U.S.-Taiwan Relationship:
Overview of Policy Issues
Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs
Wayne M. Morrison
Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance
January 4, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41952
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues
Summary
The purpose and scope of this CRS report is to provide a succinct overview with analysis of the
issues in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. This report will be updated as warranted. Taiwan formally
calls itself the sovereign Republic of China (ROC), tracing its political lineage to the ROC set up
after the revolution in 1911 in China. The ROC government retreated to Taipei in 1949. The
United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained a non-diplomatic
relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing in
1979. The State Department claims an “unofficial” U.S. relationship with Taiwan, despite official
contacts that include arms sales. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has
governed policy in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. Other key
statements that guide policy are the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués of 1972, 1979, and 1982;
as well as the “Six Assurances” of 1982. (See also CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan:
Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.)
For decades, Taiwan has been of significant security, economic, and political interest to the
United States. In 2011, Taiwan was the 10th-largest U.S. trading partner and the 6th-largest market
for U.S. agricultural exports. Taiwan is a major innovator of information technology (IT)
products. Ties or tension across the Taiwan Strait affect international security (with potential U.S.
intervention), the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and U.S.-PRC cooperation. While the United States
does not diplomatically recognize Taiwan, it is a significant autonomous actor in the world.
Today, 23 countries including the Vatican have diplomatic relations with Taiwan as the ROC.
Taiwan’s 23 million people enjoy self-governance with free elections. After Taiwan’s presidential
election in 2008, the United States congratulated Taiwan as a “beacon of democracy.” Taiwan’s
democracy has allowed its people a greater say in their status, given competing party politics
about Taiwan’s national political identity and priorities. Taiwan held presidential and legislative
elections on January 14, 2012. Kuomintang (KMT) President Ma Ying-jeou won re-election
against the candidate from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
Since Taiwan and the PRC resumed their quasi-official dialogue in 2008 under President Ma and
cross-strait tension decreased, some have stressed concerns about steps seen as needed to be taken
by the United States and by Taiwan to strengthen their relationship. Another approach has viewed
closer cross-strait engagement as allowing U.S. attention to shift to expand cooperation with a
rising China, which opposes U.S. arms sales and other dealings with Taiwan. In any case,
Washington and Taipei have put more efforts into their respective relations with Beijing, while
contending that they have pursued a positive, parallel U.S.-Taiwan relationship.
Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou has sought U.S. support for his policies, including Taiwan’s
entry in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP) and proposed talks on maritime territorial disputes
in the East and South China Seas. Other policy issues include whether to approve arms sales,
restart Cabinet-level visits, and resume trade talks under the Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA), or TIFA talks. The United States has cited concerns about Taiwan’s
restrictions on U.S. beef, even as Taiwan seeks support in international organizations.
Legislation in the 112th Congress include H.Con.Res. 39, H.Con.Res. 77, H.Con.Res. 122, H.R.
2583, H.R. 2918, H.R. 2992, H.R. 4310, H.R. 5902, H.R. 6313, H.Res. 352, H.Res. 616, S. 1539,
S. 1545, S.Con.Res. 17, S.Res. 542, S. 3254, H.Res. 814, and H.R. 6649. Other congressional
actions have focused on arms sales, particularly the issue of whether to sell F-16C/D fighters.
(See CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990.)
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U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues
Contents
Overview: Policy Interests and Issues ............................................................................................. 1
Historical Background ............................................................................................................... 3
Bipartisan “One China” Policy .................................................................................................. 3
Democratic Politics ................................................................................................................... 4
Major Developments in Cross-Strait Engagement........................................................................... 6
Resumed Dialogue and Reduced Tension ................................................................................. 6
Economic Agreements and ECFA ............................................................................................. 6
Continuing Challenges .............................................................................................................. 7
Issues in U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan ............................................................................................ 11
Overview ................................................................................................................................. 11
International Security .............................................................................................................. 13
International Organizations ..................................................................................................... 16
Arms Sales to Taiwan .............................................................................................................. 18
Visa Waiver Program (VWP) .................................................................................................. 18
Extradition Treaty .................................................................................................................... 19
Human Rights and Rule of Law .............................................................................................. 20
Democratic Elections (KMT and DPP) ................................................................................... 21
Restoring Trust and Resolving Disputes (Beef) ...................................................................... 23
Economic Relationship ............................................................................................................ 25
Cross-Strait Economic Ties ............................................................................................... 26
U.S.-Taiwan Trade and Investment ................................................................................... 27
Legislation in the 112th Congress ................................................................................................... 29
Figures
Figure 1. U.S.-Taiwan Merchandise Trade: 2002-2011 ................................................................. 29
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 30
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U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues
Overview: Policy Interests and Issues
The purpose and scope of this CRS report is to provide a succinct overview with analysis of the
issues in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Taiwan has been of significant security, economic, and
political interest to the United States. Although the United States does not diplomatically
recognize Taiwan, it is a de facto, significant autonomous actor in the world. Today, 23 countries
including the Vatican have diplomatic relations with Taiwan as the Republic of China (ROC). In
what many consider to be a model democracy, Taiwan’s 23 million people enjoy self-governance
with free elections. In 2011, Taiwan was the 10th-largest U.S. trading partner and the 6th-largest
market for U.S. agricultural exports.
With active congressional involvement, the United States has played critical roles in Taiwan’s
economic development, political liberalization from an authoritarian dictatorship to a dynamic
democracy, self-defense against the People’s Republic of China (PRC’s) military threats, and
preservation of international space. Overall, U.S. policy seeks to support security, political, and
economic interests that involve peace and stability, the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan’s
efforts to maintain international space, democracy and human rights in Taiwan, and U.S.
businesses in Taiwan. As a critical concern, the United States has interests in the ties or tension
across the Taiwan Strait, which affect international security (with potential U.S. intervention), the
U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and U.S.-PRC cooperation. The cross-strait relationship has grown
closer since the 1980s. When James Lilley arrived as the U.S. representative in Taipei in 1982, he
was one of the first officials to encourage cross-strait economic ties as the driver in a trend toward
greater peace and security.1 Indeed, closer economic engagement gradually has increased regular
contacts and reduced tension across the Taiwan Strait.
U.S. support for Taiwan has posed challenges to U.S. engagement with the PRC, though
Washington and Beijing have advanced an overall cooperative relationship since the 1970s. As
Washington has engaged with both Taipei and Beijing, long-standing issues for policy have
included how to balance U.S. relations with Taiwan and with the PRC, and also how to balance
maintaining the relationship with Taipei in its own right as opposed to approaching Taiwan as part
of Washington’s relationship with Beijing. For decades, Taipei has harbored fears about whether
Beijing’s cooperation with Washington has occurred at the expense of Taiwan’s interests. U.S.
policy seeks a cooperative relationship with a rising PRC, which opposes U.S. arms sales and
other official dealings with Taiwan as interference in its internal affairs in unifying with Taiwan
as a part of China. In an apparent contradiction, Beijing also seeks its preferred U.S. policies to
influence Taiwan. However, Taiwan considers itself a sovereign country. As Taiwan shifted from
an authoritarian political system, U.S. policy has been mindful of respecting its democracy.
After the Kuomintang (KMT) Party’s Ma Ying-jeou became president in Taiwan in May 2008, he
promptly resumed the dialogue across the Taiwan Strait after its suspension for a decade. The
PRC had accused his predecessor, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s Chen Shui-bian, of
pushing for de jure independence of Taiwan. The resumption of the cross-strait dialogue resulted
in even closer economic engagement between Taiwan and the PRC as well as a reduction of
tension, which was welcomed by the United States. This situation afforded U.S. policy
opportunities to strengthen the U.S.-Taiwan relationship and/or shift attention to seek greater
cooperation from Beijing. President Ma Ying-jeou has sought U.S. support, including arms sales,
1 James Lilley with Jeffrey Lilley, China Hands (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
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for Taiwan’s stronger position to sustain cross-strait talks. One view has stressed concerns that the
United States and Taiwan have needed to strengthen their relationship to pursue U.S. interests.
Another approach has stressed that the new era of cross-strait engagement allowed for improved
U.S. ties with a rising China and that Taiwan has pursued its own interests in engaging with the
PRC. In any case, Washington and Taipei have put more efforts into their respective relations with
Beijing, while contending that they have pursued a parallel, positive U.S.-Taiwan relationship.
Overall, some salient issues for policy include:
• How effectively is the Administration encouraging Taiwan to support U.S.
interests in peace and prosperity, including in U.S. alliances and the cross-strait
relationship? Is the Administration effectively influencing Taiwan to play a
helpful, stabilizing role in maritime territorial disputes in East Asia?
• How should Congress exercise its roles in U.S. policy or engage with Taiwan?
• Should the United States sell more weapons and which ones, as requested by
Taiwan for its self-defense? How should the United States encourage Taiwan to
strengthen its self-defense, including by increasing the defense budget?
• Should the United States resume visits by Cabinet-level officials to Taiwan?
• Should the United States conclude an extradition treaty with Taiwan, and what
would be the congressional role in concluding such a treaty or agreement?
• Should the United States also favor Taiwan’s observership (if not membership) in
supporting Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, such as the
World Health Organization (WHO), International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), and U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)?
• Should U.S. policy allow or encourage more senior officials from Taiwan to visit
and encourage expanded communication with Taiwan’s president?
• Should policy allow U.S. flag and general military officers to visit Taiwan?
• How should the United States support transparent, fair, and impartial rule of law,
elections, and freedoms in Taiwan, while respecting Taiwan’s democracy?
• How should policy press Taiwan to contribute more in weapons nonproliferation,
counter-piracy, foreign aid, and other areas of international security?
• What is Taiwan’s role in the U.S. comprehensive strategy for rebalancing
priorities toward the Asian-Pacific region (so-called “pivot” to the Pacific)?
• Should decisionmakers review policy on Taiwan, with the last review in 1994?
• How should U.S. policy encourage Taiwan to import more U.S. beef and pork?
• Should the United States press Taiwan to notify the cross-strait Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) of 2010 to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and pay more attention to benefits for U.S. companies?
• Should the United States resume talks under the 1994 Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement (TIFA), negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) with
Taiwan, and/or support Taiwan’s inclusion in multilateral trade negotiations,
including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?
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Historical Background
Taiwan formally calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), tracing its political lineage to the ROC
set up after the revolution in 1911 in China. The ROC does not recognize the PRC founded in
Beijing by the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1949. The PRC claims that the ROC ceased to
exist in 1949 and that Taiwan is a province of “one China.” (The Qing Empire had incorporated
Taiwan as a full province in 1885-1895, when more settlers moved from China to the island.) The
PRC and ROC do not recognize each other or two Chinas. The ROC refers to the other side of the
strait as the “mainland.” The PRC opposes recognition of the ROC and seeks unification of
Taiwan with the mainland as a part of “one China,” without renouncing the use of force. Taiwan
has stated an intention to set aside the dispute over sovereignty. In any case, since 1949, the ROC
has governed only on Taiwan, and the PRC based in Beijing has ruled mainland China.
Previously called Formosa, Taiwan never has been ruled by the CPC or as a part of the PRC, and
until 1945, had never been ruled by the ROC. In Taiwan after World War II, October 25, 1945, or
“Retrocession Day,” marked the ROC’s claim of “recovering” Formosa from Japan. However,
upon Japan’s surrender, that was the first time that the ROC’s military forces had occupied the
island of Formosa. When the Qing Empire ceded in perpetuity Formosa to Japan under the Treaty
of Shimonoseki of 1895, the ROC was not yet in existence. Moreover, the colony’s people did not
have a say in self-determination of their status or identity. The Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist
Party of China, has contended that the ROC claimed Formosa at Japan’s surrender in August
1945, with no country challenging the island’s status. The ROC under KMT forces led by Chiang
Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan in 1949, when the Communist forces led by Mao Zedong took over
mainland China. Taiwan’s people have faced a social, ethnic, linguistic, and political issue of
whether to identify with Taiwan or China, with two major groups of local “Taiwanese” and
“mainlanders” (folks who retreated to Taiwan with the KMT forces and their descendents). The
KMT’s imposed authoritarian rule and martial law on Taiwan, including a massacre called the
“228 Incident” of February 28, 1947, exacerbated difficulties between the groups.
Bipartisan “One China” Policy
One of the first powers to support reforms and the new republic of progressive leaders in early
20th century China, the United States recognized the ROC government from 1913 until the end of
1978.2 By the early 1970s, the United States looked to switch the diplomatic recognition to the
PRC in Beijing while figuring out a framework to maintain the relationship with Taiwan. As a
scholar on China and member of the National Security Council staff in 1977-1980 wrote,3
Many factors produced the change in U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan in the 1970s,
some tactical, some strategic. The timing of the initial step was unquestionably related to the
Vietnam War and the Sino-Soviet dispute. The second and third steps were facilitated by and
partly a response to the Soviet expansion. But these were transitory considerations. From a
longer-term perspective, America’s China policy of the 1950s and 1960s could not be
sustained. It was based on American acknowledgment of an absurd claim. Taiwan was not,
as it asserted, the government of mainland China. At the same time, China’s position was
unrealistic. The People’s Republic was not the government of Taiwan. In fact, the two
2 Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990).
3 Michel Oksenberg, “Taiwan, Tibet, and Hong Kong in Sino-American Relations,” in Living with China, edited by
Ezra Vogel (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997).
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governments ruled different parts of Chinese territory, each asserting that it was the rightful
authority for all of China, each denying the legitimacy of the other.
The United States has its own “one China” policy (vs. the PRC’s “one China” principle) and
position on Taiwan’s status. Not recognizing the PRC’s claim over Taiwan nor Taiwan as a
sovereign state, U.S. policy has considered Taiwan’s status as unsettled. Since a declaration by
President Truman on June 27, 1950, during the Korean War, the United States has supported a
future determination of the island’s status in a peaceful manner. The United States did not state a
stance on the sovereign status of Taiwan in the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués of 1972,
1979, and 1982. The United States simply “acknowledged” the “one China” position of both sides
of the Taiwan Strait. Washington has not promised to end arms sales to Taiwan for its self-
defense, although the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 terminated on December 31, 1979. U.S.
policy does not support or oppose Taiwan’s independence; U.S. policy takes a neutral position of
“non-support” for Taiwan’s independence. U.S. policy leaves the Taiwan question to be resolved
by the people on both sides of the strait: a “peaceful resolution,” with the assent of Taiwan’s
people in a democratic manner, and without unilateral changes. In short, U.S. policy focuses on
the process of resolution of the Taiwan question, not any set outcome.
The United States has maintained a non-diplomatic relationship with Taiwan after recognition of
the PRC in Beijing in 1979. The State Department claims an “unofficial” U.S. relationship with
Taiwan, despite official contacts that include arms sales. Congress passed a law that did not
describe the relationship as official or unofficial. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L.
96-8, has governed policy in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. The
TRA stipulates the expectation that the future of Taiwan “will be determined” by peaceful means.
The TRA specifies that it is policy, inter alia, to consider any non-peaceful means to determine
Taiwan’s future “a threat” to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of “grave concern”
to the United States; “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character”; and “to maintain the
capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” jeopardizing
the security, or social or economic system of Taiwan’s people. The TRA provides a congressional
role in determining security assistance “necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-
defense capability.” The TRA set up the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) to carry out the day-
to-day matters of the relationship to sustain U.S. interests after the de-recognition of the ROC.
Since 1979, the TRA has had bipartisan support in guiding policy with a firm foundation and
flexible framework for the maintenance of the relationship with Taiwan.
In addition to the three Joint communiqués and the TRA, there is a fifth key statement that guides
U.S. policy on Taiwan. President Reagan offered “Six Assurances” to Taipei on July 14, 1982,
that in negotiating the third Joint Communiqué with the PRC, the United States: (1) has not
agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan; (2) has not agreed to hold prior consultations
with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan; (3) will not play any mediation role between Taipei and
Beijing; (4) has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act; (5) has not altered its position
regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and (6) will not exert pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with
the PRC. (Also see CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—
Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, by Shirley A. Kan.)
Democratic Politics
Since those years when the United States dealt with the KMT authoritarian government in Taipei,
the relationship has grown both more robust and more complex with Taiwan’s democratization
and shared values about freedom. The United States supported Taiwan’s political liberalization
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from an authoritarian dictatorship to a dynamic democracy. Democratization and electoral politics
have allowed the people a greater say in Taiwan’s identity (as part of China or a separate entity).
In 1986, the KMT did not crack down against the formation of Taiwan’s second major party, the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which has leaned toward Taiwan’s independence. The KMT
then lifted Martial Law in 1987.
At times, the PRC has reacted unfavorably to Taiwan’s democratic politics and implications for
sovereignty, particularly since its first democratic, direct presidential election in March 1996. The
PRC’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) “test-fired” missiles into sea areas close to Taiwan, which
provoked the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996. President Clinton deployed two aircraft carrier
battle groups near Taiwan in March 1996. The PRC threatened Taiwan after President Lee Teng-
hui characterized the cross-strait relationship as “special state-to-state ties” on July 9, 1999. On
March 18, 2000, Chen Shui-bian of the DPP won the presidential election. Chen’s DPP
administration brought Taiwan’s first democratic transfer of power from one party to another,
after 55 years of KMT rule. In recognition of Taiwan’s democracy, President Clinton declared in
2000 another condition that the resolution of the Taiwan question must be peaceful as well as
with the “assent” of Taiwan’s people. In 2003, President Bush expressed “opposition” to any
unilateral decision to change the “status quo.” On the TRA’s 25th anniversary, Representative
James Leach said at a hearing of the House International Relations Committee on April 21, 2004,
that Taiwan has the unique situation in which it can have de facto self-determination only if it
does not attempt to be recognized with de jure sovereignty. He urged Taiwan’s people to
recognize that they have greater security in “political ambiguity.”
Cross-strait tension rose again when the PRC accused President Chen (2000-2008) of promoting
Taiwan’s de jure independence (e.g., with a referendum on Taiwan’s membership in the U.N.
during the presidential election on March 22, 2008). While opposing such referendums, President
Bush positioned two aircraft carriers near Taiwan, as the largely symbolic referendums were still
targets of the PRC’s belligerent condemnation. The referendums failed to be valid. The victory of
the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou ushered in Taiwan’s second democratic transfer of power from one
party to another. Bush congratulated Taiwan as a “beacon of democracy.” Some have stressed
Taiwan as a model democracy in a Chinese cultural context. (Also see CRS Report RL34441,
Security Implications of Taiwan’s Presidential Election of March 2008, by Shirley Kan.)
The KMT’s March 2008 presidential victory was preceded on January 12, 2008, by a sweeping
victory in which it swamped the DPP in elections for the Legislative Yuan (LY). Having won the
presidency as well in March, the KMT assumed solid control of the government in May 2008.
The 2008 legislative elections were the first held under new electoral rules adopted in 2005 under
an amendment to Taiwan’s constitution. The rules cut in half the size of the LY to 113 members
from its former size of 225 and increased the term of office from three years to four years. The
rules also instituted a new single-member district system employing two ballots for voters, similar
to systems used in Germany and Japan: one to be cast for a candidate and one to be cast for a
political party. As demonstrated by the electoral results, the new system favored larger, well-
organized parties and put smaller parties at a disadvantage. Two smaller opposition parties have
been the People’s First Party (PFP), initially allied with the KMT as “Blue” parties, and the
Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), siding with the DPP as “Green” parties. Compared to the KMT,
the DPP and TSU have been more Taiwan-centric in their perspectives and wary of the PRC.
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Major Developments in Cross-Strait Engagement
Ties or tension across the Taiwan Strait affect international security (with potential U.S.
intervention), the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and U.S.-PRC cooperation. Congressional oversight
has been concerned with support for U.S. interests, particularly respect for Taiwan’s democracy.
Since their first direct talks in 1992, Taiwan and the PRC have negotiated through quasi-official
organizations: the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) in Taipei and the Association for Relations
Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) in Beijing. In discussing practical issues in initial contact, the
two sides agreed to disagree on the meaning of “one China” with the verbal formula of “One
China, Different Interpretations.” To Taipei, “China” is the ROC. To Beijing, “China” is the PRC.
However, years later, the CPC in Beijing and KMT in Taipei shifted to contend that they reached
a “1992 Consensus.” The DPP has disputed that there was a “consensus” and has argued that any
understanding was reached between two political parties without a democratic mandate.
Resumed Dialogue and Reduced Tension
In the two months between his election and his inauguration on May 20, 2008, President Ma
spoke of his intentions to begin normalizing cross-strait ties in a “cross-strait common market,” to
establish direct air links with the PRC, and to ease other restrictions on cross-strait contacts. In his
inaugural address, President Ma announced his “Three Noes”: “no unification, no independence,
and no use of force” to maintain the “status quo” and set aside the sovereignty dispute. He called
for a “diplomatic truce” with the PRC and pledged to stop using “dollar diplomacy” in a zero-sum
game to win or preserve diplomatic recognition around the world.4 After his inauguration,
President Ma moved to improve cross-strait engagement, building on foundations laid by the
previous President Chen.5 KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung met with CPC General Secretary Hu
Jintao on May 28, 2008, the highest-level encounter between the two governments after 1949.6
Along with Washington’s actions to maintain the relationship with Taipei, it has pursued closer
engagement and reduced tension across the Taiwan Strait. Although the PRC objects to U.S.
security assistance to Taiwan as harming cross-strait “peaceful development,” economic
integration and other engagement between Taiwan and the mainland have intensified. Taipei
contends that U.S. support provides it with confidence and strength to engage with Beijing.
Economic Agreements and ECFA
In June 2008, KMT President Ma Ying-jeou and the PRC leadership resumed the cross-strait
dialogue (after a decade), beyond seeking détente. President Ma announced a priority of
economic talks over political negotiations with Beijing. Taiwan’s reality involved the PRC as
Taiwan’s largest trading partner by 2003 and as many as 2 million of its citizens already working
4 “Dollar diplomacy” (or “checkbook diplomacy”) refers to both Taiwan and the PRC competing for diplomatic
relations by promising to and investing huge sums in countries that may be wavering in their diplomatic allegiances.
5 Among other initiatives during the Chen Administration, in January 2005, Taiwan and the PRC launched the first
non-stop holiday direct charter flights flown in 55 years across the strait. These were expanded in 2006 with an
agreement to allow up to 168 direct annual round-trip charter passenger flights between the PRC and Taiwan.
6 On April 29, 2005, when the KMT was out of power, KMT Chairman Lien Chan met with CPC General Secretary Hu
Jintao, the first time the leaders of the KMT and CPC had met since World War II.
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and living on the mainland by 2008. By the end of 2009, Taiwan’s companies had invested about
$150 billion in over 77,000 projects in the past 20 years there.7 Since 2008, Taiwan has
announced eight rounds of SEF-ARATS talks along with the conclusion of 18 cross-strait
primarily economic agreements. Those agreements included the Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement (ECFA) to lower tariffs or relax access for 539 products and services from
Taiwan. Though politically controversial, President Ma promoted the ECFA amid the opposition
DPP’s protests and quickly negotiated it from January 2010 until it was signed in June 2010. A
range of government officials and their counterparts developed routine contacts across the strait,
including through direct phone calls. In May 2010, the two sides opened the first quasi-official
agencies (as tourism associations) in Beijing and Taipei. Two dramatic changes cited by Taiwan’s
people and foreign businesspeople have been direct flights across the strait and an increase in
tourists from the mainland. In 2010, Taiwan depended on the PRC (including Hong Kong) as the
source of 45% of visitors. From mid-2008, when Taiwan allowed PRC tour groups, until the end
of 2011, 3 million PRC tourists visited Taiwan.8 In June 2011, Taiwan announced deals that
allowed individual mainland tourists and increased direct flights from 370 to 560 a week. PRC
travelers to Taiwan totaled about 1.5 million in 2011 and reached about 2.2 million in 2012.
Starting in 2009, Taiwan looked to conclude an agreement on investment protection for Taiwan’s
business people, but negotiations were difficult over issues that involved dispute resolution
(whether to have an international mechanism). After postponing an investment protection
agreement expected in June 2012, the two sides announced in August two agreements on
investment protection (including some allowance for arbitration) and customs cooperation.
Continuing Challenges
Despite the announcements of those agreements, the two sides did not sign an expected
agreement on taxation in 2009, in a dispute over the PRC’s proposal to tax income from stock
trading. At the 7th round in October 2011, the two sides also announced a “consensus” (not
agreement) on industrial cooperation. After failing to reach an agreement between banking
regulators in April 2011, the two sides announced a “consensus” in November. Still, the Taiwan
side believed it pragmatically negotiated benefits for its banks.
Taiwan continues to face challenges in protecting its citizens from detentions in mainland China
(including secret detentions in PRC “black jails”). From June 18, 2012, just before the investment
protection agreement was expected, until August 11, the PRC’s Ministry of State Security (MSS)
detained Chung Ting-pang (Bruce Chung), a visitor from Taiwan, for sabotaging national and
public security in alleged activities in association with Falun Gong (a banned group in the PRC).
Representative Dana Rohrabacher wrote a letter on July 10 to urge President Ma to speak out
strongly against Chung’s detention. (Later, on December 18, Chung testified at a hearing chaired
by Representative Christopher Smith and Senator Sherrod Brown of the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China. Chung discussed interrogations about his activities and other Falun Gong
practitioners in Taiwan. He also commented that the Ma Administration was relatively passive in
securing his release.) Taiwan said it got a separate “consensus” in August on protecting the safety
of Taiwan’s business people. However, questions remained about protections for visitors not
doing business, not detained by the police but the MSS, held in national security-related cases,
7 Kathrin Hille, “Straitened Times,” Financial Times, March 26, 2008; CNA, Taipei, December 23, 2009.
8 Central News Agency, Taipei, January 4, 2012.
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detained in secret, and denied prompt, private, and repeated access by officials and lawyers (not
just relatives). Other questions concerned Taiwan’s enforcement of PRC promises and securing
the release of other detained citizens. NYU’s legal scholar, Jerome Cohen, offered a critique.9
Also, at the end of August 2012, Taiwan and the PRC signed a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) on an agreement for currency clearing.
The United States has welcomed the reduction in tension brought by economic and people-to-
people engagement across the Taiwan Strait. Aside from increased stability and direct flights,
however, it has been less clear how the agreements, especially ECFA, have benefitted U.S. and
other foreign firms. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Shear said in July 2010 that “if
ECFA is to be a truly successful arrangement, firms from the United States and other countries
must also be able to benefit.” Taiwan announced that ECFA entered into force on September 12,
2010. However, some have concerns that Taiwan has not notified ECFA to the WTO, as required
of its members. Taiwan’s officials have claimed that there was a notification, but Taiwan made
only an early announcement. Moreover, even as Taipei quickly negotiated ECFA with Beijing
from January to June 2010, Taipei did not devote a similar level of attention to resolving the
dispute with Washington over beef (see discussion below). Further, in mid-2011, the American
Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) in Taipei noted that 41.7% of Taiwan’s exports went to the
PRC (including Hong Kong) and warned Taiwan against the risks of over-reliance on one market.
AmCham urged Taiwan to pursue balanced relationships that include stronger ties with other
countries, particularly the United States as part of a national security agenda. When asked in 2012
about the effect of ECFA on their businesses, 40.6% of AmCham’s members in Taiwan which
answered its survey said that the effect was neutral, while 38.4% saw some positive effect. In
addition, some observers pointed out that Taiwan could increase substantive visits to the United
States by its Minister of Economic Affairs. In September 2012, AmCham published an article,
lamenting that the direct shipping links set up across the Taiwan Strait in 2008 have done little to
help Taiwan realize its aspiration of becoming a shipping hub, since the arrangement excluded
foreign carriers from direct cross-strait shipping.
Questions also have arisen about Taiwan’s reviews of technology transfers to the PRC and any
national security implications of increasing PRC investments in Taiwan, including how Taiwan’s
review of PRC investments compare with the U.S. security review by the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Taiwan has tried to use ECFA as a springboard to sign
bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with other countries. Taiwan started to explore FTAs,
including with Singapore in August 2010, with India in March 2011, and with New Zealand in
October 2011. Taiwan also has continued to face challenges in joining multilateral trade
negotiations, although it has the option of unilateral liberalization of trade and investment rules.
Further, despite the cross-strait warming trend, concerns remain about the PLA’s challenges to
Taiwan. At a hearing on Taiwan held by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on October 4,
2011, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Lavoy expressed the U.S. concern that a
Taiwan that is vulnerable, isolated, and under threat would not be in a position to discuss its
future with the mainland and might invite the very aggression U.S. policy seeks to deter. He
warned that if the PLA were to attack, it would be able to rapidly degrade Taiwan’s ability to
resist. Lavoy testified that the Defense Department’s report to Congress on Taiwan’s air power
9 Jerome Cohen and Yu-Jie Chen, “For Taiwanese, the Mainland Remains a Dangerous Place,” South China Morning
Post, Hong Kong, September 5, 2012.
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concluded that Taiwan’s defense cannot match the PLA one-for-one. He reiterated the Pentagon’s
view that Taiwan needs innovative and asymmetric approaches, not simply limited numbers of
advanced weapons systems. The Defense Secretary reported to Congress in May 2012 that China
has modernized its military with a continued focus on contingencies against Taiwan. The PLA has
modernized with capabilities that could settle the dispute with Taiwan on the PRC’s terms, has
not renounced the use of force, and has not reduced military forces facing Taiwan (including
1,000-1,200 short-range ballistic missiles, 32 attack submarines, and long-range surface-to-air
missiles), while Taiwan has eroding advantages in defense.10
Observers might watch to see whether President Ma ensures greater transparency about future
cross-strait talks for Taiwan domestically and for the United States and other countries
internationally. Since 2005, the CPC and KMT have proposed a potential “peace agreement” and
military confidence building measures (CBMs). In running for re-election in October 2011, Ma
raised a controversial idea of a cross-strait peace accord. Beijing took the results of Taiwan’s
elections in January 2012 as validation of the “peaceful development” approach. On that basis,
Beijing could continue patient engagement focused first on economics and refrain from
pressuring Ma, given cross-party criticism of his leadership and his low approval ratings.
Further into Ma’s second term, however, Beijing could increase pressure on Taiwan, in preparing
for if not pressing for political and military negotiations. In March 2012, two months before Ma’s
second inaugural address, the CPC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) in Beijing called for a new phase
of consolidating political mutual trust, negotiating economic benefits for both sides (not just for
Taiwan), and shaping Taiwan’s cultural understanding of the “national identity” of “one China”
(including “cleaning up” harmful thoughts about “Taiwan independence”). Moreover, KMT
Honorary Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung met in Beijing with CPC General-Secretary Hu Jintao, who
called for actions to build “political trust” with the insistence that “the mainland and Taiwan
belong to one China.” On his part, the KMT’s Wu stressed the concept of “one country, two
areas.” The opposition DPP criticized the “one country, two areas” formula, stressing that Taiwan
is a sovereign country and does not belong to the PRC. A month before Ma’s inaugural address,
TAO Director Wang Yi visited Washington in April, where he met with Deputy Secretary of State
William Burns. Wang indicated Beijing’s expectation of future political talks with Taipei.11
In his second inaugural address on May 20, 2012, President Ma did not repeat either of those
phrases. Ma apparently assured Beijing about his cross-strait policy but asserted limits in
accommodating on sovereignty. While Ma upheld the “1992 Consensus” (explicitly defined as
“One China, Different Interpretations”), he more explicitly and formally added that “one ROC,
two areas” defines the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Ma asserted that the two sides practice
“mutual non-recognition of sovereignty and mutual non-denial of governing authority,” because
the ROC’s sovereignty covers Taiwan and the mainland, but the ROC governs only the islands of
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. However, Ma reiterated the principle in the first inaugural
address of maintaining the “status quo” of what he called “no unification, no independence, and
no use of force.” Further, Ma seemed to agree with Beijing on cultural cooperation, saying that
civic groups could expand exchanges across the strait based on what he called common Chinese
ethnicity, ancestry, bloodline, history, culture, and founding father (Sun Yat-sen). Still, he also
stressed democracy, human rights, rule of law, and civil society. While Ma noted that national
10 Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China, 2012,” May 17, 2012.
11 TAO, Beijing, March 15; Xinhua, Beijing, and CNA, Taipei, March 22; Taipei Times, April 14, 2012.
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security is the key to the ROC’s “survival,” he articulated an approach that relied on cross-strait
engagement, diplomacy for international space, and defense. On his defense policy, Ma did not
explicitly cite the PLA as the threat but called for continued U.S. arms sales in order to sustain the
cross-strait engagement. While the English version of his speech called for a “strong national
defense” to deter external threats, the original text in Chinese referred to the “national defense
forces.” At a conference four days later, President Ma invoked the model of West Germany and
East Germany on a distinction between sovereignty and governing authority. Just two weeks after
Ma’s address, his Minister of Culture declined to remark on the anniversary of the Tiananmen
Crackdown in Beijing of June 4, 1989, citing potential repercussions in cross-strait negotiations
(for Taiwan’s publishing and entertainment industries).
It was unclear if Ma’s message was coordinated as part of parallel statements that involved
control of Wu’s meeting with Hu, a counter to Hu’s position, or a compromise. On May 30, when
asked about Ma’s “One ROC, Two Areas” formulation, the CPC TAO responded that it was not
surprising and was consistent with the view that both sides of the strait belong to one China
(rather than a “state-to-state relationship”) and beneficial to the peaceful development of the
cross-strait ties. However, the TAO rejected use of the model of the two Germanys.
Beijing’s patience could be tested further by the sustained separate identity in Taiwan. Despite the
pronouncements of a “one China” by leaders in Taipei and Beijing and closer cross-strait ties,
Taiwan’s people retain a strong Taiwan-centric identity after over a century of mostly separation
from mainland China. Still, Taiwan’s people pragmatically have pursued prosperity, security, and
their democratic way of life and self-governance. Moderate voters generally have supported
economic ties to the PRC amid political separation. In August 2012, only 0.9% of those surveyed
in Taiwan wished for cross-strait unification as soon as possible, while 84% desired the status quo
(at least indefinitely or with a later decision on unification or independence), 7% called for
independence as soon as possible, and the remaining 8% voiced no opinion. The results showed
even weaker support for urgent unification, compared with results back in August 2008 (shortly
after Ma became president), when 1.5% desired unification as soon as possible, 83% opted for the
status quo, 9% called for independence as soon as possible, and 7% voiced no opinion.12
In June 2012, Taiwan denied entry to ARATS Vice Chairman Wang Zaixi and others with official
security-related affiliations to attend the “Taipei Talks” arranged by an academic in Taiwan to
discuss political dialogue. On the eve of a KMT-CPC meeting, President Ma reiterated his
principles that included “no unification, no independence, and no use of force” and “economic
matters before political matters.” However, at that meeting on July 28 in Harbin, CPC Politburo
Standing Committee Member Jia Qinglin countered with political points first and foremost and
declared that the One China framework meant the mainland and Taiwan belong to “one country.”
At the 18th National Congress of the CPC in Beijing in November 2012, outgoing CPC General
Secretary Hu Jintao delivered a report that was drafted by a group led by incoming CPC General
Secretary Xi Jinping. The report called for strengthening political, economic, cultural, and social
cross-strait ties to achieve eventual “peaceful reunification.” While stressing political ties first
and without new initiatives, the report indicated that top-level authoritative policy would continue
to call for the “1992 Consensus,” military CBMs, and a peace agreement. On his part, Taiwan
President Ma said in his New Year day address for 2013 that he will cooperate with Xi Jinping on
the basis of the “1992 Consensus,” but Ma clarified that each side of the strait retains its own
12 Surveys conducted by the Election Study Center at the National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan.
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interpretation of what “one China” means. Ma said that his policy would seek to expand all
aspects of cross-strait ties while stressing economic and people-to-people ties. Ma said that
Taiwan will seek to loosen further the restrictions on investments, students, and individual
travelers from the mainland, including through amendment of Taiwan’s “Act Governing Relations
between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.” Ma also said that the two sides
would establish “administrative offices” in each other’s territory.
Issues in U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan
Overview
There has been consideration in the Administration and Congress of various options to pursue in
the relationship with Taiwan. One issue has been whether to resume Cabinet-level visits, perhaps
by the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Agriculture, Veteran Affairs, Commerce, or Energy, or
the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Cabinet-level officials visited Taiwan in 1992, 1994,
1996, 1998, and 2000. The United States and Taiwan have sought to resume trade talks under the
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), the TIFA talks last held in July 2007, but
Taiwan’s restrictions on U.S. beef raised concerns.
In 2011, Taiwan’s political campaigning constrained U.S. influence on some policy priorities,
particularly opening Taiwan’s market to U.S. beef. There was some expectation that after the
elections in January 2012, Taiwan would pay greater attention to the relationship with the United
States. Both Washington and Taipei describe the relationship as generally a positive one of an
economic and security partnership based on shared values. On the U.S. side, the Legislative and
Executive Branches took actions to strengthen the relationship. On September 14, 2011,
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, introduced
the Taiwan Policy Act (H.R. 2918) to enhance ties with Taiwan. The House Foreign Affairs
Committee held hearings on “Why Taiwan Matters” on June 16 and October 4, 2011. At the latter
hearing, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell reaffirmed that the Six Assurances—along
with the TRA and the three Joint Communiques—form the foundation of U.S. policy.
In September 2011, the Obama Administration met with visiting delegations from Taiwan’s
presidential candidates, led by DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen and a key advisor in KMT President
Ma’s campaign (King Pu-tsung). There was a congressional reception for Tsai. However, the
Administration promptly gave negative remarks to the Financial Times, saying that Tsai raised
doubts about continuing cross-strait “stability,” despite professing U.S. neutrality in Taiwan’s
democratic elections. The Administration then notified Congress on September 21 of three major
arms sales programs with a total value of $5.9 billion, including upgrades for Taiwan’s existing F-
16A/B fighters. The Administration also increased senior visits to Taiwan, sending Assistant
Secretary of Commerce Suresh Kumar in September and then U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) Administrator Rajiv Shah and Deputy Secretary of Energy Dan Poneman
in December 2011. After not mentioning Taiwan in an article in Foreign Policy on “America’s
Pacific Century” in October 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave a speech on the same
subject the next month and added that the United States has a strong relationship with Taiwan as
an “important security and economic partner.” On December 22, the State Department nominated
Taiwan as a candidate for the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), and Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry touted
the long-awaited announcement as a “Christmas gift” in appreciation to the Ma Administration.
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The Obama Administration has argued that its efforts to intensify and expand cooperative
engagement with the PRC in Beijing have not been at the expense of a stronger relationship with
Taiwan. Washington officials contend that they have pursued parallel relationships with Beijing
and Taipei. Nonetheless, policy issues have included whether the Administration actually has
ambitious objectives to achieve in the relationship with Taipei, has timed arms sales and certain
other actions out of concern about the relationship with Beijing, strengthened ties with Taiwan in
the months before the presidential election in January 2012 to favor Ma, should resume U.S.
Cabinet-level visits, has included Taiwan in the strategy to “rebalance” more weight in U.S.
priorities to the Asia-Pacific (what some called a “pivot” to the Pacific), and has continued trade
talks with Beijing despite many economic disputes but not with Taipei.
Representative Edward Royce delivered a speech on November 12, 2011, in which he stressed
strengthening the U.S.-Taiwan relationship and lamented that Taiwan’s president could not attend
that month’s APEC summit in Honolulu. Among Members who urged the Administration not to
influence Taiwan’s elections in January 2012, Senator Sherrod Brown wrote a letter to Secretary
of State Clinton on November 21. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee also wrote to Clinton on December 21, to caution against supporting any candidate
(including by not announcing a nomination to the VWP until after the elections). On the occasion
of President Ma’s second inauguration on May 20, 2012, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen led a
Congressional Delegation to visit Taiwan (along with Representatives Dan Burton, Thad
McCotter, Jim Gerlach, Brad Miller, and Jean Schmidt).
On Taiwan’s side, particularly with the sensitive political season over in January 2012, President
Ma has said he places priority on the relationship with the United States. However, some
observers stressed that Taiwan needed to restore some trust lost in the relationship and reciprocate
U.S. efforts to strengthen it. Although President Ma has served also as the Chairman of the ruling
KMT, he faced a challenge (some called a “crisis”) for years to lead his administration and party
to resolve the dispute over U.S. beef. President Ma told the Obama Administration’s delegation at
his second inauguration that Taiwan hopes to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), though in
eight years, and to resume the TIFA talks.
On the strategic rebalancing toward the Pacific region, an issue has concerned whether U.S.
strategy considers Taiwan’s security role narrowly in the Taiwan Strait or more broadly in the
Pacific. After not mentioning Taiwan in an article on a U.S. “pivot” to the Pacific in Foreign
Policy on “America’s Pacific Century” in October 2011, Secretary of State Clinton gave a speech
on the same subject the next month and added that the United States has a strong relationship
with Taiwan as an “important security and economic partner.” At the start of 2012, President
Obama and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta issued new Defense Strategic Guidance on how to
maintain U.S. military superiority in the face of budget cuts and to “rebalance” priorities, posture,
and presence to stress more attention to Asia as well as the Middle East. An issue arose about
Taiwan’s role in the U.S. comprehensive strategy of rebalancing more diplomatic, defense, and
economic attention to Asia. A related question concerned any contribution offered by Taiwan. At a
conference of defense ministers in Singapore in June 2012, Defense Secretary Panetta discussed
the strategic refocus to Asia and mentioned Taiwan by saying that the United States strongly
supports the efforts of both the PRC and Taiwan to improve the cross-strait relationship. He
added that “we have an enduring interest in peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.”
Taiwan’s Deputy Defense Minister Andrew Yang said he discussed Taiwan’s role in the
rebalancing strategy with U.S. officials in August and with Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton
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Carter on October 2, 2012.13 Meanwhile, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business
Affairs Jose Fernandez visited Taipei in August 2012. He delivered a speech that discussed
economic exchanges with Taiwan in the context of the strategic rebalancing toward Asia.
International Security
The United States has watched Taiwan’s contribution to international development and security.
In response to Haiti’s devastating earthquake in January 2010, Taiwan’s air force delivered relief
supplies on a C-130 transport plane, which received approval for refueling and repair at U.S.
bases. However, there has been a question of whether Taiwan followed up with sustained major
missions in Haiti (with which Taiwan has a diplomatic relationship), particularly as the Foreign
Minister did not stop in Haiti during trips to Latin America in September 2010, November 2011,
and January 2012 (the second anniversary). Though Taiwan completed in July 2012 a shelter for
the homeless in Haiti at the cost of $5.5 million, Taiwan’s vice president visited the Dominican
Republic on the island but not Haiti in August. After Japan’s catastrophic earthquake, tsunami,
and nuclear disaster in March 2011, President Ma led Taiwan to be the largest donor of official
and private aid, including $3.5 million from the government, though Taiwan did not offer military
and coast guard assistance to Japan. Although the USAID Administrator’s visit in 2011
highlighted Taiwan’s role as an aid donor, Taiwan’s foreign assistance amounted to US$380
million in 2010 and in 2011, accounting for 0.1% of gross national income (compared to the
international average of 0.5%). Taiwan could increase military and civilian participation in
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions, particularly in Pacific island
nations. On September 25, 2012, in Taipei, President Ma spoke at a conference on international
aid, citing Taiwan’s development aid but promising to maintain the aid budget (not a rise).
The United States could work with Taiwan to increase cooperation in international security.
Taiwan could boost its defense and foreign aid spending, contribute more to security, fight cyber
threats, and improve counter-espionage amid cases in Taiwan of alleged spying for Beijing. The
United States has obtained counterterrorism cooperation at ports through Taiwan’s agreements in
2005 and 2006 to participate in the Container Security Initiative (CSI) (to screen and inspect
cargo before shipping to U.S. ports) and the Megaports Initiative (to detect and interdict nuclear
and other radioactive materials in cargo). The U.S. Department of Energy and Taiwan’s Ministry
of Finance and Directorate of Customs completed the installation of radiation detection
equipment at the southern port of Kaohsiung in February 2011. Visiting Taipei in December 2011,
Deputy Secretary of Energy Poneman personally applauded the milestone reached after five years
of effort. He remarked that Taiwan has worked with the U.S. National Nuclear Security
Administration to strengthen nuclear security at ports to detect nuclear smuggling.
The United States also has sought Taiwan’s cooperation in nuclear and missile nonproliferation
efforts especially concerning Iran and North Korea, reportedly involving Taiwan’s companies.
For example, in March 2009, the Shanghai-based Roc-Master Manufacture and Supply Company
reportedly ordered 108 pressure gauges that could be used in centrifuges to enrich uranium for
transfer to Iran from an agent in Taiwan (Heli-Ocean Technology Company) for Inficon Holding,
the manufacturer in Switzerland. In July 2010, Taiwan reportedly raided Ho Li Enterprises which
received orders since March 2007 from Dandong Fang Lian Trading Company in Dandong, PRC,
13 Defense Department, Remarks by Secretary Panetta at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, June 2, 2012; Author’s
consultation, August 2012; Yang’s interview with Defense News, published on November 12, 2012.
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which was allegedly associated with North Korea’s military, for two dual-use, high-technology
machine tools that ended up in North Korea earlier in 2010. In August 2012, the United States
reportedly asked a Taiwan shipping company not to allow its ship to transfer suspected weapons-
related cargo in Malaysia that North Korea shipped via China bound for Burma (Myanmar).
Japan then seized the cargo. In October 2012, a U.S. court sentenced a Taiwan woman to two
years in prison for using her companies in Taiwan to procure embargoed technology for Iran.14
The United States enacted the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
(CISADA) of 2010 (P.L. 111-195) on July 1, 2010, which followed the U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1929 of June against Iran’s nuclear program. Like others, Taiwan also is expected to
comply with U.S. sanctions on Iran for nuclear proliferation in Section 1245 of the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2012 (P.L. 112-81). Taiwan has not announced its own
sanctions against dealings with Iran’s oil and gas industry, though petroleum refiner CPC
Corporation Taiwan is a state-owned enterprise. In any case, Taiwan cut the volume of imports of
oil from Iran by 49% from 2010 to 2011. In 2011, Taiwan imported $1.2 billion worth of oil from
Iran, the fifth-largest source of Taiwan’s oil imports. On June 11, 2012, Secretary of State Clinton
announced that Taiwan and six other countries significantly reduced oil purchases from Iran and
would not be subject to the NDAA’s sanctions for a renewable period of 180 days. On December
7, 2012, the Secretary of State again decided to exempt financial institutions in Taiwan (and other
countries) from the NDAA’s sanctions for 180 days, based on further reductions in oil imports
from Iran. American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Deputy Director Brent Christensen said in
December that U.S. exemptions showed Taiwan’s commitment to global security, while U.S.
policy encourages Taiwan (like other partners) to continue reducing economic ties to Iran.
Meanwhile, in November 2012, Taiwan’s Dragon Aromatics petrochemical company (operating
in the PRC) bought its first cargo of Iranian condensate (natural gas in liquid form) from the
PRC’s Zhuhai Zhenrong oil company (under U.S. sanctions for transfers of gasoline to Iran).15
Taiwan could increase counter-piracy security for and/or restrict its ships to reduce the burden on
international anti-piracy naval operations in the Gulf of Aden. A bilateral matter involved a U.S.
Navy ship and the death of the captain (Wu Lai-yu) of one of Taiwan’s fishing boats in a NATO
anti-piracy operation off Somalia on May 10, 2011. On July 23, the U.S. government provided a
report from the U.S. Fifth Fleet of the Naval Forces Central Command based in Bahrain on the
frigate USS Stephen W. Groves’ (SWG) interdiction of the Taiwan-flagged fishing boat that had
been hijacked in March 2010 and then used as a pirate mother-ship along with pirate skiffs to
attack other ships for more than a year off the Horn of Africa. The U.S. Navy operated under the
NATO-led Combined Task Force 508 to conduct an operation on May 10 against the mother-ship
to disrupt further attacks. After compelling the pirates to surrender and boarding the ship, the
Navy’s crew found Wu deceased in his cabin. An investigation found that ammunition fired from
the U.S. naval ship during the operation “inadvertently” killed him and three pirates. The naval
crew then buried the captain at sea, laid to rest in his ship, which was sunk to prevent it from
becoming a hazard to other ships. The United States expressed “regret” that the ship and its
captain were lost in the protection of shipping against piracy and sent condolences to Wu’s
family. The U.S. Navy maintained that it conducted the counter-piracy operation “in accordance
with existing rules of engagement and in compliance with international law.” However, Taiwan
persisted in protests, including a call from the Foreign Minister for U.S. compensation to Wu’s
family, which demanded $3 million. Taiwan’s government could have been trying to deflect
14 Taipei Times, October 26, 2012; Asahi, Tokyo, November 24, 2012; Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2012.
15 Reuters, November 13, 2012; Taipei Times, December 6, 2012.
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political criticism and demands for compensation from Wu’s family, since the government,
including the navy, apparently took few if any steps to rescue the boat’s captives while they were
held for over a year. Somali pirates captured another fishing ship from Taiwan in December 2010.
A PLA Navy frigate sailing off Somalia took credit for the release of the ship’s crew in July 2012,
though Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry attributed their release to a ransom and international assistance.
Concerning maritime territorial disputes in East Asia, there is an issue of whether Taiwan role
serves as a helpful, stabilizing U.S. security partner. Taiwan has asserted itself as the ROC with
sovereign claims and has sought international attention and inclusion in bilateral or multilateral
discussions. The disputes in the South China Sea involve overlapping claims by Brunei,
Malaysia, PRC, Philippines (a U.S. ally), Taiwan, and Vietnam. In the East China Sea, PRC and
Taiwan claims conflict with those of Japan (another U.S. ally). U.S. concerns involve possible
conflict between the PRC and Japan over their competing claims to the Senkaku Islands (called
Diaoyu Islands by the PRC), which could bring U.S. involvement under the U.S.-Japan defense
treaty. Taiwan, asserting itself as the ROC, also claims the islands as Diaoyutai. On June 27,
2012, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell confirmed at a public forum that the State
Department has discussed with Taiwan U.S. concerns about whether it would work with the PRC
in the South China Sea and that Taiwan assured that it would be careful. Another issue concerns
any cross-strait coordination also in the East China Sea. Taipei’s officials have insisted on a
position of no cooperation with the PRC. Nevertheless, even if not with explicit coordination, the
parallel actions of Taiwan have added pressure against Japan, a U.S. ally. Moreover, there are
concerns that the PRC and Taiwan have taken actions that militarized or escalated tensions. At
another event on December 4, Campbell said U.S. officials underscored the expectation that
Taiwan not take steps to provoke misunderstandings or tensions over the Senkaku Islands.
President Ma has sought support for his “East China Sea Peace Initiative,” announced on August
5, 2012, that reiterated the ROC’s claim over the islands as the Diaoyutai Islands and called for
joint development of resources and a code of conduct to address tension peacefully. The next
month, President Ma called for parallel bilateral talks (Taipei-Tokyo, Taipei-Beijing, and Beijing-
Tokyo) that might advance to trilateral talks. In his National Day address on October 10, Ma said
that his proposed principles also would apply in the South China Sea. There, Taiwan claims the
Pratas Islands, Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and Spratly Islands, occupying since 1956 the
largest one of the Spratly Islands (Taiping Island, or Itu Aba), near the Philippines. Since 2000,
Taiwan has stationed coast guard instead of military personnel on Taiping Island, though the
military has supplied weapons to and trained the coast guard. The PRC’s nine-dash line in its
South China Sea maps is a legacy of the ROC’s maps of the South China Sea from the 1940s.
One question is whether Taipei would clarify the meaning of the controversial line to reduce
tensions.
However, Taiwan has given mixed messages. On September 25, the very day that the PRC and
Japan held diplomatic exchanges to try to cool tensions as the United States urged, Taiwan
deployed 12 Coast Guard ships to escort about 60 fishing boats into the Senkaku Islands’
territorial waters. Reportedly, Japan’s Coast Guard ships fired water cannons at Taiwan’s fishing
boats in the territorial waters, but Taiwan’s Coast Guard ships fired water cannons toward Japan’s
official ships. The ships maneuvered in proximity, raising the risk of accidental collisions or
endangerment of lives and property. However, while the media focused on the coast guard,
Taiwan also deployed military assets. According to Taiwan’s military news media, the military
deployed two Knox-class frigates, one Perry-class frigate, F-16 fighters, Mirage fighters, E2-K
Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft, and S-70C ship-borne helicopters (a civilian version of
the UH-60 Blackhawks). The United States sold to Taiwan such weapon systems (except for the
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Mirage fighters sold by France) for Taiwan’s self-defense against the PRC. The next day,
President Ma visited military units and praised the actions of the boats sailing close to the islands.
Ma said that Japan “misappropriated” the islands for 117 years and never returned them.
While Taiwan has stressed institutionalized cross-strait engagement, such efforts with Japan have
faltered in talks over fishing rights. In 1996, after Taiwan fishermen tried to send a 200-boat fleet
to assert their right to fish near the Senkakus, Taiwan agreed with Japan to allow Taiwan’s
fishermen to fish near but not land on the islands. At their 16th round of talks on fishery disputes
in February 2009, Taiwan agreed with Japan to set up a mechanism for mutual notification of
emergencies, including disputes that occur near the Senkakus. Since then, however, Taiwan and
Japan have not been able to schedule their next round of talks over fishing rights.
In December 2012, the House and Senate passed the FY2013 NDAA (H.R. 4310) with Section
1286 (based on an amendment by Senator Jim Webb) to express the sense of the Congress
concerning the Senkaku Islands. Congress declared that the peaceful settlement of disputes in the
East China Sea requires the exercise of self-restraint by all parties in activities that would
complicate or escalate disputes and destabilize the region. The language, inter alia, stressed that
while the United States takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, the
United States acknowledges the administration of Japan over the islands. Further, the legislation
reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to Japan under Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security that addressed an armed attack in the territories under Japan’s administration.
International Organizations
Taipei is a full member in some international organizations to which the PRC also belongs, such
as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the WTO. Taiwan also has been a full member of the
Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. For the second time since initiating APEC
summits in Seattle in 1993, the United States hosted an APEC summit in November 2011 in
Honolulu. However, Taiwan’s president has not been able to attend the APEC summits.
The Clinton Administration’s 1994 Taiwan Policy Review promised to support Taiwan’s
membership in organizations where statehood is not a prerequisite and to support opportunities
for Taiwan’s voice to be heard in organizations where its membership is not possible. The focus
of Congressional action for many years was on Taiwan’s international participation at the World
Health Organization (WHO) and the annual meetings in Geneva of its governing body, the World
Health Assembly (WHA). On April 21 and May 6, 2004, the House and Senate passed H.R. 4019
and S. 2092 in support of Taiwan’s efforts to gain observer status in the WHO and to make it an
annual requirement to have an unclassified report from the Secretary of State on the U.S. plan to
help obtain that status for Taiwan. The implication of this legislative change was the end of
annual congressional statements and votes on this issue. In signing S. 2092 into law (P.L. 108-
235) on June 14, 2004, President Bush stated that the United States fully supported the
participation of Taiwan in the work of the WHO, including observer status.
President Ma decided to be more flexible than his DPP predecessor in pressing Taiwan’s bid to
rejoin the United Nations (U.N.), which it left in 1971. On August 15, 2008, Taiwan submitted
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instead a proposal (via some countries with which Taiwan has diplomatic relations) to allow
Taiwan to have “meaningful participation” in U.N. specialized organizations.16
Only after Ma Ying-jeou was inaugurated as President in May 2008 did the WHO in January
2009 include Taiwan in the International Health Regulations (IHR). At the WHA in May 2009,
Taiwan’s Minister of Health participated, as an observer, for the first time since the ROC lost
membership in the U.N. However, there have been concerns that the invitation had required the
PRC’s approval, came through a WHO-PRC memorandum of understanding (MOU), and was ad
hoc (not routine for every year or only for a KMT President). Indeed, in its required report
submitted to Congress in April 2010, the State Department reported that the WHO invited Taiwan
to attend the 2009 WHA after the PRC “agreed to Taiwan’s participation.” Moreover, in May
2011, a secret WHO Memorandum (dated September 14, 2010) came to light in Taiwan, showing
that the WHO had an “arrangement with China” to implement the IHR for the “Taiwan Province
of China” (instead of “Chinese Taipei”). At the WHA on May 17, 2011, Secretary of Health and
Human Services Kathleen Sebelius protested to the WHO, saying that no U.N. organization has a
right to determine unilaterally the status of Taiwan. The interpretation of Taiwan as a “province of
China” is contrary to the U.N.’s own General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971, which
“restored” the legal rights of the PRC in the U.N. and expelled “the representatives of Chiang
Kai-shek” but did not mention Taiwan. In its report to Congress for 2012, the State Department
stressed that the unresolved issue of nomenclature continued to severely hamper Taiwan’s
effective participation in the IHR and communication with Taiwan was delayed by routing
through PRC authorities in Beijing or Geneva. The report noted limited progress in 2011, when
Taiwan’s health experts were allowed to attend only 8 out of 21 requested WHO meetings.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Shear stated in March 2010 that “the United States is a
strong, consistent supporter of Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations.”
He also stated that “Taiwan should be able to participate in organizations where it cannot be a
member, such as the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization,
and other important international bodies whose activities have a direct impact on the people of
Taiwan.” Taiwan has sought status as an “observer” in the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) and U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Taiwan’s
Flight Safety Foundation provides indirect communication between domestic aviation authorities
and airlines and the ICAO based in Montreal. In 2011, Taiwan joined the Civil Air Navigation
Services Organization (CANSO), which is an observer in ICAO. In December 2012, President
Ma said that over one million flights pass through Taiwan’s airspace each year. Taiwan’s
challenges include justifying the practical gains and gaining PRC support. While the State
Department stopped short of supporting Taiwan’s observership in ICAO, Congress has supported
this stance in legislation. In July 2010, the House passed (by voice vote) H.Con.Res. 266
(Berkley) to express the sense of Congress that Taiwan should be accorded observer status in
ICAO. In September 2011, the Senate agreed (by voice vote) to S.Con.Res. 17 (Menendez) with
the same sense of Congress. The House also agreed (by voice vote) to S.Con.Res. 17 in
September 2012, after Representatives Ros-Lehtinen, Royce, and Berman spoke on the floor in
support of the resolution.
16 According to the China Post of August 16, 2008, the resolution was titled “The Need to Examine the Fundamental
Rights of the 23 Million People of the Republic of China (Taiwan) to Participate Meaningfully in the Activities of the
U.N. Specialized Agencies.” See also Central News Agency, August 15, 2008, and Taipei Times, August 16, 2008.
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Arms Sales to Taiwan
The Defense Department has reported to Congress in annual reports on the PLA that the balance
of forces across the Taiwan Strait has continued to shift to the PRC’s favor. Moreover, the
Secretary’s report of March 2009 told Congress that it was no longer the case that Taiwan’s Air
Force enjoyed dominance of the airspace over the strait. Since 2001, Taiwan has discussed the
acquisition of diesel-electric submarines. Since 2006, Taiwan has been unsuccessful in trying to
submit a formal request to procure new F-16C/D fighters. One policy issue concerns whether
President Obama denied or delayed arms sales out of concern about military exchanges and other
aspects of the overall relationship with the PRC. The Administration maintains that it adheres to
the TRA. While the PRC has not warned Taiwan of consequences in continuing to seek U.S.
weapons, the PRC has claimed to “suspend” many military meetings with the United States.
President Obama notified Congress on January 29, 2010, of major arms sales to Taiwan: five
programs with a total value of $6.4 billion. Again submitting notifications on one day, President
Obama proposed on September 21, 2011, three major arms sales programs with a total value of
$5.9 billion, including upgrades for Taiwan’s existing F-16A/B fighters. Like Bush, President
Obama has not notified Congress of the submarine design program (the only one pending from
decisions in 2001) and has not accepted Taiwan’s formal request for new F-16C/D fighters.
Meanwhile, the United States has concerns that Taiwan under President Ma cut its defense budget
in 2009, 2010, and 2011 until an increase in 2012 and has failed to reach the promised defense
spending at 3% of GDP. (See also CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since
1990, by Shirley A. Kan.)
Among congressional actions, on May 17, 2012, the House voted (by voice vote) to approve an
amendment (as one of a number of amendments en bloc) offered by Representative Kay Granger
to H.R. 4310, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2013, to stipulate that the
President shall sell at least 66 F-16C/D fighters to Taiwan. The House passed H.R. 4310 on May
18. To amend the Senate’s version of the NDAA, S. 3254 (Levin), Senator Daniel Coats
introduced on November 27 an amendment to authorize the transfer by sale of up to four Perry-
class frigates as Excess Defense Articles (EDA). The next day, Senator John Cornyn introduced
an amendment to stipulate that the President shall sell no fewer than 66 F-16C/D fighters to
Taiwan. The Senate did not vote on the two amendments. On December 20, the House passed the
conference report (H.Rept. 112-705) for H.R. 4310 with Section 1281 that expressed the sense of
Congress that the President should take steps to address Taiwan’s shortfall in fighters, whether
through the sale of F-16C/D fighters or other similar fighters. The Senate passed the conference
report on December 21. President Obama signed the legislation on January 2, 2013.
Also, Representative Mike Kelly introduced H.Res. 814 on November 16, 2012, to express the
sense of the House about an U.N. Arms Trade Treaty, with concerns about arms sales to Taiwan.
On December 11, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen introduced H.R. 6649, the Naval Vessel
Transfer Act of 2012, which includes authority for the transfer by sale to Taiwan of up to four
Perry-class frigates as EDA. The House passed H.R. 6649by voice vote on December 31.
Visa Waiver Program (VWP)
As one of its top priorities, Taiwan sought inclusion in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP),
which eliminates some visa requirements for qualified countries, allowing their citizens to make
temporary U.S. visits without first obtaining a valid visa. VWP countries must meet certain
criteria, such as offering reciprocal privileges to U.S. citizens, having machine-readable
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passports, and having a low non-immigrant refusal rate. (Also see CRS Report RL32221, Visa
Waiver Program, by Alison Siskin.)
The Ma Administration has stressed visa waiver status as a benefit for Taiwan’s travelers, a
symbol of support for his policies, and a step to support Taiwan’s international stature. Mariko
Silver, Acting Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for International Policy, visited Taiwan
in April 2010 and welcomed Taiwan’s adoption of e-passports and looked to Taiwan’s resolution
of technical security and a new requirement for in-person applications for passports to prevent
fraud. The refusal rate for Taiwan’s applicants of U.S. non-immigrant visas was at 2.2% in 2010,
better than the 3% standard for the VWP. In late 2010, Taiwan announced that it would sign three
relevant agreements with the United States to exchange information on stolen or counterfeit
passports, on terrorists, and on combating crime. Even without U.S. leadership in waiving visas
for Taiwan’s travelers, President Ma announced in June 2011 that Taiwan had secured offers from
116 countries and territories to grant its citizens visa-free or landing visa travel privileges. To
prevent fraud, Taiwan started on July 1, 2011, a new system to require first-time applicants for
passports to apply in person. One implication of Taiwan’s gaining visa waiver status would be
that approximately $15 million would be needed to offset visa processing fees lost per year to the
State Department (expected to start in FY2013). With broader implications for more visitors,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce Kumar said in Taiwan in September 2011 that almost 300,000
visitors from Taiwan contributed over $1 billion to the U.S. economy in 2010. On December 22,
2011, the State Department announced the nomination of Taiwan as a candidate for the VWP. The
Department of Homeland Security then reviewed Taiwan’s candidacy, including through a visit to
Taiwan in March 2012 (vs. the higher-profile announcement of candidacy). Once Taiwan was
included in the VWP, only Taiwan’s e-passports would be eligible. Another issue for resolution
concerned Taiwan’s category of passports issued to “compatriots” whom Taiwan has not accepted
for repatriation or given the right of residency (with questions about their true citizenship). On
October 2, 2012, the Secretary of Homeland Security designated Taiwan in the VWP, effective on
November 1. Taiwan’s citizens may travel to the United States for business or tourism for up to
90 days without a visa. Including Taiwan, there are 37 countries in the VWP.
Other options could include Taiwan’s inclusion in the Department of Homeland Security’s
Trusted Traveler and Trusted Trader programs. The Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary
Mark Koumans visited Taipei in December 2012. In his speech on supply chain security,
Koumans said that increased security can help facilitate (rather than impede) travel and trade.
Extradition Treaty
Taiwan has asked for an extradition treaty, and negotiations started in 2010, involving the
Departments of Justice and State. Taiwan has sought about 70 fugitives suspected of being in the
United States. Taiwan had proposed an extradition treaty with the United States as early as 1979.
In December 1992, the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Investigations
recommended negotiation of an extradition agreement with Taiwan as soon as possible. A
precedent for congressional consideration could be the U.S.-Hong Kong extradition agreement.17
Aside from an extradition treaty, another option could be authorizing statute passed by Congress.
17 Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Investigations, a report on “The New International Criminal and
Asian Organized Crime,” S. Prt. 102-129, December 1992; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, report on the “U.S.-
Hong Kong Extradition Treaty,” Exec. Rept. 105-2, August 19, 1997; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, report on
the “Agreement with Hong Kong on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons,” Exec. Rept. 105-24, October 14, 1998.
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(Also see CRS Report 98-958, Extradition To and From the United States: Overview of the Law
and Recent Treaties, by Michael John Garcia and Charles Doyle.)
Human Rights and Rule of Law
The TRA reaffirmed that the preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all of Taiwan’s
people are U.S. objectives. President Ma has contended that he has valued democracy, freedoms,
and human rights. However, in early November 2008, Taiwan’s police allegedly used heavy-
handed measures against protestors in providing security for an official from Beijing, ARATS
Chairman Chen Yunlin. Freedom House called for an independent investigation. Taiwan sent
officials to Washington to defend the police. On November 12, 2008, that happened to be the day
that ex-president Chen Shui-bian was first detained on charges of corruption, AIT Director
Stephen Young expressed the U.S. expectation that Taiwan’s judicial process be “transparent, fair,
and impartial.” Concerned observers say that Taiwan under the KMT has not done enough to
promote those values in the PRC or judicial reforms in Taiwan. Some have questioned whether
the Ma Administration has downplayed democracy promotion by the Taiwan Foundation for
Democracy (TFD) and has been less welcoming to those attacked by Beijing, such as Tibetan
leader Dalai Lama, Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer, and Falun Gong practitioners. (Also see CRS
Report R41263, Democratic Reforms in Taiwan: Issues for Congress, by Shirley Kan.)
Jerome Cohen, a respected legal scholar at New York University’s School of Law who was Ma’s
professor at Harvard, has written critiques of Taiwan’s judicial system as well as commended
Ma’s signing of the instruments of ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. He wrote that the
prosecution of former president Chen was not a political vendetta by the KMT but showed that no
one is above the law in Taiwan. Still, Cohen criticized judicial officials for a skit on “Law Day” in
2009 that mocked the detained Chen and restraints on Chen’s ability to defend himself. In a
meeting with Professor Cohen in May 2010, President Ma said that judicial authorities took
actions to reduce human rights concerns about Taiwan’s detention system.18 In his second
inaugural address in May 2012, Ma acknowledged the continued need for judicial reform.
A number of U.S. and foreign former officials, activists, and academics have written several open
letters to President Ma to express concerns. A letter of April 11, 2011, in the Taipei Times asked
whether legal charges against 17 former DPP officials of the Chen Administration for allegedly
failing to return about 36,000 documents were “politically motivated” in coming out three years
after the transition in 2008 and during electoral campaigns. On June 30, 2011, prosecutors
indicted Lee Teng-hui, who was president from 1988 to 2000, for allegedly diverting $7.8 million
in diplomatic funds for the establishment of the Taiwan Research Institute in the 1990s. Some
foreign observers questioned whether the legal action was timed to affect Lee’s support for the
DPP in the elections in January 2012 and noted the lack of prompt follow-up.19 The first hearing
on Lee’s case was on June 22, 2012, but he could not attend until another hearing on August 10.
The State Department’s human rights reports for 2011 on worldwide countries (issued on May 24,
2012) reported that Taiwan’s major human rights problems concerned corruption and violence
18 Jerome Cohen’s articles published in South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, May 28, 2009, June 11, 2009,
September 17, 2009, October 15, 2009, January 20, 2010; and Apple Daily, October 9, 2009.
19 For example, see another open letter to President Ma Ying-jeou in the Taipei Times on August 2, 2011.
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against women and children. The State Department noted that advocates in Taiwan pressed for
judicial reforms and questioned the impartiality of judges and prosecutors in high-profile and
politically sensitive legal cases. Trials of former president Chen Shui-bian (who has been
sentenced to prison for 18 and a half years in ongoing cases for corruption but also found not
guilty of other charges) heightened public scrutiny of pre-indictment and pre-trial detentions,
prosecutorial leaks, other misconduct, and judicial procedures. The report cited the situation of
Chen, who asserted his right to free speech in writing a column for a news magazine against
prison officials who first denied him permission. The State Department also reported evidence of
forced labor and violations of maximum working hours.
In March-April 2012, some Members in Congress (including Representatives Steve Chabot, Dan
Lungren, and Ed Royce) raised concerns about Chen’s prison conditions and health. In July,
Representatives Robert Andrews and Lungren submitted a report by medical professors at the
University of California at Davis to the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, raising
questions about the conditions of ex-President Chen in prison and calling for his medical parole.20
Chen’s conditions in prison reportedly improved in June. Concerns cover the former president’s
treatment in prison and his medical condition. Starting in September, Chen’s medical condition
deteriorated, requiring extended guarded stays in hospitals. In that month, activists of the
American Human Rights Action Center visited Chen, criticized the government’s treatment of
him, and called for independent medical care for him. Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice denied that
political bias influenced Chen’s medical care. In October, Representative Howard Berman wrote
to President Ma, calling for Chen’s release from prison on humanitarian grounds. Also, Senator
Sherrod Brown wrote to the AIT Director in Taipei, asking him to visit Chen. Jerome Cohen met
with Chen at a hospital in Taipei in December, while declining to call for Chen’s medical parole.
In mid-November 2012, Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry denied a visa to the Dalai Lama to attend a
conference in Taipei. Opposition DPP lawmakers criticized the decision that simply cited bad
timing. Taiwan did not issue a policy statement. In contrast, the State Department confirmed on
November 30 that Assistant Secretary for Human Rights Affairs Michael Posner met with
relatives of Tibetans who self-immolated in the Tibetan area. The department then issued a
statement on December 5 by Maria Otero, the U.S. Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues. The
United States expressed concern about violence and increasing self-immolations in the Tibetan
areas, called on the PRC government to address policies, including use of force, that exacerbated
the tensions, expressed hope that the self-immolations will end, urged the PRC to allow reporters,
diplomats, and other observers to the Tibetan areas, and called on the PRC to talk with the Dalai
Lama without preconditions. Taiwan last allowed the Tibetan leader and Nobel Peace Prize
winner to visit in 2009, in the wake of a major typhoon. Congress and President Bush had
awarded in the U.S. Capitol the Congressional Gold Medal to the Dalai Lama in October 2007.
Democratic Elections (KMT and DPP)
The United States has watched closely Taiwan’s presidential elections, because of the critical
implications for U.S. interests in democracy and security. Taiwan held elections on January 14,
2012, with the first combined presidential and legislative elections on one day. Beijing seemed to
favor incumbent President Ma Ying-jeou. The CPC and KMT oppose Taiwan’s independence and
20 U.S. Citizen Medical Team (Joseph Lin, Ken Yoneda, and Charles Whitcomb), “The Effects of Incarceration on the
Mental and Physical Health of Former President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan,” July 12, 2012.
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agree on what they call now the “1992 Consensus.” KMT President Ma won re-election with
51.6% of the votes, a victory of 6% points over DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen who won 45.6%
of the votes. Voter turnout was lower than in previous elections but still considered high (74% out
of 18 million eligible voters). Out of 113 seats in the Legislative Yuan (LY), the KMT won the
majority with 64 (down from 72 seats), and the DPP won 40 seats (up from 32). Minor parties
and an independent won the remaining 9 LY seats. The State Department congratulated Taiwan
for another free and fair election.
Observers attributed DPP Chairwoman Tsai’s loss to lack of clarity and certainty about how she
would sustain the status quo and a stable cross-strait relationship. She tried to balance appeals to
the pro-independence base and to moderate voters who support continued cross-strait economic
engagement. While Tsai proposed a “Taiwan Consensus,” the KMT touted “peaceful
development” under the KMT-CPC’s “1992 Consensus.” Instead of a clearer stance on the ECFA
signed in June 2010 amid a dwindling number of DPP-led protestors, Tsai said vaguely that she
would use “democratic procedures” to continue the policy.21 In October 2011, Tsai said “Taiwan
is the ROC, the ROC is Taiwan.” Tsai focused on income inequality, but Taiwan’s economic
conditions have been tied to the PRC’s economy. Rather than keeping distance from Taiwan’s
electoral politics, in August 2011, Beijing opposed the DPP’s policy guidelines as “unacceptable.”
On December 16, 2011, CPC Politburo Standing Committee Member Jia Qinglin warned that
cross-strait talks would not continue without accepting the “1992 Consensus.” Taiwan’s major
businesses with interests in mainland China echoed support for the “1992 Consensus.” The DPP
also attributed its loss to the Obama Administration’s actions seen as favoring Ma. As a close U.S.
observer told the Washington Post after the election, “the administration liked the fact that
tensions had been reduced across the Taiwan Strait … and rewarded Ma.”22 While it was difficult
to determine the impact of various factors, a poll taken after the elections indicated that the most
cited concerns of voters were the economy, income gap, cross-strait ties, and social welfare.23
The DPP continues as a viable party in Taiwan’s electoral politics, with observers watching for
potential party unity and rejuvenation in leadership. After Chen Shui-bian’s eight years in office,
the DPP had suffered a significant loss in the presidential election in 2008. Nonetheless, the DPP
under Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen rebuilt its strength and won a number of local and legislative
elections in 2009-2011. The DPP then lost to the KMT in the presidential election in 2012 but
with a smaller margin than that in 2008, and the DPP gained seats in the LY. Tsai stepped down as
the chair. Some observers have concerns about the DPP in future elections and any reversal of the
warming trend in cross-strait ties. Others have confidence about the DPP’s evolution as a party
that provides democratic checks and balance and about the voters’ choices on their status. While
the KMT stresses the ROC’s legacy that includes “one China,” the DPP pursues Taiwan-centric
policies based on a legacy of fighting for freedoms and a stated priority of ties to democratic
countries like the United States and Japan. In contrast to the KMT’s touting of the “1992
Consensus,” the DPP says that cross-strait talks cannot be simply KMT-CPC negotiations.
Nonetheless, both the KMT and DPP could continue to use political ambiguity, including the
KMT’s use of “1992 Consensus.” The KMT and DPP could find areas of common ground
concerning the ROC’s name and constitution, forging a domestic consensus about Taiwan’s
relationships with the United States, Japan, and mainland China, and protecting the way of life in
21 Tsai Ing-wen’s interview with Apple Daily, Taipei, September 20, 2010.
22 Andrew Higgins, “Taiwan’s Pro-China Chief Reelected,” Washington Post, January 15, 2012, quoting Douglas Paal.
23 Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), Taipei, January 16, 2012.
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the democratic, security, and economic interests of Taiwan’s people. No matter which party rules,
Taiwan faces challenges from the PRC within the context of economic integration. The DPP
could clarify or review its approach toward the United States and toward the PRC.
After winning the election to be the DPP’s chairman on May 27, 2012, former premier Su Tseng-
chang (at age 64) announced restoration of the DPP’s Department of “China Affairs,” among
various departments. While such a move took cross-strait policy out of “international” policy, the
approach differed from the KMT and CPC’s use of “mainland China.” Later, in August, Su set up
a Department on Defense Policy. On October 4-8, former Premier Frank Hsieh became the most
senior member of the DPP to visit the PRC, though on a private visit. He met with senior PRC
officials (State Councilor Dai Bingguo, ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin, and Taiwan Affairs
Office Director Wang Yi). Hsieh proposed discussing a “constitutional consensus” (“constitutions
with different interpretations”) instead of talking about the “1992 Consensus” (“one China with
different interpretations”). In November, DPP Chairman Su named himself, rather than Hsieh or
another politician, as the convener of the new, higher-level Committee on China Affairs.
Restoring Trust and Resolving Disputes (Beef)
Taiwan has a window for greater attention to governance, before the mayoral elections in 2014
and presidential election in 2016. Taiwan’s political seasons have constrained U.S. influence on
some priorities, particularly to relax Taiwan’s restrictions on U.S. beef. Taiwan banned U.S. beef
in 2003 and 2005 out of concern about bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), or mad cow
disease. In 2006, Taiwan lifted the ban but imposed restrictions on U.S. beef. U.S. concerns
include whether Taiwan abides by rules of the WTO and World Organization for Animal Health
(OIE), of which Taiwan is a member, even as Taiwan seeks to participate in more international
organizations. Taiwan has been a key market for U.S. beef exports, with values that increased
from $42 million in 2005 to $216 million in 2010. The value dropped to $200 million in 2011.
In April 2009, President Ma gave a speech directed at the Obama Administration, including a
promise to open Taiwan’s market to U.S. agricultural exports, alluding to the U.S. request
conveyed to him since his inauguration day in May 2008 that Taiwan lift restrictions on U.S. beef.
In October 2009, President Ma agreed to conclude two years of negotiations on an agreement to
relax Taiwan’s restrictions on imports of U.S. beef over Taiwan’s concern about mad cow disease.
The United States maintains that U.S. beef is safe. Under the U.S.-Taiwan agreement signed on
October 22, 2009, Taiwan would allow bone-in beef, ground beef, and cow parts under 30 months
of age without specified risk materials (skulls, spines, brains, etc.). However, both the ruling
KMT and opposition DPP complained. In what the Ma Administration admitted as a “crisis,”
Taiwan raised tension with the Obama Administration and Congress over beef. Taiwan’s
Legislative Yuan passed in January 2010 a bill to ban ground beef, parts, and risky materials from
areas with mad cow disease in the past 10 years. The USTR and others have voiced concerns
about Taiwan’s political, unscientific restrictions and questions of safety concerning U.S. beef,
unilateral abrogation of an agreement, and violations of key principles in international trade that
harmed U.S. agricultural exports. However, the broader U.S. business community has questioned
the freezing of TIFA talks because of one category of exports, and some observers have pointed
out that the United States continues trade talks with the PRC in spite of many disputes.
Right before the resumption of TIFA talks expected in late January 2011, on January 15, Taiwan
ordered the removal from sale of U.S. beef with a drug to promote leanness called ractopamine,
although the United States maintains that the additive is safe. On February 17, the chairmen and
ranking Members of the Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee
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(Senators Max Baucus and Orrin Hatch, and Representatives Dave Camp and Sander Levin)
wrote a letter to President Ma to express concern that U.S. beef exports to Taiwan stopped
effectively, to urge a correction, and to seek confidence to resume the TIFA talks. On July 13,
2011, AIT expressed disappointment in Taiwan’s apparently “political” decision to keep the ban
by citing the lack of agreement at an international commission on acceptable, maximum residue
levels (MRLs) for ractopamine. Representative Royce delivered a speech on November 12, in
which he lamented that only with Taiwan (not South Korea and Japan) has the Administration
suspended overall economic talks over the “narrow, politically-charged” dispute about beef.
With expectation that Ma would resolve the dispute after the January 2012 elections, AmCham in
Taipei urged Ma in February to put an end to the dispute before it “further damages” the
relationship with the United States. In February and March, AIT issued Fact Sheets about the
safety of U.S. beef and ractopamine, which also pointed out that Taiwan itself has established
maximum residue levels (MRLs) for over 100 veterinary compounds. The Department of
Commerce postponed the visit of Under Secretary Francisco Sanchez scheduled for March 4-6,
amid protests, recalls of U.S. beef, and DPP and KMT proposals in the LY to stipulate zero-
tolerance for ractopamine. President Ma held “national security” meetings over this “crisis.” The
Ma Administration then issued four conditions for beef: safe levels of ractopamine, separate
allowances for beef and pork (amid objections from hog farmers), labeling of meats, and no
imports of organs. To counter the domestic political pressure, Ma has argued that a resolution is
needed for U.S.-Taiwan ties and Taiwan’s international integration to avoid marginalization.
On March 6 and 15, Senator Chuck Grassley and Representative Denny Rehberg led 68 Members
of the House to protest Taiwan’s restrictions against U.S. beef and pork. Then, on April 24, the
Department of Agriculture found a cow with mad cow disease, stating that it posed no risk. In the
LY, some lawmakers of the ruling KMT voted down attempts by lawmakers of opposition parties
led by the DPP to ban U.S. beef (including on April 27 and May 4, 11, and 18). A committee in
the LY defeated on May 7 the Cabinet’s proposal to allow beef with safe levels of ractopamine,
leaving a potential vote in the full LY. Meanwhile, Taiwan sent agricultural officials who arrived
on May 6 in Washington and then set up meetings with U.S. officials, associations, and beef
processing sites. The officials visited several states over 23 days and found U.S. beef to be safe.
AmCham in Taipei lamented that the dispute over beef became “heavily politicized” but
commended President Ma for doing the right thing in working on a resolution. Although the
Speaker of the LY, Wang Jin-pyng of the KMT, negotiated an agreement between the KMT and
DPP to extend the LY’s session for two weeks until June 15, 2012, in part to vote on the
Cabinet’s, or Executive Yuan (EY)’s, amendment to the act Governing Food Safety, the LY did
not vote by then. As KMT Chairman, Ma met with the LY’s KMT Caucus on June 7 to forge
party unity behind his proposal. Starting on June 11, DPP, TSU, and PFP opposition lawmakers
occupied the Speaker’s podium in the LY’s chamber to prevent a vote all week, targeting what
some called the “U.S. beef bill” as detrimental to food safety. The DPP’s new chairman, Su
Tseng-chang, supported the DPP legislators in their obstruction. Some DPP politicians claimed
that they were not opposing U.S. beef yet denounced “toxic” or “poisonous” beef.
On July 5, Representatives Edward Royce and Gerald Connolly led 10 Members of Congress to
write to President Obama to urge a resumption of the TIFA talks, while “Taiwan must take steps
to open its market to U.S. agriculture exports.”24 On the same day, the international Codex
24 Letter to Barack Obama from Representatives Edward Royce, Gerald Connolly, Donald Manzullo, Howard Berman,
(continued...)
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Alimentarius Commission voted in Rome to adopt MRLs for ractopamine in beef and pork. The
DPP cited that development to announce support for international standards and sought to rebuild
trust with the United States. However, at a special session of the LY on July 25, all DPP
legislators voted against the bill to end the ban on ractopamine in beef. In passing the KMT-
supported bill (63-46), 40 DPP, 3 PFP, and 3 TSU legislators voted against it. While the DPP
stopped obstructing the legislative process, its vote continued to raise questions about its political
leadership and principles (professed to be in concert with Washington), when the elections were
over in January and Taiwan’s people commonly express satisfaction with U.S. products.
After the postponement of his visit in March, Under Secretary of Commerce Sanchez visited
Taipei in late October 2012. He highlighted the start on November 1 of the VWP for Taiwan’s
travelers to facilitate their visits to the United States for tourism and business. Sanchez welcomed
the news that U.S. beef was again available, a step to strengthen confidence in Taiwan as a
responsible trading partner. He did not announce a resumption of TIFA Talks.
Economic Relationship25
Taiwan is a major innovator and producer of information technology (IT), broadly defined as
computer hardware and software; telecommunications; and other knowledge-based industries.
According to the Taiwanese government, Taiwan is the world’s second-largest producer of ICT
goods.26 In 2010, Taiwan’s ICT industry generated $424.6 billion in revenues.27 Numerous
surveys have identified Taiwan as a major leader in global technology. For example:
• A BusinessWeek survey of the 100 best performing global IT companies in 2009
listed 10 Taiwanese firms, 4 of which were among the world’s top 10 IT firms.28
• According to the World Bank’s Knowledge Economy Index (KEI), which
attempts to measure and rank a country’s ability to generate, adopt, and diffuse
knowledge, Taiwan ranked 13th out of 145 economies in 2012.29
• The World Economic Forum’s Global Information Technology Report for 2012
ranked Taiwan 11th out of 142 economies in terms of preparedness to leverage
ICT advances for increased competitiveness and development.30
Taiwan’s economy is highly dependent on trade. In 2011, Taiwan’s exports of goods and services
were equal to 76% of gross domestic product (GDP). Since 2005, Taiwan’s net exports (exports
minus imports) have generally been the largest contributor to annual GDP growth.31 Taiwan’s
(...continued)
Gary Ackerman, Steve Chabot, Walter Jones, James Moran, Renee Ellmers, and Mike Kelly, July 5, 2012.
25 Written by Wayne Morrison, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance.
26 The Republic of China Yearbook 2010, p. 104.
27 Taiwan Ministry of Economics and Digitimes, Taiwan’s ICT Industry Development and Outlook, June 2011.
28 Bloomberg Businessweek, the InfoTech 100, 2009, available at http://www.businessweek.com/interactive_reports/
it100_2009.html.
29 The World Bank, the Knowledge Economy Index, 2012, at http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.asp.
30 See http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-information-technology-report-2012.
31 For example, in 2011, Taiwan’s real GDP grew by 4.0% over the previous year. The components of that growth were
net exports (at 3.7 percentage points), private consumption (1.6%), and government consumption (0.2%), while
stockbuilding and gross fixed investment declined by 0.8% and 0.7%, respectively.
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2011 merchandise exports and imports were $308 billion and $281 billion, respectively, making it
the 17th largest exporter and importer. The global economic crisis (which began in 2008) sharply
decreased Taiwan’s trade in 2009. Exports and imports fell by 20.3% and 27.3%, respectively,
and real GDP declined by 1.9% over the previous year. However, global economic recovery,
especially in China, boosted Taiwan’s exports and imports by 35.1% and 44.3%, respectively, in
2010, and real GDP grew by 10.8%. However, that growth slowed somewhat in 2011. Exports
and imports increased by 12.3% and 12.0%, respectively, and GDP grew by 4.0%, due in part to
economic slowdowns in some parts of Europe and Japan.
Cross-Strait Economic Ties
The importance of the PRC as a trading partner for Taiwan has increased significantly, especially
since 2001.32 Taiwan’s total trade with China grew from $31.5 billion in 2001 to $134.7 billion in
2011 (a 327.6% increase). The PRC is Taiwan’s largest trading partner (followed by Japan and the
United States33), its largest export market, and its second largest source of imports (after Japan).34
According to Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), the share of Taiwan’s exports to
mainland China rose from 3.2% in 1985 to 29.5% in 2011, while the share of its imports from
mainland China rose from 0.6% to 15.5%.35 Taiwan has enjoyed large annual trade surpluses with
the mainland over the past several years, which totaled $47.5 billion in 2011.36 Taiwan is a major
source of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to the PRC. According to the MAC, Taiwan’s FDI
flows to China totaled $13.1 billion in 2011, and its cumulative FDI in China through the end of
2011 was $111.8 billion.37
Many of Taiwan’s officials contend that projections that China will continue to experience rapid
economic growth over the next few decades, along with recent efforts by the PRC government to
boost domestic consumption, will make China an even more important trade and investment
partner for Taiwan in the years ahead. As a result, the Ma administration has sought to liberalize
cross-strait trade and investment barriers, including the lifting of restrictions on direct trade,
transportation, and postal links.38 The ECFA, signed in June 2010, is expected over time to
significantly liberalize trade and investment barriers, hasten the pace of cross-strait economic
integration, and boost economic growth on both sides.39 Taiwan’s willingness to sign the ECFA
was in part motivated by a need to avoid being “marginalized” by the proliferation of FTAs that
have been negotiated in recent years around the world, especially among Taiwan’s major trading
32 In 2001, Taiwan decided to relax restrictions on Taiwanese investment in the PRC and to sharply reduce the number
of PRC products subject to import bans in order to boost Taiwan’s economy (which was in recession), as well as to take
advantage of new economic opportunities that were expected to occur following the PRC’s accession to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001. Taiwan joined the WTO in January 2002.
33 In 2011, the United States was Taiwan’s second largest export market and third largest source of imports. The United
States is the largest source of cumulative foreign direct investment (FDI) in Taiwan, estimated at $21 billion.
34 China replaced the United States as Taiwan’s largest export market in 2002 and has remained so each year through
2012.
35 Taiwan’s exports to, and imports from, China in 2011 were $91.1 billion and $43.6 billion, respectively.
36 PRC data indicate that its trade deficit with Taiwan in 2011 was the largest incurred with any of its trading partners.
37 Note, China’s data on FDI inflows from Taiwan (at $85.8 billion) differ significantly from the MAC data.
38 Until recently, most trade, transportation, and postal links with China occurred indirectly, mainly via Hong Kong.
These constituted significant added time and money costs to cross-strait economic ties.
39 Taiwan estimates the ECFA will boost Taiwan’s GDP by 1.7%, exports by 5.0%, and employment by 263,000.
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partners and competitors in Asia.40 Up to now, China has sought to prevent Taiwan from being
able to negotiate FTAs by putting pressure on Taiwan’s trading partners. Taiwan’s officials hope
that the ECFA with mainland China will induce it to end its opposition to such FTAs, especially
those to which China is already a party.41 Taiwan officials also have expressed interest in
eventually joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).42
U.S.-Taiwan Trade and Investment
U.S. trade data appear to indicate that the relative importance of Taiwan as a U.S. trading partner
has declined over the past 20 or so years, especially when compared with U.S. trade with China.
For example:
• Total U.S. trade with Taiwan in 2011 was $67.2 billion, making Taiwan the 10th
largest U.S. trading partner—down from 6th in 1989.
• U.S imports from Taiwan were $41.3 billion, making Taiwan the 10th largest
source of U.S. imports—down from 5th in 1989.
• U.S. exports to Taiwan were $26.0 billion, making Taiwan the 13th largest U.S.
export market—down from 9th in 1989.
• Conversely, the importance of China as a U.S. trading partner has risen
significantly between 1989 and 2011: from 10th to 2nd for total trade, from 15th to
3rd for exports, and from 9th to 1st for imports.
As indicated in Figure 1, U.S. trade with Taiwan has been relatively stagnant over the past 10
years. From 2002-2011, U.S. exports to, and imports from, Taiwan grew by 40.8% and 28.3%,
respectively (while total U.S. exports and imports increased by 113.6% and 90.0%, respectively).
However, the trade data may not explain the whole picture. Taiwan’s manufacturers and traders
report data on the amount of export orders they receive from various countries. These data
indicate that annual orders for products from U.S. buyers are much larger than the reported level
of annual U.S. imports from Taiwan.43 For example, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs
(MOEA) reports that export orders originating from the United States for the entire year in 2011
totaled $100.5 billion, while Taiwan’s official trade data show its exports to the United States in at
$36.4 billion.44 According to Taiwan’s data, the United States accounted for 11.8% of its exports,
but 23.0% of its export orders.
40 Taiwan has FTAs with Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, but these together account for
only a minor share of Taiwan’s total trade.
41 PRC officials have argued that only “sovereign nations” can enter into FTAs, which, they claim, Taiwan is not
because it is “part of China.” However, WTO rules allow its members to negotiate FTAs. Taiwan is a member of the
WTO under the title: “the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei).”
42 The TPP is a proposed regional FTA currently under negotiation between the United States, Australia, Brunei, Chile,
Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam (and could eventually include several other economies as well).
See CRS Report R42344, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Countries: Comparative Trade and Economic Analysis, by
Brock R. Williams.
43 Taiwanese firms received export orders worth $436.1 billion in 2011. Major categories for these orders included ICT
products (25.0% of total), electronic products (23.4%), precision instruments (8.4%), and basic metal products (7.0%).
44 The United States was the second largest source of Taiwan’s export orders in 2011, after China.
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The disparity between the data on Taiwan’s export orders and U.S. import data largely is
explained by the fact that a significant level of products designed and sold by Taiwan’s firms are
actually built elsewhere, especially in mainland China, and then shipped globally, including to the
United States. For example, from 2001 to 2008, the value of Taiwan’s IT hardware (such as
computers) production increased from $42.8 billion to $100.0 billion. However, the share of that
production in Taiwan during this time declined from 47.1% to 1.3%, while the share in China
increased from 36.9% to 90.6%. A significant level of Taiwan’s IT hardware products
manufactured in China are exported. U.S. trade data indicate that computer products and parts are
the single largest category of U.S. imports from China. Thus, it is likely that a large share of U.S.
imports of computers and computer parts from China originate from Taiwan-invested firms in
China. In many cases, U.S. IT firms place orders for products with Taiwan’s firms, which
manufacture the products in China, then ship them to the United States, where U.S. firms sell the
products under their own brand name. According to MOEA, U.S. firms, such as Apple, Inc., Dell,
Verizon, and HP are among the major global purchasers of ICT products made by Taiwanese
firms. For example, many of Apple Inc.’s products (such as iPads, iPhones, and iPods), which
were developed and engineered in the United States, are assembled by Taiwan’s firms in China
(using imported parts), many of which are shipped to the United States and sold by Apple.45
The bilateral economic relationship between the United States and Taiwan has been generally
positive, although there are a few issues that have proved contentious. On the positive side,
Taiwan has greatly improved its protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). Such
improvements led the United States Trade Representative (USTR) in January 2009 to remove
Taiwan from its annual “Special 301” list of countries whose IPR policies were of the greatest
concern to the United States. In 2012, the USTR stated that Taiwan generally provides effective
IPR protection and enforcement, although it noted that a number of problems remain, such as
infringement of copyrighted material on the Internet.46
In July 2009, Taiwan joined the WTO’s government procurement agreement (GPA), which gives
U.S. firms access to a procurement market estimated at $6 billion. The United States has raised
concerns over Taiwan’s barriers on certain agricultural products (such as rice), pharmaceuticals
and medical devices, and various services. Taiwan’s use of sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS)
measures to block U.S. beef sales to Taiwan are of particular concern to U.S. officials.47 U.S.
officials charge that a bilateral protocol that provided for expanded market access for U.S. beef
and beef products in Taiwan (signed in October 2009) has been significantly undermined by
action taken by Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan in January 2010 as well as other recent administrative
measures.48 Many observers saw Taiwan’s restriction on U.S. beef as the main obstacle to the
resumption of talks under the TIFA, the main forum used by Taiwan and the United States since
1994 to discuss major economic issues. The last TIFA talks were held in 2007.
45 Taiwan’s Foxconn Technology Group is Apple’s major supplier.
46 USTR, the 2012 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE), March 2012, p. 361.
47 Taiwan banned beef imports from the United States in 2003 because of concerns over mad cow disease, but resumed
certain types of beef imports in 2006. The United States contends that U.S. beef exports are safe, regardless of age, and
that Taiwanese SPS restrictions are not scientifically-based.
48 A joint statement issued by the USTR and the Department of Agriculture in January 2010 stated that the Legislative
Yuan’s actions to impose restrictions on certain beef products would “undermine Taiwan’s credibility as a responsible
trading partner and will make it more challenging for us to conclude future agreements to expand and strengthen
bilateral trade and economic ties.”
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According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Affairs (BEA), Taiwan was the 24th largest source of
cumulative FDI in the United States, at $5.2 billion at the end of 2010 (compared to China’s FDI
in the United States, which totaled $3.2 billion). The BEA estimates U.S. FDI in Taiwan through
2010 at $21.0 billion. According to MOEA, the United States is the largest overall source of
cumulative FDI in Taiwan through January 2012 (at 19.3% of total).
Figure 1. U.S.-Taiwan Merchandise Trade: 2002-2011
(in billions of dollars)
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
-10.0
-20.0
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Trade Balance
Exports
Imports
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission Dataweb.
Legislation in the 112th Congress
H.Con.Res. 39 (Andrews), expressing the sense of Congress regarding the freedom, security, and
stability of Taiwan.
H.Con.Res. 77 (Garrett), expressing the sense of Congress that Taiwan and its 23 million people
deserve membership in the U.N.
H.Con.Res. 122 (McCaul), expressing the sense of Congress that the United States should
resume a normal diplomatic relationship with Taiwan.
H.R. 2583 (Ros-Lehtinen), Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2012; included an
amendment offered by Representatives Connolly, Berman, and Burton to express the sense of
Congress that the President should sell and upgrade F-16 fighters as well as sell submarines.
H.R. 2918 (Ros-Lehtinen), Taiwan Policy Act, to strengthen the U.S.-Taiwan relationship.
H.R. 2992 (Granger), Taiwan Airpower Modernization Act, to sell F-16C/D fighters.
H.R. 4310 (McKeon), National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013.
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H.R. 5902 (Andrews), to establish a congressional advisory commission on implementation of
U.S. policy under the TRA.
H.R. 6313 (Faleomavaega), to promote peaceful and collaborative resolution of maritime
territorial disputes in the South China Sea and its environs and other maritime areas adjacent to
the East Asian mainland.
H.R. 6649 (Ros-Lehtinen), Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2012, inter alia, to authorize the transfer
by sale of four excess Perry-class frigates to Taiwan.
H.Res. 352 (Ros-Lehtinen), to call for a peaceful and collaborative resolution of maritime
territorial disputes in the South China Sea and its environs and other maritime areas adjacent to
the East Asian mainland.
H.Res. 616 (Forbes), to express the sense of the House on a comprehensive strategic framework
of U.S. objectives in the relationship with the PRC, including to treat Taiwan in accordance with
the TRA, three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances.
H.Res. 814 (Kelly), to express the sense of the House regarding the conditions for the United
States becoming a signatory to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, with concerns about
possible implications for arms sales to Taiwan.
S. 1539 (Cornyn), Taiwan Airpower Modernization Act, to sell F-16C/D fighters.
S. 1545 (Inhofe), to designate Taiwan in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP).
S. 3254 (Levin), National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013.
S.Con.Res. 17 (Menendez), a concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress that Taiwan
should be accorded observer status in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
S.Res. 542 (Murkowski), to express the sense of the Senate that the U.S. government should
continue to support democracy and human rights in Taiwan following the January 2012
presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan.
Author Contact Information
Shirley A. Kan
Wayne M. Morrison
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs
Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance
skan@crs.loc.gov, 7-7606
wmorrison@crs.loc.gov, 7-7767
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