Lebanon: Background and U.S. Policy
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
November 6, 2012
Congressional Research Service
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Lebanon: Background and U.S. Policy
Summary
Lebanon’s small geographic size and population belie the important role it has long played in the
security, stability, and economy of the Levant and the broader Middle East. Congress and the
executive branch have recognized Lebanon’s status as a venue for regional strategic competition
and have engaged diplomatically, financially, and at times, militarily to influence events there.
For most of its independent existence, Lebanon has been torn by periodic civil conflict and
political battles between rival religious sects and ideological groups. External military
intervention, occupation, and interference have exacerbated Lebanon’s political struggles in
recent decades.
Lebanon is an important factor in U.S. calculations regarding regional security, particularly vis-a-
vis Israel and Iran. Congressional concerns have focused on the prominent role that Hezbollah, an
Iran-backed Shiite militia, political party, and U.S.-designated terrorist organization, continues to
play in Lebanese politics and regional security. Congress has appropriated over $1 billion since
the end of the brief Israel-Hezbollah war of 2006 to support U.S. policies designed to extend
Lebanese security forces’ control over the country and promote economic growth.
The civil war in neighboring Syria threatens to destabilize Lebanon. Over 110,000 Syrian
refugees have fled to Lebanon and reports suggest that regional supporters and opponents of
Syrian President Bashar al Asad are using Lebanon as a transit point and staging ground in a
wider regional conflict. The assassination of a leading Lebanese security official on October 19,
2012, has renewed accusations by some Lebanese observers of Syrian sponsorship of attacks
against Lebanese leaders. The attack sparked civil unrest and calls by Lebanese opposition parties
for the resignation of the current cabinet, which is controlled by pro-Asad forces.
The question of how best to marginalize Hezbollah and other potentially anti-U.S. Lebanese
actors without provoking civil conflict among divided Lebanese sectarian political forces remains
the underlying challenge for U.S. policy makers. In the wake of the October assassination, the
Obama Administration has endorsed calls for leadership change prior to planned May 2013
parliamentary elections. On October 31, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
Affairs Elizabeth Jones visited Lebanon and met with Lebanese officials to encourage that “a
peaceful transition be formulated without creating a political vacuum.”
This report provides an overview of Lebanon and current issues of U.S. interest. It provides
background information, analyzes recent developments and key legislative debates, and tracks
legislation, U.S. assistance, and recent congressional action. It will be updated to reflect major
events or policy changes.
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Contents
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Assessment ...................................................................................................................................... 4
Recent Developments .................................................................................................................... 10
Security, Leadership, and Syria ............................................................................................... 10
Assassination and Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) .......................................................... 11
Electoral Law and 2013 Elections ........................................................................................... 12
Other Domestic Issues ............................................................................................................. 13
U.S. Assistance and Issues for Congress ....................................................................................... 13
Legislation in the 112th Congress ............................................................................................ 15
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 16
Figures
Figure 1. Lebanon at a Glance ......................................................................................................... 6
Figure 2. Lebanon’s Political Coalitions .......................................................................................... 7
Figure 3. Israel-Lebanon-Syria Tri-Border Area ............................................................................. 8
Figure 4. Location of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon........................................................ 9
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Lebanon, FY2009-FY2013 ................................................... 15
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 17
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Lebanon: Background and U.S. Policy
Background
Since achieving political independence in 1943, Lebanon has struggled to overcome a series of
internal and external political and security challenges. Congress and the executive branch
historically have sought to support pro-U.S. elements in the country, and in recent years the
United States has invested over $1 billion to develop Lebanon’s security forces. Some Members
of Congress have supported this investment as a down payment on improved security and
stability in a contentious and volatile region. Other Members have criticized U.S. policy and
sought to condition U.S. assistance to limit its potential to benefit Lebanese groups that are
hostile to the United States.
The Lebanese population is religiously diverse, reflecting the country’s rich heritage and history
as an enclave of various Christian sects, Sunni and Shiite Muslims, Alawites, and Druze. In order
to prevent their religious diversity from fueling political rivalry and conflict, Lebanese leaders
have attempted with limited success since independence to manage sectarian differences through
a power-sharing based democratic system. Observers of Lebanese politics refer to these
arrangements as “confessional” democracy.
Historically, the system served to balance Christian fears of being subsumed by the regional
Muslim majority against Muslim fears that Christians would invite non-Muslim foreign
intervention.1 Lebanese leaders hold an unwritten “National Covenant” and other understandings
as guarantees that the President of the republic be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a
Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shiite Muslim. Although Christians were an
overall minority in Lebanon, the large Christian community benefitted from a division of
parliamentary seats on the basis of six Christians to five Muslims. This ratio was adjusted to
parity following Lebanon’s 1975-1989 civil war to reflect growth in the Muslim population.
Sectarianism is not the sole determining factor in Lebanese politics.2 The confessional system at
times has produced alliances that appear to some to unite strange bedfellows, including the
current governing coalition that links the Iran-backed Shiite militia, political party and U.S.-
designated Foreign Terrorist Organization Hezbollah together with leftist parties and pro-Syrian
Christian factions.3 While the reality of religious sectarian rivalry persists, it is also true that some
political leaders support the preservation of the confessional system to preserve their own
personal interests. These factors, combined with the tensions that have accompanied regional
1 See for example, Michael Suleiman, “The Role of Political Parties in a Confessional Democracy,” Western Political
Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1967; Ralph E. Crow, “Religious Sectarianism in the Lebanese Political System,” Journal of
Politics, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1962, pp. 489-520; Malcom Kerr, “Political Decision-Making in a Confessional Democracy,”
in Leonard Binder (ed.), Politics in Lebanon, Wiley and Sons, New York , 1966, pp.187-212; Farid el Khazen,
“Political Parties in Postwar Lebanon: Parties in Search of Partisans,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 57, No. 4, 2003, pp.
605-624; Paul Salem, “The Future of Lebanon,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 6, 2006, pp. 13-22; and, Arda Arsenian
Ekmeji, Confessionalism and Electoral Reform in Lebanon, Aspen Institute, July 2012.
2 As one academic author put it in the 1960s, “While it is an exaggeration to hold that all things political in Lebanon are
fundamentally religious, it is nevertheless true that any explanation of Lebanese politics will be incomplete unless the
role of religious attitudes and organizations are taken into account.” Crow, op. cit.
3 Hezbollah politicians won 10 seats out of 128 in parliament in the 2009 national elections, and Minister of State for
Administrative Reform Mohammed Fnaysh and Minister of Agriculture Hussein al Hajj Hassan are members of
Hezbollah. The U.S. government holds Hezbollah responsible for a number of kidnappings and high-profile terrorist
attacks on U.S., European, and Israeli interests over the last 30 years.
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conflicts and ideological struggles, overshadow limited progress toward what some Lebanese
hold as an alternative ideal—a non-confessional political system.
The consistent defining characteristic of U.S. policy during the Bush and Obama Administrations
has been a desire to weaken Syrian and Iranian influence in Lebanon. Parallel U.S. concerns
focus on corruption, the weakness of democratic institutions, the future of Palestinian refugees,
and the presence of Sunni extremist groups. The latter threat was illustrated by the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) 2007 confrontation with the Sunni extremist group Fatah al Islam, which
resulted in the destruction of much of the Nahr al Bared Palestinian refugee camp. The threat
continues to be reflected in current reports of arms trafficking and participation by Lebanese
Sunnis in support of extremist groups fighting in Syria. However, the most prominent, capable
and dangerous U.S. adversary in Lebanon remains Hezbollah.
Congress has appropriated over $1 billion in assistance for Lebanon since the end of the 34-day
Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006 to support successive Administrations’ policies of strengthening
Lebanese security forces and promoting economic growth. Some Members of Congress have
expressed support for the goals and concerns outlined by U.S. policymakers, but have questioned
the advisability of continuing to invest U.S. assistance funds, particularly at times when
Hezbollah’s political coalition has controlled the Lebanese cabinet.
U.S. engagement nominally seeks to support the development of neutral national institutions and
drive change that will allow Lebanon’s 4.4 million citizens to prosper, enjoy security, and
embrace non-sectarian multiparty democracy. In practice, U.S. policymakers have sought to walk
a line between maintaining a neutral posture and marginalizing those in Lebanon who are hostile
to the United States, its interests, and its allies. Some Lebanese—particularly Hezbollah
supporters and others that reject calls for non-state actors to disarm—have decried U.S. policy as
self-interested intervention in the zero sum games of Lebanese and regional politics. Other
Lebanese welcome U.S. support, whether as a means of fulfilling shared goals of empowering
neutral national institutions or as a means to isolate their domestic political rivals. Some groups’
views of U.S. involvement fluctuate with regional circumstances.
U.S. policymakers have struggled to overcome serious obstacles imposed by the divisive
undercurrents of Lebanese political life and the external pressures of regional strategic rivalries.
Similar dynamics have long characterized U.S. policy debates about Lebanon. After Lebanon
emerged from French control as an independent state in the 1940s, the United States moved to
bolster parties and leaders that offered reliable support for U.S. Cold War interests.4 The influx of
Palestinian refugees following Arab-Israeli wars in 1948 and 1967 further complicated the
regional and domestic scenes. Palestinian refugee camps (see Figure 4 below) became
strongholds for the Palestine Liberation Organization, staging areas for cross-border fedayeen
terrorist attacks inside Israel, and ultimately targets for Israeli military retaliation. The late 1960s
and early 1970s saw a slow drift toward civil war, as the United States provided support for the
Lebanese Armed Forces “to improve the army’s capability to control the fedayeen” in a policy
that foreshadowed current U.S. concerns and approaches.5
4 The United States intervened militarily in Lebanon in 1958 in response to fears of the overthrow of the pro-U.S.
government of President Camille Chamoun. New leaders elected during the four-month U.S. military operation and
their successors proved unable to chart a course for the country that avoided further civil conflict.
5 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Henry Kissinger) to President Richard
Nixon, “Actions to Bolster Moderates before Arab Summit,” December 23, 1969.
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Lebanon’s civil war erupted in 1975 over unresolved sectarian differences and the pressure of
external forces, including the Palestinians, Israel, and Syria. Hundreds of thousands were killed
and displaced over 14 years of brutal war among a bewildering array of forces with shifting
allegiances. Syria sent military forces into Lebanon in 1976: they remained until 2005. Israel sent
military forces into Lebanon in 1978 and again in 1982: they remained in southern Lebanon until
2000. The United States deployed forces to Lebanon in the early 1980s as part of a multinational
peacekeeping force: they targeted anti-U.S. forces and withdrew after 241 U.S. personnel were
killed in the 1983 bombing of a U.S. military barracks in Beirut.
U.S. policy toward Lebanon since the end of the civil war has been shaped by a desire to see the
country move toward the vision outlined by Lebanese leaders in 1989 at Taif, Saudi Arabia,
where they met to reach a national agreement to end the fighting. Among the goals enshrined in
the Taif Agreement were the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Lebanon, the disarming
of non-state groups, and the development of strong national security institutions and non-
confessional democracy. Successive U.S. Administrations have embraced the Taif principles,
while acting to limit opportunities for U.S. adversaries in Lebanon and maintain a strong U.S.
commitment to Israel’s security.
Syria’s security presence in Lebanon was acknowledged at Taif, but withdrawal negotiations
called for in the agreement did not occur until Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon following
the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005. Hariri’s assassination
and the mass national demonstrations that followed marked a defining political moment and led
to the emergence of the pro-Asad “March 8” coalition and the anti-Asad “March 14” coalition
that now dominate the political scene (see Figure 2 below for profiles of each coalition). The
intervening years have been marked by conflict, political gridlock, and further assassinations of
anti-Syria figures. Domestic actors and external players such as Syria, Iran, Israel, Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, the United States and others have all struggled for influence. Each coalition has
held power, although attempts at unity government have proven fruitless, with both sides
periodically resorting to resignations, mass protests, and boycotts to hamper their rivals.
The central security question for Lebanon since the Syrian departure has been the future of
Hezbollah’s substantial military arsenal and capabilities, which rival and in some cases exceed
those of Lebanon’s armed forces and police. Debate on Hezbollah’s future and Lebanon’s national
defense posture intensified after Hezbollah provoked the 2006 war with Israel, which brought
destruction to large areas of Lebanon. Following an attempt in 2008 by government forces to
assert greater security control in the country, Hezbollah used force to confront other Lebanese
factions, illustrating the lengths to which its leaders are willing to go to defend their prerogatives
and position. These issues dominate Lebanese debates and are rooted in decades-old struggles to
define the political system and regional orientation and to establish sovereign national security
institutions.
Hezbollah has traditionally defined itself and justified its paramilitary actions as legitimate
resistance to Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory and as a necessary response to the relative
weakness of Lebanese state security institutions. However, Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanese
territory in May 2000 and the strengthening of the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security
Forces with international and U.S. support since 2006 have undermined these arguments and
placed pressure on Hezbollah to adapt its rhetoric and policies. Hezbollah increasingly has
pointed to disputed territory in the Shib’a Farms area of the Lebanon-Syria-Israel tri-border
region and Israeli overflights of Lebanese territory as important justifications for its posture (see
Figure 3 below).
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Hezbollah’s Lebanese critics share its objections to Israeli military incursions in Lebanon and
have long emphasized the need to assert control over remaining disputed areas with Israel, such
as the Shib’a Farms, the Kfar Shouba Hills, and the northern part of the village of Ghajar.
However, current Hezbollah policy statements suggest that, even if disputed areas were secured,
the group would seek to maintain a role for “the resistance” in providing for Lebanon’s national
defense and would resist any Lebanese or international efforts to disarm it as called for in the
1989 Taif Accord that ended the Lebanese civil war and more recently in United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006).
Hezbollah enjoys considerable but not uniform appeal among members of the Lebanese Shiite
constituency, which is widely assumed to have become a larger percentage of the Lebanese
population than it was when the current proportional arrangements were established. In recent
years, Hezbollah candidates have fared well in municipal elections, winning seats in conjunction
with allied Amal party representatives in many areas of southern and eastern Lebanon. Lebanon
has not conducted a national census in decades largely because of the sensitivity of confessional
power-sharing arrangements. The current civil war in neighboring Syria heightens tensions
surrounding all of these issues, and presents difficult choices to Lebanese and U.S. decision
makers.
Assessment
Lebanon’s fractious political system remains deadlocked. To date, Lebanese leaders have proven
unable and unwilling to make a transition to a less sectarian democratic system. Competing
factions that represent religious sects, social groups, and local elites remain divided over domestic
policy and further define themselves in terms of their opposition to or alignment with outside
forces, most notably the government of President Bashar al Asad in Syria. Lebanon’s political
struggles are now taking place in the shadow of the Syrian civil war, which has hardened
positions between opposing factions and threatens to destabilize the country. As of November 5,
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported that over 110,000 refugees have
entered Lebanon and many require assistance.
The war and the October 2012 assassination of Internal Security Force (ISF) intelligence director
Brigadier General Wissam Hassan has placed Lebanon on a political and strategic knife’s edge.
Hassan was killed in a Beirut car bombing reminiscent of the 2005 Hariri assassination. The anti-
Asad March 14 coalition is now actively calling for pro-March 8 Prime Minister Najib Miqati’s
resignation, while some critics suggest that the prospect of a political vacuum in the midst of
volatile regional conditions could invite a return to widespread civil conflict prior to the planned
May 2013 parliamentary elections.
Prime Minister Miqati has resisted calls for his resignation and he and President Michel Sleiman
have called for national dialogue. The Obama Administration has stated its view that in light of
the assassination and resulting tensions, Lebanese leaders should now negotiate a change in
leadership to govern the country prior to the upcoming elections. On October 31, Acting Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Elizabeth Jones visited Lebanon and met with
Lebanese officials to encourage that “a peaceful transition be formulated without creating a
political vacuum.”
Like the current government, any transitional or “neutral salvation government” would face
difficult choices under very tense political circumstances. Since mid-2011, nearly every issue that
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has come before the March 8-led cabinet has devolved into a standoff, at times pitting members
of either coalition against the prime minister. Difficult issues remain unresolved, including an
agreement on a national defense strategy, a plan for disarming Hezbollah and other non-state
groups, and the adoption of an electoral law for the May 2013 elections. As faction leaders
continue to grapple for advantage, Lebanese citizens are demanding improved public services and
more competent governance while warily eyeing the abyss next door in Syria. In light of these
circumstances, the national elections scheduled for 2013 show little prospect of bridging the
communal divisions in Lebanese politics. However, they could grant a clearer ruling mandate to
the victors.
Regardless of electoral arrangements or outcomes, the stakes of the conflict in Syria threaten to
overwhelm the already complex domestic political dynamics among the Lebanese. Hezbollah’s
alliance with Syria and with Iran is an important guarantor of its strength in Lebanon. If Asad
falls and Hezbollah’s key conduit to its Iranian lifeline is severed, its calculations and those of its
enemies could change drastically. Some Lebanese Sunnis welcome the possible disruption of the
Syrian-Hezbollah alliance and the potential empowerment of Syria’s Sunni majority. However,
the war in Syria appears to be enabling the rise of extremists and Islamist groups whose interests
and goals may prove threatening to Lebanon. Some Christians and other religious minorities in
both countries view the Asad regime, the current violence, and the possible empowerment of
Sunni Islamist groups with trepidation.
As a result of the conflict in Syria, Lebanese security forces have confronted increased weapons
smuggling by Syrian rebels, incursions by Syrian troops, and sectarian clashes inside Lebanese
cities. These challenges place them squarely on the key dividing lines in domestic and regional
politics. The choices that leaders make with regard to the Syrian crisis and the use of state
security forces to protect Lebanese sovereignty and quell domestic unrest could shape the future
of U.S. security assistance and relations with Lebanon. Recent events have galvanized some anti-
Syrian nationalists, but the Lebanese are divided over how best to respond to the Syrian conflict.
For the foreseeable future, Lebanon is likely to remain an arena for sectarian and geopolitical
competition, with political paralysis and insecurity as the result.
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Figure 1. Lebanon at a Glance
Source: Prepared by Amber Hope Wilhelm, Graphics Specialist, Congressional Research Service.
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Figure 2. Lebanon’s Political Coalitions
Includes Parties with Largest Number of Seats in Parliament
Source: Congressional Research Service.
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Figure 3. Israel-Lebanon-Syria Tri-Border Area
Source: Geography and Map Division, Library of Congress, July 2001
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Figure 4. Location of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon
Source: United Nations Relief Works Agency/Congressional Research Service.
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Recent Developments
Security, Leadership, and Syria
In January 2011, the March 8 coalition withdrew from a national unity government, ostensibly in
opposition to then-Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s pledge to cooperate with the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon (STL) investigation into the 2005 assassination of his father, former Prime Minister
Rafiq Hariri. Najib Miqati, a wealthy Sunni businessman and former Prime Minister, cabinet
minister, and member of parliament, was nominated to replace Saad Hariri as Prime Minister.6
Miqati struggled to form a government during early 2011, while unrest in neighboring Syria
ratcheted up political tension in Lebanon.
Although Miqati reportedly sought to appoint a cabinet of technocrats and cast himself as a
unifying figure, the cabinet he named in June 2011 is dominated by the pro-Asad, Hezbollah-
aligned March 8 coalition, which holds 18 of the 30 seats. Hezbollah figures hold two of the
March 8 coalition cabinet seats.7 Independents hold the remaining 12 seats. No cabinet positions
were allotted to members of the predominantly Sunni, anti-Asad March 14 coalition, including
members of Saad Hariri’s Future Movement. Walid Jumblatt, head of the Druze-led Progressive
Socialist Party, switched his allegiance from the March 14 to the March 8 coalition, providing
March 8 with crucial support to break the political stalemate. Some Lebanese politicians suggest
that Syria increased its efforts to influence the cabinet negotiations in the hopes of engineering a
cabinet dominated by its supporters and minimizing the risk that an anti-Asad Lebanese
government would bolster the Syrian opposition. Jumblatt’s subsequent outspoken critiques of
Asad have complicated cabinet dynamics by splitting March 8’s supporters on the central
question of the Syrian uprising.8
The Lebanese government has stated that its official policy on the Syrian uprising is one of
“disassociation,” which in practice has amounted to walking a fine line of non-intervention while
protecting Lebanese sovereignty and interests.9 On November 5, Prime Minister Miqati reiterated
that “Lebanon is firmly resolved not to take anyone’s side in Syria. This has to do with our own
stability and security so Lebanon is not in any way interfering in Syria’s internal affairs. We hope
that the international community will understand Lebanon’s position in this extremely difficult
and delicate moment.”10 This position has been consistent since 2011. Although Lebanon sat on
the United Nations Security Council in 2011, Lebanon did not vote in favor of resolutions
criticizing the Syrian regime. Lebanon abstained from voting on the October 2011 U.N. Security
6 Current Prime Minister Miqati replaced Omar Karami as Prime Minister from April 2005 through July 2005.
7 Minister of State for Administrative Reform Mohammed Fnaysh and Minister of Agriculture Hussein al Hajj Hassan
are members of Hezbollah.
8 On January 3, 2012, Jumblatt called on Russia and Iran to reassess their positions on Syria and convince Asad that
“fundamental regime change is the only solution for the unrest.” He also has urged the Syrian Druze community not to
support Syrian state security forces in attacks against protesters and civilians.
9 Prime Minister Miqati reportedly said in late March, “No one will succeed in luring us into changing our
disassociation policy be it internally or externally.… Lebanon’s position from what is happening around us is clear and
firm—to respect the right of peoples to freedom without intervention.” “Lebanon will not budge from dissociation
policy: Mikati,” Daily Star (Beirut), March 29, 2012.
10 AFP, “Lebanon resolved not to take sides in Syria: PM,” November 5, 2012.
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Council resolution condemning the crackdown in Syria.11 Similarly, Lebanon did not vote for
Syria’s suspension from the Arab League or opt to send delegates with the Arab League observer
mission to Syria.
Border security remains a preeminent concern, particularly because the border between Syria and
Lebanon is not demarcated in many places and the Israel-Lebanon border has not been agreed.
Syria, Israel, and some Lebanese and Palestinian groups have at times disregarded Lebanese
government sovereignty, and U.N. reports suggest that violations of U.N. Security Council
Resolutions 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006), and 1701 (2006) continue.12 Syrian officials agreed to
participate in a committee to demarcate the border with Lebanon in 2008, but did not appoint a
representative. Fighting along the border involving Syrian military forces continues, and Syria
has laid antipersonnel landmines along several sections of the Lebanese border since October
2011.13 Syrian officials state that the mines and border operations are designed to deter arms
smuggling, although most observers argue that the mines seek to prevent refugees from fleeing
into Lebanon and fighters from returning to Syria.14
The Lebanese Armed Forces deployed to northeastern Lebanon in February 2012 in an attempt to
improve security in the area. Some March 14 coalition members criticized the deployment as
seeking to defend the Asad government, while some March 8 supporters and others applauded it
as a signal of Lebanon asserting sovereignty and maintaining its disassociation policy. Serious
armed clashes in the northern city of Tripoli and the tit-for-tat kidnappings of Lebanese Shiites in
Syria and Syrians and Turks in Lebanon escalated the situation in July and August 2012.15 As
detailed above, Miqati’s government now faces opposition calls for its resignation, and the U.S.
government has called for a negotiated leadership change to see Lebanon safely to new
parliamentary elections expected in May 2013.
Assassination and Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL)
The October 2012 killing of Brig. Gen. Wissam Hassan has brought the threat of Syrian spillover
and the issue of political assassinations to the forefront of national politics. In recent months, a
string of reported assassination attempts targeting several anti-Asad politicians had already
created controversy. In early 2012, a sniper attack was reported against the March 14-aligned
leader of the Lebanese Forces bloc Samir Geagea. In July 2012, March 14-aligned independent
Boutros Harb reported a failed attempt to plant explosives in his office building. In August,
former information minister Michel Samaha was arrested on charges of aiding a wider plot to
11 Nawaf Salam, Lebanon’s Special Envoy to the U.N., stated that “Lebanon is committed to defend the sovereignty of
(Syria) and the unity of its people ... but in order to protect Lebanon’s unity and stability, it abstains from voting.”
“Lebanon’s Stance on U.N. Syria Vote Creates Controversy,” Naharnet, October 6, 2011.
12 In June 2012, the U.N. Secretary General cited a number of reported violations along Lebanon’s borders, including
reports of arms trafficking to Syria and “almost daily intrusions into Lebanese airspace by Israel Defense Forces.” See
U.N . Document S/2012/502, Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution
1701 (2006), June 28, 2012.
13 Syria is not a party to the 1997 Landmine Ban Treaty. The United States also is not a party.
14 In late March 2012, Syria submitted a letter to the United Nations Security Council citing seizures of “weapons,
explosives and explosive devices smuggled from Lebanon to Syria by certain Lebanese political forces linked to
terrorist groups funded and armed from abroad.” For an example of an opposing view of the logic of Syrian operations,
see Mitchell Prothero, “Assad’s Lebanese Invasion,” Foreign Policy, December 22, 2011.
15 Babak Dehghanpisheh, “In Lebanon, Kidnapping by Clans Raise Alarm,” Washington Post, August 24, 2012.
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assassinate Lebanese figures. Many Lebanese view the ISF’s role in the assassination
investigations and Samaha’s arrest as having motivated as yet unidentified parties to assassinate
Wissam Hassan. Suspicion has fallen broadly on the Asad government and its Lebanese allies,
and the killing has precipitated renewed confrontation over the future of the Miqati cabinet.
Throughout this period, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL)—formed to investigate the 2005
assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and others—has remained controversial. On
June 30, 2011, the STL indicted four members of Hezbollah on charges of assassinating Hariri.
Hezbollah disavowed the allegations and has refused to turn over the named individuals. Many
observers had expressed concern that the STL would derail Miqati’s government in 2011,
particularly given Lebanon’s financial obligation to pay dues to the STL and Hezbollah’s
objection to contributing these funds.16 However, Miqati announced on November 30, 2011, that
Lebanon would adhere to its financial obligations to the STL, and the subsequent payment of
these dues did not lead to a government collapse.
On February 1, 2012, the STL Trial Chamber announced its intention to try the four accused in
absentia because of their inability to find them. The STL credited the Lebanese government’s
“multiple attempts … to find the accused at their last known residences, places of employment,
family homes and other locations.”17 The STL pretrial judge rejected a prosecutor request to add a
new charge to the indictment on procedural grounds in March 2012. The trial of the four accused
is presently scheduled to begin in March 2013 and may further complicate the political
environment in the immediate run-up to the May 2013 election. STL registrar Herman von Hebel
has stated that “the al Hassan case is in the hands of the Lebanese authorities,” and the STL could
only have jurisdiction if the Lebanese government and the U.N. Security Council decided to refer
the case.
Electoral Law and 2013 Elections
The key domestic political issue at present is the draft electoral law for 2013 parliamentary
elections. The 1926 constitution established Lebanon as a parliamentary republic. Citizens elect
the parliament for four-year terms, and the parliament in turn elects the president for a non-
renewable six-year term. The president chooses a prime minister and appoints a cabinet subject to
the confidence vote of parliament. Before each parliamentary election an electoral law is enacted.
Recent laws have preserved an equal balance of parliamentary seats between Muslims and
Christians and outlined specific seat quotas for religious sub-sects.18
The current law was adopted in 2008 and establishes a winner-take all system across 26 districts,
known as qada. In August 2012, after several rounds of disagreement, the cabinet endorsed a
proposal calling for the introduction of a proportional representation system over 13 larger
districts. Supporters of the draft argue that it will encourage parties to extend beyond political or
sectarian strongholds and run more nationally oriented campaigns. The Future Movement, the
Progressive Socialist Party, and some minority parties have expressed opposition to the
16 Article 5 of the Annex to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1757 requires Lebanon to pay 49% towards the costs of
the STL. The payment due from Lebanon in 2011 was $32 million.
17 Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Decision to Hold Trial in Absentia, Case STL-11-01, February 1, 2012.
18 For example, the 2008 law specified seats for Sunni, Shiite, Druze and Alawite Muslims as well as among Christians
for Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Evangelical, and Christian
minorities. See International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), The Lebanese Electoral System, March 2009.
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proportional representation system and the cabinet draft, as they fear it will undermine their
ability to achieve representation in parliament and maintain influence over cabinet formation.19 It
remains to be seen whether the parliament will adopt the draft, and consideration of other
electoral law reform proposals is likely to continue. Among the features in the cabinet draft of the
law that may be acceptable to all parties is the proposed establishment of a new independent
election oversight and administration body. However, this would raise questions regarding how
compliance with the independent body’s rulings would be enforced.
Other Domestic Issues
Lebanon’s domestic political scene in 2012 has been characterized by a series of confrontations
over a minimum wage increase, administrative appointments, budget legislation, electricity sector
policy, and drafting of new electoral legislation for the 2013 national election. The Free Patriotic
Movement and others in the March 8 coalition challenged Miqati’s wage proposals and his
authority to appoint technocrats to a series of administrative leadership positions. March 8
members argued that long-established practices of ministerial discretion and proportional
communal representation in administrative appointments should prevail. In February, these
disputes led to the resignation of Labor Minister Charbel Nahas and the temporary suspension of
cabinet meetings in light of what Miqati described as their lack of productivity.20 The 2012 budget
was finally adopted in July. Lebanon’s parliament had last enacted a national budget in 2005.
Budget debates in 2011 and 2012 focused on the legality and use of government funds that were
spent from 2006 through 2011 beyond the annual level authorized in 2005.21 Temporary
electricity outages continued to highlight the need for infrastructure investment, although the
cabinet and the prime minister remained divided over rival proposals.
U.S. Assistance and Issues for Congress
Following Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 and the war between Israel and Hezbollah in
the summer of 2006, the George W. Bush Administration requested and Congress appropriated a
significant increase in U.S. assistance to Lebanon. Since 2006, the United States has granted over
$1 billion in assistance to Lebanon, with the following goals:
• Supporting the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions,
including resolutions 1559 and 1701;
• Reducing sectarianism and unifying national institutions;
19 Future Movement leader Saad Hariri has said “this draft law is unacceptable and will not pass.” Hussein Dakroub
and Hasan Lakkis, “Hariri Vows to Block Cabinet’s Electoral Law,” Daily Star (Beirut), August 8, 2012.
20 Miqati released a forceful statement in December 2011 that set the stage for the early 2012 confrontations and drew
criticism from some March 8 coalition members. He said, “The institution of the premiership, which is tasked with the
responsibility of leading the executive authority in the country, is not and will not be an institution of a sect or
confession. Rather, it is an institution for all Lebanon and for all its sects and people. Any attempt to put it in a narrow
confessional framework is a losing attempt and will not achieve its purposes. Also, any attempt to weaken the
prerogatives of the premiership, either by directly targeting the institution or by devising political precedents in or
outside the Cabinet, will be absolutely rejected by those who are keen on the respect of the Constitution, with me at the
forefront.”
21 During this period, the March 14 coalition controlled the cabinet outright or led a national unity government, and
March 8 MPs prevented the passage of new budget legislation as a means of asserting influence over their rivals.
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• Providing military equipment and basic supplies to the Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF);
• Providing support to the Internal Security Forces (ISF) for training, equipment
and vehicles, community policing assistance, corrections reform, and
communications; and
• Increasing economic opportunity.
A major feature of current U.S. assistance is a five-year (2010-2014), $1.1 billion plan to
modernize and equip the LAF. The Obama Administration and some Members of the 112th
Congress have supported the continuation of this assistance. In the short term, some of the
continued funding is intended to help secure Lebanon’s borders, which are now an important
factor in Syrian-Lebanese relations. Over the long term, U.S. officials hope that building an
apolitical, competent state security apparatus will improve internal stability and public confidence
in the LAF and ISF. Such public confidence in theory could create space for the Lebanese
government to address more complex, politically sensitive issues ranging from political reform to
developing a national defense strategy.
The more fundamental, if less often acknowledged hope among some U.S. officials and some
Members of Congress is that building up the LAF will eventually enable the Lebanese
government to contain, or even potentially dismantle, Hezbollah’s military capabilities. Similar
hopes were advanced in the 1970s, but U.S. assistance proved unable to sufficiently empower the
LAF to take action against the Palestinian fedayeen. The political consequences of LAF
confrontations with the Palestinians contributed to the outbreak of civil conflict, which in turn led
to foreign intervention in the civil war that followed. At the same time, some Members have
worried that by improving the capabilities of Lebanese security forces, the United States may be
indirectly benefitting Hezbollah, particularly to the extent that Hezbollah members or
sympathizers are present in security forces or to the extent that Hezbollah’s participation in the
Lebanese government gives it influence over security sector decisions and resources (see below).
The Administration’s assistance request for FY2013 includes programs for border security,
special operations forces, and police training; prison reform; improving the competitiveness of
the IT sector; and encouraging growth among small and medium size enterprises. The FY2013
Continuing Appropriations Resolution (P.L. 112-175) carries forward conditions on interim
FY2013 spending for Lebanon from the FY2012 appropriation (P.L. 112-74). 22 Those conditions
include the submission of a report on the use of U.S. assistance by the LAF, a “detailed spend
plan” for the year’s funds, and regular notification of the Appropriations Committees of planned
obligations of funds for Lebanon programs.
Additional FY2013 funds could benefit Lebanon if Congress appropriates funding for the
Administration’s request for a $770 million Middle East North Africa Incentive Fund (MENA-
IF). As of October 2012, the House Appropriations Committee had declined to include funding
for the MENA-IF initiative in its version of the FY2013 Foreign Operations appropriations bill
22 The continuing resolution provides funds for U.S. foreign assistance accounts in amounts indexed to the FY2012
appropriations legislation (P.L. 112-74). Spending levels from FY2012 accounts for Lebanon were set through
consultation between the executive branch and Congress rather than specified directly in legislation, with the exception
of assistance to support certain scholarships to Lebanese academic institutions. As such, established inter-branch
consultation and notification practices will remain the primary mechanism for determining the use of any interim
FY2013 funding for Lebanon under the continuing resolution. P.L. 112-175 expires March 27, 2013.
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(H.R. 5857). The Senate Appropriations Committee included $1 billion for the MENA-IF, an
increase over the Administration’s request (S. 3241).
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Lebanon, FY2009-FY2013
Regular and supplemental foreign operations and defense appropriations; current year $U.S. in millions
FY2012
FY2013
Account FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 (Estimate) (Request)
Total
ESF 67.50
109.00
84.73
84.73
70.00
415.96
IMET 2.28 2.50 2.48 2.38 2.25
11.89
1206 49.24
23.00
0 NA
NA
72.24
FMF 159.70
100.00
74.85
75.00
75.00
484.55
INCLE 6.00
20.00
19.50
24.00
15.50
85.00
NADR 4.60 6.80 4.80 5.05 4.70
25.95
1207 10.00
NA
NA
NA
NA
10.00
Total 299.32 261.30 186.36 191.16 167.45
1,105.59
Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations. This document
includes funds from the following accounts: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Narcotics Control and
Law Enforcement Assistance (INCLE), International Military and Education Training (IMET). Funding for ‘1206’
refers to the Department of Defense Global Train and Equip program, authorized by Section 1206 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163), as amended. Funding for ’1207’ refers to
the Department of Defense Security and Stabilization Assistance program, authorized by Section 1207 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163), as amended.
Legislation in the 112th Congress
Developments in Syria and Lebanon, and any changes they create in Hezbollah’s strategic
position, appear likely to inform future debates about the scope and conditions of U.S. assistance.
As a result of increasing Hezbollah participation in the Lebanese government since 2011, some
Members of Congress have questioned the advisability of funding U.S.-sponsored initiatives in
Lebanon at current levels, particularly in an era of pressing U.S. budgetary constraints.
In June 2011, Representatives Berman, Issa, Boustany, and Rahall proposed H.R. 2215, the
Hezbollah Anti-Terrorism Act (HATA), designed to limit certain types of assistance to the LAF
while Hezbollah is part of the governing coalition in Lebanon. The bill did not preclude
supporting programs that foster democracy and rule of law, educational funding, or LAF training
through International Military Education and Training (IMET). Representative Berman later
offered HATA as an amendment to H.R. 2583, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which
was reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (H.Rept. 112-223). Congress enacted
the underlying condition that prohibited U.S. assistance to the LAF if it were controlled by a
terrorist organization in annual appropriations legislation (see below). While some Members
support greater conditionality on aid to the LAF, others suggest that the best way to weaken
Hezbollah is to provide a military and security counterweight by continuing to assist the LAF.
In December 2011, P.L. 112-74, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012, provided that the
$100 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds appropriated in FY2012 for the LAF
may not be allocated to the LAF if it is controlled by a foreign terrorist organization (such as
Hezbollah). LAF command rests with General Jean Kahwaji, who is not a Hezbollah member.
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Fayez Ghosn of the March 8 aligned Marada Movement currently serves as Defense Minister. In
February 2012, Ghosn met with Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi, who offered Iranian
weapons to Lebanon’s military. On April 1, Ghosn warned that arms smuggling to Syria from
Lebanon was increasing. He called on European countries to follow through on pledges of
support for the LAF and indicated that Iranian assistance was “ready.”
Outlook
Conditions in Lebanon are fragile and the country’s stability is jeopardized by the fighting in
Syria. At the same time, some in the Administration and Congress view the Syrian uprising as an
opportunity to weaken Hezbollah, as well as its key patron, Iran, and limit Hezbollah’s ability to
assert itself in Lebanese affairs. It remains to be seen whether a weakened Hezbollah would be
amenable to increased cooperation with its sectarian rivals. Since 2006, Hezbollah and its allies
have viewed U.S. assistance programs as a thinly veiled attempt to build proxy forces to target
them. During this period, some Members of Congress have argued that the LAF and ISF should
act more forcefully to limit weapons smuggling to Hezbollah, if not to confront Hezbollah
directly. The Obama Administration, like its predecessor, has sought to underscore that the intent
of U.S. support is to build national institutions in Lebanon that can impartially confront a range of
security challenges, of which there is no shortage at present.
In the current context, actions of the LAF and ISF to assert Lebanese sovereignty and limit
weapons smuggling both to and from Syria add a new complication to this policy question.
Members of Congress may choose to debate whether or not the United States should continue to
support the LAF and ISF if those forces mobilize to limit the activities of Syrian opposition
groups in Lebanon or the movement of weapons, supplies, personnel, and funds from Lebanon
into Syria. Similarly, one could argue that the assassination of ISF intelligence director Hassan,
the resulting civil unrest, and the calls for an interim transitional government demonstrate the
importance of continued or expanded U.S. assistance. These debates may become even more
relevant and controversial if the next U.S. Administration moves further in the direction of
pushing for political change in Lebanon or approving the provision of material support to armed
elements of the Syrian opposition.
Overall, the prevailing political balance in Lebanon continues to reflect fundamental communal
divisions and different perspectives on events in neighboring Syria. These divisions and
differences show little sign of abating, and will likely intensify as the conflict in Syria continues
or spreads to Lebanon. Some Lebanese leaders signal that they want to move beyond the sectarian
politics that have paralyzed the country, while others seek to perpetuate the confessional system
to defend or advance personal or communal interests. Cross-cutting popular demands related to
weak economic conditions and government services could create greater pressure for change if
political bickering prevents progress on issues like electricity supplies and unemployment. On
some domestic issues, Prime Minister Miqati had displayed a willingness to challenge political
power brokers and prevail, most notably with regard to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon dues
payment in late 2011 and a series of administrative decisions in early 2012.
President Sleiman, Prime Minister Miqati, and the commanders of Lebanon’s security forces have
sought to prevent instability in Syria from threatening Lebanon. Until recently, they viewed a
cautious, quiet position as a necessary preventive measure, even as various Lebanese factions and
external parties held and advanced positions clearly at odds with one another. Lebanon’s rival
political coalitions accuse each other of jeopardizing the country’s security by choosing sides in
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Syria’s conflict as each contemplates the potential change in sectarian power dynamics that could
be ushered in by prolonged conflict or regime change in Damascus. Hezbollah and its Shiite and
Christian allies fear that an empowered Syrian Sunni majority will undermine their interests and
empower their domestic rivals. The March 14 coalition seeks to undermine its competitors by
linking them to the violent oppression of the Asad government, even as questions rise about the
tactics and long-term intentions of some fellow Asad opponents among Lebanon’s small but
potentially disruptive Sunni Islamist community.
U.S. decision makers face a delicate series of choices as the Syrian conflict escalates and
Lebanese leaders seek advantage in the wake of the Hassan assassination and in the run up to
expected 2013 elections. Congress could influence U.S. policy in the short run through its
consideration of outstanding requests for FY2013 foreign assistance for Lebanon as well as
through its broader evaluation of the future direction of U.S. policy toward Lebanon and Syria.
Author Contact Information
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
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