired on May 22, 2009). The IEC decision on the latter date cited Article
33 of the Constitution as mandating universal accessibility to the voting—and saying that the
April date was precluded by difficulties in registering voters, printing ballots, training staff,
advertising the elections, and the dependence on international donor funding, in addition to the
security questions.24 His opponents insisted that Karzai’s presidency ended May 22, 2009, and
that a caretaker government should run Afghanistan until elections. On March 4, 2009, the IEC
reaffirmed the August date and the Afghan Supreme Court backed it on March 28, 2009. The
Obama Administration publicly backed these rulings.
Election Modalities and Processes
Despite the political dispute between Karzai and his opponents, enthusiasm among the public
appeared high in the run-up to the election. Registration, which updated 2005 voter rolls, was
conducted during October 2008-March 2009. About 4.5 million new voters registered, and about

23 ECC website, http://www.ecc.org.af/en/.
24 Statement of the Independent Election Commission Secretariat, February 3, 2009, provided to CRS by a Karzai
national security aide.
Congressional Research Service
26

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

17 million total Afghans were registered. However, there were widespread reports of registration
fraud (possibly half of all new registrants), with some voters registering on behalf of women who
do not, by custom, show up at registration sites, and others selling registration cards.
Presidential candidates filed to run during April 24-May 8, 2009. A total of 44 registered to run
for president, of which three were disqualified for various reasons, leaving a field of 41 (later
reduced to 32 after several dropped out). In the provincial elections, 3,200 people competed for
420 seats nationwide. Although about 80% of the provincial council candidates ran as
independents, some of Afghanistan’s parties, including Hezb-i-Islam, fielded multiple candidates
in several different provinces. The provincial elections component of the election received little
attention, in part because the role of these councils is unclear. About 200 women competed for the
124 seats reserved for women (29%) on the provincial councils, although in two provinces
(Qandahar and Uruzgan) there were fewer women candidates than reserved seats. In Kabul
Province, 524 candidates competed for the 29 seats of the council.
The European Union, supported by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) sent a few hundred observers, and the International Republican Institute and National
Democratic Institute sent observers as well. About 8,000 Afghans assisted the observation
missions, according to the U.N. Nations Development Program.
Security was a major issue for all the international actors supporting the Afghan elections process,
amid open Taliban threats against Afghans who vote. In the first round, about 7,000 polling
centers were to be established (with each center having multiple polling places, totaling about
29,000), but, of those, about 800 were deemed too unsafe to open, most of them in restive
Helmand and Qandahar provinces. A total of about 6,200 polling centers opened on election day.
The total cost of the Afghan elections in 2009 were about $300 million. Other international
donors contributing funds to close the gap left by the U.S. contribution of about $175 million.25
The Political Contest and Campaign
The presidential competition took shape in May 2009. In the election-related deal-making,26
Karzai obtained an agreement from Fahim to run as his first vice presidential running mate. In
doing so, Karzai showed the UF opposition grouping to be split. Karzai, Fahim, and incumbent
second Vice President Karim Khalili (a Hazara) registered their ticket on May 4, 2009, just before
Karzai left to visit the United States. Karzai convinced several prominent Pashtuns not to run,
including Ghul Agha Shirzai, a member of the powerful Barakzai clan; and Anwar al-Haq Ahady,
the former finance minister and Central Bank governor. Anti-Karzai Pashtuns failed to coalesce
around one challenger, such as Former Interior Minister Ali Jalali and former Finance Minister
(2002-2004) and then Karzai critic Ashraf Ghani. Ghani decided to run without Jalali or
prominent representation from other ethnicities in his vice presidential slots.
The UF had difficulty forging a united challenge to Karzai. Dr. Abdullah registered to run with
UF backing. His running mates were Dr. Cheragh Ali Cheragh, a Hazara who did poorly in the
2004 election, and a little known Pashtun, Homayoun Wasefi.

25 Report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), September 9, 2010.
26 Some of the information in this section obtained in CRS interviews with a Karzai national security aide, December
2008.
Congressional Research Service
27

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Karzai went into the election as a clear favorite, but the key question was whether he would win
in the first round (more than 50% of the vote). Although Karzai was criticized for a campaign that
relied on reaching out to traditional leaders, he did participate in at least one publicly broadcast
debate (August 16, 2009, on state-run Radio Television-Afghanistan, RTA) with two of his rivals
(Abdullah did not participate). Dr. Abdullah campaigned extensively in his key base in the north
and west, which are populated mainly by Tajiks, but he did campaign in some Pashtun-dominated
areas. Both Karzai and Abdullah held large rallies in Kabul and elsewhere. Ghani had spent much
time in the United States and Europe and many average Afghans viewed him as out of touch.
Focusing on urban voters, he made extensive use of the Internet for advertising and fundraising,
and he was advised by James Carville.27 A candidate who polled unexpectedly well was 56-year-
old anti-corruption parliamentarian Ramazan Bashardost, an ethnic Hazara. He ran a low-budget
campaign was appealed to reform-minded Afghans outside his core Hazara base. However,
Mohaqiq’s backing (he was allied to Karzai at that time) apparently helped Karzai carry the
Hazara heartland of Bamiyan province.
The Election Results
Taliban intimidation and voter apathy appear to have suppressed the total turnout to about 5.8
million votes cast, or about a 35% turnout, far lower than expected. Twenty-seven Afghans,
mostly security forces personnel, were killed in election-day violence. Some observers said that
turnout among women was primarily because there were not sufficient numbers of female poll
workers to make women feel comfortable enough to vote. In general, however, election observers
reported that poll workers were well trained, and the voting process was orderly.
Clouding the election substantially were the widespread fraud allegations coming from all sides.
Dr. Abdullah held several news conferences after the election, purporting to show evidence of
systematic election fraud by the Karzai camp. The ECC, in statements, stated its belief that there
was substantial fraud likely committed, mostly by Karzai supporters. The final, uncertified total
was released on September 16, 2009, and showed Karzai at 54.6% and Dr. Abdullah at 27.7%.
Bashardost and Ghani received single-digit vote counts (9% and 3% respectively).
The constitution required that a second-round runoff, if needed, be held two weeks after the
results of the first round are certified. Following the release of the vote count, the complaints
evaluation period began which, upon completed, would yield a “certified” vote result. On
September 8, 2009, the ECC ordered a recount of 10% of polling stations (accounting for as many
as 25% total votes). Polling stations were considered “suspect” if the total number of votes
exceeded the 600 maximum number allotted to each polling station; or where any candidate
received 95% or more of the total valid votes cast at that station. Perhaps reflecting political
sensitivities, the recount consisted of a sampling of actual votes.28
On October 20, 2009, the ECC determined, based on its investigation, that about 1 million Karzai
votes, and about 200,000 Abdullah votes, were fraudulent and were deducted from their totals.
The final, certified, results of the first round were as follows: Karzai—49.67% (according to the
IEC; with a slightly lower total of about 48% according to the ECC determination); Abdullah—
30.59%; Bashardost—10.46%; Ghani—2.94%; Yasini—1.03%; and lower figures for the

27 Mulrine, Anna, “Afghan Presidential Candidate Takes a Page From Obama’s Playbook,” U.S. News and World
Report
, June 25, 2009.
28 “Afghan Panel to Use Sampling in Recount,” USA Today, September 22, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
28

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

remaining field.29 During October 16-20, 2009, U.S. and international officials, including visiting
Senator John Kerry, met with Karzai to try to persuade him to accept that his vote did not exceed
the 50%+ threshold needed for a first-round victory. He did so on October 21, 2009, after the IEC
accepted the ECC findings. A runoff was set for November 7, 2009. Abdullah initially accepted.
In an attempt to produce a fair second round, UNAMA, which provided advice and assistance to
the IEC, requested that about 200 district-level election commissioners be replaced and that there
be fewer polling stations—about 5,800, compared to 6,200 previously—to eliminate polling
stations where very few votes were expected to be cast.
Prior to the ECC vote certification, Dr. Abdullah told CRS at a meeting in Kabul on October 15,
2009, that he might be willing to negotiate with Karzai on a “Joint Program” of reforms—such as
direct election of provincial governors—to avoid a runoff. However, some said the constitution
does not provide for a negotiated settlement. The issue was mooted on November 1, 2009, when
Dr. Abdullah refused to participate in the runoff on the grounds that problems that plagued the
first round were unresolved. On November 2, 2009, the IEC issued a statement saying that, by
consensus, the body had determined that Karzai, being the only candidate remaining in a two-
person runoff, should be declared the winner. The Obama Administration accepted the outcome as
“within Afghanistan’s constitution,” on the grounds that the fraud had been investigated. U.N.
Secretary General Ban Ki Moon (visiting Kabul), and several governments, congratulated Karzai.
As noted above, the election for the provincial council members were not certified until
December 29, 2009. The council members took office in February 2010.
September 18, 2010, Parliamentary Elections
The split over the conduct of the presidential elections widened in the run-up to the September
18, 2010, parliamentary elections. Mechanisms to prevent fraud were not fully implemented and
the results continue to be disputed as of July 2011, largely paralyzing the institutional functioning
of the Assembly and its role as a check and balance on the Karzai government. As a result, the
political structure of Afghanistan has continued to fragment, even as the government assumers
greater responsibility in the context of a transition to Afghan security leadership beginning in July
2011. The July 20, 2010, Kabul conference final communiqué included an Afghan government
pledge to initiate, within six months, a strategy for long-term electoral reform.
Election Timing
On January 2, 2010, the IEC had initially set National Assembly elections for May 22, 2010. The
IEC view was that this date was in line with a constitutional requirement for a new election to be
held well prior to the expiry of the current Assembly’s term. However, U.S., ECC, UNAMA, and
officials of donor countries argued that Afghanistan’s flawed institutions would not be able to
hold free and fair elections under this timetable. Among the difficulties noted were that the IEC
lacks sufficient staff, given that some were fired after the 2009 election; that the IEC lacked funds
to hold the election under that timetable; that the U.S. military buildup will be consumed with
securing still restive areas at election time; and that the ECC’s term expired at the end of January
2010. A functioning ECC was needed to evaluate complaints against registered parliamentary

29 See IEC website for final certified tallies, http://www.iec.org.af/results.
Congressional Research Service
29

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

candidates because there are provisions in the election law to invalidate the candidacies of those
who have previously violated Afghan law or committed human rights abuses.
The international community pressed for a delay of all of these elections until August 2010 or,
according to some donors, mid-2011.30 Bowing to funding and the wide range of other
considerations mentioned, on January 24, 2010, the IEC announced that the parliamentary
elections would be postponed until September 18, 2010. Other experts said that the security
issues, and the lack of faith in Afghanistan’s election institutions, necessitated further
postponement.31
About $120 million was budgeted by the IEC for the parliamentary elections, of which at least
$50 million came from donor countries, giving donors leverage over when the election might take
place. The remaining $70 million was funds left over from the 2009 elections. Donors had held
back the needed funds, possibly in an effort to pressure the IEC to demonstrate that it is
correcting the flaws identified in the various “after-action” reports on the 2009 election. With the
compromises and Karzai announcements below, those funds were released as of April 2010.
Election Decree/Reform
Amid the dispute between the Karzai government and international donors over how to ensure a
free and fair election, in February 2010 Karzai signed an election decree that would supersede the
2005 election law and govern the 2010 parliamentary election.32 The Afghan government argued
that the decree superseded the constitutional clause that any new election law not be adopted less
than one year prior to the election to which that law will apply. Substantively, some of the
provisions of the election decree—particularly the proposal to make the ECC an all-Afghan
body—alarmed in the international community. On March 14, 2010, after discussions with
outgoing UNAMA head Kai Eide, Karzai reportedly agreed to cede to UNAMA two
“international seats” on the ECC, rather than to insist that all five ECC members be Afghans.
Still, the majority of the ECC seats were Afghans. The National Assembly did not block the
decree; the Wolesi Jirga voted against it but the Meshrano Jirga did not act, thus allowing the
decree to stand. Karzai upheld his pledge to implement the March 2010 compromise with then
UNAMA head Eide by allowing UNAMA to appoint two ECC members and to implement a
requirement that at least one non-Afghan ECC member concur in decisions.
Among other steps to correct the mistakes of the 2009 election, the Afghan Interior Ministry
planned instituted a national identity card system to curb voter registration fraud. However,
observers say that registration fraud still occurred. On April 17, 2010, Karzai appointed a new
IEC head, Fazel Ahmed Manawi, a Tajik, who drew praise from many factions (including
“opposition leader” Dr. Abdullah, who is half Tajik and identifies with that ethnicity) for
impartiality. The IEC also barred 6,000 poll workers who served in the 2009 election from
working the 2010 election.

30 Trofimov, Yaroslav, “West Urges Afghanistan to Delay Election,” Wall Street Journal, December 11, 2009.
31 Rondeaux, Candace, “Why Afghanistan’s September Elections Ought to Be Postponed.” Washington Post, July 11,
2010.
32 Partlow, Joshua, “Afghanistan’s Government Seeks More Control Over Elections,” Washington Post, February 15,
2010.
Congressional Research Service
30

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Preparations and the Vote
Preparations for the September 18 election proceeded without major disruption, according to the
IEC. Candidates registered during April 20-May 6, 2010. A list of candidates was circulated on
May 13, 2010, including 2,477 candidates for the 249 seats.33 These figures included 226
candidates who registered but whose documentation was not totally in order; and appeal restored
about 180 of them. On May 30, 2010, in a preliminary ruling, 85 other candidates were
disqualified as members of illegal armed groups. However, appeals and negotiations restored all
but 36 in this latter category. A final list of candidates, after all appeals and decisions on the
various disqualifications, was issued June 22. The final list included 2,577 candidates, including
406 women. Sixty-two candidates were invalidated by the ECC, mostly because they did not
resign their government positions, as required.
Voter registration was conducted June 12-August 12. According to the IEC, over 375,000 new
voters were registered, and the number of eligible voters was about 11.3 million. Campaigning
began June 23. Many candidates, particularly those who are women, said that security difficulties
have prevented them from conducting active campaigning, and three candidates were killed by
insurgent violence.
On August 24, 2010, the IEC announced that the Afghan security forces say they would only be
able to secure 5,897 of the planned 6,835 polling centers. Therefore it was decided that the 938
stations not securable would not open, in order to prevent so-called “ghost polling stations”—
stations open but where no voters can go, thus allowing for ballot-stuffing. After further security
evaluation, on election day, 5,355 centers were opened. About 5.6 million votes were cast out of
about 17 million eligible voters. Turnout was therefore about 33%. A major issue suppressing
turnout was security. At first, it appeared as though election-day violence was lower than in the
2009 presidential election. However, on September 24, NATO/ISAF announced that there were
about 380 total attacks, about 100 more than in 2009. The attacks did not derail the election.
Parliamentary Election Outcome
Preliminary results were announced on October 20, 2010, and final, IEC-certified results were to
be announced by October 30, 2010, but were delayed until November 24, 2010, due to
investigation of fraud complaints. While the information below illustrates that there was
substantial fraud, the IEC and ECC have been widely praised by the international community for
their handling of the fraud allegations.
Of the 5.6 million votes cast, the ECC invalidated 1.3 million (about 25%) after investigations of
fraud complaints. The ECC prioritized complaints filed as follows: 2,142 as possibly affecting the
election, 1,056 as unable to affect the result, and 600 where there will be no investigation. Causes
for invalidation most often included ballot boxes in which all votes were for one candidate. About
1,100 election workers were questioned by ECC personnel, and 413 candidates were referred by
the ECC to the Attorney General for having allegedly committed election fraud.

33 The seat allocation per province is the same as it was in the 2005 parliamentary election—33 seats up for election in
Kabul; 17 in Herat province; 14 in Nangarhar, 11 each in Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni; 9 in Badakhshan, Konduz, and
Faryab, 8 in Helmand, and 2 to 6 in the remaining provinces. Ten are reserved for Kuchis (nomads).
Congressional Research Service
31

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

The results, as certified by the IEC, resulted in substantial controversy within Afghanistan and led
to a political crisis. The certified results were as follows.
• About 60% of the lower house (148 out of 249) winners were new members.
• As noted above, Karzai’s number of core supporters was reduced from about 90
to 60-70. This was in part because the number of Pashtuns elected was 94, down
from 120 in the outgoing lower house. Several pro-Karzai candidates lost in
Qandahar Province, and because many Pashtuns did not vote due to security
reasons, in mixed Ghazni Province. The low Pashtun turnout in Ghazni caused
Hazara candidates to win all 11 seats from the province, instead of 6 Pashtuns
and 5 Hazaras in the outgoing lower house; this was a big factor in the reduction
of the number of Pashtuns who won election. Several prominent pro-Karzai
deputies were defeated, including Jamil Karzai, Pacha Khan Zadran, Mahmud
Khan Suleimankhel (Paktika Province), and Muin Mirastyal (Konduz Province).
• Some observers note that some local militia commanders won election, adding to
or replacing similar figures in past parliaments: the newly elected include
Amanullah Guzar (Kabul) who may have been behind May 2006 rioting in Kabul
against NGO offices; and Haji Abdul Zahir (Nangarhar), a member of the well-
known “Eastern Shura” once headed by the assassinated Hajji Abdul Qadir and
one-time Kabul Governor Hajji Din Mohammad. Other mujahedin-era figures
were reelected, including Iqbal Safi (Kapisa), Zalmai Mujaddedi (Badakhshan),
Fukkuri Beheshti (Bamiyan), and Shahzada Shahed (Kunar).
• Two ex-Taliban figures, Mullah Salam Rocketi, and Musa Wardak, were
defeated.
• A date of the inauguration of the new parliament was set for January 20, 2011, at
which time, under Afghan law, President Karzai would formally open the session.
Special Tribunal, Related Political Crisis, and Resolution
The certified results triggered a major political crisis, caused primarily by Pashtuns who felt they
lost the election due to fraud. The issue brought the operations of the National Assembly to a
virtual halt, with Karzai ruling by decree, with seven cabinet posts and a few Supreme Court seats
remaining unfilled by permanent appointees. Karzai took steps to address Pashtun grievances, but
with his own interest in increasing the number of Pashtuns elected. In December 2010, the office
of the Attorney General urged election results to be voided and the Afghan Supreme Court to
order a recount. There were weekly demonstrations against the fraud by about 300 candidates
who felt deprived of victory, under a banner called the “Union of Afghan Wolesi Jirga Candidates
2010,” led by defeated Ghazni candidate Daud Sultanzoy.
On December 28, 2010, at the instruction of the Supreme Court, Karzai issued a decree
empowering a five-member tribunal to review fraud complaints. Many Afghans, including an
independent watchdog group, “Free and Fair Election Foundation,” maintained that the tribunal
had no legal authority under the constitution to review the election. The IEC and ECC, backed by
UNAMA and the international community, insisted that the certified results stand, asserting they
are the only bodies under Afghan electoral law that have legitimate jurisdiction over election
results. Still, on January 19, 2011, the day before the parliament was to convene, the tribunal
leader, Judge Sediqullah Haqiq, announced it would need another month to evaluate the fraud
allegations. On that basis, Karzai postponed the inauguration of the new parliament by a month.
Congressional Research Service
32

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Defying Karzai and the special tribunal, about 213 of the certified winners met at the
Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul on January 20, 2011, and reportedly decided to take their seats on
Sunday, January 23, 2011, without Karzai’s formal inauguration. Elected deputies at the meeting
said they would try to convene at the parliament building but would meet elsewhere, if blocked.
They elected an interim speaker, Hajji Mohammad Sarwar Osmani, from Farah Province. This
would have rendered unclear the legal status of a self-convened parliament.
During January 20-25, 2011, with the lower house threatening to convene on its own, a
compromise was found. Karzai agreed to inaugurate the lower house on January 26, 2011; that
event took place. However, the ongoing fraud investigation by the special tribunal remained
active, despite insistence by declared winners to terminate it. As noted, after its inauguration, the
lower house elected a compromise candidate, Abdul Raouf Ibrahimi, from the Uzbek community,
as speaker. This fell short of Karzai’s goal of engineering selection of Sayyaf but accomplished
his aim of denying Qanooni reselection to that post. The upper house was completed as of
February 19, 2011, when Karzai made his 34 appointments.
The crisis became acute on June 23, 2011, when the special tribunal ruled that 62 defeated
candidates be reinstated. The National Assembly—containing the 62 people who would lose their
seats if the tribunal’s order were followed—subsequently passed a no-confidence vote against
Attorney General Aloko. On August 10, 2011, Karzai tried to defuse the crisis with a decree
declaring that special court does not have jurisdiction to change election results, and that such
changes are the role of the IEC. Subsequently, on August 21, 2011, the IEC implemented
elements of a compromise urged by UNAMA by ruling that nine winners had won their seats
through fraud and must be removed—fewer than the 17 that UNAMA had urged. The newly
declared winners were sworn in on September 4, 2011, and the nine whose victories were
overturned were barred from entering the parliament building. However, in protest of the
decision, the Assembly was unable to obtain a quorum to act on legislation or government
nominees, including Supreme Court vacancies. The boycotting parliamentarians ended their
protest on October 8, 2011, paving the way for the National Assembly to resume full function.
2009 and 2010 Elections Alter Karzai-Assembly Relations
The exposure of widespread fraud in the 2009 and 2010 elections appeared to alienate Karzai
from the National Assembly. In the confirmation process of his post-2009 election cabinet,
National Assembly members, particularly the well-educated independents, objected to many of
his nominees as “unknowns,” as having minimal qualifications, or as loyal to faction leaders who
backed Karzai in the 2009 election. Karzai’s original list of 24 ministerial nominees (presented
December 19) was generally praised by the United States for retaining the highly praised
economic team (and most of that team was confirmed). However, overall, only 7 of the first 24
nominees were confirmed (January 2, 2010), and only 7 of the 17 replacement nominees were
confirmed (January 16, 2010), after which the Assembly went into winter recess. Although then
UNAMA head Kai Eide called the vetoing of many nominees a “setback” to Afghan governance,
Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell said on January 6, 2010, that the vetoing by parliament
reflected a “healthy give and take” among Afghanistan’s branches of government. Another five
(out of seven nominees) were confirmed on June 28, 2010, although one was a replacement for
the ousted Interior Minister Atmar.
The differences over cabinet selections continued after the resolution in 2011 of the Assembly
elections, although perhaps with less intensity, suggesting Karzai and the Assembly have sought
to put aside differences and focus on governing. On March 12, 2012, the National Assembly
Congressional Research Service
33

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

confirmed most of those ministers who were serving in an acting capacity—including the
controversial Ismail Khan—as well as some new nominees. As noted above, on September 16,
2012, the Assembly approved Karzai’s nominees for heads of the three main security institutions.
April 5, 2014 Presidential and Provincial Elections: Credibility Still in Doubt34
U.S. officials and many Afghans remain concerned that the fraud uncovered in the 2009 and 2010
elections could recur in the 2014 presidential elections, which will occur as international forces
are completing their drawdown from Afghanistan. Another fraud-filled election could cloud
Afghanistan’s ability to govern beyond the 2014 transition. The international community seems to
be downplaying expectations, citing the need for an “acceptable” election rather than one of the
higher “free and fair” standard. According to a joint statement issued on January 11, 2013,
following President Karzai’s meeting with President Obama in Washington, DC, the two
presidents “reviewed preparations for the 2014 elections and agreed that independent Afghan
institutions are to lead election preparations and implementation, in close consultation with
legitimate stakeholders in the democratic process.” USAID plans to spend about $200 million to
support the 2014 election process in Afghanistan, including $95 million to support Afghan
institutions directly and promote voter education and election observer groups; $80 million in the
form of a donation to U.N. Development Program election support efforts (see below); and about
$15 million to support civil society groups.
Timing of the Elections
Under the constitution, the next presidential elections are to be held 30 to 60 days before the May
22, 2014, expiration of Karzai’s second term, which would place the required election day
between March 22 and April 22, 2014. On October 31, 2012, the IEC met a key requirement by
publishing a timeline for the 2014 elections, including setting the election date as April 5, 2014.
However, Dr. Abdullah and others argue that the date should be postponed to allow for the
northern part of the country (where support for non-Pashtun candidates is strong) to thaw after the
winter, in order that snow and ice would not impede voter access.
Provincial elections were due in 2013, because the last provincial elections were concurrent with
the 2009 presidential election, and provincial councils serve a four year term. However, Afghan
officials say the provincial elections could not be held until 2014 because of the logistical
difficulties involved in holding a separate election in 2013. The provincial elections will be held
concurrent with the presidential elections on April 5, 2014. The next parliamentary elections, due
in 2014—four years after the 2010 parliamentary election—will likely not be held until 2015.
Some Karzai critics still claim he plans to engineer a loya jirga—invoking national security
grounds to call such an assembly—that would keep him in office after 2014. To allay the
skepticism, on August 12, 2011, the palace issued a statement that Karzai had told a group of
parliamentarians that he would end his presidency after his second term. Press reports in
September 2012 say that Karzai has been telling diplomats and others in Kabul that he might not
endorse any candidate or involve himself in the 2014 election in any way—apparently trying to
put to rest other assessments that Karzai wants to wield post-2014 political influence from behind

34 For additional information on the upcoming elections and their implications, see International Crisis Group.
Afghanistan: The Long, Hard Road to the 2014 Transition. October 8, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
34

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

the scenes. On October 4, 2012, Karzai re-affirmed that he will leave office and in the timeframe
prescribed by the constitution, saying “You [Afghan public] can choose your favorite candidate.
Whoever you like, vote for him.”
Potential Candidate Field
There is no clear frontrunner to succeed Karzai, although a number of candidates receive
attention from observers. Some observers say that, in the interests of unity approaching the 2014
security transition, some senior figures are trying to unify around a single successor who might be
elected by consensus among the Pashtuns and the Northern Alliance figures, but it is not clear
whether that idea will be implemented. Candidates are required to register to run by September
14, 2013. Virtually all of the figures discussed in this section are discussed above.
If, as expected, the election is heavily contested, there are several potential Pashtun contenders,
all of whom are said to be competing for Karzai’s endorsement. Some are believed hesitant to
express interest in running until Karzai makes his preferences known. Potential Pashtuns who
might run (either as head of a consensus ticket or against a strong opponent) include: Ghul Agha
Shirzai, Ashraf Ghani, former Interior Minister Ali Jalali, Education Minister Faruq Wardak,
former Interior Minister Hanif Atmar , former deputy lower house speaker Mirwais Yassini, and
others. Some observers say that Karzai favors his former or current chiefs of staff as candidates—
Mohammad Umar Daudzai or Abdul Karim Kurram, respectively. Karzai has said he does not
want any of his brothers to run to succeed him, but Qayyum is said to be pondering a run.
If Karzai places the government machinery at the disposal of a favored (presumably Pashtun)
successor, some groups say they will accuse him of undermining the intention of democracy,
which is to allow the citizenry to choose a successor. Some read his reshuffling on September 20,
2012, of 10 of the 34 provincial governorships as an effort to place loyalists in position to support
his favored candidate in the 2014 election.
There are several likely Northern Alliance figures who might run, either as First Vice President in
a consensus ticket or as presidential candidates challenging Pashtun figures. Those most
prominently mentioned include Dr. Abdullah, Ahmad Zia Masoud, former intelligence chief
Amrollah Saleh, and Atta Mohammad Noor. However, if there is a hotly contested election (no
consensus ticket), a run by two or more of these Tajiks might split their vote, and it is likely these
figures will try to unite behind one Tajik representative. As of early 2013, Dr. Abdullah—who
was viewed earlier in 2012 as an almost certain candidate—was said by observers to be
undecided on running because of personal family issues as well as concerns about fraud. Should
he or the other Tajiks run, the leading Pashtun candidate still has a strong advantage if the vote
comes down to a two-person runoff.
Parliamentarian Fawzia Koofi, also a Tajik, has stated in editorials since late 2011 that she will
run, although her gender alone would lead most observers to conclude she is not favored to win.
Ramazan Bashardost, a Hazara, is likely to again run on an anti-corruption platform.
Karzai has said that any Taliban figure who commits to the Afghan constitution would be
welcome to run for president (and one former Taliban commander ran in 2009). Observers say
there is a substantial possibility that the Taliban might run candidates in the concurrent provincial
elections if there is further movement in their reintegration into the political process (discussed
further below).
Congressional Research Service
35

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Election Process Concerns
The July 8, 2012, Tokyo donors’ conference resulted in the “Tokyo Mutual Accountability
Framework,” which stipulated economic aid incentives for Afghanistan in return for
demonstrating progress in governance and against corruption. One of the Framework’s
stipulations is that Afghanistan conduct “credible, inclusive and transparent Presidential and
Parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2015,” including to “develop, by early 2013, a
comprehensive election timeline through 2015 for electoral preparations and polling dates.”35
That benchmark was met on October 31, 2012, as discussed above. Among the other key
benchmarks and their status are:
Election Preparations. Karzai’s July 26, 2012, administrative reform decree
directed the IEC to prepare a plan for registering candidates who will compete in
the 2014 presidential and provincial elections. As noted above, the IEC has set an
election date. It also has issued a list of polling centers that are to be opened for
voting, and its operational plan to prevent fraud is due out in April or May 2013.
IEC Chairman and Reform. IEC chairman Fazl Ahmad Manawi’s term expires
in April 2013. There is a broad expectation that Karzai will reappoint him, but
other names have been mentioned as well. On December 19, 2011, Karzai swore
in five new IEC commissioners he appointed, a move that renewed criticism of
mechanisms and laws that allow the president to appoint election officials. That
same month the IEC signed a two-year assistance program by UNDP called
ELECT II (Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow).
Election Laws and Complaint Process. New election laws for the 2014
elections—a law to govern the election and another one to structure the Electoral
Complaints Commission (ECC)—must be adopted within the first quarter of
2013. USAID and State Department officials say that this deadline is unlikely to
be met,36 and that Karzai, backed by the upper house of the National Assembly, is
insisting that the ECC be replaced as complaint arbiter by an Afghan Supreme
Court-run election tribunal. The lower house of the National Assembly has
adopted a draft election law that would deprive the President of sole discretion
over IEC appointments and provide for two ECC officials to be non-nationals (as
was the case for the 2010 parliamentary election). The international donor
community strongly favors continuing to have some international representation
on the ECC. Other debate continues on allocating reserved seats for women,
whether to set individual district representation for each lower house seat
(favored by Karzai), dispute-resolution mechanisms, and other issues.37 The issue
of single district representation is considered problematic because it would
require drawing boundaries for all 249 seats – and likely to cause political
disputes.
Efforts to Prevent Fraud. The government decided in November 2012 to issue
biometric ID cards (“e-taskera”) to reduce voter fraud. However, some say it is
impossible to implement such a complex and expensive ($115 million) system in

35 http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/article/the-tokyo-declaration-partnership-for-self-reliance-in-afghanistan-
from-transition-to-transf
36 USAID and State Department briefing for congressional staff. March 11, 2013.
37 U.N. Report of the Secretary-General, December 6, 2012. U.N. document no. A/67/619-S/2012/907
Congressional Research Service
36

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

time for the 2014 vote, and that this mechanism might apply to subsequent
elections.
Despite the numerous challenges, some express optimism by noting that several party coalitions
have been meeting to ensure that there is a free and fair election. In mid-October 2012, the “Free
and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan” domestic observation body held a meeting to
demand election reform. The strength of these efforts could, in the view of many, fulfill some of
the oversight roles that were lacking in 2009 and 2010.
Still, some express optimism by noting that several of the parties discussed above, such as the
National Front, the National Coalition, the Truth and Justice Party, and Hizb-e-Islam have been
meeting—as part of a “Cooperation Council of Political Parties and Coalitions of Afghanistan”
(CCPPCA) to ensure that there is a free and fair election. In mid-October 2012, the “Free and Fair
Election Foundation of Afghanistan” domestic observation body held a meeting at which 50
political parties endorsed detailed demands for election reform. The strength of these grouping
could, in the view of many, fulfill some of the oversight and accountability roles that were lacking
in 2009 and 2010.
Afghan Governing Capacity and Performance38
As noted in the Defense Department report on Afghanistan stability released in December 2012
(covering April–September 2012), there are risks that Afghanistan will revert to a terrorist haven
unless effective governance is established before the transition to Afghan leadership is completed
by 2014. U.S. and U.N. reports assess that there has been progress in the capacity of Afghan
institutions to provide services, but that significant deficiencies remain. Many of the
shortcomings in governance are attributed to all of the political disputes, alleged corruption,
nepotism and favoritism, and the lack of trained or skilled workers discussed below—as well as
the widespread security issues that continue to plague Afghanistan.
In major policy addresses, President Obama has consistently stressed that more needed to be done
to promote the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan government at both the Kabul and
local levels. The U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement, signed in Afghanistan on
May 1, 2012, commits the United States (beyond 2014) to “support the Afghan government in
strengthening the capacity, self-reliance, and effectiveness of Afghan institutions and their ability
to deliver basic services.” Of the FY2013 request for about $2.3 billion in economic aid to
Afghanistan, nearly one-third of the request is for programs to help promote good governance,
human rights, rule of law, political competition, and civil society.
Earlier, the Obama Administration developed about 45 different metrics to assess progress in
building Afghan governance and security, as it was required to do (by September 23, 2009) under
P.L. 111-32, an FY2009 supplemental appropriation.39 UNAMA, headed in Kabul by Jan Kubis,
also evaluates Afghan governance according to numerous metrics. Afghan progress according to

38 Some information in this section is from the State Department report on human rights in Afghanistan for 2011, May
24, 2012.
39 “Evaluating Progress in Afghanistan-Pakistan” Foreign Policy website, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/
09/16/evaluating_progress_in_afghanistan_pakistan.
Congressional Research Service
37

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

these metrics is presented in reports of the Secretary-General to the U.N. General Assembly, such
as a report released September 12, 2012 (U.N. document number: A/67/354-S/2012/703).
The Tokyo Framework of Mutual Accountability, cited above, issued at the conclusion of the July
8, 2012, Tokyo donors’ conference, makes aid incentives for Afghanistan (portions of $16 billion
pledged through 2015) conditional on several governance measures including40
• The holding of credible, inclusive, and transparent elections in 2014 and 2015.
• Improved access to justice, and respect for human rights, particularly for women
and children.
• Improved integrity of public financial management and the commercial banking
sector.
• Improved revenue systems and budget execution.
In part to demonstrate that Afghanistan would uphold those commitments, the Karzai
administrative reform decree issued July 26, 2012, requires virtually every ministry and
government body to develop a work plan, complete unfinished tasks, file specified reports, or
carry out specified reforms.41
Expanding Central Government Capacity
The international community has had mixed success in shifting authority in Afghanistan from
traditional leaders to transparent and effective state institutions. Since 2001, Afghan ministries
have greatly increasing their staffs, their presence in Afghan provinces, and their technological
capabilities. Most ministry offices now have modern computers and communications. Afghan-led
governmental reform and institution-building programs under way, all with U.S. and other donor
assistance, include training additional civil servants, instituting merit-based performance criteria,
basing hiring on qualifications rather than kinship and ethnicity, and weeding out widespread
governmental corruption.
However, the government still faces a relatively small recruitment pool of workers with sufficient
skills and many are reluctant to serve in the provincial offices of the central government
ministries, particularly in provinces where there is still substantial violence. U.S. mentors and
advisers serve in virtually all the Afghan ministries. Afghanistan has also tried to address the
problem of international donors luring away Afghan talent with higher salaries, by pledging at the
July 20, 2010, Kabul conference to reach an understanding with donors, within six months, on a
harmonized salary scale for donor-funded salaries of Afghan government personnel. Discussions
have been held between the Afghan government and donors on this issue.

40 http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/article/the-tokyo-declaration-partnership-for-self-reliance-in-afghanistan-
from-transition-to-transf
41 Text of the decree “On the Execution of Content of the Historical Speech of June 21, 2012, in the Special Session of
the National Assembly. Provided to CRS by the Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, DC, July 16, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
38

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

The Afghan Civil Service
The low level of Afghan bureaucratic capacity is being addressed in a number of ways, but
slowly. There are about 500,000 Afghan government employees, although the majority of them
are in the security forces. A large proportion of the remainder work as teachers. On several
occasions, the United States has funded jobs fairs that have recruited some new civil servants.
To increase the proficiency of government, during late 2010-early 2011, the government instituted
merit-based appointments for senior positions, such as deputy provincial governors and district
governors, and converted those positions to civil servants rather than political appointees. That
effort was placed on hold in 2011 because of the difficulty in developing exams and strict criteria
for selection, but has since resumed as of mid-2012.
The key institution that is deciding on merit-based appointments and standardizing job
descriptions, salaries, bonuses, and benefits is the Afghan Independent Administrative Reform
and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC). The commission has thus far redefined more than
80,000 civil servant job descriptions. The Afghan cabinet drafted a revised civil service law to
institute merit-based hiring and give the IARCSC a legal underpinning; it was ratified by the
National Assembly in late 2011 and replaced a less-specific September 2005 civil service law.
Under a USAID program called the Civilian Technical Assistance Plan, the United States is
providing technical assistance to Afghan ministries and to the IARCSC. From January 2010 until
January 2011, USAID, under a February 2010 memorandum of understanding, gave $85 million
to programs run by the commission to support the training and development of Afghan civil
servants. One of the commission’s subordinate organizations is the Afghan Civil Service Institute,
which trained over 16,000 bureaucrats during 2010-2011, and which has instituted an internship
program for 1,000 interns in national civil service jobs and 2,000 interns in provincial and district
offices. On-going training for civil servants is provided by an arm of the Civil Service Institute
called the National Training Directorate (NTD).
According to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, USAID programs are
helping employees of the state-owned Afghan power company (DABS) to manage Afghanistan’s
power grid and bill its customers. USAID programs have also trained 250 Ministry of Mines
personnel in geology to try to help develop Afghanistan’s extractive industries sector.
Many Afghan civil service personnel undergo training in India, building on growing relations
between Afghanistan and India. Japan and Singapore also are training Afghan civil servants on
good governance, anti-corruption, and civil aviation. Singapore and Germany, in 2011, jointly
provided technical assistance in the field of civil aviation. Some of these programs were
conducted in partnership with the German Federal Foreign Office and the Asia Foundation.
The Afghan Budget Process
The international efforts to build up the central government are reflected in the Afghan budget
process. The Afghan government controls its own funds as well as those of directly supplied
donor funds. The Afghan budget year has followed the solar year, which begins on March 21 of
each year, which also corresponds to the Persian New Year (Nowruz). However, as of the 2013
budget, Afghan budgets will run from December 21 – December 20 of each year. The 2013
budget was approved by the National Assembly on January 20, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
39

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

The Afghan budget is a “unitary” (centralized) system. Once a budget is adopted by the full
National Assembly (first the upper house and then the lower house, and then signed by Karzai),
the funds are allocated to central government ministries and other central government entities.
Some of the elected provincial councils, appointed provincial governors, and district governors
formulate local budget requirements and help shape the national budget process, but no locality
controls its own budget. These local organs do approve the disbursement of funds by the central
entities (called mustofiats, accounting offices in each of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces). The Tokyo
Mutual Accountability Framework, cited above, includes as one of its benchmarks the
formalization of a provincial budgeting process with more systematic provincial input into the
relevant ministries that formulate the national budget.
All revenue is collected by central government entities which implement the local programs but,
according to experts, contributes to the widespread observation that local officials sometimes
seek to retain or divert locally collected revenues. There are several pilot programs in place,
including the Provincial Budget Pilot Program (PBPP) to improve budgetary planning integration
between the national and provincial levels. To date, four ministries and the IDLG say they have
made sound progress on this program and several other ministries are to be included in it in 2013.
However, the Defense Department report on Afghan stability released December 2012 (covering
April–September 2012) say this Kabul-local budget coordination process stalled in mid-late 2012
due to funding difficulties (p. 107).
Donor Involvement in the Afghan Budget
The Afghan government took in about $2 billion in total revenue for all of 2012. Lacking
resources, about 90% of total Afghan government expenditures (operating budget and
development budget) was provided by international donors during 2006-2010, according to a
GAO study issued September 2011. Of the 90%, the United States provide 62% and other donors
provided 28% of total expenditures.42 In 2011, donor funds covered 57% of the Afghan
government’s $2.2 billion operating budget.43 The 2013 (current) Afghan budget totals about $7
billion, of which $3.8 billion for operations and $3.07 billion for development. Half of the 2013
budget is to be donor funded, meaning that the government anticipates a large increase in
government revenue generation for 2013 (to over $3 billion).
Although still wary of misuse, the United States has been accommodating Afghan demands that
aid be channeled through the Afghan government. More than 40% of U.S. aid was channeled
through the Afghan government during FY2011 and for FY2012 that figure is close to the target
of 50% that was endorsed at the July 20, 2010, Kabul conference. The percentages are up from
21% in FY2009, according to a June 8, 2011, staff report of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee (Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan). Increased percentages have
been predicated on U.S. assessments of the ability of individual ministries to accurately and
transparently administer donated funds. According to that Foreign Relations Committee staff
report, 14 Afghan ministries have received USAID and State Department funds.
Karzai has repeatedly said that the low level of direct funding has stunted the growth of Afghan
government capacity. Many international development experts concur that only through direct

42 Government Accountability Office. “Afghanistan’s Donor Dependence.” September 20, 2011.
43 The operating budget is greater than the government revenue because the operating budget includes some donor
funds.
Congressional Research Service
40

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

funding will the Afghan government be able to develop the capacity and eventually the
transparency to govern and deliver services effectively. The Tokyo Framework, cited earlier,
provides incentives for Afghanistan by continuing to raise the percentage of donor funds
channeled through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund as Afghan governance improves.
That fund gives money directly to Afghan ministries and thus gives the Afghan government
substantial discretion as compared to other donated funds that are spent directly on projects.
Expanding Local (Subnational) Governance
As U.S. concerns about corruption in the central government increased after 2007, U.S. and allied
policy has increasingly emphasized building local or “subnational” governance. This accords with
U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, which is to build institutions that can govern and secure areas
cleared by U.S. and NATO forces and preventing Taliban reinfiltration. The U.S. shift in
emphasis complements that of the Afghan government, which asserts that it has itself long sought
to promote local governance in Afghanistan’s political and economic development. As a
consequence of the Obama Administration’s push to help build local governing capacity, the
Administration recruited about 500 U.S. civilian personnel from the State Department, USAID,
the Department of Agriculture, and several other agencies—and many additional civilians from
partner countries joined them—to advise Afghan ministries, and provincial and district
administrations. That effort raised the number of U.S. civilians in Afghanistan to about 975 by
early 2010 and to 1,330 by August 2011. Of these, nearly 400 serve outside Kabul, up from 67 in
early 2009. However, the Obama Administration plans to reduce civilian personnel in
Afghanistan by about 20% when the transition to Afghan lead is completed in 2014.44
U.S. and partner country officials, as well as observers, say that local governance, particularly at
the provincial level, is improving and expanding, particularly in areas secured by the 2010 U.S.
“troop surge.” U.S. officials say that Afghans are increasingly forming local councils and building
ties to appointed local leaders in these cleared and secured areas. However, the April 2012 DOD
report on Afghanistan stability (p. 71) says subnational bodies “remain unable to provide many
basic government services.” This could be, in part, a result of attempts by Kabul to centralize
decision making—the localities have their own governing bodies but the central government
ministries in the provincial capitals of each province actually implement national programs. Local
officials often disagree with the Kabul ministry representatives on priorities and implementation.
Karzai has long complained that donor-run Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have
preventing the Afghan government from expanding its own responsibilities and capacity at the
local level. There are PRTs in about 80% of Afghan provinces, and they have far more funding
and capability than the Afghan governor in those provinces. The Tokyo Framework largely
endorses Karzai’s complaints by calling for the PRTs to be transferred to Afghan control. Karzai
administrative decree of July 26, 2012, provides for Afghan institutions to begin taking over the
roles of the PRTs, and, as of mid-2012, the United States has begun closing down the PRTs it runs
and handing them over to Afghan control.

44 Karen DeYoung. “Plans For Big Civilian Force in Postwar Afghanistan to Be Cut.” Washington Post, December 6,
2012.
Congressional Research Service
41

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)
In terms of local governance institution-building, a key institution was empowered in August
2007 when Karzai placed the selection process for local leaders (provincial governors and below)
in a new Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)—and out of the Interior
Ministry. The IDLG was headed until early 2011 by Jelani Popal, a member of Karzai’s Popolzai
tribe and a close Karzai ally. Some international officials say that Popal packed local agencies
with Karzai supporters, where they were able to arrange votes for Karzai in the August 2009
presidential elections. He was replaced by Abdul Khaliq Farahi, a former diplomat who was
kidnapped in Peshawar, Pakistan, and held for nearly three years (2008-2011) allegedly by
militants linked to Al Qaeda.
The IDLG is an implementing partner for the District Delivery Program (DDP), which now
operates in at least 32 of the 364 districts of Afghanistan. The program was created to improve
government presence and service delivery at the district level, and has been funded by the United
States, Britain, Denmark, and France. U.S. funding for the program was suspended in July 2011
pending accountability of expenditures and a request for the IDLG and Ministry of Finance to
satisfy several conditions, and has not reactivated to date.45 The IDLG also gets from the U.N.
Development Program (UNDP)’s Afghanistan Subnational Governance Program II (ASGP-II).
That program provided $83.6 million to the IDLG from the European Community, Italy,
Switzerland, and Britain. Its main achievement has been to fund assistance for the IDLG.
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils
Many believe that, even more than institutional expansion, the key to effective local governance
is the appointment of competent and incorruptible governors in all 34 Afghan provinces. U.N.,
U.S., and other international studies and reports all point to the beneficial effects (reduction in
narcotics trafficking, economic growth, lower violence) of some of the strong Afghan civilian
appointments at the provincial level.
Provincial governors are still political appointees selected mostly for loyalty to Karzai although
there is an ongoing effort to institute a merit-based appointment system for deputy provincial
governors and district governors. In mid-2011, Karzai had held up merit-based selectees for 14
deputy provincial governor positions, suggesting that he and his aides want to continue to control
appointments at the local level. The July 26, 2012, Karzai administrative reform decree directed
the IDLG to open all deputy provincial governorships to competition within two months. The
decree also requires the IDLG to fill open positions in the provinces within six months, to address
the many vacancies in the provinces, including in the ministry offices in each provincial capital. It
also requires a review of the performance of provincial governors’ performance in combating
corruption and improving governance.
A key example of a successful gubernatorial appointment was the March 2008 appointment of
Gulab Mangal as Helmand governor. He is from Laghman Province (eastern Afghanistan) and
drew immediate skepticism from the local tribes and power-brokers of the south who repeatedly
have urged Karzai to replace him. But, he drew praise from the United States and the
international community for taking effective action to convince farmers to grow crops other than
poppy. His leadership accounted for the reduction of cultivation in Helmand that has been noted

45 DOD report on Afghanistan stability, April 2012, p.73.
Congressional Research Service
42

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

since 2009. Mangal has played a key role in convening tribal shuras and educating local leaders
on the benefits of the U.S.-led offensive to remove Taliban insurgents from Marjah town and
install new authorities there. A key Mangal ally, who has reportedly helped bring substantial
stability to the Nawa district, is Abdul Manaf.
On September 20, 2012, acting subsequent to his July 2012 administrative decree, Karzai shuffled
10 out of the 34 provincial governors, asserting that those taken out of their positions had fallen
short on improving governance or combating corruption. Mangal was one of those removed,
causing consternation among some of the international donors who have raved about his
performance in Helmand. He was replaced by the little-known Gen. Mohammad Naeem. Some of
the ousted governors were assigned to different provinces. Other than Helmand, the nine
provinces where governors were changed include Wardak, Kabul, Takhar, Faryab, Baghlan,
Nimruz, Laghman, Lowgar, and Badghis.
Other governors, such as Ghul Agha Shirzai and Atta Mohammad Noor (discussed above) are
considered effective, but have been criticized for exercising excessive independence of central
authority. Many of the other governors are considered weak, ineffective, or corrupt.
Provincial Councils
One problem noted by governance experts is that the role of the elected provincial councils is
unclear. The elections for the provincial councils in all 34 provinces were held on August 20,
2009, concurrent with the presidential elections. The next provincial elections will likely be held
concurrent with the presidential election in 2014; the first provincial council elections were held
concurrent with the parliamentary elections in September 2005. In most provinces, the provincial
councils do not act as true local legislatures and are considered weak compared to the power and
influence of the provincial governors.
Perhaps the most significant role the provincial councils play is in choosing the upper house of
the National Assembly (Meshrano Jirga). In the absence of district councils (no elections held or
scheduled), the provincial councils elected in 2009 have chosen two-thirds (68 seats) of the 102-
seat body. Karzai appointed the remaining 34 seats in February 2011.
District-Level Governance
U.S. officials say there has been “measured progress” in developing effective district governance.
District governors are appointed by the president, at the recommendation of the IDLG, but the
Defense Department report on Afghan stability released December 2012 (p. 107) says that district
governors are now all appointed through a merit-based process. In some districts of Helmand that
had fallen under virtual Taliban control until the July 2009 U.S.-led offensives in the province,
there were no district governors in place at all. Some of the district governors, including in Nawa
and Now Zad district, returned after the U.S.-led expulsion of Taliban militants.
The difficulty plaguing the expansion of district governance, in addition to security issues, is lack
of resources. Only slightly more than half of all district governors (there are 364 districts) have
any staff or vehicles. In about 40 districts, the United States and partner countries have
established District Support Teams (DSTs) to assist in district-level governance and service
delivery. However, like the PRTs, the DSTs are to be turned over to Afghan control as the
transition to complete Afghan control proceeds.
Congressional Research Service
43

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

District Councils
Another problem in establishing district level governance has been the fact that no elections for
district councils have been held due to boundary and logistical difficulties. In his November 19,
2009, inaugural speech, Karzai said the goal of the government is to hold these elections along
with the 2010 parliamentary elections. However, that was not accomplished and no date for these
elections has been set. As a result, there is no one authoritative district-level representative body,
but rather a collection of groupings established by donor programs. According to the April 2012
DOD report on Afghan stability, the Afghan government has agreed in principle to a roadmap
leading to a single district level body, a roadmap to be endorsed by September 2012, although not
necessarily implying district elections could be held by then.
Municipal and Village Level Authority
As are district governors, mayors of large municipalities are appointed. There are about 42
mayors nationwide, many with deputy mayors. Karzai pledged in his November 2009 inaugural
that “mayoral” elections would be held “for the purpose of better city management.” However, no
municipal elections have been held and none is scheduled.
As noted throughout, there has traditionally been village-level governance by councils of tribal
elders and other notables. That structure remains, particularly in secure areas, while village
councils have been absent or only sporadically active in areas where there is combat. As noted
above, a U.S. official in southern Afghanistan, Henry Ensher, said in January 2011 that councils
have been formed in areas where security has been established by the 2010 U.S. “troop surge.”
The IDLG and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), with advice from
India and other donors, also are empowering localities to decide on development priorities. The
MRRD has formed about 28,000 Community Development Councils (CDCs) nationwide to help
suggest priorities, and these bodies are eventually to all be elected.
Reforming Afghan Governance: Curbing Corruption46
Since 2007, but with additional focus during the Obama Administration, U.S. policy has been to
not only try to expand Afghan governing capacity but to push for its reform, transparency, and
oversight. Partly because many Afghans view the central government as “predatory,” many
Afghans and international donors have questioned Karzai’s leadership. NATO estimates that
about $2.5 billion in total bribes are paid by Afghans each year. Reducing corruption in
government is a major focus of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, cited above, which
requires Afghanistan to “enact and enforce the legal framework for fighting corruption.” Karzai
himself has repeatedly acknowledged that corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan. In a June
21, 2012, speech, he called on his government to step up the fight against corruption, and fighting
corruption is a cornerstone of Karzai’s July 26, 2012, administrative decree. However, concerns
about Karzai’s leadership on this issue center on implementation and his apparent reluctance to
prosecute officials for corruption—particularly those related to or aligned with him politically.
This stands in contrast to his attempts to vigorously prosecute for corruption those politically

46 For more information, particularly on Rule of Law programs, see CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of
Law and Justice Sector Assistance
, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman.
Congressional Research Service
44

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

opposed to him. Some international officials have also questioned Karzai’s repeated placement of
blame for Afghan corruption on international donor contracting practices. He repeated that
criticism in advance of his January 2013 U.S. visit, blaming corruption on the NATO/ISAF
practices of contracting with firms linked to traditional faction leaders discussed above.
High Level Corruption, Nepotism, and Cronyism
At the upper levels of government, some observers have asserted that Karzai deliberately tolerates
officials who are allegedly involved in illicit activity and supports their receipt of lucrative
contracts from donor countries, in exchange for their political support. Karzai’s brother,
Mahmoud, as discussed above, has apparently grown wealthy through real estate and auto sales
ventures in Qandahar and Kabul, purportedly by fostering the impression he can influence his
brother. Some observers who have served in Afghanistan say that Karzai has appointed some
provincial governors to “reward them” and that these appointments have gone on to “prey”
economically on the populations of that province.
Another trend that has attracted notice among Afghans is that several high officials, despite very
low official government salaries, have acquired ornate properties in west Kabul since 2002. They
allegedly have appropriated to themselves private land, the ownership of which was unclear, for
homes, and housing business ventures. Redressing this issue is discussed in the “rule of law”
section below.
On the other hand, loose accusations of corruption are often used as a political weapon. One
former official accused National Security Adviser Spanta of corruption after being fired from an
Afghan government position. Spanta took the case to court, which ruled against the Afghan
accuser on September 25, 2012, and fined him $300.
Lower-Level Corruption
Observers who follow the issue say that most of the governmental corruption takes place in the
course of performing mundane governmental functions, such as government processing of official
documents (e.g., passports, drivers’ licenses), in which processing services routinely require
bribes in exchange for action.47 Other forms of corruption include Afghan security officials’
selling U.S./internationally provided vehicles, fuel, and equipment to supplement their salaries. In
other cases, local police or border officials may siphon off customs revenues or demand extra
payments to help guard the U.S. or other militaries’ equipment shipments. Other examples
include security commanders placing “ghost employees” on official payrolls in order to pocket
their salaries. Corruption is fed, in part, by the fact that government workers receive very low
salaries (about $200 per month, as compared to the pay of typical contractors in Afghanistan that
might pay as much as $6,500 per month). Many observers say there is a cultural dimension to the
corruption—that it is commonly expected by relatives and friends that those Afghans who have
achieved government positions will protect those relations with favors, appointments, and
contracts.

47 Filkins, Dexter, “Bribes Corrode Afghan’s Trust in Government,” New York Times, January 2, 2009; Kevin Seiff.
“Greasing the Wheels in Kabul.” Washington Post, February 18, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
45

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Administration Views and Policy on Corruption
As noted throughout, there is a consensus within the Administration on the wide scope of the
corruption in Afghan government and the deleterious effect the corruption has on government
popularity and effectiveness. The Administration wrestled throughout 2010 with the degree to
which to press an anti-corruption agenda with the Karzai government. In early 2011, the
Administration reportedly decided to prioritize reducing low-level corruption instead of
investigations of high-level allies of Karzai.48 The latter investigations have sometimes come into
conflict with other U.S. objectives by causing a Karzai backlash.
In addition, such investigations may complicate efforts to obtain the cooperation of Afghans who
can help stabilize areas of the country. Some of these Afghans are said to be paid by the CIA for
information and other support, and the National Security Council reportedly issued guidance to
U.S. agencies to review this issue.49
Yet, U.S. officials believe that anti-corruption efforts must be pursued because corruption is
contributing to a souring of Western publics on the mission as well as causing some Afghans to
embrace Taliban insurgents. General Petraeus, the former top U.S. and NATO commander in
Afghanistan, said he made anti-corruption a top priority to support his counter-insurgency
strategy. A key deputy, General H.R. McMaster, formed several DOD task forces to focus on anti-
corruption (Shafafiyat, Task Force Spotlight, and Task Force 2010) from a U.S. military/counter-
insurgency perspective. These task forces, in part, review U.S. contracting strategies to enhance
Afghan capacity and reduce the potential for corruption. The Shafafiyat task force announced in
February 2012 that it had caused the restitution of $11.1 million, $25.4 million in fines, and $3.4
million in seizures from allegedly fraudulent contractors, and has debarred or suspended more
than 125 American, Afghan, and international workers for alleged fraud.50
Anti-Corruption Initiatives
Obama Administration officials have credited Karzai with allowing the United States and other
donors to help develop oversight bodies to curb corruption. However, the credit is tempered by
the lack of Afghan government provision of resources or attention to building these bodies. At the
July 20, 2010, Kabul conference—following onto the January 28, 2010, London conference—the
Afghan government finalized a National Anti-Corruption Strategy (“Azimi report”) and
committed to enacting 37 laws to curb corruption. Very few of these laws have been enacted,
although the Afghan cabinet has drafted new anti-corruption and auditing laws and some
regulations have been issued by Karzai decree.
Assets Declarations and Verifications. During December 15-17, 2009, Karzai
held a conference in Kabul to combat corruption. It debated requiring deputy
ministers and others to declare their assets, not just those at the ministerial level.
That requirement was imposed. Karzai himself declared his assets on March 27,
2009. The July 20, 2010, Kabul conference communiqué51 included an Afghan

48 Strobel, Warren and Marisa Taylor. “U.S. Won’t Pursue Karzai Allies in Anti-Corruption Campaign.” McClatchy
Newspapers
, January 6, 2011.
49 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “A Subtler Takc to Fight Afghan Corruption.” Washington Post, September 13, 2010.
50 John Ryan. “Task Force Rooting Out Corruption in Afghanistan.” Army Times, February 20, 2012.
51 Communiqué text at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/world/asia/21kabultext.html.
Congressional Research Service
46

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

pledge to verify and publish these declarations annually, beginning in 2010.
According to a U.N. report of March 9, 2011, 1,995 senior Afghan officials had
declared their assets, and an unspecified number have done so since. However,
the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) report of
April 30, 2012, said that the government’s progress for verification of the
declarations “fall[s] short of U.S. expectations.”
A Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee to evaluate the government’s
performance in combating corruption was mandated by the Kabul conference
communiqué to be established within three months of the conference (by October
2010). According to a June 23, 2011, U.N. report, the committee, supported by
UNDP, was inaugurated on May 11, 2011. It was established by decree and is
composed of three Karzai nominees and three international nominees. It is
headed by Slovenian diplomat Drago Kos, and on November 28, 2012, it issued
an 87-page report on the Kabul Bank scandal, discussed below.
High Office of Oversight. In August 2008 Karzai, with reported Bush
Administration prodding, set up the “High Office of Oversight for the
Implementation of Anti-Corruption Strategy” (commonly referred to as the High
Office of Oversight, HOO) with the power to identify and refer corruption cases
to state prosecutors, and to catalogue the overseas assets of Afghan officials. It is
headed by former IEC head Azizullah Ludin. On March 18, 2010, Karzai, as
promised at the January 28, 2010, international meeting on Afghanistan in
London, issued a decree giving the High Office direct power to investigate
corruption cases rather than just refer them to other offices. However, the SIGAR
reported on April 30, 2012, that the HOO’s core functions either deteriorated or
were ineffective during the first quarter of 2012. The July 26, 2012, Karzai
administrative decree directed the HOO to, within six months, assess “private
institutions’ and government officials’ suspicious wealth” and report those
findings to the president’s office every two months. USAID is providing the
HOO $30 million total during FY2011-FY2013 to build capacity at the central
and provincial level. USAID pays for salaries of six HOO senior staff and
provides some information technology systems as well.
Establishment of Additional Investigative Bodies: Major Crimes Task Force and
Sensitive Investigations Unit. Since 2008, several additional investigative bodies
have been established under Ministry of Interior authority. The most prominent is
the “Major Crimes Task Force,” tasked with investigating public corruption,
organized crime, and kidnapping. A headquarters for the MCTF was inaugurated
on February 25, 2010, and it has been funded and mentored by the FBI, the DEA,
the U.S. Marshal Service, Britain’s Serious Crimes Organized Crime Agency, the
Australian Federal Police, EUPOL (European police training unit in
Afghanistan), and the U.S.-led training mission for Afghan forces. The MCTF
has 169 investigators, according to U.S. officials.
A related body is the Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU), run by several dozen
Afghan police officers, vetted and trained by the DEA.52 This body led the arrest
in August 2010 of a Karzai NSC aide, Mohammad Zia Salehi, on charges of

52 Nordland, Ron and Mark Mazzetti. “Graft Dispute in Afghanistan Is Test for U.S.” New York Times, August 24,
2010.
Congressional Research Service
47

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

soliciting a bribe from the New Ansari Money Exchange in exchange for ending
a money-laundering investigation of the firm. The middle-of-the-night arrest
prompted Karzai, by his own acknowledgment on August 22, 2010, to obtain
Salehi’s release and to say he would establish a commission to place the MCTF
and SIU under more thorough Afghan government control. Following U.S.
criticism that Karzai is protecting his aides (Salehi reportedly was involved in
bringing Taliban figures to Afghanistan for conflict settlement talks), Karzai
pledged to visiting Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry on
August 20, 2010, that the MCTF and SIU would be allowed to perform their
work without political interference. In November 2010, the Attorney General’s
office said it had ended the prosecution of Salehi.
Anti-Corruption Unit, and an Anti-Corruption Tribunal. These investigative and
prosecution bodies were established by decree in 2009. Eleven judges have been
appointed to the tribunal. The tribunal, under the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, tries cases referred by an Anti-Corruption Unit of the Afghan Attorney
General’s office. However, of the approximately 2,000 cases investigated by the
Anti-Corruption Unit, only 28 officials have been convicted to date. The
Department of Justice suspended its training program for the Anti-Corruption
Unit in early 2012 because of the unit’s “lack of seriousness,” according to the
SIGAR report of April 30, 2012. One of the laws pledged during the July 20,
2010, Kabul conference would be enacted (by July 20, 2011) included one to
legally empower the Anti-Corruption Tribunal and the Major Crimes Task Force.
That has not been enacted by the National Assembly to date.
Prosecutions and Investigations of High-Level Officials. The Afghanistan
Attorney General’s office has investigated at least 20 senior officials. The April
30, 2012, SIGAR report said there had been no progress by the Attorney General
in undertaking new prosecutions in early 2012. Perhaps to address that criticism,
new investigations were announced in mid-2012, including that of Minister of
Mines Wahidullah Shahrani. However, observers believe his opponents are
actually trying to combat a draft mining law that some see as too favorable to
foreign firms. Accusations in July 2012 against Finance Minister Omar Zakhiwal
appeared focused on corruption rather than policy issues: Afghan media used his
bank statements to show unusual payments from outside organizations. HOO
director Ludin has called on Zakhiwal to step down while the investigation
unfolds and Karzai did not publicly defended Zakhiwal against the accusations.
Some of those investigated previously included Commerce Minister Amin
Farhang (for allegedly submitting inflated invoices for reimbursement); former
Minister of Mines Mohammad Ibrahim Adel (who reportedly accepted a $30
million bribe to award a key mining project in to a Chinese firm);53 and former
Minister of the Hajj Mohammad Siddiq Chakari (for accepting bribes to steer
Hajj-related travel business to certain foreign tourist agencies). Chakari fled to
Britain. Then Deputy Kabul Mayor Wahibuddin Sadat was arrested at Kabul
airport in December 2009 for alleged misuse of authority.

53 Partlow, Joshua, “Afghanistan Investigating 5 Current and Former Cabinet Members,” Washington Post, November
24, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
48

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

EITI. Relatedly, Afghanistan has signed up as a candidate to the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) which is intended to ensure that
contracting for Afghanistan’s mineral resources is free of corruption. Afghanistan
hopes to become fully EITI compliant by April 2012. The World Bank gave
Afghanistan a three year grant of $52 million to manage its natural resources
effectively.
Salary Levels. The government has tried to raise salaries, particularly of security
forces, in order to reduce their inclination to solicit bribes. The results of these
initiatives have been unclear. In November 2009, the Afghan government
announced an increase in police salaries (from $180 per month to $240 per
month). During his term as Interior Minister, Bismillah Khan was credited by
DOD with instituting transparency and accountability in promotions and
assignments.
Bulk Cash Transfers Out of Afghanistan. At the July 2010 Kabul conference, the
government pledged to adopt regulations and implement within one year policies
to govern the bulk transfers of cash outside the country. This was intended to
grapple with issues raised by reports, discussed below, of officials taking large
amounts of cash out of Afghanistan (an estimated $4.5 billion taken out in 2011).
U.S. officials say that large movements of cash are inevitable in Afghanistan
because only about 5% of the population use banks and 90% use informal cash
transfers (“hawala” system). The late Ambassador Holbrooke testified on July 28,
2010 (cited earlier), that the Afghan Central Bank has begun trying to control
hawala transfers; 475 hawalas have been licensed, to date, whereas none were
licensed as recently as 2009. On August 21, 2010, it was reported that Afghan
and U.S. authorities would implement a plan to install U.S.-made currency
counters at Kabul airport to track how officials had obtained their cash (and
ensure it did not come from donor aid funds).54 On March 19, 2012, Central Bank
Governor Noorullah Delawari said the Bank had imposed a $20,000 per person
limit on cash transfers out of the country. However, a report by the SIGAR issued
December 11, 2012, found that the provided currency counters at Kabul airport
were not being used, nor were procedures to ensure that notable Afghan figures
were not taking large amounts of cash out of Afghanistan being enforced. Other
reports say that Afghans are taking significant amounts of gold out of
Afghanistan, possible to hedge against instability after the 2014 transition.
Customs Revenue Diversion. As noted above, some governors of border
provinces are siphoning off customs duties that are supposed to be remitted to the
central government. In December 2012, a commission created by Karzai
investigated the issue in twelve provinces and shut down some of these
operations. One scheme shut down was a surtax levied illegitimately at the
Torkham Gate (Khyber Pass) crossing by the provincial government of Ghul
Agha Shirzai (see above on Shirzai above).
Auditing Capabilities. The SIGAR has previously assessed that the mandate of
Afghanistan’s Control and Audit Office is too narrow and lacks the independence
needed to serve as an effective watch over the use of Afghan government funds.55

54 Miller, Greg and Joshua Partlow. “Afghans, U.S. Aim to Plug Cash Drain.” Washington Post, August 21, 2010.
55 Madhani, Aamer. “U.S. Reviews Afghan Watchdog Authority.” USA Today, May 12, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
49

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

At the Kabul conference, the government pledged to submit to parliament an
Audit Law within six months, to strengthen the independence of the Control and
Audit Office, and to authorize more auditing by the Ministry of Finance. The
government drafted an audit law but, according to the April 30, 2012, SIGAR
report, the National Assembly’s legislative committee rejected the draft law in
early 2012.
Legal Review. The Kabul conference communiqué committed the government to
establish a legal review committee, within six months, to review Afghan laws for
compliance with the U.N. Convention Against Corruption. Afghanistan ratified
the convention in August 2008.
Local Anti-Corruption Bodies. Some Afghans have taken it upon themselves to
oppose corruption at the local level. Volunteer local inspectors, sponsored
originally by Integrity Watch Afghanistan, are reported to monitor and report on
the quality of donor-funded, contractor implemented construction projects.
However, these local “watchdog” groups do not have an official mandate, and
therefore their authority and ability to rectify inadequacies are limited.
Kabul Bank Scandal and Continuing Difficulties
The near-collapse of Kabul Bank is a prime example of how well-connected Afghans have
avoided regulations and other restrictions in order to garner personal profit. Mahmoud Karzai was
a major (7%+) shareholder in the bank, which was used to pay Afghan civil servants and police,
and he reportedly received large loans from the bank to buy his position in it. Another big
shareholder was Abdul Hussain Fahim, the brother of First Vice President Fahim and partner of
Mahmoud Karzai on other ventures. The insider relationships were exposed in August and
September 2010 when Kabul Bank reported large losses ($500 million initially) primarily from
shareholder investments in Dubai properties, prompting President Karzai to appoint a Central
Bank official to run the Kabul Bank. However, the government moves did not prevent large
numbers of depositors from withdrawing their money from it.
In response to the crisis, the United States and other donors refused to recapitalize the bank, but it
offered to finance an audit of Afghan banks, including Kabul Bank. The Finance Ministry decided
instead in November 2010 to hire its own auditor—a move that suggested to some that high
Afghan officials seek to avoid sharing the results with international donors. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) suspended its credit program for the Afghan government in November
2010 because of the scandal and demanded the entire Afghan banking industry undergo an
outside forensic audit and that those responsible be held accountable. That caused the holding up
of $70 million World Bank/Afghan Reconstruction Fund (ARTF) in donor funds due to be paid
June 11, 2011. Other donors suspended as much as $1.8 billion in economic aid because of the
IMF suspension.
Amid Afghan confirmation that the questionable loans of the bank total over $925 million
(including interest due), the IMF—as a condition of resuming its credit program—subsequently
pushed for the bank to be sold. The Central Bank instead agreed to separate the bank’s
performing from nonperforming assets and then dissolve or restructure the bank.56 A version of

56 Ernesto Londono. “Afghan Officials Opt to Dissolve Bank Draped in Scandal.” Washington Post, March 27, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
50

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

the plan, which was subject to approval by an Afghan government committee, was formally
approved and announced on April 21, 2011.
The “good bank” (part of the bank with deposits and which still functions) was financed by a
Central Bank loan of $825 million. It was renamed “New Kabul Bank.” The Afghan Finance
Ministry has promised to pay back the loan with recovered assets and tax revenues. On October
16, 2011, the National Assembly voted on a supplemental budget that enabled the Finance
Ministry to reimburse the Central Bank loan over eight years. Central Bank governor Noorullah
Delawari said in April 2012 that the country plans to sell Kabul Bank in June 2012. However, as
of the mid-February 2013, only one consortium (Ali Akbar Zhandawal consortium) finalized a
bid for the bank.
The Afghan government, through its “Financial Dispute Resolution Commission,” continues to
try to recoup the lost funds. Of the estimated $925 million in losses, about $300 million of the
losses are judged by the Afghans as untraceable because of a lack of documentation. As of the end
of 2012, the commission had recovered $128 million in cash and $145 million in property, mostly
luxury villas in Dubai.57 The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, discussed above, requires
Afghanistan to continue asset recovery and to strengthen banking supervision though the Central
Bank (Da Afghanistan Bank).
Attempting Accountability
The political fallout also produced some resolution. On January 15, 2011, the office of Afghan
Attorney General Ishaq Aloko announced an investigation into the near-collapse of the bank. The
investigating commission briefed reporters on its findings on May 30, 2011, placing much of the
blame on lax controls by the Central Bank and its governor, Abdul Qadir Fitrat. The government
commission also largely absolved Mahmoud Karzai of any wrongdoing, saying he had paid off
his loans, and naming other key figures, such as Dostam, as taking out $100,000 in unsecured
loans. The following day, Central Bank governor Fitrat disputed the commission’s conclusions.
He had previously told parliament that Mahmoud Karzai owed $22 million. In part because of his
feuding with figures such as Mahmoud Karzai, Fitrat fled Afghanistan for the United States and
announced his resignation on June 27, 2011. Karzai subsequently barred U.S. advisers from the
Central Bank. On December 11, 2011, Karzai called for the United States to extradite Fitrat to
Afghanistan and blamed U.S. officials for knowing of the Bank’s problems at an early stage but
failing to alert Afghan authorities.
In a step toward holding principals accountable, on June 30, 2011, the government announced the
arrest of two former Kabul Bank executives, Sherkhan Farnood and Khalilullah Frouzi, who
allegedly allowed the concessionary loans to the high-level Afghans and their relatives. However,
by late 2011, the detentions of the two had been relaxed and they were frequently sighted at
various public places in Kabul.58 On August 1, 2011, the Attorney General’s office sent the names
of about 15 people allegedly responsible for the scandal to Afghan courts for trial. On April 3,
2012, Karzai ordered a special prosecutor appointed and a special tribunal created to try those
involved. On June 2, 2012, at the urging of Karzai’s office, 21 people were indicted by the special

57 Joshua Partlow. “Afghan Bureaucrat Tasked With Recovering Millions in Bad Loans.” Washington Post, July 7,
2012. Afghanistan Plans to Sell Scandal-Scarred Kabul Bank in June. Bloomberg.com, April 11, 2012.
58 Matthew Rosenberg and Graham Bowley. “Intractable Afghan Graft Hampering U.S. Strategy.” New York Times,
March 8, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
51

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

tribunal, including Farnood, Frouzi, Fitrat, nine other government officials, and nine other bank
employees who were allegedly in positions to have known of and reported the fraud while it was
occurring but did not. The trial of Farnood, Frouzi, and about 20 others allegedly involved began
on November 10, 2012, under the leadership of a three judge panel. All twenty one defendants
were found guilty, and Farnood and Frouzi received five year sentences and financial penalties.
The Attorney General has appealed the sentences as too light; he wanted them found guilty of the
original charges of embezzlement and money laundering rather than fraud; the former charges
carry longer jail terms if convicted. In addition, the Attorney General is appealing the sentences
of the other 19 defendants who the Attorney General believes were not involved in the
misfeasance and should not have been tried.
Conclusions and Fallout
On November 27, 2012, the New York Times reported on the Central Bank’s audit of Kabul Bank
by Kroll Associates. The Kroll investigation called Kabul Bank a virtual “Ponzi scheme”
involving numerous deliberate efforts to deceive the bank’s original auditors. Two days later, the
Joint Evaluation and Monitoring Committee, discussed above, released its 87-page report on the
Bank scandal, detailing how Bank funds were smuggled out of the country surreptitiously and
alleging high level Afghan government political interference in handling the scandal and in
deciding whom to hold accountable.59
The investigations, the recovery of some lost funds, and the forensic audits of the bank suggested
Afghanistan was moving to meet the IMF conditions for the restart of its credit program. In
November 2011, the IMF resumed its program by approving a $133 million loan to Afghanistan.
That move restored the flow of some previously blocked donor funds, including U.S.
contributions to the World Bank-run Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF).
The IMF also wants a timetable for another bank found by the Central Bank to be vulnerable to
collapse, Azizi Bank, to shore up its finances. Another Afghan entity suspected of corruption is
the New Ansari Money Exchange, a large money-trading operation. On February 18, 2011, the
Treasury Department designated the New Ansari, and persons affiliated with it, as major money
laundering entities under the “Kingpin Act,” a designation that bans U.S. transactions with the
designees. The Treasury Department accused the New Ansari and affiliates of serving as a vehicle
for narcotics trafficking organizations.
Moves to Penalize Lack of Progress on Corruption
Several of the required U.S. “metrics” of progress, cited above, involve Afghan progress against
corruption. A FY2009 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 111-32) mandated the withholding of
10% of about $90 million in State Department counter-narcotics funding subject to a certification
that the Afghan government is acting against officials who are corrupt or committing gross human
rights violations. In the 111th Congress, in June 2010, the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of
the House Appropriations Committee deferred consideration of some of the nearly $4 billion in
civilian aid to Afghanistan requested for FY2011, pending the outcome of a committee
investigation of the issue. The subcommittee’s action came amid reports that as much as $3

59 Matthew Rosenberg. “Audit Says Kabul Bank Began as “Ponzi Scheme.” New York Times, November 17, 2012;
Pamela Constable. “Report Cites Interference in Afghan Bank Probe.” Washington Post, November 29, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
52

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

billion in funds have been allegedly embezzled by Afghan officials over the past several years.60
In part on the basis of the findings of the House Appropriations Committee investigation, the
Senate Appropriations Committee’s FY2011 omnibus appropriation marked up in December 2010
required Administration certifications of progress against corruption as a condition of providing
aid to Afghanistan. Some of this conditionality was included in the FY2011 continuing
appropriations (P.L. 112-10). Aid conditionality based on Afghan performance against corruption,
on incorporation of women in the reconciliation process, and on reports on progress on the Kabul
Bank scandal, are included in the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 112-74). No U.S.
funding for Afghanistan has been permanently withheld because of this or any other legislative
certification requirement.
Promoting Human Rights and Civil Society61
Since 2001, U.S. policy has been to build capacity in human rights institutions in Afghanistan and
to promote civil society and political participation. As do previous years’ State Department
human rights reports, the report on Afghanistan for 2011 analyzed numerous human rights
deficiencies, attributing most of them to overall lack of security, loose control over the actions of
Afghan security forces, pervasive corruption, and cultural attitudes including discrimination
against women. A UNAMA report issued January 20, 2013, documented numerous cases of
torture and ill treatment for detainees at the hand of Afghan security forces.62
Institution-Building: The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights
Commission (AIHRC) and Outside Human Rights Organizations

One of the institutional human rights developments since the fall of the Taliban has been the
establishment of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). It is headed
by a woman, Sima Simar, a Hazara Shiite from Ghazni Province. It acts as an oversight body over
alleged human rights abuses but its members are appointed by the government and some believe
it is not as aggressive or independent as some had hoped. However, its members are appointed by
the president and, as an indication of government interference, in December 2011, Karzai
dismissed its deputy chairman Ahmad Nader Nadery for his outspoken writings alleging abuses
by traditional allies of Karzai. Nadery heads another civil society watchdog organization, the Free
and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan (see above), which was highly critical of Karzai and
his allies for the 2009 and 2010 election fraud. Institutions and groups focused on women’s rights
are discussed in the section on Afghan women below.
The July 20, 2010, Kabul conference communiqué contained a pledge by the Afghan government
to begin discussions with the AIHRC, within six months, to stabilize its budgetary status. It
pledged to provide $1 million per year, but has provided only half that amount. A December 10,
2010, U.N. Secretary General report says the Afghan cabinet has approved inserting a line item in
the annual Afghan budget for the AIHRC, but the March 5, 2012, report of the Secretary General

60 Rosenberg, Matthew. “Corruption Suspected in Airlift of Billions in Cash From Kabul.” Wall Street Journal, June
28, 2010.
61 Information in this section is primarily from Department of State. 2011 Human Rights Report: Afghanistan, May 24,
2012; http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dynamic_load_id=186457#wrapper.
62 http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=VsBL0S5b37o%3d&tabid=12254&language=en-US
Congressional Research Service
53

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

said the National Assembly has not regularized the AIHRC status within the national budget
framework. USAID has given the AIHRC about $10 million per year since the fall of the Taliban.
Since 2002, there has been a proliferation of organizations that demand transparency about
human rights deficiencies. Prominent examples of Afghan NGO’s that monitor and agitate for
improved human rights practices include the Afghanistan Human Rights and Democracy
Organization, and the Research Institute for Women, Peace and Security. The December 5, 2011,
Bonn Conference was preceded by meetings (December 2-3, 2011, in Bonn) of Afghan civil
society activists, intended to help assess the progress of Afghan governance and highlight the role
of civil society in governance.
It is in part the work of these groups that has produced responses by the government. For
example, Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (intelligence directorate but with arrest
powers), which has widely been accused of detainee abuse and torture, established in late 2011 a
“human rights unit” to investigate these allegations. On June 2, 2012, Karzai ordered disarmed a
local security unit whose members were accused of raping an 18-year old woman in Konduz
Province. On July 9, 2012, Afghan forces were sent to track down Taliban militants who had
executed a woman for adultery in Parwan Province.
Religious Influence on Society: National Ulema Council
Counterbalancing the influence of post-Taliban modern institutions such as the AIHRC are
traditional bodies such as the National Ulema Council. The Council consists of the 150 most
respected and widely followed clerics throughout Afghanistan, and represents a network of about
3,000 clerics nationwide. It has taken conservative positions on free expression and social
freedoms, such as the type of television and other media programs available on private media
outlets.
In August 2010, 350 clerics linked to the Council voted to demand that Islamic law (Sharia) be
implemented (including such punishments as stoning, amputations, and lashings) in order to
better prevent crime. The government did not implement the recommendation, which would
require amending the Afghan constitution that does not implement Sharia. The Council’s March
2, 2012, backing of Sharia interpretations of the rights of women is discussed below in the section
on women’s rights.
The government (Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs) is also involved in regulating religious
practices. Of Afghanistan’s approximately 125,000 mosques, 6,000 are registered and funded by
the government. Clerics in these mosques are paid about $100 per month and, in return, are
expected to promote the government line. In April 2012, the Ministry decreed that it would fire
government-funded clerics who refuse to heed warnings and preach violence or incitement.
Riots over Quran Burnings and Anti-Islamic Video: 2011 and 2012
As an illustration of Afghanistan’s Islamic conservatism, riots broke out in two successive years
over what some Afghans perceived as U.S. disrespect of Islam. On April 2, 2011, hundreds of
Afghans rioted in the normally quiet (and non-Pashtun) city of Mazar-e-Sharif to protest the
burning of a Quran by a Florida pastor a few weeks earlier. The rioters, who had been instigated
by the sermons of three mullahs (Islamic preachers) at the city’s signature Blue Mosque, stormed
the U.N. compound in the city and killed at least 12 people, including 7 U.N workers. Over the
Congressional Research Service
54

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

next several days, similar, but less violent, demonstrations took place in Qandahar and other
Afghan cities. Earlier, in September 2010, some National Ulema Council figures organized
protests against plans by the Florida pastor to burn Qurans, although that burning was not
conducted following international and U.S. criticism of the pastor.
A more serious eruption occurred in late February 2012 over the mistaken U.S. discarding of
Qurans used by detainees at Bagram Airfield. Riots and protests occurred in several cities,
including the normally peaceful and pro-U.S. north. The public reaction to the Quran burning was
more intense than it was following the March 11, 2012, killing of 16 Afghans allegedly by a U.S.
soldier, Robert Bales, who is in U.S. military custody.
On September 17, 2012, several hundred Afghans rioted outside a U.S. training facility east of
Kabul city to protest a video produced in the United States (“Innocence of Muslims”) that mocks
the Prophet Muhammad. Afghan police protected the facility from assault from the crowd.
These perceived U.S. slights may account for some of the killings of U.S. military personnel by
Afghan security forces over the past few years. The so-called “green on blue” attacks have caused
tensions between Afghan forces and their U.S. mentors, and prompted U.S. commanders to
impose counter-measures that potentially complicate the U.S. effort to accelerate the transition to
Afghan security before the end of 2014.
Religious Freedom
The International Religious Freedom report for 2011 (released August 13, 2012) says that the
government did not either improve or backslide in respecting and protecting the right to religious
freedom during 2011.63 Members of minority religions, including Christians, Sikhs, Hindus, and
Baha’i’s, often face discrimination; the Supreme Court declared the Baha’i faith to be a form of
blasphemy in May 2007. There are no public Christian churches and four synagogues, although
they are not used because there is no longer a Jewish community in Afghanistan. Karzai has had a
Hindu as an economic advisor and one member of the Sikh community serves in the Meshrano
Jirga (upper house). There are three active gurdwaras (Sikh places of worship) and five Hindu
mandirs (temples). Buddhist foreigners are free to worship in Hindu temples.
Northeastern provinces have a substantial population of Isma’ilis, a Shiite Muslim sect often
called “Seveners” (believers in the Seventh Imam as the true Imam). Many Ismailis follow the
Agha Khan IV (Prince Qarim al-Husseini), who chairs the large Agha Khan Foundation that has
invested heavily in Afghanistan. There are four Isma’ilis in the National Assembly.
One major case that drew international criticism was a January 2008 death sentence, imposed in a
quick trial, against 23-year-old journalist Sayed Kambaksh for allegedly distributing material
critical of Islam. On October 21, 2008, a Kabul appeals court changed his sentence to 20 years in
prison, a judgment upheld by another court in March 2009. He was pardoned by Karzai and
released on September 7, 2009.
As discussed above, Afghanistan’s Shiite minority, mostly from the Hazara tribes of central
Afghanistan (Bamiyan and Dai Kundi provinces) can celebrate their holidays openly, a
development unknown before the fall of the Taliban. However, as noted above, some Pashtuns

63 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper
Congressional Research Service
55

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

have become resentful of the open celebrations and some clashes have resulted. Some Afghan
Shiites follow Iran’s clerical leaders politically, but Afghan Shiites tend to be less religious and
more socially open than their co-religionists in Iran. The former Minister of Justice, Sarwar
Danesh, is a Hazara Shiite, the first of that community to hold that post. He studied in Qom, Iran,
a center of Shiite theology. (Danesh was voted down by the parliament for reappointment on
January 2, 2010). There was unrest among some Shiite leaders in late May 2009 when they
learned that the Afghan government had dumped 2,000 Iranian-supplied religious texts into a
river when an Afghan official complained that the books insulted the Sunni majority.
Afghan Christians can worship in small congregations in private homes, but several conversion
cases have earned international attention. An Afghan man, Abd al-Rahman, who had converted to
Christianity 16 years ago while working for a Christian aid group in Pakistan, was imprisoned
and faced a potential death penalty trial for apostasy—his refusal to convert back to Islam. Facing
international pressure, Karzai prevailed on Kabul court authorities to release him (March 29,
2006). His release came the same day the House passed H.Res. 736 calling on protections for
Afghan converts. In May 2010, the Afghan government suspended the operations of two
Christian-affiliated international relief groups claiming the groups were attempting to promote
Christianity among Afghans—an assertion denied by the groups (Church World Service and
Norwegian Church Aid). Another case arose in May 2010, when an amputee, Said Musa, was
imprisoned for converting to Christianity from Islam, an offense under Afghan law that leaves it
open for Afghan courts to apply a death sentence under Islamic law (Shariah). The arrest came
days after the local Noorin TV station broadcast a show on Afghan Christians engaging in their
rituals. Following diplomatic engagement by governments and human rights groups, Musa was
quietly released from prison on February 24, 2011, and reportedly went to Italy, where he
obtained asylum.
Media and Freedom of Expression/Social Freedoms
Afghanistan’s conservative traditions have caused some backsliding in recent years on media
freedoms, which were hailed during 2002-2008 as a major benefit of the U.S. effort in
Afghanistan. In those years, numerous television channels, newspapers, and other media forms
were established, giving Afghanistan some of the freest press in the region. Media has expanded
to the point where the government, in 2012, began a process of launching a communications
satellite to help with broadcast speed and breadth of dissemination. However, a press law was
passed in September 2008 that gave independence to the official media outlets but also contained
a number of content restrictions and required that new newspapers and electronic media be
licensed by the government.
According to the State Department report on human rights for 2011, there continues to be
intimidation and sometimes violence against journalists who criticize the central government or
powerful local leaders, and some news organizations and newspapers have occasionally been
closed for incorrect or derogatory reporting on high officials. In October 2012, the Afghan
government threatened to expel the staff of the International Crisis Group because of a report it
issued that warned that Afghanistan might slide into civil war if the 2014 presidential elections
are not free and fair. Supporters of the government position reportedly threatened the senior Crisis
Group expert in Kabul, Candace Rondeaux, prompting her to leave the country.
USAID programs have trained investigative journalists to do more reporting on official
corruption and other issues. The United States has provided funding and advice to an Afghan
Government Media Information Center that the Afghan government uses to communicate with
Congressional Research Service
56

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

the public. However, possibly as part of an effort to transition more tasks to the Afghans, or
possibly as a sign of frustration with Karzai criticism of some U.S. military operations, U.S.
advisers were pulled from the Center in late December 2011.
Separately, Islamic conservatives (such as the Ulema Council, parliamentarian Sayyaf, and Shiite
cleric Ayatollah Asif Mohseni), have sometimes asserted control over media content. This has
been an attempt to curb the popularity of such post-Taliban networks as Tolo Television. With the
Council’s backing, in April 2008 the Ministry of Information and Culture banned five Indian-
produced soap operas on Tolo Television on the grounds that they are too risqué, although the
programs were restored in August 2008 under a compromise that brought in Islamic-oriented
programs from Turkey. In June 2011, pressure from the Ulema Council caused Tolo to remove a
soap opera called “Forbidden Love.” Tolo has also aired programs with women performers—
presentations that raise eyebrows among religious conservatives—and about official corruption.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s “Radio Azadi” service for Afghanistan has distributed 20,000
solar powered radios to poor (and usually illiterate) Afghans to improve their access to
information. In general, the government does not restrict access to the Internet, but it does ban
access to pornographic web sites.
Regarding broader social freedoms, as another example of the growing power of the Islamist
conservatives, alcohol is increasingly difficult to obtain in restaurants and stores, although it is
not banned for sale to non-Muslims. There were reports in April 2010 that Afghan police had
raided some restaurants and prevented them from selling alcoholic beverages at all. On the other
hand, some point to the fact that rock bands have appeared publicly in high profile shows in 2011
as evidence of increasing modernity.
Harsh Punishments
The State Department reports widespread examples of torture, rape, and other abuses by officials,
security forces, detention center authorities, and police. In September 2011, U.S. and partner
transfers of prisoners to some Afghan facilities were suspended because of alleged torture by
Afghan prison authorities. Afghanistan’s Interior Ministry and National Directorate of Security
denied the allegations, which included assertions that prisoners were being beaten with rubber
hoses or given electric shocks. In October 2007, Afghanistan resumed enforcing the death penalty
after a four-year moratorium, executing 15 criminals. In August 2010, the issue of stoning to
death as a punishment arose when Taliban insurgents ordered a young couple who had eloped
stoned to death in a Taliban-controlled area of Konduz Province. Although the punishment was
not meted out by the government, it was reported that many residents of the couple’s village
supported the punishment.
Human Trafficking
For the third year in a row, Afghanistan was again placed in Tier 2: Watch List in the State
Department report on human trafficking issued on June 19, 2012, (Trafficking in Persons Report
for 2012). However, Afghanistan was given a waiver for an automatic downgrade to Tier 3 (the
downgrade is automatic after a country is “watch-listed” for three consecutive years). The waiver
was based on a the government’s writing of a plan that, if implemented, would qualify as a
significant effort to comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. The
Congressional Research Service
57

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

government is assessed in the 2012 report as not complying with minimum standards for
eliminating trafficking, and not showing evidence of increasing efforts to address the issue.
The State Department report says that women from China, some countries in Africa, Iran, and
some countries in Central Asia are being trafficked into Afghanistan for sexual exploitation,
although, according to the report, trafficking within Afghanistan is more prevalent than
trafficking across its borders. The report asserts that some families knowingly sell their children
for forced prostitution, including for bacha baazi, a practice in which wealthy men use groups of
young boys for social and sexual entertainment. The report added that some members of the
Afghan National Security Forces have sexually abused boys as part of the bacha baazi practice.
Since 2001, the United States has spent about $500,000 on programs to eliminate human
trafficking in Afghanistan.
Advancement of Women
Women and women’s groups are a large component of the burgeoning of civil society in post-
Taliban Afghanistan. Freedoms for women have greatly expanded since the fall of the Taliban
with their elections to the parliament and their service at many levels of government. The Afghan
government pursues a policy of promoting equality for women under its National Action Plan for
Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA). The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework requires
Afghanistan to implement the NAPWA and all of its past commitments and laws to strengthen the
rights of women and provide services to them.
The major institutional development since 2001 was the formation in 2002 of a Ministry of
Women’s Affairs dedicated to improving women’s rights. It is headed by Husn Banu Ghazanfar..
Its primary function is to promote public awareness of relevant laws and regulations concerning
women’s rights. It plays a key role in trying to protect women from domestic abuse by running
11women’s shelters across Afghanistan, with a total of 29 such shelters planned. Women’s rights
groups in Afghanistan expressed outrage over a June 2012 statement by Afghanistan’s justice
minister that the shelters encourage “immorality and prostitution.”
One of the most prominent civil society groups operating in post-Taliban Afghanistan is the
Afghanistan Women’s Network. It has at least 3,000 members and its leaders say that 75
nongovernmental organizations work under its auspices. In addition, the Afghanistan Independent
Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and a private group, Afghanistan Human Rights and
Democracy Organization, focus extensively on rights for Afghan women.
Among the most notable accomplishments since 2001, women are performing jobs that were
rarely held by women even before the Taliban came to power in 1996, including in the new police
force. The first Afghan female pilots arrived for training in the United States in July 2011. There
are over 200 female judges and nearly 500 female journalists working nationwide. Women are
legally permitted to drive, and press reports say an increasing number of Afghan women,
although mainly in Kabul and other main cities, are learning how to drive and exercising that
privilege. The wearing of the full body covering called the burqa is no longer obligatory, and
fewer women are wearing it than was the case a few years ago. In November 2010, the
government opened a USAID-funded women-only park in Kabul called “Women’s Garden”
where women can go, without male escort, and undertake fitness and job training activities.
Congressional Research Service
58

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Some groups, such as Human Rights Watch, report backsliding on women’s rights since 2008,64
although the State Department human rights report for 2011 says that the situation of women in
Afghanistan improved “marginally” during 2011. Numerous abuses, such as denial of educational
and employment opportunities, continue primarily because of Afghanistan’s conservative
traditions. This is particularly prevalent in rural areas, and less so in larger urban areas. Along
with the assertion of authority of conservative Islamic institutions, on March 2, 2012, the Ulema
Council issued a pronouncement saying women should be forced to wear the veil and be
forbidden from traveling without a male chaperone. The pronouncement did reiterate support for
the rights of women to inherit and own property, and to choose their marital partners. On March
6, 2012, Karzai endorsed the Ulema Council statement.
Among the most widespread abuses reported:
• More than 70% of marriages in Afghanistan are forced, despite laws banning the
practice, and a majority of brides are younger than the legal marriage age of 16.
• The practice of baad, in which women are given away to marry someone from
another clan to settle a dispute, remains prevalent.
• There is no law specifically banning sexual harassment, and women are routinely
jailed for zina—a term meaning adultery, and a crime under the penal code, and
that includes running away from home, defying family choice of a spouse,
eloping, or fleeing domestic violence. These incarcerations are despite the fact
that running away from home is not a crime under the penal code. That code is
often relatively lenient towards males—a man convicted of “honor killing” (of a
wife who commits adultery) cannot be sentenced to more than two years in
prison. One case receiving substantial attention in December 2011 involved a
woman who was jailed for having a child outside wedlock even though the child
was a product of rape.
• Women’s rights activists have been assassinated on several occasions. On
December 10, 2012, the head of the Women’s Affairs Ministry department in
Laghman Province was gunned down. Her predecessor in that post was killed by
a bomb planted in her car four months earlier.
Major Legal Developments
Some Afghan laws passed over the past few years have affected women, both positively and
negatively. The Afghan government tried to accommodate Shiite leaders’ demands in 2009 by
enacting (passage by the National Assembly and signature by Karzai in March 2009) a “Shiite
Personal Status Law,” at the request of Shiite leaders. The law was intended to provide a legal
framework for members of the Shiite minority in family law issues. However, the issue turned
controversial when international human rights groups and governments—and Afghan women in a
demonstration in Kabul—complained about provisions that would appear to sanction marital rape
and which would allow males to control the ability of females in their family to go outside the
home. President Obama publicly called these provisions “abhorrent.” In early April 2009, taking
into account the outcry, Karzai sent the law back to the Justice Ministry for review, saying it

64 “We Have the Promises of the World: Women’s Rights in Afghanistan,” Human Rights Watch, December 2009,
http://www.wluml.org/sites/wluml.org/files/hrw_report_2009.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
59

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

would be altered if it were found to conflict with the Afghan constitution. The offending clauses
were substantially revised by the Justice Ministry in July 2009, requiring that wives “perform
housework,” but also apparently giving the husband the right to deny a wife food if she refuses
sex. The revised law was passed by the National Assembly in late July 2009, signed by Karzai,
and published in the official gazette on July 27, 2009, although it remains unsatisfactory to many
human rights and women’s rights groups.
On August 6, 2009, perhaps in an effort to address some of the criticisms of the Shiite law, Karzai
issued, as a decree, the “Elimination of Violence Against Women” (EVAW) law. Minister of
Women’s Affairs Ghazanfar told CRS in October 2009 that the bill was long contemplated and
not related to the Shiite status law.65 It was enacted by the National Assembly as a law as of
December 2010; it had been held up by the Assembly for final passage because some Islamic
conservatives, such as Sayyaf (cited above), reportedly object to the provisions of the law
criminalizing child marriages. A U.N. report on human rights in Afghanistan, released January 18,
2012 (A/HRC/19/47), says the EVAW law implementation has been weakened by some Supreme
Court rulings and other Afghan legal decisions. A subsequent report on EVAW implementation by
the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), released in December 2012, said that
prosecutions of abuses against women have increased significantly but still lag far behind the
growing number of complaints. Only a small percentage of reports of violence against women are
registered with the judicial system, and about one-third of those proceed to trial.66
Women in Key Positions
Despite conservative attitudes, women have moved into prominent positions in all areas of
Afghan governance, although with periodic setbacks. Three female ministers were in the 2004-
2006 cabinet: former presidential candidate Masooda Jalal (Ministry of Women’s Affairs), Sediqa
Balkhi (Ministry for Martyrs and the Disabled), and Amina Afzali (Ministry of Youth). Karzai
named three women to cabinet posts on January 9, 2010, including Afzali (to Labor and Social
Affairs). Of the three, only Afzali was immediately confirmed; the other two (Minister of Health
and Minister of Women’s Affairs) were kept on in acting capacities and confirmed in subsequent
years. Afghanistan has one female ambassador and Karzai has a female deputy chief of staff,
Homaira Ludin-Etemadi. In the December 16, 2009, nomination list, Karzai proposed a woman to
head a new Ministry of Literacy, but parliament did not vote on this nomination because it had
not yet acted to approve formation of the ministry. In March 2005, Karzai appointed a former
minister of women’s affairs, Habiba Sohrabi, as governor of Bamiyan province, inhabited mostly
by Hazaras. As noted above, there is a growing number of female judges and prosecutors in
Afghanistan’s provinces.
One woman (Masooda Jalal) ran in the 2004 presidential election, and two ran for president in the
August 20, 2009, election. In the latter, each received less than one-half of 1%. As noted above,
parliamentarian Fawzia Koofi already has declared she will run in 2014, and there are likely to be
additional female candidates.
In the National Assembly, the constitution reserves for women at least 17 of the 102 seats in the
upper house and 68 of the 249 seats in the lower house of parliament. There were 69 women

65 CRS meeting with the Minister of Women’s Affairs, October 13, 2009.
66 Alissa Rubin. “Slow Gains in Justice for Afghan Women.” New York Times, December 12, 2012;
http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Qy9mDiEa5Rw%3d&tabid=12254&language=en-US
Congressional Research Service
60

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

elected in the 2010 parliamentary elections, one more than the quota. (400 women ran for those
seats—about 16% of all candidates.) The target ratio is ensured by reserving an average of two
seats per province (34 provinces) for women—the top two female vote getters per province.
(Kabul province reserves 9 female seats.) There are 28 women in the upper house, substantially
more than the minimum prescribed number. In the lower house, Shukria Barekzai, was chair of
the Defense Committee of the elected lower house during 2011. Some NGOs and other groups
believe that the women elected by the quota system are not viewed as equally legitimate
parliamentarians.
About 300 women were delegates to the 1,600-person “peace jirga” that was held during June 2-
4, 2010, which endorsed an Afghan plan to reintegrate insurgents who want to end their fight. The
High Peace Council to oversee the reconciliation process, which met for the first time on October
10, 2010, has 9 women out of 70 members, although these women report that their views are not
taken into account to any significant extent in the Council. At U.S. and other country urging, a
woman was part of the official Afghan delegation to the major international conference on
Afghanistan in Bonn on December 5, 2011; she was selected at a meeting of civil society activists
in Bonn, a day before the major conference begins.
U.S. and International Posture on Women’s Rights
U.S. officials say that its policy is to promote women’s rights in Afghanistan rigorously. The
Administration has and is following its “Strategy for Assistance to Women in Afghanistan, 2010-
2013.”67 U.S. officials said aid allocations are geared toward that strategy. Specific earmarks for
use of U.S. funds for women’s and girls’ programs in Afghanistan are contained in recent annual
appropriations, and these earmarks have grown steadily. The United States provided $159 million
to programs for Afghan women in FY2009, slightly more than the $150 million earmarked, and
about $225 million for FY2010, more than the $175 earmarked.68 For FY2010, assistance for
women was provided in the following “pillars” of the U.S. Strategy: health ($87 million);
education ($31 million); economy, work, and poverty ($54.6 million); legal protection and human
rights ($12 million); and leadership and political participation ($43 million). Total U.S. funding
for women’s programs for Afghanistan were similar for FY2011 and FY2012 and of similar
magnitude for FY2013. Among the funding streams has been U.S. Ambassador small grants to
support gender equality (FY2009-FY2012) which has been used to help finance over 830,000
microloans to women during 2004-2011 for the establishment of 175,000 small businesses,
according to the SRAP report released November 2011.
These strategy pillars, and specific programs funded by them, are discussed in annual State
Department reports on U.S. aid to women and girls. However, an audit issued in July 2010 by the
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction found that the State Department and
USAID did not provide complete and consistent information about the reported activities in
which women and girls were intended beneficiaries.
The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (AFSA, P.L. 107-327) authorized $15 million per
year (FY2003-FY2006) for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. Those monies are donated to the
Ministry from Economic Support Funds (ESF) accounts controlled by USAID. S. 229, the

67 A draft of this strategy document was provided to CRS by the State Department, April 21, 2011.
68 For prior years, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman, in the section on aid to Afghanistan, year by year.
Congressional Research Service
61

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Afghan Women Empowerment Act of 2009, introduced in the 111th Congress, would authorize
$45 million per year in FY2010-FY2012 for grants to Afghan women, for the ministry of
Women’s Affairs ($5 million), and for the AIHRC ($10 million).
Democracy, Human Rights, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues
U.S. funding for democracy, governance, and rule of law programs has grown, in line with the
Obama Administration strategy for Afghanistan. During FY2002-FY2012, USAID spent about
$1.5 billion on democracy, governance, rule of law and human rights, and elections support.
The following was spent by USAID (using Economic Support Funds) for FY2012 and
appropriated in P.L. 112-74 (Consolidated Appropriation)
$546.5 million for overall democracy and human rights-related funding including
• $435.5 million for good governance;
• $31 million for rule of law and human rights (not including INCLE funds);
• $37 million for political competition and consensus building; and
• $43 million for civil society.
For FY2013, the ESF democracy and governance request (ESF) is $578.2 million, including
• $447.2 million for good governance;
• $31.5 million for rule of law and human rights (not including INCLE);
• $64.3 million for political competition and consensus-building;
• $35.2 million for civil society.
For tables on U.S. aid to Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban
Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
, by Kenneth Katzman.
Effects of a Settlement with the Taliban
A major U.S. and Afghan initiative—to reach a conflict-ending settlement with the Taliban—is
likely to affect all of the issues discussed in this paper: Afghan politics, future elections, the
performance of the government along all its metrics, and the human rights situation. Many in the
international community, including within the Obama Administration, initially withheld
endorsement of the concept, fearing it might result in the incorporation into the Afghan political
system of insurgent leaders who retain ties to Al Qaeda and will roll back freedoms instituted
since 2011. The minority communities in the north, women, intellectuals, and others remain
skeptical that their freedoms can be preserved if there is a political settlement with the Taliban.
These groups fear that the Taliban could be given major ministries, seats in parliament, or even
tacit control over territory as part of any deal. Most insurgents are highly conservative Islamists
who oppose the advancement of women that has occurred and women have been a target of
attacks by Taliban supporters, including attacks on girls’ schools and athletic facilities. Then
Secretary Clinton said in India on July 20, 2011, that any settlement must not result in and
undoing of “the progress that has been made [by women and ethnic minorities] in the past
decade.”
Congressional Research Service
62

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance


To respond to those fears, Afghan and U.S. officials say that the outcome of a settlement would
require the Taliban to drop at least some of its demands that (1) foreign troops leave Afghanistan;
(2) a new “Islamic” constitution be adopted; and (3) Islamic law be imposed. This issue is
covered in greater depth in CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy
, by Kenneth Katzman.

Table 1. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations
Clan/Tribal
Confederations Location

Example
Durrani
Mainly southern Afghanistan:

Qandahar, Helmand, Zabol, Uruzgan,
Nimruz
Popalzai
Qandahar
Hamid Karzai, president of Afghanistan; Jelani Popal,
former head of the Independent Directorate of
(Zirak branch
Local Governance; Mul ah Bradar, the top aide to
of Durrani
Mullah Umar, captured in Pakistan in Feb. 2010.
Pashtun)
Two-thirds of Qandahar’s provincial government
posts held by Zirak Durrani Pashtuns
Alikozai
Qandahar
Mullah Naqibullah (deceased, former anti-Taliban
faction leader in Qandahar)
Barakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Ghul Agha Shirzai (Governor, Nangarhar Province)
Achakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Abdul Razziq, Police Chief, Qandahar Province
Alozai
Helmand (Musa Qala district)
Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh (former Helmand
governor); Hajji Zahir, former governor of Marjah
Noorzai
Qandahar
Noorzai brothers, briefly in charge of Qandahar
after the fall of the Taliban in November 2001
Ghilzai
Eastern Afghanistan: Paktia, Paktika,

Khost, Nangarhar, Kunar
Ahmadzai

Mohammed Najibullah (pres. 1986-1992); Ashraf
Ghani, Karzai adviser, Finance Minister 2002-2004
Hotak

Mullah Umar, but hails from Uruzgan, which is
dominated by Durranis
Taraki

Nur Mohammed Taraki (leader 1978-1979)
Kharoti

Hafizullah Amin (leader September-
December1979); Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, founder of
Hezb-e-Islami (Gulbuddin), former mujahedin party
leader now anti-Karzai insurgent.
Zadran
Paktia, Khost
Pacha Khan Zadran; Insurgent leader Jalaluddin
Haqqani
Kodai


Mangal
Paktia, Khost
Ghulab Mangal (Governor of Helmand Province)
Orkazai

Congressional Research Service
63

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Clan/Tribal
Confederations Location

Example
Shinwari
Nangarhar province
Fasl Ahmed Shinwari, former Supreme Court Chief
Justice
Mandezai

Sangu Khel


Sipah

Wardak
Wardak Province
Abdul Rahim Wardak (Defense Minister)
(Pashtu-speaking
non-Pashtun)
Afridis
Tirah, Khyber Pass, Kohat

Zaka khel


Jawaki

Adam khel


Malikdin, etc


Yusufzais
Khursan, Swat, Kabul

Akozais

Malizais

Loezais

Khattaks
Kohat, Peshawar, Bangash

Akorai

Terai

Mohmands
Near Khazan, Peshawar

Baizai


Alimzai


Uthmanzais

Khawazais


Wazirs
Mainly in Waziristan

Darwesh khel


Bannu

Source: This table was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information Research Specialist, CRS.
Congressional Research Service
64


Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Figure 1. Map of Afghan Ethnicities

Source: 2003, National Geographic Society, http://www.afghan-network.net/maps/Afghanistan-Map.pdf. Adapted
by Amber Wilhelm, Graphics Specialist, Publishing and Editorial Resources Section, CRS.
Notes: This map is intended to be illustrative of the approximate demographic distribution by region of
Afghanistan. CRS has no way to confirm exact population distributions.

Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612

Acknowledgments
The table of major Pashtun tribes was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information Research
Specialist, CRS.
Congressional Research Service
65