Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
February 8, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL30588
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Summary
The United States and its partner countries are gradually reducing military involvement in
Afghanistan as the end of the formal international security mission approaches by the end of
2014. Under an agreement between President Obama and Afghan President Karzai announced
January 11, 2013, Afghan forces will assume the security lead nationwide in the spring of 2013
and U.S. forces will move to a support role. The number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which
peaked at about 100,000 in June 2011, has been reduced to a “pre-surge” level of 66,000 as of
September 20, 2012, and a further draw down schedule is to be announced by mid-2013.
Subsequently, the size of the U.S. force that will remain in Afghanistan after 2014 will be
announced, pursuant to a bilateral security agreement between the United States and Afghanistan
that is under negotiation pursuant to a May 1, 2012, U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership
Agreement. U.S. military recommendations for the post-2014 force reportedly range from 3,000
to 20,000 U.S. forces, likely performing missions that include combat against high-value targets
as well as training for the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). U.S. partners are likely
to contribute a still unspecified number of forces for these missions. Still, fearing instability after
2014, some key ethnic and political faction leaders are preparing to revive their militia forces
should the international drawdown lead to a major Taliban push to retake power.
The Administration remains concerned that Afghan stability after 2014 is at risk from weak and
corrupt Afghan governance and insurgent safe haven in Pakistan. Among other efforts to promote
effective and transparent Afghan governance, U.S. officials are pushing for substantial election
reform to ensure that the next presidential election, scheduled for April 2014, will be not
experience the fraud of the elections in 2009 and 2010. An unexpected potential benefit to
stability could come from a negotiated settlement between the Afghan government and the
Taliban and other insurgent groups. Negotiations have proceeded sporadically since early 2010
and a formal negotiation process stalled in early 2012. However, informal discussions have
continued and, by the end of 2012, began to evolve into discussions of specific proposals to settle
the conflict. Afghanistan’s minorities and women’s groups worry about a potential settlement,
fearing it might produce compromises with the Taliban that erode human rights and ethnic power-
sharing.
To promote long-term growth and prevent a severe economic downturn as international donors
scale back their involvement in Afghanistan, U.S. officials also hope to draw on Afghanistan’s
vast mineral and agricultural resources. Several major privately funded mining, agricultural, and
even energy development programs have begun or are beginning. U.S. officials also seek greater
Afghanistan integration into regional trade and investment patterns. Persuading Afghanistan’s
neighbors to support Afghanistan’s stability instead of their own particular interests has been a
focus of U.S. policy since 2009, but with mixed success.
Even if these economic efforts succeed, Afghanistan will likely remain dependent on foreign aid
indefinitely. Through the end of FY2012, the United States has provided nearly $83 billion in
assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $51 billion has been to
equip and train Afghan forces. During FY2001-FY2012, the Afghan intervention has cost about
$557 billion, including all costs. About $9.7 billion in economic aid and $82 billion in additional
U.S. military costs are requested for FY2013. As announced in the context of the July 8, 2012,
Tokyo donors’ conference, Administration economic aid requests for Afghanistan are likely to
continue at current levels through at least FY2017. See CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan:
Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.
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Contents
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
From Early History to the 19th Century ..................................................................................... 1
Early 20th Century and Cold War Era ........................................................................................ 1
Soviet Invasion and Occupation Period ..................................................................................... 2
The Seven Major “Mujahedin” Parties and Their Activities ............................................... 3
Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal ........................................................................ 3
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban ................................................................ 4
Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001) ...................................................................... 5
U.S. Policy Toward the Taliban During Its Rule/Bin Laden Presence ................................ 5
The “Northern Alliance” Congeals...................................................................................... 6
Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 ................................................................................................. 7
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom ................................................... 8
Post-Taliban Governance-Building Efforts ............................................................................... 9
U.S. and International Civilian Policy Structure ............................................................... 11
Security Policy, 2011-2014 “Transition, and Beyond” .................................................................. 13
Who Is “The Enemy”? Taliban, Haqqani, Al Qaeda, and Others ............................................ 13
Groups: The Taliban/“Quetta Shura Taliban”(QST) ......................................................... 13
Al Qaeda/Bin Laden .......................................................................................................... 14
Hikmatyar Faction ............................................................................................................. 15
Haqqani Faction ................................................................................................................ 15
Pakistani Groups ............................................................................................................... 17
Insurgent Tactics ................................................................................................................ 17
Insurgent Financing: Narcotics Trafficking and Other Methods ....................................... 18
The U.S.-Led Military Effort: 2001-2008 ............................................................................... 19
Perception of “Victory,” Followed by Setback and Deterioration..................................... 19
Obama Administration Surge .................................................................................................. 20
McChrystal Assessment and December 1, 2009, Surge Announcement ........................... 21
Progress of the Transition and Drawdown .............................................................................. 22
Tranches of Territory in Transition: ................................................................................... 23
Unwinding of the Surge Announced June 22, 2011 .......................................................... 23
Surge Implementation and Results/Current Security Assessments ................................... 24
Beyond 2014: Likely Outcomes, Size of Residual Force, Strategic
Partnership Agreement, and Bilateral Security Agreement .................................................. 26
Likely Size and Structure of Post-2014 Force ................................................................... 27
Strategic Partnership Agreement ....................................................................................... 28
Transition Pillar: Building Afghan Forces and Establishing Rule of Law .............................. 30
Current and Post-2014 Size of the Force........................................................................... 31
Training Overview ............................................................................................................ 32
The Afghan National Army (ANA) ................................................................................... 33
Afghan Air Force ............................................................................................................... 34
Afghan National Police (ANP) ......................................................................................... 35
Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector................................................................................. 38
Policy Component: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) ................................................ 38
Cooperation With Allies/Managing the 2014 Exit................................................................... 39
Major Contingent Developments During the U.S. “Surge” .............................................. 41
Potential Upside Surprises: Reintegration and Reconciliation With Insurgents ...................... 42
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Regional Dimension ...................................................................................................................... 46
Pakistan/Pakistan-Afghanistan Border .................................................................................... 49
Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations ........................................................................................ 50
Iran ........................................................................................................................................... 51
Iran’s Development Aid for Afghanistan........................................................................... 52
Iranian Assistance to Afghan Militants and to Pro-Iranian Groups and Regions .............. 52
Bilateral Government-to-Government Relations .............................................................. 53
India ......................................................................................................................................... 54
India’s Development Activities in Afghanistan ................................................................. 55
Russia, Central Asian States, and China .................................................................................. 55
Russia/Northern Distribution Network ............................................................................. 55
Central Asian States .......................................................................................................... 57
China ................................................................................................................................. 58
Persian Gulf States................................................................................................................... 59
Saudi Arabia ...................................................................................................................... 59
UAE ................................................................................................................................... 60
Qatar .................................................................................................................................. 60
Keys to Afghanistan’s Post-War Future: U.S. and International Aid and
Economic Development.............................................................................................................. 60
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan ................................................................................................ 61
Aid Oversight .................................................................................................................... 61
Aid Authorization: Afghanistan Freedom Support Act ..................................................... 62
Direct Support to the Afghan Government ........................................................................ 63
Sustaining Aid Beyond the Transition ............................................................................... 64
Development in Key Sectors ................................................................................................... 65
Education ........................................................................................................................... 66
Health ................................................................................................................................ 66
Roads ................................................................................................................................. 66
Bridges .............................................................................................................................. 67
Railways ............................................................................................................................ 67
Electricity .......................................................................................................................... 67
Agriculture ........................................................................................................................ 69
Telecommunications .......................................................................................................... 70
Airlines .............................................................................................................................. 70
Mining and Gems .............................................................................................................. 70
Oil, Gas, and Related Pipelines ......................................................................................... 71
Trade Promotion/Reconstruction Opportunity Zones .............................................................. 72
Residual Issues from Past Conflicts ............................................................................................... 83
Stinger Retrieval ...................................................................................................................... 83
Mine Eradication ..................................................................................................................... 83

Figures
Figure A-1. Map of Afghanistan .................................................................................................... 86
Figure A-2. Map of Afghan Ethnicities ......................................................................................... 87

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Tables
Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process .......................................................................... 10
Table 2. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) ....................................................... 12
Table 3.Summary of Current U.S. Strategy and Implementation .................................................. 22
Table 5. Background on NATO/ISAF Formation and U.N. Mandate ............................................ 41
Table 6. Major Security-Related Indicators ................................................................................... 46
Table 7. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for
Operations in and Supply Lines to Afghanistan ......................................................................... 48
Table 8. Major Reporting Requirements ........................................................................................ 64
Table 9. Comparative Social and Economic Statistics ................................................................... 74
Table 10. Major Non-U.S. Pledges for Afghanistan 2002-2012 .................................................... 75
Table 11. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998 ......................................................... 76
Table 12. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2001 ......................................................... 77
Table 13. Post-Taliban U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan ................................................................. 78
Table 14. Total Obligations for Major Programs: FY2001-FY2011 .............................................. 79
Table 15. NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations ................................................................................ 80
Table 16. Provincial Reconstruction Teams ................................................................................... 81
Table 17. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan ......................................................................... 82

Appendixes
Appendix. U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted ....................................................................... 84

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 87

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Background
Afghanistan has a history of a high degree of decentralization, and resistance to foreign invasion
and occupation. Some have termed it the “graveyard of empires.”
From Early History to the 19th Century
Alexander the Great conquered what is now Afghanistan in three years (330 B.C.E. to 327
B.C.E), although at significant cost and with significant difficulty, and requiring, among other
steps, marriage to a resident of the conquered territory. For example, he was unable to fully pacify
Bactria, an ancient region spanning what is now northern Afghanistan and parts of the
neighboring Central Asian states. (A collection of valuable Bactrian gold was hidden from the
Taliban when it was in power and emerged from the Taliban period unscathed.) From the third to
the eighth century, A.D., Buddhism was the dominant religion in Afghanistan. At the end of the
seventh century, Islam spread in Afghanistan when Arab invaders from the Umayyad Dynasty
defeated the Persian empire of the Sassanians. In the 10th century, Muslim rulers called Samanids,
from Bukhara (in what is now Uzbekistan), extended their influence into Afghanistan, and the
complete conversion of Afghanistan to Islam occurred during the rule of the Gaznavids in the 11th
century. They ruled over the first vast Islamic empire based in what is now Ghazni province of
Afghanistan.
In 1504, Babur, a descendent of the conquerors Tamarlane and Genghis Khan, took control of
Kabul and then moved on to India, establishing the Mughal Empire. (Babur is buried in the Babur
Gardens complex in Kabul, which has been refurbished with the help of the Agha Khan
Foundation.) Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, Afghanistan was fought over by the Mughal
Empire and the Safavid Dynasty of Persia (now Iran), with the Safavids mostly controlling Herat
and western Afghanistan, and the Mughals controlling Kabul and the east. A monarchy ruled by
ethnic Pashtuns was founded in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, who was a senior officer in the
army of Nadir Shah, ruler of Persia, when Nadir Shah was assassinated and Persian control over
Afghanistan weakened.
A strong ruler, Dost Muhammad Khan, emerged in Kabul in 1826 and created concerns among
Britain that the Afghans were threatening Britain’s control of India; that fear led to a British
decision in 1838 to intervene in Afghanistan, setting off the first Anglo-Afghan War (1838-1842).
Nearly all of the 4,500-person British force was killed in that war, which ended with a final
British stand at Gandamack. The second Anglo-Afghan War took place during 1878-1880.
Early 20th Century and Cold War Era
King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan (Third
Anglo-Afghan War) shortly after taking power and won complete independence from Britain as
recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular
modernizer presiding over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated. He was
succeeded by King Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), and then by King Mohammad Zahir
Shah. Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973) is remembered fondly by many older Afghans for
promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and promoting
freedoms for women, including dropping a requirement that they cover their face and hair. In part,
the countryside was secured during the King’s time by local tribal militias called arbokai.
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However, possibly believing that he could limit Soviet support for Communist factions in
Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also built ties to the Soviet government by entering into a significant
political and arms purchase relationship with the Soviet Union. The Soviets built large
infrastructure projects in Afghanistan during Zahir Shah’s time, such as the north-south Salang
Pass/Tunnel and Bagram airfield.
This period was the height of the Cold War, and the United States sought to prevent Afghanistan
from falling into the Soviet orbit. As Vice President, Richard Nixon visited Afghanistan in 1953,
and President Eisenhower visited in 1959. President Kennedy hosted King Zahir Shah in 1963.
The United States tried to use aid to counter Soviet influence, providing agricultural and other
development assistance. Among the major U.S.-funded projects were large USAID-led irrigation
and hydroelectric dam efforts in Helmand Province, including Kajaki Dam (see below).
Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s, during the Nixon Administration, when the
diametrically opposed Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While
receiving medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad
Daoud, a military leader who established a dictatorship with strong state involvement in the
economy. Daoud was overthrown and killed1 in April 1978, during the Carter Administration, by
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA, Communist party) military officers under the
direction of two PDPA (Khalq, or “Masses” faction) leaders, Hafizullah Amin and Nur
Mohammad Taraki, in what is called the Saur (April) Revolution. Taraki became president, but he
was displaced in September 1979 by Amin. Both leaders drew their strength from rural ethnic
Pashtuns and tried to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part by
redistributing land and bringing more women into government. The attempt at rapid
modernization sparked rebellion by Islamic parties opposed to such moves.
Soviet Invasion and Occupation Period
The Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent further gains by
the Islamic militias, known as the mujahedin (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets
replaced Amin with another PDPA leader perceived as pliable, Babrak Karmal (Parcham, or
“Banner” faction of the PDPA), who was part of the 1978 PDPA takeover but was exiled by
Taraki and Amin.
Soviet occupation forces numbered about 120,000. They were assisted by Democratic Republic
of Afghanistan (DRA) military forces of about 25,000-40,000, supplemented by about 20,000
paramilitary and tribal militia forces, including the PDPA-dominated organization called the
Sarandoy. The combined Soviet and Afghan forces were never able to pacify the outlying areas of
the country. DRA forces were consistently plagued by desertions and its effectiveness on behalf
of the Soviets was limited. The mujahedin benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided
through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in cooperation with Pakistan’s Inter-Service
Intelligence directorate (ISI).

1 Daoud’s grave was discovered outside Kabul in early 2008. He was reburied in an official ceremony in Kabul in
March 2009.
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The Seven Major “Mujahedin” Parties and Their Activities
The mujahedin were also relatively well organized and coordinated by seven major parties that in
early 1989 formed a Peshawar-based “Afghan Interim Government” (AIG). The seven party
leaders and their parties—sometimes referred to as the “Peshawar 7”—were Mohammad Nabi
Mohammadi (Islamic Revolutionary Movement of Afghanistan); Sibghatullah Mojaddedi
(Afghan National Liberation Front); Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (Hezb-i-Islam—Gulbuddin, Islamic
Party of Gulbuddin); Burhanuddin Rabbani (Jamiat Islami, Islamic Society); Yunus Khalis (Hezb-
i-Islam); Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf (Ittihad Islami, Islamic Union for the Liberation of
Afghanistan); and Pir Gaylani (National Islamic Front). Mohammadi and Khalis died of natural
causes in 2002 and 2006, respectively, and Rabbani was killed in a September 20, 2011,
assassination. The others are still active in Afghan politics and governance or, in the case of
Hikmatyar, fighting the Afghan government.
The mujahedin weaponry included U.S.-supplied portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems
called “Stingers,” which proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The United States
decided in 1985 to provide these weapons to the mujahedin after substantial debate within the
Reagan Administration and some in Congress over whether they could be used effectively and
whether doing so would harm broader U.S.-Soviet relations. The mujahedin also hid and stored
weaponry in a large network of natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan.
However, some warned that a post-Soviet power structure in Afghanistan could be adverse to
U.S. interests because much of the covert aid was being channeled to the Islamist groups
including those of Hikmatyar and Sayyaf.
Partly because of the effectiveness of the Stinger in shooting down Soviet helicopters and fixed
wing aircraft, the Soviet Union’s losses mounted—about 13,400 Soviet soldiers were killed in the
war, according to Soviet figures—turning Soviet domestic opinion against the war. In 1986, after
the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced Karmal with the director of
Afghan intelligence, Najibullah Ahmedzai (known by his first name). Najibullah was a Ghilzai
Pashtun, and was from the Parcham faction of the PDPA. Some Afghans say that some aspects of
his governing style were admirable, particularly his appointment of a prime minister (Sultan Ali
Keshtmand and others) to handle administrative duties and distribute power.
Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal
On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva Accords) requiring
it to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by February 15, 1989, leaving in place the weak
Najibullah government. A warming of relations moved the United States and Soviet Union to try
for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict, a trend accelerated by the 1991 collapse of the
Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow’s capacity for supporting communist regimes in the Third
World. On September 13, 1991, Moscow and Washington agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid
to the Afghan combatants as of January 1, 1992, which was implemented by all accounts.
The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and covert military
assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from 1980 until the end of the
Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid program grew from about $20 million
per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per year during FY1986-FY1990.2 The Soviet pullout

2 For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from $300 million the previous year
(continued...)
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was viewed as a decisive U.S. “victory.” The Soviet pullout caused a reduction in subsequent
covert funding and, as indicated in Table 10, U.S. assistance to Afghanistan remained at
relatively low levels after the Soviet withdrawal. There was little support for a major U.S.-led
effort to rebuild the economy and society of Afghanistan. The United States closed its embassy in
Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its pullout, and it remained so until
the fall of the Taliban in 2001.
Despite the Soviet troop withdrawal in 1989, Najibullah still enjoyed Soviet financial and
advisory support and Afghan forces beat back the first post-Soviet withdrawal mujahedin
offensives—defying expectations that his government would immediately collapse after a Soviet
withdrawal. However, military defections continued and his position weakened subsequently,
particularly after the Soviets cut off financial and advisory support as of January 1, 2992 under
the agreement with the United States discussed above. On March 18, 1992, Najibullah publicly
agreed to step down once an interim government was formed. That announcement set off
rebellions by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders in northern Afghanistan—particularly Abdul
Rashid Dostam, who joined prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masoud of the
Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. Masoud had earned a
reputation as a brilliant strategist by preventing the Soviets from conquering his power base in the
Panjshir Valley north of Kabul. Najibullah fell, and the mujahedin regime began April 18, 1992.3
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban
The fall of Najibullah exposed the differences among the mujahedin parties. The leader of one of
the smaller parties (Afghan National Liberation Front), Islamic scholar Sibghatullah Mojadeddi,
was president during April-May 1992. Under an agreement among the major parties, Rabbani
became president in June 1992 with agreement that he would serve until December 1994. He
refused to step down at that time, saying that political authority would disintegrate without a clear
successor. That decision was strongly opposed by other mujahedin leaders, including Gulbuddin
Hikmatyar, a Pashtun, and leader of the Islamist conservative Hizb-e-Islam Gulbuddin mujahedin
party. Hikmatyar and several allied factions began fighting to dislodge Rabbani. Rabbani reached
an agreement for Hikmatyar to serve as Prime Minister, if Hikmatyar would cease the shelling
Kabul that had destroyed much of the western part of the city. However, because of Hikmatyar’s
distrust of Rabbani, he never assumed a working prime ministerial role in Kabul.
In 1993-1994, Afghan Islamic clerics and students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin, formed the
Taliban movement. Many were former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with conflict
among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries
(“madrassas”) mainly of the “Deobandi” school of Islam.4 Some say this interpretation of Islam is
similar to the “Wahhabism” that is practiced in Saudi Arabia. Taliban practices were also
consonant with conservative Pashtun tribal traditions. The Taliban’s leader, Mullah Muhammad
Umar, had been a fighter in Khalis’s Hezb-i-Islam party during the anti-Soviet war—Khalis’ party

(...continued)
to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half of the fiscal year. See “Country Fact Sheet:
Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377.
3 After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul until the Taliban
movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them.
4 The Deobandi school began in 1867 in a seminary in Uttar Pradesh, in British-controlled India, that was set up to train
Islamic clerics and to counter the British educational model.
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was generally considered moderate Islamist during the anti-Soviet war, but Khalis and his faction
turned against the United States in the mid-1990s. Many of his fighters, such as Mullah Umar,
followed Khalis’ lead. Umar had lost an eye in the anti-Soviet war.
The Taliban viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt and anti-Pashtun, and the four years of
civil war (1992-1996) created popular support for the Taliban as able to deliver stability. With the
help of defections, the Taliban peacefully took control of the southern city of Qandahar in
November 1994. Upon that capture, Mullah Umar ordered the opening of the Qandahar shrine
containing the purported cloak used by the Prophet Mohammad; he reportedly donned the
purported cloak briefly in front of hundreds of followers.5 By February 1995, it was approaching
Kabul, after which an 18-month stalemate ensued. In September 1995, the Taliban captured Herat
province, bordering Iran, and imprisoned its governor, Ismail Khan, ally of Rabbani and Masoud,
who later escaped and took refuge in Iran. In September 1996, new Taliban victories near Kabul
led to the withdrawal of Rabbani and Masoud to the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul with most of
their heavy weapons; the Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996. Taliban gunmen
subsequently entered a U.N. facility in Kabul to seize Najibullah, his brother, and aides, and then
hanged them.
Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001)
The Taliban regime was led by Mullah Muhammad Umar, who held the title of Head of State and
“Commander of the Faithful.” He remained in the Taliban power base in Qandahar and almost
never appeared in public, although he did occasionally receive high-level foreign officials. Al
Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden relocated from Sudan to Afghanistan, where he had been a
recruiter of Arab fighters during the anti-Soviet war, in May 1996. He at first was located in
territory in Nangarhar province controlled by Hezb-i-Islam of Yunus Khalis (Mullah Umar’s party
leader) but then had free reign in Afghanistan as the Taliban captured nearly all the territory in
Afghanistan. Umar reportedly forged a political and personal bond with Bin Laden and refused
U.S. demands to extradite him. Like Umar, most of the senior figures in the Taliban regime were
Ghilzai Pashtuns, which predominate in eastern Afghanistan. They are rivals of the Durrani
Pashtuns, who are predominant in the south.
The Taliban lost international and domestic support as it imposed strict adherence to Islamic
customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including executions. The
Taliban authorized its “Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice” to use
physical punishments to enforce strict Islamic practices, including bans on television, Western
music, and dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home,
except in health care, and it publicly executed some women for adultery. In what many consider
its most extreme action, and which some say was urged by Bin Laden, in March 2001 the Taliban
blew up two large Buddha statues carved into hills above Bamiyan city, considering them idols.
U.S. Policy Toward the Taliban During Its Rule/Bin Laden Presence
The Clinton Administration opened talks with the Taliban after it captured Qandahar in 1994, and
engaged the movement after it took power. However, the Administration was unable to moderate

5 According to press reports in December 2012, the cloak remains in the shrine, which is guarded by a family of
caretakers who, despite professions of political neutrality, have suffered several assassinations over the years.
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the Taliban’s policies and relations worsened. The United States withheld recognition of Taliban
as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no faction as the government.
The United Nations continued to seat representatives of the Rabbani government, not the Taliban.
The State Department ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, DC, closed in August 1997.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1193 (August 28, 1998) and 1214 (December 8, 1998) urged
the Taliban to end discrimination against women. Women’s rights groups urged the Clinton
Administration not to recognize the Taliban government. In May 1999, the Senate-passed S.Res.
68 called on the President not to recognize an Afghan government that oppresses women.
The Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda’s leadership gradually became the Clinton Administration’s
overriding agenda item with Afghanistan. In April 1998, then-U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations Bill Richardson (along with Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and NSC senior
official Bruce Riedel) visited Afghanistan, but the Taliban refused to hand over Bin Laden. They
did not meet Mullah Umar. After the August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda bombings of U.S. embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton Administration began to strongly pressure the Taliban to
extradite him, imposing U.S. sanctions on Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and achieving adoption
of some U.N. sanctions as well. On August 20, 1998, as a response to the Africa embassy
bombings, the United States fired cruise missiles at alleged Al Qaeda training camps in eastern
Afghanistan, but Bin Laden was not hit.6 Some observers assert that the Administration missed
several other opportunities to strike him, including a purported sighting of him by an unarmed
Predator drone at a location called Tarnak Farm in Afghanistan in the fall of 2000.7 Clinton
Administration officials said that domestic and international support for ousting the Taliban
militarily was lacking.
The “Northern Alliance” Congeals
The Taliban’s policies caused different Afghan factions to ally with the Tajik core of the anti-
Taliban opposition—the ousted President Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Masoud, and their ally in the
Herat area, Ismail Khan. Joining the Tajik factions in the broader “Northern Alliance” were
Uzbek, Hazara Shiite, and even some Pashtun Islamist factions discussed below. Virtually all the
figures mentioned remain key players in politics in Afghanistan, sometimes allied with and at
other times adversaries of President Hamid Karzai. The Soviet occupation-era parties remain
relatively intact informally, although they do not remain organized under those prior names.
(Detail on these figures is in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.)
Uzbeks/General Dostam. One major faction was the Uzbek militia (the
Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) of General Abdul
Rashid Dostam. Frequently referred to by some Afghans as one of the “warlords”
who gained power during the anti-Soviet war, Dostam first joined those seeking
to oust Rabbani during his 1992-1996 presidency, but later joined him and the
other Northern Alliance factions opposed to the Taliban.
Hazara Shiites. Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims, are
prominent in Bamiyan, Dai Kundi, and Ghazni provinces (central Afghanistan)

6 A pharmaceutical plant in Sudan (Al Shifa) believe to be producing chemical weapons for Al Qaeda also was struck
that day, although U.S. reviews later corroborated Sudan’s assertions that the plant was strictly civilian in nature.
7 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4540958.
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and are always fearful of, and subject to some extent to, repression by Pashtuns
and other larger ethnic factions. The Hazaras have tended to serve in working
class and domestic household jobs, although more recently they have been
prominent in technology jobs in Kabul, raising their economic status. They are
also increasingly cohesive politically. During the various Afghan wars, the main
Hazara Shiite militia was Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, composed of eight
different groups). Hizb-e-Wahdat suffered a major setback in 1995 when the
Taliban captured and killed its leader Abdul Ali Mazari. One of Karzai’s vice
president’s Karim Khalili, is a Hazara. Another prominent Hazara faction leader,
Mohammad Mohaqeq, is a Karzai critic.
Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf. Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, now a leading Islamic
conservative in parliament, headed a Pashtun-dominated hardline Islamist
mujahedin faction (Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, Ittihad
Islami
) during the anti-Soviet war. Even though he is an Islamist conservative,
Sayyaf viewed the Taliban as selling out Afghanistan to Al Qaeda and he joined
the Northern Alliance.
Policy Pre-September 11, 2001
Throughout 2001, but prior to the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration policy differed little
from Clinton Administration policy: applying economic and political pressure on the Taliban
while retaining some dialogue with it, and refusing to militarily assist the Northern Alliance. The
September 11 Commission report said that, in the months prior to the September 11 attacks,
Administration officials leaned toward providing such aid, as well as aiding anti-Taliban Pashtun.
Other covert options were reportedly under consideration as well.8 In accordance with U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State Department ordered the Taliban
representative office in New York closed, although Taliban representative Abdul Hakim Mujahid
continued to operate informally.9 In March 2001, Administration officials received Taliban envoy
Rahmatullah Hashemi (who enrolled as a student at Harvard University after the fall of the
Taliban) to discuss bilateral issues. In one significant departure from Clinton Administration
policy, the Bush Administration stepped up engagement with Pakistan to try to reduce its support
for the Taliban. At that time, there were widespread but unconfirmed allegations that Pakistani
advisers were helping the Taliban in their fight against the Northern Alliance.
Even though the Northern Alliance was supplied with Iranian, Russian, and Indian financial and
military support, the Northern Alliance nonetheless continued to lose ground to the Taliban after it
lost Kabul in 1996. By the time of the September 11 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75%
of the country, including almost all provincial capitals. The Alliance suffered a major setback on
September 9, 2001 (two days before, and possibly a part of, the September 11 attacks), when
Ahmad Shah Masoud was assassinated by Al Qaeda operatives posing as journalists. He was
succeeded by one of his top lieutenants, Muhammad Fahim,10 a veteran Tajik figure but who
lacked Masoud’s charisma and undisputed authority.

8 Drogin, Bob. “U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11.” Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2002.
9 Mujahid has reconciled with the current Afghan government,and serves as one of the deputy leaders of the
70-member High Peace Council on political reconciliation.
10 Some Afghan sources refer to him by the name “Fahim Khan,” or “Marshal Fahim.”
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September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom
After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the
Taliban when it refused a final U.S. offer to extradite Bin Laden in order to avoid military action.
President Bush articulated a policy that equated those who harbor terrorists to terrorists
themselves, and judged that a friendly regime in Kabul was needed to enable U.S. forces to
search for Al Qaeda personnel there.
U.N. and Congressional Authorization for Military Action
The Administration sought U.N. backing for military action, although the outcome was perhaps
less clear cut than was sought. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1368 of September 12, 2001,
said that the Council “expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond (implying
force) to the September 11 attacks.” This was widely interpreted as a U.N. authorization for
military action in response to the attacks, but it did not explicitly authorize Operation Enduring
Freedom to oust the Taliban. Nor did the Resolution specifically reference Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter, which allows for responses to threats to international peace and security.
In Congress, S.J.Res. 23 (passed 98-0 in the Senate and with no objections in the House, P.L.
107-40, signed September 18, 2011), was somewhat more explicit than the U.N. Resolution,
authorizing11 “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons.”
The War Begins
Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on October 7, 2001. It
consisted primarily of U.S. air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, facilitated by the
cooperation between reported small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S. special operations forces and
Central Intelligence Agency operatives. The purpose of these operations was to help the Northern
Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces by providing information to direct U.S. air strikes
against Taliban positions. In part, the U.S. forces and operatives worked with such Northern
Alliance contacts as Fahim and Amrollah Saleh, who during November 2001-June 2010 served as
Afghanistan’s intelligence director (National Directorate of Security), to weaken Taliban defenses
on the Shomali plain north of Kabul. The plain extends south of Bagram Airfield, which marked
the forward position of the Northern Alliance during Taliban rule. Some U.S. combat units (about
1,300 Marines) moved into Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban around Qandahar at the height of
the fighting (October-December 2001), but there were few pitched battles between U.S. and
Taliban soldiers.
The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif on November 9, 2001, to forces
led by Dostam.12 Northern Alliance forces—the commanders of which had initially promised
then-Secretary of State Colin Powell that they would not enter Kabul—did so on November 12,

11 Another law (P.L. 107-148) established a “Radio Free Afghanistan” under RFE/RL, providing $17 million in funding
for it for FY2002.
12 In the process, Dostam captured Taliban fighters and imprisoned them in freight containers, causing many to
suffocate. They were buried in a mass grave at Dasht-e-Laili.
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2001, to popular jubilation. The Taliban subsequently lost the south and east to U.S.-supported
Pashtun leaders, including Hamid Karzai. The end of the Taliban regime is generally dated as
December 9, 2001, when the Taliban surrendered Qandahar and Mullah Umar fled the city,
leaving it under Pashtun tribal law.
Subsequently, U.S. and Afghan forces conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley
south of Gardez (Paktia Province) during March 2-19, 2002, against 800 Al Qaeda and Taliban
fighters. In March 2003, about 1,000 U.S. troops raided suspected Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters in
villages around Qandahar (Operation Valiant Strike). On May 1, 2003, then-Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld announced an end to “major combat.”
Post-Taliban Governance-Building Efforts13
The George W. Bush Administration argued that the U.S. departure from the region after the 1989
Soviet pullout allowed Afghanistan to degenerate into chaos, and that this pattern not be repeated
after the defeat of the Taliban. The Bush Administration and international partners of the United
States decided to try to dismantle local security structures and try to build a relatively strong,
democratic, Afghan central government and develop Afghanistan economically. The effort, which
many outside experts described as “nation-building,” was supported by the United Nations,
international institutions, and U.S. partners in post-Taliban international meetings.
The Obama Administration’s strategy review in late 2009 initially narrowed official U.S. goals to
preventing terrorism safe haven in Afghanistan, but Obama Administration strategy during 2009-
2011 in some ways expanded the nation-building policy.14 No matter how expansively the U.S.
mission has been defined, building the capacity of and reforming Afghan governance have been
consistently judged to be key to the success of U.S. policy. This has been stated explicitly in each
Obama Administration policy review, strategy statement, and report on progress in Afghanistan,
as well as all major international conferences on Afghanistan, including the NATO summit in
Chicago during May 20-21, 2012, and the Tokyo donors’ conference on July 8, 2012.
The conclusion of virtually every Administration and outside assessment has been that Afghan
central governmental capacity and effectiveness has increased, but that local governance remains
weak and all levels of government are plagued particularly by governmental corruption. U.S.
assessments say that the deficiencies in governance could jeopardize stability after the 2014
transition. Afghan governance is assessed extensively in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan:
Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman. Table 1 depicts, in
brief, the process and events that led to the formation of the post-Taliban government of
Afghanistan.

13 Governance issues are analyzed in detail in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government
Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.
14 Text of the released summary is at http://documents.nytimes.com/the-obama-administrations-overview-on-
afghanistan-and-pakistan.
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Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process
Interim
Formed by Bonn Agreement. Headed by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, but key security
Administration
positions dominated by mostly minority “Northern Alliance.” Karzai reaffirmed as leader
by June 2002 “emergency loya jirga.” (A jirga is a traditional Afghan assembly.)
Constitution
Approved by January 2004 “Constitutional Loya Jirga” (CLJ). Set up strong presidency, a
rebuke to Northern Alliance that wanted prime ministership to balance presidential
power, but gave parliament significant powers to compensate. Gives men and women
equal rights under the law, allows for political parties as long as they are not “un-Islamic;”
al ows for court rulings according to Hanafi (Sunni) Islam (Chapter 7, Article 15). Set out
electoral roadmap for simultaneous (if possible) presidential, provincial, and district
elections by June 2004. Named ex-King Zahir Shah to non-hereditary position of “Father
of the Nation;” he died July 23, 2007.
Presidential Election
Elections for president and two vice presidents, for five-year term, held October 9, 2004.
Turnout was 80% of 10.5 million registered. Karzai and running mates (Ahmad Zia
Masoud, a Tajik and brother of legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masoud,
who was assassinated by Al Qaeda two days before the September 11 attacks, and Karim
Khalili, a Hazara) elected with 55% against 16 opponents. Second highest vote getter,
Northern Alliance figure (and Education Minister) Yunus Qanooni (16%). One female ran.
Funded with $90 million from donors, including $40 million from U.S. (FY2004, P.L. 108-
106).
Parliamentary
Elections held September 18, 2005, on “Single Non-Transferable Vote” System; candidates
Elections
stood as individuals, not in party list. Parliament consists of a 249 elected lower house
(Wolesi Jirga, House of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper house (Meshrano Jirga,
House of Elders). 2,815 candidates for Wolesi Jirga, including 347 women. Turnout was
57% (6.8 million voters) of 12.5 million registered. Upper house is appointed by Karzai (34
seats, half of which are to be women), and by the provincial councils (68 seats). When
district councils are elected, they will appoint 34 of the seats. Funded by $160 million in
international aid, including $45 mil ion from U.S. (FY2005 supplemental, P.L. 109-13).
First Provincial
Provincial elections held September 18, 2005, simultaneous with parliamentary elections.
Elections/
Exact powers vague, but now taking lead in deciding local reconstruction Provincial
District Elections
council sizes range from 9 to the 29 seats on the Kabul provincial council. Total seats are
420, of which 121 held by women. l3,185 candidates, including 279 women. District
elections not held due to complexity and potential tensions of drawing district boundaries.
Second
Presidential and provincial elections were held August 20, 2009, but required a runoff
Presidential/Provincial because no candidate received over 50% in certified results issued October 20. Second
Elections
round not held because Dr. Abdullah pulled out of runoff. Election costs: $300 million.
Second Parliamentary Original y set for May 22, 2010; held September 18, 2010. Results disputed, but agreement
Elections
reached for Karzai inaugurate new lower house on January 26, 2011, six days after original
date. 70 women elected, two more than quota. Speaker selected on February 27, Abdul
Raouf Ibrahimi, an ethnic Uzbek. Special tribunal set up to investigate results and on June
23 ruled that 62 results be altered, prompting a backlash from those who might be
deprived of seats and threats of impeaching Karzai. Crisis eased on August 11, 2011, when
Karzai disbanded special tribunal and announced that only the election bodies have
standing to overturn results. Independent Election Commission announced August 21 that
nine lower house winners would be unseated for fraud. They were sworn in September 4;
but a broad lower house boycott renderied it non-functional until October 9, 2011. For
the upper house, 68 seats council are appointed to four-year terms by the elected
provincial councils in each of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, and remain in office. Karzai made
his 34 appointments on February 19, 2011. The speaker of that body is Muslim Yaar (a
Pashtun).
Third
To be held on April 5, 2014. There is no clear Pashtun front runner to succeed him, and
Presidential/Provincial several Northern Alliance (Tajik) figures, including Dr. Abdullah, are potential candidates.
Election
Specific candidates are discussed in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman, referenced throughout.
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U.S. and International Civilian Policy Structure
Building the capacity of the Afghan government, and helping it develop economically, is
primarily, although not exclusively, the purview of U.S. and international civilian officials and
institutions. In line with the prioritization of Afghanistan policy, in February 2009, the
Administration set up the position of appointed “Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan” (SRAP), occupied first by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, reporting to Secretary of
State Clinton. Holbrooke died on December 13, 2010, and that office at the State Department was
led during February 2011—November 2012 by Ambassador Marc Grossman. Grossman was
replaced by his deputy, veteran diplomat David Pearce. Administration officials have told
journalists the SRAP office is likely to be retained until the completion of the transition in 2014.
At the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Ambassador Ryan Crocker replaced Karl Eikenberry on July 25,
2011, but departed in July 2012 and was succeeded by James Cunningham, formerly the “deputy
Ambassador,” who was confirmed in late July 2012. There are separate Ambassador-rank
officials to manage U.S. economic assistance issues, to oversee Embassy operations, and to
coordinate U.S. rule of law programs. Under various programs, U.S. civilian and coalition
military personnel are assigned as advisors to Afghan ministries.
The U.S. Embassy has progressively expanded its personnel and facilities to accommodate the
additional civilian hires and Foreign Service officers who have been posted to Afghanistan since
2009 as mentors and advisers to the Afghan government. U.S. officials say there are more than
1,300 U.S. civilian officials in Afghanistan up from only about 400 in early 2009. Of these at
least 400 serve outside Kabul to help build governance at the provincial and district levels. That is
up from 67 outside Kabul in 2009. However, press reports in late 2012 say the State Department
is planning for a 20% reduction in staff by the completion of the transition in 2014.
On February 7, 2010, in an effort to improve civilian coordination between the United States, its
foreign partners, and the Afghan government, the powers of the NATO “Senior Civilian
Representative” in Afghanistan were enhanced as UK Ambassador Mark Sedwill took office. This
office works not only with U.S. military officials but with representatives of the embassies of
partner countries and with a special U.N. Assistance Mission-Afghanistan (UNAMA, see Table
2
). In April 2011 Sedwill was replaced by the former British Ambassador to Iran, Sir Simon Gass.
Afghan Ambassador to the United States Sayed Tayib Jawad served as Ambassador from 2004
until his recall in August 2010. Then deputy Foreign Minister Eklil Hakimi replaced him on
February 23, 2011.
Consulate in Herat and Others Planned
The tables at the end of this report include U.S. funding for State Department and USAID
operations, including Embassy construction and running the “Embassy air wing,” a fleet of twin-
engine turboprops that ferry U.S. officials and contractors around Afghanistan. In a significant
development attempting to signal normalization of certain areas of Afghanistan, in June 2010,
Deputy Secretary of State William Burns formally inaugurated a U.S. consulate in Herat. The
State Department spent about $80 million on a facility in Mazar-e-Sharif that was slated to open
as a U.S. consulate in April 2012, but the site was abandoned because of concerns about the
security of the facility. A U.S. consulate there is considered an important signal of U.S. interest in
engagement with the Tajik and Uzbek minorities of Afghanistan. Alternative locations are being
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considered,15 and consulates are planned for the major cities of Qandahar and Jalalabad by the
end of 2014.
Table 2. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
The United Nations is extensively involved in Afghan governance and national building, primarily in factional conflict
resolution and coordination of development assistance. The coordinator of U.N. efforts is the U.N. Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). It was headed during March 2010-December 2011 by Swedish diplomat Staffan de-
Mistura, replacing Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide. Mistura formerly played a similar role in Iraq. Slovakian diplomat Jan
Kubis replaced him in January 2012.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1806 of March 20, 2008, expanded UNAMA’s authority to strengthen cooperation
between the international peacekeeping force (ISAF, see below) and the Afghan government. In concert with the
Obama Administration’s emphasis on Afghan policy, UNAMA is to open offices in as many of Afghanistan’s 34
provinces as financial y and logistical y permissible. The mandate of UNAMA, was renewed for another year on March
22, 2011, by Resolution 1974. As did Resolution 1917 the previous year, Resolution 1974 largely restated UNAMA’s
coordinating role with other high-level representatives in Afghanistan and election support role, while referring to
UNAMA’s role in facilitating the coming transition to Afghan leadership. As part of the expansion of its mandate,
UNAMA is playing a role in reintegration of surrendering insurgent fighters through a “Salaam (Peace) Support
Group” that coordinates with Afghanistan’s High Peace Council (that is promoting reconciliation and reintegration).
UNAMA has always been involved in local dispute resolution and disarmament of local militias,
UNAMA is also playing a growing role in engaging regional actors in Afghan stability. It was a co-convener of the
January 28, 2010, and July 20, 2010, London and Kabul Conferences, respectively. Along with Turkey, UNAMA chairs
a “Regional Working Group” to enlist regional support for Afghan integration.
On development, UNAMA co-chairs the joint Afghan-international community coordination body cal ed the Joint
Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), and is helping implement Afghanistan’s development strategy based on
Afghanistan’s “National Strategy for Development,” presented on June 12, 2008, in Paris. However, UNAMA’s donor
coordination role did not materialize because of the large numbers and size of donor-run projects in Afghanistan.
The difficulties in coordinating U.N. with U.S. and NATO efforts were evident in a 2007 proposal to create a new
position of “super envoy” that would represent the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO in Afghanistan.
In January 2008, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon tentatively appointed British diplomat Paddy Ashdown as the
“super envoy,” but Karzai rejected the appointment over concerns about the scope of authority of such an envoy and
the issue was dropped.
For more background on UNAMA, see CRS Report R40747, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan:
Background and Policy Issues
, by Rhoda Margesson.


15 Ernesto Londono. “U.S. Abandons Consulate Plan in Northern Afghanistan.” Washington Post, May 6, 2012.
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Security Policy, 2011-2014 “Transition,
and Beyond”16

The Obama Administration policy goal is to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a safe
haven for global terrorism. But, the Administration has defined that goal in terms of the ability of
the Afghan government and security forces to defend the country and govern effectively and
transparently. Under an agreement announced after a meeting between President Obama and
President Karzai in Washington, DC on January 11, 2012, the U.S. security mission will change
from combat leadership to a mentoring and “overwatch” role by spring of 2013. Still, many of the
pillars of U.S. and NATO security strategy that have been in place since 2001 will remain intact
until the end of the transition in 2014.
Who Is “The Enemy”? Taliban, Haqqani, Al Qaeda, and Others
Security in Afghanistan is challenged by several armed groups, loosely allied with each other.17
There has not been agreement about the relative strength of insurgents in all of the areas where
they operate. The top commander in Afghanistan, General John Allen, told journalists in October
2011 that the numbers of insurgents may be far fewer than the 25,000 previously assessed.
Groups: The Taliban/“Quetta Shura Taliban”(QST)
The core insurgent faction in Afghanistan remains the Taliban movement, much of which remains
at least nominally loyal to Mullah Muhammad Umar, leader of the Taliban regime during 1996-
2001. Although press reports say even many of his top aides do not see him regularly, he and
those subordinates reportedly still operate from Pakistan, probably the city of Quetta but possibly
also Karachi. This accounts for the term usually applied to Umar and his aides: “Quetta Shura
Taliban” (QST). In recent years, Umar has lost some of this top aides and commanders to U.S.-
led military action or Pakistan arrests, including Mullah Dadullah, Mullah Obeidullah Akhund,
and Mullah Usmani. His top aide, Mullah Abdul Ghani Bradar, was arrested by Pakistan in
February 2010.
Some of Umar’s inner circle has remained intact, and the release by Pakistan in late 2012 of
several top Taliban figures close to Umar has helped him fill out his leadership circle. Akhtar
Mohammad Mansoor, a logistics expert,18 is head of the Taliban’s senior shura council and a
reputed pragmatist. Other senior pragmatists include Shahabuddin Delawar, who attended
informal talks with Afghan officials in late 2012, and Noorudin Turabi, who was released by
Pakistan in December 2012. Some experts believe that Umar and these figures blame their past
association with Al Qaeda for their loss of power. Signals of Mullah Umar’s potential for
compromise have been several recent statements including: his statement on the 10th anniversary
of the September 11 attacks on the United States (September 11, 2011) acknowledging there have

16 Much of the information in this section is taken from U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), “Report on Progress
Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” December 2012.
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/1230_Report_final.pdf
17 http://www.defense.gov/news/1230_1231Report.pdf.
18 Ibid.; Moreau, Ron. “New Leaders for the Taliban.” Newsweek, January 24, 2011.
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been some settlement talks, although only over prisoner exchanges; a statement marking a
Muslim holiday on November 10, 2011, admonishing Taliban commanders to avoid causing
civilian casualties; an August 16, 2012, statement marking the Eid al-Fitr holidy saying that the
Taliban would not allow Afghan territory to be used against outside countries; and his message
marking the Eid al-Adha on October 24, 2012, indicating that the Taliban does not seek to regain
a monopoly of power. On the other hand, the latter statement supported attempts to persuade pro-
Taliban members of the Afghan security forces to attack international forces in Afghanistan.
The pragmatists are facing debate from younger and reputedly hardline, anti-compromise leaders
such as Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir. Zakir, a U.S. detainee in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba until
2007, is the top military commander of the Taliban and purportedly believes outright Taliban
victory is possible after 2014. The Taliban has several official spokespersons at large, including
Qari Yusuf Ahmadi and Zabiullah Mujahid, and it operates a clandestine radio station, “Voice of
Shariat” and publishes videos.
Al Qaeda/Bin Laden
U.S. officials have long considered Al Qaeda to have been largely expelled from Afghanistan
itself, characterizing Al Qaeda militants in Afghanistan as facilitators of militant incursions into
Afghanistan rather than active fighters. U.S. officials put the number of Al Qaeda fighters in
Afghanistan at about 50-100;19 some are believed to belong to Al Qaeda affiliates such as the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). However, in May 2012, a Pentagon spokesman said Al
Qaeda has safe haven in some areas of eastern Afghanistan, and can move back and forth from
Pakistan; the statement came after the United States announced killing an Al Qaeda figure in
Kunar Province.
Until the death of Bin Laden at the hands of a U.S. Special Operations Force raid on May 1, 2011,
there had been frustration within the U.S. government that Al Qaeda’s top leadership had eluded
U.S. efforts to capture them. In December 2001, in the course of the post-September 11 major
combat effort, U.S. Special Operations Forces and CIA operatives reportedly narrowed Osama
Bin Laden’s location to the Tora Bora mountains in Nangarhar Province (30 miles west of the
Khyber Pass), but the Afghan militia fighters who were the bulk of the fighting force did not
prevent his escape into Pakistan. Some U.S. military and intelligence officials later publicly
questioned the U.S. decision to rely mainly on Afghan forces in this engagement.
U.S. efforts to find Al Qaeda leaders now reportedly focus on his close ally Ayman al-Zawahiri,
who is also presumed to be on the Pakistani side of the border and who was named new leader of
Al Qaeda in June 2011. CNN reported October 18, 2010, that assessments from the U.S.-led
coalition said Zawahiri was likely in a settled area, and not in a remote area. A U.S. strike
reportedly missed Zawahiri by a few hours in the village of Damadola, Pakistan, in January
2006.20 Many observers say that Zawahiri is not well liked within Al Qaeda, while other accounts
say he has successfully held the group together since bin Laden’s death and is focused on taking
political advantage of the Arab uprisings since 2011. Other senior Al Qaeda leaders are said to be
in Iran, including Kuwait-born Sulayman Abu Ghaith, as well as Sayf al Adl. The United States

19 Text of the Panetta interview with ABC News is at http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=11025299.
20 Gall, Carlotta and Ismail Khan. “U.S. Drone Attack Missed Zawahiri by Hours.” New York Times, November 10,
2006.
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has no diplomatic relations with Iran and has called on Iran to arrest and submit any Al Qaeda
operatives to international authorities for trial.
U.S. efforts—primarily through armed unmanned aerial vehicles—have killed numerous other
senior Al Qaeda operatives in recent years. In August 2008, an airstrike was confirmed to have
killed Al Qaeda chemical weapons expert Abu Khabab al-Masri, and two senior operatives
allegedly involved in the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa reportedly were killed by an
unmanned aerial vehicle strike in January 2009. Following the killing of Bin Laden, three top
operational leaders, Ilyas Kashmiri, Attiyah Abd al-Rahman, and Abu Yahya al-Libi were killed
in Pakistan by armed drone strikes in June 2011 and August 2011 and June 2012, respectively.
Hikmatyar Faction
Another significant insurgent leader is former mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who
leads Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). The faction received extensive U.S. support against the
Soviet Union, but turned against its mujahedin colleagues after the Communist government fell in
1992. Hikmatyar was displaced by the Taliban as the main opposition to the 1992-1996 Rabbani
government, but it is now active against U.S. and Afghan forces in Kunar, Nuristan, Kapisa, and
Nangarhar provinces, north and east of Kabul. The group is ideologically and politically allied
with Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents but sometimes has armed clashes with Taliban fighters over
control of territory. A suicide bombing on September 18, 2012, which killed twelve persons,
including eight South African nationals working for a USAID-chartered air service, was allegedly
carried out by a female HIG member. On February 19, 2003, the U.S. government formally
designated Hikmatyar as a “specially designated global terrorist,” under Executive Order 13224,
subjecting it to a freeze of any U.S.-based assets. The group is not designated as a “Foreign
Terrorist Organization” (FTO).
At the same time, HIG is widely considered amenable to a reconciliation deal with Kabul. In
January 2010, Hikmatyar outlined specific conditions for reconciliation, including elections under
a neutral caretaker government following a U.S. withdrawal. On March 22, 2010, both the
Afghan government and HIG representatives confirmed talks in Kabul, including meetings with
Karzai, and Karzai subsequently acknowledged additional meetings with group representatives.
Some close to Hikmatyar attended the consultative peace loya jirga on June 2-4, 2010, which
discussed the reconciliation issue. HIG figures met government representatives at a June 2012
academic conference in Paris and a follow up meeting in Chantilly, France on December 20-21,
2012.
Haqqani Faction21
Another militant faction, cited by U.S. officials as perhaps the most potent threat to Afghan
security, is the “Haqqani Network,” founded by Jalaludin Haqqani, a mujahedin commander and
U.S. ally during the U.S.-backed war against the Soviet Union. He subsequently joined the
Taliban regime (1996-2001), serving as its Minister of Tribal Affairs. Since 2001, the network has
staunchly opposed the Karzai government and his faction is believed closer to Al Qaeda than to
the Taliban in part because one of the elder Haqqani’s wives is Arab. Over the past few years, he

21 A profile of the faction and its activities is provided in: Joshua Partlow. “In Afghan War, Haqqani Group Is
‘Resilient’ Foe.” Washington Post, May 30, 2011.
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has delegated operation control to his sons Siraj (Sirajjudin), Badruddin, and Nasiruddin,
although Badruddin was reportedly killed in a U.S. or Pakistani strike in late August 2012.
Suggesting it may sometimes act as a tool of Pakistani interests, the Haqqani network, which
reputedly has 3,000 fighters and supporters, has primarily targeted Indian interests. It claimed
responsibility for two attacks on India’s embassy in Kabul (July 2008 and October 2009), and
reportedly was involved, possibly with other groups, on the December 2009 attack on a CIA base
in Khost that killed seven CIA officers. U.S. officials attribute the June 28, 2011, attack on the
Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul and a September 10, 2011, truck bombing in Wardak Province
(which injured 77 U.S. soldiers) to the group. U.S. officials say the attacks on the U.S. Embassy
and ISAF headquarters in Kabul on September 13, 2011, were the work of the faction as well.
That the faction is tolerated or protected in the North Waziristan area of Pakistan and also its
purported ties to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) has caused sharp U.S.
criticism of Pakistan. The ISI is believed to see the Haqqanis as a potential ally in any Afghan
political structure that might be produced by a political settlement in Afghanistan. The most
widely cited criticism was by then Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mullen, following the
September 2011 attacks on the U.S. Embassy. Admiral Mullen testified before the Senate Armed
Services Committee on September 22, 2011, that the Haqqani network acts “as a veritable arm”
of the ISI. Other senior officials reiterated the thrust of that criticism, although with caveats.
During a visit to Afghanistan on June 7, 2012, Secretary of Defense Panetta, referring to the
Haqqani presence in Pakistan, said, “we are reaching the limits of our patience here, and for that
reason it is extremely important that Pakistan take action to prevent this kind of safehaven.”
Experts debate whether the faction is amenable to a political settlement with the Afghan
government. Many consider the faction less ideological than either the Taliban or Al Qaeda;
experts say the group is primarily interested in earning funds through licit and illicit businesses in
Pakistan and the Persian Gulf and in controlling parts of Khost Province. Such interests could
potentially be accommodated as part of a political settlement. Siraj Haqqani said after the
September 13, 2011, attacks on the U.S. Embassy that the faction might, at some point,
participate in settlement talks. It has also been reported that U.S. officials—as part of their drive
to facilitate a political settlement of the Afghanistan conflict—met with Haqqani representatives
over the summer of 2011, in meetings in UAE facilitated by the ISI.22 On November 13, 2012, a
top Haqqani commander said that the Haqqani Network would participate in political settlement
talks with the United States if Taliban leader Mullah Umar decided to undertake such talks.23
FTO Designation
The faction’s calculations might be affected by how the United States characterizes the group. In
July 2010, then-top U.S. commander in Afghanistan General David Petraeus advocated that the
Haqqani network be named as an FTO under the Immigration and Naturalization Act—a signal to
Pakistan that it should not continue to support the Haqqani network.24 A number of Haqqani
leaders had already been sanctioned as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) under
Executive Order 13224. Some in the State Department reportedly opposed an FTO designation

22 Matthew Rosenberg. “U.S. Secretly Met Afghan Militants.” Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2011.
23 Jibran Ahmad. “Afghan Haqqani Factions Would Consider Talks Under Taliban.” Reuters, November 13, 2012.
24 Jane Perlez, Eric Schmitt, and Carlotta Gall, “Pakistan Is Said to Pursue Foothold in Afghanistan,” New York Times,
June 24, 2010.
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because that could complicate efforts to conduct reconciliation talks with the faction. Others said
the designation could create pressure for Pakistan to be named a state sponsor of terrorism. Some
in Congress sought the FTO designation and S. 1959 (Haqqani Network Terrorist Designation Act
of 2012)—was passed and signed into law on August 10, 2012 (P.L. 112-168). It required, within
30 days of enactment, an Administration report on whether the group meets the criteria for FTO
designation and, if not, explanation of why not. On September 9, 2012, the Administration
reported to Congress that the Haqqani Network does meet the criteria for FTO designation. U.S.
officials said the key goal of the designation is to help convince other countries to shut down
Haqqani-run businesses and other funding sources, including those it cultivates among wealthy
figures in the Persian Gulf monarchy states.
Pakistani Groups
A major Pakistani group, the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP), is primarily
seeking to challenge the government of Pakistan, but it supports the Afghan Taliban goals of
recapturing Afghanistan and some of its fighters reportedly are operating from safehavens in
Taliban-controlled areas on the Afghan side of the border. Based in part on a failed bombing in
New York City in May 2010 allegedly by the TTP, the State Department designated the TTP as an
FTO on September 2, 2010. Its current leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, was named as terrorism
supporting entities that day. (He succeeded Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed in a U.S. drone
strike in August 2009.)
Another Pakistani group said to be increasingly active inside Afghanistan is Laskhar-e-Tayyiba
(LET, or Army of the Righteous). LET is an Islamist militant group that has previously been
focused on operations against Indian control of Kashmir. Some assess the group as increasingly
active in South Asia and elsewhere, and could rival Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda affiliates as potential
threat to U.S. interests. Another Pakistan-based group that is said to be somewhat active in
Afghanistan is Lashkar-i-Janghvi –it has been accused of several attacks on Afghanistan’s Hazara
Shiite community during 2011-2012.
Insurgent Tactics
As far as tactics, prior to 2011, U.S. commanders worried most about insurgent use of improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), including roadside bombs. In January 2010, President Karzai issued a
decree banning importation of fertilizer chemicals (ammonium nitrate) commonly used for the
roadside bombs, but there reportedly is informal circumvention of the ban for certain civilian
uses, and the material reportedly still comes into Afghanistan from at least two major production
plants in Pakistan. U.S. commanders have said they have verified some use of surface-to-air
missiles.25 It does not appear that sophisticated missiles were involved in the apparent shootdown
of a U.S. Chinook helicopter in which about 30 U.S. soldiers were killed on August 6, 2011.
An increasing concern during 2012 was for “insider attacks”(attacks on ISAF forces by Afghan
security personnel), some of whom might have been Taliban infiltrators. 26 Other insurgents have
used bombs hidden in turbans, which had, until October 2011, generally not been searched out of

25 Major General John Campbell, commander of RC-E, July 28, 2010, press briefing.
26 For more information on the insider attack, see CRS General Distribution memorandum “Insider Attacks in
Afghanistan,” October 1, 2012, available on request:
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respect for Afghan religious traditions. Such a bomb killed former President Rabbani on
September 20, 2011, as noted above. There have been reports that a suicide bomber who wounded
intelligence chief Asadullah Khalid in December 2012 might have had explosives surgically sewn
into his body.
Insurgent Financing: Narcotics Trafficking and Other Methods
All of the insurgent groups in Afghanistan benefit, at least in part, from narcotics trafficking.
However, the adverse effects are not limited to funding insurgents; the trafficking also
undermines rule of law within government ranks. At the same time, narcotics trafficking is an
area on which there has been progress in recent years, although some question whether progress
is sustainable. In particular, the trafficking generates an estimated $70 million-$100 million per
year for insurgents. A UNODC report of September 2011 reversed, to some extent, the relatively
positive trend in reporting on this issue, noting that 17 provinces out of 34 provinces in
Afghanistan) fall into the “poppy free” category—down from 20 provinces in the previous year’s
UNODC report.27 A UNODC report released on November 20, 2012, assessed the number of
poppy free provinces remained at 17, but said that area under cultivation increased 18% from the
previous year (154,000 hectares compared to 131,000 hectares under cultivation in 2011). The
agency attributed the increase to high opium prices.28
The Obama Administration approach focuses on promoting legitimate agricultural alternatives to
poppy growing in line with Afghan government preferences. In July 2009, the United States
ended its prior focus on eradication of poppy fields on the grounds that this practice was driving
Afghans into the arms of the Taliban as protectors of their ability to earn a living. The de-
emphasis on eradication also put aside the long-standing differences with Karzai over whether to
conduct aerial spraying of fields. Congress sided with Karzai’s view; successive annual
appropriations laws since FY2008 have prohibited U.S. counter-narcotics funding from being
used for aerial spraying on Afghanistan poppy fields without Afghan concurrence. Some U.S.
programs, such as “Good Performance Initiative” (GPI) funds, give an incentive to provinces to
actively work against cultivation. In 2011, 22 of 34 provinces received awards totaling a
combined $19.2 million.
The U.S. military flies Afghan and U.S. counter-narcotics agents (Drug Enforcement Agency,
DEA) on missions and identifying targets; it also evacuates casualties from counter-drug
operations and assists an Afghan helicopter squadron to move Afghan counter-narcotics forces
around the country. To help break up narcotics trafficking networks, the DEA presence in
Afghanistan is has expanded from 13 agents in 2008 to over 80 as of early 2013.
The Bush and Obama Administrations have exercised waiver provisions to required certifications
of full Afghan cooperation needed to provide more than congressionally stipulated amounts of
U.S. economic assistance to Afghanistan. Although successive appropriations have required
certification of Afghan cooperation on counter-narcotics, no funds for Afghanistan have been held
up on these grounds. Narcotics trafficking control was perhaps the one issue on which the Taliban
regime satisfied much of the international community. However, cultivation flourished in
provinces under Northern Alliance control, such as Badakhshan.

27 UNDOC, http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Executive_Summary_2011_web.pdf
28 http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Summary_Findings_FINAL.pdf
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Donations from Gulf State individuals
The Obama Administration has placed additional focus on the other sources of Taliban funding,
including continued donations from wealthy residents of the Persian Gulf. It established a
multinational task force to combat Taliban financing generally, not limited to narcotics, and U.S.
officials are emphasizing with Persian Gulf counterparts the need for cooperation. On June 29,
2012, the Administration sanctioned (by designating them as terrorism supporting entities under
Executive Order 13224) two money exchange networks (hawalas) in Afghanistan and Pakistan
allegedly used by the Taliban to move its funds earned from narcotics and other sources.
However, the sanctions prevent U.S. persons from dealing with those money exchanges, and will
likely have limited effect on the networks’ operations in the South Asia region.
The U.S.-Led Military Effort: 2001-2008
To combat the insurgency, the United States has partnered with 49 other countries and the Afghan
government and security forces. Until late September 2012, there were about 90,000 U.S. troops
in Afghanistan, down from about 100,000 in mid-2011, the height of the U.S. presence. That
number fell to 66,000 as of late September 2012 as the “troop surge” was unwound, and remains
at that level. The forces operate under NATO/ISAF command, although small numbers might
remain part of the post-September 11 anti-terrorism mission Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
Lieutenant General John Allen took over the command in Afghanistan on July 18, 2011,
succeeding General David Petraeus. On October 11, 2012, Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford, the
assistant Marine commandant, was nominated to take overall command in Afghanistan. He was
confirmed by the Senate on December 3, 2012, and takes command on February 10, 2013 when
Gen. Allen departs Afghanistan permanently.
Prior to the U.S. surge in 2009, most U.S. forces were in eastern Afghanistan, leading Regional
Command East (RC-E) of the NATO/ISAF operation. The most restive provinces in RC-E have
been Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Kunar, and Nuristan. Helmand, Qandahar, Uruzgan, Zabol, Nimruz,
and Dai Kundi provinces constituted a “Regional Command South (RC-S),” a command formally
transferred to NATO/ISAF responsibility on July 31, 2006. The increased U.S. troop strength in
RC-S in 2009 and 2010—a product of the fact that most of the 2009-2010 U.S. “surge” was
focused on the south—prompted a May 2010 NATO decision to bifurcate RC-S, with the United
States leading at first leading a “southwest” subdivision for Helmand and Nimruz. U.S.
commanders now lead both RC-S and RC-SW. About 4,000 U.S. forces are under German
command in RC-North, headquartered in Konduz. Turkey commands ISAF forces in the capital,
Kabul, and on October 7, 2011, Turkey agreed to continue in that role for another year. Afghan
forces are in overall lead in the capital, however.
Perception of “Victory,” Followed by Setback and Deterioration
During 2001 to mid-2006, U.S. forces and Afghan troops fought relatively low levels of insurgent
violence with focused combat operations against Taliban concentrations in the south and east. For
example, the United States and partner forces conducted “Operation Mountain Viper” (August
2003); “Operation Avalanche” (December 2003); “Operation Mountain Storm” (March-July
2004); “Operation Lightning Freedom” (December 2004-February 2005); and “Operation Pil”
(Elephant, October 2005). Toward the end of this period, U.S. and partner commanders appeared
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to believe that the insurgency had been mostly defeated. Anticipating further stabilization,
NATO/ISAF assumed lead responsibility for security in all of Afghanistan during 2005-2006.
The optimistic assessments proved misplaced when violence increased significantly in mid-2006,
particularly in the east and the south, where ethnic Pashtuns predominate. Reasons for the
deterioration included popular unrest over the ineffectiveness and corruption in the Afghan
government; the absence of governance or security forces in many rural areas; the safe haven
enjoyed by militants in Pakistan; the reticence of some NATO contributors to actively combat
insurgents; a popular backlash against civilian casualties caused by military operations; and
unrealized expectations of economic development.
NATO counter-offensives during 2006-2008, focused on the Pashtun-dominated areas, cleared
key districts but did not prevent subsequent re-infiltration because Afghan governance was not
established in cleared areas. NATO/ISAF also tried preemptive combat and increased
development work, without durable success. As a result, growing U.S. concern took hold,
reflected in such statements as a September 2008 comment by then Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman
Admiral Mike Mullen that “I’m not sure we’re winning” in Afghanistan. Several major incidents
supported that assessment, including (1) expanding Taliban operations in provinces where it had
not previously been active, particularly Lowgar, Wardak, and Kapisa, close to Kabul; (2) high-
profile attacks in Kabul, such as the January 14, 2008, attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul and
the July 7, 2008, suicide bombing at the Indian Embassy in Kabul, killing more than 50; (3) the
April 27, 2008, assassination attempt on Karzai during a military parade celebrating the ouster of
the Soviet Union; and (4) a June 12, 2008, Sarposa prison break in Qandahar, in which several
hundred Taliban captives were freed.
To try to arrest deterioration, the United States and its partners increased force levels by partly
fulfilling a mid-2008 request by General David McKiernan for 30,000 additional U.S. troops. The
decision whether to fulfill the entire request was deferred to the next Administration. U.S. troop
levels started 2006 at 30,000; climbed slightly to 32,000 by December 2008; and reached 39,000
by April 2009. Partner forces increased by about 6,000 during this time, to a total of 39,000 at the
end of 2009—achieving rough parity between U.S. and non-U.S. forces.
In September 2008, the U.S. military and NATO each began strategy reviews. The primary U.S.
review was headed by Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, the Bush Administration’s senior adviser
on Iraq and Afghanistan (who is in the Obama NSC with responsibility for Afghanistan). These
reviews were briefed to the incoming Obama Administration.
Obama Administration Surge
The Obama Administration maintained that Afghanistan needed to be given a higher priority than
it was during the Bush Administration, but that the U.S. mission in Afghanistan not be indefinite.
The Administration integrated the reviews under way at the end of the Bush Administration’s into
an overarching 60-day inter-agency “strategy review,” chaired by South Asia expert Bruce Riedel
and co-chaired by then SRAP Holbrooke and then-Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele
Flournoy. President Obama announced a “comprehensive” strategy on March 27, 2009,29

29 “White Paper,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf.
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including deployment of an additional 21,000 U.S. forces—most of General McKiernan’s request
for 30,000 additional forces.
McChrystal Assessment and December 1, 2009, Surge Announcement
On May 11, 2009, then-Secretary of Defense Gates announced the replacement of General
McKiernan with General Stanley McChrystal, who headed U.S. Special Operations forces from
2003 to 2008. He assumed the command on June 15, 2009 and delivered a strategy assessment
and recommendations on August 30, 2009, as follows:30
• That the goal of the U.S. military should be to protect the population rather than
to focus on searching out and combating Taliban concentrations. Indicators of
success such as ease of road travel, participation in local shuras, and normal life
for families are more significant than counts of enemy fighters killed.
• That there is potential for “mission failure” unless a fully resourced,
comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy is pursued and reverses Taliban
momentum within 12-18 months. About 44,000 additional U.S. combat troops
(beyond those approved in March 2009) would be needed to have the greatest
chance for his strategy’s success.
The assessment set off debate within the Administration and another policy review. Some senior
U.S. officials, such as then-Secretary of Defense Gates, were concerned that adding many more
U.S. forces could create among the Afghan people a sense of “occupation” that could prove
counter-productive. The high-level review included at least nine high-level meetings, chaired by
President Obama. The President announced the following decisions at West Point military
academy on December 1, 2009:31
• That 30,000 additional U.S. forces (a “surge”) would be sent—bringing U.S.
levels close to 100,000—to “reverse the Taliban’s momentum” and strengthen the
capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government.
• There would be a transition, beginning in July 2011, to Afghan leadership of the
stabilization effort and a corresponding drawdown of U.S. force levels.
NATO Decision on Transition by the End of 2014/Petraeus Takes Command
The Obama Administration emphasis on transition to Afghan security leadership beginning in
July 2011 was widely debated. The Administration argued that the time frame would compel the
Afghan government to assume greater responsibility for the mission. However, the deadline was
interpreted by some experts and Afghan and regional leaders as signaling a rapid decrease in U.S.
involvement.32 To address that criticism, on August 31, 2010, the President asserted that the pace

30 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.
“Commander’s Initial Assessment.” August 30, 2009, available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?.
31 President Obama speech, op. cit. Testimony of Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and Admiral Mullen before the
Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. December 2, 2009.
32 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.
Commander’s Initial Assessment.” August 30, 2009, available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf. White House. Remarks by the President In Address to the Nation on the
(continued...)
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and scope of any drawdown would be subject to conditions on the ground. The debate over the
July 2011 deadline abated substantially following the November 19-20, 2010, NATO summit in
Lisbon. At that meeting, it was agreed that the transition to Afghan leadership would begin in
2011 and would be completed by the end of 2014.
As this debate over transition timeframes was taking place, on June 23, 2010, President Obama
accepted the resignation of General McChrystal after summoning him to Washington, DC, to
discuss the comments by him and his staff to a reporter for Rolling Stone magazine that
disparaged several civilian figures involved in Afghanistan policy. He named General Petraeus as
General McChrystal’s successor. General Petraeus was confirmed by the Senate on June 30, 2010,
and assumed command on July 4, 2010.
Table 3.Summary of Current U.S. Strategy and Implementation
Goals: to prevent terrorist networks in the region from again taking root in Afghanistan.
U.S. Strategy Definition: to build capable and transparent Afghan security and governing institutions and move to a
support role in spring 2013, with transfer of full responsibility to the Afghans by the end of 2014.
Surge and then Drawdown: U.S. force levels reached a high of 100,000 in mid-2011, then fel to 66,000 by September
20, 2012. Remaining drawdown pace until 2014 not determined.
Long-Term Involvement. A strategic partnership agreement, signed in Kabul on May 1, 2012, pledges U.S. security and
economic assistance to Afghanistan until 2024. U.S. military training and some combat against high value targets likely
to continue after 2014. Exact post-2014 U.S. force levels not determined precisely, but options reportedly range from
3,000—20,000 U.S. forces. Post-2014 force also depends in part on negotiations with the Afghans on legal immunities
for U.S. troops in a potential Bilateral Security Agreement to be completed by the end of 2013.
Reintegration and Reconciliation: to support Afghan efforts to reach a settlement with insurgent leaders.
Pakistan/Regional: to enlist Pakistan’s cooperation against militant groups, such as the Haqqani network, that have a
measure of safe haven in Pakistan. And integrate Afghanistan into regional diplomatic and economic structures.
Partner Participation: to encourage partner forces to remain in Afghanistan until the completion of the transition and to
participate in post-2014 security support efforts.
Economic Development: To build an economy that can be self-sufficient by 2024.

Progress of the Transition and Drawdown
Despite doubts about the durability of progress to date, the results of the surge were considered
sufficient to permit the transition to Afghan security leadership to begin, as planned, in July 2011.
The transition is being conducted in five “tranches”—the first was announced by Karzai in March
2011, the second in November 2011, and the third in May 2012. By the end of 2013, the
completion of transition in the third tranche would put 75% of the population under the security
lead of Afghan forces, up from 50% covered in the first and second tranches. In each area of
transition, the process of completing the transition to Afghan responsibility takes 12-18 months.

(...continued)
Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. December 1, 2009.
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Tranches of Territory in Transition:
• Tranche 1 (began transition in July 2011): Three provinces: Kabul (except Sarobi
district, which is still restive), Panjshir, and Bamiyan. In Kabul, Afghan forces
have already been in the lead for at least one year. Four cities: Herat, Mazar-e-
Sharif, Lashkar Gah, and Mehtarlam. The former two cities are widely
considered stable. The latter two are in restive areas, Helmand and Laghman
provinces, respectively, and the announcement of transition in these cities
surprised many observers.
• Tranche 2 (began transition in December 2011): Complete provinces: Balkh, Dai
Kundi, Takhar, Samangan, Nimruz, and those areas of Kabul province not
transitioned already (Sarobi district). Large cities: Jalalabad (capital of
Nangarhar), Gachcharan (capital of Ghowr), Shebergan (capital of Jowzjan),
Faizabad (capital of Badakshan), Midan Shahr (capital of Wardak), and Qali Now
(capital of Badghis). Districts of several other provinces in this and the preceding
transition phase, including Nawa, Nad Ali, and Marjah of restive Helmand
province; six districts of Badakhshan; Abkamari district of Badghis; all districts
of Herat except for Shindand; three districts of Laghman; three districts of
Nangarhar (outside Jalalabad city); all districts of Parwan except Shiwari and
Siahgherd; all districts of Sar-i-Pol except Sayyad and the part of Behsud city
that is in that province; and Jalrez and the center of Behsud city in Wardak
province.
• Tranche 3 (began transition in June 2012): Territory that includes 122 districts,
bringing the total districts undergoing transition to 260 (out of 364) in all 34
provinces. All provincial capitals will be under Afghan security lead after this
tranche is completed, and this tranche includes some of the most restive areas of
Afghanistan—providing an opportunity to test the capabilities of the Afghan
government.
• Tranche 4. Locations to be announced later in February 2013, and, when
completed, would put nearly 90% of the population under Afghan security lead.
• Tranche 5. To be announced in conjunction with U.S. transition to supporting
role in spring 2013, according to statements by President Obama following
meeting with President Karzai on January 11, 2013.
Unwinding of the Surge Announced June 22, 2011
As preparations got under way to begin the transition in 2011, then top commander in
Afghanistan General Petraeus recommended a gradual drawdown in which the overwhelming
majority of the surge forces would be in combat through the end of 2012. He also wanted to
redeploy some troops to RC-E, where there had not been as intensive an effort since 2010 as in
RC-S or RC-SW. In considering these recommendations, President Obama took into account the
assessment that the killing of Osama Bin Laden represented a key accomplishment of the core
U.S. mission, and financial needs to reduce the size of the U.S. budget deficit. President Obama
announced on June 22, 2011, that:
• 10,000 U.S. forces would be withdrawn by the end of 2011. That drawdown was
accomplished, then bringing U.S. force levels to 90,000.
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• 23,000 forces (the remainder of the surge forces) would be withdrawn by
September 2012. This draw-down, completed as of September 20, 2012, brought
U.S. force levels to 66,000.
Surge Implementation and Results/Current Security Assessments
The pace and scope of the transition to Afghan security leadership was to be determined by
assessments of how well U.S. policy—primarily in the form of the surge—has worked. Prior to
the surge, the Karzai government was estimated to control about 30% of the country, while
insurgents controlled 4% (13 out of 364 districts). Insurgents “influenced” or “operated in”
another 30% (Afghan Interior Ministry estimates in August 2009). Tribes and local groups with
varying degrees of loyalty to the central government controlled the remainder. Some outside
groups report higher percentages of insurgent control or influence.33 The Taliban had named
“shadow governors” in 33 out of 34 of Afghanistan’s provinces, although many provinces in
northern Afghanistan were assessed as having minimal Taliban presence.
As of early 2013, assessments of the results of the surge are mixed. The December 2012 DOD
report on Afghan stability and security report, covering April 1, 2012 – September 30, 2012, says
that ISAF and the Afghan forces “blunted the insurgent summer offensive, continued to transition
the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) into security lead, pushed violence out of the most
populated areas, and coalition member nations signed several international agreements to support
the long-term stability and security of Afghanistan.” Secretary of Defense Panetta said on
November 20, 2012, in a speech to the Center for a New American Security, that “The insurgency
has been pushed out of population centers and strategic areas. Security dramatically improved this
year in most of Afghanistan’s largest municipalities, with attacks dropping 22 percent in Kabul
and 62 percent in Qandahar.” Only three U.S. soldiers were killed in Afghanistan in 2013, a four-
year low, and the 30 killed during November 2012 through January 2013 was the lowest of any
three-month period since late 2008.
Providing specific accomplishments, U.S. commanders and other observers note that Qandahar
city had become considerably more secure. Afghan and U.S. officials point to revolts against
Taliban infiltration of Ghazni and Wardak provinces since the summer of 2012 as a sign that the
Taliban will not be able to recapture lost ground after 2014. ISAF commanders say that about
80% of Afghanistan is free of substantial violence.
Less optimistic assessments of the surge—and of the future of Afghanistan after the 2014
transition—are based on observations that the insurgents continue to be able to penetrate into
normally quiet provinces and cities, and to conduct high profile attacks in many places. Among
specific incidents, on June 28, 2011, insurgents stormed the historic Intercontinental Hotel in
Kabul, prompting a several hour gun battle with Afghan authorities backed by NATO-led forces.
The September 13, 2011, rocket and gunfire attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and ISAF
headquarters demonstrated insurgents could strike at the heart of coalition power. On April 15,
2012, about 35 insurgents attacked several locations in downtown Kabul, as well as conducted
attacks in a few other provinces. On June 21, 2012, insurgents killed 20 Afghan civilians in an
attack on a hotel at a lake just north of Kabul city. A major blow to the impression of success
came on September 14, 2012, when fifteen militants penetrated the perimeter of the British Camp
Bastion airbase in Helmand and destroyed eight Marine Harrier jets on the tarmac before being

33 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/world/asia/12afghan.html?_r=1.
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killed. On October 26, 2012, an insurgent bomb killed more than 40 worshippers at a mosque in
Faryab Province, which has not previously been a center of insurgent activity. On November 23,
2012, a suicide truck bomb leveled several government buildings in the capital of Wardak
Province.
As expressed in Gen. Dunford’s November 15, 2012, testimony as well as Defense Secretary
Panetta’s speech on November 20, 2012, and comments by Gen. Allen in early 2013 as he
prepares to depart his post,34 there are concerns that Afghan governance is lagging to the point
where the Afghans may not be able to hold U.S./NATO gains on their own. Gains are also
threatened by the continuing safe haven that insurgents enjoy in Pakistan, a point emphasized in
successive DOD reports on Afghan stability.
U.S. to Move to Support Role in Spring 2013
In spite of doubts about the success of the surge and the ability of Afghan forces to secure
Afghanistan, in December 2011, top commander in Afghanistan General Allen, revealed a
mission change: some U.S. mentoring and advisory forces would be sent to Afghanistan in 2012
in an effort to transfer more combat burden to the Afghan forces, and thereby allow more U.S.
regular combat forces to withdraw than was previously forecast. On March 15, 2012, President
Obama affirmed this shift in emphasis, and the mid-2013 time frame for it. In joint statements
issued following a meeting between President Karzai and President Obama on January 11, 2013,
it was announced that Afghan forces will assume the lead security role nationwide in spring 2013,
with international forces moving to a “advisor-support role.”35 According to the joint statement
issued after the Obama-Karzai meeting on January 11, 2013, the move to a support role means
that U.S. forces will pull back their patrols from Afghan villages.
Drawdowns in 2013-2014
No decision on further drawdowns of the 66,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan has been announced,
and press reports in early January 2013 indicate that General Allen has not, to date, made his
recommendations on the pace of 2012-2014 drawdowns. Reports purporting to reflect General
Allen’s thinking suggests he wants to keep as many as possible of the 66,000 U.S. troops in
Afghanistan until the end of the fighting season (late fall) of 2013. However, following his
meeting with President Karzai on January 11, 2013, President Obama reiterated that there would
be a “steady pace” of U.S. drawdowns until the end of the transition at the end of 2014,36 and that
the next phase of drawdown would be announced “in the coming months.”37
Still, there are already signs that U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan is winding down.
Some U.S. airpower in country has been drawn down, reducing the capability to conduct strike
missions against insurgent positions.38 U.S.-run bases are being closed down and/or turned over
to Afghan forces, and the provincial reconstruction teams, discussed below, are being turned over
to Afghan forces and governing institutions.

34 Kevin Seiff. “Departing General Is Anxious Over the Future in Afghanistan.” January 30, 2013.
35 Joint Statement by President Obama and President Karzai. January 11, 2013.
36 http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/01/politics/obama-afghanistan-speech/index.html
37 Joint Press Conference by President Obama and President Karzai. January 11, 2013.
38 C.J. Chivers. “Afghan Conflict Losing Air Power as U.S. Pulls Out.” New York Times, July 7, 2012.
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Legislatively Mandated Accelerated Drawdown?
In Congress, some have expressed support for efforts or plans to wind down the U.S. involvement
in Afghanistan far more rapidly than those outlined by the Administration. That effort appears to
have gained momentum in the aftermath of the death of Osama Bin Laden on May 1, 2011. In the
111th Congress, H.Con.Res. 248, a resolution introduced by Representative Kucinich to require
removal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan not later than December 31, 2010, was defeated in the
House by a vote of 65 to 356 on March 10, 2010. Other legislation, requiring the Administration
to develop (by January 1, 2011) plans to wind down the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan
failed 18-80, May 27, 2010) in a Senate vote during consideration of a FY2010 supplemental
appropriation (H.R. 4899). On July 1, 2010, the House voted 162-260 to reject a plan in that bill
to require the Administration to submit, by April 4, 2011, a plan and timetable to redeploy from
Afghanistan. Earlier, in House consideration of a FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act
(H.R. 2647), a similar provision failed on June 25, 2009, by a vote of 138-278.
In the 112th Congress, on May 26, 2011, an amendment to the defense authorization bill (H.R.
1540) that would have required a plan to accelerate the transition to Afghan-lead security failed
narrowly by a vote of 204-215: it contained the main elements of the “Afghanistan Exit and
Accountability Act” (H.R. 1735). A day earlier (May 25, 2011), an amendment to that same bill
that would require U.S. troops to withdraw most of its forces failed 123-294. Among other bills,
H.R. 651 requires an agreement with Afghanistan under which U.S. forces redeploy from
Afghanistan within one year of entry into that agreement, and H.Con.Res. 28, H.R. 780, and
H.Con.Res. 248 require a withdrawal. The latter bill failed by a vote of 356 to 65 on March 10,
2011. On November 28, 2012, the Senate passed (62-33) an amendment to S. 3254, the FY2013
defense authorization bill, expressing the Sense of Congress that the United States draw down
troops at a steady pace through the end of 2014. The main elements of the provision, with some
modifications to avoid limiting the President’s prerogatives to alter strategy as needed, was
incorporated into the final version of the bill (Section 1226 of H.R. 4310) that was passed by both
chambers and signed by President Obama.
Beyond 2014: Likely Outcomes, Size of Residual Force, Strategic
Partnership Agreement, and Bilateral Security Agreement

President Obama and other senior U.S. officials have consistently sought to reassure the Afghan
government and public by saying that the end of 2014 will not produce a complete U.S. pullout.
The concluding statement from the May 2012 NATO summit in Chicago made that clear as well,
not only for the United States but also for partner contingents as well.39 Still, there are fears that
the Taliban and other insurgents will achieve success against Afghan forces once the international
force is reduced substantially by late 2014. Some Afghan factions warn of civil war after 2014—
and are preparing for that by rearming and recruiting militiamen—and some elites are said to be
moving their businesses and funds out of Afghanistan out of fear of chaos and war after
international forces end the ISAF mission.

39 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-B42E2249-9DB272D0/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm.
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Likely Size and Structure of Post-2014 Force
According to press reports, in November 2012 Gen. Allen presented to the White House three
options: 6,000, 10,000 or 20,000 forces—with decreasing levels of risk to U.S. gains associated
as the number of troops increase with each option. The option providing for the fewest forces
envisions mainly Special Operations forces remaining to help combat high-value targets. The
mid-range option provides for continued training of Afghan security forces. The largest option
would provide for some continued U.S. patrols in highly contested areas.40 Subsequent press
reports indicate that the White House prefers to keep as few troops in Afghanistan as possible,
and the DOD recommendations were reduced to options of 3,000, 6,000, or 9,000 U.S. forces.
The various options seem to have commonality at about 9,000 – 10,000 remaining forces, with a
widespread view that leaving a force as low as 3,000 would entail serious risks to Afghan stability
after 2014.
Any post-2014 presence will be predicated on agreement with the Afghan government on the
legal status of U.S. forces. This is to be spelled out in a Bilateral Security Agreement—an
agreement that will include a Status of Forces Agreement as well as an agreement on the mission
of U.S. troops to remain after 2014. On October 3, 2012, Secretary Clinton named deputy SRAP
James Warlick as lead U.S. negotiator for the Bilateral Security Agreement, and the negotiations
formally began on November 15, 2012, and President Obama said during the visit to the United
States of President Karzai in January 2013 that the two sides hope to complete this agreement by
the end of 2013. Administration officials made clear that legal immunities of post-2014 U.S.
forces is a requirement for DOD to operate in Afghanistan after 2014. President Karzai appeared
to back that view, saying in his joint press conference with President Obama on January 11, 2013,
that he would ask Afghans, possibly at a loya jirga, to endorse immunity if the United States met
Afghan requirements to transfer to Afghan control detainees held in Afghanistan.
U.S. forces currently operate in Afghanistan under “diplomatic notes” between the United States
and the interim government of Afghanistan—primarily one that was exchanged in November
2002. The notes give the United States legal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel serving in
Afghanistan. A draft SOFA reportedly has been under discussion between the United States and
Afghanistan since 2007.
No matter the force level, after 2014, the ISAF mission will end and the U.S. and allied force
presence will operate under bilateral strategic partnership agreements, such as the one signed
between the United States and Afghanistan on May 1, 2012. As noted below, several other
countries have signed separate partnership agreements with Afghanistan and will keep
unspecified numbers of trainers and advisors in Afghanistan after 2014.
Debate Over Mission Success At Possible Post-2014 Troop Levels
There is a major debate over the options for the post-2014 force levels discussed above. Some
believe that even a figure as low as 6,000 U.S. forces, supplemented by a similar amount of
partner forces, would be sufficient to prevent a collapse of Afghan forces or the Afghan
government, even if the Taliban remains as active as it is today. These experts believe that the
post-2014 international presence—coupled with local Afghan efforts to resist Taliban strength—

40 Elisabeth Bumiller and Eric Schmitt. “Afghan War Commander Gives Options For After ’14.” New York Times,
January 3, 2012.
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will convince Taliban factions that their return to power is unlikely and facilitate a political
settlement.
Others believe the options presented, even the upper ranges provided by DOD, would likely lead
to Taliban gains in the south and east and potentially an unraveling of the Afghan security forces
and government.41 These assessments are fed in part by doubts that Afghan forces, based on their
current and projected performance, can secure the country, and that Al Qaeda would regain a safe
haven again in Afghanistan if there are insufficient numbers of U.S. forces there.42
Whatever the level of post-2014 international forces, it is likely that, as international forces thin
out sharply after 2014, local militias will re-form to try to prevent the Taliban from re-infiltrating
areas they were expelled from. This was illustrated in a November 2012 meeting organized by
Herat leader Ismail Khan, in which he reportedly began taking steps to reorganize his Soviet and
Taliban-era militia. Vice President Muhammad Fahim has also discussed potentially
reconstituting the Northern Alliance force in anticipation of the need to assist Afghan government
forces against the Taliban. These and similar moves could spark ethnic and communal conflict
from an all-out struggle for power and a reversion to Afghan rule by faction leaders rather than
elected leaders.
Strategic Partnership Agreement
The Bilateral Security Agreement that will govern the presence of U.S. troops that remain after
2014 is being negotiated pursuant to the broader “Strategic Partnership Agreement” (SPA)
formally signed by President Obama and President Karzai in Afghanistan on May 1, 2012. That
broad agreement signalled that the United States is committed to Afghan stability and
development for many years after the transition is complete. The SPA was completed after more
than one year of negotiations that focused on two disagreements in particular—Afghan insistence
on control over detention centers and a halt to or control over nighttime raids on insurgents by
U.S. forces. The detainee issue was mostly resolved on March 10, 2012, with a U.S. agreement to
accelerate the transfer of imprisoned insurgents to Afghan control, to occur over six months. In
keeping with that agreement, the prison at Bagram Airfield was turned over to Afghan control in
early September 2012, although 50 non-Afghans remain in U.S. custody there. In November
2012, Karzai called on the United States to turn these detainees over to Afghan control, and
Karzai’s support for legal immunity for U.S. troops that remain after 2014 is apparently
contingent on resolution of this issue. The night raid issue was resolved in April 2012 when the
United States agreed to give Afghans more control over night raids, including requiring an
Afghan court warrant to hold any raid captives for more than 48 hours.
The strategic partnership agreement represents a broad outline of the post-2014 relationship, with
details to be filled in subsequently. It has a duration of 10 years. The major provisions include the
following:43
• A commitment to continue to foster U.S.-Afghan “close cooperation” to secure
Afghanistan. This strongly implies, but does not state outright, that U.S. troops
will remain in Afghanistan after 2014. No troop numbers are mentioned in the

41 Kimberly Kagan and Frederick Kagan. “What We’ll Need in Afghanistan.” Washington Post, November 25, 2012.
42 Ibid.
43 The text is at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf
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document. The document provides for negotiations on the Bilateral Security
Agreement, discussed above.
• The United States will seek funds (appropriations) to provide training and arms
to the Afghan security forces. The agreement does not stipulate which systems
are to be provided. The Afghans are said to have overly ambitious plans to buy
major U.S. combat systems, such as F-16s, that the Afghans cannot likely sustain
without significant long-term assistance.
• The United States will designate Afghanistan as a “Major Non-NATO Ally,” a
designation reserved for close U.S. allies and which would expedite the arms sale
process for Afghanistan.
• There will be no “permanent” U.S. bases or the use of Afghan facilities for use
against neighboring countries, but the agreement would apparently allow long-
term U.S. use of Afghan facilities.
• The Administration will request economic aid for Afghanistan for the duration of
the agreement (2014-2024). No amounts were specified in the document. The
Afghan government reportedly wanted a $2 billion per year commitment written
into the agreement but the United States told Afghanistan that amounts can only
be determined through the appropriations process.
In October 2011, even when negotiations were stalled, Karzai called a loya jirga to endorse the
concept of the pact as well as his insistence on Afghan control over detentions and approval
authority for U.S.-led night raids. A November 16-19, 2011, traditional loya jirga (the jirga was
conducted not in accordance with the constitution and its views are therefore non-binding),
consisting of about 2,030 delegates, gave Karzai the approvals he sought, both for the pact itself
and his suggested conditions. The final agreement was submitted to the Afghan National
Assembly for formal ratification, and it was ratified on May 26, 2012, by a vote of 180-4.
The SPA replaced an earlier, more limited strategic partnership agreement established on May 23,
2005, when Karzai and President Bush issued a “joint declaration.”44 The declaration provided for
U.S. forces to have access to Afghan military facilities, in order to prosecute “the war against
international terror and the struggle against violent extremism.” The joint statement did not give
Karzai enhanced control over facilities used by U.S. forces, over U.S. operations, or over
prisoners taken during operations. Karzai’s signing of the declaration had been blessed by 1,000
Afghan representatives on May 8, 2005, at a consultative jirga in Kabul. That jirga supported an
indefinite presence of international forces to maintain security but urged Karzai to delay a firm
decision to request such a presence. Karzai stated on March 22, 2011, that he would likely call
another loya jirga to evaluate the renewed and expanded partnership, if it is agreed with the
United States. A FY2009 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 111-32) and the FY2010, FY2011, and
FY2012 National Defense Authorization Acts (P.L. 111-84, P.L. 111-383, and H.R. 1540,
respectively) prohibit the U.S. establishment of permanent bases in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan Declared “Major Non-NATO Ally As Pledged
On July 7, 2012, Secretary Clinton stopped in Afghanistan on her way to an Afghanistan donors’
conference in Tokyo and announced that Afghanistan had been named a “Major Non-NATO Ally”

44 See http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/afghanistan/WH/20050523-2.pdf.
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of the United States, as provided in the Strategic Partnership Agreement. The designation opens
Afghanistan to receive (sale, donation) U.S. weaponry of the same level of sophistication as that
sold to U.S. NATO allies, and facilitates provision of training and funds to leasing defense
articles.
Afghan Attitudes Toward a Long-Term U.S. Presence in Afghanistan
The attitudes of the Afghan public might be a factor for those international forces that remain in
Afghanistan after 2014, and there are signs that the public welcome of foreign forces might be
eroding. On April 1, 2011, crowds of Afghans in the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif
demonstrated against the March 2011 burning of a Quran by a Florida pastor. The demonstration
turned violent, with protesters storming the U.N. compound in the city and killing 12, including 7
U.N. staff. Demonstrations in other Afghan cities followed. A wave of demonstrations and attacks
followed reports that U.S. soldiers had mistakenly burned several Qurans on February 20, 2012,
after removing them from Bagram Airfield detention center on suspicion that books were being
used by insurgents to plot while in detention. The reaction was less pronounced to the alleged
killing of 16 Afghans by a U.S. soldier, Sergeant Robert Bates, who has been arrested and flown
back to the United States for trial, which is now under way. On September 17, 2012, several
hundred Afghans demonstrated near a U.S.-Afghan training facility east of Kabul city (Camp
Phoenix) to protest a video made in the United States “The Innocence of Muslims.” About 40
Afghan police reportedly were wounded preventing the crowd from reaching the facility. The
demonstrations and attacks raise questions as to whether the Afghan public has begun to see
international forces as occupiers, and appeared to illustrate that a long-term presence of large
numbers of international forces might be opposed broadly within Afghanistan.
Transition Pillar: Building Afghan Forces
and Establishing Rule of Law

Key to the transition to Afghan lead is the effectiveness of the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF), consisting primarily of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police
(ANP). The ANSF have expanded considerably since 2002, and Obama Administration strategy
has thus far emphasized improving it through partnering and more intense mentoring and training.
There are still widespread doubts about their ability to take the lead on the increased
responsibility. About 35% of the force does not re-enlist each year, meaning that about one-third
of the force must be recruited to replenish its ranks. Many believe that the force was expanded to
quickly since 2009 to allow for thorough vetting or for recruitment of the most qualified
personnel. As noted above, incidents of ANSF attacks on coalition personnel have increased since
early 2011 and created increased tensions between the Afghans and their mentors. This
complicates the transition in cases in which there is less interaction between Afghan forces and
their U.S.-led mentors. Many units also suffer from a deficiency of weaponry, spare parts, and
fuel, and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported in late
October 2012 that the Afghan government will likely prove incapable of sustaining ANSF
installations after 2014, mainly because of a lack of skilled maintenance personnel.
Some of the deficiency throughout the ANSF is due to illiteracy, which prompted NTM-A to
increasingly focus on providing literacy training. To date, about 220,000 ANSF personnel have
received literacy training. Over 70% of the ANSF now have at least first grade literacy, up from
only 14% in 2009.
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Current and Post-2014 Size of the Force
On January 21, 2010, the joint U.N.-Afghan “Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board” (JCMB)
agreed that, by October 2011, the ANA would expand to 171,600 and the ANP to about 134,000,
(total ANSF of 305,600). Both forces reached that level in September 2011. In August 2011, a
larger target size of 352,000 (195,000 ANA and 157,000 ANP) was set, to be reached by
November 2012. The gross size of the force reached approximately that level by the end of
September 2012, although some of the later recruits have not been trained and will not be
assigned to units until early 2013. The target level is slightly smaller than a General Petraeus
recommendation of 378,000, which was not adopted because of the concerns about the Afghan
ability to sustain so large a force. About 1,700 women serve in the ANSF, of which about 1,370
are police.
As planning for the post-2014 period proceded in the run-up to the May 20-21, 2012, NATO
summit in Chicago, which focused on long-term financial and military sustainment of the ANSF,
there was agreement to reduce the total ANSF to 228,500 by 2017, although this level will be
subject to constant review. This lower figure was adopted to reduce the cost of sustaining it to
$4.1 billion per year. Sustaining the 352,000 force would cost an estimated $6 billion per year, a
figure that some donors balked at as too expensive.
ANSF Funding
The subject of sustaining the ANSF after 2014 was a major issue at the May 20-21, 2012, NATO
summit in Chicago because the Afghan security sector is funded almost entirely through
international donations. Planning for a $4.1 billion ANSF budget during 2017-2024, the United
States said it expects to contribute about $2.3 billion yearly, and $500 million per year would be
provided by the Afghan government, with that figure to rise steadily until 2024, at which time
Afghanistan is expected to fund its own security needs, according to Chicago summit statements.
The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction issued an audit in October 2012
saying the Afghan government will have major difficulty meeting its obligations to fund the force
as donor countries wind down their involvement. 45 As noted elsewhere, the Afghan government
will take in less than $2 billion in total revenue in 2011.
In advance of the Chicago summit, the United States sought allied contributions to fund the
remaining $1.3 billion in yearly post-2014 ANSF costs. At the summit, various countries
reportedly pledged about $1 billion per year, close to the total sought. The specific known yearly
pledges included Germany ($190 million per year), Britain ($110 million per year), and Australia
($100 million per year). Other countries that are confirmed to have made pledges, but of
unspecified amounts, include Denmark, Italy, Estonia, and the Netherlands.
In 2011, NTM-A had a budget of $10 billion, almost all of which is U.S. funded, including $3
billion for infrastructure; $3 billion for equipment; $1 billion for training; and $3 billion for
“sustainment” (food and salaries for the Afghan forces, and related costs). The United States
spent about $11.2 billion on the ANSF in FY2012, but a reduction to $5.75 billion was requested
for FY2013. Recent appropriations for the ANA and ANP are contained in the tables at the end of
this report, which also contain breakdowns for Commanders Emergency Response Program
funds, or CERP, which is used for projects that build goodwill and presumably reduce the threat

45 http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/2012-10-30audit-13-1.pdf
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to use forces. CERP has also been used for what could be considered development projects, a
point of contention among some observers. As of FY2005, the security forces funding has been
DOD funds, not State Department funds (Foreign Military Financing, FMF).
NATO Trust Fund for the ANA
In 2007 ISAF set up a trust fund for donor contributions to fund the transportation of equipment
donated to and the training of the ANA; the mandate was expanded in 2009 to include
sustainment costs. In November 2010 a further expansion was agreed on to support literacy
training for the ANA. As of September 30, 2012, donor contributions and pledges to the ANA
Trust Fund total about $570 million. U.S. funding for the ANA is provided separately, not through
this fund.
Law and Order Trust Fund for the ANP
There is also a separate “Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan” (LOTFA), run by the U.N.
Development Program (UNDP), which is used to pay the salaries of the ANP and other police-
related functions. From 2002-2012, donors contributed $2.3 billion to the Fund, of which the
United States contributed about $760 million, according to the Defense Department report on
Afghan stability released in December 2012 (p. 98). Japan’s 2009 pledge to pay the expenses of
the Afghan police for at least six months (about $125 million for each six month period) is
implemented through the LOTF. The EU has pledged about $175 million for the fund from
January 2011-March 2013.
In May 2012, there were reports of misfeasance at the fund. UNDP began to investigate the
allegations and immediately terminated the contracts of three personnel and placed two others on
administrative leave. As of late September 2012, the UNDP is continuing to investigate the issue.
Other Bilateral Donations
The DOD reports discuss other bilateral donations to the ANSF, both in funds and in arms and
equipment donations. There is a “NATO Equipment Donation Program,” through which donor
countries supply the ANSF with equipment. Since 2002, about $2.9 billion in assistance to the
ANSF has come from these sources. As an example, in October 2011, Croatia and Slovenia
donated a total of over 20,000 AK-47 assault rifles to the ANP. Australia contributed $40 million
to relocate the ANA’s 205th Corps, and South Korea contributed $30 million for medical and
communications equipment.
There is also a NATO-Russia Council Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund. Launched in March
2011, this fund provides maintenance and repair capacity to the Afghan Air Force helicopter fleet,
much of which is Russian-made.
Training Overview
U.S. forces, along with partner countries and contractors, train the ANSF and will likely continue
to do so after 2014. In February 2010, the U.S.-run “Combined Security Transition Command-
Afghanistan” (CSTC-A) that ran the training was subordinated to the broader NATO Training
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Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A). CSTC-A’s mission was reoriented to building the capacity of
the Afghan Defense and Interior Ministries, and to provide resources to the ANSF.
A core element of NATO’s training efforts are its mentoring teams—known as Operational
Mentoring Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams
(POMLTs). The OMLTs and POMLTs are responsible for training and mentoring deployed ANSF
units. OMLTs, which operate with the Afghan National Army (ANA), consist of 11-28 personnel
from one or several countries. POMLTs, which mentor the Afghan National Police (ANP), are
composed of 15-20 personnel each. Of the approximately 150 OMLTs, 77 are comprised of U.S.
trainers. U.S. trainers comprise 279 of the approximately 330 POMLTs. The total number of
required trainers (U.S. and partner) for the ANSF has been 4,750, but it is not how this structure
will change, if at all, after the 2014 transition. The main ANP training facility was turned over to
Afghan control on April 26, 2012.
Working with NTM-A is a separate France-led 300-person European Gendarmerie Force (EGF)
has been established to train Afghan forces in the provinces. The European Union is providing a
190-member “EUPOL” training effort, and 60 other experts to help train the ANP.
The Afghan National Army (ANA)
The Afghan National Army has been built “from scratch” since 2002—it is not a direct
continuation of the national army that existed from the 1880s until the Taliban era. That army
disintegrated entirely during the 1992-1996 mujahedin civil war and the 1996-2001 Taliban
period. However, some Afghan officers who served prior to the Taliban have joined the ANA.
U.S. and allied officers say that the ANA is becoming a major force in stabilizing the country and
a national symbol. The ANA now leads about 80% of all combat operations, and it leads
operations in 261 of Afghanistan’s 364 districts. However, according to the Defense Department
report of December 2012, only one of 23 ANA Kandaks (battalions) is assessed as able to operate
“Independent with Advisors” (p.93). The commando forces of the ANA, trained by U.S. Special
Operations Forces, and numbering about 5,300, are considered well-trained and are taking the
lead in some operations against high-value targets.
There is a problem of absenteeism within the ANA because soldiers do not serve in their
provinces of residences. Many in the ANA take long trips to their home towns to remit funds to
their families, and often then return to the ANA after a long absence. However, that problem has
eased somewhat in recent years because 98% of the ANA is now paid electronically, according to
U.S. officials. The FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) required that ANA recruits be
vetted for terrorism, human rights violations, and drug trafficking.
To assist its performance, the United States is attempting to better equip the ANA. Approximately
$2.7 billion worth of vehicles, weapons, equipment, and aircraft were provided during August
2011-March 2012. The United States is also helping the ANSF build up an indigenous weapons
production capability. However, in line with U.S. efforts to cut costs for the ANSF, the Defense
Department reportedly plans to shift in FY2013 from providing new equipment to maintaining
existing equipment, including Russian-supplied helicopters.
The United States has built five ANA bases: Herat (Corps 207), Gardez (Corps 203), Qandahar
(Corps 205), Mazar-e-Sharif (Corps 209), and Kabul (Division HQ, Corps 201, Air Corps).
Coalition officers conduct heavy weapons training for a heavy brigade as part of the “Kabul
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Corps,” based in Pol-e-Charki, east of Kabul. U.S. funds are being used to construct a new
Defense Ministry headquarters in Kabul at a cost of about $92 million.
ANA Ethnic and Factional Considerations
At the time the United States first began establishing the ANA, Northern Alliance figures who
were then in key security positions weighted recruitment for the national army toward its Tajik
ethnic base. Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment. The naming of a Pashtun, Abdul
Rahim Wardak, as Defense Minister in December 2004 reduced desertions among Pashtuns. (In
August 2012, he was ousted by the National Assembly on accusation of corruption and failing to
prevent shelling from Pakistan in August 2012. U.S. officials in Afghanistan say this problem was
further alleviated with better pay and more close involvement by U.S. forces, and that the force is
ethnically integrated in each unit and representative. According to the December 2012 Defense
Department report, the overall ANSF force is roughly in line with the broad demographics of the
country, although Tajiks might be slightly overrepresented in the officer ranks (p.58). However,
U.S. commanders say that those Pashtuns who are in the force are disproportionately eastern
Pashtuns (from the Ghilzai tribal confederations) rather than southern Pashtuns (mostly Durrani
tribal confederations).
Until 2010, the chief of staff was General Bismillah Khan, a Tajik who was a Northern Alliance
commander. He was replaced by a Pashtun, Lt. Gen. Sher Mohammad Karimi. Until his ouster by
the National Assembly in August 2012—on the same grounds as the ousting of Wardak—
Bismillah Khan was Interior Minister since June 2012. In that position, he reportedly promoted
his Tajik allies to key positions—a development closely watched and opposed by Pashtuns in
government. In early September 2012, Karzai named Bismillah Khan as Defense Minister; and
professional police commander Ghulam Mojtaba Patang as Interior Minister. He also named a
new intelligence director (National Directorate of Security, NDS)—Asadullah Khalid, former
Qandahar governor and a close Karzai ally, to replace Rehmat Nabil. All three were confirmed
overwhelmingly by the National Assembly, and the reshuffling preserves the relative ethnic
balance among the top security chiefs. Khalid was wounded in an assassination attempt in
December 2012, but he is expected to survive and continue his duties after treatment in the
United States.
Afghan Air Force
Equipment, maintenance, and logistical difficulties continue to plague the Afghan Air Force, and
it remains mostly a support force for ground operations rather than a combat-oriented force.
However, the Afghan Air Force has been able to make ANA units nearly self-sufficient in airlift.
The force is a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed prior to the Soviet invasion, and
is expanding gradually after its equipment was virtually eliminated in the 2001-2002 U.S. combat
against the Taliban regime. It has about over 5,725 personnel, including 400 pilots, of a target size
of about 8,000 by 2016. It has about 98 aircraft including gunship, attack, and transport
helicopters—of a planned fleet of 140 aircraft. The approximately 135 Afghan pilots are based at
Bagram air base. There are five female Afghan Air Force personnel; four arrived in the United
States in July 2011 for training as military helicopter pilots.
Afghanistan also is seeking the return of 26 aircraft, including some MiG-2s that were flown to
safety in Pakistan and Uzbekistan during the past conflicts in Afghanistan. U.S. plans do not
include supply of fixed-wing combat aircraft such as F-16s, which Afghanistan wants as part of a
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broader request for the United States to augment Afghan air capabilities, according to U.S.
military officials. There is a concern that Afghanistan will not soon have the capability to sustain
operations of an aircraft as sophisticated as the F-16. In 2010, Russia and Germany supplied MI-8
helicopters to the Afghan Air Force. The Brazilian firm Embraer was under a DOD contract ($355
million) to provide 20 Super Tucano turboprop aircraft to the Afghan Air Force, although the
work fell behind schedule and DOD may rebid all or part of the contract.
Afghan National Police (ANP)
U.S. and Afghan officials believe that building up a credible and capable national police force is
at least as important to combating the insurgency as building the ANA. The DOD reports on
Afghanistan contain substantial detail on U.S.-led efforts to continue what it says are “significant
strides [that] have been made in professionalizing the ANP.” However, outside assessments of the
ANP are widely disparaging, asserting that there is rampant corruption to the point where citizens
mistrust and fear the ANP. Among other criticisms are a desertion rate far higher than that of the
ANA; substantial illiteracy; involvement in local factional or ethnic disputes because the ANP
works in the communities its personnel come from; and widespread use of drugs. It is this view
that has led to consideration of stepped up efforts to promote local security solutions such as
those discussed above.
The United States and Afghanistan have worked to correct longstanding deficiencies. Other U.S.
commanders credit a November 2009 raise in police salaries (nearly doubled to about $240 per
month for service in high combat areas)—and the streamlining and improvement of the payments
system for the ANP—with reducing the solicitation of bribes by the ANP. The raise also
stimulated an eightfold increase in the number of Afghans seeking to be recruited. Others note the
success, thus far, of efforts to pay police directly (and avoid skimming by commanders) through
cell phone-based banking relationships (E-Paisa, run by Roshan cell network). The ANP is
increasingly being provided with heavy weapons and now have about 5,000 armored vehicles
countrywide. Still, most police units lack adequate ammunition and vehicles. In some cases,
equipment requisitioned by their commanders is being sold and the funds pocketed by the police
officers. These activities contributed to the failure of a 2006 “auxiliary police” effort that
attempted to rapidly field large numbers of new ANP officers. About 1,300 ANP are women,
demonstrating some commitment to gender integration of the force. In addition, Gen. Patang,
who became Interior Minister in September 2012, has high respect and loyalty because he is the
first professional officer to be appointed to the top police leadership slot.
The U.S. police training effort was first led by State Department/INL, but DOD took over the lead
in police training in April 2005. Some U.S. officials believe that the United States and its partners
still have not centered on a clearly effective police training strategy. A number of programs, such
as the auxiliary police program attempted during 2005 was discarded as ineffective, and replaced
during 2007-2011 with a program called “focused district development.” In that program, a
district police force was taken out and retrained, its duties temporarily performed by more highly
trained police (Afghan National Civil Order Police, or ANCOP, which number about 9,400
nationwide), and then reinserted after the training is complete. However, the ANCOP officers are
currently being used mostly to staff new checkpoints that are better securing the most restive
districts. Police training includes instruction in human rights principles and democratic policing
concepts, and the State Department human rights report on Afghanistan, referenced above, says
the government and observers are increasingly monitoring the police force to prevent abuses.
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Supplements to the National Police: Afghan Local Police (ALP) and
Other Local Forces

The failure of several police training efforts led to efforts, beginning in 2008, to develop local
forces to protect their communities. Until then, U.S. military commanders opposed assisting local
militias anywhere in Afghanistan for fear of re-creating militias that commit abuses and
administer arbitrary justice. However, the urgent security needs in Afghanistan caused General
Petraeus and his successors to expand local security experiments, based on successful experiences
in Iraq and after designing mechanisms to place them firmly under Afghan government (mainly
Ministry of Interior) control. Among these initiatives are:
Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police (ALP). The Village Stability
Operations concept began in February 2010 in Arghandab district of Qandahar
Province. U.S. Special Operations Forces organized about 25 villagers into an
armed neighborhood watch group, and the program was credited by U.S.
commanders as bringing normal life back to the district. The pilot program was
expanded and formalized into a joint Afghan-U.S. Special Operations effort in
which 12 person teams from these forces live in communities to help improve
governance, security, and development.
• An outgrowth of the Village Stability Operations is the Afghan Local Police
(ALP) program in which the U.S. Special Operations Forces conducting the
Village Stability Operations set up and train local security organs of about 300
members each. These local units are under the control of district police chiefs and
each fighter is vetted by a local shura as well as Afghan intelligence. There are
about 17,000 ALP operating in over 60 different districts, including out of three
ALP centers in Helmand province. A total of 137 districts have been approved for
the program, which is expected to bring the target size of the program to about
30,000 by the end of 2015. However, the ALP program, and associated and
preceding such programs discussed below, were heavily criticized in a September
12, 2011, Human Rights Watch report citing wide-scale human rights abuses
(killings, rapes, arbitrary detentions, and land grabs) committed by the recruits.
The report triggered a U.S. military investigation which substantiated many of
the report’s findings, although not the most serious of the allegations.46 In May
2012, Karzai ordered one ALP unit in Konduz disbanded because of its alleged
involvement in a rape there. And, ALP personnel reportedly were responsible for
some of the insider attacks in 2012.
• The ALP initiative was also an adaptation of another program, begun in 2008,
termed the “Afghan Provincial Protection Program” (APPP, commonly called
“AP3”), funded with DOD (CERP) funds. The APPP got under way in Wardak
Province (Jalrez district) in early 2009 and 100 local security personnel
“graduated” in May 2009. It was subsequently expanded to 1,200 personnel. U.S.
commanders said no U.S. weapons were supplied to the militias, but the Afghan
government provided weapons (Kalashnikov rifles) to the recruits, possibly using
U.S. funds. Participants in the program are given $200 per month. General
Petraeus showcased Wardak in August 2010 as an example of the success of the

46 Ernesto Londono. “U.S. Cites Local Afghan Police Abuses.” Washington Post, December 16, 2011. The Human
Rights Watch report is entitled “Just Don’t Call It a Militia.” http://www.hrw.org, September 12, 2011.
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APPP and similar efforts. The National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84)
called for a report on the program within 120 days of the October 28, 2009,
enactment.
Afghan Public Protection Force. This force is growing, under the supervision of
the Ministry of Interior, to guard development sites and organizations. The force
was developed to implement Karzai’s August 17, 2010, decree (No. 62) that
private security contractor forces be disbanded and their functions performed by
official Afghan government forces by March 20, 2012. That deadline was
extended to March 2013 because of the slow pace of standing up the new
protection force, and some development organizations continue to use locally
hired guard forces. At about 11,000 personnel as of October 2012, it has begun
operations to secure supply convoys. It is intended to grow to 30,000 personnel
by March 2013, the revised deadline for it to assume full responsibilities. Until it
reaches full capability, embassies and other diplomatic entities can still use
private security firms. The Interior Minister, Gen. Patang, was in charge of
building this force prior to his September 2012 ministerial appointment.
The local security experiments to date resemble but technically are not arbokai, which are private
tribal militias. Some believe that the arbokai concept should be revived as a means of securing
Afghanistan, as the arbokai did during the reign of Zahir Shah and in prior pre-Communist eras.
Reports persist that some tribal groupings have formed arbokai without specific authorization.
The local security programs discussed above appear to reverse the 2002-2007 efforts to disarm
local sources of armed force. And, as noted in the April 2012 DOD report on Afghan stability,
there have sometimes been clashes and disputes between ALP and ANSF units, particularly in
cases where the units are of different ethnicities. These are the types of problems that prompted
the earlier efforts to disarm rather than establish local militia forces, as discussed below.
DDR. The main program, run by UNAMA, was called the “DDR” program—Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration—and it formally concluded on June 30, 2006. The program
got off to a slow start because the Afghan Defense Ministry did not reduce the percentage of
Tajiks in senior positions by a July 1, 2003, target date, dampening Pashtun recruitment. In
September 2003, Karzai replaced 22 senior Tajiks in the Defense Ministry officials with Pashtuns,
Uzbeks, and Hazaras, enabling DDR to proceed. The major donor for the program was Japan,
which contributed about $140 million. Figures for collected weapons are in and U.S. spending on
the programs are in the U.S. aid tables later in the report.
The DDR program was initially expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters, although that figure was
later reduced. (Figures for accomplishment of the DDR and DIAG programs are contained in
Table 5.) Of those demobilized, 55,800 former fighters have exercised reintegration options
provided by the program: starting small businesses, farming, and other options. U.N. officials say
at least 25% of these found long-term, sustainable jobs. Some studies criticized the DDR program
for failing to prevent a certain amount of rearmament of militiamen or stockpiling of weapons
and for the rehiring of some militiamen.47 Part of the DDR program was the collection and
cantonment of militia weapons, but generally only poor-quality weapons were collected. As one
example, Fahim, still the main military leader of the Northern Alliance faction, continues to turn

47 For an analysis of the DDR program, see Christian Dennys. Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament?, June
6, 2005, http://www.jca.apc.org/~jann/Documents/Disarmament%20demobilization%20rearmament.pdf.
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heavy weapons over to U.N. and Afghan forces (including four Scud missiles), although the U.N.
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) says that large quantities of weapons remain in the
Panjshir Valley.
Despite the earlier demobilization, which affected many of the northern minorities, there are
indications that some faction leaders may be seeking to revive disbanded militias. The minorities
may fear increased Taliban influence as a result of the Karzai reconciliation efforts, and the
minorities want to be sure they could combat any Taliban abuses that might result if the Taliban
achieves a share of power.
DIAG. Since June 11, 2005, the disarmament effort has emphasized another program called
“DIAG”—Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups. It is run by the Afghan Disarmament and
Reintegration Commission, headed by Vice President Khalili. Under the DIAG, no payments are
available to fighters, and the program depends on persuasion rather than use of force against the
illegal groups. DIAG has not been as well funded as was DDR: it has received $11 million in
operating funds. As an incentive for compliance, Japan and other donors have made available
$35 million for development projects where illegal groups have disbanded. These incentives were
intended to accomplish the disarmament of a pool of as many as 150,000 members of 1,800
different “illegal armed groups”: militiamen that were not part of recognized local forces (Afghan
Military Forces, AMF) and were never on the rolls of the Defense Ministry. These goals were not
met by the December 2007 target date in part because armed groups in the south say they need to
remain armed against the Taliban, but UNAMA reports that 100 out of 140 districts planned for
DIAG are now considered “DIAG compliant.” (U.N. Secretary General Report, March 9, 2011).
Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector
Many experts believe that an effective justice sector is vital to Afghan governance. Some of the
criticisms and allegations of corruption at all levels of the Afghan bureaucracy have been
discussed throughout this report. U.S. justice sector programs generally focus on promoting rule
of law and building capacity of the judicial system, including police training and court
construction. The rule of law issue is covered in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics,
Elections, and Government Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman, and CRS Report R41484,
Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth
Katzman.
Policy Component: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
U.S. and partner officials have generally praised the effectiveness of “Provincial Reconstruction
Teams” (PRTs)—enclaves of U.S. or partner forces and civilian officials that provide safe havens
for international aid workers to help with reconstruction and to extend the writ of the Kabul
government—in accelerating reconstruction and assisting stabilization efforts. The PRTs, the
concept for which was announced in December 2002, perform activities ranging from resolving
local disputes to coordinating local reconstruction projects, although most U.S.-run PRTs and
most PRTs in combat-heavy areas focus on counter-insurgency. Many of the additional U.S.
civilian officials deployed to Afghanistan during 2009 and 2010 have been based at PRTs, which
have facilities, vehicles, and security. Some aid agencies say they have felt more secure since the
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PRT program began,48 but several relief groups did not want to associate with military forces
because doing so might taint their perceived neutrality.
Virtually all the PRTs, listed in Table 15, were placed under the ISAF mission. Each PRT
operated by the United States has U.S. forces; DOD civil affairs officers; representatives of
USAID, State Department, and other agencies; and Afghan government (Interior Ministry)
personnel. Most PRTs, including those run by partner forces, have personnel to train Afghan
security forces. USAID officers assigned to the PRTs administer PRT reconstruction projects.
USAID spending on PRT projects is in the table on USAID spending in Afghanistan at the end of
this report.
The Afghan government and some outside organizations have long argued that the PRTs have
hampered Afghan government efforts to acquire the skills and resources to secure and develop
Afghanistan on its own. USAID observers say there has been little Afghan input, either into
development project decision making or as contractors for facility and other construction. To
address some of this criticism, during 2008-2012 some donor countries enhanced the civilian
component of the PRTs and tried to change their image from military institutions. The State
Department sought to “civilianize” U.S.-run PRTs by assuming a larger role for State Dept. and
USAID development and governance experts at the PRTs. In 2006, the PRT in the Panjshir Valley
became the first U.S.-led PRT to be State Department led. As noted, in March 2009, the
Netherlands converted its PRT to civilian lead, although that alteration ceased after the
assumption of U.S. and Australian PRT command in July 2010.
Still, President Karzai criticized the PRTs as holding back Afghan capacity-building and called
for their abolition as “parallel governing structures.” The declaration of the May 20-21, 2012,
NATO summit in Chicago expresses agreement to phase out the PRTs. Karzai’s July 26, 2012,
administrative reforms called on the Afghan government to beginning planning to assume their
functions and, in July 2012, the first U.S.-PRT closed (Laghman Province). Several have closed
since and those remaining—along with local U.S.-led structures such as District Support Teams
(which help district officials provide government services)—are to close by the end of 2014.
Cooperation With Allies/Managing the 2014 Exit
Partner forces have been key to the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. Since 2006, the vast bulk of all
U.S. troops in Afghanistan have served under the umbrella of the NATO-led “International
Security Assistance Force” (ISAF). ISAF consists of all 28 NATO members states plus partner
countries—a total of 50 countries including the United States. However, as the transition to
Afghan security leadership began in July 2011, U.S. officials have been attempting, with some
success, to prevent a “rush to the exits” in which partner forces pull out before their areas of
responsibility are ready for transition. U.S. officials want partner drawdowns to occur at roughly
the same rate and proportion as the U.S. drawdown occurs—a rate that has been achieved.
Virtually all the European governments have long been under pressure from their publics and
parliaments to end or reduce their military involvement in Afghanistan. During 2010 and 2011,
the Netherlands and Canada, respectively, ended their combat missions. Canada continues to
furnish 950 trainers for the ANSF, and the Netherlands retained 500 trainers after its combat

48 Kraul, Chris. “U.S. Aid Effort Wins Over Skeptics in Afghanistan.” Los Angeles Times, April 11, 2003.
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mission ended. Partner forces that continue to bear the brunt of combat in Afghanistan include
Britain, Canada, Poland, France, Denmark, Romania, and Australia.
Still, some partner countries have announced withdrawals before the end of 2014.
• President Francois Hollande, inaugurated in May 2012, reiterated in the context
of the May 20-21 NATO summit in Chicago that he would fulfill his pledge to
pull French combat troops out by the end of 2012, a year earlier than the time
frame of former President Sarkozy. France turned over Kapisa Province to
Afghan control on July 4, 2012, and it formally ended its combat mission in
November 2012. About 1,500 French troops remain in 2013 to repatriate
equipment and continue training the ANSF.
• Britain announced in early 2012 that it would withdraw about 500 of its force by
the end of 2012, and the remainder of the contingent would remain until the end
of 2014. However, in September 2012, British officials and commanders asserted
that their mission in Helmand is winding down and they reportedly will remove
about 3,800 forces during 2013. Britain has signed a partnership agreement with
Afghanistan and it is likely to keep some trainers in Afghanistan after 2014.
• Italy and Germany have indicated a reduction in their involvement in
Afghanistan before the end of 2014. Germany said in October 2012 that it will
likely cap its troop contribution at 4,400 for 2013 and to 3,300 for 2014.
Germany will, on the other hand, augment its combat helicopter force to partially
compensate for the declining ground capabilities. Both Germany and Italy have
signed bilateral strategic agreements with Afghanistan to continue to train Afghan
forces after 2014, although Germany is said to want a U.N. mandate for any
international forces in Afghanistan after 2014. Italian Prime Minister Mario
Monti visited Afghanistan in early November 2012 and indicated Italy would
remain in Afghanistan after 2014, but without stating force levels or missions.
• Denmark said it will withdraw 120 troops by the end of 2012, but will increase
development aid and ANSF training contributions.
• Poland said in March 2012 that it would not withdraw forces before the end of
2014.
• Belgium is to remove 300 personnel from Kabul International Airport by the end
of 2012.
• Turkey is to redeploy 200-300 personnel from Kabul by the end of 2013.
• Australia plans to end its mission in Afghanistan before the 2014 completion of
the transition. In April 2012, it began to hand off its mission in Uruzgan Province
to Afghan forces.
• New Zealand said in May 2012 it will withdraw its troops in Bamiyan Province
in early 2013. Its PRT will close in April 2013.
• South Korea said in July 2012 that it might pull at least some of its 400 forces out
of Parwan Province in early 2013, with the remainder to stay until the end of
2014.
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• On the other hand, Georgia said in late November 2012 it had doubled its troops
in Afghanistan to about 1,570—a decision likely intended, at least in part, to
support its bid to join NATO.
Table 4. Background on NATO/ISAF Formation and U.N. Mandate
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created by the Bonn Agreement and U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001, a Chapter 7 resolution),49 initially limited to Kabul. In October 2003, after
Germany agreed to contribute 450 military personnel to expand ISAF into the city of Konduz, ISAF contributors
endorsed expanding its presence to several other cities, contingent on formal U.N. approval—which came on
October 14, 2003, in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1510. In August 2003, NATO took over command of ISAF—
previously the ISAF command rotated among donor forces including Turkey and Britain.
NATO/ISAF’s responsibilities broadened significantly in 2004 with NATO/ISAF’s assumption of security responsibility
for northern and western Afghanistan (Stage 1, Regional Command North, in 2004 and Stage 2, Regional Command
West, in 2005, respectively). The transition process continued on July 31, 2006, with the formal handover of the
security mission in southern Afghanistan to NATO/ISAF control. As part of this “Stage 3,” a British/Canadian/Dutch-
led “Regional Command South” (RC-S) was formed. Britain is the lead force in Helmand; Canada is lead in Qandahar,
and the Netherlands was lead in Uruzgan until its departure in July 2010; the three rotated the command of RC-S.
“Stage 4,” the assumption of NATO/ISAF command of peacekeeping in 14 provinces of eastern Afghanistan (and thus
all of Afghanistan), was completed on October 5, 2006. As part of the completion of the NATO/ISAF takeover, the
United States put about half the U.S. troops then operating in Afghanistan under NATO/ISAF in “Regional Command
East” (RC-E).
The ISAF mission was renewed (until October 13, 2012) by U.N. Security Council Resolution 2011 (October 12,
2011), which reiterated previous resolutions’ support for the Operation Enduring Freedom mission. Resolution 2069
of October 10, 2012, renewed the mandate for another full year. Some countries, such as Germany and Russia (not
an ISAF member) want a U.N. mandate to authorize international forces to remain in Afghanistan after 2014. Tables
at the end of this report list contributing forces, areas of operations, and their Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

Major Contingent Developments During the U.S. “Surge”
U.S. partners note that they have repeatedly answered U.S. calls to support the mission. In concert
with the beginning of the U.S. surge in early 2009, additional pledges came through at the April
3-4, 2009, NATO summit, and other force pledges were announced in conjunction with the
January 28, 2010, conference on Afghanistan in London. Among major pledges (troops and major
aid funds) that supported the U.S. surge:
• July 2009: South Korea announced it would increase its aid contribution to
Afghanistan by about $20 million, in part to expand the hospital capabilities at
Bagram Air Base. In July 2010, it returned about 150 engineers to Afghanistan
for development missions, protected by 400 South Korean forces, to Parwan
Province.50

49 Its mandate was extended until October 13, 2006, by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1623 (September 13, 2005);
and until October 13, 2007, by Resolution 1707 (September 12, 2006).
50 Until December 2007, 200 South Korean forces at Bagram Air Base, mainly combat engineers, were part of
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF); they left in December 2007 in fulfillment of a decision by the South Korean
government the previous year. However, many observers believe South Korea did not further extend its mission beyond
that, possibly as part of an agreement in August 2007 under which Taliban militants released 21 kidnapped South
Korean church group visitors. Two were killed during their captivity. The Taliban kidnappers did not get the demanded
release of 23 Taliban prisoners held by the Afghan government.
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• November 10, 2009: Ahead of President Obama’s visit to Asia, Japan announced
a pledge of $5 billion over the next five years for Afghanistan civilian
development, although it suspended its naval refueling mission. Japan has been
covering about half of the $250 million yearly salary costs of the ANP.
• December 2009-January 2010 (London conference): A total of about 9,000 forces
were pledged (including retaining 2,000 sent for the August 2009 election who
were due to rotate out). Several countries pledged police trainers.
Potential Upside Surprises: Reintegration and Reconciliation With
Insurgents51

Although many remain pessimistic about Afghan stability after 2014, some believe that there are
opportunities for an outcome that might be substantially better than expected. Such a positive
outcome could result from a political settlement with the insurgency, either in advance of or
shortly after the completion of the transition in 2014. The issues of reintegrating insurgent
fighters into society and reconciling with insurgent leaders, have received high-level attention.
Both are Afghan-led processes but they have concerned some in the international community and
Afghanistan because of the potential for compromises with insurgents that may produce
backsliding on human rights. Most insurgents are highly conservative Islamists who agreed with
the limitations in women’s rights that characterized Taliban rule. Many leaders of ethnic
minorities are also skeptical of the effort because they fear that it might further Pashtun political
strength within Afghanistan, and enhance the influence of Pakistan in Afghan politics. The United
States and the Karzai government agree that any settlement requires that fighters and insurgent
leaders agree, as an outcome,52 to (1) cease fighting, (2) accept the Afghan constitution, and (3)
sever any ties to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Reintegration
The concept of providing incentives to persuade insurgents to surrender and reenter their
communities has received at least some U.S. and Afghan attention since 2002. The elements
included in a formal reintegration plan drafted by the Afghan government and adopted by a
“peace loya jirga” during June 2-4, 2010,53 included providing surrendering fighters with jobs,
amnesty, protection, and an opportunity to be part of the security architecture for their
communities. Later in June 2010, President Karzai issued a decree to implement the plan, which
involves outreach by Afghan local leaders to tribes and others who can convince insurgents to lay
down their arms.
As of the end of 2012, about 6,800 fighters had entered the reintegration process. However, the
pace of reintegration slowed somewhat in 2012 compared to 2011, according to the Defense
Department. Those reintegrated are still mostly overwhelmingly (about 3,900 of the reintegrees)
from the north and west, with perhaps some gradually increasing participation from militants in

51 This issue is discussed in substantial detail in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman
52 The concept that this stipulations could be an “outcome” of negotiations was advanced by Secretary of State Clinton
at the first annual Richard C. Holbrooke Memorial Address. February 18, 2011.
53 Afghanistan National Security Council. “Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program.” April 2010.
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the more violent south and east. Some observers say there have been cases in which reintegrated
fighters have committed Taliban-style human rights abuses against women and others, suggesting
that the reintegration process might have unintended consequences.
The reintegration effort received formal international backing at the July 20, 2010, Kabul
Conference. Britain, Japan, and several other countries, including the United States, have
announced a total of about $235 million in donations to a new fund to support the reintegration
process, of which $134 million has been received.54 The U.S. contribution is about $100 million
(CERP funds), of which $50 million was formally pledged in April 2011.55
Previous efforts had marginal success. A “Program for Strengthening Peace and Reconciliation”
(referred to in Afghanistan by its Pashto acronym “PTS”) operated during 2003-2008, headed by
then Meshrano Jirga speaker Sibghatullah Mojadeddi and Vice President Karim Khalili, and
overseen by Karzai’s National Security Council. The program persuaded 9,000 Taliban figures
and commanders to renounce violence and join the political process, but made little impact on the
tenacity or strength of the insurgency.
Reconciliation With Militant Leaders
A related U.S. and Afghan initiative is to reach a conflict-ending settlement with the Taliban.
Many in the international community, including within the Obama Administration, initially
withheld endorsement of the concept, fearing it might result in the incorporation into the Afghan
political system of insurgent leaders who retain ties to Al Qaeda and will roll back freedoms
instituted since 2011. The minority communities in the north, women, intellectuals, and others
remain skeptical that their freedoms can be preserved if there is a political settlement with the
Taliban. These groups fear that the Taliban could be given major ministries, seats in parliament,
or even tacit control over territory as part of any deal. Secretary Clinton said in India on July 20,
2011, that any settlement must not result in and undoing of “the progress that has been made [by
women and ethnic minorities] in the past decade.” To respond to those fears, Afghan and U.S.
officials say that the outcome of a settlement would require the Taliban to drop at least some of its
demands that (1) foreign troops leave Afghanistan; (2) a new “Islamic” constitution be adopted;
and (3) Islamic law be imposed.
Following the 2010 U.S. shift to supporting a settlement, an “Afghan High Peace Council”
intended to oversee the settlement process was established on September 5, 2010. Former
President and Northern Alliance political leader Burhanuddin Rabbani was appointed by Karzai
to head it as a Karzai effort to bring skeptical Tajiks and other minorities to support
reconciliation. These minority figures, as noted above, fear that reconciliation with the Taliban
will strengthen Pashtun control of government to the detriment of the non-Pashtun minorities.
Among other accomplishments, Rabbani established provincial representative offices of the
Council in at least 27 provinces. On September 20, 2011, Rabbani was assassinated by a Taliban
infiltrator posing as an intermediary. On April 14, 2012, the High Peace Council members voted
Rabbani’s son, Salahuddin, as his replacement.

54 United Nations. Report of the Secretary General: “The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International
Peace and Security.” March 9, 2011.
55 The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84) authorized the use of CERP funds to win local
support, to “reintegrate” Taliban fighters.
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Prior to the Rabbani killing, U.S., Taliban, and Afghan representatives had proliferated. In May
2011, it was reported that U.S. officials had met at least three times in 2011 with Tayeb Agha, a
figure believed close to Mullah Umar. In late June 2011, those meetings were confirmed by then-
Secretary of Defense Gates, who said the talks had been led by the State Department and have
been facilitated by Germany and Qatar. However, the process stalled after the Rabbani
assassination and Pakistan’s boycott of the December 5, 2011, Bonn Conference over a
November 26, 2011, security incident in which U.S. forces killed 24 Pakistani border troops.
In December 2011, as tensions over these issues abated, U.S. officials pursued confidence-
building measures centered on the opening of a Taliban political office in Qatar to facilitate talks.
The Taliban office has not formally opened to date, but some Taliban figures are operating from
Qatar informally, as discussed below. The United States also revealed it had discussed other
confidence-building measures, including transferring captives from the Guantanamo detention
facility to a form of house arrest in Qatar—to be conducted simultaneous with the Taliban release
of the one U.S. prisoner of war, it holds, Bowe Bergdahl. A release of Taliban captives would
require U.S. congressional notification. The Taliban figures to be released to Qatar include some,
such as Mullah Mohammad Fazl who were major figures in the Taliban regime (Fazl was deputy
defense minister). H.Res. 529 expresses opposition to their release. The United States also
demanded a public Taliban statement severing its ties to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups,
possibly as a prelude to a limited battlefield ceasefire.
The confidence-building measures did not take advance, and talks stalled in March 2012
reportedly in large part over Qatar’s failure to fully assure the United States that the detainees
would be able to escape custody. The joint statement of President Karzai and President Obama on
January 11, 2013, revived the issue, stating both presidents had agreed to support the formal
opening of a Taliban office in Qatar. However, in early February 2013, Karzai appeared to balk on
the Taliban office issue, insisting on written guarantees about the validity of the Taliban
representatives and controls on the Taliban representatives’ activities by Qatar. Still, even without
a formal office, several Taliban figures are operating in Qatar informally, using it as a base to talk
with U.S. officials and to attend meetings abroad with Afghan officials.
And, other issues are moving forward, including movement toward Afghan government –Taliban
talks, exchanges of substantive positions, and Pakistani flexibility. Some Afghan officials express
optimism the talks will yield a settlement eventually, particularly if the Afghan government
provides assurances of security for Taliban leaders who reconcile. In late June 2012, Afghan
government officials and Taliban representatives held talks at two meetings—one in Paris, and
one an academic conference in Kyoto, Japan, on reconciliation issues. At the Kyoto meeting, the
Afghan government was represented by Mohammad Stanekzai, a member of the High Peace
Council, and the Taliban was represented by Qari Din Mohammad, a member of the Taliban
political council who had traveled from Qatar. The Kyoto meeting appeared to represent an
acceptance by the Taliban of direct talks with Afghan government officials. In August 2012,
Afghan officials reportedly held talks with high-ranking Taliban figure Mullah Abdul Ghani
Bradar,56 who was arrested by Pakistan in February 2010, purportedly to halt between Bradar and
Afghan intermediaries. A potentially even more significant meeting took place in France during
December 20-21, 2012, because talks took place between senior Taliban figures and members of
the Northern Alliance faction—considered least amenable to reconciling with the Taliban—and

56 “Afghan Officials Meet Key Taliban Figure in Pakistan.” Reuters.com, August 12, 2012.
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included submission by the Taliban of a political platform that signalled acceptance of some
aspects of human rights and women’s rights provisions of the current constitution.
Highly significantly, Pakistan is signaling that it wants to play a more active role in the
reconciliation process. In February 2012, Pakistani leaders, for the first time, publicly encouraged
Taliban leaders to negotiate a settlement to the conflict. More significant steps came in the course
of a visit to Pakistan in mid-November 2012, by Salahuddin Rabbani and other High Peace
Council members, as well as a subsequent visit by Afghan Foreign Minister Rassoul. As a result
of the visits, Pakistan released at least eighteen high ranking Taliban figures who favor
reconciliation, and it released another eight in December 2012. Among the released was the son
of the late mujahedin party leader Yunus Khalis and Noorudin Turabi, the Justice Minister in the
Taliban regime. Additional releases by Pakistan reportedly are planned, although it is not clear if
Mullah Bradar will be among them.
Previous talks have taken place primarily in Saudi Arabia and UAE. Press reports said that
Afghan officials, including Karzai’s brother, Qayyum; Arsala Rahmani, a former Taliban official
who reconciled but was assassinated in May 2012; and the former Taliban Ambassador to
Pakistan, Abdul Salam Zaeef, who purportedly is in touch with Umar’s inner circle. These same
Taliban representatives may be involved in the ongoing talks referred to above. The Taliban as a
movement was not invited to the June 2-4, 2010, consultative peace jirga, but some Taliban
sympathizers reportedly were there.
Removing Taliban Figures From U.N. Sanctions Lists. A key Taliban demand in negotiations—
and supported by the Karzai government—is the removal of the names of some Taliban figures
from U.N. lists of terrorists. These lists were established pursuant to Resolution 1267 and
Resolution 1333 (October 15, 1999, and December 19, 2000, both pre-September 11 sanctions
against the Taliban and Al Qaeda) and Resolution 1390 (January 16, 2002). Press reports before
the July 20, 2010, Kabul Conference said the Afghan government has submitted a list of 50
Taliban figures it wants taken off this list (which includes about 140 Taliban-related persons or
entities) as a confidence-building measure. The Conference called on Afghanistan to engage with
the U.N. Security Council to provide evidence to justify such de-listings, and U.N., U.S., and
other international officials said they would support considering de-listings on a case-by-case
basis. On January 26, 2010, Russia, previously a hold-out against such a process, dropped
opposition to removing five Taliban-era figures from these sanctions lists, including Taliban-era
foreign minister Wakil Mutawwakil, who ran in 2005 parliamentary elections. Also removed was
Abdul Hakim Monib, who has served Karzai as governor of Uruzgan, Abdul Hakim Mujahid,
who was Taliban representative in the United States, and three others. Mujahid now is one of
three deputy chairs of the High Peace Council. “Mullah Rocketi,” not on the sanctions list, is a
former Taliban commander who ran for president in the August 2009 elections.
On June 17, 2011, in concert with U.S. confirmations of talks with Taliban figures, the U.N.
Security Council adopted Resolution 1988 and 1989. The resolutions drew a separation between
the Taliban and Al Qaeda with regard to the sanctions. However, a decision on whether to remove
the 50 Taliban figures from the list, as suggested by Afghanistan, was deferred. On July 21, 2011,
14 Taliban figures were removed from the “1267” sanctions list; among them were four members
of the High Peace Council (including Arsala Rahmani, mentioned above).
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Table 5. Major Security-Related Indicators
Force Current
Level
Total Foreign Forces
About 103,000: 66,000 U.S. and 37,000 partner forces. (U.S. total was: 25,000 in 2005;
in Afghanistan
16,000 in 2003; 5,000 in 2002. ISAF totals were: 12,000 in 2005; and 6,000 in 2003.)
U.S. Casualties in
2,047 killed, of which 1,706 by hostile action. Additional 11 U.S. deaths by hostile action in
Afghanistan
other OEF theaters and 1 DOD civilian killed by hostile action. 150 U.S. killed from October
2001-January 2003. 500+ killed in 2010.
NATO/ISAF Sectors
RC-South: U.K. lead. RC-Southwest: U.S. lead; RC-East: U.S. lead; RC-North: Germany lead;
RC-West: Italy lead; RC-Kabul: Turkey and Afghan lead.
Afghan National Army About 195,000, the target size that was planned by November 2012. 5,300 are commando
(ANA)
forces, trained by U.S. Special Forces. ANA private paid about $200 per month; generals
about $750 per month.
Afghan National
About 157,000, the target size planned by November 2012. 21,000 are Border Police;
Police (ANP)
3,800+ counter-narcotics police; 14,400 Civil Order Police (ANCOP).
ANSF Salaries
About $1.6 billion per year, paid by donor countries bilaterally or via trust funds
Number of Al Qaeda
“Less than 100 or so,” according to General Petraeus in April 2011. Also, small numbers of
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and other Al Qaeda affiliates.
Number of Taliban
Up to 25,000 (U.S. military and Afghan estimates in mid-2011), although General Allen
fighters
believes numbers are much lower. Plus about 3,000 Haqqani faction and 1,000 HIG.
Reintegrations
About 6,800 fighters reintegrated since 2010
Afghan casualties
See CRS Report R41084, Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians, by Susan G.
Chesser.
Sources: CRS; testimony and public statements by DOD officials.

Regional Dimension
The Obama Administration is promoting Afghanistan’s integration into regional security and
economic organizations and patterns, and to deter Afghanistan’s neighbors from meddling there
to secure their own interests in a post-2014 Afghanistan. The Administration obtained pledges
from Afghanistan’s neighbors to that concept at a region-led international meeting in Istanbul on
November 2, 2011 (“Istanbul Declaration”) and again at the December 5, 2011, Bonn Conference
on Afghanistan (the 10th anniversary of the Bonn Conference that formed the post-Taliban
political and security architecture for Afghanistan). The latter meeting was attended by high-level
representatives from 85 countries and 15 international organizations. Although the final
declaration of the conference affirmed that vision, Pakistan decided not to send high-level
representation to the conference because of a November 26, 2011, security incident with the
United States, reducing the conference’s focus on regional integration.
As a follow-up to the Istanbul Declaration, the regional component of Afghan stability post-2014,
including possible confidence-building measures to be taken by Afghanistan’s neighbors, were
discussed at a Kabul ministerial conference on June 14, 2012. At that meeting, also known as the
“Heart of Asia” ministerial conference, Afghanistan hosted 14 other countries from the region, as
well as 14 supporting countries and 11 regional and international organizations. The assembled
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nations and organizations agreed to jointly fight terrorism and drug trafficking, and pursue
economic development.57 The Administration is emphasizing development of a Central Asia-
South Asia trading hub—part of a “New Silk Road” (NSR)—in an effort to keep Afghanistan
stable and economically vibrant as donors wind down their involvement.
Prior to the recent efforts, Afghanistan has been slowly integrated into regional security and
economic organizations. In November 2005, Afghanistan joined the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and, in June 2012, Afghanistan was granted full observer status
in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a security coordination body that includes
Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. There was extensive
discussion of greater SCO country involvement in Afghanistan after the 2014 transition during
the June 6-7, 2012, meeting of the group in Beijing, which Karzai attended. U.S. officials have
also sought to enlist both regional and greater international support for Afghanistan through the
still-expanding 50-nation “International Contact Group.”
Several regional meeting series have been established involving Afghanistan, including
• Summit meetings between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkey; and between Iran,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The latest Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan meeting took
place in Islamabad on February 16-17, 2012. The previous such meeting occurred
in Tehran on June 25, 2011. The fifth of the Turkey-led meetings occurred on
December 24, 2010.
• Turkey and UNAMA co-chair a “Regional Working Group” initiative, which
organized the major meeting on Afghanistan in Istanbul on November 2, 2011.
UNAMA also leads a “Kabul Silk Road” initiative, to promote regional
cooperation on Afghanistan.
• Russia has assembled two “quadrilateral summits,” the latest of which was on
August 18, 2010, among Pakistan, Russia, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, and
focused on counter-narcotics and anti-smuggling.
• Another effort is the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on
Afghanistan, which was launched in 2005. It held its fifth meeting in Tajikistan
on March 26-27, 2012.

57 Participating were: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, UAE, and Uzbekistan.
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Table 6. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for
Operations in and Supply Lines to Afghanistan
Facility
Use
Bagram Air
50 miles north of Kabul, the operational hub of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and base for CJTF-82.
Base
At least 2,000 U.S. military personnel are based there. Handles many of the 150+ U.S. aircraft
(including helicopters) in country. Hospital constructed, one of the first permanent structures
there. FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provided about $52 million for various projects to
upgrade facilities at Bagram, including a control tower and an operations center, and the
FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provided $20 mil ion for military
construction there. NATO also using the base and sharing operational costs. Bagram can be
accessed directly by U.S. military flights following April 2010 agreement by Kazakhstan to allow
overflights of U.S. lethal equipment.
Qandahar Air
Just outside Qandahar, the hub of military operations in the south. Turned over from U.S. to
Field
NATO/ISAF control in late 2006 in conjunction with NATO assumption of peacekeeping
responsibilities. Enhanced (along with other facilities in the south) at cost of $1.3 billion to
accommodate influx of U.S. combat forces in the south.
Shindand Air
In Farah province, about 20 miles from Iran border. Used by U.S. forces and combat aircraft
Base
since October 2004, after the dismissal of Herat governor Ismail Khan, who controlled it.
Peter Ganci
Used by 1,200 U.S. military personnel as wel as refueling and cargo aircraft for shipments into
Base: Manas,
Afghanistan. Leadership of Kyrgyzstan changed in April 2005 in an uprising against President
Kyrgyzstan
Askar Akayev and again in April 2010 against Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Previous Kyrgyz governments
demanded the U.S. vacate the base but in both cases, (July 2006 and July 2009) agreement to
use the base was extended in exchange for large increase in U.S. payments for its use (to $60
million per year in the latter case). Interim government formed in April 2010 first threatened
then retracted eviction of U.S. from the base. Defense Secretary Panetta visited in March 2012
to launch talks on extending U.S. use of the facility beyond 2014.
Incirlik Air
About 2,100 U.S. military personnel there; U.S. aircraft supply U.S. forces in Iraq and
Base, Turkey
Afghanistan. U.S. use repeatedly extended for one year intervals by Turkey.
Al Dhafra, UAE Air base used by about 1,800 U.S. military personnel, to supply U.S. forces and related
transport into Iraq and Afghanistan.
Al Udeid Air
Largest air facility used by U.S. in region. Houses central air operations coordination center for
Base, Qatar
U.S. missions in Iraq and Afghanistan; also houses CENTCOM forward headquarters. About
5,000 U.S. personnel in Qatar.
Naval Support
U.S. naval command headquarters for OEF anti-smuggling, anti-terrorism, and anti-proliferation
Facility, Bahrain
naval search missions, and Iraq-related naval operations (oil platform protection) in the Persian
Gulf and Arabian Sea. About 5,000 U.S. military personnel there.
Karsi-Khanabad Not used by U.S. since September 2005 fol owing U.S.-Uzbek dispute over May 2005 Uzbek
Air Base,
crackdown on unrest in Andijon. Once housed about 1,750 U.S. military personnel (900 Air
Uzbekistan
Force, 400 Army, and 450 civilian) supplying Afghanistan. U.S. relations with Uzbekistan have
improved since 2009, but there is still no U.S. use of the air base. Some U.S. shipments began in
February 2009 through Navoi airfield in central Uzbekistan, and U.S. signed agreement with
Uzbekistan on April 4, 2009, al owing nonlethal supplies for the Afghanistan war. Goods are
shipped to Latvia and Georgia, some transits Russia by rail, then to Uzbekistan.
Tajikistan
Some use of air bases and other facilities by coalition partners, including France, and emergency
use by U.S. India also uses bases under separate agreement. New supply lines to Afghanistan
established in February 2009 (“northern route”) make some use of Tajikistan.
Pakistan
As discussed below, most U.S. supplies have flowed through Pakistan, but progressively
increased use is being made through the Northern Distribution Network. Heavy equipment
docks in Karachi and is escorted by security contractors to the Khyber Pass crossing.
Russia
Allows non-lethal equipment to transit Russia by rail. In March 2012, expressed willingness to
allow use of an airfield to move goods to Afghanistan. Still does not allow lethal aid to transit
and may reduce cooperation after 2014 if the U.N. mandate for international forces ends.
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Pakistan/Pakistan-Afghanistan Border
The Afghanistan neighbor that is considered most crucial to Afghanistan’s future is Pakistan, and
Pakistan’s policies and actions on the Afghanistan issue are of significant concern to U.S.
policymakers. The DOD reports on Afghanistan’s stability repeatedly identify Afghan militant
safe haven in Pakistan as among the largest threats to Afghan stability after 2014. Pakistan’s goal
in allowing some groups, such as the Haqqani Network, relative safehaven may be to develop
leverage against historic rival India; Pakistan appears insistent that Afghanistan, at the very least,
not align with rival India, and, at best, provide Pakistan strategic depth against India. Pakistan
says India is using its Embassy and four consulates in Afghanistan (Pakistan says India has nine
consulates) to train and recruit anti-Pakistan insurgents, and is using its aid programs to build
influence there. Still, Pakistan’s releases of major pragmatic Afghan Taliban figures since
November 2012 could signal a shift toward promoting stability in Afghanistan after 2014; this
could reflect a Pakistani assessment that chaos in Afghanistan will rebound to Pakistan’s
detriment. A further indication of this possible shift came in January 2013 when Pakistan and
Afghanistan held talks on possible Pakistani training for the ANSF.
The May 1, 2011, U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan added to pre-existing strains
on U.S.-Pakistan cooperation in Afghanistan—strains mainly over Pakistan’s refusal to crack
down on the Haqqani network. U.S. concerns about Pakistan’s stance on the Haqqanis increased
significantly in the wake of the September 13, 2011, attack on U.S. Embassy Kabul, allegedly by
the Haqqani Network. Relations worsened further after a November 26, 2011, incident in which a
U.S. airstrike killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. Pakistan responded by closing border crossings,
suspending participation in the border coordination centers (see below), and boycotting the
December 5 Bonn Conference. With the border crossings still not open seven months after the
November 26, 2011, incident, NATO ultimately invited Pakistan to the May 20-21, 2012, NATO
summit in Chicago but President Obama declined to hold a formal meeting with President Zardari
during that summit. Secretary of State Clinton’s July 2, 2012, expression of remorse for the 24
Pakistani soldier deaths in November led Pakistan to reopen the border crossings, removing a key
point of tension. Pakistan muted its reaction to the September 9, 2012, U.S. naming of the
Haqqani Network as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
The 2011 U.S.-Pakistan recriminations contrast with the first several years after the September
11, 2001, attacks, when Pakistani cooperation against Al Qaeda was considered by U.S. officials
to be relatively consistent and effective. Pakistan arrested over 700 Al Qaeda figures after the
September 11 attacks.58 Pakistan allowed U.S. access to Pakistani airspace, some ports, and some
airfields for OEF. Others say Musharraf acted against Al Qaeda only when it threatened him
directly; for example, after the December 2003 assassination attempts against him.
In April 2008, in an extension of the work of the Tripartite Commission (Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and ISAF, in which military leaders of these entities meet on both sides of the border), the three
countries agreed to set up five “border coordination centers” (BCCs) which include networks of
radar nodes to give liaison officers a common view of the border area. These centers build on an
agreement in May 2007 to share intelligence on extremists’ movements. Four have been
established to date, including one near the Torkham Gate at the Khyber Pass, but all four are on

58 Among those captured by Pakistan are top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah (captured April 2002); alleged September
11 plotter Ramzi bin Al Shibh (September 11, 2002); top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March 2003);
and a top planner, Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005).
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the Afghan side of the border. Pakistan has not fulfilled its May 2009 pledge to establish one on
the Pakistani side of the border.
Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations
The U.S. mission in Afghanistan also depends on healthy, consistent, and operationally significant
cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan-Pakistan relations have
tended to fluctuate. Many Afghans fondly remember Pakistan’s role as the hub for U.S. backing
of the mujahedin that forced the Soviet withdrawal in 1988-1989, but, later, most Afghan leaders
came to resent Pakistan as the most public defender of the Taliban movement when it was in
power. (Pakistan was one of only three countries to formally recognize it as the legitimate
government; Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the others.) Anti-Pakistan sentiment
is particularly strong among the minority communities of northern and western Afghanistan,
particularly the Tajiks.
After the end of the rule of military leader and President Pervez Musharraf in 2008, there was
improvement in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. Karzai attended the September 9, 2008,
inauguration of civilian President Asif Zardari. Zardari visited Kabul on January 9, 2009, where
he and Karzai signed a joint declaration against terrorism that affects both countries. (A
September 2010 meeting between them reaffirmed this declaration.) Afghan and Pakistani
ministers jointly visited Washington, DC, during February 23-27, 2009, to participate in the first
Obama Administration strategic review, and Karzai and Zardari conducted a joint visit to
Washington, DC, in May 2009.
In the aftermath of Afghan recriminations against Pakistan for the presence of Bin Laden, Karzai
had productive meetings in Islamabad during June 10-11, 2011, including the announcement of
implementation of the new transit trade agreement discussed below. The summit paved the way
for a U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan meeting on June 28, 2011, attended by then SRAP Grossman,
although the meeting was clouded somewhat by Afghan allegations that several hundred rockets
had been fired into Afghanistan from Pakistan in prior days. The September 2011 attacks on the
U.S. Embassy and the killing of former President Rabbani worsened relations significantly.
Pakistan’s worst fears about Indian influence in Afghanistan were inflamed when Karzai, on
October 5, 2011, and perhaps as a reaction to the Haqqani attacks in Kabul, flew to India to sign a
significant trade and security pact (see below). Relations have improved substantially since late
2012 in line with Pakistan’s possible shift toward more cooperation in stabilizing Afghanistan, as
demonstrated by its release of Afghan Taliban figures who reputedly seek reconciliation.
Regarding the long-term relationship, Pakistan wants the government of Afghanistan to pledge to
abide by the “Durand Line,” a border agreement reached between Britain (signed by Sir Henry
Mortimer Durand) and then Afghan leader Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893, separating
Afghanistan from what was then British-controlled India (later Pakistan after the 1947 partition).
The border is recognized by the United Nations, but Afghanistan continues to indicate that the
border was drawn unfairly to separate Pashtun tribes and should be renegotiated. Afghan leaders
bridled at October 21, 2012, comments by then SRAP Grossman that U.S. “policy is that border
is the international border,” even though that comment reflected a longstanding U.S. position. As
of October 2002, about 1.75 million Afghan refugees have returned from Pakistan since the
Taliban fell, but as many as 3 million might still remain in Pakistan.
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Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA)
Pakistan has also sought to control Afghanistan’s trade, particularly with India, leading to U.S.
efforts to persuade Pakistan to forge a “transit trade” agreement with Afghanistan. That effort
bore success with the signature of a trade agreement between the two on July 18, 2010, allowing
for an easier flow of Afghan products, which are mostly agricultural products that depend on
rapid transit. On June 12, 2011, in the context of a Karzai visit to Islamabad, both countries began
full implementation of the agreement. It is expected to greatly expand the $2 billion in trade per
year the two countries were doing prior to the agreement. The agreement represented a success
for the Canada-sponsored “Dubai Process” of talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan on
modernizing border crossings, new roads, and a comprehensive border management strategy to
meet IMF benchmarks. A drawback to the agreement is that Afghan trucks, under the agreement,
are not permitted to take back cargo from India after dropping off goods there. The Afghanistan-
Pakistan trade agreement followed agreements to send more Afghan graduate students to study in
Pakistan, and a June 2010 Afghan agreement to send small numbers of ANA officers to undergo
training in Pakistan.59
Iran
As an immediate goal, Iran seeks to deny the United States the use of Afghanistan as a base from
which to pressure or attack Iran. To that end, Iran publicly opposed the May 1, 2012, U.S.-
Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement. As a longer term objective, Iran seeks to exert its
traditional influence over western Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the
Persian empire, to protect Afghanistan’s Shiite and other Persian-speaking minorities. There are
mixed views on how influential Iran is in Afghanistan; most experts appear to see Iran as a
relatively marginal player, particularly compared to Pakistan, while others believe Tehran is able
to mobilize large numbers of Afghans, particularly in the west, to support its policies. The United
States will attempt to better gauge Tehran’s influence in Afghanistan through the State
Department establishment of in early 2013 of an “Iran watch” diplomatic position at the U.S.
consulate in Herat.
The Obama Administration initially saw Iran as potentially helpful to its strategy for Afghanistan;
the late SRAP Holbrooke was an advocate of cooperation with Iran on Afghanistan issues. Iran
was invited to the U.N.-led meeting on Afghanistan at the Hague on March 31, 2009. At the
meeting, Holbrooke briefly met the Iranian leader of his delegation and handed him a letter on
several outstanding human rights cases involving Iranian-Americans. At the meeting, Iran
pledged cooperation on combating Afghan narcotics and in helping economic development in
Afghanistan—both policies Iran is pursuing to a large degree.
Suggesting that the concept of cooperation with Iran on Afghanistan still resonates with some
U.S. officials and outside experts, Iran’s attendance of the October 18, 2010, International
Contact Group meeting in Rome, including a briefing by then top commander in Afghanistan
General Petraeus. Earlier, the United States and Iran took similar positions at a U.N. meeting in
Geneva in February 2010 that discussed drug trafficking across the Afghan border. Iran did not
attend the January 28, 2010, international meeting in London, but it did attend the July 28, 2010,
international meeting in Kabul (both discussed above). As a member of the OIC, an Iranian

59 Partlow, Joshua. “Afghans Build Up Ties With Pakistan.” Washington Post, July 21, 2010.
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representative attended the March 3, 2011, Contact Group meeting at OIC headquarters in
Jeddah. Iran attended the region-led international meeting in Istanbul on November 2, 2011, the
December 5, 2011, Bonn Conference, and the Tokyo donors’ conference on July 8, 2012.
Iran’s Development Aid for Afghanistan
Iran’s economic aid to Afghanistan supports international efforts to develop Afghanistan. Iran has
pledged about $1 billion in aid to Afghanistan, of which about $500 million has been provided to
date. The funds have been used mostly to build roads and bridges in western Afghanistan. In
cooperation with India, Iran has been building roads that would connect western Afghanistan to
Iran’s port of Chahbahar, and provide Afghan and other goods an easier outlet to the Persian Gulf.
Iran also has provided credits to the Afghan private sector and helped develop power transmission
lines in the provinces bordering Iran, two of which were turned over to Afghan ownership in
January 2013. Some of the funds reportedly are funneled through the Imam Khomeini Relief
Committee, which provides charity in Iran and worldwide. Iran also provides gasoline and other
fuels to Afghanistan, although a SIGAR report in January 2013 said that some U.S. funds might
have been used to purchase fuels from Iran for Afghanistan. U.S. sanctions bar virtually all U.S.
energy transactions with Iran. (See CRS Report RS20871: Iran Sanctions).
Iranian Assistance to Afghan Militants and to Pro-Iranian Groups and Regions
Even though Iran aids Afghanistan’s development, it also is allegedly arming militants there. Iran
may be arming groups in Afghanistan to try to pressure U.S. forces that use Afghanistan’s
Shindand air base,60 which Iran fears the United States might use to attack or conduct surveillance
against Iran. Or, Iran’s policy might be to gain broader leverage against the United States by
demonstrating that Iran is in position to cause U.S. combat deaths in Afghanistan.
The State Department report on international terrorism for 2011, released July 31, 2012, repeated
language in prior reports that, since 2006, the Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps of Iran has provided training to the Taliban on small unit tactics, small arms, explosives,
and indirect weapons fire, and that it ships arms to militants in Qandahar. This phrasing implies
that Iran is arming Pashtun Taliban militants in the core of the combat zone in Afghanistan.
Weapons provided, according to the State Department report, include mortars, 107mm rockets,
rocket-propelled grenades, and plastic explosives. On March 9, 2011, NATO said it had seized 48
Iranian-made rockets in Nimruz Province, bound for Afghan militants; the 122mm rockets, have a
range (13 miles) greater than those previously provided by Iran. On August 3, 2010, the Treasury
Department, acting under Executive Order 13224, named two Qods Force officers as terrorism
supporting entities (freezing assets in the United States, if any). They are Hossein Musavi,
Commander of the Qods Force Ansar Corps, which is the key Qods unit involved in Afghanistan;
and Hasan Mortezavi, who is a Qods officer responsible for providing funds and materiel to the
Taliban, according to the Treasury Department.61

60 Rashid, Ahmed. “Afghan Neighbors Show Signs of Aiding in Nation’s Stability.” Wall Street Journal, October 18,
2004.
61 Treasury Department. Fact Sheet: U.S. Treasury Department Targets Iran’s Support for Terrorism. August 3, 2010.
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Iran reportedly has allowed a Taliban office to open in Iran.62 While some see that as a move to
support the insurgency, others might see it as an effort to exert some influence over reconciliation
efforts. Iran previously allowed Taliban figures to attend conferences in Iran that were attended
by Afghan figures, including the late High Peace Council head Burhanuddin Rabbani.
Assistance to Ethnic and Religious Factions in Afghanistan
Others are puzzled by Iran’s support of Taliban fighters who are Pashtun, because Iran has
traditionally supported Persian-speaking or Shiite factions in Afghanistan, many of whom have
been oppressed by the Pashtuns. Some of Iran’s funding has been intended to support pro-Iranian
groups in the west as well as Hazara Shiites in Kabul and in the Hazara heartland of Bamiyan,
Ghazni, and Dai Kundi, in part by providing scholarships and funding for technical institutes. Iran
has used some of its funds to construct mosques in Herat, pro-Iranian theological seminaries in
Shiite districts of Kabul, and Shiite institutions in Hazara-dominated areas. Iran also offers
scholarships to Afghans to study in Iranian universities, and there are consistent allegations that
Iran has funded Afghan provincial council and parliamentary candidates who are perceived as
pro-Tehran.63 These efforts have helped Iran retain close ties with Afghanistan’s leading Shiite
cleric, Ayatollah Mohammad Mohseni, as well as a Hazara political leader Mohammad Mohaqiq.
Bilateral Government-to-Government Relations
Iran’s interest in a broad relationship with Karzai has not, to date, been affected by Iran’s
continued support for Taliban and other militants in Afghanistan. Karzai has, at times, called Iran
a “friend” of Afghanistan; in March 2010 he met with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
on two occasions. One of the meetings was just after the departure of visiting Defense Secretary
Gates. Previously, Karzai received Ahmadinejad in Kabul in August 2007, and he visited Tehran
at the end of May 2009 as part of the tripartite diplomatic process between Iran, Pakistan, and
Afghanistan. Karzai has repeatedly said that Afghanistan must not become an arena for the
broader competition and disputes between the United States and Iran.64 In June 2011, Iran’s
Defense Minister, Ahmad Vahidi, visited Kabul to sign a bilateral border security agreement.
A controversy arose in late October 2010 when Karzai acknowledged accepting about $2 million
per year in cash payments from Iran, via his then Chief of Staff Mohammad Daudzai. On the
other hand, in December 2010, Iran suddenly ceased shipping fuel into Afghanistan, causing
some spot dislocations in Afghanistan, including in Kabul.
Many Afghans look fondly on Iran for helping them try to oust the Taliban regime when it was in
power. Iran saw the Taliban regime, which ruled during 1996-2001, as a threat to its interests in
Afghanistan, especially after Taliban forces captured Herat in September 1995. Iran subsequently
drew even closer to the ethnic minority-dominated Northern Alliance than previously, providing
its groups with fuel, funds, and ammunition.65 In September 1998, Iranian and Taliban forces
nearly came into direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of its diplomats were killed in the

62 Maria Abi-Habib. “Iranians Build Up Afghan Clout. Wall Street Journal, October 26, 2012.
63 King, Laura. “In Western Afghan City, Iran Makes Itself Felt.” Los Angeles Times, November 14, 2010.
64 Comments by President Karzai at the Brookings Institution. May 5, 2009.
65 Steele, Jonathon. “America Includes Iran in Talks on Ending War in Afghanistan.” Washington Times, December 15,
1997.
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course of the Taliban’s offensive in northern Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the border and
threatened military action, but the crisis cooled without a major clash, possibly out of fear that
Pakistan would intervene on behalf of the Taliban. Iran offered search and rescue assistance in
Afghanistan during the U.S.-led war to topple the Taliban, and it also allowed U.S. humanitarian
aid to the Afghan people to transit Iran. Iran helped construct Afghanistan’s first post-Taliban
government, in cooperation with the United States—at the December 2001 “Bonn Conference.”
In February 2002, Iran expelled Karzai-opponent Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, but it did not arrest him.
At other times, Afghanistan and Iran have had disputes over Iran’s efforts to expel Afghan
refugees. There are 1 million registered Afghan refugees in Iran, and about 1.4 million Afghan
migrants (non-refugees) living there. A crisis erupted in May 2007 when Iran expelled about
50,000 into Afghanistan. About 300,000 Afghan refugees have returned from Iran since the
Taliban fell.
India
The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are the inverse of those of Pakistan: India’s
goals are to deny Pakistan “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, to deny Pakistan the ability to block
India from trade and other connections to Central Asia and beyond, and to prevent militants in
Afghanistan from attacking Indian targets in Afghanistan. India saw the Afghan Taliban’s hosting
of Al Qaeda during 1996-2001 as a major threat to India itself because of Al Qaeda’s association
with radical Islamic organizations in Pakistan, such as LET (Laskhar-e-Tayyiba, or Army of the
Righteous), one of the groups that was formed in Pakistan to challenge India’s control of part of
the disputed territories of Jammu and Kashmir. Some of these groups have committed major acts
of terrorism in India, including the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008 and in July
2011. Pakistan accuses India of using nine consulates in Afghanistan to spread Indian influence in
Afghanistan. According to Afghan officials, India has four consulates (in the major cities of
Qandahar, Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Herat) and no security presence in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan has sought close ties to India but without alarming Pakistan—a delicate balancing
act backed by the United States. During a May 2011 visit to Afghanistan by India’s Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh, India and Afghanistan announced a “Strategic Partnership,” which
demonstrated India’s support for U.S. efforts to better integrate Afghanistan into regional
political, economic, and security structures. On October 5, 2011, shortly after the Rabbani
assassination and related Afghan recriminations against Pakistan, Karzai visited Delhi to sign the
pact. The pact affirmed Pakistan’s worst fears because it gave India, for the first time, a formal
role as one of the guarantors of Afghan stability, and it provided for expanded India-Afghanistan
political and cultural ties. Indian experts noted that no Indian troops or security forces would
deploy to Afghanistan as a consequence of the pact, but it did lead to a late 2011 agreement for
India to train some ANSF personnel in India. As an outgrowth of a four-day Karzai follow-up
visit to India in November 2012, India reportedly agreed to train up to 600 ANSF per year at the
Indian Army’s jungle warfare school.
Still, India reportedly does not want to be saddled with the burden of helping secure Afghanistan
as U.S.-led forces depart. Nor does it seek to inflame Pakistan’s sentiments by playing a large
security role in Afghanistan. India has stressed its economic aid activities there, showcased by its
hosting of a June 28, 2012, meeting in Delhi to discuss investment and economic development in
Afghanistan.
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Some believe India has been concerned that any negotiated settlement of the Afghanistan conflict
will give Pakistan preponderant influence in Afghanistan. India, which supported the Northern
Alliance against the Taliban in the mid-1990s, has been stepping up its contacts with those
factions to discuss possible contingencies in the event of an Afghan settlement deal. Many
Northern Alliance figures have lived in India at one time or another, although Indian diplomats
stress they have long also had close connections to Afghanistan’s Pashtuns. As noted above,
Karzai studied there. Still, possibly at U.S. urging, during the May 2011 Singh visit discussed
above, India publicly expressed support for the reconciliation process. In addition, Tajikistan,
which also supported the mostly Tajik Northern Alliance against the Taliban when it was in
power, allows India to use one of its air bases.
India’s Development Activities in Afghanistan
India is the fifth-largest single country donor to Afghan reconstruction, funding projects worth
over $1.5 billion, with an additional $500 million announced during the Singh visit to Kabul in
May 2011. Indian officials assert that all their projects are focused on civilian, not military,
development and are in line with the development priorities set by the Afghan government. India,
along with the Asian Development Bank, financed a $300 million project, mentioned above, to
bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. It has also renovated the well-known Habibia
High School in Kabul and committed to a $67 million renovation of Darulaman Palace as the
permanent house for Afghanistan’s parliament. India and Afghanistan finalized the construction
plans for that building in early 2012. At a cost of about $85 million, India financed the
construction of a road to the Iranian border in remote Nimruz province, linking landlocked
Afghanistan to Iran’s Chahbahar port on the Arabian Sea. India is currently constructing the 42
megawatt hydroelectric Selwa Dam in Herat Province at a cost of about $77 million, expected to
be completed in late 2012. This will increase electricity availability in the province. In December
2011, an Indian firm, the Steel Authority of India, Ltd. (SAIL) was declared winning bidder on
three of four blocs of the Hajji Gak iron ore project in Bamiyan Province. This led to assessments
that India is also an economic beneficiary of international intervention in Afghanistan, without
taking the risk of involving India militarily there.
India is also helping Afghanistan’s Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) with its
efforts to build local governance organizations, and it provides 1,000 scholarships per year for
Afghans to undergo higher education in India. Some Afghans want to enlist even more Indian
assistance in training Afghan bureaucrats in accounting, forensic accounting, oversight, and other
disciplines that will promote transparency in Afghan governance.
Russia, Central Asian States, and China
Some neighboring and nearby states take an active interest not only in Afghan stability, but in the
U.S. military posture that supports U.S. operations in Afghanistan. The region to the north of
Afghanistan is a growing factor in U.S. efforts to rely less on supply routes through Pakistan,
particularly as U.S. relations with Pakistan have remained strained.
Russia/Northern Distribution Network
Russia wants to reemerge as a great power and to contain U.S. power in Central Asia, including
Afghanistan. At the same time, by supporting the “Northern Distribution Network” supply route
for NATO forces in Afghanistan, Russia supports U.S. and NATO efforts to combat militants in
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the region who have sometimes posed a threat to Russia itself. Its hosting of the “quadrilateral
summits” mentioned above, could represent stepped up efforts by Russia to exert influence on the
Afghanistan issue. Previously, Russia had kept a low profile in the country because it still feels
humiliated by its withdrawal in 1989 and senses some Afghan resentment of the Soviet
occupation. Since 2002, Russia has only been providing small amounts of humanitarian aid to
Afghanistan.
In line with Russian official comments in June 2010 that more economic and social assistance is
needed for Afghanistan, Russia is investing $1 billion in Afghanistan to develop its electricity
capacity and build out other infrastructure. Included in those investments are implementation of
an agreement, reached during a Karzai visit to Moscow on January 22, 2011, for Russia to resume
long dormant Soviet occupation-era projects such as expanding the Salang Tunnel connecting the
Panjshir Valley to Kabul, hydroelectric facilities in Kabul and Baghlan provinces, a customs
terminal, and a university in Kabul.
During the 1990s, after its 1989 withdrawal and the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia
supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban with some military equipment and technical
assistance in order to blunt Islamic militancy emanating from Afghanistan.66 Although Russia
supported the U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan out of fear of Islamic
(mainly Chechen) radicals, Russia continues to seek to reduce the U.S. military presence in
Central Asia. Russian fears of Islamic activism emanating from Afghanistan may have ebbed
since 2002 when Russia killed a Chechen of Arab origin known as “Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-
Khattab), who led a militant pro-Al Qaeda Chechen faction. The Taliban government was the
only one in the world to recognize Chechnya’s independence, and some Chechen fighters fighting
alongside Taliban/Al Qaeda forces have been captured or killed.
Northern Distribution Network and Other Aid to Afghan Security
Russian cooperation is crucial to the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. In February 2009, Russia paved
the way for the expansion of the Northern Distribution Network supply route into Afghanistan by
allowing the resumption of shipment of non-lethal equipment into Afghanistan through Russia
(following a suspension in 2008 caused by differences over the Russia-Georgia conflict). There
are discussions with Russia over possibly allowing some lethal equipment to transit as well and
for use of a Russian air base as a hub in the supply chain. About half of all ground cargo for U.S.
forces in Afghanistan now flow through the Northern Distribution Network, and the United States
is emphasizing this network as relations with Pakistan remain strained, although the costs to ship
goods through the route are far greater than the Pakistan route. Still, Russia insists that it will
continue to cooperate with this supply route after 2014 only if a U.N. mandate for an international
force in Afghanistan continues after that time.
Russia has also responded to NATO requests to provide helicopters and spare parts to the Afghan
forces (which still make heavy use of Russian-made Hind helicopters) as well as fuel. In April
2011, there was agreement to establish a “Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund.” Russia has also
delivered 24 helicopters to Afghan forces, financed by the United States. Russia reportedly has
pledged to train Afghan security forces.

66 Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” New York Times, July 27, 1998.
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In November 2010, in its most significant intervention in Afghanistan since its occupation,
Russian officers reportedly joined U.S. and Afghan forces attempting to interdict narcotics
trafficking in Afghanistan. However, the move prompted a complaint by President Karzai because
he was not consulted about the inclusion of the Russians.
Central Asian States
These states are crucial to the U.S. transition in Afghanistan, as discussed in a Senate Foreign
Relations Committee staff report released December 19, 2011, entitled “Central Asia and the
Transition in Afghanistan.” As shown in Table 6, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and
Kazakhstan are pivotal actors in U.S. efforts to expand the Northern Distribution Network supply
route. Kyrgyzstan is key to the U.S. ability to fly troops and supplies in and out of Afghanistan.
These states are also becoming crucial to the New Silk Road (NSR) strategy that seeks to help
Afghanistan become a trade crossroads between South and Central Asia—a strategy that could
net Kabul substantial customs duties and other economic benefits. An increasing amount of trade
is flowing from Afghanistan to and through the Central Asian states. As noted below, railway
lines are being built to Uzbekistan. The Panj bridge, built largely with U.S. funds, has become a
major thoroughfare for goods to move between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Kazakhstan is funding
a $50 million program to develop Afghan professionals. The revival of a long-standing plan to
establish Afghanistan as a transit hub for Central Asian natural gas (TAPI pipeline) is discussed
later in this report under “Development in Key Sectors.”
The Central Asian countries have long had an interest in seeing Afghanistan stabilized and
moderate. In 1996, several of the Central Asian states banded together with Russia and China into
the SCO because of the perceived Taliban threat.
Tajikistan
On security cooperation, Tajikistan allows access primarily to French combat aircraft, and
Kazakhstan has allowed use of facilities in case of emergency. In May 2011, Kazakhstan became
the first Central Asian state to pledge forces to Afghanistan (four non-combat troops). Earlier, in
April 2010, Kazakhstan agreed to allow U.S. over flights of lethal military equipment to
Afghanistan, allowing the United States to use polar routes to fly materiel directly from the
United States to Bagram Airfield.
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan, a sponsor of Afghan faction leader Abdul Rashid Dostam, an ethnic Uzbek, allowed
use of Karshi-Khanabad air base by OEF forces from October 2001 until a rift emerged in May
2005 over Uzbekistan’s crackdown against riots in Andijon. Uzbekistan’s March 2008 agreement
with Germany for it to use Karshi-Khanabad air base temporarily, for the first time since the rift
with the United States, suggested potential for resumed U.S.-Uzbek cooperation on Afghanistan.
Renewed U.S. discussions with Uzbekistan apparently bore some fruit with the Uzbek decision in
February 2009 to allow the use of Navoi airfield for shipment of U.S./NATO goods into
Afghanistan. As a rift with Pakistan widened in September 2011, the United States launched new
overtures to Uzbekistan, including a call from President Obama to Uzbek President Islam
Karimov congratulating him on 20 years of independence from Russia/Soviet Union.
Subsequently, the Administration opened formal negotiations with Uzbekistan to enlist its
cooperation with further expansion of the Northern Distribution Network. However, in late
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August, 2012, Uzbekistan’s parliament advanced legislation that would ban foreign military bases
on Uzbekistan territory—a move widely interpreted as reluctance to resume permission for U.S.
forces to expand operations in Uzbekistan.
During Taliban rule, Russian and Central Asian leaders were alarmed that radical Islamic
movements were receiving safe haven in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, in particular, has long asserted
that the group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), allegedly responsible for four
simultaneous February 1999 bombings in Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is
linked to Al Qaeda.67 One of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed while
commanding Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in Konduz in November 2001. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
do not directly border Afghanistan, but IMU guerrillas transited Kyrgyzstan during incursions
into Uzbekistan in the late 1990s.
Turkmenistan
Currently, perhaps to avoid offending Pakistan or other actors, Turkmenistan takes a position of
“positive neutrality” on Afghanistan. It does not allow its territory to be part of the Northern
Distribution Network. No U.S. forces have been based in Turkmenistan.
This neutrality essentially continues the policy Turkmenistan had when the Taliban was in power.
During that time, Turkmenistan was the only Central Asian state to actively engage the Taliban
leadership, possibly viewing engagement as a more effective means of preventing spillover of
radical Islamic activity from Afghanistan. It saw Taliban control as facilitating construction of the
TAPI natural gas pipeline, discussed above, that was under consideration during Taliban rule and
discussion of which has been revived in recent years. The September 11 events stoked
Turkmenistan’s fears of the Taliban and its Al Qaeda guests and the country publicly supported
the U.S.-led war.
China68
China’s involvement in Afghanistan policy appears to be growing, primarily to secure access to
Afghan minerals and resources but perhaps also to help its ally, Pakistan, avoid encirclement by
India. That was exemplified on September 23, 2012, when a senior Chinese official made a rare
visit to Afghanistan to sign security and economic agreements with Afghanistan, including a
pledge to help train, fund, and equip the ANP. Like Pakistan, China has been a rival of India.
China also is concerned about the potential for Islamic militancy in Afghanistan to inflame
Islamist sentiment among China’s Uighur community in China. A major organizer of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China has a small border with a sparsely inhabited sliver of
Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan Corridor,” and it is building border access routes and supply
depots to facilitate China’s access to Afghanistan through the corridor.
Chinese delegations continue to assess the potential for new investments in such sectors as
mining and energy,69 and the cornerstone is the development of the Aynak copper mine south of

67 The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in September 2000.
68 For more information, see CRS Report RL33001, U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy,
by Shirley A. Kan.
69 CRS conversations with Chinese officials in Beijing. August 2007.
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Kabul. In early 2012, China National Petroleum Co. was awarded the rights to develop oil
deposits in the Amu Darya basin (see below). Since 2002, China has pledged about $255 million
in economic aid to Afghanistan, about 75% of which has been provided to date.
Prior to the September 2012 agreements discussed above, China had taken only a small role in
securing Afghanistan. No Chinese forces have deployed to Afghanistan, and it trained small
numbers of ANP at a People’s Armed Police facility in China since 2006, with a focus on counter-
narcotics. It also has offered training for ANSF officers at People’s Liberation Army training
colleges and universities. On the sidelines of the SCO meeting during June 7-8, 2012, China
agreed on a strategic partnership with Afghanistan that includes security cooperation.
During the Taliban era, in December 2000, sensing China’s increasing concern about Taliban
policies, a Chinese official delegation met with Mullah Umar. However, China did not
enthusiastically support U.S. military action against the Taliban, possibly because China was
wary of a U.S. military buildup nearby.
Persian Gulf States
The Gulf states are considered a key part of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan. As noted, the late
Ambassador Holbrooke focused substantial U.S. attention—and formed a multilateral task
force—to try to curb continuing Gulf resident donations to the Taliban in Afghanistan. He
maintained that these donations are a larger source of Taliban funding than is the narcotics trade.
The Gulf states have also been a source of development funds and for influence with some
Afghan clerics and factions.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia has a role to play in Afghanistan in part because, during the Soviet occupation,
Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of dollars to the Afghan mujahedin, primarily the
Islamist factions. In so doing, Saudi Arabia developed extensive intelligence ties to these factions
as well as to the Taliban. A majority of Saudi citizens practice the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam
similar to that of the Taliban, and Saudi Arabia was one of three countries to formally recognize
the Taliban government. Some press reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders
discussed, but did not agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to decide
Bin Laden’s fate.
Saudi Arabia has played a role as a go-between for negotiations between the Karzai government
and “moderate” Taliban figures. This role was recognized at the London conference on January
28, 2010, in which President Karzai stated in his opening speech that he sees a role for Saudi
Arabia in helping stabilize Afghanistan. As noted, some reports say that a political settlement
might involve Mullah Umar going into exile in Saudi Arabia. This may explain why Karzai has
preferred to hold any talks with the Taliban in Saudi Arabia rather than Qatar. The Afghan
government also sees Saudi Arabia as a potential new source of investment; in early November
2012 it was reported that the Saudis will fund a $100 million mosque and education center in
Kabul. Some see the investment as a Saudi effort to enhance its influence in Afghanistan as
international involvement there wanes.
According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively, if not publicly, with OEF. It
broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September 2001 and quietly permitted the
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United States to use a Saudi base for command of U.S. air operations over Afghanistan, but it did
not permit U.S. airstrikes from it.
UAE
The United Arab Emirates, the third country that recognized the Taliban regime, is emerging as
another major donor to Afghanistan. It contributes about 300 troops to OEF and ISAF security
missions in southern Afghanistan, including Helmand province. Some are military medical
personnel who run small clinics and health programs for Afghans in the provinces where they
operate.
The UAE has donated at least $135 million to Afghanistan since 2002, according to the Afghan
Finance Ministry. Projects funded include housing in Qandahar, roads in Kabul, a hospital in
Zabol province, and a university in Khost. At the same time, the UAE property market has been
an outlet for investment by Afghan leaders who may have acquired their funds through soft loans
from the scandal-plagued Kabul Bank or through corruption connected to donor contracts or other
businesses.
Qatar
Until 2011, Qatar was not regarded as a significant player on the Afghanistan issue. It had not
recognized the Taliban regime when it was in power, and was said to have little influence with
Taliban figures interested in reconciliation. However, since late 2011, Qatar has increased its
profile as host of some Taliban negotiators there. The United States views Qatar as less influenced
by Pakistan than is Saudi Arabia, and this might explain why the United States has pushed for
Qatar to be the accepted host of a Taliban presence.
Keys to Afghanistan’s Post-War Future:
U.S. and International Aid and
Economic Development

Experts have long believed that accelerating economic development would contribute greatly to
improve the security situation. Economic development is widely considered pivotal to
Afghanistan’s ability to shape its future after 2104, at which time donors presumably wind down
their financial along with their military involvement. Donor aid currently accounts for more than
95% of Afghanistan’s GDP, and replacements for donated funds of that magnitude are hard to
identify. The crucial role of economic factors in the success of the transition and in post-2014
Afghanistan is discussed in an Administration report released in December 2011, called the “U.S.
Economic Strategy for Afghanistan.”70
Adding to the complexity of strategy development is the analysis that some economic sectors in
Afghanistan have been developed largely with private investment, including by wealthy or well-

70 The report, produced by the National Security Staff, was released December 2, 2011. It was mandated by the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011 (Section 1535 of P.L. 111-383).
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connected Afghans who have founded companies. Therefore, it is often difficult to determine the
effects on Afghanistan’s economy of aid, as compared to the effects of investment, trade, and
other variables. As noted above, as part of the U.S. strategy, in July 2011 then Secretary of State
Clinton and other U.S. officials articulated a post-transition vision of greater Afghan economic
integration in the region and its role in a “New Silk Road” trading pattern that would presumably
accelerate Afghan private sector growth and customs revenue receipts.
Hindering Afghanistan is that its economy and society are still fragile after decades of warfare
that left about 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans, and about 1 million Afghan children
who were born and raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. More than 3.5 million Afghan
refugees have since returned, although a comparable number remain outside Afghanistan. As
discussed, the literacy rate is very low and Afghanistan has a small, although growing, pool of
skilled labor, middle managers, accountants, and information professionals.
There are debates over virtually all aspects of international aid to Afghanistan, including amounts,
mechanisms for providing it, the lack of coordination among donors, and how aid is distributed
within Afghanistan. For example, some of the more stable provinces, such as Bamiyan and Balkh,
complain that most of the U.S. and international aid—an estimated 80%—is flowing mostly to
the restive provinces in an effort to quiet them, and ignoring the needs of poor Afghans in
peaceful areas. Later in this report are tables showing U.S. appropriations of assistance to
Afghanistan, and Table 13 lists U.S. spending on all sectors for FY2001-FY2010.
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan
During the 1990s, the United States became the largest single provider of assistance to the Afghan
people. During Taliban rule, no U.S. aid went directly to that government; monies were provided
through relief organizations. Between 1985 and 1994, the United States had a cross-border aid
program for Afghanistan, implemented by USAID personnel based in Pakistan. Citing the
difficulty of administering this program, there was no USAID mission for Afghanistan from the
end of FY1994 until the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan in late 2001.
For all of FY2002-FY2012, the United States provided about $83 billion in assistance, including
military “train and equip” for the ANA and ANP (which is about $51 billion of these funds). The
figures in the tables, which include aid costs for FY2012 and the request for FY2013, do not
include costs for U.S. combat operations. Those costs amount are/estimated to be about $90
billion in FY2010, $104 billion for FY2011, $93 billion for FY2012, and $82 billion for FY2013.
When those costs are included, the United States has spent about $557 billion on the Afghanistan
effort during FY2002-2012. For further information, see CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
, by Amy Belasco.
Aid Oversight
Still heavily dependent on donors, Karzai has sought to reassure the international donor
community by establishing a transparent budget and planning process. Some in Congress want to
increase independent oversight of U.S. aid to Afghanistan; the conference report on the FY2008
defense authorization bill (P.L. 110-181) established a “special inspector general” for Afghanistan
reconstruction, (SIGAR) modeled on a similar outside auditor for Iraq. Funds provided for the
SIGAR are in the tables below. The SIGAR issues audit reports on numerous aspects of Afghan
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governance and security, with particular attention to how U.S.-provided funds have been used.
The SIGAR, as of July 2012, is John Sopko.
Aid Authorization: Afghanistan Freedom Support Act
A key post-Taliban aid authorization bill, S. 2712, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA)
of 2002 (P.L. 107-327, December 4, 2002), as amended, authorized about $3.7 billion in U.S.
civilian aid for FY2003-FY2006. The law, whose authority has now expired, was intended to
create a central source for allocating funds; that aid strategy was not implemented. However,
some of the humanitarian, counter-narcotics, and governance assistance targets authorized by the
act were met or exceeded by appropriations. No Enterprise Funds authorized by the act have been
appropriated. The act authorized the following:
• $60 million in total counter-narcotics assistance ($15 million per year for
FY2003-FY2006);
• $30 million in assistance for political development, including national, regional,
and local elections ($10 million per year for FY2003-FY2005);
• $80 million total to benefit women and for Afghan human rights oversight ($15
million per year for FY2003-FY2006 for the Afghan Ministry of Women’s
Affairs, and $5 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 to the Human Rights
Commission of Afghanistan);
• $1.7 billion in humanitarian and development aid ($425 million per year for
FY2003-FY2006);
• $300 million for an Enterprise Fund;
• $550 million in drawdowns of defense articles and services for Afghanistan and
regional militaries. (The original law provided for $300 million in drawdowns.
That was increased by subsequent appropriations laws.)
A subsequent law (P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004), implementing the recommendations of the
9/11 Commission, contained “The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.” The
subtitle mandated the appointment of a U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan and requires
additional Administration reports to Congress.
Afghan Freedom Support Act Reauthorization
In the 110th Congress, H.R. 2446, passed by the House on June 6, 2007 (406-10), would have
reauthorized AFSA through FY2010, and have authorized about $1.7 billion in U.S. economic aid
and $320 in military aid (including drawdowns of equipment) per fiscal year for that period. A
Senate version (S. 3531), with fewer provisions than the House bill, was not taken up by the full
Senate. H.R. 2446 would It also would have authorized a pilot program of crop substitution to
encourage legitimate alternatives to poppy cultivation and a cut off of U.S. aid to any Afghan
province in which the Administration reports that the leadership of the province is complicit in
narcotics trafficking. AFSA reauthorization was not reintroduced subsequently.
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Direct Support to the Afghan Government
Because of the paucity of funds taken in by the Afghan government—about $2 billion expected
for all of 2012, about 90% of total Afghan government expenditures (operating budget and
development budget) is provided by international donors. Of that amount, the United States
provide 62% and other donors provided 28% of total expenditures.71 Afghan officials stated in
material circulated at the December 5, 2011, Bonn Conference that it will need at least $10 billion
in donated funds per year from 2014 (the end of the security transition) until 2025, at which time
Afghanistan is to be financially self-sufficient.
Currently, the United States disburses more than 40% of its donated aid funds through the Afghan
government. The Kabul Conference (July 20, 2010) communiqué endorsed a goal of increasing
that to about 50% and for 80% of all funds to align with Afghan government priorities.
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)
Some U.S. funds are provided both directly and through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust
Fund (ARTF), discussed above, run by the World Bank. As of June 2012, donors have pledged
$6.1 billion to the ARTF, with about $5.7 billion paid. The funds are about equally split between
funding Afghan salaries and priority development investments. Of those funds, the United States
has paid in $1.74 billion. Donors, including the United States, resumed contributing to the ARTF
in November 2011, when the IMF restored its credit program for Afghanistan, which had been
suspended for more than a year because of the Kabul Bank scandal.
National Solidarity Program
Through the ARTF, the United States supports an Afghan government program that promotes
local decision making on development—the “National Solidarity Program” (NSP). The program
provides block grants of about $60,000 per project to local councils to implement their priority
projects, most of which are water projects. The Afghan implementer is the Ministry of Rural
Rehabilitation and Development. It is widely hailed by many institutions as a highly successful,
Afghan-run program, although its contributions to improving local governance are unclear. Still,
it is being implemented in almost every district of Afghanistan. Donors have provided the
program with over $600 million, about 90% of which has been U.S. funding. U.S. funds for the
program are drawn from a broad category of ESF for “good governance.” P.L. 111-32, the
FY2009 supplemental discussed above, earmarked $70 million to defray a large part of a shortfall
in that program. The FY2010 consolidated appropriation (P.L. 111-117) earmarked another $175
million in ESF for the program.

71 Government Accountability Office. “Afghanistan’s Donor Dependence.” September 20, 2011.
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Table 7. Major Reporting Requirements
Several provisions require Administration reports on numerous aspects of U.S. strategy, assistance, and related issues.

P.L. 108-458, The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments required, through the end of FY2010, an
overarching annual report on U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Other reporting requirements expired, including
required reports (1) on long-term U.S. strategy and progress of reconstruction; (2) on how U.S. assistance is
being used; (3) on U.S. efforts to persuade other countries to participate in Afghan peacekeeping; and (4) a joint
State and DOD report on U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan.

P.L. 110-181 (Section 1230), FY2008 Defense Authorization Act requires a quarterly DOD report on the
security situation in Afghanistan; the first was submitted in June 2008. It was required by that law through
FY2011. Section 1231 required a report on the Afghan National Security Forces through the end of FY2010.
Both reports have been extended until the end of FY2014 by the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act
(H.R. 1540, P.L. 112-81).

Section 1229 of the same law requires the quarterly report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR).

P.L. 111-8 (Omnibus Appropriation, explanatory statement) required a State Department report on the use of
funds to address the needs of Afghan women and girls (submitted by September 30, 2009).

P.L. 111-32, FY2009 Supplemental Appropriation (Section 1116), required a White House report, by the time of
the FY2011 budget submission, on whether Afghanistan and Pakistan are cooperating with U.S. policy sufficiently
to warrant a continuation of Administration policy toward both countries, as wel as efforts by these
governments to curb corruption, their efforts to develop a counter-insurgency strategy, the level of political
consensus in the two countries to confront security chal enges, and U.S. government efforts to achieve these
objectives. The report was released with a date of September 30, 2010.

The same law (Section 1117) required a report, by September 23, 2009, on metrics to be used to assess
progress on Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy. A progress report measured against those metrics is to be
submitted by March 30, 2010, and every six months thereafter, until the end of FY2011.

Section 1228 of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84) required a report, within 120
days, on the Afghan Provincial Protection Program and other local security initiatives. Section 1235 authorized a
DOD-funded study of U.S. force levels needed for eastern and southern Afghanistan, and Section 1226 required
a Comptrol er General report on the U.S. “campaign plan” for the Afghanistan (and Iraq) effort.

Sections 1212-1226 of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310, P.L. 112-239) contains
several reporting or congressional notification requirements on Afghanistan, on issues such as women’s rights, an
independent assessment of the performance of the ANSF, negotiations on the bilateral security agreement, the
political reconciliation and insurgent reintegration process, the U.S. campaign plan, insider attacks, any changes to
U.S. troop levels, and other issues. These sections also contain authorities on use of some DOD funds in
Afghanistan, such as CERP and funding for the reintegration process.

Sustaining Aid Beyond the Transition
U.S. and Afghan policymakers are concerned that international assistance will wane after the end
of the transition in 2014. As shown in Table 9, non-U.S. donors, including such institutions as the
EU and the Asian Development Bank, have provided over $29 billion in assistance to Afghanistan
since the fall of the Taliban. When combined with U.S. aid, this by far exceeds the $27.5 billion
for reconstruction identified by the IMF as required for 2002-2010. Major pledges have been
made primarily at donor conferences such as Tokyo (2002), Berlin (April 2004), Kabul (April
2005), London (February 2006), Paris (June 2008), and London (January 2010).
The December 5, 2011, Bonn Conference was not, according to U.S. officials, intended as a
“pledging conference.” However, in advance of that conference the World Bank released a report
warning that an abrupt aid cutoff could lead to fiscal implosion, loss of control over the security
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sector, the collapse of political authority, and the possibility of civil war. At the Bonn Conference,
Afghan officials stated that Afghanistan would be dependent on about $10 billion per year of
international economic aid until 2025.
Among multilateral lending institutions, the World Bank is expected to be key to sustaining
Afghanistan long term. In May 2002, the World Bank reopened its office in Afghanistan after 20
years. Its projects have been concentrated in the telecommunications and road and sewage
sectors. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has also been playing a major role in Afghanistan,
including in financing railway construction. Another of its projects in Afghanistan was funding
the paving of a road from Qandahar to the border with Pakistan, and as noted above, it is
contributing to a project to bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. On the eve of the
London conference on January 28, 2010, the IMF and World Bank announced $1.6 billion in
Afghanistan debt relief.
July 8, 2012, Tokyo Conference72
Identifying sources of post-2014 assistance (2012-2022 is termed the “transformation decade”)
was the focus of an international conference on Afghanistan in Tokyo on July 8, 2012. At the
conference, the United States and its partners pledged a total of $16 billion in aid to Afghanistan
through 2015 ($4 billion per year for 2012-2015) and agreed to sustain support through 2017 at
levels at or near the past decade. As part of that overall pledge, at the conference, Secretary
Clinton said the Administration would ask Congress to sustain U.S. aid to Afghanistan at roughly
the levels it has been through 2017. Among other major pledges, Japan pledged $5 billion over
five years (2012-2017), and Germany pledged $550 million over four years (2014-2016).
The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework issued in concert with the final conference
declaration lays out requirements of the Afghan government in good governance, anti-corruption,
holding free and fair elections, and human rights. As an incentive, if Afghanistan meets the
benchmarks, the Framework will increase (to 10% by 2014 and to 20% by 2024) the percentage
of aid provided through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and other incentive
mechanisms. The ARTF gives Kabul the maximum discretion in use of the donated funds.
Development in Key Sectors
Efforts to build the legitimate economy are showing some results, by accounts of senior U.S.
officials. Some sectors, discussed below, are being developed primarily (although not
exclusively) with private investment funding. There has been substantial new construction,
particularly in Kabul, including luxury hotels; a $25 million Coca Cola bottling factory (opened
in September 2006); apartment and office buildings; and marriage halls and other structures. The
bottling factory is located near the Bagrami office park (another private initiative), which includes
several other factories. The Serena luxury hotel was built by the Agha Khan foundation, a major
investor in Afghanistan. On the other hand, press reports in March 2012 said that uncertainty
about the post-2014 political and security situation is causing some Afghan businessmen to
relocate outside the country, or to develop external components of their business in case the

72 http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/article/the-tokyo-declaration-partnership-for-self-reliance-in-afghanistan-
from-transition-to-transf

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situation in Afghanistan deteriorates. Others say that private investment could have been healthier
if not for the influence exercised over it by various faction leaders and Karzai relatives.
An arm of DOD, called the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, formerly headed by
Deputy Under Secretary Paul Brinkley, facilitated some of the investment. The FY2011 Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383) required the Task Force be folded into State/USAID-led
assistance structures by the end of FY2011. The following are some key sectors and what has
been accomplished with U.S. and international donor funds, as well as with private investment.
Education
Despite the success in enrolling Afghan children in school since the Taliban era (see statistics
above), setbacks have occurred because of Taliban attacks on schools, causing some to close. In
addition, Afghanistan’s university system is said to be woefully underfunded, in part because
Afghans are entitled to free higher education (to the B.A. level) by the Constitution, which means
that demand for the higher education far outstrips Afghan resources. The shortfall is impeding the
development of a large enough pool of skilled workers for the Afghan government. Afghanistan
requires about $35 million to operate its universities and institutes for one year; USAID plans to
spend about $20 million to help fund those activities in FY2012.73
Health
The health care sector, as noted by Afghan observers, has made considerable gains in reducing
infant mortality and giving about 65% of the population at least some access to health
professionals. In addition to U.S. assistance to develop the health sector’s capacity, Egypt
operates a 65-person field hospital at Bagram Air Base that instructs Afghan physicians. Jordan
operates a similar facility in Mazar-e-Sharif.
Roads
Road building is considered a U.S. priority and has been USAID’s largest project category there,
taking up about 25% of USAID spending since the fall of the Taliban. Roads are considered key
to enabling Afghan farmers to bring legitimate produce to market in a timely fashion, and former
commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan General Eikenberry (later Ambassador) said “where the
roads end, the Taliban begin.” The major road, the Ring Road, is nearly all repaved, and the 150
miles in the northwest remaining to be repaved is being funded by a $350 million Asian
Development Bank donation. Among other major projects completed are a road from Qandahar to
Tarin Kowt, (Uruzgan province) built by U.S. military personnel, inaugurated in 2005; and a road
linking the Panjshir Valley to Kabul. In several of the most restive provinces, U.S. funds
(sometimes CERP funds) are being used to build roads that link up farming communities to the
market for their products. Other key priorities are completing a Khost-Gardez road, under way
currently, but slowed by security concerns, and a Salang Bypass Road through Bamiyan province.
The Afghan government has committed to developing an East-West road across Afghanistan,
from Herat to Kabul. However, funding only for a few segments (Herat to Chest-e-Sharif, and

73 Boak, Josh. “Afghan Universities Struggling for Funding.” Washington Post, February 13, 2011.
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Maidany Shar to Bamiyan, and Bamiyan City to Yakowlang in that same province) have been
identified, from Italy and Japan.
Bridges
Afghan officials are said to be optimistic about increased trade with Central Asia now that a new
bridge has opened (October 2007) over the Panj River, connecting Afghanistan and Tajikistan.
The bridge was built with $33 million in (FY2005) U.S. assistance. The bridge is helping what
press reports say is robust reconstruction and economic development in the relatively peaceful
and ethnically homogenous province of Panjshir, the political base of the Northern Alliance.
Railways
Afghanistan is beginning to develop functioning railways—a sector it lacked as a legacy of
security policy during the late 19th century that saw railroads as facilitating invasion of
Afghanistan. Rail is considered increasing crucial to Afghanistan’s ability to develop its mineral
wealth because it is the means by which minerals can be exported to neighboring countries. Three
railway projects are under way. One, a 45 mile line from Mazar-i-Sharif to Hairaton, on the
border with Uzbekistan, was completed in March 2011 with $165 million from the Asian
Development Bank. It began operations in early 2012 and shortly thereafter began carrying its
peak capacity of 4,000 tons of cargo per month.
On the other hand, some other rail lines might not get built if foreign investors believe they will
not yield a significant payoff for their projects in the mining sector. In particular, China has
committed to building a line from its Aynak copper mine project to the northern border. A spur to
the Hajji Gak iron mine would be funded by India (about $1 billion) as part of its project there.
However, there are indications India and China might opt not to build these lines and to instead
truck their minerals out, a process that would slow full exploitation of these mines. There are also
plans to build a line from Herat and Kabul to Qandahar, and then on to the border with Pakistan.
The planned railways will link Afghanistan to the former Soviet railway system in Central Asia,
and to Pakistan’s railway system, increasing Afghanistan’s economic integration in the region.
Electricity
At least 10% of USAID funds for Afghanistan have been spent on power projects. The Afghan
government set a goal for electricity to reach 65% of households in urban areas and 25% in rural
areas by 2010, a goal that was not met. However, severe power shortages in Kabul, caused in part
by the swelling of Kabul’s population to about 3 million are fewer now than two years ago. Power
to the capital has grown due to the Afghan government’s agreements with several Central Asian
neighbors to import electricity, as well as construction of new substations. Many shops in Kabul
are now lit up at night, as observed by numerous visitors over the past few years, including CRS.
As noted above, in January 2011, Russia pledged to resume work on some long dormant
hydroelectric projects in Afghanistan that were suspended when Soviet troops withdrew in 1989.
Much of the USAID and DOD effort electricity capacity effort has been focused on southern
Afghanistan. There has been some criticism of a 105 Megawatt power generating plants built by
USAID at Tarakhil, in north Kabul at a cost of about $300 million because of the high costs of
fuel, the questionable need for the plant given alternative plants built recently, and the possible
inability of the Afghan authorities to maintain them. USAID has a $35 million program under
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way to help the national electric utility—Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkas (DABS)—operate and
maintain the Tarakhil plant. In January 2013, Afghanistan gained formal title to the Tarakhil plant
as well as two less efficient power plants built by Iran in western Afghanistan.
Regarding power capacity in southern Afghanistan, the key long-term project is to expand the
capacity of the Kajaki Dam, located in Helmand Province. Currently, two turbines are
operating—one was always working, and the second was repaired by USAID contractors. This
has doubled electricity production in the south and caused small factories and other businesses to
come to flourish. USAID plans to further expand capacity of the dam by installing a third turbine
(which there is a berth for but which never had a turbine installed.) In an operation involving
4,000 NATO troops (Operation Ogap Tsuka), components of the third turbine were successfully
delivered to the dam in September 2008. It was expected to be operational in mid-late 2009 but
technical and security problems, such as inability to secure and build roads leading to the dam,
have delayed the project.
During 2004-January 2012, USAID spent $72 million on the dam, and it intends to spend $85
million more. Those USAID funds—coupled with DOD funds from the Infrastructure Fund (see
aid tables at the end of this paper)—are being used to fund a $266 million contract to Black and
Veatch in December 2010 to complete the installation of the third turbine. Another $205 million
will be spent by the Army Corps of Engineers to improve power lines and substations fed by the
dam.74 Work on the third turbine installation did not begin as planned in April 2012, partly
because supply routes from Pakistan remained closed, and there still is no public estimate as to
when the third turbine will be completed.
In the interim, and to the consternation of some who want long-term, sustainable solutions for
Afghanistan rather than short-term palliatives, the U.S. military and USAID began in February
2011 to implement a plan (“Qandahar Bridging Solution”) to build smaller substations and
generator projects that can bring more electricity to Qandahar and other places in the south
quickly. The initiative was pursued in order to facilitate the U.S.-military led counter-insurgency
strategy in Qandahar. Some of the power provided by additional diesel generators is being used to
supply the Qandahar Industrial Park. However, the SIGAR reported in July 2012 that 5 of the 7
projects of the Bridging Solution are 6-15 months behind schedule. The SIGAR also recommends
that some focus be shifted to building up northern power distribution routes (North East Power
System) rather than an exclusive focus on the South East Power System network. Other criticism
centers on the cost of fuel for the diesel generators, for which the Afghans are dependent on
continued U.S. funding. For these and other power projects, the Administration requested
legislative authority for an “Infrastructure Fund” to be funded by DOD. That authority was
provided in the FY2011 DOD authorization bill (P.L. 111-383). Actual funding is depicted in the
aid tables below. President Karzai said in a CNN interview on June 26, 2011, that the Afghan
government favored emphasizing the longer-term Kajaki Dam project rather than the interim
generator project.
There is also an apparent increasing emphasis on providing electricity to individual homes and
villages through small solar power installations. A contractor to USAID, IRG, has provided small
solar powered-electricity generators to homes in several districts of Afghanistan, alleviating the
need to connect such homes to the national power grid. However, there are technical drawbacks,
including weather-related inconsistency of power supply and the difficulty of powering

74 Michael Phillips. “Afghan Dam Saga Reflects U.S. Travails.” Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2012.
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appliances that require substantial power. The U.S. broadcasting service to Afghanistan, Radio
Azadi, run by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, has given out 20,000 solar-powered radios
throughout Afghanistan.
Agriculture
With about 80% of Afghans living in rural areas, the agriculture sector has always been key to
Afghanistan’s economy and stability. The late Ambassador Holbrooke, including in his January
2010 strategy document, outlined U.S. policy to boost Afghanistan’s agriculture sector not only to
reduce drug production but also as an engine of economic growth. Prior to the turmoil that
engulfed Afghanistan in the late 1970s, Afghanistan was a major exporter of agricultural
products.
USAID has spent about 15% of its Afghanistan funds on agriculture (and “alternative
livelihoods” to poppy cultivation), and this has helped Afghanistan double its legitimate
agricultural output over the past five years. One emerging “success story” is growing Afghan
exports of high-quality pomegranate juice called Anar. Other countries are promoting not only
pomegranates but also saffron rice and other crops that draw buyers outside Afghanistan. Another
emerging success story is Afghanistan’s November 2010 start of exports of raisins to Britain.75
Wheat production was robust in 2009 because of healthy prices for that crop, and Afghanistan is
again self-sufficient in wheat production. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has about 110
personnel in Afghanistan on long-term and priority projects; there are also at least 25 agriculture
experts from USAID in Afghanistan. Their efforts include providing new funds to buy seeds and
agricultural equipment, and to encourage agri-business. In addition, the National Guard from
several states is deploying nine (as of March 2011) “Agribusiness Development Teams” in
several provinces to help Afghan farmers with water management, soil enhancement, crop
cultivation, and improving the development and marketing of their goods.
U.S. strategy has addressed not only crop choice but also trying to construct the entirety of the
infrastructure needed for a healthy legitimate agriculture sector, including road building, security
of the routes to agriculture markets, refrigeration, storage, transit through Pakistan and other
transportation of produce, building legitimate sources of financing, and other aspects of the
industry. U.S. officials in Kabul say that Pakistan’s restrictions on trade between Afghanistan and
India had prevented a rapid expansion of Afghan pomegranate exports to that market, but the
transit trade agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, discussed above, is expected to
alleviate some of these bottlenecks. Dubai is another customer for Afghan pomegranate exports.
There is a vibrant timber industry in the northeast provinces. However, the exports are illegal. De-
forestation has been outlawed because of the potential for soil erosion and other economic and
environmental effects.
In terms of specific programming, USAID has a $150 million program for the relatively safe
areas of Afghanistan to continue to develop licit crops. The Incentives Driving Economic
Alternatives for the North, East, and West (IDEA-NEW) program is planned to run through
FY2014. In southern and eastern areas of the country where counterinsurgency operations are
ongoing, USAID’s $474 million Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture
(AVIPA-Plus) program ran through FY2011 and includes initiatives coordinated with U.S.

75 Lemmon, Gayle Tzemach. “New Hope for Afghan Raisin Farmers.” New York Times, October 9, 2010.
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counterinsurgency operations in Helmand and Qandahar provinces. The program provides
vouchers for wheat seed, fertilizer, and tools, in addition to supporting cash for work programs
and small grants to local cooperatives.
Telecommunications
Several Afghan telecommunications firms have been formed. With startup funds from the Agha
Khan Foundation (the Agha Khan is leader of the Isma’ili community, which is prevalent in
northern Afghanistan), the highly successful Roshan cellphone company was founded. Another
Afghan cellphone firm is Afghan Wireless. The most significant post-Taliban media network is
Tolo Television, owned by Moby Media. U.S. funds are being used to supplement the private
investment; a $4 million U.S. grant, in partnership with the Asia Consultancy Group, is being
used to construct communication towers in Bamiyan and Ghor provinces. The Afghan
government plans to link all major cities by fiber optic cable by mid-2012.
Airlines
The 52-year-old national airline, Ariana, is said to be in significant financial trouble due to
corruption that has affected its safety ratings and left it unable to service a heavy debt load.
However, there are new privately run airlines, such as Safi Air (run by the Safi Group, which has
built a modern mall in Kabul), and Kam Air. Another, Pamir, was ordered closed in 2010 due to
safety concerns. In January 2013, the U.S. military ceased contracting with an Afghan airline,
Kam Air, on the grounds that it was helping traffic opium; the U.S. military rescinded the ruling
after Afghan complaints that questioned the allegation. The Afghan government agreed to
investigate the allegations.
Mining and Gems
Afghanistan’s mining sector has been largely dormant since the Soviet invasion. Some Afghan
leaders complain that not enough has been done to revive such potentially lucrative industries as
minerals mining, such as of copper and lapis lazuli (a stone used in jewelry). The issue became
more urgent in June 2010 when a DOD development team announced, based on surveys, that
Afghanistan may have untapped minerals worth over $1 trillion.76 Although copper and iron are
the largest categories by value, there are believed to also be significant reserves of such minerals
as lithium in western Afghanistan—lithium is crucial to the new batteries being used to power
electric automobiles. However, as noted above, some of the expected revenue from this sector
might not materialize if investors decide not to build rail lines needed to export the minerals from
Afghanistan in large volumes.
Mes Aynak Copper Field. A major project, signed in November 2007, is with China Metallurgical
Group for the company to invest $3.0 billion to develop Afghanistan’s Mes Aynak copper field in
Lowgar Province. The agreement, viewed as generous to the point where it might not be
commercially profitable for China Metallurgical Group, includes construction of two coal-fired
electric power plants (one of which will supply more electricity to Kabul city); a segment of
railway (discussed above); and a road from the project to Kabul. Work on the mine reportedly has
been slowed by various factors, including the need to clear mines in the area and to excavate

76 Risen, James. “U.S. Identifies Mineral Riches in Afghanistan.” New York Times, June 14, 2010.
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ancient Buddhist artifacts that local activists insist be preserved. Actual digging at the mine was
expected to begin in mid-2012, but it is not clear if this has occurred to date. U.S. forces do not
directly protect the project, but U.S. forces have set up small bases on some of the roads leading
to the mine project to provide general stability there.
Hajji Gak Iron Ore Project. In September 2011 seven bids were submitted for another large
mining project, the Hajji Gak iron ore mine (which may contain 60 billion tons of iron ore) in
Bamiyan Province. The bids—from Chinese, Indian, and other firms—were evaluated and, in late
2011, the Steel Authority for India Ltd. (SAIL) was awarded the largest share of the project. One
of the four blocs of the project was awarded to Kilo Gold of Canada. The project is expected to
generate $200 million in annual government revenues when fully operational—expected by
2017—although this level might not be reached unless the associated rail lines are built to allow
export in high volumes.
On December 14, 2010, with involvement of the DOD Task Force for Business and Stability
Operations, 10 outside investors announced $50 million in investment in a gold mine in Baghlan
Province. There is another gold mine operating in neighboring Takhar Province.
On December 7, 2011, the Ministry of Mines began accepting bids to develop copper and gold
deposits in large parts of the north, northeast, west, and central Afghanistan. Other tenders have
gone out to develop the Namak Sar lithium deposit in Herat Province.
Oil, Gas, and Related Pipelines
Years of war have stunted developed of a hydrocarbons energy sector in Afghanistan. The country
has no hydrocarbons export industry and a small refining sector that provides some of
Afghanistan’s needs for gasoline or other fuels. Most of Afghanistan’s fuel comes from
neighboring states. However, Afghanistan’s prospects in this sector appeared to brighten by the
announcement in March 2006 of an estimated 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet
of gas reserves, amounts that could make Afghanistan self-sufficient in energy or even able to
export. In a major development, on December 15, 2010, the Afghan government let a six-month
contract to a local firm, Ghazanfar Neft Gas, to collect and market crude oil from the Angot field
in northern Afghanistan (part of a field that may contain 80 million barrels of oil), initially
producing at the low rate of 800 barrels per day.
The energy sector took a major step forward with the awarding in early 2012 of development
rights to the Amu Darya basin (northern Afghanistan) oil fields to China National Petroleum Co.
The field is expected to start producing 5,000 barrels per day by early 2013, with a longer-term
potential of 145,000 barrels per day. The $3 billion development has a local partner, the Watan
Group, owned by Karzai relatives Rashid and Rateb Popal.
A tender will be offered later in 2012 or in early 2012 to develop a larger oil field in Balkh
Province (Kasha Kari bloc), estimated to hold 1.8 billion barrels of oil. Exxon-Mobil is reportedly
weighting a bid on the project—an action that Afghan officials say would instill substantial
confidence in the investment climate in Afghanistan.77

77 Matthew Rosenberg. “As Exxon Mobil Weights Oil Bid, Afghans Move Closer to a Foreign Investment Goal.” New
York Times, July 6, 2012.
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USAID has funded test projects to develop gas resources in northern Afghanistan. Building on
that aid, there is increasing optimism that private investors will fund at least 25% of a $300
million needed investment for a 200 megawatt gas-fired thermal plant in northern Afghanistan.
The plant would be part of a plan to link Afghanistan’s natural gas field in Shehbergan to the
population center in Mazar-e-Sharif. Another pilot project, funded by the Defense Department’s
Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, is to develop filling stations and convert cars to
use compressed natural gas (CNG), which is produced in the gas field in Shehbergan and could
provide an inexpensive source of fuel in the future.
TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) Gas Pipeline Project.
Another long-stalled major energy project appears to be gaining momentum. During 1996-1998,
the Clinton Administration supported proposed natural gas and oil pipelines through western
Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions to cooperate. A consortium led by Los
Angeles-based Unocal Corporation proposed a $7.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline that would
originate in southern Turkmenistan and pass through Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible
extensions into India.78 The deterioration in U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 suspended hopes for
the pipeline projects. At a summit meeting in late May 2002, the leaders of Turkmenistan,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan agreed to revive the project. Sponsors held an inaugural meeting on
July 9, 2002, in Turkmenistan, signing a series of preliminary agreements. On December 12,
2010, in the Turkmenistan capital Ashkabad, the relevant leaders reaffirmed their intent to
complete the project. In late 2011, the Asian Development Bank has agreed to finance the project,
removing what had been a major hurdle. U.S. officials view this project as a superior alternative
to a proposed gas pipeline from Iran to India, transiting Pakistan.
Trade Promotion/Reconstruction Opportunity Zones
The key to U.S. economic strategy, as exemplified by the New Silk Road strategy, is to encourage
Afghanistan’s trade relationships. The United States is doing so by promoting regional economic
integration, discussed above, as well as through bilateral economic agreements with Afghanistan.
A key to the strategy was accomplished in 2011 when Afghanistan and Pakistan finalized
provisions to implement their 2010 transit trade agreement. To facilitate Afghanistan’s ability to
increase trade, USAID is funding a five year project ($63 million total during 2010-2014) to
simplify the customs clearance process. This includes new import procedures that have reduced
the time needed for imports to clear customs by 45%. On December 13, 2004, the 148 countries
of the World Trade Organization voted to start membership talks with Afghanistan.
Earlier, in September 2004, the United States and Afghanistan signed a bilateral trade and
investment framework agreement (TIFA), and most of Afghanistan’s exports are eligible for duty
free treatment under the enhanced Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program. The
Administration economic strategy report of December 2011 says the Administration is reaching
out to Afghan exporters and U.S. importers of Afghan products to make increased use of the GSP

78 Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of South Korea, Crescent Steel
of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say
Russia’s Gazprom would probably receive a stake in the project. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), October 30, 1997,
p. 3.
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program. The TIFA is seen as a prelude to a broader and more complex bilateral free trade
agreement, but negotiations on an FTA have not yet begun.
Another initiative supported by the United States is the establishment of joint Afghan-Pakistani
“Reconstruction Opportunity Zones” (ROZs) which would be modeled after “Qualified Industrial
Zones” run by Israel and Jordan in which goods produced in the zones receive duty free treatment
for import into the United States. Bills in the 110th Congress, S. 2776 and H.R. 6387, would have
authorized the President to proclaim duty-free treatment for imports from ROZs to be designated
by the President. In the 111th Congress, a version of these bills was introduced (S. 496 and H.R.
1318). President Obama specifically endorsed passage of these bills in his March 2009 strategy
announcement. H.R. 1318 was incorporated into H.R. 1886, a major Pakistan aid appropriation
that passed by the House on June 11, 2009, and was then appended to H.R. 2410. However, the
version of the major Pakistan aid bill that became law (S. 1707, P.L. 111-73) did not authorize
ROZs.
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Table 8. Comparative Social and Economic Statistics
Population
28 million +. Kabul population is 3 million, up from 500,000 in Taliban era.
Ethnicities/Religions
Pashtun 42%; Tajik 27%; Uzbek 9%; Hazara 9%; Aimak 4%; Turkmen 3%; Baluch 2%.
Size of Religious
Religions: Sunni (Hanafi school) 80%; Shi te (Hazaras, Qizilbash, and Isma’ilis) 19%; other 1% Christians-
Minorities
estimated 500-8,000 persons; Sikh and Hindu-3,000 persons; Bahai’s-400 (declared blasphemous in May
2007); Jews-1 person; Buddhist- smal numbers. No Christian or Jewish schools. One church.
Literacy Rate
28% of population over 15 years of age. 43% of males; 12.6% of females.
GDP, and GDP Growth
$29.8 billion purchasing power parity (PPP). 109th in the world. Per capita: $1,000 purchasing power parity.
and Unemployment
212th in the world. Growth: about 9% for 2010; 8% expected for 2011; and 7% for 2012. GDP was about $10
Rates
billion (PPP) during last year of Taliban rule. Unemployment rate is about 8%, but underemployment rate may
be nearly 50%.
Children in
7.1 million, of which 40% are girls. Up from 900,000 boys in school during Taliban era. 4,000 schools built (all
School/Schools Built
donors) and 140,000 teachers hired since Taliban era. 17 universities, up from 2 in 2002. 75,000 Afghans in
since 2002
universities in Afghanistan (35% female); 5,000 when Taliban was in power.
Afghans With Access to
65% with basic health services access-compared to 8% during Taliban era. Infant mortality down 22% since
Health Coverage
Taliban to 135 per 1,000 live births. 680 clinics built.
Roads Built
About 2,500 miles paved post-Taliban, including repaving of “Ring Road” (78% complete) that circles the
country. Kabul-Qandahar drive reduced to 6 hours.
Judges/Courts
Over 1,000 judges (incl. 200 women) trained since fal of Taliban.
Banks Operating
17, including branches in some rural areas, but about 90% of the population still use hawalas (informal money
transfer services). No banks existed during Taliban era. Some limited credit card use. Some Afghan police
now paid by cel phone (E-Paisa).
Access to Electricity
15%-20% of the population. Much of its electricity imported from neighboring states.
Government Revenues
About $1.7 billion in 2010; more than double the $720 million 2007. Total Afghan budget is about $4.5 billion
(excl. donor funds)
(including development funds)—shortfal covered by foreign donors, including through Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund.
Financial Reserves/Debt
About $4.4 billion, up from $180 million in 2002. Includes amounts due Central Bank. $8 billion bilateral debt,
plus $500 million multilateral. U.S. forgave $108 million in debt in 2004, and $1.6 billion forgiven by other
creditors in March 2010.
Foreign/Private
About $500 million to $1 billion per year. Four Afghan airlines: Ariana (national) plus at least two privately
Investment
owned: Safi and Kam. Turkish Air and India Air fly to Kabul.
Mining/Minerals
Vast untapped minerals affirmed by U.S. experts (June 2010). Chinese firm mining copper in Lowgar Province,
and contracts to mine iron ore and produce oil in in various stages of consideration and implementation.
Legal Exports/
80% of the population is involved in agriculture. Self-sufficiency in wheat production as of May 2009 (first time
Agriculture
in 30 years). Exports: $400 million+ (2011): fruits, raisins, melons, pomegranate juice (Anar), nuts, carpets,
lapis lazuli gems, marble tile, timber products (Kunar, Nuristan provinces). July 2010 Afghanistan-Pakistan
trade agreement.
Imports
Imports: $3.4 billion (2009): food, energy, capital goods, textiles, autos. Top five trading partners (in
descending order): Pakistan, Russia, Iran, India, United States.
Oil Proven Reserves
3.6 billion barrels of oil, 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas. Current oil production negligible, but USAID funding
project to revive oil and gas facilities in the north.
Cellphones/Tourism
About 6.5 million cellphone subscribers, up from neglibile amounts during Taliban era. Tourism: National
park opened in Bamiyan June 2009. Increasing tourist visits.
Sources: CIA, The World Factbook; various press and U.S. government official testimony; IMF and World Bank
estimates.
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Table 9. Major Non-U.S. Pledges for Afghanistan 2002-2012
($ in millions)
Japan

13,150
European Union

2,880
Germany 2,680
Asian Development Bank

2,270
Britain
2,220
World Bank

2,140
India
1,515
Canada
1,255
Iran
1,000
Netherlands
775
Norway 745
Australia 645
Italy
645
Sweden 635
United Nations

445
Denmark 435
France
320
China
255
Spain
220
Turkey 210
Finland 160
Russia
150
Saudi Arabia

140
UAE
135
Switzerland
120
South Korea

115
Czech Republic

105
Total
$24,900

(includes donors of under
(of which $19,700
$100 million, not listed)
disbursed—about 80%)
Source: Afghanistan Ministry of Finance: Development Cooperation Report, 2010; various U.S. government
reports, including Defense Department reports on Afghanistan stability. Figure for Japan includes $5 billion
pledged in 2008 (over five years) to fund Afghan National Police salaries, and funds pledged at July 8, 2012,
Tokyo donors conference. Figures for Germany included $550 mil ion pledged (over four years) at that meeting.
Note: Table includes donors of over $100 million only.
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Table 10. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998
($ in millions)
Fiscal
Devel.
Econ. Supp.
P.L. 480 (Title I
Other (Incl. Regional
Year
Assist.
(ESF)
and II)
Military
Refugee Aid)
Total
1978 4.989 —
5.742 0.269
0.789 11.789
1979 3.074 —
7.195 —
0.347 10.616
1980

(Soviet invasion-December 1979)


1981 — —
— —


1982 — —
— —


1983 — —
— —


1984 — —
— —


1985 3.369 —



3.369
1986 — —
8.9 —

8.9
1987 17.8 12.1
2.6 —

32.5
1988 22.5 22.5 29.9 —

74.9
1989 22.5 22.5 32.6 —

77.6
1990 35.0 35.0 18.1 —

88.1
1991 30 30 20.1 —
— 80.1
1992 25.0 25.0 31.4 —

81.4
1993 10 10 18.0 —
30.2 68.2
1994 3.4 2.0
9.0 —
27.9 42.3
1995 1.8 —
12.4 —
31.6 45.8
1996 — — 16.1 —
26.4 42.5
1997 — — 18.0 —
31.9a 49.9
1998 — —
3.6 —
49.14b 52.74
Source: Department of State.
a. Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics.
b. Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake relief aid,
100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and $1.54 for
counternarcotics.
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Table 11. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2001
($ in millions)

FY1999 FY2000 FY2001
U.S. Department of
42.0 worth of
68.875 for 165,000
131.1 (300,000
Agriculture (DOA) and
wheat (100,000
metric tons.
metric tons under
USAID Food For Peace
metric tons under
(60,000 tons for
P.L. 480, Title II,
(FFP), via World Food
“416(b)” program.)
May 2000 drought
and 416(b))
Program(WFP)
relief)
State/Bureau of
16.95 for Afghan
14.03 for the same
22.03 for similar
Population, Refugees and
refugees in Pakistan
purposes
purposes
Migration (PRM) via
and Iran, and to
UNHCR and ICRC
assist their
repatriation
State Department/
7.0 to various
6.68 for drought
18.934 for similar
Office of Foreign
NGOs to aid
relief and health,
programs
Disaster Assistance
Afghans inside
water, and
(OFDA)
Afghanistan
sanitation programs
State Department/HDP
2.615 3.0
2.8
(Humanitarian Demining
Program)
Aid to Afghan Refugees
5.44 (2.789 for
6.169, of which
5.31 for similar
in Pakistan (through
health, training—
$3.82 went to
purposes
various NGOs)
Afghan females in
similar purposes
Pakistan)
Counter-Narcotics

1.50
USAID/Office of

0.45
(Afghan
Transition Initiatives
women in
Pakistan)
DOD



Foreign Military



Financing
Anti-Terrorism



Economic Support Funds



(E.S.F)
Peacekeeping


Totals
76.6
113.2
182.6
Source: CRS.

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Table 12. Post-Taliban U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan
(appropriations/allocations in $ millions)
2002-2012
2013
Fiscal
Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
2010 2011 2012 Total
Req
ESF
117
239.3 895 1,280 473 1,211 1,400 2,048 3,346 2,066 1,837 14,953 1,850
DA
18.3 42.5 153 170 185 167 149
.4
.3
0
0
884
0
GHCS
7.5 49.7 33.4 38 41.5 101
63
58.
92
70
0
554
0
Refugee
Accounts 160
61.5
63.3 47 36 54 44 77 82 65 84 780 65
Food
Aid
206
74.5 99 97 108 70 231 87 32 19 .6 1,023 0
IDA
197
85.8
11.2
4.2 0 0 17 27 30 67 49 488 0
INCLE

60 0 220 709 233 252 308 484 589 400 324 3,562 600
NADR
44
34.7 67
38.
18.2 37 27 49 58 69 65 506 54
IMET

0.2
0.3 0.6 0.8 .8 1.1 1.7 1.4 1.8 1.6 2
13 1.5
FMF
57
191
414
397 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1,059 0
Other
32
23.1 36 18 0.2 0.1 21
5 3.8 7.4 8 156 0
DOD—ASSF
0 0
0 995 1,908 7,406 2,750 5,607 9,163 1,1619 11200 50,648 5,749
DOD—CERP
0 0 40 136 215 209 488 551 1000 400 400 3,439 400
Infrastructure
Fund 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 400 400 800 400
Business
Task
Force 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 59 239 258 571 179
DOD—Counternarc 0 0 72
224.5 108 291 193 230 392 376 425 2,312 405
DOD—Other
7.5
165
285
540 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 998 0
DEA Counternarc
0.6
2.9
3.7
17
23.7
20
41
19
0
0
0
128
0
Total U.S. Assistance
908
970
2393
4,711
3,351
9,818
5,732
9,299
14,848
15,801
15,051
82,872
9,703
Sources and Notes: Prepared by Curt Tarnoff, Specialist in Foreign Assistance, August 2012. Department of State annual budget presentation documents; SIGAR Report
July 30, 2012; and CRS calculations. Does not include SIGAR or State/USAID operational expenses (over $5 billion since 2002). Food aid includes P.L.480 Title II, Food for
Education, Food for Progress, 416b Food Aid, Emerson Trust, and USAID CCC. “Other” = USAID Other, Office of Transition Initiatives, Treasury Technical Assistance,
and Peacekeeping accounts. ESF = Economic Support Funds; DA = Development Assistance; GHCS = Global Health/Child Survival; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; NADR
= Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining, and Related: IMET = International Military Education and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics and Law Enforcement;
ASSF = Afghan Security Forces Funding; IDA = International Disaster Assistance.
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Table 13. Total Obligations for Major Programs: FY2001-FY2011
($ in millions. Source: USAID and CRS calculations)
Security Related Programs (mostly DOD funds)
Afghan National Security Forces (incl. FMF, and DOD ANSFF)
40,506
Commander Emergency Response Program (CERP)
3,039
Karzai Protection (NADR funds)
440
Counter-Narcotics (INCLE, DOD, DEA)
5,146
Other, incl de-mining operations (Halo Trust, other contractors)
155
International Military Education and Training Funds (IMET)
10.2
Defense article drawdown/DOD Infrastructure Fund/Business Task Force
1,711
Humanitarian-Related Programs
Food Aid (USDA and USAID: P.L. 480 Title 1 and II; Food for Progress, 416(b),
1,096
Food for Education)
Migration and Refugee aid (including emergency)
690
Debt Relief for Afghan government
11
Disaster Relief (IDA)
438
USAID Development Funding: Economic Support Funds (ESF) and
Total: 13,847
Development Assistance (DA)
Afghan government budget support
255
Democracy (Including election support)
1,400
Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (for National Solidarity Program, etc)
1,690
(about 500 for NSP)
Rule of Law and Human Rights (not incl. some INCLE funds)
187
Roads
2,148
Power/Electricity
1,921
Education
795
Health Sector
930
Water
120
Agriculture
1,025
PRT projects (development and local governance)
1,234
Private Sector Development/Econ. Growth (incl cash-for-work)
1,122
Alternative Development/Livelihoods
1,020
Other Aid:

Child Survival and Health
554
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)
26
Treasury Technical Assistance
3.5
Total (including minor amounts not included in table)
67,672
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Table 14. NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations
(approximate as of December 2012)
NATO Countries
Non-NATO Partners
Belgium 283
Albania 212
Bulgaria 572
Armenia 126
Canada 950*
Austria 3
Czech Republic
422
Australia
1550
Denmark 613
Azerbaijan 94
Estonia 155
Bosnia-Herzegovina
54
France 1500
Croatia 260
Germany 4737
Finland
136
Greece 12
Georgia
1570
Hungary 555
Ireland
6
Iceland 3
Jordan 0
Italy 4000
Macedonia
168
Latvia 40
Malaysia
46
Lithuania 221
Mongolia 88
Luxemburg 10
Montenegro 41
Netherlands 500
New
Zealand 155
Norway 145
Singapore 39
Poland
1800
South Korea
350
Portugal 141
Sweden 506
Romania 1762
Ukraine
25
Slovakia
343
United Arab Emirates
35
Slovenia 77
Tonga 55
Spain 1450


Turkey 1328


United Kingdom
9500


United States
68000


Total Listed ISAF: 105,000 (approximate)
Source: ISAF “Placemat”—October 8, 2012, and country announcements. Figure for Georgia reflects
announcement by that country of force increase, and figure for France reflects end of combat mission in
November 2012.
Note: *ISAF figures reflect Canada combat troop pul out in July-August 2011; numbers listed are to train
the ANSF.

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Table 15. Provincial Reconstruction Teams
Location (City)
Province/Command
U.S.-Lead (all under ISAF banner)
1. Gardez
Paktia Province (RC-East, E) (closed September 2012)
2. Ghazni
Ghazni (RC-E). Now mostly run by Poland.
3. Jalalabad
Nangarhar (RC-E)
4. Khost
Khost (RC-E)(closed September 2012)
5. Qalat
Zabol (RC-South, S). with Romania.
6. Asadabad
Kunar (RC-E) (closed September 2012)
7. Sharana
Paktika (RC-E)
8. Mehtarlam
Laghman (RC-E)(closed September 2012)
9. Jabal o-Saraj
Panjshir Province (RC-E), State Department lead Z(closed September 2012)
10. Qala Gush
Nuristan (RC-E)
11. Farah
Farah (RC-SW)
Partner Lead (most under ISAF banner)
PRT Location
Province
Lead Force/Other forces
12. Qandahar
Qandahar (RC-S)
Canada (seat of RC-S)
13. Lashkar Gah
Helmand (RC-S)
Britain. with U.S., Denmark, and Estonia
14. Tarin Kowt
Uruzgan (RC-S)
Australia (and U.S.) (Replaced Netherlands in August 2010)
15. Herat
Herat (RC-W)
Italy (seat of RC-W)
16. Qalah-ye Now
Badghis (RC-W)
Spain
17. Mazar-e-Sharif
Balkh (RC-N)
Sweden
18. Konduz
Konduz (RC-N)
Germany (seat of RC-N)
29. Faizabad
Badakhshan (RC-N)
Germany. with Denmark, Czech Rep. (closed in September 2012)
20. Meymaneh
Faryab (RC-N)
Norway. with Sweden. (closed in September 2012)
21. Chaghcharan
Ghowr (RC-W)
Lithuania. with Denmark, U.S., Iceland (closed in September 2012)
22. Pol-e-Khomri
Baghlan (RC-N)
Hungary (closed in September 2012)
23. Bamiyan
Bamiyan (RC-E)
U.S. and New Zealand (not NATO/ISAF). Will close in April 2013
24. Maidan Shahr
Wardak (RC-C)
U.S. and Turkey
25. Pul-i-Alam
Lowgar (RC-E)
U.S. and Czech Republic
26. Shebergan
Jowzjan (RC-N)
Turkey (closed in September 2012)
27. Charikar
Parwan (RC-E)
South Korea (Bagram, in Parwan Province, is the base of RC-E)
28. Mahmud-i-Raqi
Kapisa (RC-E)
France
Note: RC = Regional Command.
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Table 16. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan
Party/
Ideology/

Leader Leader
Ethnicity Regional
Base
Taliban
Mullah (Islamic cleric) Muhammad Umar (still at large
Ultra-
Throughout
possibly in Afghanistan. Umar, born in Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan
orthodox
south and east.
province, is about 65 years old.
Islamic,
Smal numbers
Pashtun
elsewhere.
Haqqani
Jalaludin Haqqani. Allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda. Said to
Same
as
Paktia, Paktika,
Network
be supported, or at least tolerated, by Pakistani ISI.
above
Khost, Kabul
Islamic Society Yunus Qanooni (speaker of lower house)/Muhammad
Moderate Much of
(leader of
Fahim/Dr. Abdul ah Abdul ah (Foreign Minister 2001-2006).
Islamic,
northern and
“Northern
Ismail Khan, a so-called “warlord,” heads faction of the
mostly Tajik western
Alliance”)
grouping in Herat area. Former party head, Burhanuddi
Afghanistan,
Rabbani, assassinated by Taliban in September 2011.
including Kabul
National
Abdul Rashid Dostam. Was Karzai rival in October 2004
Secular,
left-
Jowzjan, Balkh,
Islamic
presidential election, then his top “security adviser.” As of
leaning,
Faryab, Sar-i-Pol,
Movement of
October 2011, reportedly has joined new opposition
Uzbek
and Samangan
Afghanistan
movement called “Truth and Justice Party.”
provinces.
Hizb-e-
Composed of Shiite Hazara tribes from central Afghanistan.
Shiite,
Bamiyan, Ghazni,
Wahdat
Former members Karim Khalili is vice president, but
Hazara
Dai Kundi
Mohammad Mohaqiq is Karzai rival. General y pro-Iranian.
tribes
province
Was part of Rabbani 1992-1996 government, and fought
unsuccessfully with Taliban over Bamiyan. Still revered by
Hazaras is the former leader of the group, Abdul Ali Mazari,
who was captured and killed by the Taliban in March 1995.
Pashtun
Various regional governors and local leaders in the east and
Moderate Dominant in the
tribal/regional
south; central government led by Hamid Karzai.
Islamic,
south and east
leaders
Pashtun
Hizb-e-Islam
Mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. Was part of
Orthodox Small groups in
Gulbuddin
Soviet-era U.S.-backed “Afghan Interim Government” based
Islamic,
Nangarhar,
(HIG)
in Peshawar, Pakistan. Was nominal “prime minister” in
Pashtun
Nuristan, and
1992-1996 mujahedin government but never actual y took
Kunar provinces
office. Lost power base around Jalalabad to the Taliban in
1994, and fled to Iran before being expelled in 2002. Still
active in operations east of Kabul, but open to ending
militant activity. Leader of a rival Hizb-e-Islam faction, Yunus
Khalis, the mentor of Mullah Umar, died July 2006.
Islamic Union
Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Islamic conservative, leads a pro-
orthodox Paghman
Karzai faction in parliament. Lived many years in and
Islamic,
(west of Kabul)
politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his “Wahhabi”
Pashtun
ideology. During anti-Soviet war, Sayyaf’s faction, with
Hikmatyar, was a principal recipient of U.S. weaponry.
Criticized the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein after
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
Source: CRS.
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Residual Issues from Past Conflicts
A few issues remain unresolved from Afghanistan’s many years of conflict, such as Stinger
retrieval and mine eradication.
Stinger Retrieval
Beginning in late 1985 following internal debate, the Reagan Administration provided about
2,000 man-portable “Stinger” anti-aircraft missiles to the mujahedin for use against Soviet
aircraft. Prior to the ouster of the Taliban, common estimates suggested that 200-300 Stingers
remained at large, although more recent estimates put the number below 100.79 The Stinger issue
resurfaced in conjunction with 2001 U.S. war effort, when U.S. pilots reported that the Taliban
fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft. No hits were reported. The danger of these weapons has
become apparent on several past occasions. Iran bought 16 of the missiles in 1987 and fired one
against U.S. helicopters in the Persian Gulf. India claimed that it was a Stinger supplied to
Islamic rebels in Kashmir by sympathizers in Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter
over Kashmir in May 1999.80 Soviet-made SA-7 “Strella” man-portable launchers, which
allegedly have been used in the past by Al Qaeda, including against an Israeli passenger jet in
Kenya on November 30, 2002, were discovered in Afghanistan by U.S. forces in December 2002.
In 1992, after the fall of the Russian-backed government of Najibullah, the United States
reportedly spent about $10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a premium, from individual
mujahedin commanders. The New York Times reported on July 24, 1993, that the buy back effort
failed because the United States was competing with other buyers, including Iran and North
Korea, and that the CIA would spend about $55 million in FY1994 in a renewed effort. On March
7, 1994, the Washington Post reported that the CIA had recovered only about 50 or 100 at-large
Stingers. In February 2002, the Afghan government found and turned over to the United States
“dozens” of Stingers.81 In January 2005, Afghan intelligence began buying Stingers back, at a
reported cost of $150,000 each.82 Any Stingers that remain in Afghanistan likely pose little threat,
in part because of deteriorating components. No recent uses are reported.
Mine Eradication
Land mines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute one of the principal dangers to the
Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that 5 million to 7 million mines remain scattered
throughout the country, although some estimates are lower. U.N. teams have destroyed 1 million
mines and are now focusing on de-mining priority-use, residential and commercial property,
including lands around Kabul. Amounts contributed by the United States to the de-mining effort
are shown in the tables above. Most of the funds have gone to HALO Trust, a British
organization, and the U.N. Mine Action Program for Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Compact
adopted in London in February 2006 states that by 2010, the goal should be to reduce the land
area of Afghanistan contaminated by mines by 70%.

79 Saleem, Farrukh. “Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan,” Friday Times. August 17-23, 2001.
80 “U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles—Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999.
81 Fullerton, John. “Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S.” Reuters, February 4, 2002.
82 “Afghanistan Report,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 4, 2005.
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Appendix. U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted
Virtually all U.S. and international sanctions on Afghanistan, some imposed during the Soviet
occupation era and others on the Taliban regime, have now been lifted.
• P.L. 108-458 (December 17, 2004, referencing the 9/11 Commission
recommendations) repealed bans on aid to Afghanistan outright. On October 7,
1992, President George H. W. Bush had issued Presidential Determination 93-3
that Afghanistan is no longer a Marxist-Leninist country, but the determination
was not implemented before he left office. Had it been implemented, the
prohibition on Afghanistan’s receiving Export-Import Bank guarantees,
insurance, or credits for purchases under Section 8 of the 1986 Export-Import
Bank Act, would have been lifted. In addition, Afghanistan would have been able
to receive U.S. assistance because the requirement would have been waived that
Afghanistan apologize for the 1979 killing in Kabul of U.S. Ambassador to
Afghanistan Adolph “Spike” Dubs. (Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and
killed when Afghan police stormed the hideout where he was held.)
• U.N. sanctions on the Taliban imposed by Resolution 1267 (October 15, 1999),
Resolution 1333 (December 19, 2000), and Resolution 1363 (July 30, 2001) have
now been narrowed to penalize only Al Qaeda (by Resolution 1390, January 17,
2002). Resolution 1267 banned flights outside Afghanistan by Ariana, and
directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets. Resolution 1333 prohibited
the provision of arms or military advice to the Taliban (directed against
Pakistan); ordered a reduction of Taliban diplomatic representation abroad; and
banned foreign travel by senior Taliban officials. Resolution 1363 provided for
monitors in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was provided
to the Taliban.
• On January 10, 2003, President Bush signed a proclamation making Afghanistan
a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), eliminating U.S.
tariffs on 5,700 Afghan products. Afghanistan had been denied GSP on May 2,
1980, under Executive Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740).
• On April 24, 1981, controls on U.S. exports to Afghanistan of agricultural
products and phosphates were terminated. Such controls were imposed on June 3,
1980, as part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union for the invasion of
Afghanistan, under the authority of Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405].
• In mid-1992, the George H. W. Bush Administration determined that Afghanistan
no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This opened Afghanistan to the
use of U.S. funds made available for the U.S. share of U.N. organizations that
provide assistance to Afghanistan.
• On March 31, 1993, after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, President Clinton, on
national interest grounds, waived restrictions provided for in Section 481 (h) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 mandating sanctions on Afghanistan,
including bilateral aid cuts and suspensions, including denial of Ex-Im Bank
credits; the casting of negative U.S. votes for multilateral development bank
loans; and a non-allocation of a U.S. sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions
included denial of GSP; additional duties on exports to the United States; and
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curtailment of air transportation with the United States. Waivers were also
granted in 1994 and, after the fall of the Taliban, by President Bush.
• On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to the products
of Afghanistan, reversing the February 18, 1986, proclamation by President
Reagan (Presidential Proclamation 5437) that suspended most-favored nation
(MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287). The Foreign Assistance
Appropriations for FY1986 [Section 552, P.L. 99-190] had authorized the denial
of U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) status for Afghanistan.
• On July 2, 2002, the State Department amended U.S. regulations (22 C.F.R. Part
126) to allow arms sales to the new Afghan government, reversing the June 14,
1996, addition of Afghanistan to the list of countries prohibited from importing
U.S. defense articles and services. Arms sales to Afghanistan had also been
prohibited during 1997-2002 because Afghanistan had been designated under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132) as a state
that is not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.
• On July 2, 2002, President Bush formally revoked the July 4, 1999, declaration
by President Clinton of a national emergency with respect to Taliban because of
its hosting of Bin Laden. The Clinton determination and related Executive Order
13129 had blocked Taliban assets and property in the United States, banned U.S.
trade with Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, and applied these sanctions to
Ariana Afghan Airlines, triggering a blocking of Ariana assets (about $500,000)
in the United States and a ban on U.S. citizens’ flying on the airline. (The ban on
trade with Taliban-controlled territory had essentially ended on January 29, 2002,
when the State Department determination that the Taliban controls no territory
within Afghanistan.)

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Figure A-1. Map of Afghanistan

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.

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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Figure A-2. Map of Afghan Ethnicities

Source: 2003 National Geographic Society. http://www.afghan-network.net/maps/Afghanistan-Map.pdf. Adapted
by Amber Wilhelm, CRS Graphics.
Notes: This map is intended to be illustrative of the approximate demographic distribution by region of
Afghanistan. CRS has no way to confirm exact population distributions.

Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612

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