Kosovo: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
January 23, 2013
Congressional Research Service
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Kosovo: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Summary
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. The United States and 22
of the 27 EU countries (including key countries such as Germany, France, Britain, and Italy) have
recognized Kosovo’s independence. The Kosovo government claims that 98 countries in all have
extended diplomatic recognition to it. When it declared independence, Kosovo pledged to
implement the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, drafted by U.N. envoy
Martti Ahtisaari. The document contains provisions aimed at safeguarding the rights of ethnic
Serbs and other minorities. EULEX, a European Union-led law-and-order mission, is tasked with
improving the rule of law in Kosovo. KFOR, a NATO-led peacekeeping force that includes
hundreds of U.S. soldiers, has the mission of providing a secure environment.
Serbia strongly objects to Kosovo’s declaration of independence. It has used diplomatic means to
try to persuade countries to not recognize Kosovo. It has retained parallel governing institutions
in Serb-majority areas in Kosovo. Since March 2011, the EU has mediated negotiations between
Serbia and Kosovo. The agreements reached include ones on free movement of persons, customs
stamps, recognition of university diplomas, cadastre (real estate) records, civil registries (which
record births, deaths, marriages, etc. for legal purposes), integrated border/boundary management
(IBM), and on regional cooperation. However, the accords have not been implemented or only
partly implemented.
Kosovo faces other daunting challenges, aside from those posed by its struggle for international
recognition and the status of its ethnic minorities. According to reports by the European
Commission, the country suffers from weak institutions, including the judiciary and law
enforcement. Kosovo has high levels of government corruption and powerful organized crime
networks. Many Kosovars are poor and reported unemployment is very high.
The United States has supported the EU-brokered talks between Serbia and Kosovo, but has
stressed that it is an observer, not a participant in them. On September 10, 2012, the White House
issued a statement by President Obama hailing the end of international supervision of Kosovo. He
said Kosovo has made “significant progress” in “building the building the institutions of a
modern, multi-ethnic, inclusive and democratic state.” He added Kosovo had more work to do in
ensuring that the rights enshrined in the country’s constitution are realized for every citizen.
President Obama also called on Kosovo to continue to work to resolve outstanding issues with its
neighbors, especially Serbia.
Since U.S. recognition of Kosovo’s independence in 2008, congressional action on Kosovo has
focused largely on foreign aid appropriations legislation. Aid to Kosovo has declined significantly
in recent years. In FY2012, Kosovo received an estimated $67.45 million. For FY2013, the
Administration requested a total of $57.669 million for Kosovo. Of this amount, $42.544 million
is aid for political and economic reforms from the Economic Support Fund, $10.674 million from
the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account, $0.7 million in IMET military
training aid, $3 million in Foreign Military Financing, and $0.75 million in NADR aid to assist
non-proliferation and anti-terrorism efforts.
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Kosovo: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Contents
Background: An Independent Kosovo ............................................................................................. 1
Kosovo-Serbia Negotiations ............................................................................................................ 3
Northern Kosovo ....................................................................................................................... 4
Kosovo’s Other Challenges ............................................................................................................. 5
Kosovo’s Political Situation ...................................................................................................... 6
Kosovo’s Economy and International Assistance ...................................................................... 7
U.S. Policy ....................................................................................................................................... 8
Contacts
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................. 9
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Kosovo: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Background: An Independent Kosovo
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia, sparking celebration
among the country’s ethnic Albanians, who form over 90% of the country’s population. Serbia
and the Kosovo Serb minority heatedly objected to the declaration and refused to recognize it.
Serbia continues to view Kosovo as its province.
The United States recognized Kosovo’s independence on February 18, 2008. The Kosovo
government claims their country has been recognized by 98 countries, a majority of UN member-
states. Of the 27 EU countries, 22 have recognized Kosovo, including key countries such as
France, Germany, Britain, and Italy. Five EU countries—Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia, Romania, and
Spain—have expressed opposition to Kosovo’s independence. These countries are either
traditional allies of Serbia, or have minority populations for whom they fear Kosovo
independence could set an unfortunate precedent, or both. Kosovo joined the International
Monetary Fund and World Bank in 2009.
Russia has strongly opposed Kosovo’s independence. Russian opposition will likely block
Kosovo’s membership in the United Nations for the foreseeable future, due to Russia’s veto
power in the U.N. Security Council. Kosovo seeks to eventually join the European Union and
NATO, although this is at best a distant prospect, due to the non-recognition of Kosovo by several
NATO and EU states, as well as the country’s poverty and weak institutions.
When it declared independence, Kosovo pledged to implement the Comprehensive Proposal for
the Kosovo Status Settlement, drafted by U.N. envoy Martti Ahtisaari. The provisions of the plan
were incorporated into Kosovo’s constitution. The status settlement called for Kosovo to become
an independent country, initially supervised by the international community.1 The plan bars
Kosovo from merging with another country or part of another country (a tacit reference to
Albania or parts of other neighboring countries populated mainly by ethnic Albanians.)
The document contained provisions aimed at safeguarding the rights of ethnic Serbs and other
minorities. The plan called for six Serbian-majority municipalities to be given expanded powers
over their own affairs. They have the right to form associations with each other and receive
transparent funding from Belgrade. Local police are part of the Kosovo Police Service, but their
composition has to correspond to the local ethnic mix and the local police commander is chosen
by the municipality. Central government bodies and the judiciary also have to reflect Kosovo’s
ethnic composition. Kosovo’s constitution and laws have to guarantee minority rights. Laws of
special interest to ethnic minorities can only be approved if a majority of the minority
representatives in the parliament votes for them. Serbian religious and cultural sites and
communities in Kosovo must be protected.
An International Civilian Representative (ICR) was appointed by an international steering group
of countries to oversee Kosovo’s implementation of the plan. The ICR’s mandate ended in
September 2012. The EU Special Representative in Kosovo, currently Samuel Zbogar of
Slovenia, continues to provide advice to Kosovo on the reforms needed to move closer to
eventual EU membership.
1 Ahtisaari’s report to Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon on the plan can be found at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/
unsc_presandsg_letters07.htm.
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EULEX, which operates under the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), monitors
and advises the Kosovo government on all issues related to the rule of law, specifically the police,
courts, customs officials, and prisons. It has the ability to assume “limited executive powers” to
ensure that these institutions work effectively, as well as to intervene in specific criminal cases,
including by referring them to international judges and prosecutors. In the past, critics have
charged that EULEX hasn’t been effective in fighting organized crime and corruption and that
some of its efforts, particularly in the area of witness protection, have been amateurish.
Due to the lack of unanimity within the EU on Kosovo’s independence, EULEX functions as a
“status-neutral” organization, providing assistance on rule-of-law issues to local authorities
without endorsing or rejecting Kosovo’s independence. EULEX has undergone substantial
reductions in personnel and funding. Most of the cuts have come in the police side of the mission
rather than the judiciary, where the need for assistance appears to be greatest. EULEX’s mandate
will end in June 2014.
KFOR, the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo, has the role of ensuring the overall security
of Kosovo, while leaving policing duties to local authorities and EULEX. KFOR also plays the
leading role in overseeing the training of the 2,500-strong Kosovo Security Force (KSF) called
for by the Ahtisaari plan. NATO and the United States are providing assistance and training to the
KSF, which possesses small arms but not heavy weapons such as artillery and tanks.
At a June 2009 NATO defense ministers’ meeting, the Alliance agreed to gradually reduce
KFOR’s size to a “deterrent presence.” The ministers decided that reductions were justified by the
improved security situation in Kosovo. The decision may have also been provoked by the strains
on member states’ resources posed by deployments to Afghanistan and other places, as well as by
the global economic crisis. Tasks previously undertaken by KFOR, such as guarding Kosovo’s
borders and key Serbian cultural and religious sites, have been gradually handed over to the
Kosovo police.
In November 2012, KFOR had 5,565 troops in Kosovo, of which 760 were U.S. soldiers.2 Further
cuts in KFOR’s size are on hold until the security situation in the country, unsettled since summer
2011, appears stable. In December 2012, press reports claimed that France proposed that KFOR
be replaced by a smaller, EU-led force in late 2013. The idea was reportedly shelved after some
NATO member states expressed opposition to the idea because of the still-unsettled situation in
northern Kosovo. If true, this could indicate that some NATO countries may be eager to “solve”
the difficult question of Serb-dominated northern Kosovo in 2013 so that such a transition could
take place soon thereafter.
The Kosovo government wants NATO to certify this year that the KSF is fully operational. It
wants the KSF to assume responsibility for Kosovo’s security, with continuing assistance from
the Alliance to prepare the country for eventual NATO membership. However, KFOR, like
EULEX, functions as a “status-neutral” body, given that a few NATO member states do not
recognize Kosovo’s independence. Kosovo is seeking to join the U.S.-led Adriatic Charter as a
full member. The Adriatic Charter encourages countries in the region to improve their military
capabilities and cooperation with other Charter countries, with the goal of eventual NATO
membership.
2 “KFOR Placemat,” November 30, 2012 from the KFOR website, at http://www.nato.int/kfor/structur/nations/
placemap/kfor_placemat.pdf.
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Kosovo-Serbia Negotiations
Serbia and Kosovo Serbs reject Kosovo’s independence as illegitimate, and continue to assert
Serbia’s sovereignty over its former province. Serbia seemed to have won a diplomatic victory
when the U.N. General Assembly voted on October 8, 2008, to refer the question of the legality
of Kosovo’s declaration of independence to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). However, in
July 2010, the ICJ ruled that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not contravene
international law.
After the ICJ ruling, the EU pressed Serbia to agree to hold EU-facilitated talks with Kosovo on
technical issues, rather than on the question of Kosovo’s status. The talks began in March 2011.
In July 2011, the two sides reached an agreement on freedom of movement. However, frustrated
at the failure to secure Serbia’s agreement to the free movement of goods bearing Kosovo’s
customs stamp across the border, Kosovo blocked Serbia’s goods from entering Kosovo. Saying
that EULEX refused to implement this policy, on July 25, 2011, Kosovo sent a special police unit
to seize control of two customs posts in Serbian-dominated northern Kosovo. Local Serbs
responded by erecting barricades blocking the routes to the posts. During the operation, a
Kosovar policeman was killed by a sniper. On the 27th, one of the posts was burned by a Serbian
mob. KFOR then moved to take control of the two border posts. A “cat-and-mouse” game
between KFOR and local Serbs over roadblocks and bypass routes to allow Serbs to avoid the
customs checkpoints has continued sporadically until the present, although with less violence
than occurred in 2011.
In October 2011, the European Commission released a report on Serbia’s qualifications to
become a member of the EU. The Commission recommended that Serbia be given the status of a
membership candidate if it re-engages in the dialogue with Kosovo and implements in good faith
agreements already reached. The Commission recommended that Serbia be given a date to begin
membership negotiations if it achieved further steps in normalizing its relations with Kosovo.
These include “fully respecting the principles of inclusive regional cooperation; fully respecting
the provisions of the Energy Community Treaty; finding solutions for telecommunications and
mutual acceptance of diplomas; by continuing to implement in good faith all agreements reached;
and by cooperating actively with EULEX in order for it to exercise its functions in all parts of
Kosovo.”3 In December 2011, the EU Council endorsed these recommendations.
In March 2012, the EU accepted Serbia as a membership candidate. However, the EU reiterated
that the granting of a date for the EU to begin negotiations with Serbia would depend upon
reaching agreements on energy and telecommunications with Kosovo and the implementation of
the accords already agreed to.
In May 2012, Serbia held presidential and parliamentary elections, which led to the victory of the
nationalist Progressive Party and the Socialist Party of Serbia, once led by Slobodan Milosevic,
the chief instigator of the wars in the region of the 1990s. However, both parties have moderated
their public stances in recent years. Prime Minister Ivica Dacic of the Socialist Party said the new
government is committed to implementing the agreements the previous government reached with
Kosovo and to continuing the Kosovo negotiating process, as well as beginning EU membership
3 Commission Opinion on Serbia’s Application for Membership of the European Union, October 12, 2011, at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/sr_rapport_2011_en.pdf.
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negotiations. In October 2012, the first-ever high-level meeting between the two sides took place
between Prime Minister Dacic and Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci. Such meetings have
become a regular feature of the negotiations in recent months, in addition to ongoing talks at the
“technical” level.
The agreements reached from the beginning of the talks until the end of 2012 include ones on free
movement of persons, customs stamps, mutual recognition of university diplomas, cadastre (real
estate) records, civil registries (which record births, deaths, marriages, etc. for legal purposes),
integrated border/boundary management (IBM), and on regional cooperation. Implementation of
most of these accords has lagged. A technical protocol on IBM went into effect at the end of
2012, with the opening of several joint Kosovo/Serbia border/boundary posts. The two sides also
agreed to exchange liaison personnel (to be located in EU offices in Belgrade and Pristina) to
monitor the implementation of agreements and address any problems that may arise.
In December 2012, the EU Council said that Serbia could begin membership negotiations during
2013 if it decides Belgrade’s progress on talks with Kosovo and its own reform efforts are
sufficient. In January 2013, a resolution on Kosovo policy passed by the Serbian parliament and
statements by Prime Minister Dacic appeared to some observers to signal that Belgrade may be
willing to show greater flexibility in the Kosovo talks in order to begin EU membership talks as
soon as possible. However, Serbia continues to rule out recognition of Kosovo’s independence.
Northern Kosovo
The issue of Serbian-majority areas of northern Kosovo will be particularly difficult to solve. The
area is under the de facto control of Belgrade, which operates through what the Kosovo
government, the United States, and many EU countries call “parallel institutions.” These range
from municipal governments to healthcare and educational facilities to representatives of Serbian
military and intelligences agencies, although the last of these are not formally acknowledged to
be deployed there. Control over the police and courts will likely be a major sticking point, as this
involves core issues of sovereignty and power.
The Kosovo government demands the dissolution of these institutions and insists that the region
come under its control. Kosovar leaders claim that the area would enjoy the same level of
decentralization enjoyed by Serb-majority municipalities in the rest of Kosovo under Kosovo’s
constitution. The United States, Germany, and other countries that have recognized Kosovo have
also demanded the dismantling of the parallel institutions, particularly military and intelligence
structures. They have also called on Belgrade to make its funding of healthcare, education and
other institutions in northern Kosovo more transparent.
Serbian leaders in Belgrade reject the decentralization provisions of the Kosovo constitution as
insufficient. They may try to have the current parallel institutions effectively re-baptized as
autonomous institutions within Kosovo. Even if this occurs, however, Serbia will still refuse to
recognize Kosovo as an independent state, considering it to be an autonomous province of Serbia.
Belgrade’s position could perhaps be viewed as an effort to present northern Kosovo (at least to
itself) as an “autonomy within an autonomy.” A possible effort by Serbia to try to use the talks to
extend its control over Serbian enclaves in southern Kosovo by linking them with the north in an
association of autonomous Serb municipalities is very likely to fail, given the Kosovo
government’s control of these areas and the lack of EU and US support for such a move.
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Kosovo Serb leaders in northern Kosovo reject even a symbolic Kosovo government presence in
the area. Their objections could prove politically embarrassing to Belgrade if it makes significant
concessions in the talks. In February 2012, Kosovo Serb leaders organized a local referendum,
which was not monitored by international observers, that rejected Kosovo government institutions
by an overwhelming margin.
Some observers have called for Kosovo to be formally partitioned, with northern Kosovo
formally recognized as part of Serbia and the rest of the country remaining part of Kosovo. It is
often proposed that, in exchange for the Kosovars’ formally ceding northern Kosovo, Serbia
could cede the ethnic Albanian-majority areas in the Presevo valley in southern Serbia. These
ideas are strongly opposed by the Kosovo government and by the international community. The
United States and other countries fear that partition could destabilize the region by tempting some
leaders, particularly in Bosnia and Macedonia, to try to redraw borders along ethnic lines, which
could lead to armed conflict.
In the past few years, Serbian leaders repeatedly and openly discussed the possibility of partition,
but did not make formal proposals. However, they have refrained from even raising the idea more
recently, due to strong pressure from the United States, Germany, and other EU countries that
have recognized Kosovo. These key EU countries have made clear to Serbia that continuing to
mention partition would jeopardize Belgrade’s EU membership prospects.
In December 2012, the EU called for a “single institutional and administrative set up” within
Kosovo. Such a formulation would appear to rule out partition as well as the status quo. However,
it would seem to permit the wide range of other outcomes discussed above, from a mere
relabeling of current Serbian institutions in the north as Kosovar ones, to their modification to
make them more transparent and acceptable to the EU and Kosovo, to the effective takeover of
the region by the Kosovo government.
Kosovo’s Other Challenges
Kosovo faces daunting challenges as an independent state in addition to those posed by its
struggle for international recognition and the status of its ethnic minorities. Kosovo suffers from
the same problems as other countries in the region, but is in some respects worse off than many of
them. Kosovo’s problems are especially severe as it has had little recent experience in self-rule,
having been controlled by Serbia and/or Yugoslavia until 1999, and by the international
community from 1999 until 2008.
Kosovo suffers from weak institutions, particularly in the area of the rule of law. In January 2012,
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe released a report on Kosovo’s judiciary.
While praising the adoption of legislation on the courts, the vetting of judges, and on judges’
salaries, the report noted serious problems, such as a legacy of strong executive influence, threats
against judges and their families, and poor court infrastructure and security arrangements. Reports
from the European Commission and other sources note Kosovo’s severe problem with organized
crime and high-level corruption.
Kosovo’s image suffered a blow as a result of a report approved by the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe in January 2011. The report, authored by human rights rapporteur Dick
Marty of Switzerland, linked Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci and others with the alleged
murder of prisoners during the Kosovo Liberation Army’s war with Serbia in the 1990s, and the
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extraction of their organs in Albania for sale on the international black market. Thaci and other
former KLA leaders strongly deny the charges. Serbia called for an independent investigative
body to be formed by the U.N. Security Council. However, the United States and the EU did not
support this approach. An EULEX-appointed prosecutor, John Williamson, an American, is
conducting an investigation into the charges.
Despite the differences between member countries on recognizing Kosovo’s independence, the
EU has opened the door to possible negotiations on a Stabilization and Association Agreement
(SAA) between Kosovo and the EU. An SAA would establish closer, contractual relations
between Kosovo and the EU and has in the past been a steppingstone to eventual EU
membership. However, the EU has said that Kosovo will need to make progress on short term
priorities concerning the rule of law, public administration, protection of minorities and trade
before SAA negotiations could begin. In general, the EU has been pleased with Kosovo’s
progress in establishing a legal basis in these and other areas, but has said that more progress is
needed in implementation.
If the EU Commission reports favorably on Kosovo’s progress this spring, negotiations on an
SAA could begin later this year. In addition its possible benefits in encouraging reform in
Kosovo, the prospect of an SAA may also encourage Kosovo to demonstrate a constructive
approach in its talks with Serbia.
Kosovar leaders criticized EU decisions to permit visa-free travel to the EU for the citizens of
other countries in the region in 2010, while continuing to require visas for Kosovo. In addition to
the practical inconveniences involved, Kosovars may view the decision as a blow to the prestige
of their country. Moreover, the country’s European integration may be hindered if Kosovars,
particularly young people, find it difficult to travel to the EU and see how EU countries function
at first hand.
In January 2012, the EU launched a dialogue with Kosovo on visa-free travel. However, Kosovo
is unlikely to receive visa-free travel in the near future, given that the EU will likely demand
substantial improvements in rule of law and border controls first. Moreover, several EU countries
have complained about a surge in asylum-seekers from the region since 2010, and the EU has
threatened to suspend the whole program unless the problem is resolved.
Kosovo’s Political Situation
Kosovo’s current government was formed in February 2011, after the December 2010 elections.
Hashim Thaci, leader of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), was reelected as prime minister.
In addition to the dominant PDK (which has 34 seats), the government, which was approved by
65 of the 120 members of the parliament, also includes the New Kosovo Alliance, led by wealthy
construction magnate Behgjet Pacolli (8 seats). Most of the remaining coalition parties represent
Serbs and other ethnic minorities.
As part of the deal to set up the government, Pacolli was elected president of Kosovo by the
parliament in February 2011. However, in March 2011, the Kosovo Constitutional Court ruled
that Pacolli’s election was illegal because not enough members of parliament were present for the
vote. Pacolli resigned, and in April 2011 Atifete Jahjaga was elected as president of Kosovo. A
non-political, compromise figure, Jahjaga was formerly deputy director of the Kosovo Police
Service. The reportedly prominent role played by U.S. Ambassador Christopher Dell in pushing
for her election sparked some controversy in the Kosovar press.
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The acquittal of Ramush Haradinaj of war crimes charges at the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia in November 2012 has led to a rapprochement between his opposition
Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) party and the ruling PDK. This has provided a more
stable political basis for the government’s negotiations with Serbia. Kosovo may hold early
parliamentary elections in 2013, but will likely have to pass electoral reforms acceptable to the
international community first. Kosovo’s previous elections have been marred by fraud. The
parliament could also agree on changes to the constitution, including to make the presidency a
popularly-elected post, and to hold early presidential elections along with ones for a new
parliament.
Kosovo’s Economy and International Assistance
Poverty, unemployment, and a lack of economic opportunity are serious problems in Kosovo.
Kosovo is one of Europe’s poorest countries. According to the World Bank, 34.5% of Kosovo’s
population fell below the country’s poverty line in 2009. Poverty is particularly severe in rural
areas and among Roma and other ethnic minorities. Unemployment in Kosovo is over 40%,
according to the European Commission’s October 2012 report on Kosovo, which notes that data
on the subject is scarce and often unreliable. Youth unemployment is even higher, at about 70%.
The unemployment is largely structural in character, with about 80% of the unemployed without
work for a year or more.
Small and inefficient farms are the largest employers in Kosovo. The country has little large-scale
industry and few exports. However, Kosovo does have significant deposits of metals and lignite.
Kosovo has to improve its investment climate in order to stimulate growth and attract foreign
investment, according to the European Commission and World Bank.
Due to a surge in government spending (including a sharp increase in government salaries) and a
failure to rein in its budget deficit, the IMF cut off funding from a stand-by loan in June 2011.
This also led to the interruption of macro-financial funding from the EU. However, a new 106.6
million Euro stand-by arrangement was approved in April 2012, and Kosovo has received
tranches of the loan since then.
Kosovo has been dependent on international aid and expenditures by international staff in
Kosovo. These sources of income have declined in recent years. Kosovo is also dependent on
remittances from the large number of Kosovars abroad. The first makes up about 7.5% of
Kosovo’s Gross Domestic Product, and the latter about 10%, according to the 2013 CIA World
Factbook. Kosovo has not been as strongly affected by the global economic crisis as other
countries, due to its low level of integration into the global economy. The IMF projected GDP
growth of 3.8% for Kosovo in 2012, and 4.1% growth in 2013.
In 2013, Kosovo is slated to receive 65 million Euro in aid under the EU’s Instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance (IPA). The aid provides support for the rule of law, the economy, and for
public administration reform. The EU is discussing the amount to be allocated for the IPA
program as a whole for the period 2014-2020. No decision has been reached yet, but given the
EU’s financial difficulties, funding may be at least slightly reduced in real terms when compared
to the 2007-2013 period.
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U.S. Policy
The United States recognized Kosovo’s independence on February 18, 2008, one of the first
countries to do so. The United States has urged other countries to extend diplomatic recognition
to Kosovo, with mixed success. In December 2008, President Bush announced that Kosovo had
been included under the Generalized System of Preferences, a program that cuts U.S. tariffs for
many imports from poor countries. (Kosovo also receives similar trade privileges from the EU.)
Vice President Joseph Biden set the tone for the Obama Administration’s Balkans policy when he
visited Kosovo in May 2009, after stops in Bosnia and Serbia. He received a hero’s welcome in
Kosovo, where he declared that the “success of an independent Kosovo” is a U.S. “priority.” He
offered U.S. support to Kosovo in dealing with its many challenges, including building effective
institutions, fighting organized crime and corruption, and improving ties with ethnic minorities.
He said he stressed to Serbian leaders the United States’ own strong support for an independent
Kosovo and urged them to cooperate with Kosovo institutions and EULEX instead of setting up
separate institutions for Kosovo Serbs.4 On the other hand, when he was in Belgrade, Biden told
Serbia’s leaders that he did not expect them to recognize Kosovo’s independence in order to have
improved relations with the United States.
Although strongly supporting the Serbia-Kosovo talks, U.S. officials have said the United States
is a “guest,” not s a participant or mediator. However, many analysts claim that the U.S. role is
still significant, if indirect, given that Kosovar leaders view the United States as their country’s
most powerful and reliable ally.
On September 10, 2012, the White House issued a statement by President Obama hailing the end
of supervised independence in Kosovo. He said Kosovo has made “significant progress” in
“building the building the institutions of a modern, multi-ethnic, inclusive and democratic state.”
He added Kosovo had more work to do in ensuring that the rights enshrined in the country’s
constitution are realized for every citizen. President Obama also called on Kosovo to continue to
work to resolve outstanding issues with its neighbors, especially Serbia. U.S. officials have also
urged Serbia to come to terms with Kosovo’s independence, including by normalizing ties with
Pristina and dismantling parallel Serbian institutions in Kosovo.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited the region in late October and early November 2012,
stopping in Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Croatia, and Albania. In a move that underlines the U.S.
focus on coordination with the EU, she visited Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo jointly with EU
foreign policy chief Baroness Catherine Ashton. At every stop, Clinton emphasized the solidarity
between Brussels and Washington on Balkan policy.
During visits to Serbia and Kosovo, Clinton stressed the importance for both sides to negotiate in
good faith in the EU-brokered talks aimed at normalizing their relationship so that they can
integrate with the European Union. She praised Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci for
meeting in Brussels with Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dacic and Ashton. Clinton stressed that the
United States regards Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as completely non-negotiable.
4 A text of Vice President Biden’s speech to the Assembly of Kosovo can be found at the White House website at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-The-Vice-President-To-The-Assembly-Of-Kosovo/.
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Although most EU countries would agree with the statement, Ashton could not make such a
comment, as the EU is divided on the issue of Kosovo’s independence. 5
Clinton’s statement may have been aimed at offering reassurance to Thaci for the talks, which are
about as controversial in Kosovo as they are in Serbia. It is considered likely that Kosovo will
face pressure from Serbia and possibly from some EU countries to agree to wide-ranging de facto
autonomy for Serbian-dominated northern Kosovo.
U.S. aid to Kosovo has declined significantly in recent years. According to the FY2013
Congressional Budget Presentation for Foreign Operations, in FY2012, Kosovo received an
estimated $67.45 million. For FY2013, the Administration requested a total of $57.669 million
for Kosovo. Of this amount, $42.544 million is aid for political and economic reforms from the
Economic Support Fund, $10.674 million from the International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement account, $0.7 million in IMET, $3 million in FMF, and $0.75 million in NADR aid.
U.S. aid programs include efforts to support the Kosovo Police Service and strengthen the judicial
system and local government in Kosovo. U.S. aid is used to provide police officers and judges to
EULEX. Technical assistance is used to build the capacity of Kosovo’s government and
parliament. U.S aid also assists Kosovo in improving its system of higher education. A significant
part of U.S. aid is targeted at promoting the integration of the Serbian minority into Kosovo’s
government and society. Foreign Military Funding (FMF) and IMET military training aid help
improve the capabilities of the Kosovo Security Force. Assistance from the Nonproliferation,
Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) account is aimed at boosting the
capacity of Kosovo border police to fight proliferation and trafficking.
Author Contact Information
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
swoehrel@crs.loc.gov, 7-2291
5 See the State Department website at http://www.state.gov/secretary/trvl/2012/199645.htm
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