Gangs in Central America
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
January 28, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34112
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Gangs in Central America
Summary
Congress has maintained an interest in the effects of gang violence in Central America, and on the
expanding activities of transnational gangs with ties to that region operating in the United States.
Since FY2008, Congress has appropriated significant amounts of funding for anti-gang efforts in
Central America, as well as domestic anti-gang programs. Two recent developments may affect
congressional interest in Central American gangs: a truce between rival gangs has lowered
violence in El Salvador, and the U.S. Treasury Department has designated the Mara Salvatrucha
(MS-13) as a significant transnational criminal organization (TCO).
MS-13 and its main rival, the “18th Street” gang (also known as M-18), continue to threaten
citizen security and challenge government authority in Central America. Gang-related violence
has been particularly acute in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, which have had among the
highest homicide rates in the world. Recently, some governments have moved away from
repressive anti-gang strategies, with the government of El Salvador now facilitating a historic—
and risky—truce involving the country’s largest gangs. The truce has contributed to a large
reduction in homicides since March 2012, but robberies, assaults, and extortions have continued.
The truce carries risks for the Salvadoran government, such as what might happen if the gangs
were to walk away from the truce stronger, better organized, and with more political clout.
U.S. agencies have been engaged on both the law enforcement and preventive sides of dealing
with Central American gangs; an inter-agency committee developed a U.S. Strategy to Combat
Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico that was first announced in July 2007. The
strategy focuses on diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and
prevention. An April 2010 study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended
that U.S. agencies consider strengthening the anti-gang strategy by developing better oversight
and measurement tools to guide its implementation. U.S. law enforcement efforts may be
bolstered by the Treasury Department’s October 2012 decision to designate and sanction MS-13
as a major TCO pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13581.
In recent years, Congress has increased funding to support anti-gang efforts in Central America.
Between FY2008 and FY2012, Congress appropriated roughly $35 million in global International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds for anti-gang efforts in Central America.
Congress provided additional support in FY2008 and FY2009 for anti-gang efforts in the region
through the Mérida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime program for Mexico and Central
America, and, more recently, through the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).
Congressional oversight may focus on the efficacy of anti-gang efforts in Central America; the
interaction between U.S. domestic and international anti-gang policies, and the impact of the
Treasury Department’s TCO designation on law enforcement efforts against MS-13.
This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country and regional
approaches to deal with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central
America. Also see CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative:
Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.
Congressional Research Service
Gangs in Central America
Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Scope of the Gang Problem in Central America .............................................................................. 1
Defining Gangs .......................................................................................................................... 1
Gangs in Central America ......................................................................................................... 2
Factors Exacerbating the Gang Problem in Central America .................................................... 6
Poverty and a Lack of Educational and Employment Opportunities .................................. 6
Societal Stigmas .................................................................................................................. 6
Role of the Media ................................................................................................................ 6
Anti-gang Law Enforcement Efforts ................................................................................... 7
Prisons in Need of Reform .................................................................................................. 7
U.S. Deportations to Central America and the Gang Problem .................................................. 7
Country Anti-Gang Efforts .............................................................................................................. 9
Mano Dura (Heavy-Handed) Anti-Gang Policies ..................................................................... 9
Military Involvement in Public Security ................................................................................. 10
Approaches in Other Central American Countries .................................................................. 11
Gang Truce in El Salvador ...................................................................................................... 11
Prospects for Country Prevention and Rehabilitation Efforts ................................................. 13
U.S. Policy ..................................................................................................................................... 14
Congressional Interest and Appropriations for Anti-Gang and Related Security Efforts
in Central America ................................................................................................................ 15
Evolution of U.S. International Anti-Gang Efforts .................................................................. 16
State Department ............................................................................................................... 17
Department of Justice ........................................................................................................ 18
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) ......................................................... 19
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) ..................................................... 19
U.S. Treasury Department ................................................................................................. 20
Possible Questions for Oversight ............................................................................................ 20
Figures
Figure 1. Estimated Gang Membership in the Northern Triangle of Central America, 2012 .......... 4
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Deportations to Top Receiving Countries: FY2009-FY2011 ..................................... 8
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 21
Congressional Research Service
Gangs in Central America
Introduction
In recent years, analysts and U.S. officials have expressed ongoing concerns about the increasing
rates of violent crimes committed by drug traffickers, organized criminal groups, and gangs in
Central America.1 Central American governments, the media, and some analysts have attributed a
significant proportion of violent crime in that region to youth gangs or maras, many of which
have ties to the United States. U.S. concerns about gangs have accelerated as the Mara
Salvatrucha (MS-13), a particularly violent group with ties to Central America, has increased its
presence and illicit activities in the United States.2 Policy-makers in countries throughout the
region, including in the United States, are struggling to find the right mix of suppressive and
preventive policies to confront the gang problem. Most agree that a comprehensive, regional
approach to gangs is necessary to prevent further escalation of the problem.
Congress is likely to maintain an interest in crime and gang violence in Central America, as well
as the related activities of Central American gangs in the United States. In recent years, Congress
has considered what level of U.S. assistance is most appropriate to help Central American
countries combat gang activity and what types of programs are most effective in that effort.
Members of Congress have also taken an interest in the impact of U.S. deportations of individuals
with criminal records to Central America on the gang problem, as well as the evolving
relationship between Mexican drug trafficking organizations and the gangs. More recently, there
has been congressional interest in the gang truce in El Salvador and the potential implications that
its success or failure might have for anti-crime efforts in other countries. In the coming year,
Congress may also examine how anti-gang efforts have been affected by the Treasury
Department’s October 2012 decision to designate and sanction the MS-13 as a significant
Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO).3
This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country approaches to deal
with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central America. It concludes
with possible questions for oversight that Congress may consider.
Scope of the Gang Problem in Central America
Defining Gangs
Academics and other experts on gangs continue to debate the formal definition of the term “gang”
and the types of individuals that should be included in definitions of the term. There is general
agreement that most gangs have a name and some sense of identity that can sometimes be
1 The Central American countries include Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and
Panama. This report focuses on the “northern triangle” countries of Central America where the gang problem has been
most acute, which include El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. It refers to the other countries and governments in
the region periodically for comparative purposes. For more information, see: CRS Report R41731, Central America
Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.
2 U.S. Department of Justice, National Gang Intelligence Center, National Gang Threat Assessment (NGTA) 2011:
Emerging Trends, 2011.
3 U.S. Department of Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Latin American Criminal Organization,” press release, October 11,
2012.
Congressional Research Service
1
Gangs in Central America
indicated by symbols such as clothing, graffiti, and hand signs that are unique to the gang. Gangs
are thought to be composed of members ranging in age from 12 to 24, but some gang members
are adults well over the age of 24. Typically, gangs have some degree of permanence and
organization and are generally involved in delinquent or criminal activity. Gangs may be involved
in criminal activities ranging from graffiti, vandalism, petty theft, robbery, and assaults to more
serious criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, drug smuggling, money laundering, alien
smuggling, extortion, home invasion, murder, and other violent felonies.
The lines between transnational gang activity and organized crime are increasingly blurry. Gangs
generally feature horizontal power structures, with many small subgroups (semi-independent
“franchises”) and limited central leadership setting strategy and enforcing discipline. While many
gangs lack the organizational structure, capital, and manpower required to run sophisticated
criminal schemes or to penetrate state institutions at high levels, some (such as the MS-13 and the
18th Street) have become more highly organized.4 In Central America, gangs are often involved in
the street-level distribution of drugs and in extortion rackets, but MS-13 may also be involved in
higher-level criminal drug distribution.5
When referring to gangs in Central America, some studies use the term pandillas and maras
interchangeably, while others distinguish between the two.6 Studies that make a distinction
between the two types of Central America gangs generally define pandillas as localized groups
that have long been present in the region, and maras as a more recent phenomenon that has some
transnational roots. Some have more recently classified gangs into “first generation” (localized
groups), “second generation” (national groups with some transnational links), and “third
generation” gangs. Those analysts have augured that some gangs in the region may be evolving
into “third generation” gangs that are “internationalized, networked, and complicated structures.”7
Gangs in Central America
The major gangs operating in Central America with ties to the United States are the “18th Street”
gang (also known as M-18), and their main rival, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13).8 The 18th Street
gang was formed by Mexican youth in the Rampart section of Los Angeles in the 1960s who
were not accepted into existing Hispanic gangs. It was the first Hispanic gang to accept members
from all races and to recruit members from other states. MS-13 was created during the 1980s by
Salvadorans in Los Angeles who had fled the country’s civil conflict. Both gangs later expanded
their operations to Central America. This process accelerated after the United States began
deporting illegal immigrants, many with criminal convictions, back to the region after the passage
4 CRS interview with official from the National Gang Unit of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
January 2, 2013.
5 Ibid; “Capturan a Salvadoreño en Costa Rica por Secuestro,” La Prensa Gráfica, August 11, 2009.
6 See, for example, Demoscopia S.A., Maras y Pandillas: Comunidad y Policía en Centroamérica, October 2007, as
opposed to Dennis Rodgers et al., “Gangs of Central America: Causes, Costs, and Interventions,” Small Arms Survey
Occasional Paper 23, May 2009.
7 John P. Sullivan and Adam Eikus, “Global Cities, Global Gangs,” Open Society Net, December 2, 2009.
8 For the history and evolution of these gangs in the United States, see Tom Diaz, No Boundaries: Transnational Latino
Gangs and American Law Enforcement, (Ann Arbor, M.I.: University of Michigan Press, 2009). For a cross-national
comparison of gang development, see: Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America, eds. Thomas Bruneau,
Lucía Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2011). Hereinafter: Bruneau, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
2
Gangs in Central America
of the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996.9 Many
contend that gang-deportees “exported” a Los Angeles gang culture to Central America and
recruited new members from among the local populations.
Estimates of the overall number of gang members in Central America vary widely, with a top
State Department official recently estimating that there may be 85,000 MS-13 and 18th Street
gang members in the northern triangle countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras).10 The
U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) recently estimated total MS-13 and M-18
membership in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras at a more modest 54,000 (see Figure 1
below).11 According to UNODC, in 2012 there are roughly 20,000 gang members in El Salvador,
12,000 in Honduras, and 22,000 in Guatemala. El Salvador has the highest concentration of gang
members, with some 323 mareros (gang members) for every 100,000 citizens, double the level of
Guatemala and Honduras. In comparison, in 2007, UNODC cited country membership totals of
10,500 in El Salvador, 36,000 in Honduras, and 14,000 in Guatemala.12
Nicaragua has a significant number of gang members, but does not have large numbers of MS-13
or M-18 members, perhaps due to the fact that Nicaragua has had a much lower deportation rate
from the United States than the “northern triangle” countries.13 Costa Rica, Panama, and Belize
also have local gangs. There are some MS-13 members present in the Costa Rican border regions,
as well as increasing numbers of MS-13 members in Belize.14
9 IRIRA expanded the categories of illegal immigrants subject to deportation and made it more difficult for immigrants
to get relief from removal.
10 U.S. Department of State, “Gangs, Youth, and Drugs – Breaking the Cycle of Violence,” Remarks by William R.
Brownfield, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, at the Institute of the
Americas, press release, October 1, 2012. Hereinafter Brownfield, 2012.
11 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean:
a Threat Assessment, September 2012, p. 29. Hereinafter: UNODC, 2012.
12 UNODC, Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire, May 2007, p. 60. Hereinafter:
UNODC, 2007.
13 Rodgers et al., 2009.
14 CRS interview with official from the National Gang Unit of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
January 2, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
3
Gangs in Central America
Figure 1. Estimated Gang Membership in the Northern Triangle of Central America,
2012
25,000
20,000
5,000
15,000
12,000
10,000
17,000
7,000
5,000
8,000
5,000
0
Guatemala
Honduras
El Salvador
M-18
MS-13
Source: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the
Caribbean: a Threat Assessment, September 2012.
While MS-13 and M-18 began as loosely structured street gangs, there is some evidence that both
gangs, but particularly the MS-13, have expanded geographically and become more organized
and sophisticated. By early 2008, U.S. law enforcement had found evidence suggesting that some
MS-13 leaders jailed in El Salvador were ordering retaliatory assassinations of individuals in the
Washington, DC metro area, as well as designing plans to unify their clicas (cliques) with those in
the United States.15 In 2008-2009, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) simultaneously
arrested gang members in El Salvador and in Charlotte, North Carolina responsible for carrying
out several murders in North Carolina.16 Ties between some Washington, DC-based cliques and
groups in El Salvador are particularly well developed.17 Studies have shown that, as happened in
the United States, gang leaders in Central America have used prisons to increase the discipline
and cohesion among their ranks.18 Still, UNODC maintains that the term “transnational gangs” is
misleading when used to describe the maras, as their primary focus continues to be on local
issues, such as dominating a particular extortion racket or local drug distribution area.19
Press reports and some Central American officials have blamed MS-13 and other gangs for a
large percentage of violent crimes committed in those countries, but some analysts assert that
those claims may be exaggerated. UNODC found limited evidence to support that conclusion in
2007, and now maintains that disputes between crime groups over cocaine trafficking routes are
the primary driver of violence in most of the region.20 Gang experts have argued that, although
15 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Regional Gang Initiative:
Assessments and Plan of Action, July 1, 2008.
16 Email from Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) official, December 10, 2012.
17 Geoffrey Ramsey, “Tracking El Salvador’s Mara Salvatrucha in Washington, DC,” InSight Crime, October 12, 2012.
18 Demoscopia S.A, 2007.
19 UNODC, 2012, p. 28.
20 UNODC, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
4
Gangs in Central America
gangs may be more visible than other criminal groups, gang violence is only one part of a broad
spectrum of violence in Central America.21 Still, the decline in homicides that has occurred in El
Salvador since the government facilitated a gang truce in March 2012 lends evidence to the
assertion that gangs are responsible for a significant percentage of violence in that country.
Although the actual percentage of homicides that can be attributed to gangs in Central America
remains controversial, the gangs have unquestionably been involved in a broad array of other
criminal activities. Those activities include kidnapping; human trafficking; and drug, auto, and
weapons smuggling. Gangs have increasingly been involved in extortions of residents, bus
drivers, and business owners in major cities throughout the region. Failure to pay often results in
harassment or violence by gang members. In September 2010, to protest recently enacted anti-
gang legislation, the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs in El Salvador jointly issued a warning for
public transportation operators to stay home for three days or face reprisals; the threats paralyzed
the country’s transport system.22 In 2010, gangs reportedly killed 130 Guatemalan bus drivers and
53 bus toll collectors.23
While some studies maintain that ties between Central American gangs and organized criminal
groups have increased, others have downplayed the connection. A March 2010 report from
Mexico’s Attorney General’s Office reported the presence of MS-13 and 18th Street in 20 of
Mexico’s 32 states, with the gangs involved in extortion, drug distribution, and migrant
smuggling.24 Regional and U.S. authorities have confirmed increasing gang involvement in drug
trafficking, although mostly on a local level, as U.S. officials maintain that the gangs “facilitate
the logistics and transportation for the trafficking industry in Central America and Mexico.”25
MS-13 members are reportedly being contracted on an ad-hoc basis by Mexico’s warring DTOs
to carry out revenge killings. Some analysts maintain that the relationship between DTOs and
gangs appears to be most developed in El Salvador and, to a lesser extent, in Honduras, with few
DTO-gang connections in Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, or Panama.26
Notably, analysts have found no links between Central American gangs and Al Qaeda or other
terrorist groups.27
21 Testimony of Geoff Thale, Program Director of the Washington Office on Latin America, before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, June 26, 2007.
22 “Governments Unite Against Maras; Maras Against Governments,” Latin American Regional Report: Caribbean &
Central America, October 2010.
23 Talea Miller and Christa Bollman, “Buses Targeted by Guatemala City Gangs,” PBS Newshour, March 8, 2011.
24 Gobierno Federal de México, Procuraduría General de la República, Medidas de Acción y Prevención contra el
Fenómeno de las Pandillas en México, March 2010.
25 Brownfield, 2012.
26 Stephen S. Dudley, Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America: Transportistas, Mexican Cartels, and
Maras, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security
Cooperation, May 2010.
27 Testimony of David Shirk, Professor and Director of the Trans-Border Institute, before the House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice and Science, and Related Appropriations, March 24, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
5
Gangs in Central America
Factors Exacerbating the Gang Problem in Central America
Poverty and a Lack of Educational and Employment Opportunities
Several organizations working directly with gang members have asserted that the combination of
poverty, social exclusion, and a lack of educational and job opportunities for at-risk youth are
perpetuating the gang problem. In Honduras, for example, close to 30% of the population is youth
ages 15-24. Those youth have very limited educational or job opportunities. A 2007 World Bank
risk assessment for Honduras stated that the country had large numbers of unemployed youth who
were not in school. Unable to develop the skills required for attending a university or obtaining
skilled employment, they provide a ready pool of gang recruits.28 In the absence of familial and
community support, many marginalized youth have turned to gangs for social support, a source of
livelihood, and protection.
Societal Stigmas
Societal stigmas against gangs and gang-deportees from the United States have made the process
of leaving a gang extremely difficult.29 A 2007 State Department report on youth gangs in El
Salvador identified religious conversion, marriage, enlistment in the military, or enrollment in a
substance abuse rehabilitation program as the few options available for those who seek to leave a
gang. Many organizations that work with former gang members, particularly those with criminal
records, say that offender reentry is a major problem in many countries. Ex-gang members report
that employers are often unwilling to hire them. Tattooed former gang members, especially
returning deportees from the United States who are often native English speakers, have had the
most difficulty finding gainful employment. In El Salvador, several hundred gang members have
gone through complete tattoo removal, a long and expensive process, which many feel is
necessary to better blend into Salvadoran society.30
Role of the Media
Many studies have observed that sensationalist media coverage of the gang phenomenon in
Central America has contributed to a sense of insecurity in the region and may have inadvertently
enhanced the reputation of the gangs portrayed. Exaggerated media reports may have also
contributed to the popular perception, which has been backed by politicians, that youth gangs are
responsible for the majority of violent crime in the northern triangle countries. This sentiment has
led many Central American citizens to support tough law enforcement measures against gangs,
hire private security firms, and, in isolated cases, take vigilante action against suspected youth
gang members.31
28 Sara Michel, Elizabeth Utting, and Bob Moquin, Honduras: a Risk Assessment, World Bank, February 2007.
29 Demoscopia S.A, 2007.
30 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Issue Paper: Youth Gang Organizations
in El Salvador, June 2007.
31 Testimony of Lainie Reisman before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere, June 26, 2007. The State Department Human Rights Report covering Honduras for 2011 includes
references to NGO reports that vigilante torture and even killings of youths have continued to occur. NGOs assert that
these abuses may have been perpetrated by groups that included members of the security forces. The State Department
report covering Guatemala includes allegations that unnecessary force is often used by police against suspected gang
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
6
Gangs in Central America
Anti-gang Law Enforcement Efforts
While tough law enforcement reforms (discussed below in the section “Mano Dura (Heavy-
Handed) Anti-Gang Policies”) initially proved to be a way for Central American leaders to show
that they were cracking down on gangs, recent studies have cast serious doubts on their
effectiveness. In response to law enforcement roundups of any and all tattooed youth, gangs are
now changing their behavior to avoid detection. Many gang members are hiding or removing
their tattoos, changing their dress, and avoiding the use of hand signals, making them harder to
identify and arrest. Studies have also shown that, largely in response to law enforcement tactics,
gangs have developed into more sophisticated criminal entities, some of which are now running
extortion rackets throughout the region.32
Prisons in Need of Reform
The implementation of aggressive anti-gang roundups has overwhelmed prisons in Central
America. Prison conditions in the region are generally harsh, with severe overcrowding,
inadequate sanitation, and staffing shortages. Many facilities that were already teeming with
inmates have been filled beyond their capacities with thousands of suspected gang members,
many of whom have yet to be convicted of any crimes. In El Salvador, for example, as of
December 2011, some 25,294 inmates (9,575 current or former gang members) were being held
in prisons designed to hold a maximum of 8,090 people.33
Due to a lack of security within the prisons, gangs are often able to carry out criminal activities
from behind bars, sometimes with assistance from corrupt prison officials. As previously
mentioned, there is evidence that gangs have become larger, better organized, and more cohesive
within the confines of many of the region’s prisons. Some observers have described prisons as
“finishing schools”34 where, rather than being rehabilitated, first-time offenders often deepen their
involvement in illicit gang activities.
Disputes between members of rival gangs, between gang and non-gang inmates, and between
gangs and prison guards regularly occur. Prisoner abuse and torture is also not uncommon. Some
argue that gangs have responded to “extralegal violence” employed by police and prison guards
by waging war on governments and those suspected of collaborating with them.35
U.S. Deportations to Central America and the Gang Problem
Policymakers in Central America have expressed ongoing concerns that increasing U.S.
deportations of individuals with criminal records are worsening the gang and security problems in
(...continued)
members in Guatemala.
32 Demoscopia, S.A., 2007; José Miguel Cruz, “Central American Maras: From Youth Street Gangs to Transnational
Protection Rackets,” Global Crime, November 2010.
33 U.S. Department of State, 2011 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: El Salvador, May 2012.
34 T.W. Ward, Gangsters Without Borders: An Ethnography of A Salvadoran Street Gang (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012).
35 José Miguel Cruz, "Responses and the Dark Side of Suppression of Gangs in Central America," in Bruneau, et al.,
2011.
Congressional Research Service
7
Gangs in Central America
the region.36 The Central American countries of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador have
received the highest numbers of U.S. deportations (after Mexico) for the last several fiscal years.
Despite the large numbers of deportees repatriated to the region, the Central American countries
have typically received a lower percentage of individuals deported from the United States on
criminal grounds than other top receiving countries like Jamaica or the Dominican Republic (see
Table 1). In recent years, however, the percentage of Central Americans deported on criminal
grounds has increased significantly. This may be due to increasing efforts by U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to identify illegal immigrants subject to deportation.
Table 1. U.S. Deportations to Top Receiving Countries: FY2009-FY2011
(Including Annual Percentage of Individuals Deported on Criminal Grounds)
Country FY2009
%
Crim. a
FY2010
% Crim.
FY2011
% Crim.
Mexico 275,217
37.9%
279,687
54.7%
286,893
59.1%
Honduras 27,679
25.1%
25,635
41.5%
23,822
47.5%
Guatemala 30,411
21.4%
31,347
31.3%
33,324
37.9%
El Salvador
21,157
30.0%
20,830
41.4%
18,870
47.3%
Dom. Republic
3,850
56.5%
3,853
61.1%
3,380
65.0%
Brazil 3,298
11.6%
3,321
16.3%
3,634
17.0%
Colombia 2,778
40.6%
2,617
49.6%
2,273
49.8%
Ecuador 2,526
25.5%
2,559
29.8%
1,991
40.4%
Nicaragua 2,190
28.1%
1,975
42.4%
1,693
45.5%
Haiti 710
65.9%
344b 39.8% 731
34.1%
Jamaica 1,630
76.9%
1,548
79.1%
1,572
82.0%
Source: Prepared by CRS with information provided by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Office of Enforcement and Removal. Figures include “removals” (deportations), but not
voluntary departures (returns). FY2012 figures are not yet available.
a. Criminal deportees have been convicted of a crime in the United States that makes one removable (i.e.,
eligible for deportation) under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Not all individuals who have been
deported on criminal grounds are gang members or violent criminals. Low level drug convictions and some
non-violent offenses may result in a removal on criminal grounds. Non-criminal deportees have been
removed because of a status violation (e.g., being in the country illegally or working without authorization).
b. Deportations to Haiti were halted for a time in the wake of the January 2010 earthquake in that country.
For more information, see CRS Report RS21349, U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants, by Ruth Ellen
Wasem.
For the past several years, Central American officials have asked the U.S. government to consider
providing a complete criminal history for each individual who has been deported on criminal
grounds, including whether or not he or she is a member of a gang. While ICE does not provide a
complete criminal record for deportees, it may provide some information regarding an
individual’s criminal history when specifying why the individual was removed from the United
States. ICE does not indicate gang affiliation unless it is the primary reason why the individual is
being deported. However, law enforcement officials in receiving countries are able to contact the
36 Kate Joynes et al., “Central America, Mexico and the United States Formulate Shared Strategy to Fight Gang
Violence,” Global Insight Daily Analysis, April 9, 2008.
Congressional Research Service
8
Gangs in Central America
FBI in order to request a criminal history check on particular criminal deportees after they have
arrived in that country. With support from the Mérida Initiative/CARSI, ICE and the FBI have
developed a pilot program called the Criminal History Information Program (CHIP) to provide
more information about deportees with criminal convictions to officials in El Salvador, the first of
its kind anywhere in the world.37 CHIP is being expanded into Honduras and then Guatemala.
The types of support services provided to deportees returning from the United States and other
countries vary widely across Latin America. While a few large and relatively wealthy countries
(such as Colombia and Mexico) have established comprehensive deportee reintegration assistance
programs, most countries provide few, if any, services to returning deportees. In Central America,
for example, the few programs that do exist tend to be funded and administered by either the
Catholic Church, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or the International Organization for
Migration (IOM). In 2010, USAID began providing support to IOM to administer a deportee
reintegration project in Guatemala.
Country Anti-Gang Efforts
Country efforts to deal with gangs and gang-related violence have varied significantly. In general,
governments in the “northern triangle” countries have adopted more aggressive law enforcement
approaches than the other Central American countries. Tough anti-gang approaches carried out in
the mid-2000s, which will subsequently be discussed, failed to stave off rising crime rates in the
region and had several negative unintended consequences. As a result, recent studies maintain
that governments appear to be moving away from enforcement-only policies towards “second-
generation” anti-gang programs. Newer programs have emphasized, among other things,
prevention programs for at-risk youth, interventions to encourage youth to leave gangs, and the
creation of municipal alliances against crime and violence.38 Even as governments have adopted
some prevention and rehabilitation programs, they have continued to employ elite anti-gang units
to carry out operations, begun to use wiretapping to further anti-gang investigations, and
increasingly involved their military forces in law enforcement efforts. In 2012, the Salvadoran
government has taken a new—and risky—approach to combating gang violence by facilitating a
truce between the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs.39
Mano Dura (Heavy-Handed) Anti-Gang Policies
Mano Dura is a term used to describe the type of anti-gang policies initially put in place in El
Salvador, Honduras, and, to a lesser extent, Guatemala in response to popular demands and media
pressure for these governments to “do something” about an escalation in gang-related crime.
Mano dura approaches have typically involved incarcerating large numbers of youth (often those
with visible tattoos) for illicit association, and increasing sentences for gang membership and
gang-related crimes. A Mano Dura law passed by El Salvador’s Congress in 2003 was
subsequently declared unconstitutional, but was followed by a Super Mano Dura package of anti-
gang reforms in July 2004. These reforms enhanced police power to search and arrest suspected
37 Embassy of the United States in San Salvador, El Salvador, “El Salvador Signs Chip,” press release, May 9, 2012.
38 Rodgers et al., May 2009.
39 Lauren Villagran, “Can a Gang Truce in El Salvador Open the Door to Lasting Peace?” Christian Science Monitor,
October 24, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
9
Gangs in Central America
gang members and stiffened penalties for convicted gang members, although they provided some
protections for minors accused of gang-related crimes. Similarly, in July 2003, Honduras enacted
a penal code amendment that made maras illegal and established sentences of up to 12 years in
prison for gang membership. Changes in legislation were accompanied by the increasing use of
joint military and police patrols to arrest gang suspects. Guatemala introduced similar legislation
in 2003, but the legislation never passed. Instead, the Guatemalan government has launched
periodic law enforcement operations to round up suspected gang members.
Mano Dura reforms initially proved to be a way for Central American leaders to show that they
were getting tough on gangs and crime, despite objections from human rights groups about their
potential infringements on civil liberties and human rights. Early public reactions to the tough
anti-gang reforms enacted in El Salvador and Honduras were extremely positive, supported by
media coverage demonizing the activities of tattooed youth gang members. Tony Saca was
elected to the presidency of El Salvador in 2004 largely on the basis of his promises to further
crack down on gangs and crime. Mano Dura enabled police to arrest large numbers of suspected
gang members, including some 14,000 youth in El Salvador between mid-2004 and late 2005. In
addition, according to Salvadoran officials, even though many suspects were eventually released,
gang detainees provided law enforcement officials with invaluable sources of intelligence
information that those officials have since used to design better anti-gang strategies.40
Despite the early apparent benefits of Mano Dura policies, effects on gangs and crime have been
largely disappointing. Most youth arrested under mano dura provisions were subsequently
released for lack of evidence that they committed any crime. Salvadoran police estimated that
more than 10,000 of 14,000 suspected gang members arrested in 2005 were later released.41 Some
youth who were wrongly arrested for gang involvement joined the gang life while in prison. Gang
roundups exacerbated prison overcrowding, and inter-gang violence within the prisons resulted in
several inmate deaths. There have been credible reports that extrajudicial youth killings by
vigilante groups have continued since mano dura was implemented, including alleged
assassinations of gang suspects and gang deportees from the United States. Finally, in response to
mano dura, gangs have changed their behavior to avoid detection.
Military Involvement in Public Security
Although mano dura policies have been largely phased out, El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras have deployed thousands of military troops to help their often underpaid and poorly
equipped police forces carry out public security functions, without clearly defining when those
deployments might end. In Guatemala, military officials maintain that fewer than 10% of the
country’s 9,000 soldiers perform traditional military functions and the government of retired
general Perez Molina has developed protocols to coordinate the military’s involvement in law
enforcement operations.42 In El Salvador, retired generals are in charge of the Ministry of Public
Security and Justice and the national police. Since December 2011, the Honduran government has
granted the military broad powers to carry out police functions.43 This trend has led many human
40 U.S. Department of State, INL, Regional Gang Initiative Assessments and Plan of Action, July 1, 2008.
41 “Most of 14,000 Gang Members Arrested in El Salvador Were Released,” EFE News Service, December 27, 2005.
42 CRS interview with Guatemalan military official, January 20, 2011.
43 “Gobierno de Honduras Extiende Facultades Policiales a Militares por 90 Días Más,” El Heraldo (Honduras), June
26, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
10
Gangs in Central America
rights groups to raise concerns about the “re-militarization” of some Central American countries
and to predict an increase in human rights abuses committed by military personnel in the region
who are ill-trained to perform police work (as has occurred in Mexico).44 Evidence also indicates
that military involvement in public security functions has not reduced crime rates significantly.
Approaches in Other Central American Countries
Although their efforts have received considerably less international attention than those of El
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, other Central American countries have developed a variety
of programs to deal with their gang problems. In Panama, the Ministry of Social Development, in
coordination with other government entities and several NGOs, administers gang prevention
programs, as well as a program to provide job training and rehabilitation services to former gang
members. Nicaragua has adopted a national youth crime prevention strategy that, at least on an
official level, includes the active involvement of the police in preventive and rehabilitative efforts
and focuses on family, school, and community interventions.45 With support from other countries
and NGOs, the Nicaraguan National Police’s Juvenile Affairs Division runs at least two anti-gang
activities a month. The Ministry of the Interior is administering a five-year program, which is
supported by funding from the IDB, to target at-risk youth in 11 different municipalities. While
less is known about Costa Rica’s gang prevention efforts, the country has generally tended to
favor a “preventive and rehabilitation-oriented approach.”46
Belize brokered a truce among its local gangs in September 2011 in exchange for meeting gang
members’ demands for jobs. The truce helped murders decline through March 2012, but
unraveled in April 2012 after a spate of reprisal killings. That month the country experienced its
highest monthly murder rate in two years.47 The government removed its financial support for the
truce in December 2012 as Belize recorded a record number of murders in 2012, up a reported
16% from 2011.48
Gang Truce in El Salvador
When Salvadoran President Mauricio Funes appointed his defense minister, retired general David
Munguía Payés, as minister of justice and public security in November 2011, observers expected
the minister to back a hardline approach to combating gangs. Minister Munguía Payés did
restructure the Salvadoran police and form a new elite anti-gang unit that has received U.S.
training. However, he also surprised many analysts by lending government support to a former
guerrilla fighter and congressman (who was his aid in the defense ministry) and a Catholic bishop
who brokered a truce between the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 18th Street (M-18) gangs. In
March 2012, Minister Munguía Payés agreed to transfer high-ranking gang leaders currently
44 See, for example, relevant sections of George Withers, Lucila Santos, and Adam Isaacson, Preach What you
Practice: the Separation of Military and Police Roles in the Americas, WOLA, November 2010.
45 Some studies have described a disconnect between the Nicaraguan government’s official rhetoric in support of non-
repressive approaches to youth violence and the excessive use of force that some low-ranking police officials have used
against youth in Nicaragua. Those studies are summarized in: Peter Peetz, "Youth Violence in Central America:
Discourses and Policies," Youth Society, October 11, 2010.
46 Ibid.
47 “A Meeting of the Maras; Central America's Gangs,” The Economist, May 12, 2012.
48 Grant Hurst, “Belize Registers Record Murders in 2012,” IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, January 4, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
11
Gangs in Central America
serving time in prison to less secure prisons in order to facilitate negotiations for a truce between
the gangs. Questions remain surrounding what exactly was negotiated with the gangs, when, and
under what circumstances. Until very recently, Minister Munguía Payés had denied his role in
facilitating the truce.49
Since the time the prison transfers took place, the Salvadoran government reports that homicide
rates have dramatically declined (from an average of roughly 14 per day to 5.5 per day); U.S. law
enforcement has not been able to verify those figures.50 Gang leaders have pledged not to forcibly
recruit children into their ranks or perpetrate violence against women, turned in small amounts of
weapons, and offered to engage in broader negotiations that could potentially result in a
permanent truce.51 They did not agree to give up control of over their territories. Gang negotiators
have said that improving prison conditions and providing more rehabilitation and reintegration
programs for gang members will be crucial to maintaining the truce. They hope to obtain donor
support for those efforts.52 The Organization of American States (OAS) has begun monitoring the
implementation of the truce and trying to build support for the nascent peace process from civil
society, the private sector, and politicians, among others.53
In November 2012, gang negotiators proposed the establishment of “peace zones” in
municipalities across the country where gangs would stop all crimes in exchange for being able to
participate in reinsertion programs. By January 2013, the first four municipalities participating in
the “peace zone” plan had been announced, one governed by the leftist Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN) and three governed by the conservative Nationalist Republican Alliance
(ARENA) party. A total of 18 municipalities may participate. The government of El Salvador has
reportedly said that municipalities that participate in the effort will receive investments from a
fund of some $72 million, although it is as yet unclear where that money will come from.54 A
charitable foundation has been established to coordinate international efforts to support the truce,
including the “peace zone” plan. While some have praised the effort, others have expressed
doubts about the gangs’ commitment to ending all crimes (including extortion), and the
government’s ability to ensure that the “peace zones” do not become havens for lawlessness.55
Many, including OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza, have praised the truce for reducing
the homicide rate in El Salvador and effectively saving the lives of thousands of young people.56
The coordinator of U.N. programs in El Salvador has said that the truce presents a unique window
of opportunity for the country to find a long-term, integral solution to violence and criminality.57
49 Carlos Martinez and Jose Luis Sanz, “The New Truth About the Gang Truce,” InsightCrime, September 14, 2012.
50 “El Salvador’s Funes Boasts Security Progress,” Latin News Daily Briefing, January 7, 2013; Email from official
from the FBI’s MS-13 National Gang Task Force, December 10, 2012.
51 WOLA, El Salvador's Gang Truce: In Spite of Uncertainty, an Opportunity to Strengthen Prevention Efforts, July
17, 2012; Randal C. Archibold, “Gangs’ Truce Buys El Salvador a Tenuous Peace,” New York Times, August 27, 2012.
52 CRS interviews conducted in El Salvador, August 20-22, 2012.
53 Lauren Villagran, “Can a Gang Truce in El Salvador Open the Door to Lasting Peace?” Christian Science Monitor,
October 24, 2012.
54 “Political Truce Provides Key to Reducing Violence,” Latin American Weekly Report, January 24, 2013.
55 Miriam Wells, “El Salvador 'Peace Zone' Launched in Second Phase of Gang Truce,”InsightCrime, January 23,
2013.
56 Organization of American States (OAS), “Secretary General Insulza: ‘the Three Challenges to Democracy in the
Region are Inequality, Organized Crime and the Lack of Political Dialogue,’” press release, October 10, 2012.
57 “ONU: Tregua entre Pandillas es Oportunidad contra la Violencia en El Salvador,” La Prensa Gráfica, September
13, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
12
Gangs in Central America
U.S.-based gang experts have formed a Transitional Advisory Group in Support of the Peace
Process in El Salvador, while U.S. human rights groups have lent their support to the truce insofar
as it provides an opportunity to increase focus and attention on the need for prevention and
rehabilitation programs.58
The truce is not without its skeptics. Some skeptics have questioned the lack of transparency and
changing narrative regarding the government’s role in facilitating the truce.59 Still others point out
that while gang-on-gang homicides have declined, the level of extortion and other violent crimes
has remained high.60 Disappearances and the discovery of clandestine graves also continued in
2012.61 Apart from that, some analysts maintain that recognizing the gangs as legitimate political
actors and continuing to accede to their demands carries enormous risks for the Salvadoran
government. For example, should the negotiations collapse, the gangs could emerge even more
powerful and organized after taking advantage of less restrictive prison conditions.62 Skeptics are
particularly concerned about the prospects for a loss of government control over security and the
rule of law in areas deemed as “safe zones.”
U.S. officials have made few public comments about the truce; in August 2012, U.S. Ambassador
to El Salvador, Mari Carmen Aponte reportedly said that the truce had reduced crime, but that
policies must “address the root causes [of crime] in order to be effective and for any reduction [in
crime] to be sustainable.”63 While some believe the Treasury Department’s decision to sanction
the financial activities of the MS-13 may signify U.S. skepticism of the truce, Ambassador
Aponte has said that the decision responded to the activities of the gang in the United States and
was made totally independent of the truce.64 (See “U.S. Treasury Department” section below.) A
State Department Travel Warning for El Salvador issued on January 23, 2012 stated that the truce
“contributed to a decline in the homicide rate…[but] the sustainability of the decline is unclear,
and the truce [has] had little impact on robbery, assaults, and other violent crimes.”65
Prospects for Country Prevention and Rehabilitation Efforts
In the last few years, Central American leaders, including those from the northern triangle
countries, appear to have moved, at least on a rhetorical level, towards more comprehensive anti-
gang approaches. In mid-December 2007, then-Salvadoran President Tony Saca opened a summit
of the Central America Integration System by stating that the gang problem had shown the
importance of coordinated anti-crime efforts, with the most important element of those efforts
being prevention.66 All of the Central American countries have created institutional bodies to
58 WOLA, op. cit.
59 Martinez and Sanz, op. cit.
60 Hannah Stone, “Account Book Reveals Details of Salvador Gang Extortion Rackets,” Insight Crime, September 24,
2012.
61 Daníel Valencia Cervantes, “Los Desaparecidos que no Importan,” El Faro, January 21, 2013.
62 Douglas Farah, The Transformation of El Salvador’s Gangs into Political Actors, Center for Strategic &
International Studies, June 2012.
63 Archibold, op. cit.
64 Enrique García, “Aponte Reitera que la “MS” es Organización Criminal Transnacional,” El Mundo, October 16,
2012.
65 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Travel Warning: El Salvador, January 23, 2013, available at:
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_5871.html.
66 “Centroamérica Revisa Estrategias Para Luchar Contra Pandillas,” Agence France Presse, December 13, 2007.
Congressional Research Service
13
Gangs in Central America
design and coordinate crime prevention strategies and have units within their national police
forces engaged in prevention efforts. In general, however, government-sponsored gang prevention
programs have tended, with some exceptions, to be small-scale, ad-hoc, and underfunded.
Governments have been even less involved in sponsoring rehabilitation programs for individuals
seeking to leave gangs, with most reintegration programs funded by church groups or NGOs.
Central American government officials have generally cited budgetary limitations and competing
concerns, such as drug trafficking, as major factors limiting their ability to implement more
extensive prevention and rehabilitation programs. Experts have asserted, however, that it is
important for governments to offer educational and job opportunities to youth who are willing to
leave gangs before they are tempted to join more sophisticated criminal organizations. It is also
critical, they argue, for intervention efforts to focus on strengthening families of at-risk youth.67
This may be changing, however, as the government of Mauricio Funes in El Salvador has
increased funding for prevention programs to roughly 14% of the Ministry of Security’ budget
(from a historic average of just over 1%).
Research has shown that successful anti-gang efforts involve governments working in close
collaboration with civil society, the private sector, churches, mayors, and international donors in
order to leverage limited public resources.68 In fact, many successful anti-gang programs have
developed as a result of community-driven efforts to respond to particular problems which are
then supported by capacity-building programs for leaders from those communities. Although
these types of programs may benefit from financial contributions from local and/or national
governments, they may also need non-financial support, including “training, information sharing,
leadership, or simply the provision of a dedicated space for programming or meetings.”69
Country and regional youth violence prevention programs have received significant support from
a variety of international donors, but Central American governments have tended not to take an
active role in ensuring that donor funds are well-coordinated and strategically invested. European
donors, particularly the European Commission, Spain, and Germany, have been the largest
supporters of prevention programs in Central America. U.S. support for prevention programs has
also increased in recent years, particularly since the creation of an Economic and Social
Development Fund for Central America as part of the Mérida Initiative. However, with the recent
global economic downturn, many of these traditional donors now have fewer funds to dedicate to
overseas prevention projects. As a result, Central American governments may have to enact tax
reforms to increase the revenues they have available for these and other programs. They may also
seek new support for these types of projects from other countries or private entities interested in
forming public-private partnerships.
U.S. Policy
In the mid-2000s, Administration officials and Members of Congress expressed serious concerns
about gangs and violence in Central America and their spillover effects on the United States.
67 Kliksberg, 2007.
68 USAID Gang Assessment, 2006; José Miguel Cruz, Street Gangs in Central America, San Salvador: UCA Editors,
2007.
69 See the section by Caterina Gowis Roman in Daring to Care: Community-Based Responses to Youth Gang Violence
in Central America and Central American Immigrant Communities in the United States, WOLA, October 2008.
Congressional Research Service
14
Gangs in Central America
More recently, concerns about gang-related violence have become subsumed by broader concerns
about drug trafficking and organized crime in Central America, particularly since Mexico’s
aggressive anticrime efforts have pushed Mexican DTOs deeper into the sub-region.
Nevertheless, in September 2009 congressional testimony, FBI Director Robert Mueller stated
that “criminal gangs ... are of increasing concern for domestic and international law enforcement
... [and that] the MS-13 [in particular] continues to expand its influence in the United States.”70
On October 11, 2012, Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S.
Cohen said that “MS-13 is an extremely violent and dangerous gang responsible for a multitude
of crimes that directly threaten ... U.S. citizens, as well as countries throughout Central
America.”71 U.S. officials are striving to coordinate anti-gang initiatives on both the domestic and
international fronts, taking into account their likely impact on domestic security, on the one hand,
and on foreign relations with the countries of Central America and Mexico, on the other.
Congressional Interest and Appropriations for Anti-Gang and
Related Security Efforts in Central America
Congress has expressed concern about the problem of transnational gangs and interest in the
effectiveness of U.S. international anti-gang efforts. Since the 110th Congress, interest in the topic
of gangs and violence in Central America has included concerns about the domestic and
international criminal activities of the gangs, as well as the relationship between gangs and drug
trafficking organizations. Members of Congress have also expressed interest in the effects of U.S.
deportation policy and mano dura approaches in the region on Central American gangs. As
Congress has appropriated significant funding for anti-gang efforts, there has also been oversight
of the efficacy of U.S. programs that affect Central American gangs.
Since the enactment of the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 110-161, Congress has
appropriated global International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding for
anti-gang programs in Central America that are led by the Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs (INL).72 Between FY2008 and FY2012, Congress provided $27 million
through that mechanism, although the funds requested have been trending downward.73 As
subsequently discussed, a Regional Gang Advisor based in El Salvador coordinates the anti-gang
funds in support of the 2007 U.S. Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from Central
America and Mexico.
In order to address broader security concerns in Central America, Congress has appropriated
$496.5 million for the countries of Central America since FY2008 under what was formerly
known as the Mérida Initiative-Central America and is now known as the Central American
70 Testimony by Robert Mueller, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Department of Justice, before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, September 16, 2009.
71 U.S. Department of Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Latin American Criminal Organization,” press release, October
11, 2012.
72 Initial funds for the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs’ (INL)
programs in the region came from $16 million in unspent Andean Counterdrug Program funds that were reprogrammed
in September 2007 to support drug interdiction operations, anti-gang efforts, and demand reduction initiatives in
Central America.
73 The FY2010 funds for INL’s regional anti-gang efforts – roughly $8 million – were included as part of CARSI
because of legislative language that placed a cap on security aid to the region.
Congressional Research Service
15
Gangs in Central America
Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).74 Of that total, Congress has provided $146 million to the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for rule of law efforts and crime and
violence prevention programs and to the State Department for cultural programs and small grants.
The Administration requested an additional $107.5 million for CARSI for FY2013. In the absence
of a final FY2013 foreign appropriations measure, Congress passed a continuing resolution,
H.J.Res. 117, to fund most foreign aid programs—including CARSI—at FY2012 levels plus
0.6% through March 27, 2013.
Evolution of U.S. International Anti-Gang Efforts
For at least the last six years, several U.S. agencies have been actively engaged on both the law
enforcement and preventive side of dealing with Central American gangs. In 2004, the FBI
created an MS-13 Task Force to improve information-sharing and intelligence-gathering among
U.S. and Central American law enforcement officials. In 2005, the Bureau of Immigrations and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) within the Department of Homeland Security created a national anti-
gang initiative called “Operation Community Shield.” Also in 2005, USAID undertook a
comprehensive assessment of the gang problem in Central America and Mexico. In that
assessment, USAID found that while a few U.S. programs addressed some aspects of the gang
phenomenon, several new initiatives would be needed in the areas of prevention, law
enforcement, and rehabilitation/reintegration.
Throughout 2005 and 2006, an inter-agency committee worked together to develop a U.S.
Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico, which was announced at
a July 2007 U.S.-Central America Integration System (SICA)75 summit on security issues.76 The
strategy acknowledged that, based on previous U.S. and regional experiences, future anti-gang
efforts should be holistic, comprehensive, and regional in scope. It called for active engagement
with governments in the region, the OAS, and the SICA. The strategy stated that the U.S.
government will pursue coordinated anti-gang activities in five broad areas: diplomacy,
repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention. Selected current initiatives
by U.S. agencies to implement the international components of that strategy are discussed below.
In April 2010, the GAO published a report examining (1) the extent to which the federal
government had developed an adequate strategy to combat Central American gangs, and (2) how
well federal agencies had implemented the strategy, coordinated their actions, and assessed their
results.77 According to that report, the U.S. government has developed and implemented an
interagency anti-gang strategy that outlines the threats posed by Central American gangs and the
activities that each federal agency is doing to respond to those threats. However, the GAO
recommended that the strategy be revised to include better coordination mechanisms between the
various implementing agencies and performance measures to evaluate its progress.
74 For more information, see: CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and
Policy Issues for Congress.
75 The Central American Integration System (SICA), a regional organization with a Secretariat in El Salvador, is
composed of the governments of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama. The Security
Commission was created in 1995 to develop and carry out regional security efforts.
76 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Combating Criminal Gangs from Central America and
Mexico,” July 18, 2007.
77 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Combating Gangs: Federal Agencies Have Implemented a Central
American Gang Strategy, but Could Strengthen Oversight and Measurement of Efforts, 10-395, April 23, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
16
Gangs in Central America
In recent years, the U.S. government has expanded its citizen security and law enforcement
programs in Central America through the Mérida Initiative/CARSI. CARSI builds upon existing
programs, both on a bilateral and regional basis. Its five primary goals are to (1) create safe
streets for the citizens in the region; (2) disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband within
and between the nations of Central America; (3) support the development of strong, capable, and
accountable Central American governments; (4) re-establish effective state presence and security
in communities at risk; and (5) foster enhanced levels of security and rule of law coordination and
cooperation between the nations of the region.78 CARSI does not focus on gangs directly, as its
“two principle targets are violence and drugs.”79 However, since gangs are tied to both drug
trafficking and violence, broader CARSI programs complement, and may at times overlap with,
INL’s anti-gang programs.
El Salvador’s selection as one of four countries in the world to participate in the Obama
Administration’s Partnership for Growth (PFG)80 initiative has further heightened the attention on
security issues—including anti-gang efforts—in that country in particular. As a first step of
implementing the PFG in El Salvador, a binational team conducted a diagnostic study published
in July 2011 that identified the two greatest constraints on growth in the country as crime and
insecurity and a lack of competitiveness in the “tradables”81 sector.82 The countries then signed a
2011-2015 Joint Country Action Plan83 that includes detailed pledges by the U.S. and Salvadoran
governments on how they intend to address 20 shared goals, 14 of which focus on security. Since
the two countries have promised to provide public reports every six months on progress made in
reaching those goals, there has been pressure on both governments to expand community policing
programs, U.S. training of the police’s anti-gang unit, and crime prevention programs. It remains
to be seen whether the PFG will lead the U.S. government to focus more attention on El Salvador
than on neighboring Honduras and Guatemala.
State Department
Over the last several years, the State Department has provided training and technical assistance to
law enforcement and corrections officials throughout Central America, sponsored anti-gang
workshops at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA)84 in San Salvador, promoted
regional coordination through SICA, and established model police precincts. As previously
mentioned, INL programs have also been funded since FY2008 by a line item in the Foreign
78 U.S. Department of State, "The Central American Regional Security Initiative: A Shared Partnership," press release,
August 5, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/scp/fs/2010/145747.htm.
79 Brownfield, 2012.
80 The principles behind the PFG Initiative are to (1) focus on broad-based economic growth; (2) select countries with
demonstrated performance and political will; (3) use joint decision-making and prioritization of activities; (4) support
catalytic policy change and institutional reform; (5) leverage U.S. government engagement for maximum impact; and
(6) emphasize partnership and country ownership.
81 “Tradables” refers to products that are or can be traded internationally.
82 U.S. Department of State, Partnership for Growth: El Salvador Constraints Analysis, July 19, 2011.
83 U.S. Department of State, Partnership for Growth: El Salvador-United States Joint Country Action Plan 2011-2015,
November 2011, http://photos.state.gov/libraries/elsavador/92891/octubre2011/Joint_Country_Action_Plan.pdf.
84 The International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) based in San Salvador, El Salvador is one of four regional law
enforcement training academies funded by the State Department’s INL Bureau. The ILEA in San Salvador offers
training and technical assistance to law enforcement officials from throughout Latin America. In 2009, the ILEA
conducted five anti-gang courses.
Congressional Research Service
17
Gangs in Central America
Operations budget designated for “Criminal Youth Gangs.” Funds provided through that line item
totaled approximately $35 million between FY2008 and FY2012.
In January 2008, INL sent a Regional Gang Advisor to El Salvador to coordinate its Central
American gang programs. In July 2008, that advisor produced a detailed assessment of the gang
problem in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala and a work plan focusing on six key areas:
investigative capacity, legal capacity, intelligence capacity, community policing, prevention, and
prisons. Since that time, INL has sponsored trainings and technical exchanges for police, prison
officers, and justice sector operators from across the region; provided training and equipment to
vetted police units and intelligence analysts; and established five community policing/model
police precinct programs in Guatemala and El Salvador.85 INL gang funding is also supporting a
Regional Corrections Advisor who is assisting with prison reform programs in the region,
including the development of intelligence units within the prisons. In the area of prevention, INL
has trained more than 100 police officers throughout Central America who have provided training
to 12,000 youth in the past two years through the Gang Resistance Education and Training
(GREAT) program.86
Additionally, the State Department, which coordinates Mérida Initiative/CARSI programs in
Central America, identified gangs as a critical threat to the region, and allocated resources to the
Department of Justice, ICE, and the U.S. Agency for International Development to enable those
agencies to counter the impact of gangs in the region.
Department of Justice
Within the Department of Justice (DOJ), the FBI is implementing several programs to improve
the capacity of law enforcement in Central America to carry out investigations and share
intelligence on gang suspects. It also focuses on developing and protecting witnesses who will
testify in gang cases. The Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and
Training (OPDAT) has also provided some training on prosecuting gang-related cases to judicial
officials in the region. The deployment of a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosive
(ATF) Regional Advisor to San Salvador is enabling ATF to support transnational gang
investigations involving U.S. origin firearms. FBI, OPDAT, and ATF programs are supported by
the Mérida Initiative/CARSI or other State Department funding and are carried out in
collaboration with INL. Recent programs include:
• Central American Fingerprinting Exploitation (CAFÉ): a criminal
file/fingerprint retrieval initiative that has incorporated thousands of finger prints
from gang members from Mexico, El Salvador, Belize, Honduras, and Guatemala
into the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System since
2006. The data are accessible to Central American police officials.
85 Model police precincts currently exist in Guatemala (Coban, Mixco, and Villanueva) and El Salvador (Lourdes and
Santa Ana). Another is in the process of being developed in Honduras. The model precincts emphasize crime
prevention and targeted, intelligence-driven enforcement. In Lourdes, the implementation of the model precinct
program and its practices coincided with a 40% drop in homicides and other crimes. U.S. Department of State, Bureau
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Regional Gang Initiative Progress Status Report – CY2011,
January 27, 2012.
86 Brownfield, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
18
Gangs in Central America
• Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) Units: a program that began in El Salvador in
October 2007 involving the creation of vetted police units that work with FBI
agents stationed in San Salvador on investigating gang-related cases that have a
nexus with the United States. TAG activities have been expanded into Guatemala
and Honduras and have contributed to successful indictments of MS-13 members
in major cities across the United States.
• Central American Law Enforcement Exchange (CALEE): a joint FBI/INL
program that brings law enforcement officials from Central America together
with their counterparts from several large U.S. cities to share information and
intelligence.
• Repatriation-Criminal History Information Program (CHIP): a joint
FBI/ICE program to provide more complete criminal history information on U.S.
deportees to Central American law enforcement officials in receiving countries.
CHIP began in El Salvador in 2012.87 It is being expanded into Honduras and
then Guatemala.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Through December 2012, Operation Community Shield had led to the arrest of some 4, 156 MS-
13 gang members in the United States, an increasing percentage of those arrests made on criminal
grounds, including under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) provisions.88 In
addition to Operation Community Shield, ICE formed an anti-gang task force in Honduras to
gather intelligence to support gang investigations in Honduras and in the United States. ICE
special agents are also based at other U.S. embassies in the region, including in Guatemala and El
Salvador. ICE supports Transnational Criminal Investigative Units (TCIUs) in Mexico, El
Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Panama. The TCIUs focus on transnational investigations
and border crimes, some of which have a nexus with gangs. ICE has also developed an internet-
based system to facilitate the transmission of travel documents for individuals, including gang
members, who are deported to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
USAID has implemented a variety of country and regional anti-gang programs, some of which
have been co-managed by SICA. Initial support for these programs came from what was known
as the Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF) for Central America that was created by
P.L. 110-252, the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act. Congress has maintained support for
these efforts by providing a percentage of CARSI funds through the Economic Support Fund
(ESF) account, which is implemented by USAID.
As of mid-2012, USAID had projects under implementation in 50 municipalities and 175
communities.89 Those projects include support for municipal committees to develop crime
87 FBI Press Release, “United Against MS-13; Our Central American Partnerships,” November 10, 2009; Embassy of
the United States in San Salvador, El Salvador, “El Salvador Signs Chip,” press release, May 9, 2012.
88 For background on RICO, see: CRS Report 96-950, RICO: A Brief Sketch, by Charles Doyle.
89 USAID’s Impact Blog, “Ask the Expert: Enrique Roig, Coordinator for Central America Regional Security Initiative
(CARSI),” May 31, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
19
Gangs in Central America
prevention plans; funding to implement the initiatives identified as priorities by those
municipalities, including community policing programs, crime observatories, and at-risk youth
programs; and the establishment of 100 outreach centers to provide recreational and educational
opportunities for youth in high-crime areas. USAID has also worked with SICA on regional
policy initiatives, such as reforming juvenile justice systems throughout the region to move
towards an emphasis on restorative justice. Finally, USAID has formed partnerships with other
donors, private foundations/companies, and, most recently, the city of Los Angeles, to develop
innovative prevention and rehabilitation/reinsertion programs. The city of Los Angeles will share
best practices in preventing gang violence and promoting youth development with cities in
Central America and advise USAID and its implementers on citizen security programming.
U.S. Treasury Department
On October 11, 2012, the Treasury Department designated the MS-13 as a significant
transnational criminal organization whose assets will be targeted for economic sanctions pursuant
to Executive Order (E.O.) 13581.90 Issued in July 2011 as part of the Obama Administration’s
National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, E.O. 13581 enables the Treasury
Department to block the assets of members and associates of designated criminal organizations
and prohibit U.S. citizens from engaging in transactions with them.91 The Treasury Department
worked with ICE to build evidence to support the designation of the MS-13 based on the gangs’
involvement in “drug trafficking, kidnapping, human smuggling, sex trafficking, murder,” and
other serious criminal offenses that threaten U.S. and Central American citizens.
While there is evidence that some MS-13 cliques in the Washington, DC area collaborate with
groups based in El Salvador, some analysts maintain that transnational collaboration is not the
norm for the MS-13.92 Salvadoran officials seemed surprised by the designation, with President
Funes asserting that U.S. officials may be “overestimating the economic risk or financial risk
resulting from the criminal actions of the MS.”93 He and Minister of Justice and Public Security
Munguía Payés have pledged to continue supporting efforts in the peace process involving MS-13
and M-18 despite the designation. In response, U.S. officials have stood by the TCO designation,
asserting that it will provide law enforcement with additional tools to advance domestic and
international anti-gang efforts.94
Possible Questions for Oversight
• Evolving Gang Threat. To what degree are the gangs in Central America
becoming more organized and sophisticated? Are their concerns primarily local,
or transnational? What types of ties do they have with other criminal
90 The criteria established for declaring a transnational criminal organization pursuant to Executive Order 13581 are
available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/25/executive-order-blocking-property-transnational-
criminal-organizations. U.S. Department of Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Latin American Criminal Organization,”
press release, October 11, 2012.
91 The first four criminal organizations that received Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO) designations were: the
Brother’s Circle, the Camorra, Los Zetas, and the Yakuza. See: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
Executive Order 13581--Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations,” July 25, 2011.
92 Geoffrey Ramsey, “Tracking El Salvador’s Mara Salvatrucha in Washington, DC,” InSight Crime, October 12, 2012.
93 Geoffrey Ramsey, “El Salvador President: US 'Overestimating' MS-13,” InSight Crime, October 11, 2012.
94 Garrett, October 2012.
Congressional Research Service
20
Gangs in Central America
organizations based in Central America and with Mexican DTOs? To what extent
are cliques in the region communicating with groups in the United States?
• U.S. Strategy. Five years after the adoption of an interagency strategy to combat
the gangs, what have been the results of U.S. efforts? How is the success or
failure of the strategy being measured? How are domestic and international
efforts in support of the strategy being coordinated?
• CARSI. To what extent is CARSI addressing the gang problem in Central
America? Is there any duplication between INL’s centrally managed gang
programs and CARSI initiatives? Does it still make sense to fund and implement
the two programs separately?
• Leveraging U.S. assistance. To what extent are U.S. anti-gang efforts being
coordinated with those of other donors? Has the private sector stepped forward to
complement any donor-led initiatives? Have any recipient countries been able to
take over responsibility for programs that began with U.S. funding? How well is
SICA coordinating regional anti-gang efforts?
• U.S. Efforts and the Gang Truce in El Salvador. Have any U.S. programs been
revamped or scaled up in order to support the truce? Should the truce fail, what
might be the impact on security in that country and across the region?
• New Tools. To what extent are countries in the region using new tools—such as
asset forfeiture and wiretapping—to go after the gangs? How might the Treasury
Department’s decision to sanction the MS-13 bolster efforts to combat the gangs,
both in the United States and in Central America?
Author Contact Information
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
cseelke@crs.loc.gov, 7-5229
Congressional Research Service
21