Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and
Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy
Issues
Alex Tiersky
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
Susan B. Epstein
Specialist in Foreign Policy
November 26, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42834
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues
Summary
The deaths of Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other U.S. personnel in Benghazi,
Libya, on September 11, 2012, along with attacks on U.S. embassies in Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia,
and Yemen, have drawn renewed attention to the challenges facing U.S. diplomats abroad, as well
as to the difficulty in balancing concerns for their security against the outreach required of their
mission. Congress plays a key role in shaping the response to these challenges, such as by
providing resources for diplomatic security and examining security breaches overseas.
The inability to provide perfect security, especially against the evident threat of mob violence, has
focused particular scrutiny on the deployment of diplomatic personnel in high-threat
environments. The Department of State currently maintains a presence in locations faced with
security conditions that previously would likely have led State to evacuate personnel and close
the post.
Under reciprocal treaty obligations, host nations are obligated to provide security for the
diplomatic facilities of sending states. However, instances in which host nations have been unable
or not fully committed to fulfilling this responsibility have sometimes left U.S. facilities
vulnerable, especially in extraordinary circumstances. U.S. facilities therefore employ a layered
approach to security, including not only the measures taken by a host country, but also additional,
U.S.-coordinated measures, to include armed Diplomatic Security agents, hardened facilities,
U.S.-trained and/or contracted local security guards, and sometimes U.S. Marine Security Guard
detachments (whose principal role is securing sensitive information).
The rapid growth in the number of U.S. civilians deployed in high-risk environments of Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan spurred significant investment in recent years in the Department of
State’s capacity to provide security in dangerous areas through its Bureau of Diplomatic Security
(DS), while simultaneously placing unprecedented burdens on DS’s capability to carry out this
mission successfully there and in other challenging locations. With greater focus on these
frontline states, funds for other U.S. facilities could be strained.
Most of the funding for the protection of about 285 missions abroad is provided through
Worldwide Security Protection (WSP) within the State Department’s Diplomatic & Consular
Programs (D&CP) account and through Worldwide Security Upgrades (WSU) within the
Embassy Security, Construction and Maintenance (ESCM) account. The total security funding
requested for FY2012 was about $2.9 billion, and the amount enacted was about $2.6 billion.
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Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues
Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Host Nation Responsibility Under the Vienna Conventions ............................................................ 4
U.S. Responsibilities and Posture .................................................................................................... 5
Assessing the Threat .................................................................................................................. 6
Physical Security at U.S. Diplomatic Facilities ............................................................................... 7
Embassy Security Construction ................................................................................................. 8
Incident Response .......................................................................................................................... 10
Temporary U.S. Personnel and/or Citizen Evacuation ............................................................ 10
Changing the Status of a Foreign Post ..................................................................................... 11
Accountability Review Boards ................................................................................................ 11
Oversight and Funding................................................................................................................... 14
Funding Data ........................................................................................................................... 15
Recent-Year Funding Observations ......................................................................................... 15
Funding Issues for Congress ................................................................................................... 16
Tables
Table 1. State Department Funds for Embassy and Diplomatic Security, FY2007-FY2013
Request ....................................................................................................................................... 18
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 19
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Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues
Introduction
The United States maintains about 285 diplomatic facilities worldwide.1 Attacks on such
facilities, and on U.S. diplomatic personnel, are not isolated instances. U.S. Ambassador
Christopher Stevens and three other U.S. personnel were killed in Benghazi, Libya, on September
11, 2012, after armed individuals attacked and burned buildings on the main mission compound
and subsequently attacked a second annex site where U.S. personnel had been evacuated.
Five other U.S. ambassadors have died by violent acts in the line of duty, although none since
1979.2 In addition to this total, 38 U.S. diplomats who were not ambassadors have been killed in
the past 30 years.3 There were 39 attacks against U.S. embassies and consulates and official U.S.
personnel overseas between 1998 and 2008, excluding regular attacks against the U.S. Embassy
in Baghdad.4
These events, along with recent attacks on U.S. embassies in Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen,
have drawn renewed attention to the challenges facing U.S. diplomats abroad, as well as to the
difficulty in balancing concerns for their security against the outreach required of their mission.
Under reciprocal treaty obligations, host nations are obligated to provide security for the
diplomatic facilities of sending states. However, instances in which host nations have been unable
or not fully committed to fulfilling this responsibility have sometimes left U.S. facilities
vulnerable, especially in extraordinary circumstances. U.S. facilities therefore employ a layered
approach to security, including not only the measures taken by a host country, but also additional,
U.S.-coordinated measures, to include armed Diplomatic Security agents, hardened facilities,
U.S.-trained and/or contracted local security guards, and sometimes U.S. Marine Security Guard
detachments (whose principal role is securing sensitive information).
The inability to provide perfect security, especially against the evident threat of mob violence, has
led some observers to question the deployment of personnel in high-threat environments. The
Department of State’s Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, testifying in November 2009,
underlined that “the Department currently operates diplomatic missions in locations where, in the
past, we might have closed the post and evacuated all personnel when faced with similar
threats.”5
1 See “Frequently Asked Questions: Diplomatic Security,” at the Department of State’s website: http://www.state.gov/
m/ds/about/faq/index.htm.
2 Two additional U.S. ambassadors died in plane crashes: Arnold L. Raphel, in Pakistan, 1988, and Laurence A.
Steinhardt, in Canada, 1950. See U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.history.state.gov/about/faq/ambassadors-and-chiefs-of-mission.
3 Joe Davidson, “Foreign Service workers know risks come with job,” The Washington Post, September 24, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/foreign-service-workers-know-risks-come-with-job/2012/09/24/4027e0c6-0675-
11e2-afff-d6c7f20a83bf_print.html.
4 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Diplomatic Security’s Recent Growth Warrants Strategic Review, GAO-10-
156, November 2009, p. 53, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10156.pdf.
5 Statement by Ambassador Eric J. Boswell, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, U.S. Department of
State, before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, The Diplomat’s Shield:
Diplomatic Security in Today’s World, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., December 9, 2009.
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The rapid growth in the number of U.S. civilians deployed in the high-risk environments of Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan spurred significant investment in recent years in the Department of
State’s capacity to provide security in dangerous areas through its Bureau of Diplomatic Security
(DS). The challenges of providing security in these war-related areas may have also strained DS’s
capability to provide security for deployed diplomats in other hardship posts around the world.
Observers have suggested that funding for embassy security follows a “boom and bust” cycle, in
which major attacks are followed by a sudden influx of resources that may be difficult to expend
in a well-planned manner. An influx of security-related resources in the 1980s was followed by a
lull in the 1990s when diplomatic security funding was greatly reduced prior to the 1998 attacks
in Kenya and Tanzania. The subsequent State Department Accountability Review Board
suggested that the preceding years of reduced spending for embassy security was a contributing
factor to the vulnerability of the targeted embassies.6
This report provides background information on the authorities, regulations, and procedures in
place at the Department of State regarding diplomatic security. It also describes several areas of
potential congressional interest, including the Accountability Review Board process, whose
conclusions the Secretary of State is required to report to Congress, and discussion of embassy
security funding trends. It may be updated to reflect ongoing developments.
6 See Scott Stewart, Diplomatic Security in Light of Benghazi, Stratfor, September 27, 2012, http://www.stratfor.com/
weekly/diplomatic-security-light-benghazi, and Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, Counterterrorism Funding: Old Fears
and Cyclical Lulls, Stratfor, March 18, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/
20090318_counterterrorism_funding_old_fears_and_cyclical_lulls.
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Embassy Security and the Benghazi Attack7
Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other U.S. officials were killed in an attack on U.S. offices in Benghazi,
Libya, on September 11, 2012. The State Department has stated that U.S.-provided security was robust, consistent
with other small missions in similar environments, and that Libyan guards fought the attackers alongside U.S.
personnel.8 Ongoing congressional inquiries have focused on a number of questions, including whether sufficient
resources were provided to protect the facilities and personnel in the context of an increasingly threatening security
situation that led to the closure of the British consulate in Benghazi, among other international facilities.
According to DS Bureau documents, a DS team was deployed to Benghazi in 2011 to establish a diplomatic presence
there after the embassy in Tripoli had closed due to deteriorating security. The team first established a temporary
location; after subsequently identifying a more secure location, DS moved Department personnel to a large villa
compound which, according to DS, “significantly enhanced the security of al U.S. personnel in Benghazi.”9
Congressional testimony and media reporting have suggested that the temporary U.S. facilities in Benghazi had, in the
months preceding the attack, been reinforced with higher walls, better lighting, and sandbagged emplacements and
guard booths, among other measures; however, it remains unclear whether these or additional measures
contemplated by Department officials prior to the attack would have significantly hindered the September 11, 2012,
assault.
On the night of the attack, the Benghazi facilities were reportedly protected by an unarmed, contracted local guard
force; a local militia; and armed DS agents. A U.S. Marine detachment had not been posted there, a situation that is
not unusual for smal er posts at which classified information is not produced. The compound’s security posture
included:
•
locally hired unarmed guards were provided under contract with a British private security firm named Blue
Mountain. The contract, which took effect in March, reportedly was worth $387,413 over one year. Among the
tasks of the guards were the operation of a metal detector and inspection of visitors’ bags. While armed security
contractors protect many State Department facilities in high-threat locations, Libyan political sensitivities ruled
out the use of private security companies; the local contracted guard force was therefore unarmed. There were
reportedly four unarmed Blue Mountain guards at the facilities on the night of the attack.
•
armed members of the February 17 Brigade, a local militia that participated in the anti-Qaddafi uprising. Given
the lack of centralized Libyan governmental capacity to discharge its responsibilities as host nation to protect
the U.S. facilities under the Vienna Convention (as described below), this function was provided by the Brigade,
which trained with U.S. officials for this role. Its members, who were reportedly expected to provide their own
weapons and ammunition, were paid $28 per day, what one press account describes as a “relatively standard
wage.”10 DS officials have testified that on the night of the attack, three February 17 Brigade personnel were
present at the U.S. facilities.
U.S. security personnel at the facilities on the night of the attack included five armed Diplomatic Security agents
(three who were assigned to Benghazi, and two travelling with the ambassador), according to testimony by a senior
Diplomatic Security official. The compound could also call on a “well-trained U.S. quick reaction security team”
stationed at an annex two kilometers away.11
7 Information regarding the Benghazi attack is based on initial open source reporting and may not reflect additional
details that may emerge subsequent to the date of this report. For additional information on Libya and analysis of the
September 11, 2012, attack, see CRS Report RL33142, Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M.
Blanchard. For more information on other attacks on U.S. facilities and interests in Muslim countries, see CRS Report
R42743, Recent Protests in Muslim Countries: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Christopher M.
Blanchard.
8 The State Department has provided a detailed account of the attack and its aftermath in a background briefing on
October 9, 2012, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/10/198791.htm.
9 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Tested in Times of Transition: 2011 Year in Review, Annual
Report, May 2012, p. 9, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/189611.pdf.
10 Michael Birnbaum, “Sensitive documents left behind at U.S. diplomatic post in Libya,” The Washington Post,
October 3, 2012.
11 Testimony provided by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Charlene Lamb, U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, The Security Failures of Benghazi, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., October 10, 2012.
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Further complicating the U.S. security picture in Benghazi, news reports on November 2, 2012, indicated that the
annex was a classified CIA installation and that the quick-reaction team mentioned above was part of the CIA
presence. Personnel in Benghazi reportedly included a security force of approximately 10 individuals, who had on
previous occasions shielded Ambassador Stephens when he left the U.S. facility. Members of this force were
reportedly among those responding directly to the September 11 attack.12
Host Nation Responsibility Under the
Vienna Conventions
Under the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations13 and the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations,14 nearly all countries around the world participate in reciprocal obligations
regarding the diplomatic facilities of other countries in their territory. The United States is a state
party to these conventions.15
Section 3 of Article 31 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, “Inviolability of
the consular premises,” states that, other than in the case of fire or other disaster requiring prompt
protective action, “the receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to
protect the consular premises against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of
the peace of the consular post or impairment of its dignity.” Article 40 of the same Convention
further states that “the receiving State shall treat consular officers with due respect and shall take
all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their person, freedom or dignity.”
An attack on an ambassador is also covered under Article 29 of the 1961 Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, which states, “The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He
shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due
respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or
dignity.”
The grounds of diplomatic missions are protected under the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. Article 22 (section 1-3) of the Convention states
1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not
enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.
2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the
premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of
the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.
3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of
transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution.
12 Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman, and Margaret Coker, “CIA Takes Heat for Role in Libya,” The Wall Street Journal,
November 2, 2012.
13 The 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations can be accessed at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf.
14 The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations can be accessed at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf.
15 The conventions are nearly universally adopted; for example, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia are also states party.
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U.S. Responsibilities and Posture
The protection of U.S. government employees and facilities under Chief of Mission (COM)
authority overseas from terrorist, criminal, or technical attack is the responsibility of the Secretary
of State, as designated under the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, as
amended.16
The act specifies that the Secretary of State must develop and implement (in consultation with the
heads of other federal agencies having personnel or missions abroad where appropriate and
within the scope of the resources made available) policies and programs, including funding levels
and standards, to provide for the security of U.S. government operations of a diplomatic nature
and foreign government operations of a diplomatic nature in the United States.
Within the Department, the Secretary has delegated these responsibilities to the Assistant
Secretary for Diplomatic Security (DS).17 The current Assistant Secretary is Eric J. Boswell; he
has been in the position since July 2008.18 The Assistant Secretary, who heads the Bureau for
Diplomatic Security, is responsible for, among other tasks:
• establishing and operating post security and protective functions abroad;
• emergency planning abroad;
• establishing and operating local guard services abroad;
• supervising the U.S. Marine Corps security guard program;
• liaising with U.S. private-sector security interests abroad;
• developing and coordinating counterterrorism planning, emergency action
planning abroad, threat analysis programs, and liaison with other federal agencies
to carry out these functions; and
• developing and implementing technical and physical security programs,
including security-related construction, radio, and personnel security
communications, armored vehicles, computer and communications security, and
research programs necessary to develop such measures.19
The mission of developing and implementing security policies and programs that provide for the
protection of all U.S. government personnel (including accompanying dependents) on official
duty abroad is executed through the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), also established by the
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, as amended.20
The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) provides protection to personnel, information and
facilities at over 285 embassies and consulates, and over 100 domestic Department of State
16 22 U.S.C. § 4801 et seq., P.L. 99-399.
17 See “Diplomatic Security Senior Leadership” at http://www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/bio/index.htm.
18 A biography of Assistant Secretary Boswell is available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/106593.htm.
19 See 1 FAM 260 Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/84179.pdf.
20 22 U.S.C. § 4801 et seq., P.L. 99-399.
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locations.21 According to its website, “every diplomatic mission in the world operates under a
security program designed and maintained by Diplomatic Security.”22
The bureau is staffed by more than 34,000 employees worldwide—with roughly 90% of them
contractors. Out of a total force of special agents of approximately 2,000, DS has nearly 800
special agents posted in regional security offices at over 250 posts worldwide. Its reach to
diplomatic missions in 157 countries makes it the most widely represented American security and
law enforcement organization around the world, according to its website.
When serving abroad, DS special agents are referred to as regional security officers (RSOs).
RSOs’ responsibilities include not only managing security programs and formulating emergency
contingency plans, but also providing the first line of defense for U.S. personnel and dependents,
as well as facilities and sensitive information. RSOs are the primary advisor to the Chief of
Mission (usually the ambassador) on all security matters.
In performing their functions, RSOs work closely with other groups, including Marine Security
Guards, surveillance detection teams, local guards, cleared American guards, local investigators,
and host government officials. DS also provides Mobile Security Teams, dispatched from
Washington, DC, to high-threat posts to conduct training for embassy personnel, their dependents,
and local guards in protective tactics, as well as providing emergency security support, including
protective security for COMs, surveillance detection operations, and assistance with post
evacuations. DS also provides specially trained agents to lead contractor-provided personal
protection teams and guard services in areas of ongoing conflict, where the host nation is unable
or unwilling to provide the required level of security. In extreme situations, U.S. military
assistance can be provided to the RSOs in the form of combat-equipped Fleet Anti-Terrorism
Security Teams (FAST) provided by regional commanders.
Assessing the Threat
The security posture of each U.S. diplomatic facility varies based on the Department of State’s
assessment of local conditions.23 Regular reviews of threats to posts are conducted by the State
Department. Senior officials recently stated that all posts were required to review their security
posture in advance of the 9/11 anniversary. In the wake of the attack on the U.S. interim facilities
in Benghazi, Libya, all diplomatic posts were again ordered to review their security posture and
to take all necessary steps to enhance it if necessary.24
The process of resource allocation to specific posts is based on a set of security standards called
the Security Environment Threat List (SETL). The list is mentioned in 22 U.S.C. § 4865,
“Security requirements for United States diplomatic facilities,” which requires that such a list
21 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Diplomatic Security: Expanded Missions and Inadequate Facilities Pose
Critical Challenges to Training Efforts, GAO-11-780T, June 29, 2011, p. 1, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-
780T.
22 See “Bureau of Diplomatic Security,” http://www.state.gov/m/ds/index.htm.
23 Transcript, Department of State Press Briefing, September 13, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/09/
197729.htm.
24 Transcript, State Department Briefing to Update on Recent Events in Libya, September 12, 2012,
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2012/09/20120912135895.html.
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shall contain a section that addresses potential acts of international terrorism against United
States diplomatic facilities based on threat identification criteria that emphasize the threat of
transnational terrorism and include the local security environment, host government support,
and other relevant factors such as cultural realities. Such plan shall be reviewed and updated
every six months.
Based on the SETL, DS, in consultation with other agencies, assigns threat levels to each post.
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), six threat categories inform the
SETL: international terrorism, indigenous terrorism, political violence, crime, human intelligence,
and technical threat. A rating is then assigned for each category, on a four-level scale.
• Critical: grave impact on American diplomats
• High: serious impact on American diplomats
• Medium: moderate impact on American diplomats
• Low: minor impact on American diplomats
The protective measures for each post are dictated by the post’s overall threat level.25
State Department FY2013 budget documents state that “DS is reexamining the process for
assigning threat ratings in the Security Environment Threat List (SETL). This is an effort to
accurately determine the ratio between threat and vulnerability at diplomatic facilities
overseas.”26 The documents further state that DS increasingly provides security support at greater
distances from capital cities and traditional embassy platforms, “often in places and situations
where the Security Environment Threat List and the security standards did not foresee today’s
realities.” DS is therefore “developing guidelines whereby diplomatic facilities in contingency
zones and other non-traditional platforms can be recognized as ‘critical plus,’” which would
require innovative security solutions or waivers of existing standards.27
In an average year, DS receives over 1,000 threats and incidents against U.S. interests overseas.28
Physical Security at U.S. Diplomatic Facilities
While security arrangements for specific locations or individuals are not made public by the
Department of State, diplomatic facilities typically rely on a combination of an outer layer of host
nation-provided and/or contract guard forces, physical perimeter security, and State Department
agents or contractors. These arrangements are overseen by the Department’s Bureau of
Diplomatic Security (DS) and the deployed Regional Security Officer (RSO).
Reporting to the Director of Diplomatic Security, the U.S. Marine Security Guard currently posts
detachments to 152 U.S. diplomatic facilities around the world; Marine Corps guards are thus
25 U.S. Government Accountability Office, State Department: Diplomatic Security’s Recent Growth Warrants Strategic
Review, GAO-10-156, December 7, 2009, pp. 7-8, http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/298354.html.
26 State Department FY2013 Congressional Budget Justification, Vol. 1, Department of State Operations, p. 417.
27 State Department FY2013 Congressional Budget Justification, Vol. 1, Department of State Operations, p. 66.
28 See http://www.state.gov/m/ds/about/overview/c9006.htm.
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present at many, but not all, such facilities.29 As of March 2010, there were over 1,300 Marine
Corps guards deployed worldwide.30 The primary mission of these specially trained Marines is to
prevent the compromise of classified U.S. government information and equipment. A secondary
role is the protection of U.S. citizens at those facilities during crises. The detachments, when
deployed, are under civilian authority at all times, under a chain of command that includes the
RSO and ultimately the Chief of Mission.31
Some observers have suggested that while any number of physical threats are taken into
consideration by State Department planners, the threat of mob violence over a sustained time
period is one that no facility, no matter how well fortified, can defeat in the absence of protection
from the host nation’s security forces. 32
Embassy Security Construction
The coordinated bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 attacks spurred a
period of intense congressional scrutiny of embassy construction, leading to a funding program
codified in the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (SECCA).33
Among the provisions of the SECCA were the following:
• The authorization of five years of funding at $900 million each year for
Worldwide Security in the State Department’s Embassy Security Construction
and Maintenance Account (ESCM), as well as additional funds for Worldwide
Security in the Diplomatic and Consular Programs account covering security
upgrades at posts, such as improved doors and windows, computer and software
security improvements, purchase of secure vehicles, and other items.
• A requirement that the Secretary of State submit to Congress each year a
prioritized list identifying each diplomatic facility or diplomatic or consular post
and compound in need of replacement or for any major security enhancements.
• A requirement that embassy emergency action plans address the threat of large
explosive attacks from vehicles, and a requirement that new sites be large enough
to co-locate all non-military U.S. government personnel. In addition, any new
facility was required to be no less than 100 feet from the embassy or consulate
compound’s perimeter.
29 U.S. Marine Corps information provided to CRS, September 14, 2012.
30 See “United States Marine Security Guards: Safeguarding Missions Around the World,” U.S. Department of State
Bureau of Diplomatic Security Public Affairs, March 2010, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/138440.pdf.
31 10 U.S.C. 5983 authorizes the assignment of Navy personnel to Foreign Service posts under the direct operational
control of the chiefs of diplomatic missions or principal officers, or their designees, and provides the basic authority for
the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated August 1, 1967, between the Department of State and Department of
Defense, which authorizes the Department of State and the U.S. Marine Corps to develop, execute, and issue such
policy instructions as may be required from time to time to implement their joint responsibilities in support of the
Marine Security Guard (MSG) Program. The MOA dated January 9, 2001, between the Department of State and the
U.S. Marine Corps delineates authorities, responsibilities, and other terms between the Marine Corps and the
Department in support of the MSG Program.
32 Scott Stewart, U.S. Diplomatic Security in Iraq After the Withdrawal, Stratfor, December 22, 2011,
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/us-diplomatic-security-iraq-after-withdrawal.
33 H.R. 3427, which was enacted as Title VI of Appendix G of P.L. 106-113.
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This additional funding stream and heightened priority led the State Department to elevate what
had been an Office of Foreign Buildings Operations to the Bureau of Overseas Building
Operations (OBO), led by an Assistant Secretary-equivalent Director/Chief Operating Officer
reporting directly to the Undersecretary for Management. OBO’s responsibility is to direct the
worldwide overseas building programs for all federal employees serving under the authority of
the Chief of Mission in a country. With the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, OBO determines the
security priority status of U.S. diplomatic facilities around the world and the steps needed to bring
the facilities into compliance with State Department security standards.
To bring the many diplomatic facilities up to security standards quickly, in 2001 OBO instituted
the Standard Embassy Design (SED) initiative to standardize new chanceries and consulates.34
SED divided new embassy projects into three categories: small, medium, and large facilities, each
with a pre-engineered design featuring high fences and 100-foot setbacks. The SED provided
plans for the site, the main office building, annex buildings, perimeter protection, warehouse,
shops, utility buildings, recreation centers, and Marine Security Guard quarters. With pre-
engineered plans, OBO contended that costs were lower, construction was faster, and the quality
was enhanced because of the inclusion of security and construction best practices in SED designs.
The SED designs were responsive to the concerns of the 1998 Accountability Review Board,
which strongly emphasized security; its report asserts that “when choosing embassy sites, safety
and security concerns should guide our considerations more than whether a location may be
convenient or of historic, symbolic importance.... We must face this fact and do more to provide
security or we will continue to see our people killed, our embassies blown away, and the
reputation of the United States overseas eroded.”35 However, critics of the SED designs suggested
that the highly secure facilities present a closed, unwelcoming, fortress image of the United
States. These critics also argued that the security requirements such as co-location and required
distance of buildings from perimeters force embassies away from central locations, making it
more difficult for diplomats to do their work.
In 2010, OBO moved away from the Standard Embassy Design concept, and introduced a new
building initiative called Design Excellence. Rather than security and uniformity, this new
program emphasizes site-specific architectural features and environmental considerations. Rather
than placing U.S. facilities outside of cities in order to achieve appropriate setbacks, embassies
and consulates would, by their location in urban areas, “contribute to the civic and urban fabric of
host cities.” Designs would be “welcoming,” responsive to local culture, and would use
“contextually appropriate and durable materials.”36 The impact of the recent attacks on the
Department of State’s Design Excellence concept remains to be seen.
The State Department claims that OBO’s efforts have, since 2000, “moved over 25,840 people
out of vulnerable locations and into more secure, safe and functional facilities—vastly improving
the protection of both employees and sensitive U.S. government information,” according to
budget documents.37
34 The Department of State’s Bureau of Overseas Building Operations website, http://www.state.gov/obo/c13075.htm.
35 January 1999 ARB report, op cit., p. 2.
36 See “Design Excellence: Overview,” Department of State Bureau of Overseas Building Operations, May 2011,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/164725.pdf.
37 State Department FY2013 Congressional Budget Justification, Vol. 1, Department of State Operations, p. 470.
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Incident Response
In the aftermath of a major security incident, a number of measures are at the disposal of U.S.
officials, ranging from the temporary evacuation of Americans (personnel, their dependents, and
U.S. citizens as a whole) to closing a post.
Temporary U.S. Personnel and/or Citizen Evacuation
The State Department, depending on local conditions, may recommend that diplomatic staff or
dependents, or all U.S. citizens, leave the foreign country.
Should local situations become unpredictable or unmanageable, a Chief of Mission may, upon the
approval of the Under Secretary of State for Management, order an “Authorized Departure” for a
given post. It allows families of post employees and/or non-essential staff to depart on a voluntary
basis. This step provides some flexibility in determining which employees or groups of
employees may depart.
Authorized Departure is an intermediate step in the events leading up to an Ordered Departure, or
drawdown, of diplomatic mission personnel and their dependents. Ordered Departure is initiated
in extraordinary circumstances when the embassy or consulate is no longer confident of the
security of its personnel and families. Implementation of this status mandates the departure of all
non-emergency mission staff and employees. Such a step may be initiated by the Chief of
Mission or the Secretary of State. 38
For U.S. citizen evacuations, the Department may, in certain exceptional cases, provide departure
assistance.39 The Department encourages the use of existing commercial transportation options
whenever possible and provides U.S. citizens with information on these options. Where the local
transportation infrastructure is compromised, the Department tries to arrange chartered or non-
commercial transportation for U.S. citizens to evacuate. Involvement of the U.S. military in any
evacuation is, the Department emphasizes, a last resort; most evacuations employ commercial
means and local infrastructure.40 The cost of any assistance is, by law, required to be provided “on
a reimbursable basis to the maximum extent practicable.”41 This means that evacuation costs are
generally the responsibility of the U.S. citizen evacuated, who is asked to commit in writing to
repayment of the U.S. government. Emergency financial assistance may be available for destitute
evacuees.
38 See https://www.osac.gov/pages/ResourceLibraryDetails.aspx?cid=3262 and 3 FAM 3770 at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/85108.pdf.
39 See “Emergencies and Crises” at http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/emergencies/emergencies_1212.html.
40 Instances in which the U.S. military contributes to an evacuation of U.S. citizens are termed noncombatant
evacuation operations (NEO) by the Department of Defense (DOD). In an NEO, DOD personnel assist the Department
of State in evacuating US citizens, DOD civilian personnel, and designated host nation and third country nationals
whose lives are in danger from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven. During NEOs, the US
ambassador, not the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, is the senior USG
authority for the evacuation. See United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, Joint
Publication 3-68, December 23, 2010, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_68.pdf.
41 22 U.S.C. § 2671(b) (2) (A).
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Changing the Status of a Foreign Post
The recent attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities have raised questions as to whether the
Administration might decide to close specific posts. Department of State’s regulations explain
that a decision to open, close, or change the status of an embassy is made by the President; for
lower-level representations such as consulates, the State Department’s Under Secretary for
Management may determine its status. Proposals to modify the status of a post are usually made
by the Assistant Secretary of the regional bureau concerned.42
Accountability Review Boards
The Accountability Review Board (ARB) process was first recommended by the 1985 Advisory
Panel of Overseas Security led by Admiral Inman, which recommended that “Foreign Service
Regulations be promulgated to require the Secretary of State to convene a Board of Inquiry with
powers of establishing accountability in all cases involving terrorism or security related attacks
that result in significant damage and/or casualties to United States personnel or property.”43 This
recommendation was codified by the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of
1986, as amended.44
The act requires the Secretary of State to convene an Accountability Review Board after a
security-related incident, defined by the act as “any case of serious injury, loss of life, or
significant destruction of property at or related to a U.S. Government mission abroad, or a case of
a serious breach of security involving intelligence activities or a foreign government directed at a
U.S. mission abroad (other than a facility or installation subject to the control of a U.S. area
military commander).” 45 Exceptions are made for incidents determined by the Secretary of State
as not relating to security, and for facilities in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The objective of such Boards, according to State’s regulations, is “to foster more effective
security of U.S. missions and personnel abroad by ensuring a thorough and independent review of
security-related incidents ... the Board seeks to determine accountability and promote and
encourage improved security programs and practices.”46 Subsequent attacks on U.S. diplomatic
facilities and personnel, such as the August 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, or
the deaths of three Defense Department personnel serving in the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan in
February 2010, prompted the Secretary of State to convene Accountability Review Boards.47
42 2 FAM 400, “Opening, Closing or Changing the Status of a Foreign Post,” http://www.state.gov/m/a/dir/regs/fam/
02fam/0400/index.htm.
43 Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security (the Inman Report), http://www.state.gov/
www/publications/1985inman_report/inman2.html#accountability.
44 22 U.S.C. § 4831.
45 22 U.S.C. § 4831(a)(1).
46 See U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 12 - Diplomatic Security, 12 FAM 030,
Accountability Review Board (ARB), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/88323.pdf.
47 A CRS search of the Federal Register shows 11 Accountability Review Boards convened by the Secretary of State
since 1995 (prior to the current ARB studying the Benghazi attack).
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Past Reviews of Diplomatic Security:The 1985 Inman Report and 1998 ARB
In the wake of the 1983-1984 bombings of U.S. facilities in Beirut, Lebanon, the Department of State formed an
Advisory Panel on Overseas Security. The panel, chaired by retired Admiral Bobby Inman, is often referred to as
the Inman Commission.48 Its June 1985 security recommendations included the creation of the Bureau for
Diplomatic Security; improvements in State’s protective intelligence, threat analysis, and alerting procedures;
improvements in training for Foreign Service personnel and dependents; improvements in contingency planning at
posts; assigning Marine Security Guard detachments to all highly sensitive posts; revising the Diplomatic Security
Service physical security standards; pursuing a substantial building program to correct security deficiencies, in
particular regarding perimeter security; and initiating a capital budgeting procedure to avoid security improvement
delays due to budgetary reasons. The panel also offered a number of classified recommendations. The Advisory
Panel identified 126 facilities with inadequate security. The Inman standards added a “security premium” to the cost
of embassy construction and refurbishment in the range of 10%-15%, according to a State Department official.49
The Accountability Review Board established in October 1998 to investigate the coordinated bombings of the U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania was chaired by Admiral William Crowe, who had served as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and Ambassador to the United Kingdom.50 The ARB affirmed that security provisions at the attacked
posts had been appropriate for the level of the assessed threat; the embassy in Nairobi was considered a moderate-
risk post, while the embassy in Dar es Salaam was considered a low-risk post. The ARB concluded that the
bombings had been successful in part because insufficient appropriations had been made to implement the earlier
Inman Commission recommendations; Admiral Crowe estimated that 80% of U.S. diplomatic facilities around the
world stil did not meet the Inman Commission standards.51 Among the board’s recommendations were bringing
U.S. overseas facilities up to the Inman standards and boosting funding for security at U.S. overseas facilities to
approximately $1.4 billion per year over an approximate 10-year period.
The act specifies that a Board is to be convened not later than 60 days after the occurrence of an
incident, although the Secretary can extend this for an additional 60 days if she determines that
the additional period is necessary for the convening of the Board. A written decision by the
Secretary of State to convene the Board, specifying its membership and duration, as well as its
purposes and jurisdiction, is published in the Federal Register, or other similar document, if
deemed appropriate by the Secretary.
On forming a Board, the Secretary is also required to promptly inform the chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
that the Board has been convened, the membership of the Board, and other appropriate
information about the Board.
The written findings of an ARB are to include
• the extent to which the incident or incidents with respect to which the Board was
convened was security related;
48 The unclassified elements of the report of the Advisory Panel on Overseas Security (the ‘Inman panel’) are available
at http://www.state.gov/www/publications/1985inman_report/inman1.html.
49 As quoted in Shaun Waterman, “Benghazi attack followed deep cuts in State Department security budget,” The
Washington Times, September 27, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/sep/27/benghazi-attack-
followed-deep-cuts-in-state-depart/?page=all.
50 While there were two boards established, the boards submitted a combined report with similar conclusions about the
bombings and recommendations; this report therefore treats the two boards as one. While ARB reports have generally
not been released to the public, the unclassified elements of the Crowe ARB’s combined report is available on the
Department of State website: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/accountability_report.html.
51 Admiral William Crowe, as quoted in transcript, PBS NewsHour, January 8, 1999, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/
africa/jan-june99/bombings_1-8.html.
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• whether the security systems and security procedures at that mission were
adequate;
• whether the security systems and security procedures were properly
implemented;
• the impact of intelligence and information availability; and
• such other facts and circumstances that may be relevant to the appropriate
security management of United States missions abroad.52
The recommendations of previous Boards appear not to have been made public, other than the
unclassified version of the Crowe ARB empanelled to study the 1998 embassy attacks. The ARBs
do not report directly to Congress. However, executive branch officials are required to report to
Congress the recommendations of the ARB as follows:
• any recommendations made by the Board to the Secretary of State to improve the
security and efficiency of any program or operation which the Board has
reviewed, must be reported by the Secretary to Congress no later than 90 days
after the receipt of such recommendations, including any action taken with
respect to that recommendation.
• should the Board find any breach of duty by U.S. personnel, the Board notifies
the head of the appropriate federal agency or instrumentality, who shall, not later
than 30 days after the receipt of that finding, transmit to the Congress a report
specifying the nature of the case and a summary of the evidence transmitted by
the Board; and the decision by the federal agency or instrumentality to take
disciplinary or other appropriate action against that individual or the reasons for
deciding not to take disciplinary or other action with respect to that individual.53
Accountability Review Board in the Wake of the Benghazi Attack
On September 20, 2012, Secretary of State Clinton confirmed her intent to form an Accountability Review Board to
investigate the Benghazi attacks; the Board is chaired by former Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering. The
panel includes five members, four of which are designated by the Secretary of State and one by the intelligence
community. The members of the board are Admiral Michael Mullen (Ret), a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff; Richard Shinnick, a retired Senior Foreign Service Officer who served as interim Director for the Department of
State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations in 2008; Catherine Bertini, a Professor of Public Administration and
International Affairs at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs and former Executive Director of the
United Nations World Food Program; and Hugh Turner, a former deputy director of the CIA’s Directorate of
Operations.
In her October 2, 2012, letter to the Chairman of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, the
Secretary of State stated that the Board is “charged with determining whether our security systems and procedures
in Benghazi were adequate, whether those systems and procedures were properly implemented, and any lessons that
may be relevant to our work around the world.” She further asserted her intent to share the Board’s findings and the
Department’s response with the Congress.54
52 22 U.S.C. § 4834.
53 22 U.S.C. § 4834.
54 Josh Rogin, “Clinton promises answers on Benghazi attack,” Foreignpolicy.com, October 2, 2012,
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/02/clinton_promises_answers_on_benghazi_attack.
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Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues
Secretary Clinton gave the Board 60 days from its first meeting to submit its conclusions and recommendations to
her, “unless the Chair determines a need for additional time,” according to the Department’s Federal Register notice.
The notice also states the Department’s pledge to report to Congress on al recommendations made by the Board
and any actions undertaken in response to those recommendations “within the timeframe required by statute
following receipt of the report.”55
Oversight and Funding
The Benghazi attack prompted renewed congressional focus on diplomatic security issues, in
particular on ensuring that relevant lessons are learned and applied to the protection of U.S.
diplomatic facilities abroad. Areas of scrutiny include the management of risk in deploying
diplomatic personnel to high-threat areas; threat assessment processes and procedures; the
acquisition and sharing of intelligence; physical protection measures at U.S. facilities;
interagency coordination in crisis response; and decision-making processes by the Department of
State and other U.S. government agencies with presence abroad.
The appropriation of funds for embassy security is one area in which Congress is particularly
active. Title I, Sec. 2 (k) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 states that the
Secretary of State “may use funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Secretary to
provide maximum physical security in Government-owned and leased properties and vehicles
abroad.”
The original authorization to use appropriated funds designated for embassy security in the
Department of State’s Embassy Security Construction and Maintenance (ESCM) account is
derived from the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999.56 The Foreign
Relations Authorization Act of 2003 increased the authorization levels of the original
legislation.57 Because the Congress has not passed subsequent foreign relations authorization
legislation, the authorization of appropriations for embassy security purposes is derived from
appropriating funds for “Worldwide Security Upgrade” in the Department of State, Foreign
Operations appropriations legislation and in provisions in the same Act stating that “Funds
appropriated by this Act ... may be obligated and expended notwithstanding” provisions in the
Department of State Basic Authorities Act of 1956 requiring an authorization of funding before
appropriations can be obligated or expended.58
55 See “Convening of an Accountability Review Board To Examine the Circumstances Surrounding the Deaths of
Personnel Assigned in Support of the U.S. Government Mission to Libya in Benghazi, Libya on September 11, 2012,”
Notice by the Department of State, Federal Register, October 4, 2012, https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2012/
10/04/2012-24504/convening-of-an-accountability-review-board-to-examine-the-circumstances-surrounding-the-
deaths-of.
56 Sec. 604 of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (Title VI of Appendix G of P.L.
106-113; 22 U.S.C. 4865 note).
57 Sec. 111(3)(B) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-228).
58 Sec. 15 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act prohibits appropriated funds from being obligated or expended
unless the appropriation has been authorized by law (P.L. 84-885; 22 U.S.C. 2680). In the case of the FY2010
appropriations in the Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2010
(Division F of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010; [P.L. 111-117]), the authorization waiver is Sec. 7023.
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Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues
Funding Data
Within the Department of State budget, virtually all of the embassy and diplomatic security
funding is within five subaccounts: Worldwide Security Protection (WSP), Worldwide Security
Upgrades within the Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) account,
Diplomatic Security (DS), Counterterrorism within the Diplomatic and Consular Programs
(D&CP), and Diplomatic Security within Border Security Program (BSP).
• WSP, the largest component of security-related funding within the Department of
State, provides for a safe and secure environment overseas for personnel
promoting the interests of the United States. It provides for the security of life,
property, and information. WSP supports numerous security programs including
a worldwide guard force protecting overseas diplomatic missions and residences,
as well as domestic facilities.
• The Worldwide Security Upgrades (WSU) within ESCM provides funding for
bricks-and-mortar type of security needs. It funds the Department of State’s
portion of the Capital Security Cost Sharing that combines with funds from other
agencies represented overseas for planning, design, and construction of secure
new embassy compounds. It also funds ongoing security activities and security-
related maintenance.
• The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) funded under D&CP is the law
enforcement and security arm of the Department of State. DS protects people,
property, and information. It conducts international investigations, provides
threat analysis, and focuses on cyber security, counterterrorism, personnel
security, and security technology.
• The Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) funded within D&CP leads the U.S.
government in counterterrorism diplomacy and provides an on-call capability to
respond to terrorist incidents worldwide.
• The Diplomatic Security subaccount within the Border Security Program (BSP)
guards domestic consular affairs facilities. It also coordinates and investigates
security issues related to U.S. visas and passports.
Table 1 below provides base funding (also referred to as regular appropriations or core) and total
security funding requested and enacted for the five security-related accounts from FY2007 to
FY2013. Total security includes the base funding plus supplemental and/or Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) funding for diplomatic security. Supplemental funds were requested and
enacted for FY2007, FY2008, and FY2009. OCO funds were requested and enacted for FY2012
and requested for FY2013. Supplemental and OCO security funding has been largely for war-
related security measures in the frontline states of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The base total
is for diplomatic security activities in the rest of the 285-plus U.S. facilities around the world, but
may also include some ongoing security funding for the three frontline states.
Recent-Year Funding Observations
Following are some observations derived from the data in Table 1:
• In recent years, FY2010, and FY2011 were the only years that did not include
supplemental or OCO funding.
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• At $2.8 billion, FY2010 was the peak year for State Department total base
security requests. The highest level of base diplomatic security funding enacted
by Congress ($2.7 billion) also was in FY2010.
• At $3.1 billion, FY2013 is the peak year for requested total security funds
including additional funds for the frontline states of Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan. The peak year for total funding enacted by Congress was in FY2009
when Congress provided about $3.5 billion, one-third of which was supplemental
funding. (The U.S. Embassy in Iraq opened in January 2009.)
• For total base security funding, Congress enacted less than was requested every
year since FY2007. For total security that includes supplementals and OCO,
Congress enacted more ($925.3 million) than requested only in FY2009, with
FY2007 amounts virtually the same as requested.
• The largest gap between requested and enacted funds occurred in FY2012,
$240.4 million less in base security enacted vs. requested funds and $251.1
million less in total security enacted versus requested funds.
• Requests for base security funding increased by 38% from FY2007 to FY2012,
while enacted funding increased by 27% over those years.
• The State Department’s base request for security activities in FY2013 is $245
million less than was requested in FY2012, and about $5 million less than was
enacted in FY2012.
• The Administration requested about $230 million more for total security in
FY2013 than it requested in FY2012 and $481 million more than Congress
enacted for that year.
• Total security requests as a percent of Administration of Foreign Affairs funding
requests trended up from FY2007 to FY2009, but declined each year between
FY2010 and FY2012. The FY2013 request shows an increase. Enacted total
security funding has generally declined after the peak of 32% in FY2009.
• From FY2007 to FY2009, total security funding ranged between 19% and 22%
of total State Department funding. Since FY2010, it has hovered around 15% of
all State Department funding. The FY2013 request represents 17% of the total
State Department request.
• The largest year-to-year decrease in enacted base security funding was from
FY2011 to FY2012 when it declined by 6.1%. The largest year-to-year enacted
increase was from FY2008 to FY2009 at 25%.
Funding Issues for Congress
As Congress examines whether enough funding has been provided or more is needed for properly
securing American personnel, embassies, and information around the world, it will do so in a
climate of shrinking budgets; any proposed funding increases are likely to be met with calls for
offsetting cuts elsewhere.
Also of near-term concern is the possible effect that the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L.
112-25) sequestration could have on diplomatic security funding. If across-the-board spending
reductions occur as scheduled on January 2, 2013, currently estimated at about 8.2% of funding,
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security funding could be reduced as well. Those who consider embassy security funding to be
insufficient would find the problem exacerbated by sequestration. The combined effects of a
sequestration in 2013 and a half year Continuing Resolution that ends in March 2013 could
generate concerns about diplomatic security funding in the months and years ahead.
Some foreign policy experts are concerned that, with limited available dollars for foreign affairs
overall, war-related costs in frontline states may be drawing funds away from needs in the rest of
the 285-plus U.S. diplomatic facilities around the world. With the recent Arab Spring uprisings,
for example, U.S. personnel located in those countries may be more vulnerable than those located
in the frontline states where the embassies were built and heavily fortified recently. Some
observers wonder if the rapidly evolving changes in Arab Spring countries may have contributed
to difficulties in achieving and maintaining adequate diplomatic security there. Possibly adding to
the difficulty is the unpredictability in the timing of funding bills being passed by Congress.
Fiscal years may not be in sync with new increasing needs or with contracts. Furthermore, when
Congress is unable to pass funding bills until well into the new fiscal year, or passes continuing
resolutions in place of spending bills for the remainder of the fiscal year, the agency is left to
guess what annual funding they can expect and has fewer months to spend the funds once
received.
Another, perhaps longer-term related aspect of the funding debate is whether the United States
can afford to maintain facilities and adequate security everywhere, especially in nascent
democracies that are often unstable and unpredictable. If embassy security is the responsibility of
the local government, but that government does not have the capability required to keep
American personnel safe, the U.S. government must weigh the security risks of keeping a U.S.
presence in such environments.
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Table 1. State Department Funds for Embassy and Diplomatic Security,
FY2007-FY2013 Request
(In millions of current U.S. $)
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013
Req. Enacted Req. Enacted Req. Enacted Req. Enacted Req. Enacted Req. Enacted Req. Enacted
WSP
base
$795.0 $766.0 $964.8 $974.8 $1,162.8 $1,117.0 $1,648.0 $1,586.2 $1,560.7 $1,500.0 $1,453.7 $1355.0 $1,428.5 n.a.
Supplemental/OCO
$67.2
$96.5
$162.4
$210.4
$193.8
$224.8
―
―
―
―
$246.9 $236.2 $721.5 n.a.
ESCM
WSU
base
$899.4 $897.0 $806.9 $676.0 $948.4 $905.2 $938.2 $847.3 $824.2 $795.0 $938.2 $775.0 $688.8 n.a.
Supplemental/OCO
―
―
―
$76.7
―
$921.5
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
Diplomatic Security
$194.0 $196.6 $188.5 $169.6 $187.1 $255.9 $190.6 $214.9 $193.0 $224.9 $215.6 $220.5 $226.3 n.a.
(DS)
D&CP
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
$3.2
―
16.6 $19.0 n.a.
Counterterrorism
Border
Security
DS $14.4 $15.2 $15.2 $24.0 $37.3 $30.3 $35.2 $35.2 $42.8 $15.3 $15.3 $15.3 $15.3 n.a.
Total base
$1,902.8 $1,874.8 $1,975.4 $1,844.4 $2,335.6 $2,308.4 $2,812.0 $2,683.6 $2,620.7 $2,538.4 $2,622.8 $2,382.4 $2,377.9
n.a.
Total Securitya
$1,970.0 $1,971.3 $2,137.8 $2,131.5 $2,529.4 $3,454.7 $2,812.0 $2,683.6 $2,620.7 $2,538.4 $2,869.7 $2,618.6 $3,099.4
n.a.
Admin of Foreign
$6,932.4 $7,422.1 $7,317.1 $8,991.2 $8,217.5 $10,932.8 $12,069.5 $12,357.2 $12,377.4 $11,226.0 $14,748.4 $13,371.9 $13,950.5
n.a.
Affairsa
Total Security as % of
28% 27% 29% 24% 31% 32% 23% 22% 21% 23% 19% 20% 22% n.a.
Admin of Foreign
Affairs
State Dept 150
$10,327.8 $10,150.2 $10,708.8 $12,501.4 $11,345.6 $15,825.7 $16,256.3 $17,367.5 $17,104.3 $15,625.3 $19,349.8 $17,695.3 $18,508.3
n.a.
functiona
Total Security as % of
19% 19% 19% 17% 22% 22% 17% 15% 15% 16% 15% 15% 17% n.a.
State Dept 150
Source: Congressional Budget Justification, Volume I, Department of State, Fiscal years FY2007 – FY2013, communication with Department of State on November 8,
2012, legislation, and CRS calculations.
Notes: WSP=Worldwide Security Protection; ESCM=Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance; WSU=Worldwide Security Upgrades; OCO=Overseas
Contingency Operations; Diplomatic Security=DS; D&CP=Diplomatic and Consular Programs.
a. Includes supplemental and OCO funds.
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Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues
Author Contact Information
Alex Tiersky
Susan B. Epstein
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
Specialist in Foreign Policy
atiersky@crs.loc.gov, 7-7367
sepstein@crs.loc.gov, 7-6678
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