The U.S. Congress and the European
Parliament: Evolving Transatlantic Legislative
Cooperation
Kristin Archick
Specialist in European Affairs
Vincent Morelli
Section Research Manager
January 2, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41552
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

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The U.S. Congress and the European Parliament

Summary
The United States and the European Union (EU) share an extensive, dynamic, and for many a
mutually beneficial political and economic partnership. A growing element of that relationship is
the role that the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament (EP)—a key EU institution—have
begun to play, including in areas ranging from foreign and economic policy to regulatory reform.
Proponents of establishing closer relations between the U.S. Congress and the EP point to the
Parliament’s growing influence as a result of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty which increased the relative
power of the EP within the EU, and in some cases, with significant implications for U.S. interests.
Consequently, some officials and experts on both sides of the Atlantic have asked whether it
would be beneficial for Congress and the EP to strengthen institutional ties further and to explore
the possibility of coordinating efforts to develop more complementary approaches to policies in
areas of mutual interest.
The Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD), the formal exchange between Congress (actually
the House of Representatives) and the European Parliament, was launched in 1999, but semi-
annual meetings between Congress and the EP date back to 1972. The TLD’s visibility, although
still relatively low, increased following the 2007 decision to name it as an advisor to the
Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), which seeks to “advance the work of reducing or
eliminating non-tariff barriers to transatlantic commerce and trade.”
In response to the TLD’s new TEC-related responsibilities, some Members of Congress suggested
that there was a need for more contact between and cooperation with the EP, and raised questions
with respect to how this might best be accomplished. For those Members and outside advocates
of closer relations, questions surfaced about whether the TLD itself was organized in a way that
would facilitate such relations, how the standing committees in both institutions might interact,
and the role, if any, of the U.S. Senate. Since 2007, regular contacts between Congress and the
Parliament, including at the committee level, have fluctuated in frequency. However, many
observers note that the EP has been far out in front of Congress in pursuit of a stronger
relationship mostly through the many EP delegations traveling to Washington to meet their
counterparts. In 2010, a key event in the evolution of Congress-Parliament relations took place
when the Parliament opened a liaison office (EPLO) in Washington. The EPLO was charged with
keeping the EP better informed of legislative activity in Congress and vice-versa.
While there appears to be no opposition within Congress to increasing contacts with the European
Parliament, some point out that with the exception of a few Members with previous experience in
the TLD, Congress as a whole has been seen at best as ambivalent to such efforts and has not
demonstrated as much enthusiasm as the EP about forging closer relations. This observation had
been noted by the EP itself when at the beginning of the 112th Congress the appointment of both
the new chair and vice chair of the USTLD took almost six months and took place just before the
annual spring session.
This report provides background on the Congress–EP relationship and the role of the TLD. It also
explores potential future options that could be considered during the 113th Congress should an
effort to strengthen ties between the two bodies gain momentum. For additional information, see
CRS Report RS21998, The European Parliament, by Kristin Archick.

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Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
The U.S.-EU Relationship ......................................................................................................... 1
Development of Relations Between the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament .................... 2
Transatlantic Policy Network (TPN) ......................................................................................... 3
New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) ............................................................................................. 3
Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) .................................................................................... 5
European Parliament Liaison Office (EPLO) ............................................................................ 7
Role of the Legislatures ................................................................................................................... 8
The Current Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue ........................................................................... 13
Initiatives to Strengthen Congress-Parliament Cooperation .......................................................... 16
1. Enhance the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue ................................................................ 17
2. Develop Closer TLD Coordination with the Standing Committees and Promote
Committee Cooperation ....................................................................................................... 20
3. Utilize European Parliament Liaison Staff Deployed to Washington .................................. 22
4. Establish a Senior Staff “Fellowship” Exchange ................................................................. 22
5. Deploy Congressional Staff to Brussels .............................................................................. 23
6. Establish a Congressional Commission on the EU.............................................................. 24
Role of the Senate .......................................................................................................................... 25
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 26
Appendix. Comparison of Committees in the European Parliament and the U.S. Congress ........ 27

Tables
Table A-1. Comparison of Committees in the EP and the U.S. Congress ..................................... 28

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 29

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Introduction
The U.S.-EU Relationship
The United States Congress and successive U.S. administrations have long supported the
European Union (EU) as a way to advance democracy and strong economic partners in Europe.
The current 27-member EU is the latest stage in a process of European integration begun in the
1950s to promote lasting peace and prosperity on the European continent.1 During the Cold War,
the United States viewed this European integration project as central to deterring the Soviet threat
by securing free markets and engendering political stability in Europe.
Despite the end of the Cold War more than two decades ago and the recent talk of a “Pacific
rebalance” in United States foreign policy, many observers assert that the security and prosperity
of the United States and Europe remain inextricably linked. Both the United States and the EU, in
addition to common foreign policy challenges, face a set of new challenges ranging from
countering terrorism and weapons proliferation to addressing cyber-security and on-line piracy
issues to managing economic downturns and promoting job creation. The United States and the
EU have few other comparable partners with whom they share such similar interests, values, and
determination to address issues of common concern. Proponents of close U.S.-EU ties argue that
neither side can adequately address the diverse number of global challenges alone, and that the
United States and the EU have a proven track record of working together. For example, the two
sides have worked closely to promote security in the Balkans and Afghanistan, have intensified
law enforcement cooperation since the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, and have been
cooperating closely to manage and contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Historically, U.S.-EU
cooperation has also been critical in making the world trading system more open and efficient.
Furthermore, the United States and the EU share a huge, mutually beneficial, and increasingly
interdependent trade and investment relationship. Despite the global economic downturn and on-
going eurozone crisis, the combined U.S. and EU economies account for over 50% of global
gross domestic product and roughly 25% of global exports and 32% of global imports. According
to one recent study, the transatlantic economy generates close to $5 trillion in commercial sales a
year and employs up to 15 million workers on both sides of the Atlantic. Of particular importance
is the fact that U.S. and European companies are the biggest investors in each other’s economies
and the United States and Europe remain each other’s most profitable markets.2
At the same time, the U.S.-EU relationship has been challenged in recent years by numerous
foreign policy and trade conflicts. U.S.-EU relations reached a historic low in 2003 over the U.S.-
led invasion of Iraq, which some EU member states supported and others strongly opposed. In the
aftermath of this crisis, the United States sought to improve cooperation and emphasize areas of
partnership with the EU. In the years since, observers point out that U.S.-EU tensions on several
key issues, such as Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, have not only dissipated, but that
U.S.-EU relations have taken on a renewed sense of cooperation. This cooperative spirit has taken

1 The 27 members of the EU are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
2 Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan, The Transatlantic Economy 2012: Annual Survey of Jobs, Trade, and
Investment between the United States and Europe, Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2012.
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on more of a dynamic in the areas of economic growth and trade. U.S.-EU differences in some
areas—such as data privacy, climate change, and energy security—persist, as do U.S.-EU trade
disputes over aircraft subsidies and bio-engineered food products. Regulatory barriers to greater
trade and investment also remain despite efforts on both sides to promote regulatory cooperation.
To address these issues, in 2011 the United States and the EU created a joint High Level Working
Group (HLWG) on Economic Growth and Job Creation to tackle such common concerns and to
promote an even stronger and more integrated transatlantic economy. The HLWG will release its
final recommendations early in 2013 outlining ways in which the transatlantic economy can be
strengthened and expanded. It is anticipated that the Group will recommend that both sides
launch negotiations that could lead to a comprehensive transatlantic economic and trade
agreement.
Development of Relations Between the
U.S. Congress and the European Parliament
In light of both the possible benefits of and challenges to greater U.S.-EU cooperation on a wide
array of common political and economic issues, some Members of Congress and their
counterparts in the European Parliament (EP) have long expressed interest in strengthening
institutional ties and exploring greater cooperation in areas of mutual interest. The EP is a key
institution of the European Union and the only one that is directly elected. Relations between the
U.S. House of Representatives and the European Parliament can be traced back to 1972, when a
group of Members of the House, led by former Representative Sam Gibbons of the House Ways
and Means Committee, traveled to Brussels for the express purpose of meeting and exchanging
views with the Parliament. At the time, Congress viewed the then-European Community (the
precursor to the modern day EU) mostly as a commercial and trade arrangement with the ability
to negotiate trade agreements, but the EP was an institution with limited visibility and unknown
authority. The first congressional visits to Brussels were arranged by Members of the House
Committee on Ways and Means who were interested in issues such as agriculture subsidies, steel
tariffs, anti-dumping initiatives, and general trade-related areas. These initial parliamentary
contacts, which only involved the House of Representatives, became known as the United States-
European Community Interparliamentary Group. Soon after these early exchanges were initiated,
Members of the House and Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) began meeting twice a
year, once in the United States and once in Europe. Formal institutional cooperation was
established in 1999 and currently exists through the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD).
Given the evolving nature of the transatlantic relationship, and the changes taking place within
the EU itself, the purpose and focus of the Congress–EP interparliamentary exchange gradually
turned more to a foreign policy agenda dedicated to issues involving the Cold War and the
development of the European Union. By the mid-1980s, the responsibility for arranging the U.S.-
EP meetings in the U.S. Congress and the formation of the congressional delegations to Europe
shifted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. As historic political events in Europe began to
unfold in the late 1980s, the relevance and importance of the Congress–Parliament exchange
began to increase under the leadership of former Representatives Lee Hamilton, Tom Lantos, and
Benjamin Gilman, who were strong supporters of close U.S.-European relations. These Members,
along with a handful of others, focused on the implications of the end of the Cold War for the
United States and the role the EU would play in the new European landscape; they all believed
that Congress should better understand both the EU as a whole and its legislative process, a
feeling that continues to be shared by many, although not all, even today.
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Contacts between the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament have been stimulated from
time to time by events that have contributed to the slow but steady evolution of ever-closer
relations between the two institutions. Four such milestones include the creation of the
Transatlantic Policy Network (TPN) in 1992; the launch of the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA)
in 1995; the establishment of the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) in 2007, and the opening
of the European Parliament’s Liaison Office (EPLO) in 2010.
Transatlantic Policy Network (TPN)
The TPN was established in 1992 as a broad-based, multi-party group of EU and U.S. politicians,
corporate leaders, influential think tank experts, and academics. It was (and remains) dedicated to
encouraging regular dialogue and the maintenance of close personal relationships as a means to
help both the United States and the EU identify their common interests and strengthen their
partnership. The significance of the founding of TPN was that, for the first time, an outside
organization provided a venue—apart from the semi-annual Congress-Parliament meetings—
where Members of Congress and MEPs could study and debate specific issues, exchange views
with an eye towards finding transatlantic solutions, and coordinate their actions with other U.S.
government officials and EU policymakers. The TPN continues to support this transatlantic
dialogue today under the continued leadership of MEPs such as James Ellis and Peter Skinner and
through programs such as its two-day workshops during what has become known as
“Transatlantic Week” in Washington. The most recent 2012 TPN conference included a
comprehensive set of issue-oriented panels that not only included experts in the respective fields
but also several Members of Congress and/or MEPs as panel moderators or speakers.
New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA)
Although the United States government and the European Union had been engaged in a political
and economic partnership since 1954, the launch of the NTA in 1995 sought to provide a new
framework intended to move the relationship essentially from one of consultation to one of joint
action in several areas. Often overlooked in the statement outlining the goals and purposes of the
NTA was the acknowledgment by the leaders of the United States and the EU that they “attached
great importance to enhanced parliamentary links” and agreed to “consult with parliamentary
leaders on both sides of the Atlantic regarding consultation mechanisms, including building on
existing institutions, to discuss matters related to our transatlantic partnership.”3
However, implementation of the provisions of the NTA was slow to develop. Even slower was
implementation of the decision to consult with parliamentary leaders, in part because Congress
and the European Parliament were uncertain on how to define the roles they might play in the
NTA. In January 1999, after four years of little or no progress on incorporating the legislatures
into a transatlantic decision-making process, and sensing a need to acknowledge the NTA’s
commitment to include the legislatures, the delegations of the U.S. House and the EP—at their
50th meeting—agreed to formalize the dialogue and to change the group’s name to the
Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue. In announcing the formation of the TLD, the two delegations
stated that the Dialogue “will constitute the formal response of the European Parliament and the
U.S. Congress to the commitment in the New Transatlantic Agenda to enhance parliamentary ties

3 Declaration of the New Transatlantic Agenda at the U.S.-EU Summit, December 13, 1995.
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between the European Union and the United States.”4 In response to the decision to re-name the
interparliamentary exchange, the U.S. House in November 1999, during consideration of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (H.R. 3194/P.L. 106-113), amended
Section 109(c) of the Department of State Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1984/1985 (22
U.S.C. 276 note) to officially change the name of the group to the TLD.
Following the introduction of the NTA in 1995, a small minority of Representatives in Congress
and the European Parliament began arguing for greater legislative involvement in broader U.S.-
EU relations, even including participation in the annual U.S.-EU Summit. The formal launch of
the TLD provided new impetus for the kind of input these legislators hoped for, and efforts were
made on both sides to reinforce the interests of the legislatures in assuming an enhanced role in
the transatlantic relationship. Since the 1999 declaration officially establishing the TLD,
numerous resolutions have been introduced and even passed in both Congress and the Parliament
expressing the importance of the transatlantic partnership, calling for enhanced dialogue and
coordination between Congress and the EP, and asserting that the legislatures should be consulted
more closely by U.S. and EU policymakers. In particular, related to the development of the
transatlantic economic relationship outlined in the NTA, in 2004 and 2005, the EP and the U.S.
House passed resolutions supporting, among other things, the completion of a transatlantic market
by 2015. In 2006, the U.S. Senate passed a similar resolution.
Although those legislators dedicated to improving parliamentary input into the U.S.-EU
relationship appeared prepared to take on a more substantive role, many observers note that the
nature of transatlantic cooperation, the complexities of the issues, the multiple layers of agencies
involved, the sometimes slow pace of reform, and the press of normal legislative business, have
frequently hindered greater Congress-Parliament participation. To address some of these concerns
on the U.S. side, the then-chairman of the House International Relations Committee, Henry Hyde,
in 2000 created a new subcommittee solely dedicated to Europe. In 2005, several Members of the
House agreed to establish a Members Caucus on the EU to consider the wide range of
transatlantic political and economic issues on a regular, informal basis. Both of these
developments provided new venues for a more focused discussion of U.S.-EU relations among
interested legislators. It was also hoped that the subcommittee and caucus would help the TLD to
identify new Members with an interest in the EU and to assume a more active role in promoting
transatlantic contact and cooperation.
In addition, since 1999 especially, organizations such as TPN, the German Marshall Fund of the
United States (both in Washington and Brussels), the Atlantic Council, the Center for
Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins/SAIS, the European Institute, and other public policy
groups, have become more involved in attempting to develop and expand the transatlantic
knowledge-base of Congress and the European Parliament. Such groups hold briefings and host
conferences on numerous U.S.-EU issues and promote international travel for Members and staff.
Publications, such as the annual transatlantic economic report issued by the SAIS Center for
Transatlantic Relations, have brought the importance of the economic, trade, and job creation
dimensions of the U.S.-EU partnership to the forefront and often highlight other specific elements
of the relationship. All of these efforts have served to help Members of Congress and the EP to
better understand the nature of the transatlantic partnership, to identify issues of common interest,
and to expand contacts and dialogue.

4 Joint statement of the delegations of the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament, January 16, 1999.
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Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC)
Despite the various measures described above to bolster ties between Congress and the European
Parliament, the existence and purpose of the exchange between the U.S. House and the EP—at
least on the U.S. side—continued to remain little known or understood, both within and outside
the House. This appeared to be disappointing to some Members, MEPs, and other government
officials and experts because over the previous decades, many congressional delegations had
traveled to Europe and several senior Members of the House had participated in exchange
activities or knew of the exchange sessions with the EP. For instance, in 1987, then-Speaker of
the House Jim Wright attended the interparliamentary meeting in Madrid, and between 1994 and
2000, the chairman of the House International Relations Committee also served as the U.S. chair
of the interparliamentary exchange with the EP.
However, some suggest it was the creation of the TEC in 2007 that initially helped elevate
relations between the U.S. House and the EP perhaps more than any other previous initiative to
strengthen the relationship. In January 2007, upon assuming the rotating six-month presidency of
the EU, German Chancellor Angela Merkel proposed further liberalization of transatlantic trade
and investment barriers by enhancing the existing cooperation among U.S. and EU regulatory
agencies. In part, her proposal was in line with the provision in the New Transatlantic Agenda that
called for the creation of a transatlantic marketplace by eliminating or reducing both tariff and
non-tariff barriers that hindered the flow of goods, services, and capital between the United States
and Europe. Building on the Merkel initiative, the April 2007 U.S.-EU Summit adopted a
Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration. The Framework affirmed the
importance of further deepening transatlantic economic integration, particularly through efforts to
reduce or harmonize regulatory barriers to international trade and investment. The TEC was
established as a new institutional structure to advance the process of regulatory cooperation and
barrier reduction by encouraging both U.S. and EU regulators to move forward on issues outlined
in the Framework. It was agreed that the TEC would be headed on both sides by ministerial-level
appointees with cabinet rank.
As part of its mandate, the TEC was directed to include a broader participation of stakeholders,
including—for the first time in a formal regulatory framework—legislators. In particular, the
Framework instructed the TEC to establish an “advisory group” that would draw upon the heads
of the “existing transatlantic dialogues” to provide input and guidance on priorities for pursuing
transatlantic economic integration. The existing transatlantic dialogues included the Transatlantic
Business Dialogue (TABD), the Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue (TACD), and the Transatlantic
Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD).
The lack of knowledge about the TLD seemed to contribute to the surprise of many in the wider
transatlantic community when the TEC leadership invited the TLD to be a member of its
Advisory Group. In fact, it was unclear that anyone at the White House at the time of the 2007
U.S.-EU Summit contacted the House leadership to inform them a new role was to be asked of
the legislative branch. Nor did it appear that anyone had informed the TLD chairs at the time that
the TLD was to be handed a new and possibly far-reaching responsibility—that of formally
representing the views of Congress and the European Parliament in the transatlantic economic
integration and regulatory cooperation process.5

5 CRS interviews with congressional staff.
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Nevertheless, many supporters of the effort to achieve a more barrier-free transatlantic
marketplace believed that ultimate success could not be achieved without the strong commitment
and active participation of the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament. Some advocates had
long decried the low level of engagement by Congress and the Parliament in the overall economic
integration and regulatory cooperation process. As such, proponents of giving the TLD a role in
the TEC maintained that through more active oversight, legislators could articulate their support
for, or concerns about, a particular regulatory direction before the regulators proceeded too far
down the negotiation path. Although Congress does not regularly interject itself in regulatory
matters, advocates asserted that the U.S. Congress, through its authorization and appropriation
roles, Members could prod the regulators to move the cooperative efforts forward and provide the
funds necessary to carry out that mandate. Finally, supporters noted that for the European
Parliament, the Lisbon Treaty would give the EP more decision-making authority over trade-
related issues as well as an enlarged role in regulatory decision-making and oversight.
For those interested in the transatlantic economic relationship, the mandate to include the
legislatures in the TEC process generated greater interest in the role that the U.S. Congress and
the European Parliament can or should play in regulatory cooperation and convergence. This
interest prompted immediate efforts by groups such as the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the European-American Business Council, among others, to
reach out to Congress and Parliament in order to inject more economic and regulatory specificity
to the debate. Two reports issued at the time, one co-authored by the Atlantic Council and the
Bertelsmann Foundation,6 and another co-authored by several U.S. and European think tanks
entitled Shoulder to Shoulder: Forging a Strategic U.S.-EU Partnership,7 discussed the
parameters that a regulatory cooperation dialogue should take, including how the transatlantic
legislatures could play an influential role. On the U.S. side, the role of the business community in
encouraging Congress to engage more in the transatlantic economic debate was manifested in the
spring of 2012 when over 50 Members of the House and a large number of Senators signed a
business community-supported letter to the President urging the U.S.-EU High Level Working
Group on Economic Growth and Job Creation to expedite its work in recommending ways in
which both sides could help stimulate the transatlantic economy.
Some observers contend that the attempts by these outside organizations to increase awareness
about transatlantic economic and regulatory issues, especially among some U.S. members and
congressional committees with relevant jurisdictions, did initially have some impact on how some
in Congress viewed both the narrow regulatory cooperation agenda as well as on the broader
legislative relationship between the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament. Many of this
view acknowledge that the transatlantic impact of legislation had rarely been a central
consideration during the legislative process, whether in Congress or in the EP. Nor did they
believe that Congress would submit its own legislative initiatives to any form of a transatlantic
impact assessment or cede its authority to react to a national crisis, such as a terrorist attack or
banking crisis, without first consulting the EU, or vice versa. Some other observers asserted that
efforts to improve congressional and EP understanding of the magnitude of the transatlantic
economic relationship, and the increasing dialogue on transatlantic economic integration and
regulatory cooperation, did help encourage an expanded U.S.-EU legislative dialogue beyond the

6 Resetting The Trans-Atlantic Economic Council, A Blue Print, A Report by the Atlantic Council and Bertelsmann
Foundation, October 2009.
7 Shoulder to Shoulder: Forging a Strategic U.S.-EU Partnership, Atlantic Council of the United States, Center for
Transatlantic Relations et al., December 2009.
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TEC-related issues and began to result in a more notable desire by some in the EP to become
more engaged with their counterparts in Congress. An example of this was seen during the course
of the negotiations on the U.S – EU passenger name record accord that enabled the sharing of
airline passenger data to help combat terrorism. As opponents of some of the provisions in the
revised U.S.-EU agreement in the EP expressed their concerns and requested changes, there was
an attempt by the EP’s rapporteur for PNR, as well as members of the EP’s Civil Liberties
Committee, to meet with Members of Congress to discuss the EP’s concerns, in part, in the name
of legislative cooperation, as well as transatlantic harmony.
European Parliament Liaison Office (EPLO)
Perhaps the most significant recent development in the effort to promote closer Congress-
Parliament relations was the decision by the Parliament to open a liaison office in Washington in
2010. As noted previously, although regular contact between Members of the U.S. House and the
EP had taken place since 1972, some in the Parliament had been increasingly interested in
developing relations with a broader audience in Congress. In 1984, then-EP President Klaus
Haensch put forward a proposal in which he argued that it was important for MEPs to liaise
directly with their counterparts in Congress, and suggested that the Parliament should have its
own representation in Washington. This idea, in one form or another, has been part of the
European Parliament’s effort to establish “co-equality” with the U.S. Congress. However, the
concept did not begin to gain significant momentum until 2006. In 2006, MEP Elmar Brok, who
was rapporteur for the EP’s Committee on Foreign Affairs at the time, prepared a Parliament
report on “improving EU-U.S. relations.” Mr. Brok’s report expressed a desire that the “EP
budget for 2007 should establish a permanent post in Washington so that the Parliament and the
(EU) Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue may maintain permanent contact with the U.S. House of
Representatives and the Senate.”
On March 26, 2009, the EP adopted a resolution on the state of transatlantic relations.8 In that
resolution, the Parliament restated a long-held view that the U.S. Congress and the EP should
continue to develop a closer working relationship with respect to legislative initiatives in each
others’ institutions, should enhance cooperation between legislative committees, and should
create a reciprocal “early-warning” system in order to identify potential legislative activities that
could affect U.S.-EU relations. The resolution further “invited” the EP’s Secretary-General to
proceed as a “matter of utmost urgency” to implement a decision taken by the Parliament’s
Bureau on December 11, 2006, to open a parliamentary office in Washington and to deploy
officials to serve as the EP’s legislative liaison to the U.S. Congress, a responsibility that had up
to that time been entrusted to the European Commission’s Washington delegation.9
On April 29, 2010, Klaus Haensch’s vision became a reality when former EP President Jerzy
Buzek officially opened the EPLO with the U.S. Congress in Washington and named Piotr
Nowina-Konopka (former EP Director for Relations with National Parliaments) its first Director.
In November 2012, Mr. Nowina-Konopka was succeeded by Mr. Antoine Ripoll, the former Head
of Cabinet to the Chairman of the European People’s Party (EPP). Although the EPLO is
mandated to develop contacts with a broad array of policymakers, think tanks, and other

8 European Parliament resolution (A6-0114/2009) adopted March 26, 2009.
9 As of December 1, 2009, and as a result of the ratification of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty, the Commission’s Washington
office is now referred to as the “Delegation of the European Union.”
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institutions in Washington, and will serve to facilitate visits by MEPs, the primary mission of the
Liaison Office is to “build a network of Congress–Parliament staff who can be identified to work
together on concrete issues requiring legislative and political cooperation or at least intellectual
attention and understanding.”10 The EPLO reports to the EP Secretary-General. At the time of its
opening, the Liaison Office had three professional and two administrative staff; at the beginning
of 2012, the EPLO had a total of 10 staff including one foreign policy expert representing the
EP’s Directorate General for External Affairs (DGEXPO) that covers all foreign and defense
policy, international development, and trade, and one expert from the Directorate General for
Internal Policy (DGIPOL) which covers the issues equivalent to domestic U.S. policy issues.
After almost three years in operation, some believe the EPLO concept is beginning to take root
within Congress, providing a steady stream of contact and information on the work of the
Parliament as well as establishing a solid base of congressional staff contacts.
Interestingly, the 2009 EP resolution calling for the establishment of the EPLO also included
language inviting the U.S. Congress to consider the possibility of setting up its own congressional
liaison office in Brussels. The U.S. Congress, through periodic resolutions such as H.Res. 230
adopted in 2007, has long expressed support for closer cooperation between Congress and the EP.
Some individual Members have endorsed practices such as instituting a legislative early warning
system (often mentioned in the press releases issued at the end of TLD meetings), and during the
111th Congress a number of Members involved in the TLD expressed support for the idea in
principle of establishing a congressional liaison office in Brussels. At a December 15, 2009,
hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Europe Subcommittee, the proposal for a
Brussels office was raised and received a good deal of attention, including from the former
subcommittee chairman. To date, however, Congress as a whole has not demonstrated significant
interest in or enthusiasm about establishing a reciprocal congressional liaison office in Brussels a
view likely to continue for the foreseeable future. (for more information, see “Initiatives to
Strengthen Congress-Parliament Cooperation”).
Role of the Legislatures
One of the key factors driving Congress-Parliament cooperation has been the European
Parliament’s interest in working with Congress as a co-equal legislative partner. This
determination was further enhanced following the entrance into force of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty
in December 2009. The Lisbon Treaty—the EU’s latest effort at institutional reform born out of
an earlier effort to adopt a constitution for the Union—significantly increased the relative power
of the EP within the EU. Among other measures, the treaty further expands the EP’s role in the
EU’s legislative process by giving the EP a greater say over most all legislation proposed in the
EU, including in sensitive areas such as agriculture and justice and home affairs. The treaty also
strengthens the EP’s role in the EU’s budgetary process as well as in the oversight of the
implementation of EU law by the Commission, and it gives the EP the right to approve or reject
international agreements by majority vote, and expands the EP’s decision-making authority over
trade-related issues.11

10 For more information, see the EPLO website, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/us.
11 The Lisbon Treaty seeks to reform the EU’s governing institutions and decision-making processes in order to enable
an enlarged Union to function more effectively. In addition to implementing a number of changes in how the EP and
the other EU institutions operate, the Lisbon Treaty seeks to give the EU a stronger and more coherent voice on the
world stage and to increase democratic transparency within the EU. For more information, see CRS Report RS21618,
(continued...)
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Background on the European Parliament

The 754-member European Parliament (EP) is the only EU institution that is directly elected. As such, it represents
the citizens of the EU. The EP plays a key role in the EU’s legislative and budgeting processes, and works closely with
the two other main EU bodies: the European Commission, which represents the interests of the EU as a whole and
essentially serves as the EU’s executive; and the Council of the European Union (also known as the Council of
Ministers), which represents the EU’s 27 member states. The EP also exercises a degree of supervision over the
Commission as well as its implementation of EU law; it has more limited oversight over the activities of the Council.
The EP has accumulated more power over time. While the European Commission has the right of legislative initiative
in most cases, the EP shares legislative power with the Council of Ministers in most policy areas ranging from
economics to the environment to social policy; in such areas, both the EP and the Council must approve a
Commission proposal for it to become EU law in a process known as the ordinary legislative procedure or co-decision.
With the entrance into force of the new Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, co-decision now applies to the majority of
EU legislation (with some exceptions, such as in the areas of taxation and foreign policy).
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) serve five-year terms. Voting for the EP takes place on a national
basis, with the number of MEPs representing each EU member state based roughly on population size. The EP
currently has seven political groups, which caucus according to political ideology plus a number of “non-attached”
or independent members. A political group must contain at least 25 MEPs from a minimum of seven EU member
states. No single group in the EP has ever achieved an absolute majority, making compromise and coalition-building
important elements of the legislative process.
The EP’s two largest groups are the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), with 273 seats, and the center-left
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D), with 189 seats. The other EP groups are
the centrist Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), with 84 seats; the leftist and pro-environment
Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA), with 57 seats; the right-wing, anti-federalist European Conservatives and
Reformists (ECR), with 55 seats; the far-left European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), with 35 seats; and the
euroskeptic Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD), with 32 seats. The remaining seats are non-attached.
Every two-and-a-half years (twice per parliamentary term), MEPs vote to elect the President of the European
Parliament to oversee its work and to represent the EP externally. The EP has 20 standing committees that are
key actors in the adoption of EU legislation and 41 delegations that maintain international parliament-to-parliament
relations. A Secretariat of more than 5,000 non-partisan civil servants provides administrative and technical support
to the Parliament. MEPs and political groups also have their own staff assistants. Work in the Parliament is conducted
in 23 working languages.
Strasbourg, France, is the official seat of the EP; this location, close to the border with Germany, was chosen to
symbolize peace and reconciliation in Europe. Plenary sessions are held in Strasbourg once a month. The work of the
EP is also carried out in Brussels, Belgium, where the standing committees meet and where occasional part-plenary
sessions are held. Luxembourg also hosts some sections of the EP’s Secretariat, particularly the linguistic staff.


Analysts observe that the EP has not been shy about exerting its new powers, and in some cases,
with implications for U.S. interests. In February 2010, for example, the EP rejected a U.S.-EU
terrorist finance tracking agreement (known as the SWIFT accord) that would have continued
allowing U.S. authorities access to European financial data to help counter terrorism. Prior to the
Lisbon Treaty, the EP did not have the authority to veto such international agreements. Although
the EP eventually approved a new U.S.-EU SWIFT accord in July 2010, it did so only after

(...continued)
The European Union’s Reform Process: The Lisbon Treaty, by Kristin Archick and Derek E. Mix.
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several EP demands related to strengthening data privacy protections for EU citizens were agreed
to by the United States and the other EU institutions. Similarly, the Lisbon Treaty empowered the
EP to approve the previously mentioned U.S.-EU PNR agreement. Some in the EP had long
expressed concern that the PNR agreement did not contain sufficient protections to safeguard the
personal data and privacy rights of EU citizens. In an effort to assuage EP concerns and ensure
the PNR agreement’s approval in Parliament, U.S. and EU officials negotiated some revisions to
the 2007 PNR accord; the new U.S.-EU PNR agreement was approved in April 2012 by the
Parliament.
More recently, even before the aforementioned U.S.-EU High Level Working Group issued its
recommendation on the transatlantic economy, the Parliament approved a report prepared by its
International Trade Committee endorsing the launch of negotiations between the U.S. and the EU
for a new transatlantic economic and trade agreement. In setting out its interests and concerns in
the report, the Parliament indicated that the EP plans to be an active participant in the trade
debate. Any such agreement in the end will also have to be approved by the EP for it to take
effect.
U.S. policymakers have taken note that the EP has become an increasingly important actor in the
conduct of U.S.-EU relations. In May 2010, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden addressed the EP
in Brussels. In September 2010, in a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton acknowledged that the EP was now an “influential player” and
not long after visited the Parliament as well. In November 2010, U.S. Ambassador to the EU
William Kennard asserted that there was an “urgent need to intensify and deepen” the U.S.
relationship with the EP, and in particular, that between Congress and the EP.12 When the
President of the Parliament visited the United States in November 2012, he met with Vice
President Biden, Senate Majority Leader Reid, and House Minority Leader Pelosi. All of these
meetings have been seen by some U.S. officials and analysts and examples of how it has become
important for U.S. interests that Congress forge stronger ties with the EP.
Many of those who support attempts to bolster relations between the two legislative bodies also
point out that, in the past, there have been instances in which legislation passed by either the U.S.
Congress or the EP has affected the other side and contributed to U.S.-EU tensions. For example,
in 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to reform U.S. corporate accounting
practices in the wake of a series of scandals at major corporations such as Enron. EU officials
objected to many of the provisions of the act, claiming that they did not take into account
differences in European corporate governance and financing mechanisms. Meanwhile, some U.S.
business interests, exporters, and Members of Congress had expressed similar concerns about the
costs and burdens of new EU regulations, such as those governing chemicals (known as
REACH), which took effect in 2007. In 2010, U.S.-EU frictions surfaced over proposed EU
legislation to regulate hedge funds and private equity groups. And most recently, Congress
expressed its concern over the EU’s decision to endorse a carbon tax on all airlines, including
U.S. carriers flying into Europe, as part of the EU’s emissions trading system (ETS), a measure
adopted by the European Parliament.
Pointing to the above examples, some experts assert that U.S.-EU tensions could have perhaps
been avoided—or at least reduced—if both sides’ legislative bodies had consulted more ahead of

12 U.S. Ambassador to the European Union William E. Kennard, “Improving Relations Between the U.S. Congress and
the European Parliament: A Call for Action,” U.S. Mission to the European Union, November 2010.
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time. Many of this view recommend that the U.S. Congress and the EP should make a more
concerted effort to share legislative information with each other in some policy areas. As noted
previously, in several post-TLD meeting statements, both sides have urged the creation of an
“early warning” system that would alert both bodies of potential problems related to legislation
working its way through either institution.
In addition to financial services and regulatory issues that some experts have long argued should
be issues for Congress-Parliament legislative cooperation, other areas that would likely benefit
from greater consultation and coordination include energy security, data protection, and cyber-
security. Some observers believe that greater Congress-EP consultation could be useful as both
U.S. and for example, EU policymakers grapple with issues related to trade as well as intellectual
property rights (IPR), especially as they apply to the digital environment. In July 2012, the EP
rejected the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which had been negotiated by the
United States, the EU, and several other countries, to further strengthen IPR protection and
enforcement measures and to address emerging issues such as on-line trademark and copyright
infringement; those opposed in the Parliament cited concerns that ACTA was too vague and could
jeopardize civil liberties, such as Internet free speech. The United States negotiated ACTA as an
executive agreement within existing U.S. law so it was not subject to congressional approval,
although Congress may play an oversight role in its implementation. Given that the EP’s rejection
of ACTA prevents the EU and its member states from ratifying the agreement in its current form,
some suggest that discussions between the EP and Congress could help avoid potential conflicts
related to any future legislation on either side on IPR issues in the digital environment.
Similarly, Congress and the European Parliament held an informational session on a potential
U.S.-EU trade and economic agreement during the regular TLD meeting held in Washington in
late November 2012. Many members of the House Ways and Means Committee attended this
session. Some believe this could be the first step toward closer Congress-Parliament cooperation
on trade matters.
Although there had not been significant self-initiated movement within Congress over the past
several years, including 2012, to expand Congress-EP relations, those in favor of boosting ties
between the two institutions have proposed a variety of possible options for doing so. Some have
suggested that Congress needs a new, more institutionalized structure to manage its relationship
with the EP. Others assert that a new structure is not necessary, but that the existing TLD,
especially on the U.S. side, should be enhanced and reinvigorated. (For a more extensive
discussion of these options and others, see “Initiatives to Strengthen
Congress-Parliament Cooperation.”)
On the other hand, although there have not been observable objections to enhanced Congress-EP
ties, U.S. skeptics both inside and outside of Congress have raised doubts about the need to
establish a stronger relationship between Congress and the European Parliament. They note that
despite the increased powers granted to the EP in the Lisbon Treaty, the two bodies are not
exactly comparable and that differences between the two bodies’ legislative processes are a key
issue when considering whether the U.S. Congress and the EP can effectively work with each
other on matters of common interest that might involve legislation.
For instance, a significant difference between Congress and the EP is the way legislation is
handled. In the U.S. Congress, legislation may be introduced by any Member of Congress. In the
House, the legislation is referred to a committee based on “primary” jurisdiction. Measures can
also be sequentially referred to additional committees, and many measures are referred to more
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than one panel. In the Senate, measures are referred based on “predominant” jurisdiction and it is
rare for measures to be referred to more than one committee.
In the European Union, legislation is first proposed by the European Commission (the EU’s
executive body) and then submitted to the Parliament and the Council of the European Union,
also known as the Council of Ministers. Given that the European Commission is the originator of
EU legislation, coordinating the legislative process between the two legislatures could be difficult
especially because legislation in Congress can be considered as rapidly or as deliberately as
Congress wishes, or not at all. To have legislation run parallel in both legislatures, the
Commission would probably have to submit a legislative proposal around the same time a similar
piece was introduced in either the House or Senate. Although the EP can ask the Commission to
introduce legislation on a particular issue that might be under consideration in Congress and that
the Parliament believes should be addressed, the Commission can take up to six months to decide
whether or not it will submit legislation in response to the EP’s request. Even if the Commission
decided to comply, the process of developing the actual legislative proposal could take up to one
year or longer. Thus, it would require much coordination to have legislation considered on a
simultaneous or near-simultaneous basis in both Congress and the EP, as well as a strong political
commitment from both sides to do so.
Furthermore, the EP shares its powers to accept, amend, or reject proposed EU legislation with
the Council of Ministers and both the EP and the Council must approve a Commission proposal
for it to become EU law in a process known as “ordinary legislative procedure” or more
commonly as “co-decision”. All EU legislation must have its legal basis in the EU treaties (upon
which the EU has been built) or in a piece of secondary legislation, and each legislative proposal
must cite in its preamble the EU treaty article upon which it is based. (Interestingly, a new rule
adopted by the Republican leadership for the 112th Congress would require that all bills
introduced should provide the “constitutional authority” for their provisions.) The legal basis
determines the procedure under which the legislation is considered, (i.e., whether the Parliament’s
right of “co-decision” applies).13 The Parliament’s rules of procedure determine which committee
is deemed the “competent” committee to consider the legislative proposal. If the designated
competent committee wishes to challenge the legal basis of a piece of proposed legislation, it
must consult the Legal Affairs Committee.
Once legislation is submitted to the competent committee, the EP committee appoints an MEP as
“rapporteur” to draft a report on the legislation under consideration. The rapporteur submits a
draft report to the committee for discussion, and the committee votes on and possibly amends the
report. This is similar to a congressional committee mark-up of legislation except that the
rapporteur essentially controls the fate of the report, including accepting amendments. The
committee’s report is then considered in a plenary session of the entire Parliament (similar to how
legislation is considered by the whole House or Senate), amended if necessary, and put to a vote
in the full EP. The Parliament thus adopts its position on the proposed EU legislation. However,
as noted above, the Council of Ministers must also approve the legislation before it can take
effect.

13 In some policy areas, such as tax matters, social security, and most aspects of foreign and defense policy, EU
member states retain decision-making authority and the Parliament does not have the right of “co-decision,” although it
may give a non-binding opinion.
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Another difference noted by analysts is that there are some issues in which the Parliament may
have a legislative say, but Congress does not, and vice-versa. For example, when the renewal of
the U.S.-EU SWIFT agreement was considered, the Parliament played a key role and rejected the
accord initially. Later, after changes were negotiated between the European Commission and the
U.S. government, the Parliament held a second vote and adopted the agreement. During this
whole process, the SWIFT accord was not sent to the U.S. Congress for consideration because it
was negotiated by the United States as an executive agreement within existing U.S. law.
Similarly, the EP had a legislative role in approving the previously mentioned U.S.-EU PNR
accord whereas Congress did not because like SWIFT, it was negotiated as a U.S. executive
agreement and did not necessitate any change to existing U.S. law. This is not to say Congress
cannot or would not interject itself into an issue in which it would not normally have a role. For
example, in May 2011, in the midst of U.S.-EU negotiations on the revised PNR agreement, the
House introduced a resolution (H.Res. 255) and the Senate passed one (S.Res. 174) in which they
each expressed satisfaction with the 2007 version of the accord and noted that any alterations to
the accord must not degrade its usefulness in the fight against terrorism. Most analysts viewed
these congressional resolutions as seeking to bolster the Administration’s negotiating hand vis-à-
vis the EU.
Given the number of differences between the U.S. and EU policymaking processes, skeptics
question whether stronger Congress-EP relations would add much value. Others contend,
however, that even in matters such as SWIFT or PNR—in which one side has a legislative role
and the other does not—closer ties and personal relationships between Members of Congress and
their counterparts in the EP could help inform each other of the various viewpoints, frame the
debate, and perhaps influence outcomes.
The Current Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue
Although the creation of the TEC and the appointment of the TLD to its Advisory Group perhaps
did more initially to raise the visibility of the TLD than any other event over the previous several
years, the TLD remained relatively unknown in the U.S. Congress compared with its status in the
European Parliament. With the opening of the EP’s liaison office, not only has the Parliament
become more visible on Capitol Hill but as a consequence, the TLD has also become more visible
and is more frequently mentioned in discussions with Members of Congress and staff. As noted
earlier, at the November 30, 2012, session of the TLD, a joint meeting with the House Ways and
Means Committee on a possible U.S.-EU economic and trade agreement resulted in the
participation of a large number of Committee members. Still, the visibility of the TLD within
Congress has not yet reached the level necessary to become a more influential organization in
promoting the Congress-Parliament partnership. Some suggest that a key reason for this disparity
can be found in the structure and function of the TLD itself, which differs significantly between
the U.S. Congress and the EP.
At the start of each new Parliament (the current one runs from 2009 to 2014), the EP adopts a
resolution proposing a list of interparliamentary delegations and sets the number of MEPs that
will constitute each delegation. At present, there are a total of 41 delegations in the Parliament.14

14 The EP’s 41 delegations consist of 37 interparliamentary delegations (some are termed either Joint Parliamentary
Committees or Parliamentary Cooperation Committees) that maintain relations with countries and regions around the
(continued...)
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The largest EP delegation is the Delegation for Relations with the United States (D-US), which
currently consists of 53 MEPs. Each political group in the Parliament receives an allocation of
delegation seats roughly proportional to its overall size in the EP. For example, the European
People’s Party (EPP), the largest political group in the EP, has 19 seats in the D-US whereas the
Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) group, which is the smallest in the EP, has two seats.
Similarly, each political group receives an allocation of chairmanships/vice chairs of the various
delegations, with the largest group having the first choice of chair. In 2009, the EPP selected the
chairmanship of the D-US as its first choice and named Elmar Brok, a German MEP, as chair.
MEPs are appointed to the delegation for the full five-year term of the Parliament. The D-US
meets on a periodic basis to discuss a wide range of issues involving the transatlantic relationship
as well as the upcoming TLD meetings. In 2012, Christian Ehler, a German MEP, replaced Brok
as chair of the D-US after Brok assumed the chair of the EP’s foreign affairs committee.
In the EP, participants in the semi-annual TLD meetings are drawn from the D-US delegation. EP
representation in the TLD (EUTLD) is led by a Steering Committee consisting of the chairman
and two vice chairs of the D-US and 10 MEPs who are the chairs of various EP standing
committees ranging from International Trade to Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. The
Steering Committee coordinates all activities of the TLD, ensures that there is broad
representation of MEPs from the EP’s committees at the TLD meetings, and reports to the D-US
on its activities. The number of MEPs attending the annual TLD meetings has often exceeded 20
members.
On the U.S. side, the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue is one of 13 Parliamentary and
Commission Groups operating in Congress. Unlike some of the other exchanges, such as the
NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATOPA) or the British-American Parliamentary Group
(BAPG), which also include the Senate, U.S. representation in the TLD (USTLD) is from the
House only. In addition, the USTLD is not statutorily authorized, although it is authorized to
receive funds each year to support its activities. Thus, while the NATOPA and the BAPG are
authorized by statute to include a total of 24 official delegates (12 each from the House and
Senate that are appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader
respectively), the TLD has no specified number of participants and no mandated Speaker
appointment.
Furthermore, official U.S. delegates of several of the statutorily authorized parliamentary
exchanges are appointed for the duration of each Congress. The USTLD, by contrast, has no fixed
term for its participants. Traditionally, the chair and ranking Member of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee appointed the USTLD’s chair and vice chair. During the late 1990s, the Chair
of the House International Relations Committee also served as Chair of the USTLD. In the 112th
Congress the Chair, Representative Cliff Stearns (FL) was appointed by the Speaker. The Vice
Chair, Representative Loretta Sanchez (CA) was appointed by the Minority Leader and the
ranking Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. There is no formal nomination of any other
USTLD delegate. Many Members have attended past meetings, but participation in the USTLD—
at least until recently—often seemed to be on an ad hoc basis, with little continuity of participants
and, in some instances, largely dependent on the ability of the USTLD chair to convince members

(...continued)
world ranging from Russia to China to the Middle East, and four delegations to parliamentary assemblies (such as the
Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly). For a list of current EP delegations, see the website of the European
Parliament, http://www.europarl.europa.eu.
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to attend the semi-annual meetings.15 An example of this was seen at the November 2012 TLD
meeting when after the previously mentioned trade session concluded, only four or perhaps five
Members of Congress participated in the remainder of the meetings. Moreover, the USTLD has
no equivalent “Steering Committee” to help plan future TLD meetings, set agendas, or encourage
Members to participate. Some observers have suggested that the EU Caucus, created in the House
in 2005, could serve as the umbrella organization from which TLD delegates could be drawn.
However, there has been little association between the two, even though several Members of the
House participate in both the Caucus and the TLD.
Although U.S. Member participation in TLD sessions during the 112th Congress appears to have
maintained a certain level of continuity, there is still concern among some observers that without
some additional level of formality in the House, the USTLD could continue to have difficulty
attracting and maintaining a broad group of Members willing to participate on a regular basis.
TLD supporters worry that the lack of sustained U.S. member participation hinders the
development of personal relationships between legislators, seen as essential for a truly frank and
open exchange of views and as necessary ultimately for greater legislative consultation and
coordination. Similarly, while the EUTLD has representation from most of its key parliamentary
committees, the USTLD is not structured to guarantee the inclusion of Members from all of the
major congressional committees. Combined with the uncertainty over which Members will
actually participate in the U.S. delegation each time the TLD meets, some MEPs have observed
that the TLD sessions do not necessarily provide them with good U.S. contacts on matters of
interest to them. Many in the transatlantic business and consumer communities—who are the
TLD’s partners in the TEC—also appear frustrated that there is no permanent list of USTLD
delegates with whom they can meet on a regular basis to discuss issues of mutual interest,
including those issues related to the TEC and the regulatory agenda.16
Another difference between the U.S. Congress and the EP in relation to the TLD involves
staffing. Traditionally, on the U.S. side, three principal staff have operated as the “U.S.
secretariat” for the TLD: an administrator and one Representative from the majority and minority.
In the 112th Congress, however, the majority staff also served as the delegation’s secretariat
although on several recent occasions a representative of the House’s Office of Inter-Parliamentary
Affairs has attended the TLD meetings and assisted with TLD logistics. The staff of the USTLD
are part of the House Foreign Affairs Committee structure and usually have portfolios with many
responsibilities beyond the TLD. Observers note that the Foreign Affairs Committee staff are
highly professional, knowledgeable of transatlantic relations, and provide sufficient support for
most security and foreign policy-related discussions at the TLD meetings. However, these same
observers also point out that none of the key items on the U.S.-EU economic or regulatory agenda
are ones that fall under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Affairs Committee. This disconnect
between USTLD staff and the issues most frequently found on the TLD agenda was further
highlighted when the TLD, at the beginning of the 112th Congress, was tasked to focus on a few
specific issues. At the fall 2011 and spring 2012 sessions of the TLD, two issues that formed the
centerpiece of the discussions involved financial services and transport security, neither of which
fall under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The agenda for the fall 2012 TLD
meeting also included sessions on cyber security and trade, again issues not within the
jurisdiction of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

15 CRS interviews with congressional staff.
16 CRS interviews with representatives of the business community.
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In the view of many experts, it continues to be a real stretch to expect that Foreign Affairs
Committee staff who are responsible for following issues and events in places ranging from
Russia to Kosovo to Eurasia can somehow also find the time to become proficient on cloud
computing, internet freedom, automobile crash testing, container scanning, toy safety, or hedge
fund transparency. And, realistically, neither the Foreign Affairs Committee nor the USTLD chair
and vice chairs could hire a whole cadre of staff with the kind of expertise needed to be
responsive to the various issues under consideration by the TLD, particularly those in the TEC
process. Although these non-foreign policy matters have come to dominate the TLD meeting
agenda, it does not appear that there is regular contact between USTLD staff and other standing
committee staff that would allow for coordination of issues and committee perspectives beyond
foreign policy issues.
The EUTLD is also staffed by a secretariat, which includes five permanent EP staff dedicated to
the coordination and operation of the TLD together with the relations with Canada and the G-8.
Recently, the EUTLD secretariat has worked with the secretariats of the EP standing committees
to designate a TLD Administrator for each committee; these Administrators are intended to act as
interlocutors between the committees and the TLD as well as the Parliament’s liaison office in
Washington, helping the TLD secretariat to identify issues that should be placed on the TLD
meeting agenda and promoting greater coordination of views and positions. In the EP, the D-US
falls under what is known as the Directorate-General for External Policy which provides
professional support for the EP committees on Foreign Affairs, Development, and International
Trade, as well as for all of the EP delegations. The DG-EXPO also includes a Policy Department
whose staff provide research and background information for the delegations and committees,
including the EUTLD.
Initiatives to Strengthen
Congress-Parliament Cooperation
Since the launch of the TLD in 1999, there have been numerous calls on both sides of the Atlantic
to find ways to develop even closer cooperation between Congress and the EP. Some in the
European Parliament have gone so far as to suggest the creation of a transatlantic parliamentary
assembly consisting of Members of Congress and the Parliament that would share joint
responsibility for addressing issues of mutual interest through both oversight and legislative
mechanisms. This proposal has not found any support in the U.S. Congress and likely will not in
the future.
As more Members of Congress and Parliament as well as more outside observers begin to
advocate for closer cooperation between Congress and Parliament, especially now that both
institutions have begun to discuss a potential transatlantic economic and trade agreement which
both bodies would be involved in, several ideas have been put forward to help strengthen the
overall effectiveness of the Congress-to-Parliament partnership. While the European Parliament
has been far out in front of Congress in the pursuit of a stronger relationship, as noted earlier, the
U.S. Congress as a whole, while supporting dialogue, has not seemed to embrace the need for
significantly closer ties. Nevertheless, should Congress deem it worthwhile in the years ahead to
further deepen relations with the EP, there are a number of potential options that could be
considered and explored.
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Several possible options for enhancing Congress-Parliament cooperation are discussed below;
some are specific to the USTLD, and others pertain to the broader Congress-EP relationship.
Some observers suggest that a new structure on the U.S. side is needed to oversee and guide
Congress-EP relations. However, others contend that the U.S. Congress and its committees and
subcommittees, the EU Caucus, and the TLD itself provide the necessary structure for managing
the Congress-EP relationship. For those of this view, the issue is not to create a new structure but
to find ways to promote more coordination between the various elements of the existing
structures in order to try to make the existing structure work more effectively.
1. Enhance the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue
For some, the first step in any attempt to boost Congress-EP relations and enhance the
effectiveness of the TLD might be to elevate the status of the USTLD by making the TLD
statutorily similar to other legislative dialogues and including the Senate. However, to bring the
Senate on would require a whole new legislative effort with prospects that would appear to be
difficult at this time.
Short of that, supporters of enhancing the TLD have suggested that the TLD be formally
authorized by resolution in the House. Under this option, at the beginning of each Congress
Members of the House, not just the chairman and vice chairman, would be appointed to the TLD
either by the Speaker and Minority Leader in consultation with the Chairman and Ranking
Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, or by the Chair and Ranking Member of the Foreign
Affairs Committee with the concurrence of the Speaker and Minority Leader. The number of U.S.
delegates to the TLD should also be firmly established (e.g., at 15, with up to 5 additional
delegation seats open to any Member interested). The TLD delegation would be appointed for the
full two years of a Congress. In appointing Members to the TLD, it has been suggested that
whoever ultimately appoints delegation members should ensure representation from a cross-
section of standing committees in the House. In the 112th Congress, the Speaker eventually
notified the chair of the USTLD of his appointment, but for the entire 112th Congress, it did not
appear that any other Members had been formally appointed to the TLD by anyone.
Some proponents of this option believe that the Congressional Caucus on the EU should be
revitalized and form the umbrella organization for Congress-EP relations, much like the EP’s
Delegation for Relations with the United States and that the appointed USTLD delegates come
from the core of the EU Caucus; other members of the Caucus could act as substitutes for any
USTLD delegate unable to attend a particular session or serve as additional USTLD participants.
Advocates of enhancing the TLD had in the past suggested that in appointing the TLD chair, the
Speaker or Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee should identify a few specific issues that the
TLD should focus on and that the USTLD chair, in conjunction with the EUTLD would establish
either political and economic committees within which those issues would be addressed, or
specific working groups to focus on those issues. USTLD Chair Stearns, in a press release
regarding his appointment as chair in 2011, noted three major issues the Speaker suggested the
TLD should seek to address. These included transport security; financial markets; and agriculture.
By the end of 2011, it appeared that agriculture had been eliminated from consideration, and with
the appointment of MEP Ehler as the new EUTLD chair, cyber-security has been added to the list
as an additional issue for discussion. Although identifying a few specific priorities to be discussed
was considered a step toward more productive TLD sessions, some also maintain that the TLD
should remain flexible enough to be able to address issues that might emerge in between the
semi-annual sessions, or an issue working its way through the legislative process on either side.
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For instance it now appears that transatlantic trade could become an additional issue for the TLD
in 2013.
Supporters of this type of structure asserted that it would offer Members and MEPs the
opportunity to focus more sustained attention on issues in which they may have a particular
interest or expertise. The TLD working group chairs would report on the topics discussed in their
committees to the entire body at some point during the TLD meetings. In addition, working group
members could become more inter-active with each other in the time between the TLD’s semi-
annual meetings by promoting on-going dialogue between themselves, committee chairs,
rapporteurs, and other delegates through the use of video conferences and meetings so that TLD
members could keep in touch year-round. This idea began to gain some traction when in
preparation for the 2011 summer meeting of the TLD, the EUTLD announced the formation of
individual working groups for at least two of the priority issue areas noted above. However, as the
USTLD does not have a pre-determined membership, it was not ready to appoint members to the
working groups at that time but suggested this could be done by the fall meeting. The TLD met
again in December 2011, and although EUTLD working groups presented two “non-papers” on
financial services and transport security for discussion, the U.S. delegation still had not named
any Members to the suggested working groups. Plans shifted to the spring 2012 session to
accomplish this. At the spring 2012 TLD session, the U.S. delegation presented responses to the
two “non-papers” presented by the EUTLD at the December meeting and discussions centered on
those two issues although the USTLD had still not actually named members to the two working
groups.
Up until the spring 2012 meeting, the lack of a formal structure or even of working groups
focused on specific issues had led some observers to note that the TLD had not further
strengthened its role, in part, as an advisor to the TEC. They pointed out that the two issues the
TLD was concentrating on (financial services and transport security) were not the focus of the
TEC, which had moved on to issues such as nano-technology, electric automobiles, and e-health.
While the issues addressed by the TLD were important, some observers had hoped that some of
the other issues on the TEC agenda would emerge on the TLD agenda in the future.
Another opportunity for the TLD to become more influential came in late 2011, when the TLD’s
role as an advisory body to the TEC was handed another chance to have an effective say in
transatlantic economic relations. On November 17, 2011, in a resolution adopted by the European
Parliament regarding the annual U.S.-EU Summit to be held later that month, the EP (responding,
in part, to a report published by the TPN)17 called for a joint transatlantic jobs and growth
initiative, including a trade and investment roadmap, and expressed the need to strengthen the
TEC process to achieve these objectives. The resolution also “urged the U.S. and the EU to
involve the TLD closely in the TEC.”18
At the U.S.-EU Summit at the end of November 2011, U.S. and EU leaders discussed potential
U.S.-EU initiatives to stimulate transatlantic economic growth and job creation. In the joint
statement issued at the conclusion of the Summit, the leaders directed the TEC to establish “a
joint High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, co-chaired by the European Commissioner
for Trade and the U.S. Trade Representative.” The Summit leaders asked the Working Group to

17 Toward a Strategic Vision for the Transatlantic Market, Fourth Report, Transatlantic Policy Network, 2011.
18 See paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of the European Parliament resolution on the EU-U.S. Summit of 28 November 2011
adopted on November 17, 2011.
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“identify and assess options for strengthening the U.S.-EU economic relationship, especially
those that have the highest potential to support jobs and growth.” These types of job and growth
initiatives once identified could possibly require some legislative action by Congress and the
Parliament. To its credit, the TLD did recognize a role for itself in this area and discussed the
High Level Working Group’s mandate at its spring session in June 2012 in Copenhagen,
Denmark. In the TLD’s Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of that session, the TLD declared
its intention to continue the dialogue and to invite representatives of both the U.S. government
and the European Commission to present the results of the High Level Group’s work at the Fall
2012 session of the TLD. As noted earlier, at the November 30 TLD meeting a joint TLD/ Ways
and Means Committee meeting took place to hear from outside speakers on the idea of a
transatlantic economic and trade agreement. This unique session drew several Members from the
Committee who had the opportunity to engage with both the U.S. and EP members of the TLD.
This appeared to be a good model for future TLD sessions as it does serve to introduce other
Members of Congress and the EP to the work of the TLD potentially providing new TLD
membership opportunities.
Some observers have also argued that it may be worth considering hiring one or two dedicated
USTLD staff in the House, instead of relying on the current structure of utilizing Foreign Affairs
Committee staff. These permanent USTLD staff could potentially become part of the Speaker’s
Office of Interparliamentary Affairs. Such permanent USTLD staff could coordinate the activities
of the TLD, help the USTLD liaise with standing committee staff, and meet regularly with
representatives of the EP’s Washington liaison office. In addition, the USTLD might consider
establishing its own website to keep Members informed of its activities.
Pros and Cons. Supporters of enhancing the existing TLD—especially by having it authorized in
in the House and having the Speaker play a more active role in appointing the U.S. delegates—
maintain that such measures would raise the standing of the TLD in the House and could
guarantee a more consistent group of attendees on the U.S. side. Establishing working groups
(now done on the EUTLD side but not yet on the USTLD side) and assigning Members and
MEPs as chairs, vice chairs, and rapporteurs could convey a sense of “ownership” within the
TLD, generate more dialogue within the TLD in between the semi-annual TLD meetings, and
possibly increase liaison between the TLD and the standing committees given that the rapporteurs
would most likely contact the respective standing committees in their own institutions to discuss
their research efforts. The research projects undertaken by the rapporteurs would also provide the
opportunity for TLD staff and other support staff to be in contact with each other on a more
regular basis and with appropriate committee staff
Skeptics of this option contend, however, that it would require a significant amount of political
will in the U.S. Congress for it to materialize. In particular, they argue, this option would likely
require a strong commitment not only from those Members currently involved in the TLD but
also from the Speaker, in order to sufficiently convey to Members the importance of participating
in this interparliamentary group. Those of this view also doubt that the House leadership would
be receptive to hiring additional staff dedicated to the TLD given the current political and
economic climate.
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2. Develop Closer TLD Coordination with the Standing
Committees and Promote Committee Cooperation
One problem that has been recognized since the launch of the TLD in 1999 is that no single
committee—in either Congress or the EP—exercises jurisdiction over the broad array of issues on
the transatlantic agenda. In the U.S. House, the committee that has the primary authority to
oversee the transatlantic political relationship—the Foreign Affairs Committee under House Rule
X—has no, or limited, authority on the specific economic or trade issues under consideration by
the TLD.
Not long after the TLD was assigned its advisory role to the TEC, it became clear to some—
including former MEP Jonathan Evans who served as chair of the EUTLD from 2004 to 2009—
that the structure of the TLD was not optimally organized to address the TLD’s new
responsibilities with respect to regulatory cooperation. Evans, along with some of his colleagues
and a number of outside observers, felt that while most Members of Congress and the EP
participating in the TLD were well versed to discuss a broad range of foreign policy issues and
that the close connection between the USTLD and the Foreign Affairs Committee should
continue, the same could not necessarily be said when it came to talking about more domestic-
policy related issues or the more technical regulatory matters. Given the wide array of issues in
the regulatory dialogue—including the mutual recognition of accounting standards, supply chain
security, copyright and patent protection, preferred traveler programs, cosmetics testing, and
medical device certification—an unstructured TLD might find itself further down the learning
curve than its transatlantic business and consumer partners in the TEC, thus requiring TLD
delegates to spend time catching up on such issues. This, in turn, could present a problem for
some TLD participants who might be reluctant to become more specialized in economic and
regulatory matters at the expense of other broader transatlantic policy issues. Moreover, such
participants would probably not want the TLD to become strictly TEC-issue oriented.
It also remained unclear to Evans and others whether other House committees—such as Financial
Services, Judiciary, or Homeland Security—would necessarily defer to the TLD to provide advice
and guidance, for instance, to the TEC on issues that fall within their jurisdictions. As a result,
Evans suggested that Congress and the Parliament consider ways to improve direct committee-to-
committee contact on specific issues and for the TLD to develop mechanisms whereby it could
tap the expertise of the committees and their staffs when necessary for the TLD meetings or for
the TLD response to the TEC.
Like U.S. congressional committees, EP committees are key actors in the adoption of EU
legislation. Currently, the EP has 20 standing committees and one special committee (EP special
committees investigate or oversee specific issues for a limited period of time).
In the U.S. Congress, the House and Senate have similar lists of standing committees, albeit not
exactly the same. Committee jurisdictions are defined by the rules of each chamber and the House
and Senate committee jurisdictions are not always parallel. For example, the Senate Agriculture
Committee is responsible for child nutrition legislation, whereas that responsibility is handled in
the House by the House Education and Workforce Committee (not the House Agriculture
Committee). Child nutrition programs in the EP are handled by the Environment Committee.
Thus, Evans and many observers argued that an information-sharing process should be
established between the TLD and the standing committees, especially on the U.S. side. As
mentioned above, the European Parliament has already sought to address the TLD-committee
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relationship in two ways. First, the EUTLD requires representation from most of the EP’s
standing committees. Second, each EP committee has identified a “TLD Administrator” on its
staff to act as the liaison between the committee and the TLD, and at some point, between the
committee and its counterpart committee in Congress and with the EPLO. Any such TLD-to-
committee interaction in the U.S. Congress seems to occur, at best, on an ad hoc basis, if at all.
In addition to promoting closer links between the TLD and the standing committees in each
legislature, some experts suggest that the committees themselves should explore ways to work
directly and more closely with each other (on the U.S. side, some contend both House and Senate
committees should be involved). In part, this could be accomplished through video conferences,
joint hearings, and delegation visits encouraged by both the TLD and the EPLO in Washington.
One example of where it was thought cooperation could have worked was in the agriculture
sector. When the 112th Congress began the process to reauthorize the U.S. Farm Bill and the EP
began considering renewal of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, some observers felt that
issues such as farm and export subsidies, GMOs, and phytosanitary regulations were politically
important on both sides of the Atlantic and that the U.S. and EP agriculture committees might
explore how they could work in concert with each other, especially to identify areas of potential
conflict. Some suggested that the EU Caucus and the USTLD could have played a substantive
role in helping coordinate the interaction between committees as well as sponsoring workshops
and briefings for all Members of Congress and the EP on the issues involved in the Farm
Bill/CAP debate. While there may have been some level of contact between the two Committees
(Congressional Agriculture Committee staff visited their counterparts in the EP in June 2011
under a program sponsored by the Bertelsmann Foundation), there does not appear to have been
any substantive follow-up attempts to coordinate, or at least to discuss, related farm policy issues
among the members of either Committee. With the addition of financial services regulation, trade,
and cyber-security as issues of interest to the TLD, there could be new opportunities for the TLD
to explore ways to coordinate what the respective U.S. and EP committees are doing, as well as
what legislation is moving forward and what impact, if any, such legislation in either body could
have on the United States or the EU.
Pros and Cons. Proponents of developing closer ties between the TLD and the standing
committees stress that it is essential that committees with jurisdiction over issues on the U.S.-EU
agenda, including the TEC agenda, be included in the TLD dialogue in some way. For instance,
they assert that this is necessary because when the TEC meets and issues its recommendations on
how the United States and EU might deal with matters such as consumer product safety or port
security functions, or now, transatlantic jobs and growth initiatives, it likely does so with what it
believes to be the best guidance from the House of Representatives and the Parliament as a
whole, not just from two or three individual Members of Congress or the EP who happen to be
the TLD chairs and vice chairs. In addition, supporters contend that strengthening coordination
between the TLD and the standing committees would allow for greater committee input into what
should be included on the TLD meeting agendas and could help bring more U.S. members with
relevant expertise into the dialogue with the European Parliament as was the case at the
November 30 TLD session on trade. This lack of input from the relevant U.S. committees to the
USTLD leadership appears to have limited the kinds of progress on initiatives the TLD can
advocate or for its annual input to the TEC, which is supposed to help provide guidance to the
TEC’s work program.
Some observers point out, however, that developing closer TLD coordination with the standing
committees on the U.S. side would likely take some time and would require a sustained effort by
the USTLD chair. Given the still limited knowledge about the TLD and the EP in Congress, many
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committees would have to be convinced as to why cooperation might be in their interests. In
terms of establishing direct committee-to-committee contact in an effort to improve legislative
coordination between the two sides, others argue that some U.S. members might also be hesitant
to pursue this option for fear of being seen as putting the interests of the transatlantic relationship
ahead of those of their own constituents.
There are other potential problems as well. In many instances, personal relationships between
Committee chairmen and its members as well as chairmen and Leadership often play important
roles in attempting to coordinate and approve legislative initiatives. Whether such personal
relationships across the Atlantic could be developed in order to coordinate legislative initiatives is
for some questionable. Finally, most Members of Congress—other than a few involved in the
TLD—have not expressed as much interest or enthusiasm as their counterparts in the EP
regarding establishing closer committee coordination or cooperation. For instance, no standing
committee in the House has appointed any of its staff to act as a liaison between the committee
and its counterpart in the European Parliament or the USTLD.
3. Utilize European Parliament Liaison Staff
Deployed to Washington
This option would take advantage of the Parliament’s decision to deploy its own liaison staff to
Washington. Under this option, more regular meetings or briefings between the EPLO and the
USTLD chairs, USTLD delegates, the EU Caucus, and staff should be initiated in order to share
insights, observations, and other information regarding activities in both Congress and the EP. As
EP staffers are already in Washington and have a direct line of communication back to the
Parliament, they would update Members and staff on legislative proposals under consideration in
the EP while at the same time enlarging their own networks of Members and staff.
Pros and Cons. Supporters of this option note that the EPLO has begun to implement this option
and given that the staff of the EPLO appear eager to establish good, close relations with Members
of Congress and their staffs they would welcome the opportunity to have a regular exchange of
views. For many U.S. Members and staffers, this option would also have the advantage of being
relatively low-cost in terms of both money and time, while potentially helping to promote more
dialogue among TLD delegates in between the semi-annual meetings. Others argue that this
option may not be sufficient to significantly bolster the Congress-EP relationship. Some also
question whether this option could be structured enough to bring into the TLD dialogue a broader
range of committee staff on a regular and sustained basis. To date, it appears that individual
meetings between the EPLO staff and congressional staff are continuing but more formal
workshops or seminars hosted by the EPLO for a larger staff audience including the TLD and
committee staff to discuss issues before both the Parliament and Congress may be needed.
4. Establish a Senior Staff “Fellowship” Exchange
Under this option, senior congressional staff from either the Leadership offices or standing
committees could be designated by the House and/or Senate Leadership as congressional
“fellows” and seconded to the EP for a short-duration rotation (perhaps 2-3 months) with possibly
the EP Secretariat, a selected EP committee, or the EP’s Unit for Transatlantic Relations. This
kind of exchange could accommodate up to three or four staff rotating to Brussels over the course
of a year and would provide staff exposure to the Parliament as well as an avenue for continuous
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information exchange. Issues such as housing and other per diem costs would have to be
determined by Congress but under a “fellowship” type of program, it would appear that
congressional staff could hold an office and use equipment provided by the EP within the EP
itself, much as foreign “fellows” can work out of congressional offices.
Pros and Cons. Advocates of establishing a fellowship exchange assert that this option would
have the possible benefit of creating a cadre of U.S. staffers with first-hand knowledge of the EP
and how it functions, as well as personal contacts within the EP, something a typical staff visit of
a few days could not achieve. This could help further the goal of developing closer links between
Congress and the EP. On the negative side, some point out that rotating U.S. congressional staff
through Brussels on a short-term basis might not allow for the time necessary to establish strong
relationships with EP counterparts that could prove sustainable and useful in the future. Others
note that many congressional staffers—even at the senior level—often rotate in and out of
congressional service, potentially limiting the utility of such a fellowship program in terms of
enhancing long-term institutional ties between Congress and the EP.
One model that could be explored has already been initiated by the two largest political groups in
the EP, the center-right European Peoples Party (EPP) and Socialists and Democrats (S&D). The
EPP has occasionally invited republican staff to Brussels to learn how Parliament works and what
role political groups play. In turn, EPP staff usually spend a week in Washington meeting with
congressional staff. Although these exchanges are limited in duration, more party focused, and
not specific to an issue or legislation being consider in either body, they appear to have been
successful thus far. Similarly, the S&D has apparently initiated its own program in which an S&D
group staffer is seconded to an office of a Democratic Member for three or four weeks to learn
how Congress operates and to focus on a specific issue. Whether this kind of model could be
formalized through the TLD could be explored.
5. Deploy Congressional Staff to Brussels
This option, similar to what the EP has already done, would involve opening a congressional
liaison office in Brussels and deploying U.S. congressional staff there to work with the European
Parliament on a daily basis. Aside from the logistical issues of work visas, diplomatic status, per
diem, and others, this option would raise a series of questions for Congress such as who hires the
employees, who do they report to (the Speaker and/or Minority Leader, Committees, TLD
leadership). Other issues for consideration would include whether U.S. congressional staff could
legally occupy office space inside the Parliament and whether Congress would pay rent and
operating costs to the Parliament. As a variation of this option, some observers have suggested
that it might be possible for congressional staff to work out of the U.S. Mission to the EU, much
as the EPLO has been established administratively within the office space of the Washington
Delegation of the European Union.
Pros and Cons. Proponents of this option assert that establishing a congressional liaison office in
Brussels would be one of the most effective ways to pursue greater legislative consultation and
cooperation between Congress and the EP, provided Congress saw a need to do enhance its
relations with the Parliament. U.S. staffers deployed to Brussels would be able to follow events in
the Parliament closely and keep U.S. Members, committees, and congressional staff informed of
EP views and activities on a regular basis. Congressional staff in Brussels would also be well
placed to develop working relationships with MEPs, EP committees, and EP staffers; in turn, they
could connect Members and MEPs with similar legislative interests and help promote greater
dialogue on key issues.
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Critics contend, however, that establishing a congressional liaison office in Brussels is premature.
In the absence of a broader political commitment from the U.S. Congress to boost ties with the
EP, it appears difficult to even bolster the USTLD in Congress let alone establish a whole new
congressional entity focused on the EP. Although some of this view acknowledge that the EP’s
new liaison office in Washington may help develop closer relations between the EP and Congress,
they assert that most Members of Congress are not convinced of the need to coordinate legislation
with the EP or to have a reciprocal presence in Brussels at this time. Establishing a congressional
liaison office in Brussels would also be a considerable logistical undertaking and depending on
the eventual size of the office and the specific staff and housing arrangements, could entail a
significant financial expenditure. Some observers worry that a congressional liaison office in
Brussels could also set a precedent and lead to unrealistic expectations that Congress might seek
to establish similar offices in other countries. Possibly locating congressional staff within the U.S.
Mission to the EU would likely require extensive negotiations with the U.S. State Department and
could raise constitutional questions about the separation of powers.
6. Establish a Congressional Commission on the EU
Some proponents of forging closer ties between Congress and the EP have called for establishing
a Congressional Commission on the EU to monitor relevant EU legislation, evaluate its
implications for the United States, and serve as the primary congressional liaison with the EP and
the other EU institutions. Supporters of such an initiative assert that it could be largely modeled
on the existing U.S. Helsinki Commission, an independent government agency, which since 1976
has sought to encourage compliance with the political commitments made by the member states
of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Like the Helsinki
Commission, it has been suggested that a Congressional Commission on the EU should include
an equal number of Members from both the House and Senate, and representatives from both the
majority and minority; the Commission’s chair and vice chair would rotate each new Congress
between the House and Senate. The Commission would be able to hold hearings and meetings on
matters of mutual interest to Congress and the EP.
In January 2011, H.Con.Res. 2 was introduced (Representative Issa, CA) proposing the creation
of such a Commission along the lines described above. Although most of the staff of this potential
Commission would presumably be located in Washington, H.Con.Res. 2 also allows for the
provision of funds for the lease of office space by the Commission at or near the EP in Brussels.
Pros and Cons. Advocates of establishing a Congressional Commission on the EU argue that it
would likely focus greater attention on the Congress-EP relationship and the U.S.-EU partnership
more broadly, although some point out that it is unclear how a Commission could be any more
effective than the Europe Subcommittees, the EU Caucus, or the TLD in raising awareness of the
EU. As proposed in H.Con.Res. 2, a primary purpose of the Commission would be to monitor and
assess EU legislation and its potential impact on the United States; in doing so, some suggest it
could help to strengthen the TLD by demonstrating the EP’s growing influence and the
importance of increasing congressional engagement with the EP. In appointing Members to serve
on the Commission, it would create a small but invested group of Members with a sustained
interest in the EU and the EP. Proponents also point out that it would bring the Senate formally
into the growing dialogue with the EP. And as a liaison between Congress and the EP, such a
Commission could help to improve committee-to-committee relations between the two bodies
and/or provide an “early warning” mechanism for legislation under consideration in either the EP
or Congress.
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On the other hand, critics assert that this option is also premature given the lack of wider
congressional interest in promoting closer cooperation with the EP at this time. They also argue
that there is nothing in the proposal for a new Commission that could not already be done under
the current structures, and that unless in the creation of a such a Commission the majority of the
Commission’s staff were located in Brussels, it would not necessarily guarantee a more effective
or productive Congress-Parliament relationship. Some analysts point out that it is unclear how the
proposed Commission would relate to the TLD, or whether a TLD would even be required, and
they question whether the Senate would be willing or interested in participating (see below).
Others believe that if the current TLD were enhanced and if the standing committees in both the
U.S. Congress and the EP were to increase direct contact with each other, such a Commission
would be redundant. Moreover, amid the current U.S. political climate, some doubt that the
proposed Commission could garner the necessary support in the near future, in part because it
would likely entail significant financial and staffing commitments.
Role of the Senate
Many observers have raised the question of what role the Senate might play in efforts to
strengthen ties between the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament. For the operation of the
TLD in general, the Senate has never been involved. Visiting EP delegations coming to the
United States have paid courtesy calls occasionally on the Senate but the Senate has never
participated formally in the TLD sessions. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (NH), chair of the Europe
Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has indicated her interest in exploring
ways the Senate could be involved with the TLD although there has been no intent to create a
Senate version of the TLD or to statutorily establish a TLD with both House and Senate
participation up to this point. Some observers believe that a reinvigorated House EU Caucus
could reach out to the Senate to include some Senators as Members of the Caucus, thus giving the
Senate contact with the activities of the TLD. Others believe that interested Senators should
consider creating a Senate EU Caucus and then offer to hold joint meetings/briefings with the
House counterpart. Through a joint Caucus effort, the Senate could potentially participate in TLD
meetings as additional USTLD delegates.
For many experts, the fact that the Senate has a co-equal role in the broader transatlantic
relationship and the narrower role of regulatory overshight, but is not included as part of the TLD
for purposes of the TEC Advisory Group, is a serious concern. As of December 2012, the TEC
had met seven times with the Advisory Group, yet there does not seem to be a formal mechanism
within the TLD to include the Senate in its discussions with the TEC nor is there a way within the
TEC Advisory Group to solicit Senate opinion. Thus, while the TLD over time could develop
some level of authority to represent the views of the House on issues addressed in the Advisory
Group’s meetings with the TEC, including in a potential transatlantic trade negotiation, the TLD,
as currently structured, cannot claim to speak on behalf of the Senate. Many observers assert that
this oversight must be addressed if the TEC intends to receive the advice of the whole Congress.
At a December 2009 hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Europe Subcommittee,
the issue of the TLD and the role of the Senate in the TEC process was addressed by the
witnesses and, according to Committee staff, was to be further investigated. It is unclear that any
progress in resolving the issue has been achieved. One option that would allow the TLD to
continue its broad mandate to address a wide range of transatlantic issues and at the same time
include the Senate in its role as a TEC advisor, may be for the USTLD chair to consider creating a
Congressional TEC Working Group. This Working Group would include Members from both the
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House and Senate who sit on committees with jurisdiction over issues on the TEC Advisory
Group meeting agenda in order to encourage Senate input into the TEC process. Some observers
suggest that any efforts to elevate the broader Congress-Parliament relationship must have Senate
participation. For example, Senate committees might also be encouraged to establish direct
contact with EP committees with similar jurisdictions. As noted previously, while Senator
Shaheen has raised the issue, it remains unclear to what extent Members of the Senate may be
interested in developing relations with the EP, establishing ties with MEPs, or forging closer links
between the relevant Senate and EP committees.
Conclusion
The European Parliament places a premium on its partnership with the U.S. Congress, and is
committed to developing closer relations between the two legislative bodies. As noted above, the
EP has implemented its long-held intention to open a legislative liaison office in Washington to
increase its presence in Congress. And in recognition of the wide array of legislative issues facing
Congress and the EP that could affect the broader transatlantic relationship, the EP has sought to
involve its various standing committees in the work of the TLD in an attempt to enhance its
effectiveness and utility.
On the U.S. side, however, Congress—other than those Members who have participated in the
TLD—does not seem to be, at least at this point, as interested as the European Parliament in
trying to establish closer legislative cooperation. Some attribute this lack of enthusiasm on the
U.S. side to the fact that many believe that the two institutions do not have the exact same
legislative powers or mandates. And many Members of Congress believe that the TLD, although
never intended to be anything more than a mechanism for exchanging views among
parliamentarians, currently wields little influence or authority as a transatlantic policy resource.
The initial involvement of the TLD in the TEC’s efforts to move regulatory cooperation toward
the ultimate goal of an unencumbered transatlantic marketplace did appear to raise the TLD’s
visibility in the U.S. Congress. Since then, however, there has been little evidence that the
USTLD’s role has generated any additional congressional interest in the TLD, the TEC, or
enthusiasm for closer cooperation and collaboration with the European Parliament. While the
creation of the TEC raised several questions about the role that Congress and the EP will or
should play in the promotion of greater transatlantic economic integration and regulatory
cooperation, on the U.S. side, those questions still appear unanswered. Given the EP’s growing
power and influence within the EU as a result of the Lisbon Treaty, some U.S. officials and
Members of Congress continue to believe that it may be in U.S. interests for Congress to develop
closer ties with the Parliament. However, some of the original congressional advocates of a closer
relationship with the EP are no longer in Congress and other voices of support seemed to have
waned. Outside organizations that initially showed a commitment to try to move this agenda
forward also seem to have curbed their enthusiasm for one reason or another.
Some advocates, however, still believe that if the identified concerns about the USTLD are more
fully addressed, the TLD could become an organization capable of taking on a more important
stakeholder role in promoting Congress-Parliament cooperation and a stronger voice for
transatlantic relations in both Congress and the EP. The possibility that the United States and the
EU would begin a negotiation during the 113th Congress, possibly leading to a transatlantic
economic and trade agreement could offer some new opportunities for enhancing Congress-EP
cooperation in the years ahead. Many observers stress that efforts to significantly bolster the
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overall relationship between Congress and the Parliament will require a sustained political
commitment on both sides and serious consideration of all possible options, including but not
necessarily limited to, those focused on the TLD. Yet, many believe it is an effort worth pursuing
and look forward to the new USTLD leadership and the role it will play in attempting to bolster
relations between the two legislative organizations.
Appendix. Comparison of Committees in the
European Parliament and the U.S. Congress
The following chart identifies the European Parliament (EP) committees and the U.S. House and
Senate committees with similar or related jurisdictions. However, due to the unique nature of both
systems, not all EP committees have a corresponding congressional equivalent. For organizational
purposes, committees are grouped into broad “subject areas” given the various competencies of
both EP and U.S. committees. These “subject areas” have been generally determined by EP
committee competencies; accordingly, not all U.S. congressional committees are included. EP
special committees, which are temporary in nature, are not included either.
Given the complexities of the U.S. committee system in particular, this chart is meant largely for
illustrative purposes, and should not be construed as an exhaustive treatment of committee
jurisdictions or competencies. Both EP and U.S. congressional committees are listed in
alphabetical order.
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Table A-1. Comparison of Committees in the EP and the U.S. Congress
Related U.S. Congressional Committees
Subject Area
EP Committees
House Senate
Foreign Affairs and
• Development
• Armed Services
• Armed Services
International
• Foreign Affairs
• Foreign Affairs
• Foreign Relations
Development
International Trade
• International Trade
• Ways and Means
• Finance

Budget and
• Budgetary Control
• Appropriations
• Appropriations
Appropriations
• Budgets
• Budget
• Budget
Economic and
• Economic and
• Financial Services
• Banking, Housing, and
Monetary Policies
Monetary Af airs
• Judiciary
Urban Affairs
• Internal Market and
• Ways and Means
• Finance
Consumer Protection
• Judiciary
• Joint House & Senate Economic Committee
Social, Environmental,
• Culture and
• Agriculture
• Agriculture, Nutrition and
and Natural Resource
Education
• Education and the
Forestry
Issues
• Employment and
Workforce
• Commerce, Science, and
Social Affairs
• Energy and Commerce
Transportation
• Environment, Public
• Judiciary
• Energy and Natural Resources
Health, and Food
• Science, Space and
• Environment and Public
Safety
Technology
Works
• Women’s Rights and
• Small Business
• Finance
Gender Equality
• Ways and Means
• Health, Education, Labor and

Pensions
• Judiciary
• Smal Business and
Entrepreneurship
Technology,
• Industry, Research
• Energy and Commerce
• Commerce, Science and
Infrastructure, and
and Energy
• Science, Space, and
Transportation
Transportation
• Transport and
Technology
• Energy and Natural Resources
Tourism
• Transportation and
• Environment and Public
Infrastructure
Works
Agriculture,
• Agriculture and
• Agriculture
• Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Fisheries, and
Rural Development
• Energy and Commerce
Forestry
Regional
• Fisheries
• Natural Resources
• Commerce, Science, and
Development
• Regional
• Small Business
Transportation
Development
• Energy and Natural Resources
• Environment and Public
Works
• Smal Business and
Entrepreneurship
Homeland Security
• Civil Liberties,
• Homeland Security
• Homeland Security and
and Civil Liberties
Justice, and Home
• Judiciary
Governmental Affairs
Affairs
• Permanent Select
• Judiciary
Committee on
• Select Committee on
Intelligence
Intelligence
Constitutional and
• Constitutional Affairs
• Judiciary
• Judiciary
Legal Issues
• Legal Affairs
Other
• Petitions
• No equivalent
• No equivalent
Source: This chart was prepared by Kristin Archick, Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense and
Trade Division, and Judy Schneider, Specialist on the Congress, Government and Finance Division, CRS.
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Author Contact Information

Kristin Archick
Vincent Morelli
Specialist in European Affairs
Section Research Manager
karchick@crs.loc.gov, 7-2668
vmorelli@crs.loc.gov, 7-8051

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