International Drug Control Policy:
Background and U.S. Responses
Liana Sun Wyler
Analyst in International Crime and Narcotics
January 14, 2013
Congressional Research Service
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www.crs.gov
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CRS Report for Congress
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epared for Members and Committees of Congress
International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses
Summary
The global illegal drug trade represents a multi-dimensional challenge that has implications for
U.S. national interests as well as the international community. Common illegal drugs trafficked
internationally include cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine. According to the U.S. intelligence
community, international drug trafficking can undermine political and regional stability and
bolster the role and capabilities of transnational criminal organizations in the drug trade. Key
regions of concern include Latin America and Afghanistan, which are focal points in U.S. efforts
to combat the production and transit of cocaine and heroin, respectively. Drug use and addiction
have the potential to negatively affect the social fabric of communities, hinder economic
development, and place an additional burden on national public health infrastructures.
International Policy Framework and Debate
International efforts to combat drug trafficking are based on a long-standing and robust set of
multilateral commitments, to which the United States adheres. U.S. involvement in international
drug control rests on the central premise that helping foreign governments combat the illegal drug
trade abroad will ultimately curb illegal drug availability and use in the United States. To this end,
the current Administration maintains the goal of reducing and eliminating the international flow
of illegal drugs into the United States through international cooperation to disrupt the drug trade
and interdiction efforts.
Despite long-standing multilateral commitments to curb the supply of illicit drugs, tensions
appear at times between U.S. foreign drug policy and approaches advocated by independent
observers and other members of the international community. In recent years, an increasing
number of international advocates, including several former and sitting heads of state, have begun
to call for a reevaluation of current prohibitionist-oriented international drug policies. Alternatives
to the existing international drug control regime may include legalizing or decriminalizing certain
drugs. Debates may also focus on shifting priorities and resources among various approaches to
counternarcotics, including supply and demand reduction; the distribution of domestic and
international drug control funding; and the relative balance of civilian, law enforcement, and
military roles in anti-drug efforts.
U.S. Counternarcotics Initiatives and Foreign Policy Options
Several key U.S. strategies and initiatives outline the foundation of U.S. counternarcotics efforts
internationally, including the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy and International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report (INCSR), both of which are updated annually and congressionally
mandated. Other major country and regional initiatives include the (1) Mérida Initiative and
Strategy in Mexico; (2) Central American Citizen Security Partnership; (3) Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative (CBSI); (4) U.S.-Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI); (5) U.S.
Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan; and (6) West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative
(WACSI).
Located within the Executive Office of the President, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP) establishes U.S. counterdrug policies and goals, and coordinates the federal budget to
combat drugs both domestically and internationally. Within the U.S. government, multiple
civilian, military, law enforcement, and intelligence entities contribute to international drug
control policy, including the U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International
Congressional Research Service
International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses
Development, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, U.S. Department of the Treasury, and the Central Intelligence Agency.
As an issue of international policy concern for more than a century, and as a subject of long-
standing U.S. and multilateral policy commitment, U.S. counterdrug efforts have expanded to
include a broad array of tools to attack the international drug trade, such as the following:
• Reducing drug production at the source: Central to reducing cocaine and
heroin production is the eradication of coca bush and opium poppy crops and the
provision of alternative livelihood options to former drug crop farmers. Both
policy approaches ultimately seek to reduce the amount of illicit drug crops
cultivated.
• Combating drugs in transit: To reduce the international flow of drugs from
source countries to final destinations, U.S. efforts focus on joint monitoring and
interdiction operations as well as other forms of border, police, and maritime
cooperation and training.
• Dismantling international illicit drug networks: The United States
collaborates with other countries to target major drug traffickers and their
transnational networks through various law enforcement interventions, judicial
mechanisms, and financial sanctions. With the provision of U.S. foreign
assistance, the U.S. government supports other countries to strengthen their
capacity to investigate, arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate drug traffickers
domestically.
• Creating incentives for international cooperation on drug control: In order to
deter foreign governments from aiding or participating in illicit drug production
or trafficking, certain U.S. foreign assistance may be suspended to countries that
are major illegal drug producers or major transit countries for illegal drugs,
known as “drug majors.” Similarly, certain drug majors countries may be deemed
ineligible to be a beneficiary of preferential U.S. trade arrangements.
Congress has been involved in all aspects of U.S. international drug control policy, regularly
appropriating funds for counterdrug initiatives, as well as conducting oversight activities on
federal counterdrug programs and the scope of agency authorities and other counterdrug policies.
For FY2013, the Administration has requested from Congress approximately $25.6 billion for all
federal drug control programs, of which $2 billion is requested for international programs,
including civilian and military U.S. foreign assistance. An additional $3.7 billion is requested for
interdiction programs related to intercepting and disrupting foreign drug shipments en route to the
United States. The 113th Congress may continue its ongoing interest in counternarcotics policies,
including potential legislative activity to fund the remainder of FY2013 and consider the
Administration’s new budget.
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International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses
Contents
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Drug Cultivation and Production Trends ................................................................................... 1
Drug Trafficking and Consumption Trends ............................................................................... 6
Consequences of the Drug Trade ............................................................................................... 6
Strategic Debate ............................................................................................................................... 8
International Policy Framework .................................................................................................... 10
U.S. Foreign Policy Framework .................................................................................................... 11
U.S. National Drug Control Strategy ....................................................................................... 12
National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy ..................................................... 13
National Northern Border Counternarcotics Strategy ....................................................... 13
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report ..................................................................... 13
Selected Country and Regional Initiatives .............................................................................. 14
The Mérida Initiative and Beyond..................................................................................... 14
The Central American Citizen Security Partnership and the Central American
Regional Security Initiative ............................................................................................ 15
The Caribbean-U.S. Security Cooperation Dialogue and the Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative ........................................................................................................... 16
Colombia’s National Consolidation Plan and the Colombia Strategic
Development Initiative ................................................................................................... 17
U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan and Related Initiatives .......................... 18
West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative ...................................................................... 20
U.S. Agency Roles ......................................................................................................................... 21
Overall U.S. Drug Control Funding ............................................................................................... 22
Counternarcotics Foreign Aid and Authorities .............................................................................. 23
Civilian Authorities ................................................................................................................. 24
Military Authorities ................................................................................................................. 24
U.S. Foreign Policy Options .......................................................................................................... 25
Combat the Production of Drugs at the Source ....................................................................... 25
Crop Eradication ............................................................................................................... 25
Alternative Development .................................................................................................. 27
Combating the Flow of Drugs in Transit ................................................................................. 28
Dismantling Transnational Drug Networks ............................................................................. 29
Extradition to the United States......................................................................................... 30
Freezing and Blocking Foreign Criminal Assets ............................................................... 30
Building Foreign Law Enforcement Capacity ................................................................... 32
Creating Incentives for International Cooperation .................................................................. 32
Conditions on Foreign Aid ................................................................................................ 32
Eligibility for Trade Preference Programs......................................................................... 36
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 37
Figures
Figure 1. U.S. Estimates of Coca Bush Cultivation, 2001-2011...................................................... 2
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International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses
Figure 2. U.S. Estimates of Potential Cocaine Production, 2001-2011 ........................................... 3
Figure 3. U.S. Estimates of Opium Poppy Cultivation, 2001-2010................................................. 4
Figure 4. U.S. Estimates of Potential Opium Production, 2001-2010 ............................................. 5
Figure 5. Map of World Drug Majors in FY2013 .......................................................................... 34
Tables
Table 1. Federal Drug Control Funding, FY2010 Final-FY2013 Request .................................... 23
Table 2. Federal Drug Control Funding, FY2005 Actual-FY2009 ................................................ 23
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 38
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International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses
Background
Illegal drugs refer to narcotic, psychotropic, and related substances whose production, sale, and
use are restricted by domestic law and international drug control agreements.1 Common illegal
drugs trafficked internationally include cocaine, heroin, as well as synthetic drugs, such as
methamphetamine and ecstasy.2 Cannabis, or marijuana, is also internationally proscribed. The
illegal trade in these drugs represents a lucrative and what at times seems to be an intractable
transnational criminal enterprise.
According to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the United States is particularly affected by
this criminal activity. Describing the illicit narcotics trade as a “challenging, dynamic threat to the
United States,” DOJ concluded in 2011 that the drug threat to the United States “will not abate in
the near term and may increase.”3
Drug Cultivation and Production Trends
Both cocaine and heroin are plant-derived drugs, cultivated and harvested by farmers in typically
low-income countries or in regions of the world with uneven economic development and a history
of conflict. Coca bush, the plant from which cocaine is derived, is mainly cultivated in three
South American countries: Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia (see Figure 1). Since 1997, Colombia
has been the primary source of coca bush cultivation.4 Colombia’s proportion of the global total
illegal coca bush cultivation, however, has declined in the past decade—from approximately 77%
in 2001 (221,800 total hectares worldwide) to 56% in 2010 (177,500 hectares).5
1 With few exceptions, the production and sale of controlled substances is legally permitted only if used for medical
and scientific purposes.
2 Ecstasy is the popular term for 3, 4-methylenedioxmethamphetamine (MDMA).
3 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), National Drug Threat Assessment
2011, product no. 2011-Q0317-001, August 2011.
4 U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), National Drug Control Strategy, Data Supplement 2012.
5 The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) separately reports on coca bush cultivation trends. The resulting
estimates differ at times from those reported by the U.S. government. See UNODC, World Drug Report 2012, June
2012.
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Figure 1. U.S. Estimates of Coca Bush Cultivation, 2001-2011
200,000
150,000
ectares)
(h 100,000
ation
cultiv
50,000
0
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Colombia 169,800 144,450 113,850 114,100 144,000 157,200 167,000 119,000 116,000 100,000 83,000
Peru
32,100 34,700 29,250 27,500 34,000 37,000 36,000 41,000 40,000 53,000
Bolivia
19,900 21,600 23,200 24,600 26,500 25,800 29,500 32,000 35,000 34,500 30,000
Source: U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), Coca in the Andes, accessed online October
2012.
Note: The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) separately reports on coca bush cultivation trends. The
resulting estimates differ at times from those reported by the U.S. government. For example, UNODC reported
that Colombia cultivated approximately 62,000 hectares in 2010. In Peru, UNODC reported cultivation of
approximately 61,200 hectares in 2010 and 62,500 in 2011. In Bolivia, UNODC reported cultivation of
approximately 31,000 hectares in 2010 and 27,200 in 2011. See UNODC, World Drug Report 2012, June 2012;
Peru: Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2011, September 2012; Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia: Monitoreo de Cultivos de
Coca 2011, September 2012.
Estimates of harvestable coca bush are used to calculate how much pure cocaine could
theoretically be produced each year, taking into consideration the potency of sampled coca leaves,
the amount of eradication that took place, and the efficiency of clandestine labs, where the leaves
are chemically processed into cocaine. According to U.S. estimates, the global total potential
manufacture of pure cocaine in 2010 was approximately 790 metric tons (see Figure 2).
According to U.S. estimates, 2010 also marked the first time since 1996 that Peru led the world in
potential pure cocaine production.6 Nevertheless, U.S. law enforcement estimates indicate that
95% of all cocaine in the United States continues to be sourced from Colombia.
6 ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy, Data Supplement 2012.
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Figure 2. U.S. Estimates of Potential Cocaine Production, 2001-2011
800
600
etric tons)
tion (m
400
oduc
tential pr
200
po
0
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Colombia
700
585
445
410
500
510
475
290
290
270
195
Peru
225
280
245
230
260
265
210
215
225
325
Bolivia
100
110
100
115
115
115
120
195
195
195
265
Source: ONDCP, Coca in the Andes, accessed online October 2012.
Note: UNODC separately reports on potential pure cocaine production trends. The resulting estimates differ
at times from those reported by the U.S. government. For example, UNODC reported that Colombia’s total
potential production was approximately 350 metric tons in 2010. Comparable UNODC data for Peru and Bolivia
in 2010 is not yet available. See UNODC, World Drug Report 2012, June 2012.
Opium poppy, the plant from which opiates such as heroin are derived, is cultivated in Southwest
and Southeast Asia, as well as Latin America (see Figure 3). Opium poppy from Latin America,
primarily Mexico and Colombia, is cultivated almost exclusively for heroin consumption in the
United States. Over the past decade, Afghanistan has risen to prominence as the primary global
source of illicit opium poppy cultivation, supplanting Burma, where the majority of opium poppy
cultivation took place in the 1990s. Most of Afghanistan’s opiates are destined for Europe, Asia,
and to a lesser extent Africa. Laos and Pakistan also cultivate opium poppy for the illicit global
trade in opiates.
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Figure 3. U.S. Estimates of Opium Poppy Cultivation, 2001-2010
selected countries
250,000
200,000
res) 150,000
hecta
vation ( 100,000
lti
cu
50,000
0
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Afghanistan 1,685
30,750 61,000 206,700 107,400 172,600 202,000 157,000 131,000 119,000
Burma
105,000 77,700 47,130 36,000 40,000 21,000 21,700 22,500 17,000
Laos
22,000 23,200 18,900 10,000
5,600
1,700
1,100
1,900
1,000
3,500
Colombia
6,500
4,900
4,400
2,100
2,300
1,000
1,100
Mexico
4,400
2,700
4,800
3,500
3,300
5,000
6,900
15,000 19,500
Source: ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy, Data Supplement 2012.
Notes: UNODC separately reports on opium poppy cultivation trends. The resulting estimates differ at times
from those reported by the U.S. government. For example, UNODC reported that Afghanistan cultivated
approximately 123,000 hectares in 2010, 131,000 hectares in 2011, and 154,000 hectares in 2012. In Burma,
UNODC estimates that 31,700 hectares were cultivated in 2009, 38,100 hectares in 2010, 43,600 hectares in
2011, and 51,000 hectares in 2012. In Laos, UNODC estimates that 3,000 hectares were cultivated in 2010,
4,100 hectares in 2011, and 6,800 hectares in 2012. In Colombia, UNODC estimates that 356 hectares were
cultivated in 2009 and 341 hectares in 2010. In Mexico, UNODC has used U.S. government estimates that are
not independently validated by the Mexican government. For 2010, UNODC lists 14,000 hectares cultivated in
Mexico. See UNODC, World Drug Report 2012, June 2012; UNODC, Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2012, November
2012; and UNODC, South-East Asia: Opium Survey 2012,October 2012.
Similar to calculations used to measure how much pure cocaine could theoretically be produced
each year, estimates of potential production of opium and heroin can be derived from opium
poppy crop harvests and other factors. Afghanistan dominates global potential opium production
(see Figure 4). According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),
approximately 300 to 500 clandestine laboratories operate in remote locations in Afghanistan,
generating as much as 380 to 400 metric tons of heroin each year.7
7 UNODC, The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment, 2011, July 2011.
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Figure 4. U.S. Estimates of Potential Opium Production, 2001-2010
selected countries
8,000
)
6,000
etric tons
(m
tion
4,000
uc
ial prod
ent
2,000
pot
0
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Afghanistan
74
1,278
2,865
4,950
4,475
5,644
8,000
5,500
5,300
3,200
Burma
865
630
484
330
380
230
270
340
250
580
Laos
200
180
200
50
28
9
6
17
11
20
Colombia
68
63
30
37
15
17
Mexico
71
58
101
73
71
108
149
325
425
Source: ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy, Data Supplement 2012.
Notes: The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) separately reports on opium poppy
cultivation trends. The resulting estimates differ at times from those reported by the U.S. government. For
example, UNODC reported that Afghanistan’s total potential opium production was approximately 3,600 metric
tons in 2010, 5,800 in 2011, and 2,700 in 2012. In Burma, UNODC estimated that as much as 580 metric tons of
opium was produced in 2010, 610 in 2011, and 690 in 2012. In Laos, UNODC estimated that some 18 metric
tons of potential opium was produced in 2010, 25 in 2011, and 41 in 2012. In Colombia, UNODC estimated that
some nine metric tons of potential opium was produced in 2009 and 2010. In Mexico, UNODC estimated that
some 425 metric tons of potential opium was produced in 2009 and 305 in 2010. See UNODC, World Drug
Report 2012, June 2012; UNODC, Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2012, November 2012; and UNODC, South-East
Asia: Opium Survey 2012,October 2012.
Global illegal synthetic drug production is difficult to estimate because it is widespread and
production sites can vary significantly in size. In general, the underlying chemicals needed for the
production of synthetic drugs such as amphetamine, methamphetamine, and ecstasy may be
legally manufactured and internationally exported for legitimate commercial and pharmaceutical
purposes. In turn, some portion of the total legal production of these chemicals is clandestinely
diverted and misused to manufacture illicit synthetic drugs. Such diverted chemicals typically are
processed into illegal synthetic drugs in clandestine laboratories, which can range in size from
small residential-sized kitchens to large-scale “superlabs” capable of processing high volumes of
synthetic drugs.
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Drug Trafficking and Consumption Trends
Major trafficking routes connect drug producers with drug consumers, with often sophisticated
drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs)
controlling various aspects of the supply chain. Significant drug transit pathways flow through
Mexico and Central America (for drugs produced in South America and destined for the United
States), West Africa (for South American cocaine destined for Europe and Afghan heroin en route
to Europe and the United States), and all the countries surrounding Afghanistan (heroin destined
to Europe, Eurasia, Asia, and Africa). Traffickers employ a wide range of land, air, and maritime
methods for transporting illicit narcotics to include go-fast boats, shipping containers, self-
propelled semi- and fully submersible vessels, non-commercial aircraft, commercial airlines,
global mail delivery services, and private and commercial ground transportation. Globally,
between 153 million and 300 million people, aged 15 to 64, used illicit substances, including
cannabis, at least once in 2010.8 Among these users, approximately 15.5 million to 38.6 million
are termed “problem drug users.”9
Consequences of the Drug Trade
The global illegal drug trade represents a multi-dimensional challenge that has implications for
U.S. national interests as well as the international community. In 2010, some 99,000 to 253,000
deaths worldwide were reported to have occurred as a result of drug use. Drug use and addiction
have been said to negatively affect the social fabric of communities, hinder economic
development, and place an additional burden on national public health infrastructures. According
to the UNODC, drugs are considered both a cause and consequence of poverty, with “22 of the 34
countries least likely to achieve the Millennium Development Goals ... located in regions that are
magnets for drug cultivation and trafficking.”10 Intravenous drug users are at particular risk of
contracting diseases such as Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C, and HIV/AIDS.11
Observers suggest that drug trafficking also represents a systemic threat to international security.
Revenue from the illegal drug trade provides international drug traffickers with the resources to
evade government detection; undermine and co-opt legitimate social, political, and economic
systems through corruption, extortion, or more violent forms of influence; penetrate legitimate
economic structures through money laundering; and, in some instances, challenge the authority of
national governments. In the process, some warn that transnational networks of criminal safe
havens exist in which drug traffickers operate with impunity. As highlighted by the use of West
Africa as a major cocaine transit hub for Latin American drug traffickers, criminal actors prey on
states with low capacity for effective governance or the enforcement of the rule of law. This can
8 UNODC, World Drug Report 2012, June 2012.
9 There is no universal definition for “problem drug user.” U.N. data are based on information submitted by Member
States to the United Nations and variously includes regular or frequent drug users deemed dependent on drug use and
suffering from social and health consequences as a result of their drug use. See UNODC, World Drug Report 2012,
June 2012.
10 UNODC, World Drug Report 2010, June 2010.
11 According to the UNODC, 3 of 16 million injecting drug users in 2008 were living with HIV; 46.7% of injecting
drug users (7.4 million) in 2010 had hepatitis C; and 2.3 million injecting drug users are infected with hepatitis B.
UNODC, World Drug Report 2012, June 2012. See also Global Commission on Drug Policy, The War on Drugs and
HIV/AIDS, How the Criminalization of Drug Use Fuels the Global Pandemic, June 2012.
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exacerbate preexisting political instability, post-conflict environments, and economic
vulnerability.
Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs), Transnational Organized Crime (TOC), and
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs)
The 2010 U.S. National Drug Threat Assessment defined DTOs as “complex organizations with highly defined
command-and-control structures that produce, transport, and/or distribute large quantities of one or more illicit
drugs.”12
In addition to moving illicit drugs, DTOs are capable of generating, moving, and laundering billions of dollars in drug
proceeds annually. Major DTOs of concern to the United States include Mexican and Colombian DTOs, which are
responsible for the production and transport of most illicit drugs into the United States. Other major DTOs of
concern include the West African/Nigerian DTOs and Southwest and East Asian DTOs.
While DTOs are commonly identified by their nationality of origin, they are known to be aggressively transnational
and poly-criminal—seeking to expand their consumer markets, to diversify their criminal enterprises and product
variety, and to explore new transit points and safe havens with low law enforcement capacity and high corruption.
Many of them also have links to other illicit actors, including arms traffickers, money launderers, terrorists and
insurgent groups, and corrupt officials.
Reflecting the fact that DTOs often engage in more criminal activities than just drug trafficking, the 2011 U.S. National
Drug Threat Assessment used a different term to refer to the same criminal groups: transnational criminal
organizations (TCOs). This term is derived from the Obama Administration’s July 2011 Strategy to Combat
Transnational Organized Crime, which subsumes drug trafficking and DTOs as an element of a broader criminal
phenomenon called transnational organized crime (TOC). The July 2011 Strategy specifically defines TOC as:
[S]elf-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of
obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal
means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and/or violence, or
while protecting their illegal activities through a transnational organized structure and the
exploitation of transnational commerce or communication mechanisms.
By many accounts, drug trafficking, state weakness, political corruption, and powerful criminal
organizations are part of a seemingly self-perpetuating cycle.13 On the one hand, a drug
trafficking presence in a country can increase corruption and undermine political stability, while
on the other hand, social and political instability may be causal factors for attracting a thriving
drug industry. Further, academic literature on conflict duration indicates that control of a lucrative
illegal drug trade in the hands of a particular political actor, rebel, or insurgent group can lengthen
a conflict. State powers in the hands of a DTO or TCO through deeply entrenched kleptocracy
serve as a force multiplier to enhance a criminal organization’s power by harnessing the capacity
of a state’s infrastructure—roads, seaports, airports, warehouses, security apparatus, justice
sector, and international political sovereignty—to further the group’s illicit business aims.
The consequences of a thriving illicit drug trade co-located in a U.S. combat zone are illustrated
today in Afghanistan, where some portion of drug-related proceeds annually help facilitate the
12 DOJ, NDIC, National Drug Threat Assessment 2010, product no. 2010-Q0317-001, February 2010. Note also that
the National Drug Threat Assessment defines drug “cartels.” Specifically, it defines drug cartels to be “large, highly
sophisticated organizations composed of multiple DTOs and cells with specific assignments such as drug
transportation, security/enforcement, or money laundering. Drug cartel command-and-control structures are based
outside the United States; however, they produce, transport, and distribute illicit drugs domestically with the assistance
of DTOs that are either a part of or in an alliance with the cartel.”
13 See for example, Cornelius Graubner, Drugs and Conflict: How the Mutual Impact of Illicit Drug Economies and
Violent Conflict Influences Sustainable Development, Peace and Stability, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, Development-Oriented Drug Control Programme (DDC), 2007.
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current insurgency.14 In other regions, such as in the Western Hemisphere, Americans have been
murdered, attacked, taken hostage, and tortured for their involvement in counternarcotics
operations—highlighting the past and ongoing dangers associated with the international drug
trade.15 In addition, some observers are concerned about the potential spread of DTO- and TCO-
related violence from Mexico into the United States. Moreover, several groups listed by the U.S.
Department of State as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) are known to be involved in drug
trafficking.
2012 U.S. Intelligence Assessment of the Drug Threat
James R. Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, presented the intelligence community’s annual threat
assessment to Congress in January 2012 and highlighted, among other issues, drug trafficking as a regional challenge
for the Western Hemisphere and for Afghanistan.16 The threat assessment made reference to the following key
trends:
•
The drug threat to the United States stems mainly from the Western Hemisphere. Drug-related violence and
corruption occur at levels that undermine stability and the rule of law in some countries in the region.
•
Weak institutions and corrupt officials provide a permissive environment for criminal activity to thrive.
•
Although Mexican drug traffickers are known to have a presence within the United States and U.S. officials and
citizens in Mexico are at an increased risk because of generalized violence, the United States is “not likely to see
the level of violence that is plaguing Mexico spill across the U.S. border.”
•
Drug trafficking “continues to fuel the Revolutionary Armed Forces insurgency in Colombia.”
•
As the world’s largest supplier of illicit opium Afghanistan, local insecurity is inherently connected to the
perpetuation of the Afghan drug trade.
Strategic Debate
Drug trafficking has been an issue of international policy concern for more than a century and a
subject of long-standing U.S. and multilateral policy commitment. Yet, tensions continue to
appear at times between U.S. foreign drug policy and approaches advocated by independent
observers and the international community.
Many U.S. policymakers have argued that the confluence of political and security threats
surrounding international drug trafficking necessitates a policy posture that emphasizes the
disruption and dismantlement of the criminal actors and organizations involved in all aspects of
14 U.S. Embassy Kabul, U.S. Forces Afghanistan, United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign
Plan for Support to Afghanistan, August 10, 2009.
15 Examples include the shooting down of a drug eradication plane in Colombia in 1993, which resulted in the
immediate shooting of the pilot and the taking hostage of three American defense contractors; the killing of five U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents in Peru during the shooting down of a plane on a drug reconnaissance
mission; and the torture and murder of DEA undercover agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena Salazar in Mexico in 1985.
More recently, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Special Agent Jaime Zapata was killed in February 2011
in northern Mexico by suspected drug traffickers; another ICE agent was wounded in the same incident. In August
2012, U.S. government personnel were attacked and wounded outside of Mexico City while driving in an armored
vehicle with U.S. diplomatic plates. They were reportedly in Mexico to provide support to the Mexican Navy’s
counternarcotics efforts. In, 2010, two other attacks appeared to target U.S. consular officials and their families while
stationed in Mexico.
16 Prepared testimony of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James R. Clapper, in U.S. Congress, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, S.Hrg. 112-481,
112th Cong., 2nd sess., January 31, 2012 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012).
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the drug trade. In addition to counternarcotics responses that address public security, other
dimensions to international drug control policy emphasize programs that address health
consequences of drug abuse; drug demand reduction through treatment, rehabilitation, and social
reintegration for drug users; and sustainable and comprehensive alternative livelihood options for
impoverished drug crop farmers.
Existing approaches to international drug control, however, have long been criticized as
ineffective. In 1998, for example, the United Nations committed to “eliminating or reducing
significantly” the supply of illicit drugs by 2008. In 2009, when that goal had not been
accomplished, U.N. Member States agreed to recommit to achieve this goal in another decade, by
2019.17 In 2010, the Obama Administration’s Director of the Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP), Gil Kerlikowske, acknowledged to the press that contemporary
counternarcotics strategy “has not been successful.”18 He reportedly continued: “Forty years later,
the concern about drugs and drug problems is, if anything, magnified, intensified.”
In recent years, some international advocates have called for a fundamental shift of current
prohibitionist-oriented international drug policies. In 2009, the Latin American Commission on
Drugs and Democracy, co-led by three ex-presidents from Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil,
released a report that challenged the international community to reevaluate drug control
policies.19 In 2011, the Global Commission on Drug Policy released a report that expanded the
Latin American Commission’s drug policy debate to include, among others, two American
supporters, George P. Shultz, former U.S. Secretary of State, and Paul Volker, former Chair of the
U.S. Federal Reserve.20
Several sitting presidents have also expressed interest in exploring alternatives to the existing
international drug control regime, including Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, Cost
Rican President Laura Chinchilla, Mexican President Felipe Calderon, and Guatemalan President
Otto Perez Molina. The topic was raised at the Sixth Summit of the Americas in April 2012 as
well as at the annual opening of the U.N. General Assembly in September 2012.21 Moreover,
17 U.N. General Assembly (UNGA), Political Declaration, A/RES/S-20/2, June 10, 1998; U.N. Commission on
Narcotic Drugs (CND), Report of the 52nd Session, March 14, 2008 and March 11-20, 2009), Economic and Social
Council, Official Records, 2009, Supplement No. 8, E/2009/28, E/CN.7/2009/12.
18 Martha Mendoza, “U.S. Drug War Has Met None of Its Goals: After 40 Years and $1 Trillion, Drug Use is Rampant
and Violence Pervasive,” Associated Press, May 13, 2010.
19 Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, Drugs and Democracy: Toward a Paradigm Shift, April
2009.
20 Global Commission on Drug Policy, War on Drugs, June 2011; George P. Shultz and Paul A. Volker, “A Real
Debate About Drug Policy,” Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2011.
21 Brian Winter, “U.S.-Led ‘War on Drugs’ Questioned at U.N.,” Reuters, September 26, 2012; John Paul Rathbone,
“Colombia and Mexico Push for Drugs Debate,” Financial Times, April 6, 2012; “Remarks by President Juan Manuel
Santos at the Opening of the Sixth Summit of the Americas,” Sixth Summit of the Americas, OEA/Ser.E, CA-
VI/INF.2/12, April 14, 2012; “Speech by the President of Costa Rica, H.E. Laura Chinchilla Sixth Summit of the
Americas,” Sixth Summit of the Americas, OEA/Ser.E, CA-VI/INF.9/12, April 2012; “Statement by the President of
the Republic, Juan Manuel Santos Calderon, Following the Close of the Sixth Summit of the Americas,” Sixth Summit
of the Americas, OEA/Ser.E, CA-VI/DP-1/12, April 15, 2012; Joint Statement on Organized Crime, letter to the U.N.
Secretary-General, joint declaration by the permanent missions of the governments of Colombia, Guatemala, and
Mexico, October 1, 2012, in Spanish, http://www.sre.gob.mx/images/stories/infografias/declaracion021012.pdf. The
Summit participants mandated that the Organization of American States (OAS) Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission (CICAD) prepare a report on the drug problem in the Americas, to be completed by 2013. See CICAD
website “Drafting the Study on the Drug Problem in the Americas,” http://www.cicad.oas.org/Main/Template.asp?
File=/Main/policy/default_ENG.asp.
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recent domestic ballot initiatives on marijuana in Colorado and Washington have fueled the
debate and increased both domestic and international pressure to reconsider the contours of the
current drug control regime.22
In January 2013, the government of Bolivia succeeded in carving out an exception for coca leaf,
an internationally regulated substance pursuant to current U.N. drug conventions. After
denouncing and withdrawing from the U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended,
on June 29, 2011, Bolivia successfully rejoined the U.N. drug control regime in January 2013,
this time with a specific reservation clause that obviates its requirement to criminalize the
domestic personal use, consumption, possession, purchase, or cultivation of coca leaf. Some have
criticized the action as contrary to the international convention’s spirit, and some are concerned
that it may risk the integrity of the global drug control system.23 Others praise Bolivia’s approach
as a viable tactic to adapt the U.N. drug control regime, which some have criticized as
antiquated.24
It remains unclear whether such policy debates may translate into lasting improvements to reduce
the production, trafficking, use, and consequences of illegal drug trade.25 However, changes could
affect a range of foreign policy considerations for the United States, including foreign aid reform,
counterinsurgency strategy (particularly in Afghanistan), the distribution of domestic and
international drug control funding, and the relative balance of civilian, law enforcement, and
military roles in anti-drug efforts.
International Policy Framework
Reflecting broad consensus, international efforts to combat drug trafficking are based on a long-
standing and robust set of multilateral commitments. One of the first multilateral efforts to
combat drugs began with the International Opium Commission of 1909. Since then, the
international community has broadened and deepened the scope of international drug control
through several international treaties and monitoring mechanisms.
Today, international drug control efforts are grounded on the policy foundations laid by three
United Nations treaties: the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended; the 1971
Convention on Psychotropic Substances; and the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Approximately 92% of U.N. Member States,
including the United States, are parties to all international drug control treaties.26
22 See variously Alfonso Serrano, “U.S. Marijuana Laws Ricochet Through Latin America,” Time, January 7, 2013;
Gary S. Becker and Kevin M. Murphy, “Have We Lost the War on Drugs,” opinion, Wall Street Journal, January 4,
2013; and Michael F. Walther, Insanity: Four Decades of U.S. Counterdrug Strategy, U.S. Army War College,
Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Papers, December 2012.
23 “U.N. Panel Regrets Bolivia’s Denunciation of Narcotics Control Convention,” UN News Centre, July 5, 2011.
24 See for example Phillip Smith, “Bolivia Rejoins U.N. Drug Treaty, Sans Coca Ban,” Drug War Chronicle, January
11, 2013.
25 In support of current prohibitionist policies, see for example Bob Weiner, “Time to End Prohibition for Drugs?” New
York Times, op-ed, June 18, 2009; “How to Stop the Drug Wars,” The Economist, March 5, 2009; John P. Walters,
“Drug Legalization Isn’t the Answer,” Wall Street Journal, op-ed, March 6, 2009.
26 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Annual Report 2011, 2012. Those member states with incomplete
participation in all relevant drug control treaties include Afghanistan, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Haiti, Kiribati, Liberia,
Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
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In combination, these U.N. treaties limit the international production and trade of a defined set of
narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and the precursor chemicals used to make these
substances for primarily medical and scientific purposes. The treaties also establish international
mechanisms to monitor treaty adherence—through the International Narcotics Control Board
(INCB)—and for the collection of data related to the illicit cultivation, production, and
manufacture of proscribed drugs.
U.N. policymaking on drug-related matters takes place
through the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs, which
Key U.N. Treaties and Entities
is a functional commission of the U.N. Economic and
for International Drug Control
Social Council. The U.N. Commission on Narcotic
•
1961 Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs monitors global drug trends, develops strategies
Drugs, as amended
for international drug control, and recommends
•
1971 Convention on Psychotropic
measures to combat the world drug problem. To support
Substances
U.N. Member States in combating drugs, the UNODC
•
1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
conducts field-based technical assistance projects
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
internationally and conducts research and analysis on
Substances
current drug market trends.
•
International Narcotics Control Board
Regional counterdrug-related organizations also
•
U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs
supplement multilateral efforts globally. Such efforts
•
U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime
include the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission (CICAD), which is the drug control arm of the Organization of American States
(OAS), and the Drug Advisory Programme (DAP) of the Colombo Plan. CICAD serves as the
regional policy forum for all aspects of Western Hemisphere illegal drug issues. DAP supports
drug demand reduction, treatment, and rehabilitation in the Asia and Pacific regions. Related
international efforts also reinforce counternarcotics policies through their cross-cutting focus on
such transnational phenomena as money laundering, corruption, organized crime, and global
health.
U.S. Foreign Policy Framework
The United States has been involved in international drug control since at least the beginning of
the 20th century. Contemporary U.S. counternarcotics efforts were brought to the forefront of U.S.
policy debates in the late 1960s. In 1971, President Richard Nixon declared that illicit drugs were
America’s “public enemy number one.”27 President Ronald Reagan followed with a directive in
1986 that identified narcotics trafficking a threat to U.S. national security.28 Successive
administrations have continued to feature combating the international drug trade prominently
among U.S. foreign policy priorities.
Since at least the late 1960s, Congress has also been active on drug policy issues, enacting key
provisions in U.S. law that define U.S. policies and authorities relating to international narcotics
27 Richard Nixon, “Remarks about an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control,” June 17, 1971.
Briefing transcript at John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project, at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/WS/?pid=3047.
28 Ronald Reagan, National Security Decision Directive 221, “Narcotics and National Security,” April 8, 1986, partially
declassified on November 7, 1995, redacted version available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-221.htm.
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control, exercising oversight responsibilities on U.S. counternarcotics policy, and appropriating
funds for international counternarcotics programs.
In 1998, Congress established the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to coordinate
all U.S. counterdrug policy, both domestically and internationally. ONDCP’s Director is the
primary advisor to the President on drug policy issues. The State Department is statutorily
designated as the lead U.S. agency responsible for international counterdrug foreign assistance,
and the Defense Department is the lead in the detection and monitoring of foreign drug flows
destined for the United States. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the lead on
drug-related law enforcement. Multiple other U.S. agencies are also responsible for various
aspects of the U.S. counterdrug response.
The following sections describe several of the key U.S. government strategies and initiatives for
combating drugs internationally and in specific regions around the world.
U.S. National Drug Control Strategy
U.S. involvement in international drug control rests on the central premise that helping foreign
governments combat the illegal drug trade abroad will ultimately curb illegal drug availability
and use in the United States. To this end, the current Administration maintains the goal of
reducing and eliminating the international flow of illegal drugs into the United States through
international cooperation to disrupt the drug trade and interdiction efforts.
Since 1999, Congress has required that the White House, through the Office of National Drug
Control Policy (ONDCP), submit to Congress a National Drug Control Strategy report each
year.29 This strategy describes the total budget for drug control programs—both domestically and
internationally—and outlines U.S. strategic goals for stemming drug supply and demand.
The international component of the Administration’s 2012 National Drug Control Strategy centers
on three specific goals: (1) collaborate with international partners to disrupt the drug trade, (2)
support drug control efforts of major drug source and transit countries, and (3) attack key
vulnerabilities of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). Through international counternarcotics
efforts—including reducing drug production and trafficking; promoting alternative livelihoods
and demand reduction interventions; and strengthening rule of law, democratic institutions,
citizen security, and respect for human rights—the Administration intends to protect public health
and safety and contribute to overall national security.
For FY2013, the Administration has requested from Congress approximately $25.6 billion for all
federal drug control programs, of which $2 billion is requested for international programs,
including civilian and military U.S. foreign assistance.30 An additional $3.7 billion is requested
for interdiction programs related to intercepting and disrupting foreign drug shipments en route to
the United States.
29 This requirement was first established by Section 706 of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization
Act of 1998 (Division C, Title VII, P.L. 105-277) and is codified at 21 U.S.C. 1705.
30 ONDCP, FY2013 Budget and Performance Summary, Companion to the National Drug Control Strategy, April
2012.
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National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy
Pursuant to the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-
469), Administrations since 2007 have submitted to Congress a National Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy every two years. This strategy outlines U.S. government roles and
goals for preventing the illegal trafficking of drugs across the U.S.-Mexico border. The primary
goal of the Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy is to “substantially reduce the flow of
illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence across the Southwest border.”
The 2011 Strategy identified enhanced U.S.-Mexico cooperation on joint counterdrug efforts as
among its key strategic objectives, particularly through enhanced capacity building and training
initiatives as well as enhanced bilateral mechanisms for intelligence sharing, operational
coordination, and judicial cooperation. In addition to the goal of disrupting and dismantling
DTOs operating along the Southwest border, the 2011 Strategy also emphasized the importance of
combating the outbound flow of illegal bulk cash and weapons destined for Mexico-based
transnational criminal and drug trafficking organizations.
As required by P.L. 109-469, the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy also
includes a discussion of U.S. efforts to end the construction and use of tunnels to smuggle illicit
drugs across the international border from Mexico to the United States. The 2011 Strategy
acknowledges that the U.S. government “does not possess tunnel detection technology that is
effective for all possible border tunnel/subterranean passage scenarios” and that the continuing
existence of such clandestine cross-border tunnels “represent a unique and growing threat” to the
United States.
National Northern Border Counternarcotics Strategy
Pursuant to the Northern Border Counternarcotics Strategy Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-356), ONDCP is
required to submit to Congress a document that outlines goals to counter drug trafficking along
the U.S.-Canadian border. The overarching strategic goal of the 2012 National Northern Border
Counternarcotics Strategy is to “substantially reduce the flow of illicit drugs and drug proceeds
along the Northern border.” The Strategy emphasizes enhanced bilateral cooperation and
coordination to disrupt and dismantle TCOs involved in the production and trafficking of high
potency marijuana and ecstasy, as well as interdict both illicit drugs and illicit drug proceeds in
transit.
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
As required by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the State Department annually
submits to Congress an International Drug Control Strategy Report (INCSR).31 The INCSR,
released in two volumes each year, provides an overview of U.S. counternarcotics policies and
programs internationally. It also provides a country-by-country analysis of progress that foreign
governments, particularly those of major drug-producing and drug-transit countries, have made in
adhering to its international commitments to combat drugs (volume I) and related financial crimes
(volume II).
31 See specifically Section 489 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, and Chapter 8 of the FAA
generally.
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The 2012 INCSR, released in March 2012, reports that drug trafficking and transnational
organized crime continue to threaten U.S. and citizen security interests, particularly as the profits
that the drug trade generates remain the most lucrative criminal activity internationally. The
INCSR also reports that while progress has been achieved in certain parts of the world, continued
progress to combat drugs internationally requires ongoing cooperation and willingness to adapt to
emerging threats.
Selected Country and Regional Initiatives
The majority of U.S. counterdrug efforts internationally are concentrated in the Western
Hemisphere, including South America, Central America, and the Caribbean, as well as in
Afghanistan. Other geographic regions of emphasis include West Africa, Central Asia, and
Southeast Asia. Selected U.S.-funded regional initiatives are described below.
The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
Mexico is a major supplier and gateway for illicit drugs en route to the United States, as well as a
key location for drug-related money laundering activity. The U.S. government estimates that
approximately 95% of U.S.-destined cocaine, originating in South America, arrives on U.S. soil
through Mexico. In 2000, for comparison, DEA estimated that 55% of U.S.-destined cocaine
transited through Mexico.32 In 2011, DOJ assessed that at least seven Mexico-based criminal
organizations “dominate the supply, trafficking, and wholesale distribution of most illicit drugs in
the United States:” the Sinaloa Cartel, Los Zetas, Gulf Cartel, Juarez Cartel, Beltran-Leyva
Organization, La Familia Michoacana, and Tijuana Cartel. These groups may have since
splintered and regrouped into smaller, but more numerous criminal organizations.33 These
criminal organizations, including their offshoots, are largely accountable for the significant uptick
in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico in recent years.
Beginning in October 2007, the United States and Mexico sought to reinvigorate bilateral and
regional counternarcotics cooperation by announcing the start of a multiyear security agreement
called the Mérida Initiative.34 This initiative aimed to combat drug trafficking and other criminal
activity along the U.S.-Mexican border, as well as in Central America.35 Initial U.S. bilateral
assistance to Mexico and Central America under the initiative consisted of a $1.4 billion, three-
year security package ending in FY2010 that would provide two main forms of assistance: (1)
equipment, including helicopters and surveillance aircraft, and technical resources to combat drug
trafficking, and (2) training and technical advice for Mexican and Central American military,
judicial, and law enforcement officials.
32 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), 2000 International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Vol. 1, March 2001.
33 See for example Eduardo Guerrero-Gutiérrez, Security, Drugs, and Violence in Mexico: A Survey, 7th North
American Forum, Washington, D.C., 2011.
34 The Mérida Initiative is named for the city where it was first conceived by Presidents George W. Bush and Felipe
Calderon in March 2007.
35 See CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, by Clare Ribando
Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea, and CRS Report RL32724, Mexico: Issues for Congress, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
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In March 2010, the U.S. and Mexican governments agreed upon a strategic framework for
continued cooperation as a follow-on to the Mérida Initiative after it technically ended in
FY2010.36 Follow-on counterdrug support to Central America would be provided through a
separate implementation and funding mechanism called the Central American Regional Security
Initiative (CARSI). For the next phase in U.S. security assistance to Mexico, the character of U.S.
support shifted from a focus on major counternarcotics equipment acquisition that was designed
to improve operational ability against drug traffickers to a longer-term emphasis on institutional
development and capacity building to the Mexican justice sector. This shift included greater
emphasis on social reforms that can galvanize community support to fight organized crime,
including drug trafficking.
The Mérida strategy has four pillars: (1) disrupt and dismantle organized criminal groups; (2)
institutionalize justice sector reforms to sustain the rule of law and respect for human rights; (3)
create an efficient, economically competitive border crossing that ensures “secure two-way
flows” of travelers and trade; and (4) support Mexican government efforts to build strong and
resilient communities through community organizations, civil society participation, sustainable
economic opportunities, community cohesion, and violence reduction.37
Since FY2008, Congress has appropriated more than $1.9 billion in U.S. assistance to Mexico for
the Mérida Initiative. Of this, some $816 million has been allocated specifically for
counternarcotics purposes in Mexico. For FY2013, the Administration requested $55 million for
counternarcotics-specific assistance to Mexico through the International Narcotics Control and
Law Enforcement (INCLE) foreign operations aid account.
The Central American Citizen Security Partnership and the Central American
Regional Security Initiative
The prominence of cocaine trafficking through Central America has grown in recent years,
particularly in response to heightened counternarcotics pressure in Mexico. According to the State
Department, 80% of U.S.-bound cocaine that arrived through Mexico first stopped in at least one
Central American country (i.e., Belize, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Nicaragua, or Panama).38 U.S. estimates indicate that some 79% of all cocaine smuggling flights
departing South America first land in Honduras.39 As Mexican criminal organizations infiltrate
the region, reports further suggest that drug- and gang-related violence has reached “alarming and
unprecedented levels,” potentially costing the region as much as 8% of gross domestic product
(GDP).40 In Guatemala, per capita murder rates have reportedly doubled in the past decade.
Throughout the region, the confluence of drugs, crime, and violence has strained local law
enforcement and justice sector institutions; corruption is perceived as pervasive in many parts of
Central America.
36 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “United States-Mexico Security Partnership: Progress and
Impact,” fact sheet, March 23, 2010.
37 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA), “The Mérida Initiative: Expanding the
U.S./Mexico Partnership,” fact sheet, March 29, 2012.
38 U.S. Department of State, INL, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Vol. 1, March 2012.
39 Ibid.
40 INCB, Annual Report 2011, February 28, 2012; World Bank, Crime and Violence in Central America: A
Development Challenge, 2011.
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To address these multidimensional security concerns as well as enhance crime prevention
capacities and rule of law institutions in the region, Congress funded the Central America
Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) in FY2010 as a follow-on to anti-crime assistance provided
originally through the Mérida Initiative, beginning in FY2008.41 In March 2011, President Obama
announced the Central American Citizen Security Partnership as an overarching framework for
the implementation of CARSI funds. The five goals of both the Central American Citizen
Security Partnership and CARSI funds are to (1) create safe streets and emphasize citizen safety;
(2) disrupt the movement of criminals and trafficking of contraband throughout Central America;
(3) support the institutional capacity and accountability of governments in the region; (4)
reestablish effective state presence, services, and security in communities at risk; and (5) foster
enhanced levels of coordination and cooperation among countries in Central America, other
international partners, and donors for security and rule of law efforts.42
Since FY2008, Congress has appropriated a total of $496.5 million in regional assistance through
CARSI.43 For FY2013, the Administration has requested an additional $107.5 million.
The Caribbean-U.S. Security Cooperation Dialogue and the Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative
The Caribbean plays a role in the transit of illicit drugs to the United States, Europe, and Africa.
According to U.S. estimates, approximately 5% of cocaine destined for the United States moves
through Caribbean air and maritime vectors, including primarily through the Bahamas, the
Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica. This represents a significant decrease in cocaine flows
compared to the 1980s, when an estimated 80% of cocaine destined for the United States transited
through the Bahamas. Jamaica remains the largest Caribbean supplier of foreign marijuana to the
United States and cocaine air transit routes reportedly continue to favor the Dominican Republic.
In addition to drug trafficking, the Caribbean region is challenged by high per capita rates for
violent crimes and homicide.
In April 2009, President Obama announced at the Summit of the Americas his intention to
reinvigorate U.S. efforts to promote regional cooperation on these crime and security issues
through an enhanced security dialogue and assistance package, later described as the Caribbean
Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).44 In May 2010, representatives from 15 Caribbean countries and
the United States convened for an inaugural Caribbean-U.S. Security Cooperation Dialogue
meeting, where they agreed on a new framework for security cooperation engagement and a plan
of action.45 Stated goals included reducing drug trafficking, advancing public safety and citizen
security, and promoting social justice. The State Department officially launched the CBSI in June
41 See also CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for
Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.
42 U.S. Department of State, WHA, “The Central American Citizen Security Partnership: Countering Corruption and
Fostering Transparency,” fact sheet, November 20, 2012.
43 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, “The Central American Regional Security Initiative: A Shared
Partnership,” fact sheet, August 16, 2012.
44 Obama Administration, “Remarks by the President at the Summit of the Americas Opening Ceremony,” Port of
Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, April 17, 2009; Obama Administration, “The United States and the 2009 Summit of the
Americas: Securing Our Citizens’ Future,” fact sheet, April 19, 2009.
45 U.S. Department of State, WHA, “Caribbean-U.S. Security Cooperation Dialogue Declaration of Principles,” May
27, 2010.
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2010.46 CBSI has been described as a multi-year security assistance initiative to promote citizen
safety and to combat illicit activity and transnational criminal groups. In November 2011,
participating countries held a second Caribbean-U.S. Security Cooperation Dialogue meeting,
where participating countries reaffirmed their commitment to regional security goals.47 The third
Caribbean-U.S. Security Cooperation Dialogue meeting took place in December 2012.48
Since FY2010, Congress has appropriated a total of $203 million in regional security assistance
through the CBSI. For FY2013, the Administration has requested an additional $59 million. CBSI
funds are intended to focus on maritime and aerial security cooperation, law enforcement capacity
building, border and port security and firearms interdiction, justice sector reform, and crime
prevention and at-risk youth.49
Colombia’s National Consolidation Plan and the Colombia Strategic
Development Initiative
Since the late 1990s, Colombia has led the world in illicit coca bush cultivation and remains a top
producer of cocaine as well. Although U.S. and U.N. figures indicate that Colombia’s role in
illicit cultivation and production is in decline, Colombian cocaine nevertheless remains
disproportionately important for U.S. consumption patterns. According to DEA estimates,
Colombia is the source of more than 95% of U.S.-destined cocaine.
Drug trafficking continues to remain a source of illicit fundraising for several armed groups
located in Colombia, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the
National Liberation Army (ELN), both of which are designated by the State Department as
foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs). In the past, other major groups involved in Colombian
drug trafficking have included the United Self-Defenses Forces of Colombia (AUC), also listed as
an FTO, as well as several major drug trafficking organizations, such as the Medellin Cartel, Cali
Cartel, and Norte de Valle Cartel. In recent years, numerous additional, but comparatively
smaller, criminal organization have since emerged, collectively called BACRIM, a shorthand for
the Spanish phrase bandas criminales (criminal bands). It is estimated that relatively few arrested
BACRIM members are convicted or serve jail sentences, raising questions about judicial
impunity and possible drug-related corruption.
Much of contemporary counternarcotics efforts in Colombia stem from a 1999 Colombian
government strategy to address security and development issues, called Plan Colombia. It was
intended to be a six-year plan, concluding in 2005, to end the country’s decades-long armed
conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote economic and social development. The plan
aimed to curb trafficking activity and reduce coca cultivation in Colombia by 50% over six
years.50 In support of Plan Colombia and its follow-on programs, the U.S. government spent more
46 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Secretary Clinton and CARICOM Ministers Celebrate the
Launch of the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), a Shared Regional Security Partnership,” June 10, 2010.
47 U.S. Department of State, WHA, “Joint Statement Second Caribbean-United States Security Cooperation Dialogue,”
November 10, 2011.
48 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Third Caribbean-United States Security Cooperation
Dialogue,” media note, December 13, 2012.
49 U.S. Department of State, WHA, “The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative: A Shared Regional Security Partnership,”
fact sheet, December 3, 2012.
50 See also CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Background, U.S. Relations, and Congressional Interest, by June S.
(continued...)
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than $8 billion in security and development assistance between FY2000 and FY2011, to include
both civilian and military counterdrug support efforts.
In addition to significant reductions in illicit coca bush cultivation and cocaine production,
Colombia has also experienced a 90% reduction in kidnappings and terrorist attacks and a 45%
reduction in homicides. Moreover, as Colombia’s security and development conditions have
improved, so has its ability to fund and sustain autonomous counternarcotics efforts. As part of
the National Consolidation Plan (PCN), Colombia’s follow-on security and development
initiative after Plan Colombia, several previously U.S.-funded efforts have been nationalized by
the Colombian government, including training, equipping, and support for Colombian military
programs, such as the counterdrug brigade, Colombian Army aviation, and the air bridge denial
program.
Continued U.S. support to Colombia occurs mainly through the U.S.-Colombia Strategic
Development Initiative (CSDI), which incorporates traditional counternarcotics assistance for
eradication, interdiction, alternative development, and capacity building support for police,
military, and justice sector institutions, but also other economic and social development
initiatives. For FY2013, the Administration has requested $84.6 million in alternative
development-related counternarcotics programming through the Economic Support Fund (ESF)
and $114 million in INCLE funds for supply reduction-related counternarcotics programs.
U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan and Related Initiatives
Afghanistan has been the single largest source of illicit opium and heroin worldwide for the past
decade—and has more recently emerged as a major cultivator of cannabis and a globally
significant source of cannabis resin.51 Afghanistan also registers one of the highest opium abuse
rates in the world, estimated at approximately 2.7% of the country’s population aged 15-64
years.52 Numerous reports indicate that narcotics are both a cause and consequence of criminality,
insecurity, and corruption in Afghanistan, particularly in the southern provinces where the
majority of opium cultivation takes place, as well as in the region.53 The country’s opiate-related
trade was reportedly the equivalent of 16% of Afghanistan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in
2011 and globally generated approximately $68 billion in illicit proceeds in 2009.54 Major
beneficiaries of Afghanistan’s illicit narcotics trade reportedly include transnational criminal
organizations, local traffickers, insurgent groups, including the Taliban, corrupt officials and
border enforcement guards, as well as farmers.55 Reports indicate that significant volumes of
(...continued)
Beittel.
51 U.S. Department of State, INL, INCSR, Vol. 1, March 2012; UNODC, World Drug Report 2012, June 2012;
UNODC, Afghanistan Cannabis Survey 2010, June 2011.
52 INCB, Annual Report 2011, February 2012.
53 See for example UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012: Opium Risk Assessment for All Regions, April 17, 2012;
UNODC, The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment, July 2011.
54 UNODC, World Drug Report 2012, June 2012; UNODC, The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment,
July 2011.
55 UNODC, The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment, July 2011.
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opiates, as well as their chemical precursors, are smuggled through a wide range of maritime and
land ports.56
Drug control policy in Afghanistan underwent a shift in strategy in June 2009, when the late
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who at the time was the Obama Administration’s Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, announced a halt to U.S. eradication efforts in
Afghanistan and a concurrent increase in priority to agricultural development (or alternative
livelihoods) assistance as well as interdiction.57 The drug policy shift was formalized with the
release of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy in January 2010, which
connected U.S. counternarcotics policy with U.S. counterinsurgency goals in the region. The
January 2010 Regional Strategy had sections on combating the Afghan narcotics trade and
disrupting illicit financial flows, among others.58
In March 2010, the State Department released an updated U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for
Afghanistan. It outlined two strategic goals—(1) counter the narcotics-insurgency nexus and (2)
counter the narcotics-corruption nexus—coupled with several related objectives. Reiterating the
January 2010 Regional Strategy, the March 2010 Counternarcotics Strategy confirms the U.S.
government’s decision to “no longer fund or support large-scale eradication of poppy fields,”
while condoning Afghan-led local eradication.59 The March 2010 Counternarcotics Strategy also
emphasized the need to improve the connection between the U.S. government’s counternarcotics
goals with the U.S. government’s counterinsurgency goals.
According to the State Department, Afghanistan remains heavily reliant on external support to
implement and fund counternarcotics goals, to include demand and supply reduction programs,
interdiction, counternarcotics investigations and prosecutions, public awareness programs,
institutional capacity building, as well as international and regional cooperation. U.S. funds
provide support to such programs as the Afghan Ministry of Counternarcotics’ Good Performer’s
Initiative (GPI) and Governor Led Eradication (GLE) program. In support of drug-related
interdictions, investigations, and prosecutions, the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice,
including DEA, provide funding, training, and mentoring for Afghanistan’s Sensitive
Investigative Unit (SIU), National Interdiction Unit (NIU), the Technical Investigative Unit
(TIU), the Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF), and the Counter Narcotics Justice Center
(CNJC).60 For Afghanistan in FY2013, the Administration requested a total of $333.1 million in
counternarcotics programming through ESF and INCLE funds.
56 UNODC, Misuse of Licit Trade for Opiate Trafficking in Western and Central Asia: A Threat Assessment, October
2012.
57 Richard C. Holbrooke, “Holbrooke’s Briefing on Trip to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Brussels, July 2009,” July 29,
2009.
58 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (S/RAP), “Afghanistan
and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy,” January 2010.
59 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA), U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for
Afghanistan, March 24, 2010.
60 U.S. Department of State, INL, “Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs’ Counternarcotics
Programs in Afghanistan,” fact sheet, May 4, 2012.
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West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative
West African criminal syndicates have long been involved in small-scale drug trafficking and
retail sale of narcotics worldwide, including in the United States, but as a geographic region, West
Africa had historically played a minor role in the global narcotics trade.61 This began to change in
the early 2000s, as international cocaine traffickers began to traffic shipments of South American
cocaine destined for Europe through West Africa. The region was operationally attractive to
traffickers as a transshipment point due to its porous coastlines, weak enforcement capabilities,
susceptibility to corruption, and relative geographic proximity to Latin America. In subsequent
years, West Africa emerged as a major international narcotics trafficking transit point for South
American cocaine destined for Western Europe, which had grown in importance as a cocaine
market due to increasing demand, stagnating North American cocaine use, and increased
interdiction and law enforcement in the Western Hemisphere. Based on cocaine demand and
seizure data, UNODC estimates that the amount of cocaine trafficked through West Africa grew
from 3 tons in 2004 to 47 tons in 2007, before falling to about 21 tons in 2009. Information on
drug trafficking volumes through the region, however, is subject to high levels of variability.
Beginning in 2011, the State Department led the development of a five-year, $60 million inter-
agency, regional capacity-building program called the West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative
(WACSI).62 WACSI is designed to combat transnational crime in West Africa, including drug
trafficking, and mitigate the impact of such illicit activity on the security, stability, and good
governance in the region. WACSI has five strategic pillars, or goals:
1. Support government and civil society institutions through technical assistance
and capacity building to prevent impunity from justice by well-connected
criminals and acts of corruption by state law enforcement personnel.
2. Establish effective and modern anti-crime policies and legal frameworks through
technical assistance to draft new laws, guidance to enact such laws, and support
to improve public awareness of anti-crime policies.
3. Strengthen security and law enforcement operations to target illicit networks,
including support to elite counternarcotics units, operational and basic law
enforcement skills training, provisions of relevant equipment, and institutional
capacity building.
4. Reinforce justice sector institutions through technical assistance for prosecutors
and judges involved in complex transnational crime cases.
61 In the 1980s and 1990s, Nigerian-dominated criminal organizations active in many countries world-wide became key
players in the international smuggling of heroin, particularly into the United States, drawing the concern of U.S.
policymakers. Apart from heroin, Africa long remained a minor destination and transshipment point for other illicit
narcotics.
62 According to the State Department, an estimated $22.6 million has been budgeted already for the regional initiative
from FY2010 through FY2012: $3.4 million in FY2010, $2.4 million in FY2011, and an estimated $16.8 million in
FY2012. For FY2013, the State Department has requested an additional $13 million. The balance of the proposed $60
million may be requested in future fiscal years. Separately, a similarly named multilateral program called the West
Africa Cost Initiative (WACI) also addresses drug trafficking related threats and counternarcotics capacity building in
the region. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations, and INTERPOL are
involved in WACI.
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5. Address socio-economic dimensions of illicit activity, including drug demand
reduction and public awareness-raising about transnational organized crime.63
U.S. Agency Roles
Several U.S. agencies are involved in implementing U.S. international counternarcotics activities
in support of the Administration’s National Drug Control Strategy. These agencies include the
following:
• Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). Located within the
Executive Office of the President, ONDCP establishes U.S. counterdrug policies
and goals, and coordinates the federal budget to combat drugs both domestically
and internationally. Every year, ONDCP’s director, sometimes referred to as the
U.S. drug czar, produces the National Drug Control Strategy and the federal
counterdrug budget summary.
• Department of State. The Secretary of State is responsible for coordinating all
international counterdrug programs implemented by the U.S. government,
including foreign counternarcotics assistance. The State Department identifies
fighting the production, transportation, and sale of illegal narcotics among its
primary goals. Every March, the State Department’s Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) produces the International
Narcotics Strategy Report (INCSR), which describes the efforts of key countries
to attack all aspects of the international drug trade, including anti-money
laundering during the previous calendar year.
• U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID provides
assistance for long-term economic and social development. The USAID
Administrator serves concurrently as the State Department’s Director of U.S.
Foreign Assistance, with a rank equivalent to Deputy Secretary of State. USAID
plays a role in counternarcotics development assistance, especially regarding
alternative livelihood programs, which are designed to offer alternatives to
farmers that will enable and encourage them to discontinue planting poppy and
other illicit crops.
• Department of Defense (DOD). DOD maintains the lead role in detecting and
monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States and
plays a key role in collecting, analyzing, and sharing intelligence on illegal drugs
with U.S. law enforcement and international security counterparts. Notable
entities under DOD that focus on international drug control include the Office for
Counternarcotics and Global Threats, within Office of the Undersecretary of
Defense; the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); and various regional combatant
63 U.S. Department of State, INL, The West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative: A Shared Partnership, November 3,
2011; State Department, INL, “The West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative (WACSI),” fact sheet, July 3, 2012;
and State Department, written statement of William R. Brownfield, Assistant Secretary of State for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, during Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control hearing entitled
“Countering Narcotics Threats in West Africa,” May 16, 2012; see also U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Government
Hosts Meeting with International Partners to Coordinate Counternarcotics and Anti-Crime Assistance in West Africa,”
February 22, 2012.
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commands and joint interagency task forces. In addition, DOD provides
counternarcotics foreign assistance to train, equip, and improve the
counternarcotics capacity and capabilities of relevant agencies of foreign
governments with its Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account appropriations.
• Department of Justice (DOJ). The Attorney General is responsible for federal
law enforcement and to ensure public safety against foreign and domestic threats,
including illegal drug trafficking. This translates into an array of responsibilities
that include law enforcement operations, drug-related intelligence analysis, and
prosecution and criminal justice activities, as well as police and justice sector
training. Primary agencies under DOJ that focus on international drug control
include the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force
(OCDETF), and the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC).
• Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Secretary of Homeland
Security is responsible for U.S. policies related to interdiction of illegal drugs
entering the United States from abroad. The Strategic Plan for DHS identifies
securing the U.S. border against illegal drugs as one of its primary objectives.
Key offices within DHS that participate in counterdrug activities include the
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Coast Guard, and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE).
• Department of the Treasury. The Treasury Department participates in
counterdrug efforts as they pertain to targeting the illicit financial proceeds that
result from drug trafficking. Key offices that participate in combating drug-
related money laundering include the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
and the Financial Crime Enforcement Network (FinCEN).
• Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA’s Crime and Narcotics Center
(CNC) collects intelligence information and develops intelligence analyses to
support or conduct operations countering illicit drug activities, including trends
in illegal drug crop cultivation and production.
Overall U.S. Drug Control Funding
For FY2013, the Administration has requested approximately $25.6 billion for all federal drug
control programs (see Table 1). Of this, 22%, or $5.6 billion, is requested for international and
interdiction programs. Beginning with the FY2012 budget request, ONDCP significantly
restructured its budgeting process, adding 19 more agencies and programs to the overall drug
budget.64 According to ONDCP, these additional agencies had not previously been included in the
drug budget because the programs were deemed to be “unreliably estimated or were thought to be
64 The additional agencies and programs include U.S. Forest Service; Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency
for the District of Columbia; Defense Department Counterdrug OPTEMPO; Federal Judiciary; Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services; Health Resources and Services Administration; National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism; Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology; Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center; Federal Emergency Management Agency (Operation Stonegarden); Bureau of Land
Management; National Park Service; Asset Forfeiture Fund; Bureau of Prisons (Corrections Costs); Criminal Division;
Office of Federal Detention Trustee; U.S. Attorneys; U.S. Marshals Service; and Federal Aviation Administration.
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related to consequences of drug use (as opposed to directly related to drug use reduction).”65 The
addition of these agencies had the effect of increasing the total budget, particularly domestic
programs (compare Table 1 with Table 2).
Table 1. Federal Drug Control Funding, FY2010 Final-FY2013 Request
budget authority in $U.S. millions
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
Activities
Final
Final
Enacted
Req.
International 2,595.0 2,027.6 2,087.6 1,962.0
Interdiction 3,658.0
3,977.1
3,591.6
3,680.9
Domestic 19,634.1
19,575.0
19,505.5
19,957.0
Total 25,887.1
25,579,7
25,184.6
25,599.9
Source: Adapted from Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), National Drug Control Budget,
FY2012 and FY2013 Funding Highlights. Totals may not add due to rounding.
Note: “International” activities refers to activities primarily focused on or conducted in areas outside the United
States, mainly conducted by the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Defense
Department, and Department of Justice. International activities include a wide range of drug control programs to
eradicate crops, seize drugs (except air and riverine interdiction seizures), arrest and prosecute major traffickers,
destroy processing capabilities, develop and promote alternative crops to replace drug crops, reduce demand,
investigate money laundering and financial crime activities, and promote the involvement of other nations in
efforts to control the supply of and demand for drugs. “Interdiction” refers to activities designed to intercept
and disrupt shipments of illegal drugs and their precursors en route to the United States from abroad.
“Domestic” refers to activities related to domestic demand reduction, including federal drug treatment and drug
prevention programs, as well as domestic law enforcement.
Table 2. Federal Drug Control Funding, FY2005 Actual-FY2009
budget authority in $U.S. millions
Activities FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009
International 1,393.3 1,434.5 2,050.2 1,824.6 2,082.2
Interdiction 2,928.7 3,287.0 3,175.9 2,901.4 3,910.2
Domestic
8,462.2 8,422.6 8,618.0 8,550.3 9,286.0
Total
12,784.2 13,844.1 13,844.1 13,276.3 15,278.4
Source: Adapted from Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), National Drug Control Strategy,
FY2011 Budget Summary, 2010. Totals may not add due to rounding.
Counternarcotics Foreign Aid and Authorities
A large component of the international component of ONDCP’s national drug budget, discussed
above, is committed to civilian- and military-funded assistance to foreign countries for
counterdrug support. Such foreign aid is designed to support foreign countries interdict and
eradicate drugs, support the development of alternative livelihoods, and reduce the local demand
65 Office on National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), National Drug Control Budget, FY2012 Funding Highlights,
February 2011.
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for drugs. The following sections describe both civilian and military funding and authorities for
counternarcotics foreign assistance.
Civilian Authorities
The U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are the
two primary sources of civilian U.S. funding for international counternarcotics assistance.
Counternarcotics programs may be implemented by other U.S. government entities or to private
contractors. Funding spigots include the foreign aid accounts for Development Assistance (DA);
Economic Support Fund (ESF); Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA); and
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE).
Authority for the U.S. Department of State and USAID is derived from multiple provisions in the
Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended. Key provisions are located at Chapter 8 of
Part I of the FAA, as amended, entitled “International Narcotics Control.” Section 481 of the FAA
states that the Secretary of State is “responsible for coordinating all assistance provided by the
United States Government to support international efforts to combat illicit narcotics production or
trafficking.” Section 126 of the FAA also directs USAID, when planning programs of assistance
for countries in which illicit narcotics cultivation takes place, to “give priority consideration to
programs which would help reduce illicit narcotics cultivation by stimulating broader
development opportunities.”
Military Authorities
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has multiple roles and responsibilities in the area of
counternarcotics. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 124, DOD is the single lead federal agency for the
detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime movement of illegal drugs toward the United
States and plays a key role in collecting, analyzing, and sharing intelligence on illegal drugs with
U.S. law enforcement and international security counterparts. In addition, Congress authorizes
DOD to offer counternarcotics assistance to train and equip foreign countries in their efforts to
build institutional capacity and control ungoverned spaces used by drug traffickers.
DOD supports foreign counternarcotics activities through several authorities. Included among
these are two that authorize certain types of counternarcotics training and provisions of
equipment to foreign governments, which originate from Section 1004 of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 1991 (P.L. 101-510) and Section 1033 of the NDAA
for FY1998 (P.L. 105-85).
Under Section 1004, Congress authorized DOD to provide counterdrug-related training and
transport of law enforcement personnel to foreign law enforcement agencies worldwide, among
other provisions. Section 1005 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 extends this authority through
FY2014.
Section 1033 enables DOD to assist specific countries’ counterdrug efforts by providing non-
lethal protective and utility personnel equipment, including navigation equipment, secure and
non-secure communications equipment, radar equipment, night vision systems, vehicles, aircraft,
and boats.
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Currently, DOD is authorized to provide Section 1033 assistance to 35 countries through FY2013,
including (in chronological order) Peru and Colombia (Section 1033, P.L. 105-85); Afghanistan,
Bolivia, Ecuador, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (Section 1021, P.L. 108-
136); Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Guatemala, Belize, and Panama (Section
1022, P.L. 109-364); Mexico and the Dominican Republic (Section 1022, P.L. 110-181); Guinea
Bissau, Senegal, El Salvador, and Honduras (Section 1024, P.L. 110-417); Benin, Cape Verde,
The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Liberia, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Nigeria,
Sierra Leone, and Togo (Section 1006, P.L. 112-81).
Two additional provisions authorize DOD to conduct certain types of support for joint
counternarcotics and counterterrorism activities. One such provision stems from Section 1022 of
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2004 (P.L. 108-136), which authorized DOD joint task forces that
support counternarcotics law enforcement activities to also support law enforcement agencies
conducting counterterrorism activities. Section 1011 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013extends
this authority through FY2013.The other provision stems from Section 305 of the 2002
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From and Response To Terrorist Attacks
on the United States (P.L. 107-206). This provision authorized DOD to use counternarcotics funds
designated for Colombia to be available for a unified campaign against both narcotics trafficking
and terrorism. Section 1010 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 extends this authority through
FY2013.
U.S. Foreign Policy Options
Over the years, U.S. counterdrug efforts have expanded to include a broad array of tools to attack
the drug trade using several foreign policy approaches. Through its appropriations and federal
oversight responsibilities, Congress is able to evaluate current efforts, which appear to center
around four main drug control policy strategies: (1) combating the production of drugs at the
source, (2) combating the flow of drugs in transit, (3) dismantling illicit drug networks, and (4)
creating incentives for international cooperation on drug control. The following sections describe
and analyze each of these primary strategies and their legislative sources.
Combat the Production of Drugs at the Source
Major U.S. policy tools for combating the production of illicit drugs, particularly cocaine and
heroin, center on the eradication of coca bush and opium poppy crops and the provision of
alternative livelihood options to drug crop farmers. Both policy approaches ultimately seek to
reduce the amount of illicit drug crops cultivated.
Crop Eradication
Eradication programs seek to combat the flow of plant-based illegal drugs at the root of the
supply chain—in the fields where the crops are grown. Crop eradication can take several forms,
including (1) aerial fumigation, which involves the spraying of fields with herbicide; (2) manual
removal, which involves the physical up-rooting and destruction of crops; and (3) mechanical
removal, which involves the use of tractors and all-terrain vehicles to harrow the fields. The
United States supports programs to eradicate coca, opium, and marijuana in a number of
countries, including primarily Colombia and Afghanistan. These efforts are conducted by U.S.
government agencies and contractors that administer U.S. eradication programs providing
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producer countries with support to eradicate drug crops with chemical herbicides, technical
assistance, specialized equipment, and spray aircraft.
Eradication is a long-standing but controversial U.S. policy regarding international drug control.
As recently as 2008, the State Department had considered crop control the “most cost-effective
means of cutting supply,” because drugs cannot enter the illegal trade if the crops were never
planted, destroyed, or left unharvested.66 Without drug cultivation, the State Department’s
rationale continued, “there would be no need for costly enforcement and interdiction operations.”
Proponents of eradication further argue that it is easier to locate and destroy crops in the field
than to locate subsequently processed drugs on smuggling routes or on the streets of U.S. cities.
Put differently, a kilogram of powder cocaine is far more difficult to detect than the 300 to 500
kilograms of coca leaf that are required to make that same kilogram. Also, because crops
constitute the cheapest link in the narcotics chain, producers may devote fewer economic
resources to prevent their detection than to conceal more expensive and refined forms of the drug
product.
Opponents of expanded supply reduction policy generally question whether reduction of the
foreign supply of narcotic drugs is achievable and whether it would have a meaningful impact on
levels of illicit drug use in the United States. Manual eradication requires significant time and
human resources, reportedly involving upward of 20 work-hours of effort to pull up and destroy
one hectare of coca plants.67 Aerial application of herbicide is not legal or feasible in many
countries and is expensive to implement where it is permitted.68 Aerial fumigation in Colombia
has also raised allegations that the herbicide chemical used has caused negative human, animal,
and environmental consequences.
Others question whether a global policy of simultaneous crop control is cost-effective or
politically feasible because eradication efforts may also potentially result in negative political,
economic, and social consequences for the producing country, especially in conflict or post-
conflict environments.69 Some argue that this has been the case with respect to eradication efforts
in Afghanistan, where some U.S. officials have acknowledged that poppy eradication may have
caused many poor Afghan farmers to ally with insurgents and other enemies of the Afghan
government.70 In 2009, Richard Holbrooke, who was the Obama Administration’s Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the time, called Western eradication policies in
Afghanistan “a failure” and stated that they have “wasted hundreds and hundreds of millions of
dollars.”71 Further, aerial eradication remains a high-risk activity, as spray planes and their crew
are targeted by drug traffickers. In 2003, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),
which the State Department lists as a foreign terrorist organization, shot down a U.S. government
66 U.S. Department of State, INCSR, vol. 1, March 2008.
67 Kevin J. Riley, Snow Job? The War Against International Cocaine Trafficking (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 1996).
68 Colombia is currently the only country that conducts regular aerial spraying of coca and opium poppy.
69 Barnett R. Rubin and Alexandra Guaqueta, Fighting Drugs and Building Peace: Towards Policy Coherence between
Counter-Narcotics and Peace Building, Dialogue on Globalization, Occasional Paper No. 37, November 2007. In
Afghanistan, eradication teams can be targeted for attack, resulting in dozens of personnel injured and fatalities each
year. See UNODC, Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2012, November 2012.
70 Thom Shanker and Elisabeth Bumiller, “U.S. Shifts Afghan Narcotics Strategy,” New York Times, July 23, 2009;
Staff of Senator John F. Kennedy, “Afghanistan’s Narco War: Breaking the Link between Drug Traffickers and
Insurgents,” A Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, August 10, 2009.
71 Ibid.
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plane in the Colombian jungle, killing the American pilot and a Colombian air force sergeant and
taking three other crew members, all U.S. defense contractors, hostage.72 They remained FARC
hostages until July 2008.73
Alternative Development
U.S. counterdrug policy also includes foreign assistance specifically targeted to illicit drug crop
farmers. Alternative development can be viewed as a form of drug crop eradication. The ultimate
goal is to convince current farmers to abandon their drug crops and switch to licit, sustainable
livelihoods and sources of income. Whereas other eradication methods involve the physical
removal or chemical destruction of illicit drug crops, alternative development involves the
introduction of crop substitution options, training in sustainable farming techniques, infrastructure
development, and other projects that make alternative livelihoods economically more attractive.
The U.S. government considers alternative development a key component to drug supply
reduction policies and has active programs in Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and South
America.
U.S. alternative development programs, funded and run mainly by the State Department and U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by
helping countries develop economic alternatives to narcotics production, expand legal
employment opportunities, and offer other incentives to farmers to discontinue planting illicit
drug crops. In theory, this approach is designed to complement law enforcement and eradication
efforts to provide both a “carrot and stick” strategy.
For several decades, alternative development has been implemented in various forms and with
varying success.74 Since the late 1960s, when alternative development policies were initially
conceived as simply crop substitution projects, efforts have somewhat expanded to include a
broader concept of alternative development. Current U.S. programs include not only crop
substitution projects but also the development of and assistance for roads, infrastructure, and
health care.
Some observers, however, claim that while current U.S. efforts often aim to achieve this
broadened concept of alternative development, they may not always achieve it in practice. Some
indicate that a relationship between alternative development projects and a reduction in illicit
drug production may be tenuous, as policy coordination between alternative development projects
and eradication and interdiction efforts remains limited in some cases.75 Further, it appears that
alternative development projects are not implemented in most regions where illicit crops are
grown today. According to reports, approximately 10% to 15% of areas under illicit cultivation
are covered by alternative development projects supported by the international community, and,
72 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Background, U.S. Relations, and Congressional
Interest, by June S. Beittel, and CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by Mark P. Sullivan and June
S. Beittel.
73 “Colombia: U.S. Hostages Spotted,” New York Times, June 10, 2008; “Betancourt, U.S. Contractors Rescued from
FARC,” CNN.com, July 3, 2008.
74 See, for example, UNODC, Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation, Final Synthesis Report, 2005.
75 See, for example, “A Failed Balance: Alternative Development and Eradication,” Transnational Institute, Drugs and
Conflict Debate Paper 4, March 2002.
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on average, 5% of farmers of illicit crops receive alternative development assistance.76 Common
factors limiting the reach and prevalence of alternative development projects include ongoing
security threats in areas of illicit crop cultivation, lack of political will or resources to administer
alternative development projects, and local distrust of government or external influences.
Combating the Flow of Drugs in Transit
Interdiction efforts seek to combat the drug trade as traffickers begin moving drug products from
source countries to their final destinations. The Department of Defense is the single lead federal
agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime movement of illegal drugs toward
the United States. Along with the Defense Department, several other U.S. federal agencies are
involved in coordinating operations with foreign government interdiction forces and providing
law enforcement training and other forms of assistance to foreign countries in order to deny drug
traffickers the use of transit routes.
Within the so-called “transit zone”—a 42-million square-mile area between Central and South
America and the U.S. southern borders, which covers the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and
the eastern Pacific Ocean—a DOD-led interagency group called the Joint Inter-Agency Task
Force South (JIATF-South) coordinates interdiction operations across federal agency participants,
as well as international liaisons from Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and several Latin
American countries. The U.S.-Mexican border is the primary point of entry for cocaine shipments
and other drugs smuggled into the United States.77
Outside the transit zone, other international interdiction operations involving U.S. agencies,
mainly DEA, include Operation Containment, Project Cohesion, and Project Prism. Operation
Containment, a multinational law enforcement effort established in 2002 and led by DEA, aims to
place a “security belt” around Afghanistan to prevent processing chemicals for converting opium
poppy to heroin from entering the country and opium and heroin from leaving.78 Project
Cohesion, an international precursor chemical control initiative established in 2005 and led by the
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), tracks precursor chemicals involved in the
production of cocaine and heroin. Project Prism, a U.N.-sponsored initiative, monitors and
controls illicit trade in precursor chemicals used in the production of amphetamine-type synthetic
drugs. The Obama Administration’s revised 2010 counternarcotics policy for Afghanistan also
emphasizes in particular interdiction and the dismantling of Afghan drug trafficking syndicates.79
Several U.S. agencies also provide foreign law enforcement training and assistance in order to
enhance interdiction efforts abroad. The Department of State, the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, and DEA are involved in providing anti-narcotics law
enforcement training, technical assistance, and equipment for foreign personnel. The U.S.
76 See, for example, UNODC, The Economic Viability of Alternative Development, UNODC internal paper, 1999;
Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation, Final Synthesis Report, 2005; and “Chapter 3: Alternative
Development,” in World Drug Report, 2000.
77 DOJ, NDIC, National Drug Threat Assessment 2008, product no. 2007-Q0317-003, October 2007.
78 Statement of the Honorable Michele M. Leonhart, Acting Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies, March 12,
2008.
79 See also James Risen, “U.S. to Hunt Down Afghan Drug Lords Tied to Taliban,” New York Times, August 10, 2009;
“U.S. Drug Agents Target Afghan Poppy Pushers,” National Public Radio (NPR), July 29, 2009.
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military provides international support for drug monitoring and detection. In addition, the United
States regularly contributes funding and expertise to law enforcement assistance activities of the
United Nations and other international organizations.
U.S. interdiction activities in the transit zone, spanning the continental and maritime border areas
between the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean, are sometimes considered
among the bright spots of U.S. counterdrug efforts. The State Department reports that its
interdiction activities in the Caribbean, including Operation Bahamas Turks and Caicos
(OPBAT), contributed to a drop in illegal drug flows from 70% in the 1980s to less than 10% in
recent years.80 A 2005 report released by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), for
example, highlighted the role of improved interagency coordination and international cooperation
for improvements in transit zone interdiction operations.81 Drug trafficking organizations,
however, are reportedly growing increasingly sophisticated in their evasion techniques, and some
observers are concerned that current interdiction capabilities may not be sufficient for long-term
reductions in drug supplies. Proponents of strong drug interdiction policies, for example, have
long been concerned that the nation’s focus on anti-terror objectives will detract from resources
and political will needed to combat foreign illicit drug production and trafficking. Supporting
such concerns, the 2005 GAO report states that the commitment of U.S. military assets to Iraq
and Afghanistan in the 2000s may have hampered the ability of U.S. law enforcement to intercept
drug shipments in the future.
Some observers, however, caution that interdiction efforts could raise the retail price of illegal
drugs, potentially resulting in a perverse incentive that actually increases the economic rewards to
drug traffickers; interdiction efforts that appear to be reaping success in dismantling major drug
trafficking networks may nevertheless pose the unintended consequence of sparking short-term
increases in drug trafficking-related violence, as surviving drug traffickers compete with one
another for control—often violently—of drug routes. This appears to have been in part a
contributing factor to the ongoing drug-related violence in Mexico—and some observers are
raising the concern that similar consequences may occur in Afghanistan under the Obama
Administration’s renewed emphasis on interdiction efforts to combat the Afghan opiate trade.82
Dismantling Transnational Drug Networks
Key U.S. foreign policy tools available for targeting major drug traffickers and their illicit
networks include establishing extradition agreements with foreign countries, freezing and
blocking foreign criminal assets within U.S. jurisdiction, and building foreign capacity to
investigate, arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate drug traffickers domestically.
80 U.S. Department of State, INL, Program and Budget Guide, Fiscal Year 2008 Budget, September 2007.
81 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Decline in Drug
Interdiction Assets and Develop Better Performance Measures for Transit Zone Operations, GAO-06-200, November
2005.
82 See CRS Report R41576, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence, by
June S. Beittel.
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Extradition to the United States
The U.S. government regularly uses extradition as an important judicial tool against suspected
drug traffickers located abroad. Extradition refers to the formal surrender of a person by a state to
another state for prosecution. Proponents of extradition to the United States argue that suspected
criminals are more likely to receive a fair trial in U.S. courts than in countries where the local
judicial process may be corrupt and where suspects can use bribes and intimidation to manipulate
the outcome of a trial.
U.S. bilateral judicial cooperation with
State Department Narcotics Rewards
Mexico and Colombia is often cited as
Program
particularly exemplary, yielding record
Through the Narcotics Rewards Program, the State
numbers of extradited traffickers to the United
Department offers up to $5 million for information
States.84 In 2011, Mexico extradited 93
leading to the arrest or conviction of certain major drug
individuals to the United States and Colombia
traffickers. Currently, the State Department is offering
rewards for information associated with 41 at-large
extradited 119.
foreign drug traffickers, including primarily Mexican and
Colombian traffickers. According to the State
Some anecdotal evidence appears to suggest
Department, rewards have been paid for assistance in
that the threat of extradition has affected the
the capture of at least nine previously listed drug
behavior of foreign drug trafficking
traffickers.83
organizations. For example, some Colombian
drug traffickers are reportedly distancing themselves from overt drug distribution activities,
which could be used as evidence to trigger extradition. Nevertheless, this counterdrug tool
remains controversial and is not universally supported. Many countries simply refuse to extradite
drug traffickers, citing concerns about the potential use of the death penalty in the United States
against its citizens and state sovereignty rights. Burma is one such country, which continues to
refuse to extradite four suspected drug traffickers under indictment in the United States. Some
observers claim that suspected traffickers often take advantage of such limitations in the
extradition system and seek safe haven in countries that are unwilling to extradite.
Freezing and Blocking Foreign Criminal Assets
To reap the financial benefits of the illegal drug trade, traffickers must launder their illicit profits
into the licit economy. As a result, the United States and other members of the international
community have sought to use anti-money laundering efforts as a tool to combat this upstream
activity in the illegal drug market. Currently, several U.S. agencies are involved in international
anti-money laundering efforts designed to enhance financial transaction transparency and
regulation, improve cooperation and coordination with foreign governments and private financial
institutions, and provide foreign countries with law enforcement training and support.
83 The 112th Congress enacted S. 2318, the Department of State Rewards Program Update and Technical Corrections
Act of 2012, which amends existing State Department authorities to offer rewards not only for drug trafficking-related
information, but also for an expanded range of “transnational organized crime” activity. Such activity may include
intellectual property rights piracy, money laundering, trafficking in persons, arms trafficking, trafficking in illicit
wildlife and wildlife parts, and cybercrime.
84 U.S. Department of State, INCSR, vol. 1, March 2008; see also CRS Report RL32724, Mexico: Issues for Congress,
by Clare Ribando Seelke.
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Congress has been active in pursuing anti-money laundering regulations and program oversight.
In 1999, Congress passed the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act to authorize the
President to target the financial profits that significant foreign narcotics traffickers and their
organizations (known as “Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker Kingpins,” or SDNTKs)
have accumulated from their illicit activities.85 This tool seeks to deny SDNTKs and their related
businesses access to the U.S. financial system and all trade transactions involving U.S. companies
and individuals.86
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress further strengthened U.S. measures
to combat money laundering by providing the Secretary of the Treasury with new authorities to
impose a set of regulatory restrictions, or “special measures,” against foreign jurisdictions,
foreign financial institutions, and certain classes of financial transactions involving foreign
jurisdictions, if deemed by the Treasury Secretary to be “of primary money laundering
concern.”87 These anti-money laundering tools are designed not only to address drug trafficking,
but also to combat other forms of related criminal activity, including terrorist financing.
In addition, Congress requires that the State Department include in its annual International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) a separate volume devoted to the state of
international money laundering and financial crimes in each country. Among the report’s
congressionally mandated requirements, the State Department annually identifies the world’s
“major money laundering countries,” defined as those countries “whose financial institutions
engage in currency transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from international
narcotics trafficking” and other serious crimes.
U.S. officials and some observers have highlighted the value of anti-money laundering efforts in
combating drug trafficking. In 2007, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) reported that anti-money laundering efforts against Colombian drug cartels have been
effective in isolating and incapacitating designated supporters, businesses, and front companies
linked to the Cali Cartel and Norte del Valle Cartel.88 Some observers also describe the Treasury
Secretary’s additional authorities to designate jurisdictions of primary money laundering concern
and apply “special measures” against these jurisdictions as having “potentially profound effects
on the financial services industry.”89 Treasury’s designation of Banco Delta Asia, for example,
successfully resulted in the freezing of some $25 million in North Korean assets—funds that
reportedly included counterfeit U.S. currency and profits from other North Korean criminal
activity, including drug trafficking.
Skeptics of the use of anti-money laundering efforts to combat drug trafficking argue that tracking
illicit financial transactions may be more difficult and may yield less success than other
85 Title VIII, International Narcotics Trafficking, of P.L. 106-120, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000 (21 U.S.C. 1901-1908; 8 U.S.C. 1182).
86 The law was reportedly modeled on Treasury’s sanctions program pursuant to Executive Order 12978 (October
1995) against Colombia drug cartels under authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (Title II of
P.L. 95-223; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and the National Emergencies Act (P.L. 94-412; 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.).
87 Section 311 of the International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 (Title III,
Subtitle A of P.L. 107-56, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001) amends the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 at 31 U.S.C. 5318A.
88 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), Impact Report: Economic Sanctions
against Colombian Drug Cartels, March 2007.
89 See, for example, Douglas N. Greenburg, John Roth, and Katherine A. Sawyer, “Special Measures under Section 311
of the USA PATRIOT Act,” The Review of Banking and Financial Services, vol. 23, no. 6, June 2007.
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counterdrug tools.90 The same types of money laundering methods—bulk cash smuggling, trade-
based money laundering, and others—that the State Department identified as issues of concern
more than a decade ago remain among the most used forms of money laundering today. Further,
emerging challenges include the growing volume of financial transactions, especially the volume
of international electronic transfers, and the movement of illegal money laundering outside
formal banking channels, including through “hawala”-type chains of transnational money brokers
and through the use of stored-value cards.
Building Foreign Law Enforcement Capacity
Another element of U.S. efforts to dismantle foreign drug networks involves providing foreign
countries with the tools also improve their domestic efforts to dismantle drug networks. Such
assistance, in the form of training, equipping, and other institutional capacity building, ultimately
seeks to strengthen foreign judicial and law enforcement institutions and assist in developing host
nation administrative infrastructures to combat the illicit drug trade. Institutional development
programs focus mainly on fighting corruption and training to support criminal justice system
reforms and the rule of law. A variety of U.S. agencies are involved in counterdrug-related
capacity building efforts abroad, including the State Department, USAID, the Department of
Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense.
According to the State Department, drug trafficking organizations often seek to subvert or co-opt
governments in order to guarantee a secure operating environment and essentially “buy their way
into power.”91 Anti-corruption efforts thus seek to prevent traffickers from undermining the
legitimacy and effectiveness of foreign government institutions. Some observers, however, argue
that counterdrug policies are placing too little emphasis on projects that help foreign countries
develop a culture supportive of the rule of law. One expert explained in congressional testimony
in 2007, “unless foreign police organizations recognize and internalize what the rule of law
means, what its key characteristics are, and why the rule of law is necessary to accomplish their
mission, no amount of aid will get the job done.”92
Creating Incentives for International Cooperation
Congress has historically played a major role in developing counternarcotics-related legislative
conditions on U.S. foreign assistance and unilateral trade preference programs.
Conditions on Foreign Aid
In an effort to deter foreign governments from aiding or participating in illicit drug production or
trafficking, the President may suspend U.S. foreign assistance appropriations to countries that are
major illegal drug producers or major transit countries for illegal drugs, known as “drug
90 See for example R. T. Naylor, “Wash-Out: A Critique of Follow-the-Money Methods in Crime Control Policy,”
Crime, Law, and Social Change, vol. 32, 1999, pp. 1-57.
91 U.S. Department of State, INCSR, vol. 1, 2008.
92 Statement of Dr. Roy S. Godson, Emeritus Professor, Government, Georgetown University, President, National
Strategy Information Center, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, “Violence
in Central America,” June 26, 2007.
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majors.”93 For FY2013, the President has identified 22 drug majors: Afghanistan, The Bahamas,
Belize, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru,
and Venezuela.
Of these, Congress requires that the President certify that the drug majors have not “failed
demonstrably” to make at least “substantial efforts” to adhere to their obligations during the
previous year under international counternarcotics agreements.
Defining the Drug Majors
A “major illicit drug producing country” is statutorily defined in Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(FAA), as amended (22 U.S.C. 2291(e)(2)), as a country in which
•
1,000 hectares of more of illicit opium poppy is cultivated or harvested during a year;
•
1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca is cultivated or harvested during a year; or
•
5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis is cultivated or harvested during a year, unless the President
determines that such illicit cannabis production does not significantly affect the United States.
A “major drug transit country” is statutorily defined in Section 481 of the FAA, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2291(e)(5)), as
a country
•
in which there is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled
substances significantly affecting the United States; or
•
through which such drugs or substances are transported.
Failure to receive a presidential certification of substantial counternarcotics efforts may result in
certain foreign assistance prohibitions against those drug majors. Decertified drug majors may
continue to receive U.S. foreign assistance, however, if the President determines that assistance is
“vital” to U.S. national interests. Alternatively, foreign assistance to drug majors countries may
nevertheless be withheld by Congress, despite a presidential certification, if Congress enacts a
joint resolution disapproving of the President’s certification.
For FY2013, the President did not certify three drug majors—Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela.
The President, however, waived the aid sanctions, permitting the U.S. government to provide
assistance that is vital to the national interests of the United States (see Figure 5).94
93 Since 1992, Congress has required that the President submit annual reports that identify major drug transit and major
drug producing countries, known as the “drug majors.” Major illicit drug producing countries are defined by section
481(e)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291(e)(2)) as a country in which (1) 1,000 hectares or
more of illicit opium poppy is cultivated or harvested during a year, (2) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca is
cultivated or harvested during a year, or (3) 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis is cultivated or harvested during a
year, unless the President determines that such illicit cannabis production does not significantly affect the United
States. Major drug-transit countries are defined by section 481(e)(5) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2291(e)(5)) as a country (1) that is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled
substances significantly affecting the United States, or (2) through which are transported such drugs or substances.
94 Barack Obama, Presidential Determination No. 2012-15, “Memorandum to the Secretary of State: Major Drug
Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2013,” September 14, 2012.
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Figure 5. Map of World Drug Majors in FY2013
Source: Barack Obama, Presidential Determination No. 2012-15, “Memorandum to the Secretary of State:
Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2013,” September 14, 2012.
Since its creation in 1986, the drug majors designation process has garnered significant
controversy. Supporters of the process argue that, overall, it is an “effective diplomatic
instrument” to enforce international drug control commitments because it holds foreign
governments “publicly responsible for their actions before their international peers.”95 However,
in a few extreme cases, the drug majors designation does not appear to have much effect on a
country’s drug control policies. In the case of Bolivia’s designation, beginning in 2008, the policy
appears to have had the opposite effect, in part causing a rift in counternarcotics policy between
Bolivia and the United States, particularly with respect to interdiction cooperation.96 Observers
from many countries criticize the unilateral and non-cooperative nature of the drug certification
requirements; such critics recommend moving toward multilateral and regional fora for
evaluating governments’ counterdrug efforts. Others question the extent to which the process
reduces the scope of the illegal drug trade, when many of the world’s drug producers and transit
areas are located in countries that are not designated as drug majors or decertified by the
President. Some have suggested the OAS/CICAD Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM), a
regional system of peer review on drug control policies in OAS countries, could serve as an
alternative model to facilitate international drug control cooperation.
95 See, for example, U.S. Department of State, 1996 INCSR, 2007.
96 See, for example, Antonio Regalado, “Bolivia Plants Coca and Cocaine Flows,” Wall Street Journal, August 18,
2009; Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Fourth Report to the Congress on the Operation of the Andean Trade
Preference Act as Amended,” April 30, 2009.
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Congressional Role in Drug Certification Procedures
When making the annual drug majors decisions, the President may choose from two legislatively mandated methods
available.97 One is codified at 22 U.S.C. 2291j; the second is codified at 22 U.S.C. 2291j-1.
The Original Certification Procedure: 22 U.S.C. 2291j
Beginning 1986 (P.L. 99-570), Congress required that the President determine and certify to Congress that major
illicit drug producing or drug transit countries (i.e., drug majors) were “fully cooperating” with the U.S. government
to combat the illegal drug trade. 22 U.S.C. 2291j requires that 50% of certain bilateral assistance be withheld and that
the U.S. government oppose multilateral development assistance to the drug majors until the President makes his
determinations and certifications.98 If the President does not determine and certify a drug major as having met the
“fully cooperating” requirement (or if Congress enacts a joint resolution disapproving of a Presidential certification),
then the President must decide which of the two following actions will take place:
•
U.S. Denial of Assistance: 100% of bilateral assistance is prohibited from being obligated and the U.S.
government continues to oppose multilateral development assistance until the country is eligible for certification;
or
•
Continuance of All or a Portion of Aid for National Interest Reasons: Aid continues, not because the
country qualifies for certification, but because the President determines that “the vital national interests of the
United States require that the assistance withheld ... be provided.” In this scenario, multilateral development
assistance could also be supported.
The Revised Drug Majors Process: 22 U.S.C. 2291j-1
While not eliminating the certification procedures under 22 U.S.C. 2291j, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (P.L. 107-115), temporarily allowed for the suspension of the prior
certification procedures and their replacement with a new set of procedures. The Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-228), made permanent the modified certification requirement under P.L. 107-115, and
this new requirement became codified under 22 U.S.C. 2291j-1.
In lieu of following the original certification procedures (22 U.S.C. 2291j), the revised drug majors process (22 U.S.C.
2291j-1) required the President to designate and withhold assistance from only the worst offending drug majors—
those that were determined by the President as having “failed demonstrably” to make substantial efforts to combat
illicit drugs. It also eliminated the requirement to withhold initially 50% of bilateral aid prior to the President’s
designation and certification to Congress.
The change in standards from whether a country had “cooperated fully” to whether it had “failed demonstrably”
effectively shifted the “burden of proof to an assumption that foreign nations were cooperating with the United States
and had to be proved otherwise to trigger the restrictions” in foreign assistance.99 For those countries that were
designated as having failed demonstrably, the same two options remained as under 22 U.S.C. 2291j: (1) 100% denial of
U.S. bilateral and multilateral assistance or (2) continuance of all or a portion of aid for national interest reasons.
Methamphetamine Precursor Chemicals
An additional certification process was enacted by Congress as part of the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act
of 2005.100 This law amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to require the State Department to report the five
largest importing and exporting countries of two precursor drugs, ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, commonly used
97 Several additional drug-related certification requirements have appeared in recent appropriations legislation for
specific countries. While not codified certifications processes, failure to be certified under these provisions can result in
the prohibition of various amounts of foreign aid.
98 Aid subject to withholding included all aid under Chapter 32 of Title 22 of the U.S. Code except (1) aid under Part
VIII (International Narcotics Control) of Subchapter I of Chapter 32 of Title 22 of the U.S. Code; (2) any other
narcotics-related aid under Subchapter I of Chapter 32 of Title 22 of the U.S. Code; and (3) aid involving disaster
relief, refugees, and provisions of food and medicine.
99 H.Rept. 108-167, Part I.
100 Section 722 of Title VII of USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-177; 21 U.S.C.
801 note) amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 at Sections 489 and 490; for further explanation, see also
H.Rept. 109-133.
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to produce methamphetamine, and certify whether these countries are fully cooperating with the United States on
methamphetamine chemical precursor control. Nations deemed not to be fully cooperating face a loss of U.S. bilateral
assistance and U.S. opposition to multilateral assistance in the multilateral development banks.101 For FY2010, the
State Department identified 16 major precursor chemical source countries: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
China, Germany, India, Mexico, the Netherlands, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. So far, the President has not decertified any country for its efforts to control methamphetamine
precursor chemicals.
Eligibility for Trade Preference Programs
In 1991, Congress passed the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA; P.L. 102-182). Congress later
renewed and expanded the program in the 2002 Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication
Act (ATPDEA; P.L. 107-210).102 The ATPA and subsequent amendments have permitted select
beneficiary countries in South America to export certain products to the United States duty-free or
at otherwise preferential trade levels.103
One of the purposes of the ATPA has been to support, in part, broader U.S. international
counterdrug policy. By reducing the costs associated with exporting legitimate goods to the
United States, ATPA would theoretically provide an incentive for drug-producing countries in
South America to switch to economically viable alternative sources of income. In addition,
pursuant to the ATPA, one of the eligibility criteria for renewed benefits under the Act is whether
the beneficiary countries have upheld their international, regional, and bilateral commitments to
combat drugs.104
A long-standing issue of debate, however, has been the extent to which the ATPA has been
effective in providing Andean coca farmers alternative livelihoods and ultimately reducing illicit
coca cultivation. As required by the ATPA legislation, the United States International Trade
Commission (USITC) submits to Congress a biennial report that includes, among other matters,
an analysis of the effectiveness of the ATPA/ATPDEA in “promoting drug-related crop
101 As with the drug majors certification process, the President can waive the foreign assistance restrictions if he
determines that providing aid to the country is vital to U.S. national interest.
102 See CRS Report RS22548, ATPA Renewal: Background and Issues, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
103 Current law on the ATPA and ATPDEA is codified at 19 USC 3201 through 19 USC 3206.
104 The section of the ATPA/ATPDEA, as amended, which specifies the eligibility requirements, currently refers to a
section in law – Section 481(h)(2)(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) – that was subsequently moved to
490 of the FAA. This provision defines successful foreign cooperation on drug control as whether “during the previous
year the country has cooperated fully with the United States, or has taken adequate steps on its own, to achieve full
compliance with the goals and objectives established by the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.... ”
Section 490 of the FAA thus establishes a high threshold for drug control cooperation—full cooperation with the
United States and full compliance with U.N. standards—that prior Administrations have argued is difficult to prove. As
a result, Congress enacted an alternative standard for defining foreign cooperation on drug control at Section 5 of the
International Narcotics Control Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-583). This provision defines failed foreign cooperation on drug
control as whether a country has “failed demonstrably, during the previous 12 months, to make substantial efforts—(i)
to adhere to its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements; and (ii) to take counternarcotics measures
set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.... ”
Notably, Administrations have used the latter criteria for measuring drug control cooperation, Section 5 of the
International Narcotics Control Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-583), for determining whether a country under the
ATPA/ATPDEA remains eligible for beneficiary status.
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eradication and crop substitution efforts of the beneficiary countries.”105 The last report was
issued in September 2012, evaluating the 2010-2011 time period, concluding, as the USITC has
in previous years, that “the effectiveness of ATPA in reducing illicit coca cultivation and
promoting crop substitution efforts in the Andean countries continued to be small and mostly
indirect.”106
Conclusion
Many observers highlight the importance of international drug control policy, particularly because
of the transnational nature of the drug trade, whereas others continue to criticize existing policies
and mechanisms for failing to achieve sufficient progress in combating illegal drugs. The
UNODC has reported in recent years that global drug use has stabilized, on average; global
opium poppy and coca cultivation is in decline; and global illicit drug seizures are up—and that a
major contributing factor has been the continued international support for drug control policies.
Global coordination, many say, is vital for lasting success in combating the international drug
trade. At the same time, however, others criticize the international drug control system for failing
to achieve the United Nation’s stated goal of “eliminating or reducing significantly” by 2008 the
production and availability of synthetic drugs and precursors, as well as the cultivation of the
coca bush, cannabis plant, and opium poppy.107 In 2009, the U.N.’s Commission on Narcotic
Drugs set a new date of 2019 to “eliminate or reduce significantly and measurably” the
cultivation of illegal plant-based drugs, the demand for illegal drugs, the production and
trafficking of synthetic drugs, the diversion and trafficking of precursor chemicals used in the
manufacture of illegal drugs, and drug-related money laundering.108
Congress may continue to exercise its oversight and assess existing U.S. international drug policy.
Emerging questions in the drug policy debate include the following:
• In what ways are counternarcotics strategies facilitating or driving recent
increases in drug trafficking-related violence? Are spikes in drug-related violence
common or inevitable consequences of heightened counternarcotics operations?
In what ways might governments mitigate or dampen current and potentially
future increases in drug-related violence?
• How do counternarcotics policies interact with counterterrorism,
counterinsurgency, and anti-money laundering priorities, particularly in countries
such as Afghanistan, where the U.S. government may have an interest in all three
issues?
• What role should the Department of Defense play in providing foreign
counternarcotics assistance?
105 19 U.S.C. 3204.
106 U.S. International Trade Commission, Andean Trade Preference Act: Impact on U.S. Industries and Consumers and
on Drug Crop Eradication and Crop Substitution, 2011, 15th Report, Investigation No. 332-352, USITC Publication
No. 4352 (September 2012).
107 UNGA, Political Declaration, A/RES/S-20/2, June 10, 1998.
108 U.N. CND, Report of the 52nd Session, March 14, 2008 and March 11-20, 2009), Economic and Social Council,
Official Records, 2009, Supplement No. 8, E/2009/28, E/CN.7/2009/12.
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International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses
• How should U.S. policymakers weigh the benefits of aerial eradication as a
counternarcotics policy tool with the social, financial, and political costs it may
incur?
• To what extent is it a common phenomenon that human rights are violated over
the course of drug-related investigations and operations? In what ways might
human rights violations undermine or threaten drug control policies?
• To what extent should U.S. counternarcotics policy take into account economic
development, social development, and health and harm reduction programs, and
are such efforts sufficiently coordinated with international and bilateral partners?
• How do counternarcotics policies interact with related foreign policy goals of
anti-corruption, justice sector reform, and improving the rule of law?
• How might international regulatory and legal constraints limit the reach of U.S.
counternarcotics policy and potentially offer drug syndicates foreign safe havens?
What legislative options might be available to prevent such legal safe havens
from existing?
Author Contact Information
Liana Sun Wyler
Analyst in International Crime and Narcotics
lwyler@crs.loc.gov, 7-6177
Congressional Research Service
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