Army Drawdown and Restructuring:
Background and Issues for Congress
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
March 5, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42493
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
On January 26, 2012, senior DOD leadership unveiled a new defense strategy based on a review
of potential future security challenges, current defense strategy, and budgetary constraints. This
new strategy envisions a smaller, leaner Army that is agile, flexible, rapidly deployable, and
technologically advanced. This strategy will rebalance the Army’s global posture and presence,
emphasizing where potential problems are likely to arise, such as the Asia-Pacific region and the
Middle East.
As part of the Administration’s proposal, two armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) in Europe
will be eliminated out of a total of eight BCTs that will be cut from Active Army force structure.
The Army has stated that it may cut more than eight BCTs from the Army’s current 44 Active
BCTs. Army endstrength will go from 570,000 in 2010 to 490,000 during the Future Year
Defense Plan (FYDP) period. As part of this reduction, the Army would no longer be sized to
conduct large-scale, protracted stability operations but would continue to be a full-spectrum force
capable of addressing a wide range of national security challenges. The Army National Guard and
Army Reserves were not targeted for significant cuts. Army leadership stated the impending
decrease in Active Duty Army force structure would place an even greater reliance on the
National Guard and Reserves.
There will likely be a human dimension of the Army’s drawdown. Troops have received an
unprecedented level of support from the American public, and those soldiers leaving the
service—voluntarily and perhaps involuntarily—might have strong personal feelings about
leaving the Army and their comrades after multiple deployments to combat zones. The Army
drawdown will likely be achieved in large degree by controlling accessions (i.e., the number of
people allowed to join the Army). If limiting accessions is not enough to achieve the desired
endstrength targets, the Army can employ a variety of involuntary and voluntary drawdown tools
authorized by Congress, such as Selective Early Retirement Boards (SERBs) and Reduction-in-
Force (RIF). Voluntary tools that the Army might use include the Voluntary Retirement Incentive,
the Voluntary Separation Incentive, Special Separation Bonuses, Temporary Early Retirement
Authority, the Voluntary Early Release/Retirement Program, and Early Outs.
The Administration’s proposals to drawdown and restructure the Army raise a number of potential
issues for congressional consideration. With the possibility of sequestration and a continuing
resolution for the remainder of FY2013, Army leadership has stated that readiness and
maintenance will be negatively impacted, but nothing has been said about how these cuts could
impact drawdown and restructuring initiatives. The Army plans to “regionally align” an unknown
number of its units in both the Active and Reserve Components primarily by language and
cultural training. Little is known about how the Army plans to accomplish this, how long it will
take, how the Army will measure the effectiveness of regionalization, and how much this
initiative will cost. The Army is emphasizing “engagement” as a means of better enabling our
partners to address their regional security challenges. If the Army intends to focus much of its
post-2014 efforts on engagement operations, should the Army posture the force more toward
engagement and less towards state-on-state conflict? This report will be updated.
Congressional Research Service
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Importance to Congress ................................................................................................................... 1
The Administration’s Decision to Drawdown and Restructure the Army ....................................... 1
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
January 6, 2011, News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Gates and Chairman
Admiral Mullen ...................................................................................................................... 1
January 26, 2012, Administration Major Budget Decision Briefing ......................................... 2
January 2012 Drawdown and Restructuring Proposals ................................................................... 4
Proposal to Reduce Endstrength ................................................................................................ 4
Units to Be Eliminated .............................................................................................................. 4
Units to Be Realigned and Restructured .................................................................................... 5
Changes in Unit Basing ............................................................................................................. 6
Impact on the National Guard and Reserve ............................................................................... 6
President’s FY2013 Budget Request ......................................................................................... 7
Post-FY2013 Budget Request Developments .................................................................................. 7
May 2012 Chief of Staff of the Army News Briefing ............................................................... 7
Regional Alignment ................................................................................................................... 8
Army’s Presence in Kuwait ....................................................................................................... 8
Brigade Structural Changes ....................................................................................................... 9
Changes to the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Readiness Model ............................... 9
Regional Alignment of the National Guard and Reserves ....................................................... 10
Programmatic Environmental Assessment for Army 2020 Force Structure
Realignment.......................................................................................................................... 10
Possible Impact of Sequestration and a FY2013 Continuing Resolution (CR) ....................... 13
DOD Announces U.S. Army in Europe Force Structure Changes........................................... 14
Force Reduction and Force-Shaping Programs ............................................................................. 16
The Human Dimension of a Force Drawdown ........................................................................ 17
Accessions ............................................................................................................................... 17
Officer Accessions ............................................................................................................. 18
Personnel-Related Congressional Testimony .......................................................................... 18
More on Involuntary Separations ............................................................................................ 19
Protecting the Institutional Army ............................................................................................ 19
Potential Impact on Major Army Weapon Systems Programs ....................................................... 19
Potential Budgetary Implications ................................................................................................... 20
Relevant Legislative Provisions ..................................................................................................... 21
FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310) ...................................................... 21
Army’s Concerns with Section 403 Limitations ............................................................... 21
Potential Issues for Congress ......................................................................................................... 22
Potential Impacts of Sequestration and a Continuing Resolution (CR) on the Army’s
Plans to Restructure and Drawdown Forces ......................................................................... 22
How Does the Army Plan to “Regionalize” Its Forces? .......................................................... 23
Will the Army Be Postured for “Engagement” or for “Warfighting”? .................................... 24
Congressional Research Service
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
Figures
Figure 1. Alternative 1: Force Reductions ..................................................................................... 11
Figure 2. Alternative 2: Installation Gains ..................................................................................... 13
Tables
Table A-1. Army Retention Control Points (RCP) ......................................................................... 28
Table A-2. Promotion Timing and Opportunity ............................................................................. 29
Appendixes
Appendix A. Title 10 Drawdown Authorities ................................................................................ 25
Appendix B. Brief History of Past Army Drawdowns .................................................................. 30
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 33
Congressional Research Service
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
Importance to Congress
The Administration’s proposal to reduce the size of the Army as well as restructure units and
headquarters has national security implications that Congress will need to consider as part of its
oversight and authorizations and appropriations role. In terms of size of the force, Congress sets
the endstrength for both the Active and Reserve components of the Army. Congress also
authorizes and appropriates funds needed for Army restructuring, training exercises, equipment,
basing, and infrastructure, as well as the various manpower management tools the Army could
use to drawdown the force. Administration decisions about the structure of the Army can have a
significant impact on Army bases in a Member’s district or state that can also have economic
ramifications for communities around or near affected bases. The Administration’s downsizing
and restructuring proposals also can have a significant impact on local and state defense-related
industries. Lastly, soldiers and their families who might be affected by the Administration’s
decisions constitute a unique element of Members’ constituencies.
The Administration’s Decision to Drawdown and
Restructure the Army
Most experts would agree the Administration’s decision to reduce the size of the Army was an
outgrowth of its decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of 2011 and the stated
intent of handing over security responsibilities for Afghanistan to the Afghan government and
Afghan National Army by the end of 2014. The United States has routinely drawn down forces
upon the completion of a major conflict, eschewing a “large standing army” during peacetime—
although it can be argued that in a post-9/11 world, “peacetime” is a somewhat subjective term. A
brief history of past Army drawdowns can be found at Appendix B.
Background
The foundation for the Army’s drawdown and restructuring was laid in early 2011. A year later in
January 2012, the Administration provided additional details on proposed force structure and
global posture.
January 6, 2011, News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Gates and
Chairman Admiral Mullen1
On January 6, 2011, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Mike Mullen held a news briefing “announcing a number of decisions and measures that
mark the next major step in this department’s reform agenda.” These decisions and measures,
largely taken in response to fiscal pressures, involved a variety of cross-service actions, including
consolidating and eliminating headquarters and organizations, modifying or eliminating weapon
systems programs, and force reductions. Army force structure-specific actions included
1 Information from this section is taken from U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, “DOD News Briefing with
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen from the Pentagon,” January 6, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
1
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
• reduce Active Army endstrength by 27,000 troops starting in 2015, and
• acknowledgement there was “excess” force structure in Europe but no action would
be taken until 2015 or without consultation with allies.
Secretary Gates noted the Army was also in the process of divesting itself of an additional 22,000
troops who were temporarily authorized in 2010 and this temporary endstrength would be
eliminated by 2013. Combined with the 27,000 Active permanent endstrength reductions that will
start in 2015, this represents a reduction of 49,000 Active Duty troops from FY2011 levels.
January 26, 2012, Administration Major Budget Decision Briefing2
On January 26, 2012, senior DOD leaders unveiled a new defense strategy, based on a review of
the current defense strategy and budgetary constraints. This new strategy envisions
• a smaller, leaner military that is agile, flexible, rapidly deployable, and
technologically advanced;
• rebalancing global posture and presence, emphasizing where potential problems are
likely to arise, such as the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East;
• maintaining presence elsewhere in the world (Europe, Africa, and Latin America),
using innovative partnerships, strengthening key alliances, and developing new
partnerships;
• being able to quickly confront and defeat aggression from any adversary anytime,
anyplace; and
• protecting and prioritizing key investments in technology and new capabilities as
well as the capacity to grow, adapt, mobilize, and surge when needed.
During this briefing, the following Army force structure decisions were highlighted:
• Asia-Pacific/Middle East: Sustain Army structure in the Pacific;
• Europe and Global Partners:
• Adjust Our Posture in Europe:
• Eliminate two forward-stationed Army heavy brigades;
• Maintain NATO Article 5 commitments3 and ensure interoperability with
allied forces by allocating a U.S.-based brigade to NATO Response
Force;4 and
2 Information in this section is taken from U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Major Budget Decisions
Briefing from the Pentagon,” presented by Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff General Martin E. Dempsey, January 26, 2012; U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Major Budget
Decisions Briefing from the Pentagon,” presented by Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter and Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral James A. Winnefeld Jr., January 26, 2012; and U.S. Department of
Defense Publication, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012.
3 According to NATO, http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is the basis of a
fundamental principle of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It provides that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an
armed attack, each and every other member of the Alliance will consider this act of violence as an armed attack against
all members and will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the Ally attacked. This is the principle of collective
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
2
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
• Rotate U.S.-based Army units to Europe for training and exercises.
• Forces No Longer Sized for Long-Term Stability Operations:
• Reduce Active Army endstrength. Army will go from about 570,000 in 2010
to 490,000 in the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP); and
• Preserve expertise in security force assistance and counterinsurgency.
• Protecting the Potential for Future Adjustments:
• Retain a slightly more senior force in the Active Army to allow growth if
needed;
• Preserve Army organizational structure and training force to allow growth if
needed; and
• Retain a Ready and Capable Reserve Component;
• Reduce Army National Guard endstrength slightly;
• Sustain increased readiness prior to mobilization; and
• Maintain key combat-support and combat service-support capabilities.
In addition to force structure and endstrength decisions, the Administration also made the
following specific commitments:
• A significant land force presence would be maintained in Korea as well as an
operationally responsive peacetime presence in the Middle East;
• In light of repositioning of forces overseas and eliminating force structure, the
President would ask Congress to authorize the use of the base realignment and
closure (BRAC) process;
• The new strategic guidelines will require the Army to return to full-spectrum training,
develop a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment to succeed on land,
including environments where access will be contested; and
• Align a brigade combat team (BCT) with each geographic combatant command.
(...continued)
defense.
4 According to NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm, The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a
highly ready and technologically advanced multinational force made up of land, air, maritime, and special forces
components that the Alliance can deploy quickly to wherever it is needed. It is comprised of three parts: a command
and control element from the NATO Command Structure; the Immediate Response Force, a joint force of about 13,000
high-readiness troops provided by Allies; and a Response Forces Pool, which can supplement the Immediate Response
Force when necessary.
Congressional Research Service
3
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
January 2012 Drawdown and Restructuring
Proposals
Proposal to Reduce Endstrength5
On January 27, 2012, Army Chief of Staff General Odierno noted 90,000 soldiers were deployed
in support of operations and another 96,000 soldiers forward-stationed overseas in nearly 150
countries. DOD announced the Army would reduce the size of the Active Army starting in 2012
from a post-9/11 peak in 2010 of about 570,000 soldiers to 490,000 soldiers by the end of 2017.
DOD plans for only marginal reductions in the Army National Guard and none in the Army
Reserve. Army leadership stated endstrength reductions would “follow a drawdown ramp that
allows us to take care of soldiers and families while maintaining a ready and capable force.”6
Army leaders noted the 490,000-strong Army would have the following advantages over the
482,000-strong Army of 2001:
• a combat-seasoned force;
• increased investments in special operations forces and the cyber domain;
• drastically improved command and control capabilities, which significantly enhance
mission command;
• modularized brigade combat teams (BCTs);
• increased aviation assets;
• an operational National Guard and Reserve affording increased depth and capacity;
and
• lessons learned over 10 years of combat.7
Units to Be Eliminated8
During the January 27, 2012, briefing, DOD and Army leaders stated they planned to eliminate at
least eight Active Duty BCTs from existing force structure. Army leaders also stated two armored
BCTs9 (ABCTs) would be removed from Europe and these two ABCTs would not be re-stationed
in the United States but instead eliminated from Army force structure. On February 16, 2012, the
5 Information in this section is taken from DOD White Paper “Defense Budget Priorities and Choices,” January 2012
and transcripts of Army Chief of Staff Raymond T. Odierno Army Briefing on the FY-13 Budget Request, January 27,
2012.
6 Transcripts of Army Chief of Staff Raymond T. Odierno, Army Briefing on the FY-13 Budget Request, January 27,
2012.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Armored BCTs were formerly known as Heavy BCTs (HBCTs).
Congressional Research Service
4
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
Army issued an information paper to Congress10 that provided additional details. According to the
paper:
• The Army’s V Corps Headquarters will not return to Europe upon the completion of
its deployment to Operation Enduring Freedom in late FY2013. The long-term future
and location of the V Corps Headquarters will be addressed as part of the Total Army
Analysis (TAA) process in which overall force structure and endstrength issues are
evaluated.
• Two ABCTs will be inactivated (the 170th BCT in FY2013 and the 172nd BCT in
FY2014).
• Additional Army enabler forces, potentially in the range of 2,500 soldiers, could be
reduced from Europe as part of the TAA process.11
Press reports suggest the Army might cut more than eight BCTs Army-wide.12 These additional
cuts would most likely result from a reorganization of the BCT’s structure, which is presently
being studied by the Army staff. It was also reported that it is highly likely that the Army will cut
more ABCTs, as DOD has issued strategic guidance calling for a leaner and more rapidly
deployable force. As already noted, the 170th ABCT stationed in Baumholder, Germany, and the
172nd ABCT stationed in Grafenwoehr, Germany, will be eliminated. The 170th ABCT was
reportedly deactivated on October 9, 2012.13 In terms of cuts to forces in the Pacific, the Chief of
Staff of the Army, General Raymond T. Odierno, reportedly stated Army forces in the Pacific
would remain at current levels, with plans to keep Stryker, infantry, and aviation units—about
10,300 soldiers—at Schofield Barracks in Hawaii.14
Units to Be Realigned and Restructured15
In terms of realigning and restructuring the Active Army, DOD and the Army announced in
January 2012 that
• active forces would no longer be sized to conduct large and protracted stability
operations;
• Army force structure would be sustained in the Pacific, and a persistent presence
would be maintained in the Middle East;
• Army forces will rotate through Europe and other regions on a more frequent basis;
10 Army Information Paper, “Subject: Army Force Structure in Europe,” February 16, 2012.
11 Ibid.
12 Information in this section is taken from Sebastian Sprenger, “Odierno: Army May Cut More Than Eight Brigade
Combat Teams,” InsideDefense.com, January 27, 2012; Michelle Tan and Richard Sandza, “European Pullout: Plan to
Move 2 BCTs and Up to 10,000 Soldiers Could Start in October,” Army Times, January 23, 2012; and Michelle Tan,
“Reduction to Include 8 BCTs,” Army Times, February 6, 2012.
13 “USAREUR to Cut Civilian Jobs,” Army Times, November 30, 2012.
14 William Cole, “Army Won’t Shrink Force Level in Pacific Region, General Says,” Honolulu Star-Advertiser,
January 18, 2102.
15 Information in this section is taken from DOD White Paper “Defense Budget Priorities and Choices,” January 2012
and transcripts of Army Chief of Staff Raymond T. Odierno Army Briefing on the FY-13 Budget Request, January 27,
2012.
Congressional Research Service
5
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
• a U.S.-based heavy brigade would be allocated to the NATO Response Force;
• a brigade combat team (BCT) would be aligned with each geographic combatant
command to provide cultural and language training to support engagement
operations; and
• BCTs and enabling units would be examined for optimum design, which could lead
to further BCT reductions if the Army decides to increase the capability of BCTs.
Press reports offer additional details on how BCTS might be restructured.16 Prior to the 2003
decision to restructure the Army to a modular force, all combat brigades had three maneuver
battalions (infantry, armor, or mechanized infantry). Under modularity, only Stryker battalions
have three maneuver battalions, and infantry BCTs (IBCTs) and armored BCTs (ABCTs) have
only two, based on a contested belief at the time that additional intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) units added to the BCT could substitute for the third maneuver battalion.
Reportedly, Army leaders returning from Iraq and Afghanistan over the past few years have
lobbied to add back the third maneuver battalion to IBCTs and ABCTs, as they argued this
additional battalion could enable more successful combat, patrol, and site-security operations. In
order to add this third battalion, it is likely it would be taken from existing BCTs, and these BCTs,
after their two maneuver battalions are reassigned, would be eliminated from Army force
structure.
Changes in Unit Basing17
On January 27, 2012, Secretary of Defense Panetta indicated that he would ask Congress to
authorize a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process whereby bases in the United States
can be realigned or closed. If Congress approves BRAC, it is likely some Army bases could be
realigned or closed, which could require some Army units to move to other new or existing bases.
With the reliance on an increased use of rotational forces under the Administration’s new strategic
guidelines, it is likely a number of smaller bases—some permanent but many temporary—might
need to be established to accommodate these rotational forces. In terms of the two ABCTs
eliminated from Europe, it is not known what will happen to the Army bases at Baumholder and
Grafenwohr.
Impact on the National Guard and Reserve18
As previously noted, under the new strategic guidance DOD intends to
• retain a ready and capable reserve component;
16 Sebastian Sprenger, “Odierno: Army May Cut More Than Eight Brigade Combat Teams,” InsideDefense.com,
January 27, 2012.
17 Information in this section is taken from U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Major Budget Decisions
Briefing from the Pentagon,” presented by Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta and Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of
Staff General Martin E. Dempsey, January 26, 2012; U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Major Budget
Decisions Briefing from the Pentagon,” presented by Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter and Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral James A. Winnefeld Jr., January 26, 2012; and U.S. Department of
Defense Publication, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012.
18 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
6
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
• reduce National Guard endstrength slightly;
• sustain increased readiness prior to mobilization; and
• maintain key combat-support and combat service-support capabilities.
Like previous pronouncements, no specifics were provided regarding reductions in Reserve
Component endstrength and how readiness and support capabilities would be maintained.
Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond T. Odierno reportedly stated the Pentagon’s
decision to cut the active force by 80,000 soldiers will place greater reliance on the National
Guard and Reserves, “particularly if the United States gets into two major long-term combat
operations at the same time.”19 The report further notes the United States will be required to keep
its reserve forces at a higher state of readiness than it did before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
General Odierno suggests if the Army had to fight two large, simultaneous, long-term wars, the
United States would rely more heavily on allies and request a large-scale mobilization of the
reserves. The reserves would also be used to “buy time to increase the size of the active
component,” and because of the requirement for higher readiness, a new readiness model would
need to be developed to keep the National Guard and Reserves at a higher state of readiness.20
President’s FY2013 Budget Request
On February 13, 2012, DOD publically released the President’s FY2013 DOD Budget Request.
On the whole, the FY2013 budget request did not provide additional details on how the Army
would reduce Active Duty endstrength and how many and which BCTs and other supporting units
and headquarters would be eliminated. The FY2013 budget request did, however, reaffirm the
Army’s 490,000 Active endstrength, the elimination of a minimum of eight BCTs, and a
commitment to study brigade structure.
Post-FY2013 Budget Request Developments
From February 2012 until present, Army and DOD leadership have conducted a series of news
briefings and interviews that have helped add context to the January 2012 drawdown and
restructuring proposal. These briefings and interviews have not provided definitive details
associated with the impending drawdown and restructuring but have provided insights on future
intentions. The following section summarizes some of these activities.
May 2012 Chief of Staff of the Army News Briefing
On May 16, 2012, General Odierno held a news briefing at the Pentagon.21 He covered a variety
of topics, including the following:
19 Information in this section is taken from Lolita C. Baldor, “Army Chief Sees Greater Role for Guard and Reserves,”
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, January 27, 2012.
20 Transcripts of Army Chief of Staff Raymond T. Odierno, Army Briefing on the FY-13 Budget Request, January 27,
2012.
21 Information in this section is taken from U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, “DOD News Briefing with
Gen. Odierno from the Pentagon,” May 16, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
7
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
• With operations in Iraq complete, transition ongoing in Afghanistan, and a
rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region, the Army will implement a revised
readiness model for Active and Reserve components intended to be more responsive
to combatant commanders.
• In 2013, the Army will begin a regionally aligned force concept where geographic
combatant commands and USOCOM will be allocated one or more BCTs. The first
such alignment will be a BCT from the 10th Mountain Division in 2013, and this unit
will be aligned with U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). As part of this regional
alignment, units will be trained up and be available for 9 to 12 months to participate
in unit rotations, building partner capacity or to conduct security assistance
operations, or participate in exercises. These dedicated units will train for specific
tasks assigned by combatant commanders.
• In order to provide training, mentorship, and discipline to the five BCTs and
additional supporting forces stationed at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, the Army will
reactivate the 7th Infantry Division headquarters under the command of a major
general.
• If sequestration under the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25) occurs, the Army
will be forced to cut an additional 80,000 to 100,000 Active Duty and Reserve
soldiers over and above the current 80,000 soldier planned reductions.
Regional Alignment
It was later reported the Army had instead selected the 1st BCT from the 1st Infantry Division to
be the first brigade to be regionally aligned to USAFRICOM.22 This armored BCT would remain
based in the United States, and only those units involved in a specific task or mission would
deploy to Africa. The unit’s activities would support USAFRICOM’s partnership-building
activities, and deployments would be for weeks and months, as opposed to year-long or greater
deployments. The BCT’s first mission to Africa is expected in March 2013, and other missions
are expected throughout the year.23
In October 2012, the Deputy Commanding General of U.S. Army Pacific reportedly stated the
Army would make I Corps headquarters, based at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington,
regionally aligned to the Pacific region.24 According to Army officials, this alignment will add a
dedicated three-star headquarters and supporting staff to the U.S. Pacific Command.
Army’s Presence in Kuwait
According to a June 2012 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report:
When U.S. troops departed Iraq at the end of 2011, Kuwait welcomed a more enduring
American footprint. Currently, there are approximately 15,000 U.S. forces in Kuwait, but the
number is likely to decrease to 13,500. Kuwaiti bases such as Camp Arifjan, Ali Al Salem
22 Ann Roosevelt, “Army Aligns First Regional Brigade to U.S. Africa Command,” Defense Daily, June 15, 2012.
23 Michelle Tan, “After Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. Army to Move Soldiers to Other Regions,” Defense News, July 2,
2012.
24 Paul McLeary, “State of the Army Westward Expansion,” Army Times, October 29, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
8
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
Air Field, and Camp Buehring offer the United States major staging hubs, training ranges,
and logistical support for regional operations. U.S. forces also operate Patriot missile
batteries in Kuwait, which are vital to theater missile defense.25
This report suggests there will be a continued U.S. military presence in Kuwait for the
foreseeable future. Of the 13,500 military personnel, there will likely be a substantial U.S. Army
presence, including both permanent party, but also rotational forces.
Brigade Structural Changes
During a November 2012 interview, General Odierno discussed his priorities as Chief of Staff of
the Army. Regarding BCTs, he stated:
The one thing that is absolutely essential is that we must have a third maneuver battalion in
each of our brigades. We did not quite have enough engineers inside of our brigades. We
have to relook a little bit how we do our intelligence collection and provide fire support. All
of those will be incorporated in the new brigade design when it comes out ... in the next
several months.26
As part of these changes, the Army intends to include organic horizontal and vertical construction
capability to the BCTs.27 Additional BCT engineering capabilities include enhanced clearing,
route clearance, and gap-crossing capabilities intended to improve force protection, enhance
mobility in complex and urban terrain, and enable capacity building.28
The Army is also proposing changing Battlefield Surveillance Brigades to Reconnaissance and
Surveillance Brigades.29 The new Reconnaissance and Surveillance Brigade construct would
include additional personnel and 120mm mortar sections, additional scout platoons, artillery, and
mounted reconnaissance formations, which will give these units the ability to destroy enemy units
as opposed to simply “finding” them.30
Changes to the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Readiness
Model
The Army is reportedly changing its ARFORGEN cycle away from producing forces ready for
Afghanistan and instead focusing on providing regionally aligned forces for combatant
commanders.31 Under this revised ARFORGEN model, units ranging from platoon to brigade-
25 “The Gulf Security Architecture: Partnership with the Gulf Co-Operation Council,” A Majority Staff Report prepared
for the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, June 19, 2012, p. 12.
26 Vago Muradian, “Odierno Pushes BCT Revamp, 4 Must-Have Programs, Army Times, October 29, 2012.
27 Sebastian Sprenger, “Draft Army Concept Backs, BCT, Reconnaissance Unit Reorganizations,” InsideDefense.com,
October 5, 2012 and information from the author’s visit to the Army’s Maneuver Center of Excellence on October 10,
2012.
28 Ibid.
29 Sebastian Sprenger, “Plan for Added Firepower in Army Reconnaissance Units Taking Shape,” InsideDefense.com,
July 13, 2012 and information from the author’s visit to the Army’s Maneuver Center of Excellence on October 10,
2012.
30 Ibid.
31 Ann Roosevelt, “Army Takes Incremental Steps Toward the Future,” Defense Daily, November 2, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
9
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
sized and representing a variety of combat and support capabilities will be staffed, equipped, and
trained primarily to support regional engagement activities for the various geographic combatant
commands.
As part of the ARFORGEN realignment, the time needed to move units through the “reset,”
“train,” and “available” phases will reportedly be shortened from 36 to 24 months for the Active
Army.32 A portion of the Reserve component will go through the training and reset phases but will
not proceed to the available phase that qualifies them for deployment, and units in that category
will be considered part of the “strategic reserve” which, according to Pentagon officials, will save
money.33 Other Reserve forces not in this pool will be placed in a separate 60-month cycle, which
more closely mirrors the Active component. Also, unit training will supposedly become much
more focused, whereas a unit designed to participate in homeland defense and civil support
activities might not go through training needed for combat missions.34
Regional Alignment of the National Guard and Reserves35
In a January 2013 interview with the Army Times, Lieutenant General William Ingram, Director
of the Army National Guard, and Lieutenant General Jeffery Talley, Chief of the Army Reserve,
discussed the evolving role of the National Guard and Army Reserve. The Director of the Army
National Guard indicated the National Guard will also transition to regionally aligned forces in a
similar fashion as the Active component. In the opinion of the National Guard, this regional
alignment “fits nicely” with the National Guard State Partnership Program,36 a 20-year-old
program that has resulted in partnerships with 65 nations around the world. While the Guard has
presence in the USAFRICOM and USPACOM areas, it has expressed an interest in expanding the
number of partners in these regions. In a similar manner, the Army Reserves plans to align its 38
regional commands with the Active Army’s corps and combatant commands. The Reserves would
also establish Army Reserve Coordination Cells, which would coordinate Army Reserve forces
which deploy into a theater of operations. The Chief of the Army Reserve noted he has about
3,500 soldiers supporting USPACOM, none supporting USAFRICOM, and would like to increase
efforts in the USSOUTHCOM area of operations.
Programmatic Environmental Assessment for Army 2020 Force
Structure Realignment37
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (PL. 91-190) requires federal agencies
to consider potential environmental impacts as part of—inter alia—major organizational changes.
In accordance with this law, the Army prepared a Programmatic Environmental Assessment
32 Sebastian Sprenger, “New Force-Generation Model Lays Ground Rules for Active, Reserve Use,”
InsideDefense.com, November 6, 2012.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Michelle Tan, “Regional Alignment will Include Guard and Reserves,” Army Times, January 7, 2013.
36 For detailed information on the National Guard State Partnership Program see CRS Report R41957, The National
Guard State Partnership Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Lawrence Kapp and Nina M.
Serafino
37 Information in this section is directly taken from Programmatic Environmental Assessment for Army 2020 Force
Structure Realignment, U.S. Army Environmental Command, January 2013.
Congressional Research Service
10
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
(PEA) to consider environmental effects to the Army’s installations and training areas that could
result from proposed reorganization of the Army from FY2013 through FY2020. While this
report did not examine specific force structure and basing changes, it did examine two
alternatives:
1. Inactivate Brigade Combat Teams and realign both Combat Support and
Service Support Units between FY2013 and FY2020. Under this alternative,
Army installations would experience end-strength losses through unit
inactivations and unit realignments. As a result of the implementation of
Alternative 1, the Army would make decisions to inactivate a minimum of eight
BCTs and other support units. The structure of BCTs would not change. Under
this alternative, installation force reductions were projected as depicted in Figure
1.
Figure 1. Alternative 1: Force Reductions
From Programmatic Environmental Assessment for Army 2020 Force Structure Realignment
Source: Programmatic Environmental Assessment for Army 2020 Force Structure Realignment, January 2013, p.
3.
Congressional Research Service
11
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
2. Reorganize BCTs: Implement Alternative 1; Inactivate Additional BCTs;
and Restructure BCTs to include adding a 3rd Combat Maneuver Battalion
between FY2013 and FY2020.
Under Alternative 2, the Army would implement force reductions and
realignments discussed as part of the implementation of Alternative 1. In
addition, the Army would reduce further the total number of BCTs to provide the
additional troops that would be added to the remaining BCT force structure. The
implementation of Alternative 2 would result in the inactivation of more BCTs
across the Army. The exact number of inactivations would depend on the final
force structure designs, number of soldiers added to each BCT, and number of
BCTs that would eventually implement the new force structure design concept.
The Army also would restructure BCTs by taking combat maneuver battalions of
inactivating ABCTs and IBCTs and adding them to existing ABCTs and IBCTs
either at the same location or at other installations. Each realigned combat
maneuver battalion would add approximately 700 additional soldiers per BCT.
The addition of a combat maneuver battalion to the SBCT is not being
considered, since the SBCT already has three combat maneuver battalions. As
part of this alternative, the Army would also restructure its engineering units to
add a Brigade Engineer Battalion to each ABCT, IBCT, and SBCT, which would
add several hundred more soldiers to the BCT. There may be other
augmentations, such as additional indirect fires units, reconnaissance elements,
and other combat support unit changes between now and 2020 based on the need
to establish the optimum configuration for the BCT and its supporting elements.
Under this alternative, installation force gains were projected as depicted in
Figure 2.
Congressional Research Service
12
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
Figure 2. Alternative 2: Installation Gains
From Programmatic Environmental Assessment for Army 2020 Force Structure Realignment
Source: Programmatic Environmental Assessment for Army 2020 Force Structure Realignment, January 2013, p.
4.
While these two alternatives from the Army’s Environmental Assessment do not address specific
force structure changes (which particular unit) and basing decisions (what specific unit is added
to an installation), they do provide a degree of insight into what the Army intends to do if, in fact,
it does add a third maneuver battalion to IBCTs and ABCTs. Furthermore, in an aggregate sense,
they also suggest how U.S. installations might be impacted in terms of potential personnel losses
or growth.
Possible Impact of Sequestration and a FY2013 Continuing
Resolution (CR)
In early February 2013, the Army released a memorandum titled “Army Talking Points for
Operating Under Fiscal Uncertainty,” which discusses the potential impact on Army Active
Component Operational and Maintenance (OMA) funding in the event of a sequestration and a
potential FY2013 CR. The memorandum addresses the following training and readiness impacts:
• “Shortfalls of this size, this far into the year, when some of our budget is already
spent, will potentially impact 90% of remaining OMA funds, immediately eroding
readiness, leaving the Army with fully trained units only for OEF [Operation
Enduring Freedom], rotations to Korea and the Global Response Force Brigade
Combat Team (BCT).”
Congressional Research Service
13
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
• “With the exception of one BCT, all non-deploying or non-forward stationed units
(78% of all Brigade Combat Teams) will incur several months delay for required
training to meet COCOM requirements. Shortfalls in Professional Military
Education/Training means soldiers will join units without requisite training and
preparation. These lost capabilities require years to reinstate and some cannot be
reversed. The strategic impact is a rapid atrophy of unit combat skills with a failure to
meet demands of the National Military Strategy by the end of this year.”
• “Funding levels allow readiness focus on forces in Afghanistan, those units next-to-
deploy, and the Division Ready Brigade. Diminished available resources drive
collective training for all remaining units to squad or platoon level proficiency.
Inadequate funding through FY13 will leave our units in a degraded readiness
posture and inhibit the progressive build of unit capability to meet early FY14
missions, emergent requirements, and timelines associated with Combatant
Command Operational and Contingency Plans.”
• “Will cancel four of six brigade and battalion level collective combat training
events at Fort Irwin, California and Fort Polk, Louisiana for non-deploying
units.”
• “Will reduced support to Combatant Command Exercises and Building
Partnership Capacity events; erodes critical partnerships in a complex
strategic environment.”
• “Cancellations in Individual Military Training would produce a backlog carried into
FY14 and beyond. Army will fall short 513 aviators, ~4,000 Critical Military
Intelligence trained soldiers and will cancel fifteen (15) Field Artillery Training
courses. Loss of training is not recoverable and leads to untrained soldiers assigned to
units – a negative impact to near term readiness. Impact to the Army is a capability
shortfall in Combat Aviation Brigades and other formations.”38
However, this memorandum makes no mention of sequestration or CR impacts on planned Army
restructuring efforts that would likely require some level of OMA funding. This omission
seemingly raises three possibilities: (1) the Army does not know how much OMA funding Active
Component restructuring will require in the near to mid- term and therefore it is not included; (2)
the Army has chosen to “protect” OMA funding for Active Component restructuring and instead
had chosen to cut funding for training, readiness, and maintenance; or (3) OMA funding needed
for Active Component restructuring is relatively negligible and, therefore, cuts are warranted.
Given these possibilities, Congress might wish to further explore how sequestration or a CR
could impact Active Component restructuring OMA funding requirements.
DOD Announces U.S. Army in Europe Force Structure Changes
On March 1, 2013, DOD announced a series of force structure changes for the U.S. Army in
Europe from the period 2013 through 2016. The text of the news release is as follows:39
38 Taken directly from “Army Talking Points for Operating Under Fiscal Uncertainty” undated, obtained by CRS from
the Army.
39 U.S. Department of Defense News Release, “DOD Announces U.S. Army in Europe Force Structure Changes,” No.
120-13, March 1, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
14
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
DOD Announces U.S. Army in Europe Force Structure Changes
The Department of Defense announced today that Germany-based elements of the 173rd
Airborne Brigade Combat Team will relocate within Germany and to Italy in summer 2013.
A total of four battalions will be relocated. Two battalions will relocate from Germany to
Italy; the brigade’s headquarters and one infantry battalion will relocate from Caserma
Ederle in Vicenza, Italy, to the Army’s new facility in Del Din (formerly known as Dal
Molin) in Vicenza. The other two battalions will relocate from Schweinfurt and Bamberg,
Germany, to Grafenwoehr, Germany. In addition to the previously announced inactivation of
V Corps Headquarters and the 170th and 172nd Infantry Brigades, the disposition of 2,500
enabling forces are provided as follows:
In 2012:
170th Infantry Brigade, Smith Barracks, Baumholder, Germany – Inactivated
167th Medical Detachment (Optometry), Grafenwoehr, Germany – Inactivated
In 2013:
535th Engineer Company, Warner Barracks, Bamberg, Germany – Inactivates
12th Chemical Company, Conn Barracks, Schweinfurt, Germany – Inactivates
V Corps Headquarters, Clay Kaserne, Wiesbaden, Germany – Inactivates
172nd Infantry Brigade, Grafenwoehr, Germany – Inactivates
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 391st Combat Service Support Battalion, Warner
Barracks, Bamberg, Germany – Inactivates
B Detachment, 106th Finance Company, Katterbach Kaserne, Ansbach, Germany –
Inactivates
42nd Engineer Company, Warner Barracks, Bamberg, Germany – Returns to the United
States
99th Movement Control Team, Aviano Air Base, Italy – Returns to the United States
In 2014:
Headquarters, 18th Engineer Brigade, Conn Barracks, Schweinfurt, Germany – Inactivates
243 Engineer Detachment, Conn Barracks, Schweinfurt, Germany – Inactivates
54th Engineer Battalion, Warner Barracks, Bamberg, Germany – Inactivates
370th Engineer Company, Warner Barracks, Bamberg, Germany – Inactivates
7th Signal Brigade, Ledward Barracks, Schweinfurt, Germany – Inactivates
72nd Signal Battalion, Ledward Barracks, Schweinfurt, Germany – Inactivates
Congressional Research Service
15
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 95th Military Police Battalion, Sembach
Kaserne, Kaiserslautern – Inactivates
630th Military Police Company, Warner Barracks, Bamberg, Germany – Inactivates
464th Military Police Platoon, Camp Ederle, Italy – Inactivates
511th Military Police Platoon, Livorno, Italy – Inactivates
541st Engineer Company, Warner Barracks, Bamberg, Germany – Returns to the United
States
In 2015:
230th Military Police Company, Sembach Barracks, Kaiserslautern, Germany – Inactivates
3rd Battalion, 58th Aviation Regiment (Airfield Operations Battalion), Storck Barracks,
Illesheim, Germany – Returns to the United States
In 2016:
69th Signal Battalion, Grafenwoehr, Germany – Inactivates
525th Military Police Detachment (Military Working Dogs), Baumholder, Germany -
Returns to the United States
1st Battalion, 214th General Support Aviation Regiment structure is reduced at Clay Kaserne,
Wiesbaden, by 190 soldier spaces and at Landstuhl Heliport by 50 soldier spaces.
Information on the disposition of other units in the closing U.S. military communities of
Bamberg and Schweinfurt will be provided in the near future, as those force structure actions
are determined. These actions are part of DOD’s ongoing restructure of resources worldwide
in line with our national defense strategy and in support of combatant commanders, NATO
and our European allies.
Force Reduction and Force-Shaping Programs
Historically, military drawdowns have been rather blunt instruments of national policy. As noted
in the earlier descriptions of the drawdowns at the conclusion of World War II and Vietnam, the
focus was primarily on immediate reductions in accessions and separating/discharging others as
soon as possible. The rapid and poorly planned demobilization of Army forces in the past had a
deleterious impact on morale, terminated many aspiring military careers, and released significant
numbers of military personnel with limited transition assistance.
The recent post-Cold War drawdown was substantially different. Congress still determined the
endstrength levels but provided a number of voluntary and involuntary tools to shape each year
group of the force—officer, warrant officer, and enlisted. Voluntary separations were emphasized,
and some of the tools had robust financial incentives. Few skills were exempt from consideration,
and every soldier was vulnerable for separation at some point during nearly a decade of
drawdown. It was also the first time that resources were focused on transition assistance and
stressed the importance of working with military alumni, even after their separation.
Congressional Research Service
16
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
Title 10 Drawdown Authorities are discussed in greater detail in Appendix A.
The Human Dimension of a Force Drawdown
For the past decade, U.S. military forces have been engaged in combat operations on two fronts—
Iraq and Afghanistan. The deployments to these austere environments have been long—typically
7 to 12 months for ground forces, sometimes involuntarily extended to support surge operations
and requiring the use of “Stop Loss” policies.40 Deployments have also been frequent, sometimes
with less than a year between rotations resulting in reduced “dwell time” for both active and
reserve component personnel. These conflicts have often been very stressful for servicemembers,
spouses, and families as indicated by higher than normal divorce and suicide rates.41
Throughout this period, support from the American public and political leaders has been
consistent. Many now refer to our servicemembers as “America’s Heroes” and honor the
wounded as “Wounded Warriors.” They return home to welcome ceremonies and spontaneous
outbreaks of applause in airports, and even those who may disagree with the war effort have been
generally supportive of military personnel.
Soon the services will begin to transition from high-tempo combat operations to a more stable
training and garrison environment, while simultaneously downsizing and reshaping the force.
Those with multiple combat tours may feel that they have lost a common cause. Those with pride
in the units that they fought with may now see those units eliminated or friends separated from
the service either voluntarily or involuntarily. Those who have experienced a military focused on
fighting insurgency on multiple fronts over the past decade will see a shift of emphasis to training
for full-spectrum operations and individual professional development. The collective effect of
these changes could result in a temporary degradation of individual morale and unit effectiveness.
The key for leaders at all levels will be to refocus and minimize these potentially negative
impacts. However, reducing accessions has its own implications.
Accessions
It is assumed that the post-Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
drawdown will focus primarily on reduced accessions, because a reduction in accessions
significantly reduces the need for other voluntary and involuntary force shaping actions and their
inherent negative implications.
The military acquires or procures new personnel annually—enlisted, warrant officer, and
officer—through the enlisted recruiting process and officer accession programs. The number to be
recruited or accessed is based on the congressionally established endstrength, which is published
annually in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). With a known endstrength, the
services can then project losses for the coming year, compare this to the endstrength target, and
determine the number to be recruited and trained.
40 For a complete description of the Stop Loss program, see CRS Report R40121, U.S. Military Stop Loss Program:
Key Questions and Answers.
41 Military Review, “Saving Military Families,” by Captain (Navy) Gene Thomas Gomulka, January-February 2010.
Congressional Research Service
17
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
During the years of OIF/OEF, the Army generally recruited approximately 75,000 to 80,000
enlisted soldiers a year, initially to sustain an endstrength of 482,000 and, later, to incrementally
grow the force to its eventual target strength of 562,000. As announced in the FY2013 President’s
Budget,42 the Army will be required to draw down to an endstrength of 490,000 by FY2017, a
reduction of 72,000.43 With five years to accomplish, it appears that the accessions program could
absorb a reduction of nearly 15,000 per year and still sustain the force over time, ensure the right
mix of training and experience, and allow for reasonable promotion expectations.
Officer Accessions
In 2008, Congress authorized an increased enrollment at the U.S. Military Academy,44 from 4,000
to 4,400, and the Army greatly expanded its Officer Candidate School (OCS) program at Fort
Benning, GA, while also increasing the size of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)
program. West Point and ROTC have four-year timelines associated with their programs, but the
duration of the OCS program is measured in weeks rather than years. Therefore, to reduce officer
accessions, OCS can be quickly ramped down with any additional decrements coming from the
ROTC program and potentially reverting the service academies to their previous cap of 4,000
students.
Personnel-Related Congressional Testimony45
In testimony to Congress, the Army stated in order to reach its FY2017 endstrength goals,
approximately 24,000 enlisted soldiers and 5,000 officers would likely need to be involuntarily
separated, in other words, forced out of the active Army. The Army noted “that we expect to lose
combat seasoned soldiers and leaders, but our focus will be on retaining the best in the right
grades and skills.”46 The Army also stated funding will either need to be realigned or
reprogrammed to fund the various incentive authorities the Army can use to get soldiers to leave
the Army voluntarily.47 Congress might opt to examine these issues with the Army in greater
detail before soldiers are involuntarily separated or offered inducements to leave the service to
gain an in-depth understanding of the criteria that will be used to choose soldiers for involuntary
separation, the process that will be followed, and what types of compensation and assistance will
be provided to these soldiers to facilitate their transition to the civilian world.
42 Department of Defense, “Overview: Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller), February 2012.
43 The FY2013 Budget also announced a drawdown for the Marine Corps from its current strength of 202,100 to
182,100, also by FY2017.
44 §540, P.L. 110-417, October 14, 2008. Congress expanded each of the service academy programs—U.S. Military
Academy, U.S. Naval Academy and the U.S. Air Force Academy from 4,000 to 4,400 as determined for any year as of
the day before the last day of the academic year.
45 Information in this section is taken from a statement by Lieutenant General Thomas P. Bostick, Deputy Chief of
Staff, G1, United States Army before the Military Personnel Subcommittee, Second Session, 112th Congress, March 6,
2012.
46 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
47 Ibid., p. 5.
Congressional Research Service
18
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
More on Involuntary Separations48
During an October 29, 2012, interview, Lieutenant General Howard W. Bromberg, the Army’s
Chief of Personnel, provided additional updated drawdown insights:
• The Army now plans to eliminate about 20,000 enlisted soldiers and 5,000 officers
beginning in 2014 through 2017 through involuntary separation programs.
• Although Congress had reauthorized several voluntary separation programs, Army
leaders have opted only to reinstate the Temporary Early Retirement Authority
(TERA) for selected categories of soldiers with at least 15 but less than 20 years of
active service.
• The Army would instead rely on retention boards, reduced promotion rates, and
reduced accessions to draw down the Army.
Protecting the Institutional Army49
In order to quickly reactivate mid-grade leaders in the event of a future ground war—the “retain a
slightly more senior force in the Active Army to allow growth if needed” proposal from the
January 2012 Drawdown and Restructuring Proposal—the Army plans to insulate from the
drawdown about 90,000 soldiers from its institutional, non-operational portion of the service.
Army service leaders reportedly will instead take an end strength cut of almost 80,000 soldiers
from the operational Army. In order to retain mid-grade leaders needed to reactivate units, the
Army had planned to put these personnel in units designed to mentor foreign security forces, but
the Army is currently considering putting these individuals in Army educational institutions. If
this does become policy, these mid-grade soldiers could replace Department of the Army
Civilians and contractors presently serving in many of these billets.
Potential Impact on Major Army Weapon
Systems Programs
Because DOD and the Army have yet to determine how many Active BCTs, headquarters, and
supporting units will be cut and how BCTs and headquarters and other supporting units will be
organized, it is difficult to assess the impact of these changes on major Army weapon systems
programs. In the Army’s FY2013 Budget Request, priorities for investment in ground systems are
noted as50
• The Network;51
48 Jim Tice, “Cutting 25,000 Soldiers,” Army Times, October 29, 2012.
49 Information in this section is taken from Sebastian Sprenger, “Leaders Envision Institutional Army as Buffer Against
Loss of Talent,” InsideDefense.com, November 12, 2012.
50 Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), FY2013 President’s Budget Highlights,
February, 2012, p. 18.
51 According to the Army, “the Network will enable soldiers to access key information anytime, anyplace; share
information to facilitate fire and maneuver, and survive in close combat; provide collaboration capability to aid in
seizing and controlling key terrain; employ lethal and non-lethal capabilities, coupled with sensors, to effectively
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
19
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
• Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV);52
• Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV);53
• Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle;54 and
• Paladin Integrated Management Program.55
In addition to the aforementioned systems in various stages of development, the Army plans to
continue modernizing its M-1 Abrams tanks, M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and the
Stryker fighting vehicle.56
All of these systems are employed in the BCTs, with the GCV, Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle,
Paladin, M-1 Abrams, and M-2 Bradley exclusive to the ABCTs. With the necessity of ABCTs
being questioned and the strategic shift toward the Asia-Pacific region, it is possible the Army’s
16 Active ABCTs could be cut further than the 2 ABCTs that are being eliminated from Europe.
These reductions could have an appreciable impact on both systems in development, such as the
GCV, and those legacy systems being modernized, such as the M-1 Abrams.
Potential Budgetary Implications
The Administration’s plan to reduce Active Army endstrength and reorganize, restructure, and re-
station units is intended, in part, to respond to current and anticipated defense budget cuts.
Projected cost savings from fewer soldiers, fewer units, less equipment, and perhaps fewer Army
bases have not been made public, but General Odierno reportedly stated Army program
terminations over the next five years are expected to save $4.7 billion.57 When asked earlier about
the potential savings from cutting eight or more BCTs, General Odierno reportedly suggested that
these cuts were expected to save “substantial amounts of money” but declined to provide a
precise figure “due to the very complex nature of the arithmetic involved.”58 These statements
seem to suggest that the Army does have estimates for overall projected cost savings but these
(...continued)
engage targets at extended ranges; distinguish among friend, enemy, neutral and noncombatant; and integrate indirect
fires.” http://www.bctmod.army.mil/, accessed March 29, 2012.
52 For additional information on the GCV, see CRS Report R41597, The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
53 For additional information on the JLTV, see CRS Report RS22942, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background
and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
54 The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle is intended to replace Vietnam-era M-113 personnel carriers that are still in use
with Army forces.
55 The Paladin is a 155mm indirect fires weapon, and, according to the Army, “The M109A6 Paladin Integrated
Management Program is designed to maintain this fleet, and upgrade 600 Paladin systems to the latest configuration.
The new PIM M109A6 Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) howitzer enhances the combat-proven M109A6 Paladin
Self-propelled howitzer’s reliability, maintainability, performance, responsiveness and lethality and provides increased
commonality with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) of the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT).”
56 Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), FY2013 President’s Budget Highlights,
February, 2012, p. 18.
57 Sebastian Sprenger, Tony Bertuca, and Jen Judson, “Army Expects $4.7 Billion in Savings from Axed Programs,”
InsideDefense.com, February 13, 2012.
58 Sebastian Sprenger, “Odierno: Army May Cut More than Eight Brigade Combat Teams,” InsideDefense.com,
January 27, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
20
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
figures have not been made public. In October 2012, Army leadership suggested changes in the
Army’s force structure would begin to manifest themselves in the FY2015 Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) budget cycle.59
While these changes will likely generate cost savings over time, there are costs associated with
reducing manpower, eliminating and restructuring units, and possibly re-stationing units.
Furthermore, as part of the Army’s role in the Administration’s new Asia-Pacific/Middle East-
centric strategy, there might also be costs associated with the increased rotation of forces and
increased engagement opportunities with allies and potential allies and other strategy-driven
actions. When trying to assess the overall budgetary implications of the drawdown, restructuring
brigades, and the Army’s role under the new strategic guidelines, it is equally important that the
costs associated with these endeavors are included in discussions on anticipated cost savings
resulting from these actions.
Relevant Legislative Provisions
FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310)60
SEC. 403. ANNUAL LIMITATION ON END STRENGTH REDUCTIONS FOR
REGULAR COMPONENT OF THE ARMY AND MARINE CORPS.
(a) ANNUAL LIMITATION ON ARMY END STRENGTH REDUCTIONS.—The end
strength of the regular component of the Army shall not be reduced by more than 15,000
members during each of fiscal years 2014 through 2017 from the end strength of the regular
component of the Army at the end of the preceding fiscal year.
(b) ANNUAL LIMITATION ON MARINE CORPS END STRENGTH REDUCTIONS.—
The end strength of the regular component of the Marine Corps shall not be reduced by more
than 5,000 members during each of fiscal years 2014 through 2017 from the end strength of
the regular component of the Marine Corps at the end of the preceding fiscal year.
Army’s Concerns with Section 403 Limitations61
During a May 16, 2012, news briefing, Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno
expressed his concerns with limitations proposed under Section 403. General Odierno noted that
Section 403 caps Army endstrength at 552,000 through FY2013, which will hinder the Army as
the Army currently plans to be at about a 543,000 soldier endstrength by the end of FY2013. If
Army endstrength reductions through FY2013 are capped in accordance with Section 403, the
Army contends it will not be able to use attrition as originally intended and more soldiers would
be involuntarily separated (forced out) of the Army than intended. General Odierno noted that he
has conveyed these concerns to the House and will continue to work toward an agreement with
Congress.
59 Tony Bertuca and Jen Judson, “Army General Weighs in on Force Structure Reductions, Vehicle Plans,”
InsideDefense.com, October 19, 2012.
60 Report 112-705, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Conference Report, December 18, 2012.
61 Information in this section is taken from U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, “DOD News Briefing with
Gen. Odierno from the Pentagon,” May 16, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
21
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
SEC. 1066. REPORT ON FORCE STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY.
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of the Army shall submit to Congress a report on the force structure of the
Army.
(b) ELEMENTS OF REPORT.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include each
of the following:
(1) A description of the planning assumptions and scenarios used to determine the size and
force structure of the United States Army, including the reserve component, for the Future
Years Defense Program for fiscal years 2014 through 2018.
(2) An evaluation of the adequacy of the proposed force structure for meeting the goals of
the national military strategy of the United States.
(3) A description of any alternative force structures considered, including the assessed
advantages and disadvantages of each and a brief explanation of why those not selected were
rejected.
(4) The estimated resource requirements of each of the alternative force structures referred to
in paragraph (3).
(5) An independent risk assessment of the proposed Army force structure, to be conducted
by the Chief of Staff of the Army.
(6) Such other information as the Secretary of the Army determines is appropriate.
(c) CLASSIFIED ANNEX.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be in unclassified
form but may include a classified annex.
Potential Issues for Congress
There are a number of potential issues for Congress concerning reducing the size of the Active
Army and potentially restructuring various Army formations and headquarters. These issues are
further influenced by current budgetary concerns and the Administration’s decision to
strategically reorient the United States to the Asia-Pacific and Mid-East regions. Potential issues
include, but are not limited to the following:
Potential Impacts of Sequestration and a Continuing Resolution
(CR) on the Army’s Plans to Restructure and Drawdown Forces
To date, much of the Army’s and DOD’s discussions about the potential impacts of sequestration
and a possible CR for FY2013 has focused on how these cuts would have an adverse impact on
readiness—largely attributed to reduced levels of unit training and decreased levels of weapon
system and equipment maintenance. As previously noted, little has been said publically on how
sequester and a FY2013 CR would impact the Army’s restructuring plans as well as drawing
down the Active Component. While funding from Personnel, Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E), Procurement, and Military Construction (MILCON) accounts would be
required in varying degrees for the Army’s restructuring and drawdown initiatives, Operational
Congressional Research Service
22
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
and Maintenance (OMA) funding will be particularly important for restructuring BCTs and other
Army units.
This omission seemingly raises three possibilities: (1) the Army does not know how much OMA
funding Active Component restructuring will require in the near to mid term and therefore it is
not included; (2) the Army has chosen to “protect” OMA funding for Active Component
restructuring and instead had chosen to cut funding for training, readiness, and maintenance; or
(3) OMA funding needed for Active Component restructuring is relatively negligible and,
therefore, cuts are warranted. Given these possibilities, Congress might wish to further explore
how sequestration or a CR could impact Active Component restructuring OMA funding
requirements.
How Does the Army Plan to “Regionalize” Its Forces?
Army leadership has put a great deal of emphasis on establishing regionalized BCTs, and
headquarters, not only in the Active Component but the Reserves as well. This “regionalization,”
which, theoretically, could impact most operational units in the Army, is apparently viewed as a
necessary step by Army leadership if the Army is to successfully conduct “engagement
operations” on a world-wide basis. Other than the 1st BCT from the 1st Infantry Division being
regionally aligned to USAFRICOM and making I Corps headquarters regionally aligned to the
Pacific region, little is known about the Army’s plans to regionalize its forces.
Because of the potential scope and impact of these proposed changes, Congress might choose to
examine the Army’s regionalization plans in greater detail. Possible issues for examination could
include:
• What current unit-specific shortcomings will regionalization address? How did these
shortcomings in the past negatively impact the Army’s ability to operate in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and other regions of the world?
• How will this regionalization be accomplished? Will all soldiers, non-commissioned
officers (NCOs), and officers receive extensive language and cultural training over
their careers? Where and when will this training occur over time and how does the
Army plan to sustain this training?
• What types of forces will the Army regionalize? Does regionalization just apply to
BCTs or will other supporting units (sometimes referred to as “enabling units”) also
be regionalized?
• How will language and cultural training be addressed for the Reserve Components?
• Will soldiers be habitually assigned to units in their particular region over the course
of their careers? Is the Army Personnel Management System capable of handling this
level of assignment specificity?
• Does the Army have a “master plan” for what units will be assigned to what regions
and when the “regionalization process” will be conducted for each unit? If the Army
does not have such a plan, when can Congress expect to see one?
• Will regionalization also require unique equipment, including Command, Control,
Communications, Computer, and Intelligence (C4I) equipment?
Congressional Research Service
23
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
• Will the Army’s Force Generation (ARFORGEN) readiness construct require major
revision to accommodate regionally aligned forces?
• How much will the Army’s regionalization effort cost? How does the Army intend to
identify “regionalization costs” in its Annual Budget Request to Congress so that can
Congress can monitor these costs?
• Does the Army plan to develop any Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) to determine
if regionalization is benefitting the Army?
• How will regionalization benefit the Army’s traditional warfighting mission, which
does not require “engagement” but instead the destruction of enemy forces in
combat?
Will the Army Be Postured for “Engagement” or for “Warfighting”?
As the Army postures itself for the future, much of the Army’s emphasis appears to be focused on
engagement activities to better train and equip our partners in order to better “enable” them to
address traditional security and, to a certain extent, terrorist threats in their regions. If this is to be
the Army’s main effort for the foreseeable future, should the Army posture the force more toward
engagement and less towards traditional state-on-state combat? If this is the case, do ABCTs and
SBCTs have utility in engagement operations or would lighter, more deployable IBCTs be better
suited for these types of activities? In a similar manner, will more support units such as
engineering, logistical, and maintenance units be required for enabling-type missions, perhaps at
the expense of BCTs? Another possible topic for consideration is the balance between Active and
Reserve Components as the Army postures the force for the future. If the Active force is expected
to take on a greater role in engagement operations, will the Reserve components be given greater
responsibility for traditional combat operations?
Congressional Research Service
24
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
Appendix A. Title 10 Drawdown Authorities62
Several authorities in Title 10 result in involuntary separation. They were used sparingly during
the post-Cold War drawdown and always preceded by the offer of voluntary incentives. These
involuntary tools include the following:
Title 10 Drawdown Authorities—Involuntary
Selective Early Retirement Boards (SERB)63
Selective Early Retirement is the involuntary retirement of senior officers who are (1) serving
lieutenant colonels or commanders (Navy) who have been twice non-selected for promotion to
colonel or captain (Navy) or (2) are serving colonels or captains (Navy) who have at least four
years in grade and have not been selected for promotion. If not selected for SERB, an officer
cannot be considered for another five years. Those selected must be retired not later than the first
day of the seventh month after the Secretary concerned approves the recommendation for
retirement. While considered involuntary, those selected will receive retired pay and remain
eligible for military healthcare and the other benefits associated with military retirement.
Reduction-in-Force (RIF)64
Reduction-in-Force is the second involuntary program available for downsizing the officer
cohorts. While SERB is focused on those with 20 or more years of service, RIF is directed at
those with more than 6 but less than 20 years of service. While the post-Cold War drawdown
emphasized voluntary separations and retirements, RIF was available (but used sparingly) if the
voluntary programs did not generate adequate volunteers.
2012 Enlisted Qualitative Service Program (QSP)65
On March 14, 2012, the Army announced the initiation of the Enlisted Qualitative Service
Program (QSP) directed toward the grades of staff sergeant through command sergeant major.
Under these provisions, those soldiers under consideration for this program can opt to separate
voluntarily in lieu of being subjected for review by the QSP board.
62 For a detailed discussion of each drawdown authority, see David McCormick’s “The Downsized Warrior: America’s
Army in Transition,” 1998.
63 §638, Title 10.
64 §647, Title 10.
65 Information in this section is taken from Army Message dated 141359Z March 2012, Subject: Enlisted Qualitative
Service Program (QSP).
Congressional Research Service
25
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
Title 10 Drawdown Authorities—Voluntary66
The drawdown tools available during the post-Cold War drawdown are still available to force
planners, with several of them recently reinstated by the FY2012 NDAA. These programs were
used extensively during the post-Cold War drawdown of the 1990s. While these tools are
available to all of the services, the following descriptions will focus on Army programs for the
drawdown. They include the following:
Voluntary Retirement Incentive67
The Voluntary Retirement Incentive is the one incentive that was not available during the post-
Cold War drawdown; it was introduced in the FY2012 NDAA. This program targets retirement-
eligible servicemembers with between 20 and 29 years of service. The amount of the incentive is
determined by the Service Secretary but may not exceed the member’s annual basic pay. In
exchange for the payment, the servicemember agrees to retire. The program is capped at no more
than 675 officers, and the program expires on December 31, 2018.
Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI)68
The Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI) is an incentive that is paid annually for twice the
number of years the individual served on active duty. Servicemembers must have served between
6 and 20 years and additional eligibility criteria are established by the Service Secretary. The
formula for determining the annual annuity is 2.5% times monthly basic pay at the time of
separation, times 12, times the number of years of service. The original authority for this
incentive was the National Defense Authorization Act for 1992/1993,69 which terminated the
program on December 31, 2001. The VSI program was reinstated by the FY2012 NDAA70 for the
period December 31, 2011, through December 31, 2018.
Special Separation Bonus (SSB)71
The Special Separation Bonus (SSB) is a voluntary separation incentive available to any eligible
member of the Armed Forces. SSB is a lump sum payment equal to 15% times years of service
(YOS) and 12 times monthly basic pay. To be eligible, members must have served for more than
6 years but for less than 20. Other requirements may be established by the Service Secretary. The
original authority for the SSB program also expired on December 31, 2001, but was reinstated by
the FY2012 NDAA72 for the period December 31, 2011, through December 31, 2018.
66 Calculating the actual value of any of these voluntary programs requires individual calculations best done by a
finance and accounting professional.
67 §504, P.L. 112-81, December 31, 2011.
68 §1175, Title 10.
69 P.L. 102-190, December 5, 1991.
70 §504, P.L. 112-81, December 31, 2011.
71 §1174a, Title 10.
72 §504, P.L. 112-81, December 31, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
26
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
VSI and SSB were complementary programs that were both offered to eligible populations. The
primary difference was that VSI was an annuity program, while SSB represents a lump sum
payment. Those who volunteer for VSI or SSB do not receive retirement benefits such as a
lifelong annuity and retiree health care benefits, although they may later qualify for retirement
through reserve service.
Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA)73
The Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA) provided an opportunity for eligible officers,
warrant officers, and enlisted personnel to retire prior to completion of 20 years of service. Those
in selected grades and skills could voluntarily retire with as few as 15 years of service. TERA
retirees have their retired pay reduced for every year less than 20. However, as a retiree, they
remain eligible for retired pay; military healthcare; commissary and exchange privileges; and
Morale, Welfare and Recreation activities. The original TERA program expired on September 1,
2002, but has been reauthorized by the FY2012 NDAA. The current program began on December
31, 2011, and extends through December 31, 2018.
Voluntary Early Release/Retirement Program (VEERP)74
This voluntary program targeted the most junior and the most senior ends of the officer spectrum,
with the incentive being a reduction in service obligation. Junior officers (lieutenants and
captains) were permitted to resign prior to fulfilling their active duty obligation (five years for
U.S. Military Academy graduates, four years for most ROTC scholarship graduates, and three
years for Officer Candidate School graduates). Senior officers (lieutenant colonels and colonels)
were permitted to retire at their present rank, waiving one year of the existing retirement
eligibility criteria (normally three years). For example, a colonel could retire as a colonel but with
only two years in grade, rather than the usual three years. This authority was originally included
in the FY1991 NDAA.
“Early Outs”75
Service Secretaries have the authority to discharge enlisted servicemembers up to three months
prior to the end of their term of enlistment. The FY2012 NDAA76 expanded the three-month
standard to one year with no loss of benefits for the members taking advantage of this
opportunity. However, members are not entitled to pay and allowances for the period not served.
There is no termination date associated with this authority.
73 §1293, Title 10 (note).
74 §647, Title 10.
75 §1171, Title 10.
76 §525, P.L. 112-81, December 31, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
27
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
Other Personnel Tools with Drawdown Implications
Enlisted Retention Control Points
The military expects that individual performance will result in the periodic promotion of enlisted
personnel as their military experience increases and as their individual responsibility within the
organization grows. Those who do not progress in a timely manner may be separated prior to the
end of their term of service. This policy is implemented through a series of retention control
points that dictate how long a servicemember may remain at the current rank/grade before being
promoted. Those who fail promotion in a timely manner can be separated prior to their normal
term of service. These retention control points can be adjusted over time and can aid in force
shaping by separating those with less potential.
The current and previous Army retention control points are shown in Table A-1
Table A-1. Army Retention Control Points (RCP)
(“Shaping the enlisted force through tenure”)
Current RCP
Rank Previous
RCP
(as of June 1, 2011)
Private and Private First Class
8 years
5 years
Specialist
10 years
8 years
Promotable Specialist
15 years
12 years
Sergeants
15 years
13 years
Promotable Sergeants
20 years
15 years
Staff Sergeants
23 years
20 years
Notes: The previous RCP allowed a Sergeant (E-5) to remain on active duty until retirement eligibility at 20
years of service. With the recent tightening of these standards, a Sergeant must separate at 13 years and only the
Staff Sergeant (E-6) may remain until 20 years.
Officer Promotion Non-selection
The military’s officer management system is an “up or out” system—officers who fail to promote
after being twice considered for the next higher grade may be involuntarily separated. To support
the officer manpower requirements during the decade of OIF and OEF, many non-selected
officers were selectively continued in their current grade. In addition, the OIF/OEF period was
one of unusually high promotion selection rates (opportunity) and reduced time-in-grade (timing)
before promotion consideration. With the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and the gradual
drawdown of forces in Afghanistan, the services are again enforcing the standards for promotion
and retention. The promotion timing and opportunity standards established by DOD are shown in
Table A-2.
Congressional Research Service
28
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
Table A-2. Promotion Timing and Opportunity
To Grade
Opportunity
Timing
Major/Lieutenant Commander
80 percent
10 years +/- 1 year
Lieutenant Colonel/Commander
70 percent
16 years +/- 1 year
Colonel/Captain
50 percent
22 year +/- 1 year
Source: DOD Instruction 1320.13, July 22, 2009.
Notes: Major, Lieutenant Colonel, and Colonel apply to the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Lieutenant
Commander, Commander, and Captain apply to the Navy.
Most recently, the Air Force involuntarily separated 157 majors who had been twice non-selected
for promotion to lieutenant colonel.77 These officers received separation pay and other transition
benefits and may be eligible to transfer to the Air National Guard or Air Force Reserve but their
Active Duty careers have ended.
77 The Wall Street Journal, “Air Force Is Following Congress’s Mandate, as It Must,” January 6, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
29
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
Appendix B. Brief History of Past Army
Drawdowns
Post-World War II
During World War II, the Army determined what its reasonable post-war strength should be and
developed plans for a peaceful demobilization. Initially, the Army established a post-war goal of
an Active and Reserve structure capable of mobilizing 4 million troops within a year of the
outbreak of a future war. Later, the Army set the strength of the active ground and air forces at 1.5
million (the Army Air Corps did not become the U.S. Air Force until July 26, 1947, with the
enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, P.L. 80-235). The vast majority of
servicemembers in the Army during World War II were draftees. The Army’s demobilization
plans provided for the release of troops on an individual basis based on points. Soldiers received
point credits for length of service, combat participation and awards, time spent overseas, and
parenthood. Also factoring into the Army’s plans was the availability of shipping to bring
overseas troops to the United States, as well as the capacity to process the discharged soldiers.
However, pressure for faster demobilization from the public, Congress, and the troops themselves
affected the Army’s plan for an orderly process. The Army responded by easing eligibility
requirements and released half of its 8 million troops by the end of 1945. In early 1946, the Army
slowed its return of troops from overseas to meet its constabulatory requirements in Germany and
Japan, which elicited another public outcry to speed up demobilization. Public opposition
diminished after the Army more than halved its remaining strength during the first six months of
1946.
President Truman was determined to balance the national budget, which also affected the Army’s
manpower. The Administration’s dollar ceiling for FY1947 led to a new maximum Army strength
of just over 1 million. In order to reach this new level, the Army stopped draft calls and released
all post-war draftees along with any other troops eligible for demobilization. By June of 1947, the
Army consisted of 684,000 ground troops and 306,000 airmen. Although considered large for a
peacetime Army by American standards, the loss of many capable maintenance specialists
resulted in widespread deterioration of equipment. Active Army units were understrength, had
many barely trained replacements, and were considered “shadows of the efficient organizations
they had been at the end of the war.”
This post-war reduction saw the Army go from 8 million soldiers and 89 divisions in 1945 to
591,000 men and 10 divisions by 1950—a 93% reduction in manpower over five years. Half of
the Army’s 10 divisions were deployed overseas, with Far Eastern Command controlling four
infantry divisions on occupation duty in Japan and the European Command controlling one
infantry division in Germany. The remaining five divisions (two airborne, two infantry, and one
armored division) were stationed in the United States and constituted a general reserve to meet
emergencies. All 10 divisions had undergone organizational changes, largely based on wartime
experience. Despite this reorganization, 9 out of 10 divisions were well below their authorized
strength, with most infantry regiments having only two of their three authorized battalions, for
example. Also, most units lacked their organic armored units and lacked their wartime
complement of weapons. Whatever weapons and equipment these units had were described as
“worn-out leftovers from World War II.” The low personnel and equipment readiness levels in
Congressional Research Service
30
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
1950 became apparent during the initially weak U.S. military response when the Korean War
broke out in June of that year.
Post-Vietnam
During the 1960s, DOD had shaped and sized the Armed Forces to fight two and a half wars
simultaneously. The wars were two major theater wars, or MTWs—a war in Europe and one in
Asia—and a “half war,” a small-scale contingency operation. The force to fight this two-and-a-
half-war construct numbered over 950,000 through the middle of the 1960s, and at the height of
the Vietnam War in 1968, the Army grew to over 1,570,000 men and women. The conscripted
Army of the Vietnam War had a disproportionate representation of lower-income and non-
college-educated soldiers in its ranks, with many middle and upper class men able to qualify for
student deferments by attending college. This perceived unfairness of the draft and the protracted
nature of the Vietnam War were credited with helping to bring about the All-Volunteer Force.
In 1970, in anticipation of a drawdown in Vietnam, the Army instituted a reduction in force—
known as an RIF—with the intent of getting rid of low-performing soldiers that had accumulated
during Vietnam. The process was applied unevenly and, although the Army eliminated some
“deadwood,” a significant number of good soldiers were released and many substandard soldiers
remained on active duty.
1973 was a pivotal year for the U.S. Army as direct involvement in Vietnam’s ground war ended
and the transition to an all-volunteer Army began. Many believed the Army was a weakened
institution, and military and political leaders were blamed by many for the poor conduct and
outcome of the war. Because of the unpopular nature of the war, many returning soldiers faced a
hostile or indifferent public reception. Noted one historian, “[T]he Army that left Vietnam and
returned to America and its garrisons in Germany and Korea in the 1970s was at low ebb on
morale, discipline, and military effectiveness.”
The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam in 1973 also ushered in an era of decreased defense
budgets. In 1973, in light of budgetary constraints, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
formally instituted the Total Force. These budget reductions translated into a smaller Army, and
the Army’s endstrength declined from its Vietnam War high of 1.57 million in FY1968 to 785,000
in FY1974. By 1974, the Army fielded 13 Active Duty divisions.
Chief of Staff of the Army General Creighton Abrams believed that a 13-division Active Duty
Army was insufficient to meet the United States’ global requirements. Furthermore, the Army’s
Director of Manpower and Forces noted the Army’s 13 divisions constituted the smallest force
since prior to the Korean War and, in reality, the Army could field only 12 divisions, and only 4 of
those divisions were rated as “combat ready.”
General Abrams obtained the Secretary of Defense’s approval to increase the Army’s active
divisions to 16 without an increase in Army Active Duty endstrength, which stood at 765,000.
This was achieved, in part, by shifting soldiers from Army headquarters and instructional units to
Army divisions, assigning reserve component “round-out” brigades to late-deploying Active Duty
divisions, and moving combat support and combat service support units to the Reserve
Component.
There were a number of perceived problems associated with the Total Force. Filling the Army’s
three new Active Duty divisions from capped endstrength severely taxed the Army’s already thin
Congressional Research Service
31
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
manpower pool. The relationship between the Active Duty and Reserve Components was
considered by many as poor, with Active Duty commanders typically viewing their Reserve
Component counterparts as “weekend warriors” and doubting the combat readiness of reserve
forces. The heavy reliance on reserve forces for combat support and service support also meant
active forces would have a difficult time operating in the early days of a major conflict until
reserve forces could be mobilized and trained up to standard. While some viewed the heavy
reliance on reserve forces as problematic, General Abrams believed increased reliance on the
reserves would be beneficial in obtaining American public support in the event of a major conflict
and avoiding the kind of public dissonance associated with Vietnam. Issues related to limited
Army endstrength versus requirements, poor recruit quality, budgetary constraints, and lack of
public support in the mid-to-late 1970s led senior Army leadership to characterize the Army as
being a “hollow force.”
Post-Cold War/Desert Storm
The “hollow force” of the mid-1970s and early 1980s recovered due in part to the arguments of
senior DOD leaders, congressional action, and the defense build-up under the Reagan
Administration. In 1987, the Active Army consisted of 780,815 personnel comprising 18
divisions, with 2 of the 18 divisions still forming and not yet at 100% strength. In late 1989, the
Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union began to unravel. The demise of the Soviet Union led the United
States and its allies to pursue a “peace dividend,” whereby defense budgets and manpower would
be drastically reduced in order to decrease taxes and divert resources to other uses. In the end, a
535,000 soldier Active Duty force—a more than 30% cut—was agreed to, constituting the
smallest Army since 1939.
The late 1980s saw a fundamental rethinking of U.S. defense policy and Army force structure. A
1987 Army force structure review examining the declining Soviet threat recommended a smaller
force structure of 15 divisions and 640,000 soldiers. This force level and structure was referred to
as the “BASE Force.” Under this scenario, Chief of Staff of the Army Carl Vuono argued that
decreasing force structure by more than 35,000 soldiers per year would jeopardize readiness.
Many believed in order to achieve any meaningful savings, the Army would need to be smaller
than General Vuono’s 640,000 soldier Army. Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait suspended
downsizing debates. At the conclusion of the “100 Hour War” to liberate Kuwait, many saw it as
a validation of a more technologically focused approach toward warfare, and the policy debates
about reducing the size of the Army were renewed.
In 1993, the Clinton Administration announced it would pursue defense budget reductions of at
least $88 billion from FY1994 to FY1997. As part of this effort, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin
initiated a Bottom Up Review intended to modify force structure based on current and projected
threats to national security. The review recommended placing added emphasis on U.S. air power
and a reduction of Army endstrength to 495,000 soldiers while retaining the ability to fight two
MTWs simultaneously. In March 1994, the Bottom Up Review recommendations were
implemented and Active Army endstrength reductions to 495,000 soldiers began and 2 of 12
divisions were eliminated.
Congressional Research Service
32
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
Author Contact Information
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673
Congressional Research Service
33