Financing the U.S. Trade Deficit
James K. Jackson
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
November 16, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33274
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Financing the U.S. Trade Deficit

Summary
The U.S. merchandise trade deficit is a part of the overall U.S. balance of payments, a summary
statement of all economic transactions between the residents of the United States and the rest of
the world, during a given period of time. Some Members of Congress and other observers have
grown concerned over the magnitude of the U.S. merchandise trade deficit and the associated
increase in U.S. dollar-denominated assets owned by foreigners. International trade recovered
from the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the subsequent slowdown in global economic
activity that reduced global trade flows and, consequently, reduced the size of the U.S. trade
deficit. Now, however, U.S. exporters face new challenges with economies in Europe and Asia
confronting increased risks of a second phase of slow growth. This report provides an overview
of the U.S. balance of payments, an explanation of the broader role of capital flows in the U.S.
economy, an explanation of how the country finances its trade deficit or a trade surplus, and the
implications for Congress and the country of the large inflows of capital from abroad. The major
observations indicate that
• Foreign private investors reduced their purchases of U.S. Treasury securities in
2011 after rising sharply in 2010 in response to financial requirements in home
markets and continued uncertainty associated with disruptions in global financial
markets. During the same period, foreign private investors reduced their
purchases of U.S. corporate stocks and bonds in 2011, while foreign official
purchases of U.S. Treasury securities continued at a strong pace. The inflow of
capital from abroad supplements domestic sources of capital and likely allows
the United States to maintain its current level of economic activity at interest
rates that are below the level they likely would be without the capital inflows.
• Foreign official and private acquisitions of dollar-denominated assets likely will
generate a stream of returns to overseas investors that would have stayed in the
U.S. economy and supplemented other domestic sources of capital had the assets
not been acquired by foreign investors.

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Financing the U.S. Trade Deficit

Contents
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Capital Flows and the Dollar ........................................................................................................... 1
The U.S. Balance of Payments ........................................................................................................ 4
The U.S. Net International Investment Position ............................................................................ 10
Implications ................................................................................................................................... 15

Figures
Figure 1. Foreign Private and Official Purchases of U.S. Treasury Securities, 1997-2011 ............. 7
Figure 2. Net Inflows of Private and Official Sources of Capital, 1997-2011 ................................. 8
Figure 3. Foreign Official and Private Investment Positions
in the United States, 1994-2011 .................................................................................................. 14
Figure 4. U.S. and Foreign Investment Position, By Major Component, 2011 ............................. 15

Tables
Table 1. Selected Indicators of the Size of the Global Capital Markets, 2011 ................................. 2
Table 2. U.S. International Transactions, Selected Accounts ........................................................... 4
Table 3. Summary of the Net Balances by Major Accounts in the U.S. Balance of
Payments ....................................................................................................................................... 6
Table 4. Net Foreign Purchases of Long-Term U.S. Securities ....................................................... 8
Table 5. U.S. Net International Investment Position...................................................................... 11

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 16

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Financing the U.S. Trade Deficit

Background
By standard convention, the balance of payments accounts are based on a double-entry
bookkeeping system. As a result, each transaction that is entered into the accounts as a credit must
have a corresponding debit and vice versa. This means that a surplus or deficit in one part of the
accounts necessarily will be offset by a deficit or surplus, respectively, in another account so that,
overall, the accounts are in balance. This convention also means that a deficit in one account,
such as the merchandise trade account, is not necessarily the same as a debt.1 The trade deficit can
become a debt equivalent depending on how the deficit is financed and the expectations of those
who hold the offsetting dollar-denominated U.S. assets. The balance of payments accounts are
divided into three main sections: the current account, which includes the exports and imports of
goods and services and personal and government transfer payments; the capital account, which
includes such capital transfers as international debt forgiveness; and the financial account, which
includes official transactions in financial assets and private transactions in financial assets and
direct investment in businesses and real estate.
When the basic structure of the balance of payments was established, merchandise trade
transactions dominated the accounts. Financial transactions recorded in the capital accounts
generally reflected the payments and receipts of funds that corresponded to the importing and
exporting of goods and services. As a result, the capital accounts generally represented
“accommodating” transactions, or financial transactions associated directly with the buying and
selling of goods and services. During this early period, exchange rates between currencies were
fixed, and private capital flows, such as foreign investment, were heavily regulated so that nearly
all international flows of funds were associated with merchandise trade transactions and with
some limited government transactions.
Since the 1970s, however, private capital flows have grown markedly as countries have
liberalized their rules governing overseas investing and as nations have adopted a system of
floating exchange rates, where the rates are set by market forces. Floating exchange rates have
spurred demand for the dollar. The dollar also is sought for investment purposes as it has become
a vehicle itself for investment and speculation and it serves as a major trade invoicing currency.
This means that the balance of payments record not only the accommodating flows of capital
which correspond to imports and exports of goods and services, but also autonomous flows of
capital that are induced by a broad range of economic factors that are unrelated directly to the
trading of merchandise goods.
Capital Flows and the Dollar
Liberalized capital flows and floating exchange rates have greatly expanded the amount of
autonomous capital flows between countries. These capital transactions are undertaken in
response to commercial incentives or political considerations that are independent of the overall
balance of payments or of particular accounts. As a result of these transactions, national
economies have become more closely linked, the process some refer to as “globalization.” The
data in Table 1 provide selected indicators of the relative sizes of the various capital markets in

1 For additional information about the causes of the U.S. trade deficit, see CRS Report RL31032, The U.S. Trade
Deficit: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Options, by Craig K. Elwell.
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various countries and regions and the relative importance of international foreign exchange
markets. In 2009, these markets amounted to over $800 trillion, or more than 30 times the size of
the U.S. economy. Worldwide, foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives, which are the most
widely used hedges against movements in currencies, were valued at $567 trillion in 2011, more
than twice the size of the combined total of all public and private bonds, equities, and bank assets.
For the United States, such derivatives total more than three times as much as all U.S. bonds,
equities, and bank assets.
Table 1. Selected Indicators of the Size of the Global Capital Markets, 2011
(billions of dollars)
Bonds, Equities, and Bank Assets
Exchange Market Derivatives
Gross
OTC
OTC
Domestic Total
Foreign
Interest
Product
Official
Stock Market
Debt
Bank
Exchange
Rate

(GDP)
Reserves Total
Capitalization Securities Assets
Total
Derivatives Derivatives
World
$69,899.2 10,650.4 255,855.6
47,089.2
98,388.1 110,378.2 567,447
63,349
504,098
European
16,426.5
468.0 82,251.6
8,530.2 31,548.5 42,172.7
NA
NA
NA
Union
Euro
13,118.5
316.7 58,874.6
4,586.6 24,976.2 29,311.8 207,937
23,235
184,702
Area
United
2,431.3
79.3 19,055.6
3,266.4
4,839.2 10,950.0 50,390
7,023
43,367
Kingdom
United
15,075.7
136.9 63,976.9
15,640.7 33,700.9 14,635.3 215,925
54,061
161,864
States
Japan
5,866.5 1,258.2 31,666.1
3,540.7 15,369.3 12,756.1 80,480
13,661
66,819
Emerging
25,438.4 6,944.5 44,553.7
9,771.0
9,240.2 25,542.5
NA
NA
NA
markets

Source: Global Financial Stability Report, International Monetary Fund, October 2012. Statistical Appendix, Table
1; Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, September, 2012, Tables 20b and 21b.
Note: Total derivatives does not include equity and commodity-linked derivatives.
Another aspect of capital mobility and capital inflows is the impact such capital flows have on the
international exchange value of the dollar. Demand for U.S. assets, such as financial securities,
translates into demand for the dollar, since U.S. securities are denominated in dollars. As demand
for the dollar rises or falls according to overall demand for dollar-denominated assets, the value
of the dollar changes. These exchange rate changes, in turn, have secondary effects on the prices
of U.S. and foreign goods, which tend to alter the U.S. trade balance. At times, foreign
governments intervene in international capital markets to acquire the dollar directly or to acquire
Treasury securities in order to strengthen the value of the dollar against particular currencies. In
addition, various central banks moved aggressively following the Asian financial crisis in the
1990s to bolster their holdings of dollars in order to use the dollars to support their currencies
should the need arise.
The dollar is also heavily traded in financial markets around the globe and, at times, plays the role
of a global currency. Disruptions in this role have important implications for the United States
and for the smooth functioning of the international financial system. During the decade preceding
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the recent global financial crisis, banks and other financial institutions expanded their global
balance sheets from $10 trillion in 2000 to $34 trillion in 2007. These assets were comprised
primarily of dollar-denominated claims on non-bank entities, including retail and corporate
lending, loans to hedge funds, and holdings of structured finance products based on U.S.
mortgages and other underlying assets. As the crisis unfolded, the short-term dollar funding
markets served as a major conduit through which financial distress was transmitted across
financial markets and national borders, according to analysts with the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS).2 When these short-term dollar funding markets collapsed in the early stages of
the crises, the U.S. Federal Reserve had to engage in extraordinary measures, including a vast
system of currency swap arrangements with central banks around the world, to supply nearly
$300 billion. After initially expanding the then-existing reciprocal currency arrangements (swap
lines) with the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, the Swiss National Bank, and the
Bank of Japan, the Federal Reserve made an unprecedented announcement in October 2008 that it
would provide swap lines to “accommodate whatever quantity of U.S. dollar funding is
necessary” to stem the dollar shortage.3 At the same time, the U.S. Treasury announced a money
market guarantee program to stop the withdrawal of funds from the money markets and to offset
the withdrawals by providing public funds.
The prominent role of the dollar means that the exchange value of the dollar often acts as a
mechanism for transmitting economic and political news and events across national borders.
While such a role helps facilitate a broad range of international economic and financial activities,
it also means that the dollar’s exchange value can vary greatly on a daily or weekly basis as it is
buffeted by international events. A triennial survey of the world’s leading central banks conducted
by the Bank for International Settlements in April 2010 indicates that the daily trading of foreign
currencies through traditional foreign exchange markets4 totals $4.0 trillion, up 20% from the
$3.3 trillion reported in the previous survey conducted in 2007. In addition to the traditional
foreign exchange market, the over-the-counter (OTC)5 foreign exchange derivatives market
reported that daily turnover of interest rate and non-traditional foreign exchange derivatives
contracts reached $2.1 trillion in April 2010. The combined amount of $6.1 trillion for daily
foreign exchange trading in the traditional and OTC markets is more than three times the annual
amount of U.S. exports of goods and services. The data also indicate that 84.9% of the global
foreign exchange turnover in April 2010 was in U.S. dollars, slightly lower than the 85.6% share
reported in a similar survey conducted in 2007.6

2 McGuire, Patrick, and Gotz von Peter, “The US Dollar Shortage in Global Banking and the International Policy
Response,” BIS Working Paper No. 291, the Bank For International Settlements, October 2009; McGuire, Patrick, and
Goetz von Peter, “The U.S. Dollar Shortage in Global Banking,” BIS Quarterly Review, March 2009.
3 Ibid., p. 76.
4 Traditional foreign exchange markets are organized exchanges which trade primarily in foreign exchange futures and
options contracts where the terms and condition of the contracts are standardized.
5 The over-the-counter foreign exchange derivatives market is an informal market consisting of dealers who custom-
tailor agreements to meet the specific needs regarding maturity, payments intervals or other terms that allow the
contracts to meet specific requirements for risk.
6 Triennial Central Bank Survey: Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity in 2010. Bank for International
Settlement, September 2010. pp. 1-2. A copy of the report is available at http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx10.pdf
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The U.S. Balance of Payments
Table 2 presents a summary of the major accounts in the U.S. balance of payments over the last
six quarters. The data indicate that in 2010 and 2011 the U.S. current account, or the balance of
exports and imports of goods, services and transfers, was in deficit, or the United States imported
more than it exported. On a quarterly basis, the deficit in the current account has varied sharply
from quarter t quarter, reflecting a broad range of economic activities. According to the balance of
payments accounts, the United States experienced deficits in the merchandise trade goods
accounts through the most recent six quarters from the first quarter of 2011 to the second quarter
of 2012 in the range of $180 to $190 billion and a surplus in the services accounts during the five
quarters in the range of about $46 billion. In the income accounts, which represent inflows of
income on U.S. assets abroad relative to outflows of income earned on U.S. assets owned by
foreigners, the net balance of the accounts was in surplus throughout the six-quarter period.
Table 2. U.S. International Transactions, Selected Accounts
(billions of dollars)



2011
2012

2010 2011 I II III IV I II
Current account








Balance on current account
$-442
-466
-120
-119
-108
-119
-134
-117
Balance on goods and services
-495
-560
-137
-142
-135
-146
-148
-139
Balance on goods
-645
-738
-181
-187
-181
-189
-194
-186
Exports
1289
1497
361 372
382
382
389
394
Imports
-1934
-2236 -542 -559 -563
-571 -583 -580
Balance on services
150
179
44
46
46
43
46
46
Exports
554
606
148 152
155
151
155
157
Imports
-403
-427 -104 -106 -109
-108 -110 -110
Balance on income
184
227
52
56
58
60
47
56
Income
Receipts
676
745
181 189
187
187
185
186
Income
Payments
-492
-518 -128 -133 -129
-127 -137 -131
Unilateral current transfers
-131
-133
-35
-34
-32
-32
-33
-34
Capital account








Capital account transactions
0
-1
0
-1
0
0
0
0
Financial account








Balance on financial account
383
556
209
113
171
63
165
89
U.S.-owned assets abroad, net
-939
-484
-373
7
-92
-26
107
207
U.S. official reserve assets, net
-2
-16
-4
-6
-4
-2
-1
-3
U.S. Government assets, net
8
-104
-1
-1
-1
-101
51
17
U.S. private assets, net
-945
-364
-369
15
-87
76
57
193
Foreign-owned assets in the U.S.
1308
1001
579
99
266
57
60
-119
Foreign official assets, net
398
212
73
122
20
-3
70
83
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2011
2012

2010 2011 I II III IV I II
U.S. Treasury Securities
442
171
56
104
28
-18
85
85
Foreign private assets, net
910
789
506
-23
247
60
-10
-202
U.S. Treasury Securities
298
241
55
-18
121
83
44
7
Financial derivatives
14
39
3
7
-4
33
-1
0
Statistical discrepancy
59 -89
-89
7
-62 55
-31 29
Source: Scott, Sarah P., “U.S. International Transactions: Second Quarter 2012.” Survey of Current Business,
October 2012, p. 68.
The data also indicate that the U.S. financial accounts were in surplus throughout the period,
because they represent the opposite and offsetting transactions to the deficits in the current
account. Indeed, the accounting of the balance of payments is such that the surplus in the
financial accounts is equivalent to the deficit in the combined balance in the capital account, the
statistical discrepancy, and the balance on the current account. The balance in the financial
accounts represents the difference between the capital outflows associated with U.S. investments
abroad, which are recorded as a negative value, and the capital inflows associated with foreign
investment in the United States, which are recorded as a positive value. This investment is a
combination of both private and official investments, or investments by private individuals and
institutions and investments by governments and governmental institutions, respectively. Data for
the past six quarters indicate that foreign official purchases of U.S. Treasury securities peaked in
the second quarter of 2011, dropped through the fourth quarter of 2011, and then rose in the first
two quarters of 2012. Private foreign purchases of Treasury securities in 2011alternated between
net accumulation and net sales, with net accumulation in the first two quarters of 2012.
The data in Table 2 also indicate that in 2010 and in 2011, private capital outflows generally were
greater than official outflows, while foreign private capital inflows generally were overshadowed
by foreign official capital inflows, likely reflecting the slowdown in private economic activity in
global markets. Another way of viewing the data is presented in Table 3 which shows the net
amount of the flows in the major accounts, or the difference between the inflows and outflows. In
2011 for instance, total net capital inflows representing the net balance on the current account, the
capital account, and the statistical discrepancy, were a negative $556 billion, which was
equivalent to the $556 recorded in the financial accounts. The 2011 values represent a sharp
increase in the net amount recorded since 2010 and reflect a higher merchandise trade deficit as a
result of the slowdown in economic activity in Europe and elsewhere. These totals, however, are
subject to periodic revisions.
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Table 3. Summary of the Net Balances by Major Accounts in the U.S. Balance of
Payments
(billions of dollars)

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total Net Capital Inflows
-$532 -$701 -$809 -$664 -$578 -$240 -$383 -$556

Total
Net
Goods
-672 -791 -847 -831 -835 -506 -645 -738
Total Net Services
62
76
87
130
136
127
150
179
Total Net Income
67
72
48
91
152
120
184
227

Total
Net
Transfers
-88 -106 -91 -116 -122 -122 -131 -133
Total Net Capital Account
1
11
-4
-2
6
0
0
-1
Statistical Discrepancy
97
37
-2
65
85
142
59
-89
Total Net Financial Account
$532 $701 $809 $664 578 240 383 556
Total Net Official
402
279
496
459
16
969
404
92
Total Net Private
130
422
284
199
594
-775
-35
425

Direct
Investment
-170 76 -2 -123 -23 -139 -122 -185

Portfolio
Investment
305 331 260 306 193 -241 298 38
Other Private (Banks)
-4
14
26
16
424
-395
-211
573
Financial Derivatives
0
0
30
6
-33
45
14
39
Source: Data developed by CRS from data published by the Department of Commerce.
Commerce Department data indicate that foreign private purchases of Treasury securities turned
negative between 1999 and 2001, in 2006, and again in 2009 as foreign private investors
experienced net sales of Treasury securities, as indicated in Figure 1. In 2002, foreign private
investors returned to acquiring Treasury securities, but the amount they acquired remained
relatively level at $100 billion per year from 2002 to 2005. In contrast, foreign official net
acquisitions of Treasury securities trended slightly upward between 2000 and 2002, but such net
acquisitions more than doubled over the 2002 to 2004 period, rising to $273 billion in 2004. In
2005, though, official purchases of Treasury securities plummeted to $112 billion and were less
than private purchases of $132 billion. In 2006, private foreign investors again reduced their net
holdings of Treasury securities. This action was offset by a large increase in acquisitions of
Treasury securities by foreign governments, directed at least in part to slow the decline in the
international exchange value of the dollar. In 2009, foreign private investors sold off $15 billion
in Treasury securities, down sharply from the $197 billion they accumulated in 2008. Foreign
governments, however, increased their net purchases of Treasury securities in 2009, which rose
from $478 billion in 2008 to $570 billion in 2009. In 2010, foreign private investments in
treasury securities rose to nearly $300 billion, while foreign official purchases fell to $442 billion.
In 2011, foreign private purchases of treasury securities rose to $241 billion, outpacing foreign
official purchases of $171 billion. Over the eleven-year period 2001-2011, net foreign official
purchases of treasury securities were more than twice as large as net foreign private purchases.
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Figure 1. Foreign Private and Official Purchases of
U.S. Treasury Securities, 1997-2011

Source: Department of Commerce.
As the data in Table 3 indicate, a deficit in the net capital inflow account is financed by an
offsetting net inflow in the financial account. One striking feature of the financial flows over the
2004-2011 period is the way the composition of the balances in the net financial account has
changed. Net private and net official capital inflows have changed abruptly since the period prior
to 2002, when private inflows were greater than official inflows, as indicated in Figure 2. In
2004, 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2010, net official inflows exceeded net private inflows. Recently,
private capital flows by U.S. citizens shifted from a net outflow of $1.4 trillion in 2007 to a net
inflow of $866 billion in 2008, reflecting the financial turmoil during that period. Net private
outflows by U.S. citizens, however, resumed in the 2009 to 2011 period. During the same period,
U.S. official outflows increased from $22 billion in 2007 to $530 billion in 2008. In contrast,
foreign private inflows of capital dropped from $1.6 trillion in 2007 to $47 billion in 2008.
During the same period, foreign official inflows increased slightly from $481 billion in 2007 to
$487 billion in 2008. As a result of these changes, net official flows, or the combination of U.S.
and foreign officials flows dropped from a net outflow of $458 billion 2007 to a net inflows of
$47 billion in 2008. In addition, net private flows increased from a net inflow of $199 billion in
2007 to a net inflow of $581 billion in 2008. In 2009, however, net private inflows dropped to a
negative $774 billion, while net official inflows rose to nearly $1 trillion.
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Figure 2. Net Inflows of Private and Official Sources of Capital, 1997-2011

Source: Department of Commerce.
The data in Table 4 show the total net accumulation of long-term U.S. securities, or the amount
of securities purchased less those that were sold, by foreign private and official sources from
2004-2011. The data indicate that in 2008, the net foreign private accumulation of U.S. securities
dropped by three-fourths as foreign private investors withdrew funds from the U.S. during the
financial crisis. In 2009, however, foreign private purchases of U.S. securities rebounded from a
negative $186.5 in 2008 to a positive $51 in 2009, reflecting increased net purchases of U.S.
corporate stocks and U.S. Treasury securities. Similar purchases increased eight-fold between
2009 and 2010 as foreign private purchases reached over $400 billion before falling to $140
billion in 2011. In 2011, private foreign investors operating in Europe reduced their purchases of
corporate stocks and bonds and U.S. government agency bonds, but increased their purchases of
Treasury securities by $150 billion. With a few exceptions, foreign private investors from other
areas increased their purchases of all asset classes in 2011.
Table 4. Net Foreign Purchases of Long-Term U.S. Securities
(billions of dollars)

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total private and official net
$767.8 $875.7 $1,099.1 $989.6 $236.3 $484.8 $571.0 $419.1
purchases of U.S. securities









Total private purchases
455.6 598.3 611.4 644.8 -186.5 51.1 412.3 143.0









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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Corporate stocks
59.5 88.3 139.7 230.5 57.5 163.4 137.8 12.4

Europe
36.3 44.0 92.6 90.5 -2.1 79.6 80.8 -36.9

United
Kingdom
28.9 21.2 73.2 67.9 28.4 33.3 34.9 2.2

Canada
3.9 21.0 12.6 9.8 6.7 9.5 17.5 14.6
Caribbean financial centers
3.1
14.8
34.4
95.4
1.7
34.2
22.6
30.5
Latin America
-0.4
-0.4
1.8
1.1
3.5
5.2
4.8
0.9

Asia
5.5 8.7 -2.2 27.9 50.7 31.4 10.6 2.0
Of which: Japan
4.9
-0.1
-1.2
-5.6
21.8
20.6
11.5
3.1

Africa
-0.1 0.3 0.0 -0.4 -4.7 -0.8 -0.4 0.8









Corporate bonds
254.6 312.3 517.8 383.7 -51.4 -117.3 -24.7 -68.8

Europe
126.3 199.8 332.1 225.9 -80.4 -105.7 -64.6 -98.3
United Kingdom
69.6
144.7
203.6
130.5
-46.3
-56.1
-30.8
-51.0

Canada
6.0 1.9 7.9 12.4 -2.0 -0.1 9.8 -0.8
Caribbean financial centers
47.1
40.2
106.9
61.9
12.1
-7.4
21.3
16.1
Latin America
20.2
7.3
9.3
4.7
-13.7
-4.5
3.4
3.8

Asia
51.9 54.4 53.7 72.8 32.4 1.6 6.8 14.7

Japan
33.5 25.6 12.2 39.5 21.7 -1.6 0.8 9.3

Africa
0.6 0.6 0.2 -0.4 -0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0

Other
2.6 8.1 7.7 6.4 0.7 -1.3 -1.4 -4.3









U.S. Treasury bonds
74.1 147.9 -71.9 39.2 -20.0 49.2 273.0 199.5

Europe
38.2 65.2 -61.9 57.8 -43.5 -38.0 104.7 156.0

Canada
16.3 21.8 14.7 -1.9 -6.2 19.7 35.8 -4.0
Caribbean financial centers
22.1
44.9
-10.9
-6.2
2.6
-13.8
22.1
12.9
Latin America
-3.4
10.4
-2.1
9.8
-5.0
6.1
0.4
-6.7

Asia
1.0 1.3 -10.7
-20.8 29.3 71.9 111.0 39.2

Africa
0.7 1.7 1.1 1.5 7.0 1.1 5.5 1.9

Other
-0.8 2.5 -2.1 -1.1 -4.3 2.3 -6.4 0.3









Federal agency bonds
67.4 49.8 25.8 -8.6
-172.6 -44.3 26.2 0.0

Europe
13.3 -11.9
-8.1 42.3 -17.4 -46.6 1.1 -16.0
United Kingdom
31.4
-1.3
-8.8
70.9
42.4
-30.4
25.0
0.5

Canada
5.0 12.1 9.7 3.0 5.0 1.8 8.1 3.3
Caribbean financial centers
11.3
3.0
31.3
-21.6
-75.8
7.9
-14.5
5.8

Latin
America
1.8 7.1 3.4 2.8 0.8 0.8 5.0 6.6

Asia
36.4 40.2 -10.8 -34.6 -81.4 -3.7 28.7 0.6
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Japan
16.5 15.6
2.9 -14.9 -39.0 -1.2 21.7 15.9

Africa
-0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.6 -2.9 -2.0 -0.9 -0.2

Other
-0.3 -0.4 0.6 0.1 -1.0 -2.4 -1.2 -0.1









Total official purchases
312.2 277.4 487.7 344.8 422.8 433.7 458.7 276.1
U.S. Treasury bonds
256.8
156.9
233.5
76.6
276.2
512.7
506.8
274.5
Other U.S. Government
41.7 100.5 219.8 171.5 42.7 -132.6 -88.7 -12.4
securities

Corporate
bonds
11.5 19.1 28.6 51.6 35.0 -2.3 0.8 -0.9
Corporate stocks
2.2
1.0
5.8
45.1
68.9
55.9
39.7
15.0
Source: Scott, Sarah P., “U.S. International Transactions: Second Quarter 2012.” Survey of Current Business,
October, 2012. Table 8a.
The U.S. Net International Investment Position
As indicated above, the data in Table 2 and Table 3 show that the trade deficit is accompanied by
an equal capital inflow that represents an accumulation of dollar-denominated assets by
foreigners. Some observers have equated the trade deficit and the associated accumulation of
foreign-owned dollar-denominated assets as a debt that the U.S. economy owes to foreigners that
will have to be repaid. This characterization, however, is not entirely appropriate. The debts
owned by foreign investors represents claims on assets, rather than loans where payments on the
principle and interest are specified according to a fixed schedule and where failure to meet the
repayment schedule can result in the loans being called in and made payable in full. While
foreign investors have expectations of a positive return on their dollar-denominated assets,
returns, except for Treasury securities, are not guaranteed, but are subject to market forces. An
important feature of claims by foreign investors on U.S. assets is that some or all of the profits or
returns on the assets can be repatriated to the home country of the foreign investor, thereby
reducing the returns that otherwise would remain in the U.S. economy.
According to the most commonly accepted approach to the balance of payments, macroeconomic
developments in the U.S. economy are the major driving forces behind the magnitudes of capital
flows, because the macroeconomic factors determine the overall demand for and supply of capital
in the economy. Economists generally conclude that the rise in capital inflows can be attributed to
comparatively favorable returns on investments in the United States when adjusted for risk, a
surplus of saving in other areas of the world, the well-developed U.S. financial system, the
overall stability of the U.S. economy, and the generally held view that U.S. securities, especially
Treasury securities, are high quality financial instruments that are low risk. In turn, these net
capital inflows (inflows net of outflows) bridge the gap in the United States between the amount
of credit demanded and the domestic supply of funds, likely keeping U.S. interest rates below the
level they would have reached without the foreign capital. These capital inflows also allow the
United States to spend beyond its means, including financing its trade deficit, because foreigners
are willing to lend to the United States in the form of exchanging goods, represented by U.S.
imports, for such U.S. assets as stocks, bonds, U.S. Treasury securities, and real estate and U.S.
businesses.
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While this exchange of assets is implicit in the balance of payments, the Department of
Commerce explicitly accounts for this broad flow of dollar-denominated assets through the
nation’s net international investment position. The U.S. net international investment position
represents the accumulated value of U.S.-owned assets abroad and foreign-owned assets in the
United States measured on an annual basis at the end of the calendar year. Some observers refer
to the net of this investment position (or the difference between the value of U.S.-owned assets
abroad and the value of foreign-owned assets in the United States) as a debt, or indicate that the
United States is a net debtor nation, because the value of foreign-owned assets in the United
States is greater than the value of U.S.-owned assets abroad.
In fact, the nation’s net international investment position is not a measure of the nation’s
indebtedness similar to the debt borrowed by some developing countries, but it is simply an
accounting of assets. By year-end 2011, the latest year for which data are available, the overseas
assets of U.S. residents totaled $20.6 trillion, while foreigners had acquired about $24.8 trillion in
assets in the United States, with direct investment measured at historical cost. As a result, the U.S.
net international investment position was about a negative $4.2 trillion, with direct investment
measured at historical cost, as indicated in Table 5.
Table 5. U.S. Net International Investment Position
(billions of dollars)
Type of Investment
2008
2008
2010
2011
Net international investment position of the United States:



With direct investment at current cost
$-3,260.2
$-2,321.8
$-2,473.6
$-4,030.3

With direct investment at market value
-3,995.3
-2,661.3
-2,813.4
-4,812.4
With direct investment at historical cost
-3,425.4
-2,503.8
-2,656.2
-4,195.3

Financial
derivatives
159.6 126.3 110.4 126.3
U.S.-owned assets abroad:



With direct investment at current cost
19,464.7
18,511.7
20,298.4
21,132.4

With direct investment at market value
18,818.6
18,769.4
20,758.3
20,950.8

With direct investment at historical cost
18,948.7
18,000.9
19,782.5
20,606.4

Financial
derivatives
6,127.5 3,489.8 3,652.3 4,704.7
U.S. official reserve assets
293.7
403.8
488.7
536.0
U.S. Government assets, other
624.1
82.8
75.2
178.9
U.S. private assets:




With direct investment at current cost
12,419.4
14,535.3
16,082.2
15,712.8

With direct investment at market value
11,773.3
14,793.1
16,542.1
15,531.2

With direct investment at historical cost
11,903.4
14,024.5
15,566.3
15,186.7

Direct investment abroad:



—At current cost
3,748.5
4,029.5
4,306.8
4,681.6

—At market value
3,102.4
4,287.2
4,766.7
4,500.0

—At historical cost
3,232.5
3,518.7
3,790.9
4,155.6

Foreign
securities
3,985.7 5,565.6 6,336.4 5,922.0
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Type of Investment
2008
2008
2010
2011

—Bonds
1,237.3 1,570.3 1,689.5 1,763.8

—Corporate
stocks
2,748.4 3,995.3 4,646.9 4,158.2

U.S. claims by US nonbanking concerns
930.9
930.3
874.8
796.8

U.S. claims reported by US banks
3,754.3
4,009.9
4,564.2
4,312.4



Foreign-owned assets in the United States:



With direct investment at current cost
22,724.9
20,833.5
22,772.0
25,162.6

With direct investment at market value
22,813.9
21,430.7
23,571.7
25,763.2

With direct investment at historical cost
22,374.1
20,504.7
22,438.7
24,801.7

Financial
derivatives
5,967.8 3,363.4 3,541.9 4,578.4
Foreign official assets in the United States
3,943.9
4,402.8
4,912.7
5,250.8
Foreign private assets:



With direct investment at current cost
12,813.2
13,067.2
14,317.4
15,333.4

With direct investment at market value
12,902.2
13,664.5
15,117.1
15,934.0

With direct investment at historical cost
12,462.5
12,738.4
13,984.0
14,972.5

Direct investment in the United States:



—At current cost
2,397.4
2,398.2
2,597.7
2,908.8

—At market value
2,486.4
2,995.5
3,397.4
3,509.4

—At historical cost
2,046.7
2,069.4
2,264.4
2,547.8

U.S. Treasury securities
852.5
791.0
1,101.8
1,418.1

U.S.
other
securities
4,620.7 5,319.9 5,934.0 5,968.2

—Corporate and other bonds
2,770.6
2,825.6
2,915.7
2,910.0

—Corporate
stocks
1,850.1 2,494.3 3,018.3 3,058.2

U.S.
currency
301.1 313.8 342.1 397.1

U.S. liabilities by U.S. nonbanking concerns
740.6
706.4
643.6
629.7

U.S. liabilities reported by U.S. banks
3,901.0
3,537.9
3,698.2
4,011.6
Source: Nguyen, Elena L., “The International Investment Position of the United States at Yearend 2011,” Survey
of Current Business, July 2012. p. 18.
Foreign investors who acquire U.S. assets do so at their own risk and accept the returns
accordingly, unlike the debt owed by developing countries where principle and debt service
payments are guaranteed in advance. While foreign investors likely expect positive returns from
their dollar-denominated assets, the returns on most of the assets in the international investment
position, except for bonds, are not guaranteed and foreign investors stand to gain or lose on them
similar to the way U.S. domestic investors gain or lose.
As Table 5 indicates, the investments in the international investment position include such
financial assets as corporate stocks and bonds, government securities, and direct investment7 in

7 The United States defines foreign direct investment as the ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by one foreign
(continued...)
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businesses and real estate. The value of these assets, measured on an annual basis, can change as
a result of purchases and sales of new or existing assets; changes in the financial value of the
assets that arise through appreciation, depreciation, or inflation; changes in the market values of
stocks and bonds; or changes in the value of currencies. For instance, by year-end 2011, U.S.
private holdings abroad had fallen in value from $15.6 trillion to $15.2 trillion, with direct
investment valued at historical cost, due in part to a downward revaluation in the values of
foreign corporate stocks, reflecting a decline in stock market values, primarily in Europe,
combined with a rise in the exchange value of the euro, which depreciates the value of assets held
abroad when translated into dollar equivalents. Similarly, the value of foreign owned corporate
stocks in the United States rose in value in 2011, pulling up the overall investment position of
foreign investors. The Department of Commerce uses three different methods for valuing direct
investments that yield roughly comparable estimates for the net position, although the three
methods do provide estimates on U.S. direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment that
can be considerably different at times.8
The foreign investment position in the United States continues to increase as foreigners acquire
additional U.S. assets and as the value of existing assets appreciates. These assets are broadly
divided into official and private investments reflecting transactions by governments among
themselves and transactions among the public. While the foreign official share of the overall
amount of capital inflows has grown sharply as indicated in Table 3, the overall foreign official
share of foreign-owned assets in the United States has remained relatively modest.
As Figure 3 indicates, foreign official asset holdings were valued at about $5.2 trillion in 2011, or
about 26% of the total foreign investment position, a share that has rose above 20% in 2008 as
foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities rose during the global financial crisis.
Official assets include such monetary reserve assets as gold, the reserve position with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and holdings of foreign currency. An important component
of foreign official holdings in the United States is the acquisitions of U.S. Treasury securities by
foreign governments. At times, such acquisitions are used by foreign governments, either through
coordinated actions or by themselves, to affect the foreign exchange price of the dollar. Foreign
currency holdings account for a relatively small share of the total foreign investment position.9

(...continued)
person (individual, branch, partnership, association, government, etc.) of 10% or more of the voting securities of an
incorporated U.S. business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated U.S. business enterprise. 15 CFR
§ 806.15 (a)(1). Similarly, the United States defines direct investment abroad as the ownership or control, directly or
indirectly, by one person (individual, branch, partnership, association, government, etc.) of 10% or more of the voting
securities of an incorporated business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated business enterprise. 15
CFR § 806.15 (a)(1).
8 For additional information, see CRS Report RL32964, The United States as a Net Debtor Nation: Overview of the
International Investment Position , by James K. Jackson.
9 For additional information, see CRS Report RL32462, Foreign Investment in U.S. Securities, by James K. Jackson.
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Figure 3. Foreign Official and Private Investment Positions
in the United States, 1994-2011

Source: Department of Commerce.
Private asset holdings are comprised primarily of direct investment in businesses and real estate,
purchases of publicly traded government securities, and corporate stocks and bonds. As indicated
in Figure 4, the composition of U.S. assets abroad and foreign-owned assets in the United States
differ in a number of ways. The strength and uniqueness of the U.S. Treasury securities markets
make these assets sought after by both official and private foreign investors, whereas U.S.
investors hold few foreign government securities. As a result, foreign official assets in the United
States far outweigh U.S. official assets abroad. Both foreign private and official investors have
been drawn at times to U.S. government securities as a safe haven investment during troubled or
unsettled economic conditions.
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Figure 4. U.S. and Foreign Investment Position, By Major Component, 2011

Source: Department of Commerce.
Implications
The persistent U.S. trade deficit raises concerns in Congress and elsewhere due to the potential
risks such deficits may pose for the long term rate of growth for the economy. In particular, some
observers are concerned that foreigner investors’ portfolios will become saturated with dollar-
denominated assets and foreign investors will become unwilling to accommodate the trade deficit
by holding more dollar-denominated assets. The shift in 2004 in the balance of payments toward
a larger share of assets being acquired by official sources generated speculation that foreign
private investors had indeed reached the point where they were no longer willing to add more
dollar-denominated assets to their portfolios. This shift was reversed in 2005, however, as foreign
private investments rebounded.
Another concern is with the outflow of profits that arise from the dollar-denominated assets
owned by foreign investors. This outflow stems from the profits or interest generated by the
assets and represent a clear outflow of capital from the economy that otherwise would not occur if
the assets were owned by U.S. investors. These capital outflows represent the most tangible cost
to the economy of the present mix of economic policies in which foreign capital inflows are
needed to fill the gap between the demand for capital in the economy and the domestic supply of
capital.
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Indeed, as the data presented indicate, it is important to consider the underlying cause of the trade
deficit. According to the most commonly accepted economic approach, in a world with floating
exchange rates and the free flow of large amounts dollars in the world economy and international
access to dollar-denominated assets, macroeconomic developments, particularly the demand for
and supply of credit in the economy, are the driving forces behind the movements in the dollar’s
international exchange rate and, therefore, the price of exports and imports in the economy. As a
result, according to this approach, the trade deficit is a reflection of macroeconomic conditions
within the domestic economy and an attempt to address the issue of the trade deficit without
addressing the underlying macroeconomic factors in the economy likely would prove to be of
limited effectiveness.
In addition, the nation’s net international investment position indicates that the largest share of
U.S. assets owned by foreigners is held by private investors who acquired the assets for any
number of reasons. As a result, the United States is not in debt to foreign investors or to foreign
governments similar to some developing countries that run into balance of payments problems,
because the United States has not borrowed to finance its trade deficit. Instead the United States
has traded assets with foreign investors who are prepared to gain or lose on their investments in
the same way private U.S. investors can gain or lose. It is certainly possible that foreign investors,
whether they are private or official, could eventually decide to limit their continued acquisition of
dollar-denominated assets or even reduce the size of their holdings, but there is no firm evidence
that such presently is the case.

Author Contact Information

James K. Jackson

Specialist in International Trade and Finance
jjackson@crs.loc.gov, 7-7751


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