Right to Work Laws: Legislative Background
and Empirical Research

Benjamin Collins
Analyst in Labor Policy
December 6, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42575
CRS Report for Congress
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epared for Members and Committees of Congress

Right to Work Laws: Legislative Background and Empirical Research

Summary
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) establishes most private-sector workers’ rights to
unionize and collectively bargain over wages, benefits, and working conditions. Enacted in 1935,
the NLRA also permits collective bargaining contracts between employers and labor
organizations that require every individual covered by the collective bargaining contract to pay
dues to the negotiating labor organization. These contract provisions are known as union security
agreements. Since the NLRA was amended by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, individual states
have been permitted to supersede the union security provisions of the NLRA by enacting laws
that prohibit union security agreements. These state laws are known as right to work (RTW) laws.
Currently, 23 states have RTW laws. Of these, 12 states passed RTW laws prior to 1950 and
another six passed them prior to 1960. The two most recent states to adopt RTW laws are
Oklahoma (2001) and Indiana (2012). Several other state legislatures are debating RTW laws.
Recent legislative proposals, with substantial numbers of cosponsors, would expand RTW
policies nationwide. Advocates of national RTW laws claim that they would enhance personal
freedom and employer flexibility. Opponents argue that such laws would weaken workers’
abilities to collectively bargain for more favorable compensation and working conditions.
Proposals aiming to expand RTW policies typically strike the provisions of the NLRA that permit
union security agreements.
National RTW proposals are often discussed in the context of the economic performance of states
that have adopted them. However, research that compares outcomes in RTW and union security
states is inconclusive. The recent data trends between RTW and union security states are
relatively distinct, but the influence of RTW laws in these trends (if any) is unclear.
• Unionization rates in RTW states are less than half of what they are in union
security states. It is ambiguous what portion of this difference is attributable to
RTW laws and what portion is due to diverse preferences among the states
regarding unionization.
• In the past decade, aggregate employment in RTW states has increased modestly
while employment in union security states has declined. It is unclear if this
growth is attributable to RTW, other pro-business policies (which tend to be
concentrated in RTW states), or other factors.
• Wages are lower in RTW states than union security states. Historical research has
suggested that RTW laws have little influence on these differences. More
contemporary scholarship has come to diverse conclusions, depending on the
researchers’ methodology.
Difficulties associated with rigorously studying the relationships between RTW laws and various
outcomes are likely to continue to make it difficult to generate definitive findings about these
relationships. As such, the ongoing debate on RTW may be driven by factors other than rigorous
empirical evidence.

Congressional Research Service

Right to Work Laws: Legislative Background and Empirical Research

Contents
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Legislative History ........................................................................................................................... 1
National Labor Relations Act .................................................................................................... 2
Taft-Hartley Act ................................................................................................................... 2
Legislation Since Taft-Hartley ............................................................................................ 3
Union Security Agreements and Required Union Dues .................................................................. 3
Union Security and Workers Not Covered by the NLRA.......................................................... 4
State Right to Work Laws .......................................................................................................... 4
Recent Developments ...................................................................................................................... 5
Federal Legislation .................................................................................................................... 5
State Activities ........................................................................................................................... 6
Empirical Evidence Relating to RTW.............................................................................................. 6
Limitations on Measuring the Effects of RTW Laws ................................................................ 6
Right to Work and Unionization ................................................................................................ 7
Long-Term Trends in Unionization ..................................................................................... 9
Right to Work and Economic Outcomes ................................................................................. 10
Right to Work and Employment ........................................................................................ 10
Right to Work and Wages .................................................................................................. 12
Right to Work and Other Outcomes .................................................................................. 13
Considerations for a National Right to Work Law ........................................................................ 14

Tables
Table 1. Right to Work States and Date of Enactment ..................................................................... 5
Table 2. Union Membership and Representation by Sector and in Right to Work and
Union Security States, 2011 .......................................................................................................... 8
Table 3. Union Membership Rates in Right to Work and Union Security States,
1983-2011 ................................................................................................................................... 10
Table 4. Employment Levels for Right to Work and Union Security States, 2001, 2006,
and 2011 ...................................................................................................................................... 11
Table 5. Employment and Average Annual Wages in Right to Work and Union Security
States, 2011 ................................................................................................................................. 12

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 14

Congressional Research Service

Right to Work Laws: Legislative Background and Empirical Research

Background
To promote commerce and deter labor unrest, Congress has established laws regulating
unionization and collective bargaining (i.e., similar workers negotiating compensation and
working conditions as a unit rather than individually). The primary federal legislation that
regulates private sector collective bargaining is the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
enacted in 1935. In addition to establishing workers’ rights to organize and establishing union
election procedures, the NLRA also permits collective bargaining contracts between employers
and labor organizations that require all workers covered by the contract to pay dues to the
negotiating organization. These contract provisions are known as union security agreements.1
Since the NLRA was amended by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, individual states have had the
option of enacting laws that prohibit union security agreements. These state laws supersede the
union security provisions of the NLRA and are known as right to work (RTW) laws. As of this
writing, 23 states have enacted RTW laws.
Since the Taft-Hartley Act, changes to federal law relating to unionization and RTW have been
limited. Debate on this topic, however, has been ongoing and there have been legislative
proposals to both expand and prohibit RTW laws. Supporters of expanding RTW laws claim that
they will increase personal freedom and employer flexibility. Conversely, supporters of proposals
to eliminate RTW laws emphasize that unions must negotiate on behalf of all workers in the unit,
and as such, it is appropriate that all workers pay for that for representation.
This report is divided into two parts. The first part discusses RTW laws themselves. It provides a
brief legislative history on the federal role in the regulation of unions, a summary of the origin
and development of RTW laws, a discussion of recent events at the state level, and federal
legislation related to RTW. The second part of the report reviews the varied empirical research on
the effects of RTW laws. Specifically, it will discuss the mixed evidence indicating relationships
between RTW laws and other economic outcomes.
Legislative History
Prior to the passage of the federal labor laws discussed in this report, the regulation of labor and
collective bargaining was left to the states. Laws varied, but most states adopted policies of open
competition with minimal governmental regulations.2
In 1926, the Railway Labor Act was the first federal law to guarantee collective bargaining rights
to a group of workers. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, passed in 1932, prohibited federal courts from
issuing an injunction in any labor dispute. Previously, judges could end a strike if they did not
approve of its methods or objectives. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, however, did not guarantee

1 See 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3). Specifically, the NLRA states that contracts with union security agreements may require all
covered workers to be members of the negotiating labor organization within 30 days of beginning employment. The
courts have interpreted union membership to be equivalent to paying union dues. This distinction is outlined in greater
detail in the “Union Security Agreements and Required Union Dues” section of this report.
2 Bruce Feldracker, Labor Guide to Labor Law, 4th ed. (2000), pp. 1-3.
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collective bargaining rights; it merely regulated employer-union relations once they were
established.
National Labor Relations Act3
Enacted in 1935, the NLRA governs labor-management relations and collective bargaining for
most private sector workers.4 The NLRA is also known as the Wagner Act. Many provisions of
the NLRA were contained in the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which was enacted in
1933 but found unconstitutional in 1935. The Supreme Court upheld the NLRA in 1937.
The NLRA found that the refusals of employers to collectively bargain with employees “lead to
strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect
of burdening or obstructing commerce[.]”5 To remedy this issue, the NLRA guarantees workers
the right to organize and bargain collectively over wages, hours, and conditions of employment. It
also establishes procedures for the election and certification of unions and establishes certain
unfair labor practices for employers that may discourage workers from unionizing. The NLRA is
enforced by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), an independent federal agency.
The NLRA also permits collective bargaining contracts to contain union security agreements that
require all workers covered under the contract to pay dues to the negotiating labor organization.
Taft-Hartley Act
Passed over a presidential veto in 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act (also known as the Labor
Management Relations Act) substantially amended the NLRA. Many of the provisions in the
Taft-Hartley Act, including the statement of purpose at the beginning, remain in current law.
Whereas the original Wagner Act focused on asserting the rights of workers and organized labor,
the Taft-Hartley Act addresses employers, employees, and labor unions as equal parties in the
negotiation process and states that “neither party has any right in its relations with any other to
engage in acts or practices which jeopardize the public health, safety, or interest.” It
supplemented existing unfair labor practices for employers by establishing unfair labor practices
for unions. It also prohibited secondary strikes and outlawed so-called “closed shops” that
required an employee to be a union member prior to being hired.
The Taft-Hartley amendments also established the RTW provisions that are still part of the
NLRA. These provisions stated that individual states may pass laws prohibiting union security
agreements in labor contracts and that these state laws would supersede the NLRA provisions
authorizing union security agreements.6

3 For a detailed discussion of the NLRA and related laws, see CRS Report R42526, Federal Labor Relations Statutes:
An Overview
.
4 The NLRA, as amended, is at 29 U.S.C. 141-197. It does not cover private sector workers employed by railroads or
airlines; these workers are covered by the aforementioned Railway Labor Act.
5 See P.L. 74-198, Section 1.
6 See 29 U.S.C. 164(b). The RTW provisions of the NLRA are also sometimes referred to as 14(b) provisions, after the
section of the NLRA that permits RTW laws.
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Legislation Since Taft-Hartley
Amendments to the NLRA since 1947 have been limited. In 1959, the Landrum-Griffin Act
increased regulation of internal union activities and enumerated certain rights to all union
members.7 Subsequent legislation in 1974 expanded the provisions of the NLRA to employees of
private nonprofit hospitals, a population that had been excluded from coverage since the
enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act.
In 1980, the NLRA was amended to permit individuals who were covered by a union security
agreement but were members of a religion that objected to financially supporting a labor union to
pay the equivalent of the union dues to a charitable organization.8 No major federal legislation
related to the NLRA or RTW has been enacted since 1980, though there has been ongoing debate
on the issue.
Union Security Agreements and Required
Union Dues

In states without RTW laws, an elected union and an employer can agree to a collective
bargaining contract that requires all workers covered by the contract to become members within
30 days.9 Workplaces covered by such an agreement are often called union shops.
In 1963, the Supreme Court ruled that, even in a union shop, an employee cannot be required to
join a union pursuant to a union security agreement. Instead, the employee may pay dues but
decline to become a full union member.10 Dues-paying nonmembers are referred to as financial
core members
. In spite of their name, financial core members are not union members: they may
not participate in union activities or even vote on the ratification of the collective bargaining
contract that covers them. Financial core members are not subject to union bylaws or union
discipline but they are subject to the rights and responsibilities in the collective bargaining
contract with their employer.
Subsequent decisions have concluded that financial core members only need to pay dues to cover
the cost of collective bargaining functions. These functions include bargaining, contract
administration, and grievance adjustment. Financial core members do not have to financially
support union functions that are unrelated to collective bargaining such as political activities.
Workers subject to a union security agreement must be informed of the financial core
membership option.11
An alternative to the union shop is the agency shop. In an agency shop, workers covered by a
collective bargaining contract are required to pay a fee for representation (an agency fee) but are
not required to join the union. Since union shop agreements must permit covered workers to

7 See P.L. 86-257.
8 See P.L. 96-593.
9 Covered workers in the construction industry can be required to become union members within seven days, see 29
U.S.C. 158(f).
10 See NLRB v. General Motors Corporation, 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
11 Bruce Feldacker, Labor Guide to Labor Law, Fourth ed. (2000), pp. 424-438.
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forego union membership and only pay a representation fee, union shops and agency shops
operate similarly in practice.
In cases where a union security agreement conflicts with a worker’s religious beliefs, the
objecting worker may donate the equivalent of the agency fee or financial core dues to a non-
labor, non-religious charity.12
Union Security and Workers Not Covered by the NLRA
The collective bargaining rights of several groups of workers are covered by legislation other than
the NLRA. Union security agreements among these groups are governed by other federal laws:
• Interstate railway and airline employees’ collective bargaining rights are defined
by the Railway Labor Act (RLA).13 The RLA permits union security agreements
in all states, effectively superseding any local RTW laws.14
• Postal workers’ collective bargaining rights are defined by the Postal
Reorganization Act of 1970. The act specifies that dues will be deducted from an
employee’s pay only with the written authorization of that employee.15 This
optional deduction applies in all states.
• Federal employees’ collective bargaining rights are defined in the Federal Service
Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS).16 It specifies that dues will
only be deducted from an employee’s pay upon written authorization from that
employee.17 The FSLMRS applies equally in both RTW and union security
states.
State Right to Work Laws
The Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA permit individual states to pass laws that prohibit
union security agreements. Table 1 lists the 23 states that have passed such laws. A state may
pursue RTW through legislation, a ballot initiative, or an amendment to its state constitution.

12 See 29 U.S.C. 169.
13 The RLA also applies to any company that is defined as a “carrier” by 45 USC 151, first paragraph. It also includes
any company that is controlled by a railroad or airline.
14 See 45 U.S.C. 152, paragraph eleventh.
15 See 39 U.S.C. 1205.
16 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is excluded from FSLMRS coverage, but the General Accounting
Office Personnel Act of 1980 gave GAO employees the right to organize and bargain collectively.
17 See 5 U.S.C. 7115.
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Table 1. Right to Work States and Date of Enactment
State Year
of
Enactment State Year
of
Enactment
Florida 1943a Nevada
1951
Arizona 1947
Alabama 1953
Arkansas 1947
Mississippi 1954
Georgia 1947
South
Carolina
1954
Iowa 1947
Utah 1955
Nebraska 1947
Kansas
1958
North Carolina
1947
Wyoming
1963
North Dakota
1947
Louisiana
1976
South Dakota
1947
Idaho
1985
Tennessee 1947
Oklahoma
2001
Texas 1947b Indiana
2012
Virginia 1947


Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/righttowork.htm.
Note: Sources vary on date of enactment. The table reflects the source cited above as well as the recent
enactment of RTW in Indiana.
a. While it was originally enacted in 1943, the validity of Florida’s RTW law was unclear until the enactment of
the Taft-Hartley Act.
b. Texas original y passed RTW in 1947, though the law was modified to its current form in 1993.
The details of RTW laws vary by state. The law passed by Indiana in February 2012, for example,
excluded employees of the state, employees of “a political subdivision,” and several other groups
that are not covered by the NLRA.18 Conversely, the constitutional amendment passed in
Oklahoma is broader and includes all workers in the state.
The breadth of some state laws that have attempted to regulate workers who are not covered by
the NLRA has been challenged in the courts. For example, both a federal appeals court and the
Oklahoma supreme court have determined that Oklahoma’s prohibition of union security
agreements does not extend to workers covered by the Railway Labor Act.19
Recent Developments
Federal Legislation
While changes to federal law regarding unions and RTW have been limited in recent decades,
debate has been robust and ongoing. Congress has considered a number of proposals that would
amend the NLRA’s provisions regarding union security agreements. These proposals have ranged
from striking the provisions that permit union security agreements (effectively making every state

18 See Section 1 of Indiana Code 22-6-6.
19 See Local 514 Transport Workers Union v. Keating, Oklahoma supreme court (2003) and 10th Circuit Court (2004).
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an RTW state) to striking the provisions that allow individuals states to prohibit union security
agreements (effectively invalidating existing RTW laws).
Since the 104th Congress, a National Right to Work bill has been introduced in the House during
the first session of each Congress. Similar bills have regularly been introduced in the Senate
during this time. These bills would amend the NLRA by striking the language that permits union
security agreements and would make similar changes to the Railway Labor Act. Most national
RTW proposals are relatively narrow in scope and only prohibit union security agreements. They
typically do not address union election procedures or any other issues associated with collective
bargaining. These National Right to Work proposals often have a substantial number of
cosponsors.20
Contrasting proposals that would strike the provisions of the NLRA that allow states to enact
RTW laws have also been introduced in recent Congresses. These proposals have been introduced
with much less regularity than National Right to Work proposals. These proposals typically forbid
state RTW laws by striking the provisions of the NLRA that permit such laws.21
State Activities
As noted previously, Indiana is the most recent state to enact an RTW law. Since Indiana’s
enactment of its RTW law, several state legislatures, including those in Ohio, Michigan, and New
Hampshire have debated RTW laws, but none have enacted one.
Empirical Evidence Relating to RTW
There has been a great deal of debate and research on the effects of RTW laws on states that adopt
them. Most empirical research has concluded that RTW laws have a negative relationship with
unionization rates (also known as union density) though the causal effect is debated. The effects
of RTW laws on other economic outcomes, such as job growth and wages, have been studied,
though findings have been mixed and there is no broad consensus on the magnitude (if any) of the
effects of these laws.
Limitations on Measuring the Effects of RTW Laws
It is important to recognize that there is no straightforward way to measure how RTW laws affect
other outcomes
. It is possible to compare data from states with RTW laws to states without such
laws, but since it is not possible to observe the counterfactual—what would have happened in
each state if it had a differing union security policy—there is no simple way to tell what
contribution an RTW law (or lack thereof) made to other outcomes in the state. For example, a
researcher could compare employment growth in Arizona (an RTW state) and neighboring New
Mexico (a union security state), but it would be impossible to identify what portion of the
differences between the states was attributable to their respective union security laws and what

20 For example, in the 112th Congress, H.R. 2040 had 77 cosponsors and S. 2173 had 19 cosponsors.
21 For example, see H.R. 2775 in the 112th Congress.
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portions were attributable to differences in labor force characteristics, industry makeup, local
taxation policies, and countless other state-specific characteristics.
While it is not possible to completely isolate the effect of RTW laws in dynamic and complex
economies, some researchers have attempted to estimate the effect of RTW laws by controlling
for other factors. Their techniques have varied and it comes as little surprise that diverse
methodologies have yielded diverse conclusions.
The subsequent review of RTW-related studies does not attempt to be exhaustive. It does,
however, attempt to cover frequently cited studies as well as more recent studies that attempt to
isolate the effect of RTW laws on various outcomes.
Right to Work and Unionization
Table 2 shows the rate of union membership and the share of workers represented by a union in
RTW and union security states. Two intuitive trends emerge. First, the union membership rate in
union security states is nearly three times that of RTW states (15.8% vs. 5.7%). Second, the
proportion of workers who are covered by a union contract but who are not members of the union
is higher in RTW states than union security states. In RTW states, about 18% of the workers who
are covered by a union contract are non-members (approximately 616,000 of 3.4 million). In
union security states, this share is about 7% (about 910,000 of 12.8 million).
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Table 2. Union Membership and Representation by Sector and in Right to Work and
Union Security States, 2011
Covered by
Union
Union
% Covered
Employment
Members
% Union
Contract
by Union

(in thousands)
(in thousands)
Members
(in thousands)
Contract
Total
125,210
14,755
11.8%
16,281
13.0%
RTW
49,604
2,812
5.7%
3,428
6.9%
Union Security
75,606
11,943
15.8%
12,853
17.0%






Private
Sector



Total
104,778
7,204
6.9%
7,972
7.6%
RTW
41,182
1,350
3.3%
1,602
3.9%
Union Security
63,596
5,855
9.2%
6,370
10.0%






Public
Sector



Total
20,432
7,550
37.0%
8,309
40.7%
RTW
8,421
1,462
17.4%
1,827
21.7%
Union Security
12,010
6,088
50.7%
6,482
54.0%
Source: Current Population Survey. State-level data were disaggregated by sector by Barry Hirsch and David
Macpherson and posted at http://www.unionstats.com/. In this presentation, CRS has divided the data into RTW
and union security states.
Note: Data are limited to wage and salary workers. Due to rounding, the sum of subgroups may not equal the
corresponding larger groups. Due to varied data sources, employment levels may not be comparable to other
tables. In accordance with its status in 2011, Indiana was classified as a union security state.
Researchers have posited many hypotheses to explain the divergent unionization rates between
RTW and union security states and three common hypotheses are discussed below. These
hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and can exert a collective effect on local unionization
levels.22
The tastes hypothesis suggests that RTW laws reflect a state’s preexisting opposition to unions
and that the diversity in RTW laws simply reflects diversity in preferences toward unions. Under
this hypothesis, RTW laws have no independent effect on labor organizing: RTW states have
lower rates of unionization because that is the preference of workers in those states.
Examination of state-level unionization data shows support for the hypothesis that there was
below-average union density in states before they passed RTW laws. Among the four states to
pass RTW laws in the past 40 years, all of them had unionization rates below the national average
prior to passage. Indiana was close to the national average (11.3% statewide vs. 11.8% nationally
in 2011) but the three remaining states—Oklahoma (6.9% vs. 13.0% in 2000), Idaho (12.2% vs.
18.2% in 1985), and Louisiana (16.9% vs. 24.6% in 1975)—were substantially lower. The case of

22 For one discussion with empirical examples, see William J. Moore, “The Determinants and Effects of Right-to-Work
Laws: A Review of the Recent Literature,” Journal of Labor Economics, Summer 1998, pp. 449-50.
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Idaho is particularly unique, as the unionization rate in that state fell from 23.1% in 1981 to
12.2% in 1985. In this case, a drop in unionization preceded the passage of an RTW law, a
sequence that is consistent with the tastes hypothesis but not with either of the other hypotheses
discussed below.
The free-rider hypothesis suggests that by making dues payment optional, RTW laws lead to
workers covered by a collective bargaining contract declining to pay dues. This leads to a
decreased number of dues-paying members having to pay more for representation. The higher
dues may exceed remaining members’ willingness to pay for representation and more workers
may stop paying dues, eventually leading to unsustainably high dues for the remaining members.
Alternately, remaining workers may decline to pay higher dues, but this may restrict the
representation services available to them.
As noted above, the share of covered nonpaying workers relative to total workers covered by a
union contract is higher in RTW states than union security states. A 1995 study by Sobel divided
covered nonpaying workers into “true free riders” (those who valued union representation and
would join the union if dues were compulsory) and “induced free riders” (those who did not value
representation and would seek other employment if dues were compulsory). The study estimated
that, in RTW states, about 70% of free riders were induced free riders. This means that only 30%
of covered nonmembers in RTW states were free riding in the traditional sense.23
The bargaining power hypothesis is related to the free rider hypothesis and suggests that RTW
laws reduce the bargaining power of unions and lead to reduced membership in the long run.
Under this hypothesis, unions have less incentive to organize since they know only a portion of
the workers covered by the collective bargaining contract will pay dues. This reduces
organization and, in the long run, the prevalence of union jobs.
Empirical support for this hypothesis comes from a 1987 study by Ellwood and Fine, which
looked at changes in new union organizing efforts after the passage of RTW laws. The study
found that in the five years after states passed an RTW law, union organization fell 28% and
union organizing success fell 46%. The same study found that these effects faded in subsequent
years but that they may lead to a permanent decline in unionization levels.24
The evidence from each of these intersecting hypotheses underscores the complexity of isolating
the effect of RTW laws’ actual effect on unionization.
Long-Term Trends in Unionization
While there is debate as to the magnitude of influence RTW laws exert on unionization levels,
there is little debate that there has been a long-term decline in unionization that is independent of
RTW policies. As Table 3 shows, union density has declined in both RTW and union security
states since 1983. The share of workers covered by a collective bargaining contract (i.e., union
members plus covered workers who are not members) has followed a similar trend.

23 Russel Sobel, “Empirical Evidence on the Union Free Rider Problem: Do Right-to-Work Laws Matter?,” Journal of
Labor Research
, Summer 1995, pp. 347-365.
24 David Ellwood and Glenn Fine, “The Impact of Right to Work Laws on Union Organizing,” Journal of Political
Economy
, April 1987, pp. 250-273.
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Table 3. Union Membership Rates in Right to Work and Union Security States,
1983-2011

1983 1991 2001 2011
Total
20.1% 16.1% 13.5% 11.8%
RTW
11.6%a 8.5%b 6.8%c 5.7%

Union
Security 24.3% 20.2% 17.5% 15.8%
Source: Current Population Survey. State-level data were developed by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson
and posted at http://www.unionstats.com/. In this presentation, CRS has divided the data into RTW and union
security states.
Note: 1983 is the first year for which state-level data are available. Data are limited to wage and salary workers.
a. Includes the 20 states that had passed RTW laws by 1983.
b. Includes the 20 states that had passed RTW laws by 1983 and Idaho.
c. Includes the 20 states that had passed RTW laws by 1983, Idaho, and Oklahoma.
This nationwide decline in union density further complicates analysis of RTW laws. For example,
an RTW state’s decline in unionization could be attributable to the RTW law, other state-level
factors, or it could be influenced by a broader decline in unionization across the country.
Right to Work and Economic Outcomes
Given the complexity of establishing the relationship between RTW and first-order outcomes like
unionization rates, it comes as little surprise that the literature related to the laws’ effects on
higher-order outcomes such as employment and wages is inconclusive. Studies have yielded a
variety of conclusions, largely dependent on how researchers conduct their analyses.
The remainder of this report will summarize existing (and frequently conflicting) data and
scholarship related to RTW laws. It will discuss broad statistical trends, as well as several of the
more sophisticated studies available that attempt to control for other factors and isolate the effect
of RTW laws.
Right to Work and Employment
Broadly speaking, there are two competing views regarding the relationship between RTW laws
and employment growth:
• One view is that RTW laws create a favorable business environment in which
employers have increased flexibility in hiring, discharge, and wage-setting.
Businesses are attracted to this environment and employment in these areas
increases.
• The competing view is that business location decisions are driven by issues such
as the local labor supply and investment incentives (e.g., subsidies or tax
abatements). Under this view, RTW laws are a relatively insignificant factor in
the location of a business.
Table 4 presents data on employment levels for RTW and union security states between 2001 and
2011. Aggregate employment growth was clearly greater in states with RTW laws and RTW
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advocates often cite these trends as evidence that RTW leads to increased job growth and
employment levels.25
Table 4. Employment Levels for Right to Work and Union Security States, 2001,
2006, and 2011

Employment (in thousands)
Change in Employment
2001
2006
2011
2001-2006

2006-2011
2001-2011
Total
131,590 135,836 131,336
3.2%
-3.3% -0.2%
RTW States
49,797
52,918
51,574
6.3%
-2.5%
3.6%
Union Security States
81,793
82,918
79,762
1.4%
-3.8%
-2.5%
Source: Annual averages from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Employment Statistics, generated at
http://www.bls.gov/sae/#data. In this presentation, CRS has divided the data into RTW and union security states.
Notes: Due to varied data sources, employment levels may not be directly comparable to other tables. Total
employment was determined by calculating the sum of states. In accordance with its status through 2011, Indiana
was classified as a union security state.
Opponents of RTW laws, however, argue that aggregate data are misleading and mask substantial
variation among both RTW and union security states. For example, during the 2001-2011 period
illustrated in Table 4, employment grew 13.7% and 8.9%, respectively, in the union security
states of Alaska and Montana while declining 3.5% and 2.2%, respectively, in the RTW states of
Mississippi and Alabama. Skeptics of RTW laws’ effect on employment suggest that these diverse
outcomes show that RTW laws themselves do not lead to above-average employment growth.26
Skeptics of the relationship between RTW laws and increased employment also note that RTW
laws often exist alongside other, perhaps more compelling, pro-business policies. For example,
North Dakota reported the nation’s fastest employment growth between 2001 and 2011. While it
is an RTW state, North Dakota also sponsors a multitude of other business-oriented policies such
as tax exemptions, subsidized training, and other financial incentives.27 North Dakota’s growth
may also have been attributable to non-policy characteristics such as an above-average presence
of natural resources.
The difficulty in establishing the role of RTW in a state’s economic performance can be seen in a
frequently cited 1998 study by Holmes that analyzed manufacturing employment in counties
along several state borders in which one state was an RTW state (termed “probusiness” in the
study) and the other was a union security state (termed “antibusiness” in the study).28 The author
suggested that many local factors such as climate and access to transportation are similar on both

25 For representative example, see National Institute for Labor Relations Research, Right to Work States Benefit from
Faster Growth, Higher Real Purchasing Power - 2011 Update
, October 25, 2011, http://nilrr.org/2011/10/25/right-
work-states-benefit-faster-growth-higher-real-purchasing-power-2011-update/.
26 For a representative critique, see Gordon Lafer and Sylvia Allegretto, Does Right to Work Create Jobs?: Answers
from Oklahoma
, Economic Policy Institute, March 16, 2011, http://www.epi.org/publication/bp300/.
27 For a summary of incentives for businesses in North Dakota, see “Quick Facts,” from the North Dakota Department
of Commerce, Division of Economic Development and Finance at http://www.business.nd.gov/uploads/resources/203/
2010quickfactsbrochureprint.pdf.
28 Thomas Holmes, “The Effect of State Policies on the Location of Manufacturing: Evidence from State Borders,”
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 106, no. 4 (August 1998), pp. 667-705.
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sides of the border and that varied outcomes on either side of the border would reflect the
respective policies of the states.
The study tracked growth in manufacturing employment between 1947 (the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act) and 1992. It found that among counties within 25 miles of a state border,
manufacturing employment in counties in RTW states grew about one-third faster than
manufacturing employment in the nearby counties in non-RTW states. The author concluded that
the abrupt changes in employment at the state borders were consistent with the hypothesis that
state policies influence site location.
In spite of these findings, the author expressed uncertainty as to the influence of RTW laws.
Holmes emphasized that while he used RTW and union security as a proxy for states’ business-
friendliness, “the effect found here is an overall effect of state policy. The analysis does not
identify the contribution to the overall effect of any one particular policy, for example, a right-to-
work law” (emphasis in original). Holmes further qualified the study’s findings regarding RTW
by citing a ranking of states’ business climates. He noted that while RTW laws were only one of
15 equally-weighted criteria considered in the ranking, 14 of the 15 highest-ranked states had an
RTW law, suggesting a strong correlation between RTW laws and other pro-business policies.
Holmes concluded that subsequent study is necessary to isolate the effect of RTW laws. CRS was
unable to locate such a study, and given the frequency with which the Holmes study is still cited
in RTW discussions, it appears that no such widely accepted study has emerged.
Right to Work and Wages
Table 5 presents average annual wage data from RTW and union security states in 2011 and
shows that wages in union security states were 16.6% higher than in RTW states. As is the case
with employment levels, there is little controversy over these aggregate numbers and the trend
depicted in the table is relatively well-established.
Table 5. Employment and Average Annual Wages in Right to Work and Union
Security States, 2011
Total Wages
Average Annual
Employment
(in thousands)
Wage
United States
129,411,099
6,217,285,908
$48,043
RTW States
50,579,217
2,207,308,191
43,641
Union Security States
78,831,882
4,009,977,717
50,867
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). In this presentation,
CRS has divided the data into RTW and union security states.
Note: Due to varied data sources, employment levels may not be directly comparable to other tables. In
accordance with its status in 2011, Indiana was classified as a union security state.
Many studies have attempted to control for differences between the states and isolate the effect of
RTW polices. A 1998 summary of the empirical literature concluded that “RTW laws have no
impact on union wages, nonunion wages, or average wages in either the public or private
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sector.”29 Subsequent studies have challenged this conclusion, with findings mixed between
positive and negative wage effects from RTW laws.
A 2011 study by Gould and Shierholz examined household survey data to compare wages
between RTW and union security states while controlling for personal characteristics (such as the
lower share of workers in RTW states with college degrees) as well as macro state characteristics
(such as the higher cost of living in union security states).30 In total, the study controlled for 42
demographic, economic, geographic, and policy factors. The study concluded that “[o]nce we
control for our comprehensive set of both individual and state-level observable characteristics, we
find that the mean effect of working in a right-to-work state is a 3.2% reduction in wages.” The
same study reached similar conclusions regarding negative relationships between RTW and
employed-provided benefits.
Another study with a very different methodology challenges this conclusion. A 2003 study by
Reed examined state-level income data and, unlike many other studies, controlled for the states’
varied economic conditions before the adoption of RTW.31 Among other variables, Reed
controlled for each state’s per capita income in 1945, prior to the initial wave of RTW laws
following the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. The author reasoned that since RTW states were
typically among the lower-income states at the time of enacting RTW, comparisons between RTW
and union security states should control for this initial condition. The study concluded that, after
controlling for income levels in 1945, RTW laws were related to wages 6.7% higher than in union
security states. The study also concluded that this effect was strongest in states with the lowest
levels of income in 1945 and that states with higher initial incomes experienced weaker or
perhaps even negative effects from RTW laws.
Right to Work and Other Outcomes
Additional RTW-related research on other topics further illustrates the difficulty of
comprehensively evaluating the effects of RTW policies. For example, Zullo examined fatal on-
the-job injuries of construction workers in the context of RTW laws and union density. The study
concluded that higher unionization rates in the local construction industry were related to lower
fatality rates and that unionization’s relationship with reducing fatalities was strongest in union
security states.32
Conversely, studies that considered other outcomes suggested benefits to RTW laws. A 2009
study by Stevans found that RTW had little effect on employment but did have a positive
relationship with proprietors’ incomes.33 A 2000 study looked at the performance of stocks for
companies based in Louisiana and Idaho during the periods when those states were initially

29 William J. Moore, “The Determinants and Effects of Right-to-Work Laws: A Review of the Recent Literature,”
Journal of Labor Economics, Summer 1998, p. 460.
30 See Heidi Shierholz and Elise Gould, The Compensation Penalty of “Right-to-Work” Laws, Economic Policy
Institute, Issue Brief #299, February 17, 2011, http://www.epi.org/publication/bp299/.
31 Robert W. Reed, “How Right to Work Laws Affect Wages,” Journal of Labor Research, Fall 2003.
32 Roland Zullo, Right-to-Wok Laws and Fatalities in Construction, University of Michigan Institute for Research of
Labor, Employment, and the Economy, March 2011, http://irlee.umich.edu/Publications/Docs/
RightToWorkLawsAndFatalitiesInConstruction.pdf.
33 Lonnie K. Stevans, “The Effect of Endogenous Right-to-Work Laws on Business and Economic Conditions in the
United States: A Multivariate Approach,” Review of Law and Economics, 2009, pp. 595-614.
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passing their RTW laws in 1976 and 1986, respectively. This study evaluated the performance of
these stocks on days where there was key movement in RTW legislation in the respective states
and found that, relative to the larger market, stocks from companies based in these states
increased 2% to 4%.34
Considerations for a National Right to Work Law
The primary issue in the ongoing RTW debate pertains to the rights and expectations of workers
who are covered by a collective bargaining agreement but do not wish to pay union dues.
Supporters of expanding RTW laws argue that these workers should have a right to choose
whether or not to support their representing labor organization. Advocates of union security
agreements emphasize that negotiating labor organizations are required to represent all workers in
the bargaining unit, so it is a reasonable expectation to require all workers in the bargaining unit
to financially support the labor organization.
Advocates and opponents of expanding RTW laws also posit higher-order effects to support their
respective views. Supporters of RTW laws suggest that such laws increase employer flexibility,
and may make it difficult for strong unions to be sustained, which in turn may lead to increases in
efficiency and economic output. Opponents of RTW laws suggest that such laws reduce the
financial viability of unions, leading to declines in collective bargaining and corresponding
benefits for workers.
In assessing the potential effects of expanding RTW, existing empirical research is inconclusive.
Comparing outcomes in states with and without RTW laws can provide limited perspectives on
possible effects of these laws, but states’ economies are extremely complex and even the most
sophisticated studies are unable to fully isolate the effects of varied union security policies.
Furthermore, the variation in findings among researchers suggests that no consensus will be
reached in the near future. As such, the ongoing debate on RTW may be driven by factors other
than rigorous empirical evidence.

Author Contact Information

Benjamin Collins

Analyst in Labor Policy
bcollins@crs.loc.gov, 7-7382


34 Steven Abraham and Paula Voos, “Right to Work Laws: New Evidence from the Stock Market,” Southern Economic
Journal,
October 2000, pp. 345-362.
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