In Brief: Next Steps in the War in Afghanistan? Issues for Congress

December 6, 2012 (R42137)

On May 1, 2012, President Obama gave a speech from Bagram Air Field in which he laid out U.S. government approaches for "winding down" the war in Afghanistan.1 While a number of observers have challenged the logical plausibility of a unilateral decision to "wind down" a war, the Administration's commitment to decreasing U.S. involvement in the war in Afghanistan is clear.

Many observers point to a coalescing vision of the way forward—shared by the governments of the United States, Afghanistan, and other international partners—that includes bringing the current campaign to a close by the end of 2014, and pursuing a political settlement among the parties in conflict, while extending U.S. and other international commitments to Afghanistan beyond 2014. In evaluating this emerging vision, some observers emphasize that the overall level of ambition has been lowered, while others stress that the timeline for international engagement has been extended. For the U.S. government, the broad strategic issues at stake in the war in Afghanistan include:

At this apparent turning point in both strategic thinking and activity on the ground, this short report considers issues that may be of interest to Congress as it considers the strength and duration of further U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, to 2014 and beyond.2

Background

The Obama Administration has consistently articulated two core goals for the war—to defeat al-Qaeda and to prevent future safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Less clear to many observers is exactly what it would take to prevent future safe havens.3

Much of the rationale behind current U.S. government civilian and military efforts in Afghanistan dates back to 2009, when General Stanley McChrystal took command of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and was tasked to conduct an initial strategic assessment. That assessment, and the subsequent ISAF campaign design, were based on the Administration's two core goals as well as on the novel prospect of more troops, more civilian expertise, more resources, more highest-level leadership attention, and relatively unlimited time.4

Subsequently, four major sets of constraints were imposed on the effort:

At the same time, the timeline for the commitment of the international community to Afghanistan has been extended well past 2014—out to 2024, covering the 10-year period of "Transformation." At the NATO Chicago Summit, participants affirmed that the partnership with Afghanistan would continue beyond the conclusion of the current campaign. And the U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), signed in May 2012—a statement of mutual commitment in multiple arenas—is scheduled to remain in force throughout the Transformation period.9

Some practitioners and observers, pointing to the series of tightening constraints, note that the overall campaign remains based on the same two core goals but must now meet them with less time and fewer resources. For some, that raises a basic question: to what extent, if any, do additional constraints on time and resources introduce greater risk—in terms of cost, time, casualties, or ability to accomplish the mission? Others suggest that any such risks may be mitigated to some extent by the longer timeline for international commitment, depending on what forms that commitment takes.

Current Debates

While some basic parameters of U.S. Afghanistan policy appear to be set, particularly in the wake of the U.S. presidential elections, many issues concerning the extent of any further U.S. commitment and the forms it might take, between now and the end of 2014, and beyond 2014, remain unresolved. While troop levels and drawdown curves tend to steal the headlines, more fundamental still is the question of how coherently all the facets of U.S. government engagement in Afghanistan fit together in a single political strategy aimed at bringing the war to some resolution that will protect U.S interests over the longer term. Simultaneously with U.S. decision-making, key allies and partners, and of course the government of Afghanistan and the Afghan people, continue to make choices that shape the realm of the possible.

Troop Levels and the Campaign

For many observers, whether supporters or critics of the effort, U.S. troop levels are the starting point of the debates—the most powerful, visible marker of the extent of U.S. commitment and an indication of how far the fight has progressed. A number of observers have argued for "accelerating" the pace of U.S. troop drawdowns from Afghanistan, while others, including some commanders on the ground, have supported keeping as many troops in theater as possible through the 2013 fighting season, as well as retaining a residual troop presence after 2014.

During 2012, some basic U.S. policy parameters regarding future troop levels became clearer. In his May 2012 speech at Bagram, President Obama confirmed that after the return to the pre-surge level of 68,000 troops by September 2012, further drawdowns would continue at a steady pace. The President also stated that some U.S. troops may remain in Afghanistan after 2014 to pursue "two narrow security missions," counterterrorism and training the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).10 Any such presence would depend in part on the outcome of U.S.-Afghan negotiations, launched in late 2012, designed to achieve a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) that would provide a legal basis for any post-2014 U.S. troop presence. Meanwhile, "surge recovery"—the return to 68,000 troops—was accomplished on time, and ISAF Commander General Allen has reportedly provided the President with recommendations regarding further drawdowns.11

For those for whom the primary imperative is to bring the troops home, the conditions on the ground in Afghanistan may be largely irrelevant. But for those concerned with outcomes in Afghanistan, it may be helpful to consider the troop numbers debate in terms of requirements for the campaign to successfully set conditions so that Afghans can craft a lasting political settlement. It may also be helpful to consider potential U.S. contributions in the broader context of other coalition contributions, and the capacity and capabilities of the ANSF.

Requirements have evolved over the past several years, as the campaign has progressed:

In all of these facets of the fight, U.S. forces are part of broader efforts that also include other coalition forces, and Afghan forces, with the weight of responsibility shifting toward Afghan forces over time.

Coalition troop contributions are likely to diminish significantly in number in the near term while changing substantially in focus over the longer term. Key troop contributors to ISAF have signaled their intent to draw down or withdraw altogether ahead of the conclusion of the ISAF mission at the end of 2014.14 But NATO has announced the intention to establish a new "training, advising and assistance mission" in Afghanistan, after the conclusion of the ISAF mission, and planning efforts are reportedly underway to define and resource that mission.15

The ability of the ANSF to provide security in Afghanistan will depend on both their capacity and their capabilities. The ANSF were expected to reach their full target endstrength of 352,000 forces, including both army and police, by October 2012. While they fell slightly short of that goal, Afghan and ISAF officials express confidence that the targets will be reached in early 2013.16 But "352,000" is not regarded by most as a permanent solution, in large part due to the projected costs of sustaining a force that large. Instead, participants at the NATO Chicago Summit broadly agreed to maintain the peak level until approximately 2017, and then to begin a "gradual managed force reduction … to a sustainable level," with a working target of 228,500.17 That new target assumes both that funding will be available for that lower endstrength, and that Afghan decision-makers—no doubt with some suasion from the international community—will agree to the reductions.

Real future contributions by the ANSF are likely to depend not only on total endstrength, but also on their operational effectiveness and the institutional abilities of the Afghan system to manage and supply them; on the force mix (including high-end forces, regular army, police, border police) within the total endstrength; on contributions from auxiliary entities such as the Afghan Local Police (ALP), community-based forces vetted by local traditional leaders and under the formal authority of the Ministry of Interior; and on key decisions about force employment including where to focus and where to assume risk. Key developments in these arenas as of late 2012 included:

In addition to campaign requirements, and the projected contributions of others, U.S. troop level debates might also sensibly consider the challenges of "retrograde"—bringing U.S. troops and equipment home again safely. Bringing the troops home from Afghanistan may prove far more complicated than from Iraq, given Afghanistan's difficult terrain, its relative dearth of transportation infrastructure, and the lack of a "Kuwait" next door to pull back to. Retrograde is likely to impose significant drains on the time and attention of U.S. military leadership and forces, as the end of 2014 approaches.

Questions that might help inform the debates about the next steps for U.S. troop levels and campaign design include:

Transition and Change of Mission

All major stakeholders have agreed that central to the way forward in Afghanistan is shifting increasing responsibility for security to Afghan forces. That shift is codified at the strategic level in the formal process of Transition, and in NATO and U.S. government pledges to change the mission of coalition forces; and it is usually discussed, at the operational level, in terms of the concrete ways that coalition forces "pull back" as Afghans step forward. These strategic- and operational-level approaches to transition writ large are linked but not isomorphic, and dynamics in both arenas are constantly changing.

Formal Transition is sometimes poorly understood, in part because the concept has evolved since its launch several years ago:

When U.S. military commanders on the ground, in turn, talk about transition—which COMISAF General Allen has called "the linchpin of our strategy"25—they generally mean not the strategic-level policy decisions but rather the growing capabilities of their Afghan counterparts, and the corresponding evolution of the role of their own forces. The concept of shifting "from combat to support," used frequently at the strategic level, has engendered some confusion because it suggests a flip-of-the-switch change on a date certain. In fact, the relationship between Afghan and coalition forces has evolved continually as well as markedly over time:

Questions that might help inform the debates about transition and change of mission include:

Economy

Afghanistan's ability to sustain itself after reductions in contributions by the international community was long the little-discussed "elephant in the room" in strategic-level debates, perhaps because the challenge seemed so daunting. More recently, however, the Afghan government and the international community have worked more concertedly to craft realistic economic development plans. That intensified focus was catalyzed by one of the largest looming challenges—sustaining the ANSF.

New economic approaches, at both strategic and operational levels, moderate earlier aspirations and attempt to map plans against a timeline:

Questions that might help inform the debates about the next steps for Afghanistan's economy include:

Governance

For many practitioners, an array of triggers has brought concerns about Afghan governance to the forefront. These include deep concerns about the conduct and outcome of the 2014 Afghan presidential elections; recognition of the challenges the Afghan judicial system has faced in addressing allegations of wrongdoing arising from the 2010 Kabul Bank crisis; and wide recognition among practitioners on the ground that the leverage of the international community is likely to diminish, including the particular fears of many military commanders that international civilian efforts are likely to be sharply curtailed. Yet those concerns are counter-balanced somewhat by what many observers characterize as diminishing appetite on the part of the international community to attempt to shape outcomes in this arena. Key dynamics in recent years include:

Questions that might help inform the debates about the next steps in Afghan governance include:

Pakistan

Successful counter-insurgency generally relies on "smothering" an insurgency within a closed environment. Pakistan—Afghanistan's permanent neighbor—has long posed a conundrum for the campaign in Afghanistan by offering safe havens to Afghan insurgent leaders and fighters. The access those havens provide to recruiting, financing, training, and leadership direction grossly complicates the campaign in Afghanistan, making it far more difficult to deprive the insurgencies of the "oxygen" lifelines they need.

The challenge these safe havens pose to the campaign has not abated over time:

Questions that might help inform the debates about the implications of persistent safe havens in Pakistan include:

How Does This End?

Many observers suggest that, particularly in the wake of the NATO Chicago Summit, an unprecedentedly clear "way forward" has emerged for Afghanistan, including major components of the effort as well as a longer and more realistic timeline for international engagement. Yet some suggest that these major components are still not linked together in a single coherent strategic roadmap, one that begins with a vision of endstate that protects U.S. interests, includes the minimum essential conditions necessary to realize that endstate, articulates a strategic logic that connects the major components of the effort, and juxtaposes that roadmap against a clear timeline.

In particular, some suggest, grave conceptual confusion persists within U.S. policy about how the war itself ends—that is, the "theory of victory" for the war in Afghanistan, or the logic that links current approaches to a desired endstate. One approach, particularly prevalent at the operational and tactical levels, emphasizes the gradual accretion of gains in Afghan civilian and security capability, together with an incrementally diminished insurgency. But military commanders are usually the first to add that such an approach is most likely to lead to real war termination only if that campaign is complemented by a multi-faceted political settlement process.42

The second prevalent approach, also supported by U.S. policy, stresses achieving a negotiated settlement between the Afghan government and top insurgent leaders through a reconciliation process in which the United States aims to facilitate "Afghans talking with Afghans." Efforts to date have, by all accounts, been stymied by the lack of substantive overlap, and thus the lack of bargaining space, between the major parties to the conflict. Yet, observers suggest, there may be an even more fundamental flaw in this logic: the Afghan people generally perceive their own government as corrupt and view it with suspicion, and they generally fear the Taliban. It is not obvious to many observers, therefore, how the Afghan people, arguably the ultimate arbiters of stability in Afghanistan, would respond to a deal brokered between these two entities.43

Furthermore, some practitioners and observers suggest that these two approaches to war termination are at cross purposes. For example, if reconciliation were the primary modality for bringing the war to a close, that might suggest prosecuting the campaign on the ground differently—shaping the calculus of key insurgent leaders while preserving their networks intact so that, once a deal were struck, the leaders' orders to those networks would be carried out. If the gradual accumulation of security and governance gains were the primary modality, then the whole concept of reconciliation might not be held out to the Taliban as a prospect until their strength was very significantly eroded.

An alternative to the current bifurcated approach, a growing chorus of practitioners and observers suggests, might be a single political strategy in which the campaign helps set conditions for an inclusive, highly participatory political settlement process that might ultimately achieve a formal reconciliation.

Questions that might help inform the debates about how the war in Afghanistan ends include:

Footnotes

1.

Remarks by President Obama in Address to the Nation from Afghanistan, May 1, 2012, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/01/remarks-president-address-nation-afghanistan.

2.

For further analysis related to Afghanistan, see additional CRS reports by [author name scrubbed], Susan Chesser, [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], Alan Kronstadt, [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], Liana Wyler.

3.

President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Washington, DC, March 27, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/. The war in Afghanistan began in late 2001 with a U.S.-led coalition military operation designed to remove Afghanistan's Taliban-led regime and to prevent future terrorist safe havens, in the wake of the terrorist attacks launched by al Qaeda from Afghanistan on September 11, 2001.

4.

General Stanley McChrystal, COMISAF's Initial Assessment, August 30, 2009, available in redacted form from the Washington Post, at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf. The author was part of that assessment team.

5.

President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan, West Point, NY, December 1, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan.

6.

NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration, Lisbon, Portugal, November 20, 2010, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease.

7.

President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, Washington, DC, June 22, 2011, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/22/remarks-president-way-forward-afghanistan.

8.

Chicago Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease.

9.

Ibid., and Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, May 2, 2012, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf.

10.

See Remarks by President Obama in Address to the Nation from Afghanistan, May 1, 2012, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/01/remarks-president-address-nation-afghanistan.These remarks echoed the description of possible post-2014 missions in the U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement, signed the following day, see Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, May 2, 2012, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf. Speaking at a press conference on November 29, 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta stated that any enduring U.S. presence in Afghanistan would have "three important missions"—counter-terrorism; an advisory mission for Afghan forces; and providing enablers. See Joint Press Conference with Secretary Panetta and Minister Barak in the Pentagon Briefing Room, November 29, 2012, available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5157.

11.

ISAF placemat, December 3, 2012, available at http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php; and interviews with ISAF officials, 2012.

12.

General Stanley McChrystal, COMISAF's Initial Assessment, note 2, supra; and interviews with ISAF officials 2009, 2010, 2011.

13.

Interviews with ISAF officials, 2011; and DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," April 2012, available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_27_12.pdf.

14.

For example, France redeployed the last of its "battlespace-owning" forces, from Kapisa province, in late 2012. And the UK has indicated that in 2013, it will send home up to half of its remaining troops, drawing down from about 9,000 to 4,500. See Mohammad Abbas, "Thousands of British troops to quit Afghanistan in 2013," Reuters, October 14, 2012; and "French combat troops withdraw from Afghan war," Reuters, November 20, 2012.

15.

See Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan issued by the Heads of State and Government of Afghanistan and Nations contributing to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), May 21, 2012, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm; and interviews with ISAF officials, 2012.

16.

Interviews with ISAF officials, 2012.

17.

Participants further agreed that the international community would initially contribute the lion's share of the estimated $4.1 billion annual cost to sustain the force; and that the Afghan government would increasingly assume financial responsibility. Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan issued by the Heads of State and Government of Afghanistan and Nations contributing to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), May 21, 2012, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm.

18.

For example, the ANA 205th Corps, based in Kandahar provinces, conducted the Kalak Hode ("determined strike") series of Corps-level operations in late 2012, including, at one point, sustaining itself for 16 days during operations in Zabul province. Interviews with Afghan and ISAF officials, 2012. Will and ability alone are not enough – the most critical question concerns the effects those efforts generate, which depend on many additional factors. But will and ability are widely regarded as prerequisites for achieving effects.

19.

Interviews with Afghan and ISAF officials, 2012.

20.

Interviews with Afghan civilian officials, and ANSF and ISAF officials, 2012.

21.

See President Karzai, Inauguration Speech, November 19, 2009; and President Karzai, Opening Remarks, London Conference, January 28, 2010.

22.

NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration, Lisbon, Portugal, November 20, 2010, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease.

23.

Most observers agree that there are substantial differences in conditions among the Transition tranches announced so far. Tranche 1, announced in March 2011, included benign locales such as Panjshir and Bamiyan provinces, which had suffered barely if at all from malign external influence. Tranche 2, announced in November 2011, included former hot spots in the campaign's main effort in the south, including Marja, Nawa and Nad-e Ali districts of Helmand province, where sustained combined operations over time had significantly degraded the insurgency. Tranche 3, announced in May 2012, included 122 districts as well as all remaining provincial capitals—covering a wide array of security and governance conditions. Remaining territory includes, significantly, much of the area along Afghanistan's eastern border with Pakistan. See NATO Backgrounder, "Transition to Afghan Lead: Inteqal," available at http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20120516_media_backgrounder_transition_en.pdf.

24.

See Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan issued by the Heads of State and Government of Afghanistan and Nations contributing to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), May 21, 2012, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm.

25.

DOD News Briefing with General John Allen from the Pentagon, May 23, 2012, available at http://www.deffense/gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5040.

26.

General Stanley McChrystal, COMISAF's Initial Assessment, and interviews with ISAF officials, 2009 and 2010.

27.

Interviews with ISAF officials, 2011 and 2012.

28.

DOD News Briefing with General John Allen from the Pentagon, May 23, 2012, available at http://www.deffense/gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5040.

29.

Interviews with ISAF and U.S. Army officials, 2012.

30.

Interviews with Afghan and ISAF officials, 2012.

31.

See Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Towards a Self-Sustaining Afghanistan: An Economic Transition Strategy, November 29, 2011; Afghanistan and the International Community: From Transition to the Transformation Decade, Conference Conclusions, the International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, December 5, 2011, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/afghanistan/docs/2011_11_conclusions_bonn_en.pdf; and The Tokyo Declaration: Partnership for Self-Reliance in Afghanistan, from Transition to Transformation, from the Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan, July 8, 2012, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/tokyo_conference_2012/index.html/. For more explicitly U.S. government perspectives, see National Security Staff, U.S. Economic Strategy for Afghanistan, December 2, 2011, crafted in response to the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, P.L. 111-383, January 7, 2011, Section 1535; and Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, May 2, 2012, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf.

32.

Interviews with U.S. Embassy Kabul and ISAF officials, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012. The November 2010 Bonn concluding document also stressed the shift from service delivery to capacity-building, see Afghanistan and the International Community: From Transition to the Transformation Decade, Conference Conclusions, the International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, December 5, 2011, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/afghanistan/docs/2011_11_conclusions_bonn_en.pdf.

33.

General Stanley McChrystal, COMISAF's Initial Assessment, and interviews with ISAF officials, 2009 and 2010.

34.

Interviews with ISAF officials, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012.

35.

Interviews with U.S. Embassy Kabul and ISAF officials, 2011 and 2012.

36.

Participants in the NATO Chicago Summit reminded the Afghan government of its commitment "to a democratic society, based on the rule of law and good governance, including progress in the fight against corruption.…" The U.S.-Afghan SPA describes a division of labor in which the Afghan government will improve governance by increasing responsiveness and transparency, including efficiency and accountability at all levels, to better meet the Afghan people's needs, while the U.S. will focus on capacity-building. Interviews with ISAF officials, 2011 and 2012, and see Chicago Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease; and Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, May 2, 2012, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf.

37.

See the Tokyo Declaration, Partnership for Self-Reliance in Afghanistan from Transition to Transformation, July 8, 2012, including Annex, Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/tokyo_conference_2012/index.html.

38.

General Stanley McChrystal, COMISAF's Initial Assessment.

39.

Interviews with U.S., Afghan, Pakistani officials, 2009, 2010, 2011.

40.

Investigation into the Incident in Vicinity of the Salala Checkpoint on the Night of 25-26 Nov 2011, redacted, a report by Brigadier General Stephen A. Clark, U.S. Central Command, December 26, 2011, available at http://www.centcom.mil/images/stories/Crossborder/report%20exsum%20further%20redacted.pdf.

41.

Interviews with ISAF officials, 2011 and 2012. And see General Allen, Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Afghanistan, transcript, March 22, 2012; and DOD News Briefing with LTG Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, June 11, 2012, available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5059.

42.

Interviews with ISAF officials, 2011 and 2012.

43.

Interviews with Administration officials and Afghan officials, 2011 and 2012.