Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive
Vincent Morelli
Section Research Manager
March 5, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
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CRS Report for Congress
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epared for Members and Committees of Congress

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

Summary
As 2013 opened, the Republic of Cyprus had just concluded what many agreed was a highly
successful six-month presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) that began on July 1,
2012. During that same six-month period, the republic continued to experience banking and fiscal
crises not unlike what was taking place in Greece and elsewhere throughout Europe, resulting in
the beginning of a prolonged negotiation with the EU for financial assistance and the
implementation of a tough economic austerity program. The republic, at the beginning of 2013,
also entered a period of national elections for a new government.
Lost in the conduct of the EU presidency, the trauma of the fiscal crisis, and the beginning of the
electoral season was the negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots to try to resolve the political
division of Cyprus and set reunification into motion. By May 2012, the U.N.-sponsored talks,
which had endured two years (2010-2012) of intense negotiations including regular leadership
meetings, technical level discussions, and five meetings with U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon, had essentially reached a stalemate and were suspended. Republic of Cyprus President
Demetris Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Dervis Eroglu were simply unable to find
common ground or make enough necessary concessions on the difficult issues of governance,
security, property rights, territory, and citizenship (mostly involving mainland Turks who had
“settled” in the north), to craft a final settlement.
On February 27, 2013, Nicos Anastasiades of the DISY party, was sworn in as the new president
of the Republic of Cyprus after having won office in a February 24 second-round presidential
vote. Anastasiades, who himself had supported the 2004 Annan Plan for reunification, had
partnered during the election cycle with the center-right DIKO party, which had expressed strong
opposition to many of the positions reportedly taken by former President Christofias in the
negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots.
With the election over, and Anastasiades committed to first addressing the government’s fiscal
crisis, questions have been raised about how, when, and under what conditions the talks would
restart. The Turkish Cypriots saw an opportunity to hopefully start over, under different
conditions, with a newly elected government in the republic. However, Mr. Eroglu recently stated
that “while there is a Greek Cypriot administration in the South, there is the TRNC state in the
North. The Cyprus Republic was a state based on the partnership of Turkish and Greek Cypriots.
We were ousted from this republic in 1963 and [now] we are seeking a bicommunal state based
on bizonality, political equality and two founding states.” This view, which seems to set a new
condition for resuming the talks, will not likely be shared by the Anastasiades government.
Eroglu has also restated his belief that if the talks resume they must come with a deadline for
conclusion, a demand previously rejected by the Christofias administration.
Legislation (H.Res. 676 and S.Con.Res. 47) had been introduced during the 112th Congress
calling for support for the republic. The Congress will likely continue to maintain its interest in a
resolution of the Cyprus issue during the 113th Congress. This report provides a brief overview of
the history of the negotiations, a more detailed review of the negotiations since 2008, and a
description of some of the issues involved in the talks.


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Contents
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Annan Plan ................................................................................................................................ 2
The Christofias-Talat Negotiations: 2008-2010 ........................................................................ 3
A New Era: Christofias and Eroglu ........................................................................................... 6
New Settlement Deadlines, New Concerns ............................................................................... 9
New Year, Continued Stalemate, End of the Talks .................................................................. 12
Elections 2013 ......................................................................................................................... 14
Issues ....................................................................................................................................... 15
Assessment .............................................................................................................................. 18

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Cyprus .................................................................................................................. 2

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 23

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Background1
The island Republic of Cyprus gained its independence from Great Britain in 1960. Of the total
population living on the island, approximately 77% are of Greek ethnic origin, and roughly 18%
of Turkish ethnic origin. (This figure may have changed slightly as an influx of mainland Turkish
settlers over the past 20 years has increased the Turkish population.) Maronite Christians,
Armenians, and others constitute the remainder. At independence, the republic’s constitution
defined elaborate power-sharing arrangements between the two main groups. It required a Greek
Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice president, each elected by his own community.
Simultaneously, a Treaty of Guarantee signed by Britain, Greece, and Turkey ensured the new
republic’s territorial integrity, and a Treaty of Alliance among the republic, Greece, and Turkey
provided for Greek and Turkish soldiers to help defend the island. However, at that time, the two
major communities aspired to different futures for Cyprus: most Greek Cypriots favored union of
the entire island with Greece (enosis), while Turkish Cypriots preferred to partition the island
(taksim) and possibly unite the Turkish Cypriot zone with Turkey.
Cyprus’s success as a stable, new republic lasted from 1960 to 1963. After President (and Greek
Orthodox Archbishop) Makarios III proposed constitutional modifications that favored the
majority Greek Cypriot community in 1963, relations between the two communities deteriorated,
with Turkish Cypriots increasingly consolidating into enclaves in larger towns for safety. In 1964,
Turkish Cypriots withdrew from most national institutions and began to administer their own
affairs. Intercommunal violence occurred between 1963 and 1964, and again in 1967. On both
occasions, outside mediation and pressure, including by the United States, appeared to prevent
Turkey from intervening militarily on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots. On March 4, 1964, the
United Nations authorized the establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
(UNFICYP) to control the violence and act as a buffer between the two communities. It became
operational on March 27, 1964, and still carries out its mission today.
In 1974, the military junta in Athens supported a coup against President Makarios, replacing him
with a more hard-line supporter of enosis. In July 1974, Turkey, citing the 1960 Treaty of
Guarantee as a legal basis for its move, deployed its military forces in two separate actions to the
island, and by August 25, 1974, had taken control of more than one-third of the island. This
military intervention2 had many ramifications. Foremost was the widespread dislocation of both
the Greek and Turkish Cypriot population and related governance, refugee, and property
problems.
After the conflict subsided and a fragile peace took root, Turkish Cypriots pursued a solution to
the conflict that would keep the two communities separate in two sovereign states or two states in
a loose confederation. In February 1975, the Turkish Cypriots declared their government the
“Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” (TFSC). In 1983, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash
declared the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC)—a move considered by some to be
a unilateral declaration of independence. At the time, Denktash argued that creation of an
independent state was a necessary precondition for a federation with the Greek Cypriots.

1 Parts of this report are drawn from a more comprehensive history of the Cyprus negotiations found in CRS Report
RL33497, Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations and Related Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz.
2 Turkey officially refers to its action as a “peace operation.” The Greek Cypriots and much of the international
community refer to it as an “invasion.” Unofficial estimates indicate that Turkish military forces currently deployed in
northern Cyprus range from between 20,000 to 30,000.
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However, he ruled out a merger with Turkey and pledged cooperation with United Nations-
brokered settlement efforts. Twenty-nine years later, only Turkey has recognized the TRNC.
Between 1974 and 2002, there were numerous, unsuccessful rounds of U.N.-sponsored direct and
indirect negotiations to achieve a settlement. Negotiations focused on reconciling the two sides’
interests and reestablishing a central government. They foundered on definitions of goals and
ways to implement a federal solution. Turkish Cypriots emphasized bizonality and the political
equality of the two communities, preferring two nearly autonomous societies with limited contact.
Greek Cypriots emphasized the freedoms of movement, property, and settlement throughout the
island. The two parties also differed on the means of achieving a federation: Greek Cypriots
wanted their internationally recognized national government to devolve power to the Turkish
Cypriots, who would then join a Cypriot republic. For the Turkish Cypriots, two entities would
join, for the first time, in a new federation. These differences in views also affected the resolution
of issues such as property claims, citizenship of Turkish settlers who had come to the island, and
other legal issues. These differences in views continue to plague the negotiations even today.
Figure 1. Map of Cyprus

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
Annan Plan
Negotiations for a final solution to the Cyprus issue appeared to take a dramatic and positive step
forward when on November 11, 2002, then-U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented a draft
of “The Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem,” commonly
referred to as the Annan Plan. The plan called for, among many provisions, a “common state”
government with a single international legal personality that would participate in foreign and EU
relations. Two politically equal component states would address much of the daily responsibilities
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of government in their respective communities. The Annan Plan was a comprehensive approach,
and of necessity addressed highly controversial issues for both sides.
Over the course of the next 16 months, difficult negotiations ensued. Turkish Cypriot leader
Denktash was replaced as chief negotiator by a more pro-settlement figure, and newly elected
“prime minister,” Mehmet Ali Talat. Republic of Cyprus President Glafkos Clerides was replaced
through an election with, according to some observers, a more skeptical president, Tassos
Papadopoulos. The Annan Plan itself was revised several times in an attempt to effect
compromises demanded by both sides. Complicating the matter even more, on April 16, 2003, the
Republic of Cyprus signed an accession treaty with the European Union to become a member of
the EU on May 1, 2004, whether or not there was a settlement and a reunited Cyprus.
Finally, after numerous meetings and negotiations and despite a lack of a firm agreement but
sensing that further negotiations would produce little else, on March 29, 2004, Secretary-General
Annan released his “final revised plan” and announced that the Plan would be put to referenda
simultaneously in both north and south Cyprus on April 24, 2004. The Turkish Cypriot leadership
split, with Denktash urging rejection and Talat urging support. Greek President Papadopoulos, to
the dismay of the U.N., EU, and United States, but for reasons he argued were legitimate
concerns of the Greek Cypriot community, urged the Greek Cypriots to reject the referenda. On
April 24, what remaining hope existed for a solution to the crisis on Cyprus was dashed as 76%
of Greek Cypriot voters rejected the Plan, while 65% of Turkish Cypriot voters accepted it. In his
May 28, 2004, report following the vote, Annan said that “the Greek Cypriots’ vote must be
respected, but they need to demonstrate willingness to resolve the Cyprus problem through a
bicommunal, bizonal federation and to articulate their concerns about security and
implementation of the Plan with ‘clarity and finality.’”
For roughly the next four years, to little avail, Cyprus muddled through a series of offers and
counter-offers to restart serious negotiations even as the Greek Cypriots solidified their new status
as a member of the EU, a status not extended to the Turkish Cypriots despite an EU pledge to try
to help end the isolation of the north.
The Christofias-Talat Negotiations: 2008-2010
On February 24, 2008, 61-year-old Demetris Christofias of the Progressive Party of Working
People (AKEL) was elected to a five-year term as president of the Republic of Cyprus. Mr.
Christofias was educated in the Soviet Union and is a fluent Russian-speaker. He joined the
communist-rooted AKEL party at the age of 14 and rose through its ranks to become leader in
1988. Christofias was elected president of the Cypriot House of Representatives in 2001 and won
reelection in 2006.
Christofias’s election had the backing of the Democratic (DIKO) Party and the Socialist (EDEK)
Party. Christofias, in part, tailored his campaign to opposing what he believed was an
uncompromising approach toward the Turkish Cypriots by his opponent, President Papadopoulos,
and the stagnation in the attempt to reach a just settlement of the Cyprus problem. Although
serious differences existed between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides over a final
settlement, Christofias took the outcome of the vote as a sign that Greek Cypriots wanted to try
once again for an end to the division of the island. In his inaugural address, President Christofias
expressed the hope of achieving a “just, viable, and functional solution” to the Cyprus problem.
He said that he sought to restore the unity of the island as a federal, bi-zonal, bi-communal
republic; to exclude any rights of military intervention; and to provide for the withdrawal of
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Turkish troops and, ultimately, the demilitarization of the island. Christofias also reaffirmed that
the 2004 Annan Plan, which he himself opposed at the time, was null and void and could not be
the basis for a future settlement.
After Christofias’s election, Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat, a long-time acquaintance
of Christofias, declared that “a solution in Cyprus is possible by the end of 2008.”3 He also
declared that “the goal is to establish a new partnership state in Cyprus, based on the political
equality of the two peoples and the equal status of two constituent states.”4 As early as 2004,
Talat, as Turkish Cypriot “prime minister,” was credited with helping convince the Turkish
Cypriots to support the Annan Plan and had been seen as perhaps the one Turkish Cypriot leader
who could move the Greek Cypriots toward a more acceptable solution for both sides. For his
efforts at the time, Talat, on April 17, 2005, was elected “president” of the unrecognized TRNC
over the UBP’s Dervis Eroglu, receiving 55.6% of the vote in a field of nine.
On March 21, 2008, Christofias and Talat met and agreed to establish working groups to address
issues related to a comprehensive settlement, including governance and power-sharing, EU
matters, security and guarantees, territory, property, and economic matters. They also created
seven technical committees to address day-to-day issues of crime, economic and commercial
matters, cultural heritage, crisis management, humanitarian matters, health, and environment.
On July 2, 2008, the two leaders met and agreed in principle on a single national sovereignty and
citizenship and decided to start full-fledged negotiations by September 3. On July 18, 2008, U.N.
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon named former Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer to
be his special advisor on Cyprus and to lend the good offices of the U.N. to the negotiation
process. On July 20, 2008, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, perhaps recognizing
that Turkey’s own future as a potential member of the EU was very much tied to a successful
settlement on Cyprus, extended full support to Talat and said that “a comprehensive solution will
be possible in a new partnership where the Turkish Cypriot people and the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus will equally be represented as one of the founder states. This new partnership
will be built upon such indispensable principles as bi-zonality, political equality, and Turkey’s
effective guarantorship.”5 The last part of that statement sent red flags throughout Greek Cyprus
and reignited the ongoing debate over the continued presence of some 30,000 Turkish military
forces on the island and the intense desire on the part of the Greek Cypriots to have all Turkish
troops removed. Nevertheless, on September 11, 2008, substantive negotiations on governance
and power-sharing began.
While the negotiations between Christofias and Talat appeared to get off to a fast start, the
differences in positions quickly became apparent and the talks, although held on a regular basis,
started to bog down. Talat wanted to pursue negotiations on the basis of the provisions of the old
Annan Plan, while Christofias, mindful of the Greek Cypriot rejection of that plan, was keen to
avoid references to it. Old differences quickly resurfaced. As the negotiations dragged on well
into 2009, it appeared that impatience, frustration, and uncertainty were beginning to mount
against both Christofias in the south and Talat in the north.

3 “I am Hopeful about a Solution, TRNC President Talat,” Anatolia, February 25, 2008, BBC Monitoring European,
February 26, 2008.
4 Letter to the Editor, Financial Times, March 5, 2008.
5 “Erdogan Warns Against Attempts to Water Down Parameters of Cyprus Settlement,” Turkish Daily News, July 21,
2008.
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Two political events in the spring of 2009 seemed to have hamstrung the ability of either side to
take the dramatic steps needed to boost the negotiations into a final phase. In March 2009, the
Democratic Party (DIKO), one of the main governing coalition partners of President Christofias,
held party elections in which hard-line candidates won all three posts contested. The new
leadership suggested that the party consider withdrawing from the coalition due in part to a belief
that Christofias was not keeping them informed of his negotiating positions or of the concessions
he may have offered to Talat. The outcome of this vote left many wondering whether Christofias
would face difficulties in gaining approval for any agreement he would reach with Talat that
included concessions unacceptable to the coalition partners. In the north, parliamentary elections
were held on April 19, 2009, in which the opposition UBP won 26 out of the 50 seats in the
parliament. The election propelled UBP Party leader Dervis Eroglu into the forefront of the
presidential elections scheduled for April 2010 and presented Mr. Talat with a less sympathetic
parliament to deal with, one whose disapproval of any agreement would likely play an important
role in any referenda in the north.
By the end of 2009 perspectives on both sides of the island seemed to have begun to change.
Some suggested that the Greek Cypriots sensed that the talks could not produce a desired
outcome before the April 2010 elections in the north, in which Talat was trailing in the polls to
Eroglu, and thus the negotiations were likely to have to begin anew, possibly with an entirely
different Turkish Cypriot leadership. Under that scenario, many Greek Cypriots, including
members within the political parties of the governing coalition, seemed leery of weakening their
hand by offering further concessions. Some Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, appear to have
begun to think that the Greek Cypriot side would not offer Talat a negotiated settlement, betting
from the opinion polls in the north that Eroglu would win the April elections and would pull back
from serious negotiations, at least for a while as he consolidated his new government and
reordered his strategy. The Greek Cypriots could then blame the anticipated hard-liners in the
north and their presumed patrons in Ankara if the talks collapsed.
As the negotiations entered 2010, it appeared that the window of opportunity to reach a final
settlement, at least between Christofias and Talat, was closing fast. Despite the fact that the two
sides had been in negotiations for almost 18 months and in close to 60 meetings, they appeared to
have very little to show for their efforts. In his new year message to the Greek Cypriots,
Christofias suggested that while some progress had been made in a few areas, the two sides were
not close to a settlement.
The intensive dialogue between Christofias and Talat resumed on January 11, 2010, but after
three sessions the talks seemed to have reached a standstill with the gap between the respective
positions of President Christofias and Mr. Talat on many of the tougher issues seeming to be
insurmountable. On February 9, 2010, Christofias’s coalition partner EDEK quit the coalition,
claiming that, in their opinion, “the President has been following a mistaken strategy which the
other side is using to its own advantage.”6 EDEK argued that the concessions Christofias
apparently had made regarding a rotating presidency and the acceptance of 50,000 settlers had to
be withdrawn. Soon after the EDEK decision, some factions within the DIKO party, the other
member of the governing coalition, began agitating for a similar vote to leave the government,
citing very similar reasons, including their disagreement over a rotating presidency. On February
23, 2010, the DIKO central committee met but decided to remain in the coalition for the present.

6 “EDEK quits government,” Cyprus Mail, February 9, 2010.
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The last formal negotiating session between Christofias and Talat concluded on March 30, 2010,
with apparently no new developments. In the run-up to the final session there was some
speculation that both sides would issue a joint statement assessing the negotiations up to that
point and perhaps even announcing some of the areas in which “convergences” between
Christofias and Talat had been achieved. Speculation was that Talat had wanted something
positive to take into the final days of the election campaign and had presented Christofias a report
summarizing what the Turkish Cypriots understood to have been achieved. Christofias, however,
was already under pressure from his coalition partner, DIKO, and former coalition partner,
EDEK, not to issue such a statement, which could have been interpreted as an interim agreement.
On March 30, 2010, Christofias and Talat issued a short statement suggesting that they had indeed
made some progress in governance and power sharing, EU matters, and the economy, but they did
not go beyond that. On April 1, Talat, feeling he needed to say more to his Turkish Cypriot
constituents about the negotiations, held a press conference at which he outlined his
understandings of what he and Christofias had achieved to that point. Christofias would neither
confirm nor deny what Talat had presented but did indicate that the issues would be considered by
the National Council, the Greek Cypriot political body that advises the president on Cyprus
settlement issues.
A New Era: Christofias and Eroglu
On April 18, 2010, Turkish Cypriot leader Talat lost his reelection bid to his rival Dervis Eroglu
of the National Unity Party (UBP). Observers believe Talat’s defeat was due to a combination of
his failure to secure a settlement of the Cyprus problem after almost two years and his inability to
convince the EU and others to help end what the Turkish Cypriots believed was the economic
isolation of the north. Some observers also noted that an overwhelming number of Turkish
settlers, who continue to identify more with mainland Turkey and who have little interest in
unification with Greek Cyprus, voted for Eroglu because they believed his views were consistent
with theirs.
Eroglu, a 72-year-old physician and long-time politician, won the election with just over 50% of
the vote. Eroglu was seen as having a style and harder-line views similar to former Turkish
Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, particularly in seeking more autonomy for each community.
Eroglu also headed a party in which some in the party had advocated a permanently divided
island and international recognition for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). It was
reported that during the campaign he may have suggested that perhaps Cyprus should consider a
kind of “soft divorce” similar to what the Slovaks and Czechs did when they separated. During
the campaign, Eroglu also criticized Talat for what he thought were too many concessions to the
Greek Cypriot side, including the agreement that a reunited Cyprus would hold a single
sovereignty through which both sides would reunite. Nevertheless, even while criticizing Talat’s
positions, Eroglu insisted that negotiations would continue under his presidency. Upon assuming
his new office, Eroglu wrote a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressing his
willingness to resume the negotiations under the good offices of the U.N. and at the point where
the negotiations had left off. Despite Eroglu’s position regarding the resumption of talks, most
political elements on the Greek Cypriot side saw Eroglu’s election as a negative development and
expressed their skepticism as to what the future would hold.
Interestingly, in early March 2010, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan invited Greek Cypriot media
representatives to Turkey to meet with him to discuss Turkish views on the Cyprus peace process.
During the meeting, which was unprecedented, it was reported that Erdogan spoke about his
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support for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation; the eventual withdrawal of Turkish troops from
the island; and a pledge of Turkish support for a “lasting comprehensive settlement” at the earliest
possible time.7 Erdogan’s comments were mostly seen as positive support for the continuation of
the negotiations (a position demanded by the EU as part of Turkey’s EU accession talks) and read
by some in Cyprus as an indication that even if Talat was not reelected in April, his successor
would not be allowed to “walk out of the talks.”8 In his post-election statement, Eroglu told
Turkey’s NTV television that “no one must think that I will walk away from the negotiating table.
The talks process will continue.”9 Subsequently, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan congratulated
Eroglu on his election and promised to continue to support the Turkish Cypriots. However,
appearing on television right after the vote, Erdogan apparently did suggest that Ankara wanted a
solution to the Cyprus issue by the end of 2010.10
The United Nations also seemed to endorse the desire to see more progress toward a solution by
both sides as quickly as possible. U.N. Secretary-General Ban stated that he would issue reports
by the U.N. Good Offices mission every six months assessing the progress of the negotiations.
However, he also suggested that the U.N. Good Offices mission could end if no substantial
progress had been made by the end of 2010.
On May 26, 2010, President Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Eroglu held their first formal
negotiating session. The meeting was held under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary-General’s
Special Advisor on Cyprus Alexander Downer. Property rights became the first issue to be
addressed; up to this point property rights had not been seen as an issue that Christofias and Talat
had focused on at all.
Although the meeting was described as positive, low-key, and business-like, a controversy arose
when it was reported that Downer apparently read a statement from U.N. Secretary-General Ban
congratulating the parties for starting the talks again from where they left off including the
confirmation of existing convergences agreed to by Christofias and Talat, for agreeing to abide by
U.N. Security Council resolutions on Cyprus, and suggesting that a final agreement could be
reached in the coming months. The first part of the controversy involved criticism from several of
the Greek Cypriot political parties that were concerned that the references to the “convergences”
arrived at by Christofias and Talat were being considered as agreements by the U.N., a position
not shared by the Greek Cypriots. In addition, some Greek Cypriots, including President
Christofias, had expressed concern over references to the end of 2010 as an unofficial deadline to
reach a solution. On the other hand, apparently after the May 26 meeting, Eroglu made a
statement that the Turkish Cypriots would not be bound by the statement of the U.N. Secretary-
General, especially with regard to previous U.N. Security Council resolutions, some of which did
include calls for Turkey to withdraw its troops from Cyprus. While Eroglu was trying to clarify
that he accepted U.N. resolutions on the parameters of the negotiations, some in the Greek
Cypriot leadership seem to question whether Eroglu was trying to redefine the basis under which
he would proceed with the negotiations.

7 Account of the press conference between representatives of Greek Cypriot media and Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan as reported in the Cyprus Mail, March 2, 2010.
8 “What was the meaning behind Erdogan’s words?,” Cyprus Mail, March 7, 2010.
9 “Nationalist Dervis Eroglu wins northern Cyprus election,” BBC News, April 18, 2010.
10 “Turkey wants Cyprus deal in 2010 after Eroglu win,” Reuters UK, April 18, 2010.
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When the talks resumed in May 2010, Christofias and Eroglu, along with several technical
committees and working groups with representatives from both sides, met regularly. Christofias
and Eroglu focused almost entirely on the difficult issue of property rights, where both sides have
long-held and very different positions, while their aids negotiated other issues. In September, in
an interview with Greek Cypriot press, Eroglu expressed his frustration with the process and
accused the Greek Cypriots of treating Turkish Cypriot positions with contempt. He apparently
suggested that Christofias needed to inform the Greek Cypriot people that any final solution
would involve pain on both sides but also had to minimize social upheaval, especially among the
Turkish Cypriot community. When apparently asked what pain Eroglu was prepared to accept,
however, he stated that it would not include giving up the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
or its flag, or sending mainland settlers back to Turkey.11 In October 2010, Turkish press reported
that Eroglu appeared so frustrated with the negotiations that he suggested that Turkish Cypriots
had become fed up and no longer believed in the possibility of a mutually agreeable settlement.
“As time passes” he said, “the willingness of the two communities to live together is
diminishing.”12 For his part, Christofias told the United Nations Secretary-General in September
2010 that both sides were not coming closer to a settlement and that Turkey, given its own
domestic and regional problems, “was not ready to solve the Cyprus problem.”13
On October 21, 2010, U.N. Secretary-General Ban apparently called both Christofias and Eroglu
to express his concerns over the slow pace of the negotiations and urged them to make concrete
progress, suggesting that the U.N. was worried about the direction the talks had taken. On
November 18, 2010, Christofias and Eroglu were invited to New York to meet with the Secretary-
General in an attempt by the U.N. to boost momentum for the talks. Although Ban suggested after
the meeting that the discussions had been constructive, he did say that “the talks were without
clear progress or a clear end in sight.”14 On November 24, the Secretary-General issued his
progress report on the negotiations. The report noted “sluggish activity” and, with the May 2011
parliamentary elections scheduled in the Republic of Cyprus and the June national elections in
Turkey in mind, expressed concern that the critical window of opportunity (for a settlement) was
rapidly closing. Ban suggested that the three meet again in January 2011, at which time “the
leaders should be prepared with a practical plan for overcoming the major remaining points of
disagreement.”15
In mid-December 2010, it was reported that a survey conducted by Symmetron Market Research
for the Greek Cypriots and KADEM Cyprus Social Research for the Turkish Cypriots concluded
that faith in a Cyprus solution was losing steam in both communities. It was reported that
according to the survey, while 68% of Greek Cypriots and 65% of Turkish Cypriots still
supported a solution, some 65% of Turkish Cypriots did not believe a solution was likely while
Greek Cypriots were apparently split 50:50. In addition, over 50% in each community apparently
indicated that they did not desire to be governed under a power-sharing agreement.
Although assessments of the negotiations appeared to be growing more pessimistic, additional
sessions were held through the end of December. Talks were then suspended while Eroglu had
heart surgery in Ankara. While both sides continued to talk and continued to pledge to work to

11 Eroglu: ‘treated with contempt,” Cyprus Mail, September 19, 2010.
12 “Turkish Cypriot leader ready for tripartite New York meeting,” Hurriyet Daily News, October 22, 2010.
13 “Christofias: two sides not getting closer,” Cyprus-Mail, September 12, 2010.
14 “Slap on the wrist from Ban Ki-moon, Cyprus Mail, November 19, 2010.
15 Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, United Nations, November 24, 2010.
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seek a solution, the discussions did not move beyond the property issue and neither side had
indicated whether progress was being made or any compromises were possible. On January 1,
2011, Cypriot President Christofias declared his disappointment over the passing of another year
without a settlement and accused Turkey of not making any effort to promote a solution to the
Cyprus issue.
On January 28, 2011, Christofias and Eroglu traveled to Geneva to meet for a second time with
U.N. Secretary-General Ban in what appeared to be another inconclusive attempt by the U.N. to
boost momentum for the talks. Ban’s subsequent March 2011 report to the U.N. Security Council
on the progress in the talks again noted the slow pace of the negotiations and the lack of any
significant movement toward a resolution on any of the major issues.
In mid-April 2011 the Republic of Cyprus entered into a parliamentary election period that
concluded on May 22. The outcome of the elections did not seem to suggest that the negotiating
position of Christofias would require changes. Although opposition to what was perceived to be
Christofias’s concessions to the north was voiced during the campaign, none of the three parties
with the most hardline views—EDEK, EVROKO, and DIKO—increased its vote share. The
impact of the elections would later prove problematic for the negotiations. Similarly, in national
elections held in Turkey in June, Cyprus was barely an issue among the competing parties. After
the election there was some speculation that Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, having won another
five-year term, might have been prepared to inject some positive new energy into the Cyprus
negotiations. Later this seemed to have been a misreading of the prime minister’s intentions.
New Settlement Deadlines, New Concerns
On July 7, 2011, Christofias and Eroglu traveled to Geneva to meet for a third time with U.N.
Secretary-General Ban in another attempt by the U.N. to boost momentum for the talks. Ban
insisted that the negotiations be stepped up so that they could conclude by mid-October and the
three would meet on October 30 to assess what progress had been achieved. The U.N. would then
be prepared to organize an international conference to discuss security-related issues as suggested
by Turkey. This would be followed by plans to hold referenda on a final solution in both the north
and south by the spring of 2012. The hope among some was that by intensifying the negotiations
and reaching a solution by the end of 2011, a potentially reunified Cyprus would be prepared to
assume the rotating presidency of the EU on July 1, 2012. Just prior to the talks with Ban, U.N.
Special Envoy for Cyprus Alexander Downer called the previous three months disappointing and
the worst three months in the history of the negotiations.16
It was reported that in a pre-Geneva meeting Eroglu and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan both
agreed that if by July 1, 2012, there was no resolution of the Cyprus problem, then the two
peoples and the two states should be allowed to go their separate ways.17 Nevertheless, after the
Geneva meeting both Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots expressed agreement on the proposed
timetable while it was unclear whether Christofias had changed his previous position of not being
bound by any timetables.

16 “Downer: worst three months of talks since process began,” Cyprus-Mail, July 7, 2011.
17 “Coming to a crucial junction in Cyprus talks,” Huriyet Dailey News, July 5, 2011.
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Almost immediately after the two leaders returned to Cyprus from their meeting with the
Secretary-General, hopes for speedy and productive negotiations to reach a final solution began to
unravel in the form of three events.
On July 11 a major explosion of old munitions stored at the Greek Cypriot naval base in Mari
killed 13 people and caused significant damage to a major power generating station, cutting off
electrical supplies to a large portion of the south. Adding a measure of insult to injury for some,
the damage to the electrical power station required Christofias’s government to purchase
electricity from the Turkish Cypriot side. President Christofias became the target of public
outrage over the events, forcing him to reshuffle his cabinet and defend his presidency from calls
for his resignation. Fighting off public discontent over the explosion, Christofias was confronted
by an additional political crisis when in early August the DIKO Party, the last partner in the
governing coalition, withdrew from the government citing differences with Christofias over
concessions he apparently made to the Turkish Cypriots in the settlement negotiations. Although
the DIKO leadership had long-standing disagreements with Christofias over his negotiating
strategy, some observers believe DIKO left the coalition in order to avoid the criticisms being
leveled at the government over the munitions episode. Nevertheless, DIKO’s withdrawal left
Christofias without a majority in parliament, which instantly made it much more difficult for him
to win approval for any negotiated settlement with the north. A subsequent independent
investigation of the Mari incident concluded that President Christofias, along with several in his
cabinet, bore the main responsibility for the tragedy,18 prompting several opposition party leaders
to call for Christofias’s resignation or to call for early presidential elections. Christofias refused to
do either, but all of this had proven to be a distraction from the negotiations and made it more
difficult for him to accept any compromise.
A second event took place on July 20, 2011, when in a speech to Turkish Cypriots, Turkey’s
Prime Minister Ergodan seemed to have hardened his views when he suggested that a negotiated
solution to the Cyprus problem had to be achieved by the end of 2011 or the island would remain
split.19 In his speeches in the north, Erdogan also suggested that territorial concessions, including
the possible return of Morphou and Verosha by the Turkish Cypriots, were not acceptable and that
if, in his words, “southern Cyprus” were to assume the presidency of the EU on July 1, 2012, then
Ankara would freeze its relations with the EU because it could not work with a presidency that it
does not recognize.20 Erdogan’s statements drew harsh criticism from all sectors of the Greek
Cypriot political community and a rebuke from President Christofias, who declared that “there
could be no prospect for peace if the Turkish [Cypriot] position mirrored the statements of the
Turkish Prime Minister.”21 Reaction from some quarters of the EU was equally strong, with
European Parliament member and member of the Parliament’s EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary
Committee Andrew Duff suggesting that Erdogan’s comments were an appalling twist to Turkey’s
policy toward Cyprus.22 Some believe Erdogan’s comments were an attempt to inject a sense of
urgency into the negotiations on the part of the Greek Cypriot side and to put pressure on the EU
to urge Christofias to seek a quicker settlement.

18 “President was responsible for Keeping explosives at Mari, Polyviou concludes,” Cyprus-Mail, October 3, 2011.
19 “PM draws the line for Cyprus: Unity or split,” Hurriyet Dailey News, July 20, 2011.
20 “Erdogan: Cyprus at EU helm unacceptable,” Cyprus-Mail, July 20, 2011.
21 “Turkey ‘dynamites’ prospect of a solution,” Cyprus-Mail, July 20, 2011.
22 “Erdogan comments irk EU officials,” Cyprus Mail, July 22, 2011.
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A third issue that had cast doubt over the future success of the negotiations arose during the
summer when Greek Cypriot President Christofias announced that Noble Energy Company of
Texas would begin exploring for natural gas off the southern coast of the island that the Republic
of Cyprus claimed as its own Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In 2007, the Republic of Cyprus
granted Noble Energy a license to explore for gas and oil in that area. Turkey’s Prime Minister
Erdogan warned that Turkey would not stand idly by and let the exploration go forward and
threatened to take strong action against the Greek Cypriots if they persisted. Despite the protests
from Turkey and from the Turkish Cypriots, who warned that the negotiations could be negatively
impacted, on September 20, 2011, the initial exploration by Noble began. Cyprus’s actions
received the support of the United States and the European Union, although both expressed
concerns over the rise in tension between Cyprus and Turkey.
Doubts about the prospects of a solution acceptable to both sides were also raised with the release
of a public opinion poll conducted by Interpeace as part of its “Cyprus 2015” initiative. The poll,
released on July 5, 2011, interviewed 1,000 Greek and 1,000 Turkish Cypriots. The results of the
polling apparently found a growing negative climate and public discontent on the island, an
increased ambivalence on the part of Turkish Cypriots, and a possible shift towards a no vote for
reunification among Greek Cypriots. The poll also found that society on both sides needed to
begin a very public discussion of the parameters of the negotiations and that confidence building
measures needed to be implemented to increase the levels of trust in the peace process.23
Several of the issues mentioned above served to raise tensions between President Christofias and
his domestic political opposition and to weaken his standing among the general public. It also
contributed to the mistrust between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and Greek Cypriots and Turkey.
Despite these “bumps in the road,” the negotiations between Christofias and Eroglu continued.
However, reaching a negotiated settlement by the end of October, when Christofias and Eroglu
met for the fourth time with U.N. Secretary-General Ban, became impractical. During those
meetings little new progress seemed evident, and after two days Ban asked the two Cypriot
leaders to continue the negotiations and return to New York in January, hopefully with the non-
security-related issues resolved. Even if Christofias and Eroglu could have reached an acceptable
solution by January 2012, it appeared that Christofias would have had a difficult time gaining its
approval from the legislature.
Although Christofias and Eroglu continued the negotiation process throughout 2011, the talks
produced little progress and increasingly exposed differences between the two leaders. By the fall
of 2011, both sides seemed to have lost a clear urgency to achieve a final solution. As 2011 ended,
pessimism abounded with many feeling that what had not been accomplished in the previous two
years could become very difficult to achieve in 2012 as the Republic of Cyprus entered into full
preparation for its EU presidency. Many felt that unless there was a major breakthrough in the
negotiations by early 2012, the talks would become even more stalemated and could culminate in
a potential dramatic turn of events by the summer. Even the potential gains the entire island could
realize from the gas exploration did not appear to be adequate incentive to stimulate the sides to
reach a resolution of the Cyprus problem.
One interesting note was struck when members of the European Parliament’s Liberal Group, the
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), visiting Turkey in October 2011, seemed

23 “Latest Cyprus poll findings: Greek and Turkish leadership must take bold action now,” Interpeace initiative,
“Cyprus 2015,” July 5, 2011.
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to suggest that in their view the U.N. sponsored negotiations could be on their way to failure and
that if that were the case, the EU should be prepared to step in and assume a more active role in
the peace process.24 Turkey has traditionally rejected an enhanced EU role in the negotiations.
New Year, Continued Stalemate, End of the Talks
As 2012 began, both sides were again preparing to travel to New York for a fifth meeting with
U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to assess the progress of the negotiations. Ban had asked
both Christofias and Eroglu to come to New York on January 22-24 with significant offers in the
areas of governance, economy, and EU affairs so that the “Greentree 2” meeting could attempt to
facilitate a final deal on these and other internal issues that would allow the U.N. to convene an
international conference in the spring to resolve security-related issues and allow referenda on a
final agreement in both the north and south by early summer of 2012. The hope again was to
reach an agreement so that a reunified Cyprus could assume the rotating presidency of the EU on
July 1, 2012.
It appeared, however, that even before arriving in New York neither Christofias nor Eroglu were
willing or able to make necessary concessions on the difficult issues of property rights, security,
territory, mainland Turks who had “settled” in the north, or citizenship, areas where both sides
have long-held and very different positions. The uncertainty of what could be achieved prompted
Christofias to question whether the meeting should take place at all. The lack of any progress to
that point led some in the Greek Cypriot opposition to suggest the meeting be cancelled and warn
Christofias not to accept any deadlines or U.N. arbitration, or to agree to an international
conference without explicit agreements on internal issues. Nevertheless, Greentree 2 took place
and it was reported that both sides had submitted to Ban extensive proposals that each felt could
provide the basis for a solution.
The Greentree meetings concluded without any new agreement to end the stalemate and led an
apparently frustrated Secretary-General Ban to say that he would wait until he received a progress
report from his Special Advisor at the end of March 2012 before deciding whether to convene an
international conference, despite Christofias’s opposition to any such decision. Ban’s press
release was not well received in the republic, and several members of the various Greek Cypriot
political parties called the meeting a total failure and criticized Eroglu for backing away from the
convergences they felt had been reached with his predecessor Ali Talat. For his part, Eroglu
expressed mild satisfaction with the outcome of Greentree suggesting he anticipated no new
offers from the Greek Cypriot side that he would be willing to accept; he also suggested that the
lack of a solution by July would set a number of changes in the north into motion.
Cristofias and Eroglu resumed their direct negotiations in mid-February focusing on the property
issue, but it appeared unlikely that the stalemate could have been broken at that point. The
Turkish Cypriots appeared unable to accept any deal until an international conference suggested
by Turkey, and backed by the U.N., was held, a conference Christofias would not have agreed to
attend. Any agreement Christofias would have accepted would have been difficult for him to sell
to the political opposition and the ensuing debate, even before a referendum could be scheduled,
would detract from the upcoming presidency of the EU. Thus, even though negotiations would
continue, the potential for any agreement looked to be delayed not only until after the EU

24 “Europeanize talks in Cyprus, if U.N. plan fails,” Hurriyet Daily News, October 11, 2011.
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presidency but also until after the February 2013 national elections in the republic. In essence, the
Turkish Cypriots would have been placed on hold for almost a year, a status they indicated they
could not accept. The stalemate set the stage for a potentially dramatic decision by the Turkish
Cypriots near the end of June, when it appeared they could announce they were suspending the
unification negotiations beginning on July 1, 2012, the date the republic would assume the
rotating presidency of the EU Council. Some speculated that the Turkish Cypriots could also seek
additional diplomatic recognition for the TRNC. This, of course, would have been bad news for
Christofias and the beginning of the Cypriot presidency of the EU.
Some suggested that Ankara would not let this scenario play out because Ankara’s relations with
the EU would suffer by any such action taken by the Turkish Cypriots. However, since Ankara
had already stated that it would not deal with the EU on any issue in which the Greek Cypriots
would chair, and given Turkey’s own stalemated EU accession negotiations, which would be
placed on further hold during the Cypriot presidency, Ankara apparently did not feel it could
insist that Eroglu continue the negotiations.
In early April it was reported that the Turkish Cypriot side had suggested that the U.N.-sponsored
talks be terminated once the republic assumed the EU presidency on July 1, 2012. This prompted
President Christofias to respond that Turkish Cypriots were no longer interested in a solution
even though, as Christofias suggested, the talks could continue during the EU presidency as the
two issues were not related.25 Two weeks later, U.N. Special Envoy Alexander Downer
announced that U.N. Secretary-General Ban had decided not to call for an international
conference on Cyprus due to the lack of agreement on core domestic issues and further stated that
the U.N. would no longer host the “unproductive” leaders’ talks. Downer said that the U.N. would
reconvene the meetings “when there was a clear indication that both sides had something
substantial to conclude.”26 Although U.N. Secretary-General Ban had originally committed the
U.N.’s Good Offices in Cyprus to the negotiation process for the entirety of 2012, the March
2012 assessment of the negotiation process by Special Envoy Downer altered the U.N.
commitment to continuing its Good Offices. While both sides blamed the other for a lack of
progress on an agreement, the reaction to the downgrading of the talks appeared to be muted
among both the political leaders and the general publics in both communities.
On May 14, 2012, recognizing his own internal political realities and reverting back to an earlier
statement that he would not seek reelection if he was not able to resolve the Cyprus problem,
President Christofias, stating that “there are no reasonable hopes for a solution to the Cyprus
problem or for substantial further progress in the remaining months of our presidency,”
announced that he would not seek reelection in 2013.27 On May 17, 2012, EU Commissioner for
Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy Štefan Füle and Turkish Minister for European
Affairs Egemen Bağış launched a new “positive agenda” with Turkey in Ankara, stating that the
new “positive agenda” was intended to bring fresh dynamics into EU-Turkey relations. On the
other hand, the “new agenda” was described by some as essentially an “institutional trick
intended to circumvent the Cyprus issue.”28 The launch of the “new agenda,” however, may have
had an immediate, perhaps unintended, impact on the Cyprus settlement negotiations. It could be

25 “Eroglu seeks termination of U.N. talks on Cyprus, President says,” Famagusta Gazette, April 12, 2012.
26 “U.N. decides to take a back seat,” Cyprus-Mail, April 28, 2012.
27 “Christofias bows out,” Cyprus-Mail, May 15, 2012.
28 Dimitar Bechev, “EU-Turkey Relations: A Glimmer of Hope,” European Council on Foreign Relations, July 27,
2012.
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suggested that the Turkish Cypriots concluded that the EU’s timing on its decision to launch the
“new agenda” appeared to signal that since Turkey’s long-term relations with the EU may no
longer be dependent on Turkey’s contribution to any measurable progress on the Cyprus issue,
there was little incentive to continue the negotiations, thus fulfilling Ankara’s and the Turkish
Cypriots’ warning that July 1, 2012, was indeed the deadline to conclude an agreement over
Cyprus or the talks could end.
By the end of May 2012, and with no reasonable hope of a breakthrough, the U.N.-sponsored
talks having essentially reached a stalemate were suspended. Republic of Cyprus President
Demetris Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Dervis Eroglu had been unable to find common
ground or make enough necessary concessions on the difficult issues of governance, security,
property rights, territory, and citizenship (mostly involving mainland Turks who had “settled” in
the north), to craft a settlement. In early June, Kudret Ozersy, the chief advisor to Eroglu for the
negotiations resigned further signaling that the talks, even at the technical level, would not
continue.
Elections 2013
In January 2013, the Republic of Cyprus entered a period of national elections. With Christofias
out of the picture, the political stars began to quickly align. Leading early public opinion polls,
Nicos Anastasiades of the DISY Party received the backing of the center-right DIKO party, which
had been part of the previous Christofias-led government but which withdrew from the coalition
in disagreement over some of the positions taken by Christofias in the negotiations with the
Turkish Cypriots. Anastasiades’ closest challenge came from the AKEL party itself, led by
Stavros Malas. Although Anastasiades took the largest number of first round votes, he was forced
into a run-off with Malas but eventually emerged victorious. During the campaign very little
concrete proposals regarding the negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots were offered by either
candidate as the fiscal and budget crisis took center-stage. Anastasiades, who had backed the
2004 Annan Plan for a Cyprus settlement, appeared cautious about his intentions other than
calling for a settlement, perhaps not wanting to cause a public rift with his DIKO allies until after
the elections were over. Upon being sworn-in as president, Anastasiades did reach out to the
Turkish Cypriots referring to them as citizens of Cyprus but not giving any clear signal as to his
timetable for restarting the negotiations.
On the other hand, Yiannakis Omirou, leader of the Parliament stated that “a new national policy
is necessary. We need to denounce the Turkish stance to the international and European
community and redefine the Cyprus problem as a problem of invasion, occupation and violation
of international law.” The new policy, Omirou went on, must set out the framework for a Cyprus
solution and use Cyprus’ EU membership and Turkey’s EU prospects to exert pressure on Ankara
to terminate the island’s occupation and accept a solution, in accordance with the international
and the European law.29
For their part, the Turkish Cypriots have been cautious about which negotiating partner they
expect to see across the table if and when the negotiations resume. Would it be the Anastasiades
who was earlier sympathetic to the provisions of the Annan Plan, or a different negotiator who
was critical of the previous government’s negotiating positions and who has teamed with what the

29 “House President: A New Policy on the Cyprus Problem Needed,” Famagusta Gazette, March 2, 2013.
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Turkish Cypriots believe to be a hardline partner? The Turkish Cypriots have also seemed to set a
new standard regarding their status as a prelude for resuming the talks. Turkish Cypriot leader
Eroglu had stated that the talks could not resume automatically from where they left off, and has
continuously referred to the two “states,” a new dynamic, a new negotiating table, and a timetable
for concluding whatever talks do resume.
The United Nations has also weighed in with U.N. Special Advisor Downer expected in Cyprus
shortly for exploratory discussions to determine the prospects for a resumption of the talks and to
extend to the two leaders an invitation to travel to New York to meet with U.N. Secretary-General
Ban to discuss a new round of U.N.-hosted negotiations.
Issues
As intensely as the Cyprus negotiations between Christofias and Talat between 2008 and 2010
had been followed in the press and by political observers, it had always been difficult to
determine with any specificity exactly what either side meant by the term “convergences” when
referring to the issues under negotiation.
In his April 1, 2010, press conference, former Turkish Cypriot leader Talat stated that 31 “joint
documents” had been prepared addressing a range of issues. For instance, he suggested that the
new federal government would have powers over external relations, EU relations, citizenship,
budget, and economic coordination. Another understanding may have determined that one side
would hold the portfolio of the foreign minister and the other the EU portfolio. Still another had
the equal constituent states covering most of the remainder of the governance issues. It appears
that the two sides had agreed on a Senate, equally represented, and a House proportionally based
on population. There was also reportedly a “convergence” on a new judicial court that would
have equal Turkish and Greek Cypriot representation and that Cyprus would be represented in the
European Parliament by four Greek and two Turkish Cypriot MPs.
When Christofias and Eroglu began their negotiations neither side acknowledged the
Christofias/Talat “convergences” as anything more than unofficial understandings, as both sides
adhered to the idea that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.”
What appears to be more clear are the issues on which little agreement has been reached. Both
sides continue to differ over how a new united Cyprus would be created. The Greek Cypriots
assumed the new unified state would evolve from the existing Republic of Cyprus. The Turkish
Cypriots wanted the new state to be based on two equal “founding states” as Eroglu has stated
that he is not prepared to give up the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or its flag. The
Turkish Cypriots also want the new entity referred to as something other than the “Republic of
Cyprus.”
Christofias reportedly proposed the direct election of a president and vice president for a six-year
term on the same ticket with weighted cross-community voting. The president would be a Greek
Cypriot for four years and the vice president would be a Turkish Cypriot; they would then rotate
offices, with the Turkish Cypriot becoming president for two years. Turkish Cypriots initially
proposed that the executive have two alternating presidents elected by the Senate. Turkish
Cypriots were opposed to a single list of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot candidates to be
elected by all of the people of Cyprus principally because Greek Cypriots, by virtue of their
majority, would in effect elect the Turkish Cypriot candidate. At some point Talat seemed to have
made a significant concession in agreeing to accept the Greek position for the election of a
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president and vice president even though he continued to have doubts about direct popular voting.
Although the idea of a rotating presidency was not new, opposition to the proposal was, and
continues to be, vocal on the Greek Cypriot side as many Greek Cypriots apparently could not
accept the idea of being governed by a representative of the Turkish Cypriot minority.30
The thorny issue of property had been the focus of the first 15 or so meetings between Christofias
and Eroglu. As a result of the ethnic strife of the 1960s and the deployment of Turkish military
forces on the island in 1974, it was estimated that over 150,000 Greek Cypriots living in the north
were forced south and close to 50,000 Turkish Cypriots living in the south fled to the north, with
both communities leaving behind massive amounts of vacated property, including buildings and
land. Greek Cypriots have long insisted that the original and legal owners who lost properties in
the north must have the right to decide how to deal with their property, whether through recovery,
exchange, or compensation. Turkish Cypriots believe that the current inhabitant of a property
must have priority and that the issue should be resolved through compensation, exchange of
alternate property, or restitution. To try to help resolve some of the property issues, the Turkish
Cypriots established the Immovable Property Commission (IPC) to hear cases related to Greek
Cypriot property claims in the north. The Greek Cypriots initially rejected the IPC. And although
initially only a few private Greek property owners had filed claims for compensation with the IPC
it now appears that the number of claims being filed is increasing. As in past negotiations, the gap
in the respective Cypriot positions has been great and appears to remain so.
Eroglu had indicated that any final solution could not result in significant social upheaval in north
Cyprus, meaning that significant numbers of citizens of the north, whether from the mainland or
not, could not be forced to leave and only a small number of Greek Cypriots would be permitted
to return to property in the north. Press leaks initially indicated that Eroglu had proposed that
property in the south owned by Turkish Cypriot or Muslim charitable foundations be given to
Greek Cypriots unable to return to their properties in the north. He also apparently had suggested
that Turkish Cypriot property in the south become part of an urban development program in
which money, presumably from the sale or rent of the property, would be placed in a fund to
compensate Greek Cypriots for lost property in the north.31 In either case, the U.N. has offered its
expertise to work with both sides to find ways to raise the funds necessary to provide adequate
compensation to the original owners, should that be part of the settlement outcome. News
accounts reported in the press in September 2010 indicated that Christofias may have suggested
that Turkish Cypriot inhabitants of Greek Cypriot property pay rent to the original owners until a
settlement of a property’s status is arranged. After press leaks in September indicated that part of
Eroglu’s proposals on property may have set minimum limits on the number of displaced Greek
Cypriots that could return to their properties in the north, several of the Greek Cypriot political
parties reacted negatively. Yiannakis Omiirou, then-leader of EDEK and now president of the
Parliament, reportedly called Eroglu’s proposals “infuriating and uncompromising” and not worth
discussing.32 The U.N. progress report issued on November 24, 2010, indicated that for the time
being the two positions were irreconcilable.
The question of overall territory that would come under the jurisdiction of the two equal states is
also in dispute. The Turkish Cypriot side of the “green line” includes approximately 37% of the

30 According to a poll conducted by the EDEK party in the Spring of 2010, over 70% of Greek Cypriots polled
expressed opposition to a rotating presidency.
31 “Property leaks undermine the peace talks,” Cyprus-Mail, September 5, 2010.
32 “Christofias: unity needed now, before it’s too late,” Cyprus-Mail, September 9, 2010.
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island and includes several areas, such as Varosha, Morphou, and Karpas, that had been almost
100% Greek Cypriot inhabited before the 1974 division. Greek Cypriots want that territory
returned, which would leave the Turkish Cypriot side controlling about 29% of the territory. In
July 2010, President Christofias, seeking to unlock the property issue, tabled a proposal that
would link the property and territory issues into one agreement and included Christofias’s
apparent earlier offer to Talat to include allowing 50,000 mainland Turkish settlers to remain in
the north. Eroglu rejected the offer and since then has stated that “no one on Cyprus is any longer
a refugee” and that sending mainland Turkish settlers back to Turkey was not something he could
agree to. And, as stated earlier, on July 20, 2011, in a speech to Turkish Cypriots, Turkey’s Prime
Minister Ergodan suggested that territorial concessions, including the possible return of Morphou
and Verosha by the Turkish Cypriots, were no longer acceptable.
In his proposals, Christofias also resurrected an older proposal that would have the Turkish side
return the uninhabited city of Varosha to Greek Cyprus in exchange for opening the sea port of
Famagusta for use by the Turkish Cypriots to conduct international trade. The port would be
operated by the EU and a joint Greek/Turkish Cypriot administration, thus allowing direct trade
between northern Cyprus and the EU. Eroglu, perhaps banking on a proposal at the time by the
EU to open direct trade with the north rejected the Varosha/Famagusta proposal, although some
speculate that Ankara was opposed to such a deal because it then would have placed pressure on
Turkey to comply with its obligations under the Ankara Protocol to open its ports to Cypriot
commerce. The European Parliament in its 2011 report on Turkey’s accession progress
(introduced in Parliament in 2012) called for that very trade-off.
The Interpeace public opinion poll released in early July 2011 seemed to indicate that Turkish
Cypriots, while opposed to any type of major territorial adjustments under a settlement,33 might
have supported Christofias’s offer of a jointly administered port at Famagusta in return for
Verosha. The Turkish Cypriots have offered to allow Greek Cypriots to return to their homes in
Varosha, where they would live under a Turkish Cypriot administration.
With respect to the issue of mainland Turks who have settled in the north, Greek Cypriot political
parties, other than Christofias’ AKEL, were opposed to any agreement that would allow the
“settlers” to remain on the island. However, the Interpeace poll noted above indicated that
although Turkish Cypriots thought most settlers should be permitted to stay, particularly those
who have intermarried with Turkish Cypriots, the poll seemed to suggest that a compromise could
be found that would allow the settlers to stay with a residence permit but not with full citizenship
or voting rights.34
Next to the property issue, the issue of security guarantees continues to be one of the most
difficult bridges to cross. The Greek Cypriots had long argued that all Turkish military forces
would have to leave the island. They argued that the EU could offer guarantees to all of its
member states. Therefore, once the entire island became part of the EU, they saw no reason for
guarantees from third countries, such as Turkey, Greece, or the United Kingdom.35 Turkish
Cypriots and Turkey maintain that the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance must be
reaffirmed in any settlement, and Turkish security guarantees should not be lifted until Turkey

33 Interpeace Cyprus 2015 poll, op. cit.
34 Ibid.
35 “Cypriot FM: No Derogations from Acquis During a Solution,” Cyprus News Agency, November 14, 2008, BBC
Monitoring European, November 17, 2008.
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joins the EU, because, without guarantees, the Turkish Cypriots would feel insecure based on
their history with ethnic violence on the island in the 1960s.
During an earlier period in 2010 when the talks were faltering, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan
suggested that, as a way to move the negotiations forward, a five-party international conference
be held to try to help settle the major differences between the two Cypriot sides. The initial Greek
Cypriot reaction was that such a conference was not needed and that a solution would have to
come from the Cypriots themselves. However, in a March 18, 2010, speech Christofias did seem
to suggest that an international conference that included the permanent members of the U.N.
Security Council, the EU, Greece, Turkey, and the two Cypriot sides might be useful if it focused
on what he termed the international aspects of the problem, namely troop withdrawals, mainland
Turkish settlers, and future security guarantees. Christofias maintained his support for such an
option as long as all of the “domestic” issues between the Greek and Turkish communities were
resolved first. At the July 2011 meeting between Christofias, Eroglu, and the U.N. Secretary-
General, Ban indicated that the U.N. was prepared to call such an international conference on
security once an agreement between the two sides had been reached on the other issues. However,
in a July 2011 speech commemorating the 1974 Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, Eroglu
stated that “the security guarantees with Motherland Turkey could not be changed.”36
Assessment
The elections of Christofias and Talat in 2008 ushered in a period of higher expectations for a
settlement than at any time since 2004, when the Annan Plan was considered by both Cypriot
communities. The personal relationship between Christofias and Talat and their public
commitments to finding a solution to the Cyprus problem suggested that if these two leaders
could not achieve a negotiated settlement, not perfect for either side but acceptable to both, then it
might take a long time before two like-minded leaders would again find themselves in a position
to find a way to unify the people of Cyprus.
Yet, after two years and close to 80 meetings and despite the strong commitment, good intentions,
and warm relations between the two leaders, progress in the talks fell victim to the harsh realities
of four decades of separation, mistrust, misunderstanding, and in some cases, indifference to the
need for a final settlement and unification of the island. Similarly, the inability of Christofias and
Eroglu to reach an acceptable accommodation and the ensuing stalemate and suspension of the
negotiations in May 2012 has led some observers to question whether a settlement can still be
achieved at all or whether, despite all of the rhetoric, maintaining the status quo, or even moving
to permanent separation, could become a less desirable but less disruptive outcome for both sides.
Throughout the period since Mr. Eroglu’s election as leader of the Turkish Cypriots, both he and
Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan had warned all involved in the negotiations that time was
running out to find an agreed solution. While their speeches and interviews progressively moved
their “deadlines” through 2010 and 2011, it seemed to have become obvious to both Eroglu and
Erdogan that they would eventually have to stop moving the target and carry out their warnings.
That seems to have been what happened at the beginning of 2012, when both Erdogan and Eroglu
suggested that this time they meant what they said about the need for an agreement to be in place
before July 1, 2012, when the Republic would assume the presidency of the Council of the EU, or

36 Comments from the speech of Turkish Cypriot leader Dervis Eroglu commemorating the Turkish intervention in
Cyprus, July 20, 2011.
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the whole process could collapse. As noted earlier in this report, in October 2010 Turkish press
reported that Eroglu appeared so frustrated with the negotiations that he suggested that Turkish
Cypriots had become fed up and no longer believed in the possibility of a mutually agreeable
settlement. “As time passes” he said, “the willingness of the two communities to live together is
diminishing.” Now, unless a dramatic breakthrough occurs, it would appear that Eroglu’s
observation may become a reality and that the island may be on the verge of the kind of Czech-
Slovak separation Eroglu talked about during his election campaign.
For his part, while Christofias had initially agreed to step up the negotiation process in 2010, he
did not change his position regarding artificial timetables and rejected all of the deadlines,
including July 1, 2012, proposed by Eroglu and Erdogan as the last chances to reach an
agreement. It also became clear, however, that given his public standing in the aftermath of the
Mari naval base explosion, his relations with the political opposition by late summer 2011, and
the withdrawal of the DIKO Party from the governing coalition in the summer of 2011 leaving
Christofias without a majority in parliament to defend any agreement that might have been
reached, he had little room to maneuver. He also knew that since most Greek Cypriots appeared
to believe that the lack of a final settlement would not affect the benefits they currently enjoy as
members of the European Union, there were few incentives to have their leader negotiate away
parts of their current authority and power to govern. As if to fortify this perspective, Greek
Cypriot Archbishop Chrysostomos in May 2011 stated that if the negotiations led to another
Annan-type plan, it would be rejected by the vast majority of Greek Cypriots as it was in 2004. In
2012 one high-ranking leader of the EDEK Party stated that any Greek Cypriot proposals on
property, rotating presidency, weighted voting, and Turkish settlers should be withdrawn.37 By
May 2012, and with the EU presidency fast approaching, it appeared that Christofias understood
the talks could not achieve anything positive and although he insisted that the negotiations could
continue during the EU presidency, the U.N. did not. Christofias, along with Eroglu, did not
strongly object when the U.N. decided to suspend their role in the talks.
By 2012, the negotiations had fallen victim to the convergence of several factors. First, the
negotiations had gone on for almost five years of intense, direct negotiations first between
Christofias and Talat, then Christofias and Eroglu without measurable success and with little
prospects of such on the horizon. The issues had long been clearly defined (they hadn’t changed
since the Annan Plan in 2004) and the positions and proposed solutions each side had taken on
them had been thoroughly debated and rejected by each side over and over. In fact, some of the
“convergences” often referred to by either side or by the U.N. Special Envoy seem to have been
modified or even withdrawn. For instance, Prime Minister Erdogan’s comments in the summer of
2011 regarding his opposition to territorial concessions, an issue thought to have been one of the
agreed “convergences,” represented a step backward for many Greek Cypriots, just as the
growing opposition by Greek Cypriot political leaders to a rotating presidency and the number of
mainland Turkish settlers permitted to stay on the island had been for the Turkish Cypriots. These
apparent reversals raised the question of what compromises, if any, either side could really make
and stick with.
A second factor contributing to the demise of the negotiations was Christofias’s intent to make the
Republic’s presidency of the EU a success. Christofias clearly did not want a divisive debate over
what probably would have been an unpopular agreement even if he and Eroglu could have
negotiated a settlement, to preoccupy or to ultimately overshadow the Cyprus EU presidency.

37 “Fury at state land swap payout,” Cyprus Mail, July 11, 2012.
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This attitude contributed to Mr. Eroglu’s decision not to meet directly with President Christofias
during the six-month EU presidency, despite the fact that the settlement negotiations were not
part of the presidency’s mandate, mirroring the position taken by Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan
not to deal with any aspect of the EU that involved the Republic of Cyprus acting as president of
the EU.
The emergence of a fiscal and budget crisis in Cyprus brought on in the aftermath of the larger
eurozone crisis was also a contributing factor to the demise of the negotiations. Cyprus’ banks
were caught with a significant shortfall of cash reserves due to their large investments in Greek
bonds that had lost significant value and a large portfolio of bad or non-performing loans,
centered mostly in Greece. By spring 2012 talk was already emerging about a need to seek
financial assistance from the EU and the IMF. Managing a serious fiscal crisis and the presidency
of the EU were about to take place simultaneously.
A fourth factor was the discovery of natural gas deposits off the southern coast of Cyprus in late
2011 that led to accusations, threats, and distrust between the Republic, the Turkish Cypriots, and
Ankara over whether and how these resources would be exploited and shared between the two
communities. While some observers felt the energy issue could have become a rallying point for
stepped up and hopefully successful negotiations, the atmosphere was quickly poisoned and
foreclosing on any potential incentive to use the energy card to spur more serious negotiations.
A final factor that led to the suspension of the U.N.-led talks was the pending February 2013
national election in the Republic. Both sides recognized that no agreement could likely be
reached and approved before the election and Christofias did not want endless rounds of
unproductive talks to detract from his role overseeing the EU presidency. The Turkish Cypriots on
the other hand wanted to see just how the election campaign would be conducted and how the
settlement issue would play in the various political camps. U.N. Special Envoy Downer in his
May 2012 remarks on the suspension of the talks stated that the forthcoming national elections in
the republic “injected a great deal of uncertainty” with no guarantee that the winner of the
presidential election would want to start up the negotiations from the point they were
suspended.38
As noted earlier the EU Commission’s decision in early 2012 to launch its new “positive agenda”
with Turkey may have had the unintended consequence of contributing to the stalemate in the
Cyprus negotiations. The “positive agenda” may have allowed Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to
calculate that the EU Commission was so obsessed with continuing relations with Turkey during
the Republic of Cyprus EU presidency that the Commission no longer felt a solution to or
significant progress on the Cyprus issue, for which Turkey plays a significant role either
positively by helping find a solution or negatively by contributing to the stalemate, would have to
come first. Thus, Erdogan and Eroglu may have felt that by not objecting to the suspension of the
negotiations and possibly even changing the basis under which future negotiations would restart
would no longer come with consequences for Ankara with respect to its relations with the EU.
The impact of the EU’s “positive agenda” with Turkey and its ultimate impact on the Cyprus
negotiations were not lost within the ranks of some officials in the Republic. For instance, in a
speech in August 2012, then-Foreign Minister Marcoullis, in pointing out what she considered
Turkey’s “fraud in wishing to resolve the Cyprus issue,” stated “the international community and

38 “Our View: The U.N. could be preserving the talks procedure for nothing,” Cyprus-Mail, May 26, 2012.
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particularly Cyprus’ EU partners should ‘wake up’ and set aside any other interests they may have
as regards Turkey.”39
The May 2012 suspension of formal negotiations has been seen by many as a significant blow to
the future of Cyprus as a whole and raises questions regarding the future of the negotiations.
Outside of the island, many want to see the negotiations resume as soon as possible now that
elections in the Republic are over and a new government has settled in. Many observers are
looking for signs from President Anastasiades as to when he may be prepared to meet with the
Turkish Cypriots and what he may have to offer. However, it appears that the Turkish Cypriots
have decided to pursue a course of action designed to strengthen the idea that the island now has
two equal states and that the resumption of the negotiations, if they can restart at all, may have to
be based on that foundation.
Although some Greek Cypriots have held all along that Eroglu’s goal was a separate state in the
north, he did appear willing to negotiate something less if he did not have to compromise much of
his viewpoint. Now, it appears that for the Turkish Cypriots, returning to the negotiating table to a
less than equal status may no longer be acceptable. In statements made in December 2012, Mr.
Eroglu said “the Cyprus problem cannot be solved under existing conditions” and that “a possible
settlement of the Cyprus issue could be viable only if it is based on the existing realities on the
island,” which acknowledges that “ there were two different people having two separate
languages, religions, nationality and origin and two different states” and that “certainly it was
possible to find a solution to make these two people live together, however people should bear in
mind, it is [not] realistic to establish one state from two separate states.”40 Mr. Eroglu has also
recently referred to the political situations with respect to Kosovo, East Timor, and South Sudan
to illustrate his point that the negotiations could only resume if new parameters were established.
In other examples of this changed attitude, Besire Atalay, deputy prime minister of Turkey, was
reported to have stated that “Turkish Cypriots would live free and prosperous as equal owners of
the island.”41 Similarly, Cemil Cicek, speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, was
reported to have said that there were two equal people, two states, and two democracies in Cyprus
and that a well-balanced solution will be based on these foundations.42 Also, some suggest that
opinions, mostly from within the large mainland Turkish community in the north with closer ties
to Ankara, indicate that a growing number in the north do not wish to be governed in any way by
Greek Cypriots.
Although both sides have expressed a desire to begin negotiations anew, discussions regarding
even how and when to resume a new round of talks, whether directly between President
Anastasiades and Mr. Eroglu or through the U.N., appear to come with new conditions which
may make resumption of the talks more difficult to achieve. President Anastasiades, while
foreclosing new discussions based on the old Annan Plan which he once supported, did not give
much of an indication during his campaign how he would approach a new round of talks. He has
stated that the basis of the talks would have to be the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements
reached between the Greek and Turkish leadership at the time and the 2006 set of principles

39 “Turkey’s accession course should act as a stick not only as a carrot, says Cyprus FM,” Famagusta Gazette, August
13, 2012.
40 Statements made by Turkish Cypriot leader Eroglu on various occasions in December 2012.
41 Remarks of Besir Atalay during a speech in north Cyprus as quoted in the Famagusta Gazette, July 23, 2012.
42 Statement provided by Turkish Cypriot representation office in Washington.
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agreed to by former Cypriot leaders. Mr. Eroglu, for his part, in addition to seeking a new
recognition of the status of the Turkish Cypriot community has stated that the talks could only
begin if they came without any Christofias/Talat-era pre-conditions and a timetable for
concluding the talks one way or another, conditions the new Greek Cypriot government will
likely have difficulty accepting.
Despite some concern heard in some quarters of the Turkish Cypriot community regarding the
end to the negotiations last year, permanent partition as an acceptable alternative for many seems
to be gaining momentum in the north. As far back as 2009, the International Crisis Group (IGC)
suggested in a report that “the island may be accelerating a slide toward permanent partition and
that some elements in both communities given many years of futility and the wide differences of
opinion over each item on the table from property rights to Turkish settlers to governance, may be
willing to concede the possibility of a permanently divided land.”43
As the ICG report pointed out, there appears to be a growing younger generation on both sides of
the island who have never interacted with the other and see no reason to, do not have as much of
a stake in the property issue, and may not wish to face the uncertainties and potential problems
that a settlement neither side likes, but accepts, could create. If the suspension of the talks and any
serious difficulties surrounding their resumption are really the beginning of the end of the
negotiations, the permanent division of the island would no longer be seen as the simple musings
of a small group of separatists.
Up to this point no interested parties, except perhaps mainland Turks who have settled in the
north, support a permanent separation of the island, although that reality may be gaining more
momentum. The biggest headache resulting from this potential course of action would fall on the
EU, which, having stated that the entire island was part of the EU, would have to determine how
to deal with a separate Turkish Cypriot state and what to do with Turkish Cypriots who hold EU
passports. Clearly, for the moment, such an outcome would also likely affect not only Cypriot-to-
Cypriot relations but also Cyprus-Turkey, Greece-Turkey, EU-Turkey, and NATO-EU relations.
With the window of opportunity to reach an agreed solution mostly closed since May 2012,
Turkish Cypriot leader Eroglu’s comments from October 2010 seem to be ringing true. Now,
however, there is once again a small glimmer of hope that something positive might emerge by
the spring of 2013, when the new government in the Republic and the leadership in the north hold
their first exchanges to determine whether the will and the commitment to seek a solution exists.
If so, the difficult work of restarting the effort to agree to and approve that final elusive settlement
can again begin. However, reaching an end point will still not prove to be any easier.


43 Cyprus: Reunification or Partition? Europe Report 201, The International Crisis Group, September 30, 2009.
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Author Contact Information

Vincent Morelli

Section Research Manager
vmorelli@crs.loc.gov, 7-8051

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