Cuba: Issues for the 112th Congress
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
November 6, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41617
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Cuba: Issues for the 112th Congress

Summary
Cuba remains a one-party communist state with a poor record on human rights. The country’s
political succession in 2006 from the long-ruling Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl was
characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. The government of Raúl Castro has
implemented limited economic policy changes, including an expansion of self-employment. A
party congress held in April 2011 laid out numerous economic goals that, if implemented, could
significantly alter Cuba’s state-dominated economic model. Few observers expect the government
to ease its tight control over the political system. The government has reduced the number of
political prisoners over the past several years, including the release of over 125 since 2010 after
talks with the Catholic Church, but short-term detentions and harassment have increased
significantly.
U.S. Policy
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy has consisted largely of isolating Cuba through economic
sanctions. A second policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people,
including U.S.-sponsored broadcasting and support for human rights activists. In light of Fidel
Castro’s departure as head of government, many observers called for a reexamination of policy.
Two broad approaches have been at the center of debate. The first is to maintain the dual-track
policy of isolating the Cuban government while providing support to the Cuban people. The
second is aimed at changing attitudes in the Cuban government and society through increased
engagement. Since taking office, the Obama Administration has lifted restrictions on family travel
and remittances, moved to reengage Cuba on several bilateral issues, and eased restrictions on
other types of purposeful travel and remittances. The Administration has criticized Cuba’s
repression of dissidents, but has welcomed the release of political prisoners. The Administration
has continued to call for the release of U.S. government subcontractor Alan Gross, detained in
2009, and sentenced to 15 years in prison in March 2011.
Legislative Action
Strong interest on Cuba is continuing in the 112th Congress. In the first session, an attempt to roll
back the Administration’s easing of restrictions on travel and remittances was unsuccessful. The
provision had been included in the House Appropriations Committee version of the FY2012
Financial Services appropriations bill, H.R. 2434, but was not included in the FY2012 “megabus”
appropriations measure (H.R. 2055, P.L. 112-74). Both H.R. 2434 and the Senate version of the
bill, S. 1573, also would have continued to clarify the definition of “payment of cash in advance”
for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba during FY2012, but the provision was not included in the
“megabus” measure.
In the second session, the Senate approved: S.Res. 366 on February 1, 2012, condemning the
Cuban government for the death of democracy activist Wilman Villar Mendoza; and S.Res. 525
on July 31, 2012, honoring prominent Cuban dissident Oswaldo Payá who was killed in a car
accident. With regard to Cuba democracy funding, the Senate Appropriations Committee version
of the FY2013 foreign aid appropriations measure, S. 3241, would provide $15 million as the
Administration requested, while the House Appropriations Committee version of the bill, H.R.
5857, would provide $20 million. With regard to Cuba broadcasting, S. 3241 would provide
$23.4 million ($194,000 less than the Administration’s request) while H.R. 5857 would provide
$28.062 million ($4.468 million more than the request). Since Congress did not complete action
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on FY2013 appropriations before the beginning of the fiscal year, it approved a continuing
appropriations resolution in September 2012 (H.J.Res. 117, P.L. 112-175) that continues FY2013
funding through March 27, 2013, at the same rate for projects and activities in FY2012, plus an
across-the-board increase of 0.612%.
Among other initiatives, two would increase sanctions: H.R. 2583 would roll back the easing of
travel and remittance restrictions, and H.R. 2831 would attempt to curb frequent travel to Cuba
by Cubans who have recently emigrated to the United States. Several initiatives would ease
sanctions: H.R. 255 and H.R. 1887 (overall sanctions); H.R. 833 and H.R. 1888 (agricultural
exports); and H.R. 380 and H.R. 1886 (travel). Two initiatives, S. 603 and H.R. 1166, would
modify a trademark sanction. Eight bills, H.R. 372, S. 405, H.R. 2047, H.R. 3393, H.R. 4310,
H.R. 4135, H.R. 6067, and S. 1836, would take different approaches toward Cuba’s offshore oil
development. Two bills, S. 476 and H.R. 1317, would discontinue Radio and TV Martí
broadcasts.














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Contents
Recent Developments ...................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 3
Cuba’s Political and Economic Situation ......................................................................................... 5
Brief Historical Background ...................................................................................................... 5
Political Conditions ................................................................................................................... 6
Human Rights ...................................................................................................................... 9
March 2012 Visit of Pope Benedict .................................................................................. 16
Death of Human Rights Activist Oswaldo Payá ............................................................... 18
Economic Conditions and Reform Efforts .............................................................................. 20
Reform Efforts in the 1990s .............................................................................................. 21
Reform Efforts Under Raúl Castro .................................................................................... 22
Damage from Hurricane Sandy ......................................................................................... 26
Cuba’s Foreign Relations ........................................................................................................ 27
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba............................................................................................................... 30
Background on U.S.-Cuban Relations ..................................................................................... 30
Clinton Administration’s Easing of Sanctions ................................................................... 31
Bush Administration’s Tightening of Sanctions ................................................................ 31
Debate on the Direction of U.S. Policy ................................................................................... 32
Obama Administration Policy ................................................................................................. 33
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 33
Policy Developments in 2009 ........................................................................................... 34
Policy Developments in 2010 ........................................................................................... 35
Policy Developments in 2011 ............................................................................................ 35
Policy Developments in 2012 ........................................................................................... 37
Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations ...................................................................................................... 38
U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances .......................................................................... 38
People-to-People Travel .................................................................................................... 40
Legislative Proposals Regarding Travel and Remittances ................................................ 41
U.S. Agricultural Exports and Sanctions ................................................................................. 43
Legislative Proposals Regarding Agricultural Exports to Cuba ........................................ 46
Trademark Sanction ................................................................................................................. 47
Anti-Drug Cooperation ............................................................................................................ 49
Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development .......................................................................................... 50
Terrorism Issues ....................................................................................................................... 55
U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights ........................................................ 57
Oversight of U.S. Democracy Assistance to Cuba ............................................................ 60
December 2009 Imprisonment of Alan Gross ................................................................... 61
Radio and TV Marti ................................................................................................................. 64
Funding for Cuba Broadcasting ........................................................................................ 65
Controversies ..................................................................................................................... 66
Migration Issues ...................................................................................................................... 69
1994 and 1995 Migration Accords .................................................................................... 69
Coast Guard Interdictions .................................................................................................. 70
Arrivals of Unauthorized Cubans to the United States ..................................................... 71
Cuba Alters Its Policy Regarding Exit Permits ................................................................. 72
Legislative Initiatives Regarding Cuban Migration .......................................................... 72
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Migration Talks ................................................................................................................. 73
Cuban Spies in the United States ............................................................................................. 74
Legislative Initiatives in the 112th Congress .................................................................................. 76
Enacted Measures .................................................................................................................... 76
Additional Initiatives ............................................................................................................... 77

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Cuba ..................................................................................................................... 4
Figure 2. Cuba: Real GDP Growth (percentage), 2004-2012 ........................................................ 21
Figure 3. Cuban Exports by Country of Destination, 2010 ........................................................... 28
Figure 4. Cuban Imports by Country of Origin, 2010 ................................................................... 29
Figure 5. U.S. Exports to Cuba, 2001-2011 ................................................................................... 45
Figure 6. Cuba’s Offshore Oil Blocks............................................................................................ 52
Figure 7. Maritime Interdiction of Cubans, FY2002-FY2012 ....................................................... 71

Appendixes
Appendix A. Selected Executive Branch Reports and Web Pages ................................................ 83
Appendix B. Earlier Developments in 2012 and 2011 .................................................................. 85
Appendix C. CRS and GAO Reports ............................................................................................. 89

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 91
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 91

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Recent Developments
In mid-November 2012, Cuba is scheduled to host peace talks between the Colombian
government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Formal peace talks began
in Norway on October 18. (See “Terrorism Issues” below.)
On November 2, 2012, Cuba announced that an oil well being drilled offshore Cuba by the
Venezuelan state oil company, PdVSA, was not commercially viable. The Italian-owned oil rig,
Scarabeo-9, reportedly will be moved to Brazil to drill there. This was the third well drilled by
foreign oil companies offshore Cuba this year that did not find oil, and is a significant setback for
the Cuban government’s efforts to develop its deepwater offshore hydrocarbon resources. (See
“Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development” below.)
On November 1, 2012, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement denouncing the
U.S. Interests Section in Havana for supporting activities to provoke a “regime change” in Cuba,
including establishing “illegal Internet connections and networks” and providing training and
offering courses. The U.S. Department of State maintained on November 2, 2012 that the U.S.
Interests Section in Havana regularly provides computer access and offers free Internet courses to
Cubans who sign up because the Cuban government restricts public access to the Internet and
prevents its own citizens from getting technology training.
On October 25, 2012, Hurricane Sandy struck eastern Cuban causing significant damage in the
provinces of Santiago, Holguin, and Guantanamo. Eleven Cubans were killed in the storm, with
damage to over 188,000 homes, including more than 15,000 totally destroyed. The storm also
reportedly did significant damage to Cuba’s agricultural sector, including coffee and sugar
production. (See “Damage from Hurricane Sandy” below.)
On October 16, 2012, the Cuban government announced that it would be updating its migration
policy, effective January 14, 2013, by eliminating the longstanding policy of requiring an exit
permit and letter of invitation for Cubans to travel abroad. On its face, Cuba’s action can be
viewed as a human rights improvement, but how significant that improvement is will depend on
how the law is implemented. (See “Cuba Alters Its Policy Regarding Exit Permits” below.)
On October 15, 2012, a Cuban court convicted Spanish politician Angel Carromero Barrios of
vehicular manslaughter for the accident that claimed the life of human rights activist Oswaldo
Payá in July. The Spanish politician reportedly will not appeal the conviction; instead, diplomatic
efforts reportedly will be made to repatriate Carromero to Spain. (See “Death of Human Rights
Activist Oswaldo Payá” below.)
On September 13, 2012, the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control released a report,
Preventing a Security Crisis in the Caribbean, in which Caucus Chairman Senator Feinstein
recommended that the Obama Administration consider taking four steps to increase U.S.
collaboration with Cuban on counternarcotics, including the negotiation of a bilateral
counternarcotics agreement with Cuba. (See “Anti-Drug Cooperation” below.)
On August 6, 2012, Cuba announced that an exploratory oil well being drilled by the Malaysian
state-oil company Petronas in cooperation with the Russian company Gazprom was found not to
be commercially viable because of its compact geological formation. (See “Cuba’s Offshore Oil
Development” below.)
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On July 31, 2012, the Senate approved S.Res. 525 (Bill Nelson), recognizing and honoring the
life and exemplary leadership of human rights activist Oswaldo Payá, who was killed in a car
accident on July 22. The resolution also calls on the Cuban government to allow an impartial,
third-party investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Payá. (See “Death of
Human Rights Activist Oswaldo Payá” below.)
On July 31, 2012, the State Department issued its Country Reports on Terrorism 2011 report,
which stated that “current and former members of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
continued to reside in Cuba,” and that “press reporting indicated that the Cuban government
provided medical care and political assistance” to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC). At the same time, the report maintained that there “was no indication that the Cuban
government provided weapons or paramilitary training for either ETA or the FARC.” The
terrorism report also stated that the Cuban government continues “to permit fugitives wanted in
the United States to reside in Cuba,” and provides such support as housing, food ration books,
and medical care. (See “Terrorism Issues” below.)
On July 18, 2012, Amnesty International (AI) issued an urgent action appeal calling on Cuban
authorities to either charge or release three protestors (two members of the Ladies in White
human rights group and a husband of one of the women) detained since March 2012 after
participating in a peaceful protest. Subsequently, AI announced that one of the protestors was
released on October 5, 2012, pending trial, while the other two reportedly continue to be
incarcerated. AI also reported numerous short-term detentions of members of the Ladies in White
in September 2012. (See “Ladies in White” below.)
On July 2, 2012, Cuba published new regulations that, beginning in September 2012, impose
significantly higher duties on imported goods carried or shipped to individuals in Cuba. Many
small entrepreneurs that depend on the imported goods could be threatened by the new duties.
(See “Growth of the Private Sector” below.)
On June 18, 2012, the Cuban government reimposed duties on imported food that had been lifted
in 2008 after several hurricanes hurt domestic production. The duties could have an impact on the
flow of food parcels brought by visiting Cuban Americans. (See “Agricultural Sector Reform”
below.)
On June 12, 2012, the U.S. Departments of the Treasury and Justice announced a $619 million
settlement with a Dutch bank, ING, for violating U.S. sanctions against Cuba, Burma, Sudan,
Libya, and Iran. The Cuba sanction violations were the most extensive and stemmed from ING’s
processing of financial transactions valued at more than $1.6 billion. (See “Policy Developments
in 2012” below.)
For additional entries, see Appendix B.
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Introduction
Political and economic developments in Cuba and U.S. policy toward the island nation, located
just 90 miles from the United States, have been significant congressional concerns for many
years. Since the end of the Cold War, Congress has played an active role in shaping U.S. policy
toward Cuba, first with the enactment of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-484, Title
XVII) and then with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114).
Both of these measures strengthened U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba that had first been
imposed in the early 1960s, but the measures also provided roadmaps for a normalization of
relations dependent upon significant political and economic changes in Cuba. A decade ago,
Congress modified its sanctions-based policy toward Cuba somewhat when it enacted the Trade
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) allowing for
U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba that led to the United States becoming a major source for
Cuba’s food imports.
Over the past decade, much of the debate over U.S. policy in Congress has focused on U.S.
sanctions, especially over U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba. The George W. Bush Administration
initially liberalized U.S. family travel to Cuba in 2003, but subsequently tightened restrictions on
family and other categories of travel in 2004 because of Cuba’s crackdown on political dissidents.
In 2009, Congress took legislative action in an appropriations measure (P.L. 111-8) to ease
restrictions on family travel and travel for the marketing of agricultural exports, marking the first
congressional action easing Cuba sanctions in almost a decade. The Obama Administration took
further action in April 2009 by lifting all restrictions on family travel and on cash remittances by
family members to their relatives in Cuba and restarting semi-annual migration talks that had
been curtailed in 2004. In January 2011, the Administration announced the further easing of
restrictions on educational and religious travel to Cuba and on non-family remittances, and it also
expanded eligible airports in the United States authorized to serve licensed charter flights to and
from Cuba.
This report is divided into three major sections analyzing Cuba’s political and economic situation,
U.S. policy toward Cuba, and selected issues in U.S.-Cuban relations. The first section on the
political and economic situation includes a brief historical background, a discussion of the human
rights situation and political prisoners, and an examination of economic policy changes that have
occurred to date under Raúl Castro. The second section on U.S. policy provides a broad overview
of U.S. policy historically through the George W. Bush Administration and then provides a brief
discussion of the broad debate on the direction of U.S. policy toward Cuba. Policy under the
Obama Administration is then examined in more detail. The third section analyzes many of the
key issues in U.S.-Cuban relations that have been at the forefront of the U.S. policy debate on
Cuba and have often been the subject of legislative initiatives. These include U.S. restrictions on
travel, remittances, and agricultural exports to Cuba; a sanction that denies protection for certain
Cuban trademarks; the status of anti-drug cooperation with Cuba; the status of Cuba’s offshore
development and implications for disaster response preparedness; terrorism issues, especially in
consideration of Cuba remaining on the State Department’s state sponsors of terrorism list; U.S.
funding for democracy and human rights projects; U.S. government-sponsored broadcasting to
Cuba (Radio and TV Martí); and migration issues.

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Figure 1. Map of Cuba

Source: CRS.

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Cuba’s Political and Economic Situation
Brief Historical Background1
Cuba did not become an independent nation until 1902. From its discovery by Columbus in 1492
until the Spanish-American War in 1898, Cuba was a Spanish colony. In the 19th century, the
country became a major sugar producer with slaves from Africa arriving in increasing numbers to
work the sugar plantations. The drive for independence from Spain grew stronger in the second
half of the 19th century, but it only came about after the United States entered the conflict when
the USS Maine sank in Havana Harbor after an explosion of undetermined origin. In the
aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the United States ruled Cuba for four years until Cuba
was granted its independence in 1902. Nevertheless, the United States still retained the right to
intervene in Cuba to preserve Cuban independence and maintain stability in accordance with the
Platt Amendment2 that became part of the Cuban Constitution of 1901. The United States
subsequently intervened militarily three times between 1906 and 1921 to restore order, but in
1934, the Platt Amendment was repealed.
Cuba’s political system as an independent nation was often dominated by authoritarian figures.
Gerardo Machado (1925-1933), who served two terms as president, became increasingly
dictatorial until he was ousted by the military. A short-lived reformist government gave way to a
series of governments that were dominated behind the scenes by military leader Fulgencio Batista
until he was elected president in 1940. Batista was voted out of office in 1944 and was followed
by two successive presidents in a democratic era that ultimately became characterized by
corruption and increasing political violence. Batista seized power in a bloodless coup in 1952 and
his rule progressed into a brutal dictatorship. This fueled popular unrest and set the stage for Fidel
Castro’s rise to power.
Castro led an unsuccessful attack on military barracks in Santiago, Cuba, on July 26, 1953. He
was jailed, but subsequently freed and went into exile in Mexico where he formed the 26th of July
Movement. Castro returned to Cuba in 1956 with the goal of overthrowing the Batista
dictatorship. His revolutionary movement was based in the Sierra Maestra and joined with other
resistance groups seeking Batista’s ouster. Batista ultimately fled the country on January 1, 1959,
leading to more than 45 years of rule under Fidel Castro until he stepped down from power
provisionally in July 2006 because of poor health.
While Castro had promised a return to democratic constitutional rule when he first took power, he
instead moved to consolidate his rule, repress dissent, and imprison or execute thousands of
opponents. Under the new revolutionary government, Castro’s supporters gradually displaced
members of less radical groups. Castro moved toward close relations with the Soviet Union while

1 Portions of this background are drawn from U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Cuba,” April 28, 2011. For
further background, see Cuba, A Country Study, ed. Rex A. Hudson, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002); “Country Profile: Cuba,” Federal Research Division,
Library of Congress, September 2006, available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Cuba.pdf; Cuba, A Short
History, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom,
(New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971).
2 U.S. Senator Orville Platt introduced an amendment to an army appropriation bill that was approved by both houses
and enacted into law in 1901.
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relations with the United States deteriorated rapidly as the Cuban government expropriated U.S.
properties (see “Background on U.S.-Cuban Relations” below). In April 1961, Castro declared
that the Cuban revolution was socialist, and in December 1961, he proclaimed himself to be a
Marxist-Leninist. Over the next 30 years, Cuba was a close ally of the Soviet Union and
depended on it for significant assistance until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
From 1959 until 1976, Castro ruled by decree. In 1976, however, the Cuban government enacted
a new Constitution setting forth the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) as the leading force in state
and society, with power centered in a Political Bureau headed by Fidel Castro. Cuba’s
Constitution also outlined national, provincial, and local governmental structures. Since then,
legislative authority has been vested in a National Assembly of People’s Power that meets twice
annually for brief periods. When the Assembly is not in session, a Council of State, elected by the
Assembly, acts on its behalf. According to Cuba’s Constitution, the president of the Council of
State is the country’s head of state and government. Executive power in Cuba is vested in a
Council of Ministers, also headed by the country’s head of state and government, that is, the
president of the Council of State.
Fidel Castro served as head of state and government through his position as president of the
Council of State from 1976 until February 2008. While he had provisionally stepped down from
power in July 2006 because of poor health, Fidel still officially retained his position as head of
state and government. National Assembly elections were held on January 20, 2008, and Fidel
Castro was once again among the candidates elected to the now 614-member legislative body.
(As in the past, voters were only offered a single slate of candidates.) On February 24, 2008, the
new Assembly was scheduled to select from among its ranks the members of the Council of State
and its president. Many observers had speculated that because of his poor health, Fidel would
choose not to be reelected as president of the Council of State, which would confirm his official
departure from heading the Cuban government. Statements from Castro himself in December
2007 hinted at his potential retirement. That proved true on February 19, 2008, when Fidel
announced that he would not accept the position as president of the Council of State, essentially
confirming his departure as titular head of the Cuban government.
Political Conditions
After Fidel stepped down from power, Cuba’s political succession from Fidel to Raúl Castro was
characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. After two and one half years of provisionally
serving as president, Raúl Castro officially became Cuba’s president on February 24, 2008, when
Cuba’s legislature selected him as president of the 31-member Council of State.3
For many years, Raúl, as first vice president of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers,
had been the officially designated successor and was slated to become head of state with Fidel’s
departure. Raúl also had served as Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) since the
beginning of the Cuban revolution. When Fidel stepped down from power in 2006, he signed a
proclamation that ceded political power to Raúl on a provisional basis, including the positions of
first secretary of the Cuban Communist Party, commander in chief of the FAR, and president of

3 For more on Cuba’s political succession, see CRS Report RS22742, Cuba’s Political Succession: From Fidel to Raúl
Castro. For background discussion of potential Cuban political scenarios envisioned in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s
stepping down from power in 2006, see CRS Report RL33622, Cuba’s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy
Approaches.
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the Council of State. Despite the change in government in February 2008, Fidel still officially
held the title of first secretary of the PCC, although Raúl as provisional first secretary was leading
the party. (It was not until the PCC’s sixth party congress held in April 2011 that Raúl officially
assumed the title of first secretary.)
While it was not a surprise to observers for Raúl to succeed his brother Fidel officially as head of
government, the selection of José Ramón Machado Ventura as the Council of State’s first vice
president in February 2008 was a surprise. (At the same time, Machado became first vice
president of the Council of Ministers, and later in April 2011 became PCC second secretary at the
sixth party congress.) Born in 1930, Machado is a physician by training and is part of the older
generation of so-called históricos of the 1959 Cuban revolution along with the Castro brothers
(Fidel Castro was born on August 13, 1926, while Raúl Castro was born on June 3, 1931). He has
been described as a hard-line communist party ideologue, and reportedly has been a close friend
and confident of Raúl for many years.4 Machado’s position is significant because it makes him
the official successor to Raúl, according to the Cuban Constitution. Many observers had expected
that Carlos Lage, one of five other vice presidents on the Council of State, would have been chose
as first vice president. Born in 1951, Lage was responsible for Cuba’s economic reforms in the
1990s and represented a younger generation of Cuban leaders.
Several key military officers and confidants of Raúl also became members of the Council of
State, increasing the role of the military in the government. General Julio Casas Regueiro, who
already was on the Council, became one of its five vice presidents. Most significantly, Casas
Regueiro, who had been first vice minister in the FAR, was selected by Raúl as the country’s new
minister of the FAR, officially replacing Raúl in that position. Casas Regueiro also is chairman of
GAESA (Grupo de Administracion Empresarial, S.A.), the Cuban military’s holding company for
its extensive business operations.5 (On September 2, 2011, Casas Regueiro died from a heart
attack at 75 years of age, and was replaced as minister of the FAR by 70-year old Gen. Leopoldo
Cintra Frías, who was serving as first vice minister of the FAR and also was a member of the
Council of State.)6
In March 2009, Raúl orchestrated a government shake-up that combined four ministries into two
and ousted a dozen high-ranking officials, most notably including Foreign Minister Felipe Pérez
Roque, Council of Ministers Secretary Carlos Lage, and Minister of Economy and Planning José
Luis Rodriguez García. The streamlining combined the portfolios of food and fishing into one
ministry and the foreign investment and trade portfolios into another ministry. Changes in the
bureaucracy had been anticipated since February 2008 when Raúl Castro vowed to make the
government smaller and more efficient, but the ouster of both Felipe Pérez Roque and Carlos
Lage, who lost all their government and party positions, caught many observers by surprise. Pérez
Roque was replaced by career diplomat Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla, who served for eight years
(1995-2003) as Cuba’s U.N. Ambassador and most recently as vice foreign minister. Carlos Lage,
who most significantly lost his position as a vice president of the Council of State, was replaced
by military General José Amado Guerra, who had worked for Raúl Castro as secretary of the
FAR.

4 Daniel Dombey, Richard Lapper, and Andrew Ward, “A Family Business, Cuban-Americans Look Beyond the
Havana Handover,” Financial Times, February 27, 2008.
5 Pablo Bachelet, “New Cuban Leader Adds Military Loyalists to Team,” Miami Herald, February 25, 2008.
6 Domingo Amuchastegui, “Defense Minister Casas Dies; Cintra Frías to Replace Him,: Cuba News, September 2011.
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What was unexpected about the simultaneous ouster of both Pérez Roque and Lage was that they
represented different tendencies within Cuba’s communist political system. Pérez Roque, a
former private secretary to Fidel, was known as a hardliner, while Carlos Lage, who was
responsible for Cuba’s limited economic reforms in the 1990s, was viewed as a potential
economic reformer. Some observers maintain that the ouster of both Pérez Roque and Lage was a
move by Raúl to replace so-called Fidelistas with his own supporters. Fidel, however, wrote in
one of his reflections in the Cuban press that both officials had been seduced by ambitions for
power, and that a majority of the other officials who were replaced by Raúl had not originally
been appointed by Fidel.7 Along these lines, a number of observers maintain that the ouster of
Pérez Roque and Lage had more to do with removing potential contenders for power in a post-
Castro Cuba. What appears clear from the government shake-up is that Raúl Castro began putting
his mark on the Cuban government bureaucracy. Some observers contend that Raúl was moving
forward with his pledge to make the government more efficient. According to this view, ideology
did not play a role in the appointments, and several of those brought in as ministers were
relatively unknown technocrats.8 The new appointments also continued the trend toward bringing
more military officials into the government.
While Raúl began implementing some limited economic reform in 2008 (see “Reform Efforts
Under Raúl Castro,” below), there has been no change to his government’s tight control over the
political system and few observers expect there to be, with the government backed up by a strong
security apparatus. Some observers point to the significantly reduced number of political
prisoners over the past several years as evidence of a lessening of repression, but while human
rights activists have welcomed the change, some maintain that the overall situation has not
improved, with the government resorting to short-term detentions and other forms of intimidation.
The Cuban Communist Party’s sixth congress was expected to be held at the end of 2009 (the last
was held in 1997), but the party postponed it, with Raúl Castro maintaining that additional and
extensive preparation was needed for the meeting. Ultimately the party congress was held April
16-19, 2011, concentrating on making changes to Cuba’s economic model, but some political
changes also occurred at the party congress. As expected, Fidel was officially replaced by Raúl as
first secretary of the PCC, and First Vice President José Ramón Machado become the party’s
second secretary. The party’s Political Bureau or Politburo was reduced from 24 to 15 members,
with three new members, Marino Murrillo, Minister of Economy Adel Yzquierdo Rodriguez, and
the first secretary of the party in Havana, Mercedes Lopez Acea. The party’s Central Committee
also was reduced from 125 to 115 members, with about 80 of those being new members of the
committee.
At the April 2011 party congress, Raúl Castro also proposed two five-year term limits for top
positions in the party and in the government, calling for systematic rejuvenation. This change was
confirmed by a January 28-29, 2012, PCC national conference (a continuation of the April 2011
party congress, but focusing on PCC internal changes.) Some analysts maintain that enacting term
limits ultimately could pave a way for political succession from one generation to another.9

7 According to Fidel Castro, “The sweetness of power for which they had made no sacrifice awoke in them ambitions
that led them to an unworthy role. The external enemy was filled with illusions about them.” See Reflections of Fidel,
“Healthy Changes within the Council of Ministers,” from CubaDebate as translated by Granma International, March 3,
2009.
8 Frances Robles, “Cuban Government Undergoes Massive Restructuring,” Miami Herald, March 3, 2009.
9 Arturo Lopez-Levy, “Change in Post-Fidel Cuba: Political Liberalization, Economic Reform, and Lessons for U.S.
Policy,” New America Foundation, May 2011.
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Cuba’s revolutionary leadership has been criticized for remaining in party and government
positions far too long, and for not passing leadership opportunities to a younger generation. Some
observers had expected leadership changes to occur at the January 2012 meeting. While this did
not occur, the conference approved a resolution by which the PCC Central Committee would be
allowed to replace up to 20% of its 115 members within its five-year mandate. Overall, analysts
expressed disappointment that the national conference, which reaffirmed the PCC as Cuba’s only
recognized party, did not offer more significant political reforms.10 Given the age of Cuba’s
current leadership, some observers believe that the government could confront significant
difficulty if it faced a sudden succession scenario.
In February 2013, Cuba is scheduled to select the country’s next president and most observers
expect Raúl Castro to be reselected for a five year-term. The selection process begins in January
2013 when Cubans vote to elect members of the National Assembly, who in turn will meet in
February to select the next president of the Council of State, Cuba’s head of government. In the
last National Assembly election in 2008, all candidates ran unopposed and were vetted by
government-run commissions.11 More recently, on October 21, 2012, more than 7 million Cubans
went to the polls to select representatives to 168 Municipal Assemblies of People’s Power—a
second round where no candidate received more than 50% of the vote was held on November 4,
2012 (except for Santiago and Holguin provinces because of Hurricane Sandy). Under Cuba’s
one-party system, the overwhelming majority of those elected are PCC members. Critics maintain
that the elections are a sham and entirely controlled by the Communist Party.
Human Rights
Cuba has a poor record on human rights, with the government sharply restricting freedoms of
expression, association, assembly, movement, and other basic rights since the early years of the
Cuban revolution. Some observers anticipated a relaxation of the government’s oppressive tactics
in the aftermath of the January 1998 visit of Pope John Paul II, but government attacks against
human rights activists and other dissidents continued. While the government has released
numerous political prisoners over the past several years—including more 125 since 2010—it has
also resorted to thousands of short-term detentions for political reasons and other forms of
harassment and intimidation against government critics. At the same time, there appears to have
been increased space for public discussion and dialogue on economic and social issues, including
in Catholic Church and academic publications. (See the text box on “Human Rights Reporting on
Cuba” below for links to reports from Human Rights Watch, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, the State Department, Amnesty International, and the Cuban Commission on
Human Rights and National Reconciliation.)
Cuba signed two U.N. human rights treaties in 2008: the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Some
considered this a positive step, while others point out that Cuba has not yet ratified the
agreements, and has not taken any significant action to guarantee civil and political freedoms.
Human rights activists in Cuba have called on the Cuban government to put into place the legal
and political guarantees embodied in the two covenants. In March 2008, the Cuban government

10 Juan O. Tamayo, “Cuban Communists OK Term Limits for Party and Government Officials,” Miami Herald,
January 29, 2012, and “Cuba’s Communists Meet to Update Party, Not Much Buzz on Street,” Miami Herald, January
28, 2012; Patricia Grogg, “Cuba: Party Aims for Efficient, Inclusive Socialism,” Inter Press Service, February 1, 2012.
11 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011, Cuba,” May 24, 2012.
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did lift the ban on Cubans staying at tourist hotels. Although few Cubans will be able to afford the
cost of staying in such hotels, the move was symbolically significant and ended the practices of
what critics had dubbed “tourism apartheid.”
While Cuban authorities have continued to stifle dissent and repress freedoms, Cuban pro-
democracy and human rights activists continue to call attention to the country’s poor human
rights record and many have been recognized over the years by the international community for
their efforts.
Ladies in White
A human rights group known as the Ladies in White (Las Damas de Blanco) was formed in April
2003 by the wives, mothers, daughters, sisters, and aunts of the members of the “group of 75”
dissidents arrested a month earlier in Cuba’s human rights crackdown.12 The group conducts
peaceful protests calling for the unconditional release of political prisoners. Dressed in white, its
members attend Mass each Sunday at St. Rita’s Church in Havana and then walk silently along
First Avenue to a nearby park. In April 2008, 10 members of the Ladies in White were physically
removed from a park near the Plaza of the Revolution in Havana when they demanded the release
of their husbands and the other members of the “group of 75” still imprisoned. The group held
protests during the third week of March 2010 to commemorate the March 2003 crackdown.
Cuban security forces and government-orchestrated mobs forcefully broke up the protests on
March 16 and 17, while protests on other days were subject to verbal abuse by mobs. In April
2010, the Ladies in White were prevented from conducting their weekly protests by government-
orchestrated mobs. Through the intercession of Roman Catholic Cardinal Jaime Ortega, the
Cuban government ended the harassment in early May 2010 and allowed the Ladies in White to
resume their weekly marches.
Nevertheless, the Ladies in White have continued to face harassment. On March 18, 2011,
members of the group were subject to “acts of repudiation” by government-orchestrated mobs as
they attempted to commemorate the anniversary of the 2003 human rights crackdown. In August
2011, pro-government mobs attacked members of the Ladies in White in the city of Santiago
when they attempted to march peacefully.13 On August 18, 2011, more than 40 members of the
Ladies in White in Havana were attacked by a government-orchestrated mob. The group had been
attempting to stage a protest to call attention to the recent harassment of their colleagues in
Santiago.14 In late August 2011, police used tear gas to disrupt a street march in the town of
Palma Soriano in Santiago province that was protesting the attacks against the Ladies in White.15
Amnesty International and the Department of State called for the end of harassment and attacks
against the human rights group.16 In September 2011, pro-government supporters prevented the
Ladies in White in Havana from marching to attend Mass on the feast day of the Virgin of

12 Two websites with information on the activities of the Ladies in White are available at
“http://www.damasdeblanco.com/” and “http://www.damasdeblanco.org/”
13 Juan O. Tamayo, “Cuban Human Rights Activists Report Dissident Injured in Crackdown,” Miami Herald, August 8,
2011, and “ Cuban Dissidents Say Cops Again Beat Women,” Miami Herald, August 16, 2011.
14 Juan O. Tamayo, “Ladies in White Attacked in Cuba,” Miami Herald, August 19, 2011.
15 Juan O. Tamayo, “Dissidents Say Police Used Tear Gas in Raid, Beat Women,” Miami Herald, August 29, 2011.
16 Amnesty International, “Urgent Action, Women Denied Right to Protest,” September 1, 2011; “Dissidents Detained
in Cuba,: Rights Group,” Agence France Presse, August 30, 2011; “Cuba: The Históricos Vs. The Damas,” Latin
American Weekly Report, September 22, 2011.
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Mercy.17 A founding member and leader of the Ladies in White, Laura Pollán, died unexpectedly
in a Havana hospital from respiratory complications on October 14, 2011.
In late November 2011, two human rights activists—Ivonne Malleza Galano and her husband
Ignacio Martínez Montejo—were arrested after staging a peaceful protest in Havana, while an
onlooker who protested their arrest—Isabel Haydee Álvarez—was also arrested. Malleza Galano
was a member of a group supporting the Ladies in White. Amnesty International subsequently
adopted all three as prisoners of conscience. After 52 days of being held without charges, all three
were released from prison on January 20, 2012 (a day after the death of hunger striker Wilman
Villar Mendoza), and were reportedly warned that they would face harsh sentences if they
continued their dissident activities.18
On the weekend of February 18-19, 2012, Cuban Archbishop Dionisio Garcia reportedly helped
evacuate 14 members of the Ladies in White who had sought refuge at the El Cobre Basilica in
Santiago, Cuba, after the women received messages that they would face beatings by the police.19
In the lead up to the visit of Pope Benedict XVI to Cuba in March 2012, repression against the
Ladies in White increased with numerous short-term detentions intended to block the human
rights activists from attending planned activities.
In early June 2012, representatives of the Ladies in White held an almost four-hour meeting with
Cardinal Ortega that some observers maintained was an effort to improve relations between the
Church and dissidents, relations that have been strained in recent months. Berta Soler, the leader
of the Ladies in White, expressed satisfaction with the meeting, and said that she asked the
Cardinal to intercede with the government to curb repression against her group.20
Amnesty International (AI) issued an urgent action appeal on July 18, 2012, calling on Cuban
authorities to either charge three protestors—Ladies in White Niurka Luque Álvarez and Sonia
Garro Alfonso, and Sonia’s husband Ramón Alejandro Muñoz González—or release them. All
three were first detained in March 2012 after the two women participated in a peaceful
commemoration of the anniversary of Cuba’s March 2003 human rights crackdown. According to
AI, Luque Álvarez was released on October 5, 2012, pending trial, while both Garro Alfonso and
her husband reportedly continue to be incarcerated.21
AI also reported that some 68 members of the Ladies in White were arrested from September 21-
25, 2012, but all were released by September 26. Around 50 had been traveling from different
provinces to attend four-day event in Havana, but were arrested en route, while 18 had been
arrested in Havana.22 On October 14, 2012, at least 22 members of the Ladies in White were
detained to prevent them from commemorating the one-year anniversary of the death of the

17 “Gov’t Supporters Harass Cuba’s Ladies in White,” EFE News Service, September 25, 2011; “Pro-Regime Mob
Takes Aim at Rights Activists in Cuba,” Agence France Presse, September 24, 2011.
18 Amnesty International, “Urgent Act, Prisoners of Conscience Freed,” January 23, 2012.
19 Juan O. Tamayo, “Cuban Archbishop Evacuates Ladies in White from Basilica Amid Fears of Police Beating,”
Miami Herald, February 20, 2012.
20 Paul Haven, “Supporters and Detractors of Cuba’s Controversial Cardinal Clash Over His Comments and Role,”
Associated Press, June 13, 2012; and Juan O. Tamayo, “Cuba’s Ladies in White Say They Trust Cardinal Ortega,”
Miami Herald, June 7, 2012.
21 Amnesty International, “Lady in White Released from Cuban Prison,” October 11, 2012.
22 Amnesty International, “Human Rights Activists Released in Cuba,” October 2, 2012.
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group’s leader Laura Pollán—dozens of other members, however, were able to commemorate
Pollán during their weekly march.

Human Rights Reporting on Cuba
Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights in the Republic of Cuba, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/cuba. AI
issued a statement on January 20, 2012, maintaining that “the responsibility for Wilman Villar Mendoza’s death in
custody lies squarely with the Cuban authorities, who summarily judged and jailed him for exercising his right to
freedom of expression” (available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/cuban-authorities-responsible-activists-death-
hunger-strike-2012-01-20).
In March 2012, AI published a report maintaining that “the Cuban government wages a permanent campaign of
harassment and short-term detentions of political opponents to stop them from demanding respect for civil and
political rights.” The report maintained that the release of dozens of political prisoners in 2011 “did not herald a
change in human rights policy.” It asserted that “the vast majority of those released were forced into exile, while in
Cuba the authorities were determined to contain the dissidence and government critics with new tactics.” (Amnesty
International, Routine Repression, Political Short-Term Detentions and Harassment in Cuba,” available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR25/007/2012/en/647943e7-b4eb-4d39-a5e3-
ea061edb651c/amr250072012en.pdf.)
The independent Havana-based Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation
(Comisión Cubana de Derechos Humanos y Reconciliación Nacional, CCDHRN) reports there were at
least 4,123 short-term detentions for political reasons in 2011 (almost double the number of such detentions in
2010), and that the number of short-term detentions in 2012 has increased substantial y, with 5105 such detentions
through September (including 1,158 in March alone surrounding the visit of Pope Benedict XVI). (CCDHRN, “Cuba:
Algunos Actos de Represion Politica Durante Septiembre de 2012,” October 2, 2012, available at
http://www.hispanocubana.org/archivos_pdfs/20121002_163234_derechos_id217_overview_septiembre_comision_2
012_2.pdf).
Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/en/americas/cuba. The human rights group maintained in a January 20,
2012, statement that the death of dissident Wilman Vil ar Mendoza after a 50-day hunger strike highlights ongoing
repression in Cuba.
In March 2012, the group cal ed for the Cuban government to halt repression aimed at silencing dissent before and
during the visit of Pope Benedict XVI. In the group’s 2012 World Report, Human Rights Watch maintained that
“Cuba remains the only country in Latin America that represses virtually all forms of political dissent” (available at
http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-cuba).
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights maintained in its 2011 annual human rights report, issued
in April 2012, that “the restrictions on political rights, on the right to freedom of association, freedom of expression,
freedom of thought, the lack of elections, the lack of an independent judicial branch and restrictions on freedom of
movement have, over the decades, become permanent fixtures in systematic violations of the human rights of the
Cuban people.” (Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2011, Cuba section in Chapter
IV, April 9, 2012, available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2011/TOC.asp.)
According to the State Department’s human rights report for 2011, issued in May 2012, Cuba’s “principal
human rights abuses were: abridgement of the rights of citizens to change their government; government threats,
intimidation, mobs, harassment, and detentions to prevent citizens from assembly peacefully; and a significant increase
in the number of short-term detentions.” Additional human rights abuses included: beatings, harsh prison conditions,
selective prosecution and denial of fair trials, pervasive monitoring of private communications, and severe limitations
on freedom of speech and press. (See the report, available at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dynamic_load_id=186505.)
Internet Bloggers
Over the past several years, numerous independent Cuban blogs have been established that are
often critical of the Cuban government—all of these are hosted on overseas servers. The Cuban
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government has responded with its own team of some 1,000 official bloggers to counter the
independent bloggers.23
Cuban Internet blogger Yoani Sánchez has received considerable international attention since late
2007 for her website, Generación Y, which includes commentary critical of the Cuban
government. (Sánchez’s website is available at http://www.desdecuba.com/generaciony/, and has
links to numerous other independent Cuban blogs and websites). In May 2008, Sánchez was
awarded Spain’s Ortega y Gasset award for digital journalism, but the Cuban government did not
provide her with an exit permit (known as a “white card”) allowing her to travel to Spain to
accept the award. On November 6, 2009, Sánchez and two other bloggers, Orlando Luis Pardo
and Claudia Cadelo, were intercepted by state security agents while walking on a Havana street
on their way to participate in a march against violence. Sánchez and Pardo were beaten in the
assault. The Department of State issued a statement deploring the assault, and expressed its deep
concern to the Cuban government for the incident.
In early February 2012, Sánchez was denied an exit visa by the Cuban government to travel to
Brazil to attend a documentary screening on freedom of expression. Sánchez has been denied an
exit visa numerous times in the past, highlighting a common practice of the Cuban government in
forbidding citizens from leaving Cuba without official permission. Sánchez maintains that she
will test the recent changes in Cuba’s migration policy announced October 16, 2012, that will
eliminate the long-criticized required “exit permit”—the changes are scheduled go into effect on
January 14, 2013. (For more, see “Cuba Alters Its Policy Regarding Exit Permits” below.)
Sánchez, along with her husband, Reinaldo Escobar, and several other dissidents were detained
for some 30 hours in early October 2012 after traveling to the city of Bayamo to cover the trial of
a Spanish politician accused of causing the death of political dissident Oswaldo Payá in a car
crash in July 2012 (see “Death of Human Rights Activist Oswaldo Payá” below).
Political Prisoners and Death of Hunger Strikers
Overview. The Cuban government conducted a severe crackdown in March 2003 (often referred
to as the Primavera Negra, or Black Spring) and imprisoned 75 democracy activists, including
independent journalists and librarians and leaders of independent labor unions and opposition
parties. Until mid-2010, a majority of the “group of 75” political prisoners remained incarcerated,
but the Cuban Catholic Church held talks with the Cuban government in July 2010 that ultimately
led to the release of all of them by March 2011. Overall, more than 125 political prisoners have
been released since mid-2010. Most traveled to exile in Spain, while a dozen remained in Cuba.
In April 2012, the Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation (CCDHRN)
reported that there remained at least 50 political prisoners in Cuba sanctioned for political reasons
(along with another 15 released on parole); this compares to more than 200 political prisoners
estimated by the CCHHRN at the beginning of 2010.24 As described below, two Cuban political
prisoners conducting hunger strikes have died in recent years, Orlando Zapata Tamayo in
February 2010 and Wilman Villar Mendoza in January 2012. The Department of State maintains
that accurate numbers of political prisoners are difficult to determine because the Cuban

23 Committee to Protect Journalists, “After the Black Spring, Cuba’s New Repression,” July 6, 2011.
24 CCDHRN, “Lista Parcial de Sancionados o Procesados por Motivos Políticos en Cuba,” April 25, 2012, available at
http://cuba.blogspot.com/2012/04/lista-parcial-de-sancionados-o.html
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government continues to deny prison access to independent monitors who could help determine
the size of the political prisoner population.25
In anticipation of Pope Benedict XVI’s March 2012 visit, the Cuban government released almost
3,000 prisoners in late December 2011, including about 7 political prisoners. In May 2012, the
Cuban government maintained that it had released over 10,000 prisoners over the past six months,
leaving some 57,000 people incarcerated in the country. The CCDHRN, however, estimates that
the actual number of Cubans incarcerated is between 65,000 and 70,000.26
Death of Orlando Zapata Tamayo. The death of imprisoned Cuban dissident Orlando Zapata
Tamayo on February 23, 2010, after an 83-day hunger strike focused increased U.S. and world
attention on the plight of Cuba’s political prisoners. Zapata, who was 42 years old at the time of
his death, was arrested on March 20, 2003, while taking part in a hunger strike to demand the
release of political prisoner Oscar Biscet. He was a member of the Alternative Republican
Movement and the National Civic Resistance Committee. Zapata was not counted among the
“group of 75” political prisoners arrested in 2003, but in January 2004, Amnesty International
declared that he was a prisoner of conscience. In May 2004, Zapata was sentenced to three years
in prison for “disrespect, public disorder, and resistance,” but he was subsequently tried on further
charges and was serving a total sentence of 36 years.27
U.S. officials maintained that Zapata’s death highlighted the injustice of Cuba’s holding political
prisoners and called for their immediate release.28 President Obama issued a statement on March
24, 2010, expressing deep concern about the human rights situation in Cuba, including the death
of Zapata, the repression of the Ladies in White, and increased harassment of those who dare to
express support for their fellow Cuban citizens. The President called for the end of repression, the
immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners, and respect for the basic rights of
the Cuban people. On March 18, 2010, the Senate approved S.Con.Res. 54 (Nelson, Bill), which
recognized Zapata’s life and called for a continued focus on the promotion of internationally
recognized human rights in Cuba.
Zapata’s death also prompted considerable criticism from human rights organizations and other
countries. Amnesty International expressed strong criticism of the death of Zapata, which it
maintained was an “indictment of the continuing repression of political dissidents in Cuba.” It
called for Cuba to invite international human rights experts to visit Cuba to verify respect for
human rights.29 The European Parliament condemned the death of Zapata and called for the
“immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners,” and even Spain, which had been
lobbying the European Union for a relaxation of its common policy on Cuba, urged the release of
Cuban political prisoners. Chile and Costa Rica also criticized Cuba for Zapata’s death, and
Mexico expressed concern for the health of Cuban dissidents. President Raúl Castro said that he

25 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011, Cuba,” May 24, 2012.
26 CCDHRN, “Cuba: Represion Politica Durante Mayo de 2012 y Comentarios a Proposito del Sistema y la Poblacion
Carcelaria Existentes,” June 2012, available http://www.cubanet.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/OVERVIEW-
COMISION-MAYO-2012.pdf
27 Amnesty International, “Death of Cuban Prisoner of Conscience on Hunger Strike Must Herald Change,” February
24, 2010, and “Cuba: Newly Declared Prisoners of Conscience,” January 29, 2004.
28 U.S. Department of State, Philip J. Crowley, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Death of Cuban
Dissident Orlando Zapata Tamayo,” February 24, 2010.
29 Amnesty International, “Death of Cuban Prisoner of Conscience on Hunger Strike Must Herald Change,” February
24, 2010.
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regretted Zapata’s death, but he also maintained that no one has been tortured or murdered in
Cuba.30
Zapata’s death prompted protests by other dissidents, and several dissidents vowed to undertake
hunger strikes. Cuban dissident Guillermo Fariñas began a hunger strike on February 24, 2010,
calling for the release of 26 political prisoners who were reported to be in ill health. Fariñas had
undertaken numerous other hunger strikes over the years, but he developed complications and a
blood clot that drove him to near death before he ended the strike on July 8, 2010, when the
Cuban government, after talks with the Cuban Catholic Church, announced that it would release
52 political prisoners.
Death of Wilman Villar Mendoza. On January 19, 2012, 31-year old Wilman Villar Mendoza
died following a 50-day hunger strike after he was convicted of “contempt” of authority in
November 2011 and sentenced to four years in prison. Villar Mendoza had participated in a
peaceful demonstration with eight other members of the dissident Cuban Patriotic Union. The
Cuban government has attempted to paint Villar Mendoza as a common criminal, but human
rights organizations hold the government responsible for the political dissident’s death. Amnesty
International said that Villar Mendoza’s death was a “shocking reminder of the Raúl Castro
government’s intolerance for dissent.”31
A White House statement on Villar Mendoza described the hunger striker as a “young and
courageous defender of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba,” and maintained that
“his senseless death highlights the ongoing repression of the Cuban people and the plight faced
by brave individuals standing up for the universal rights of all Cubans.”32 On February 1, 2012,
the Senate approved S.Res. 366 (Menendez), “honoring the life of dissident and democracy
activist Wilman Villar Mendoza” and “condemning the Castro regime for the death of Wilman
Villar Mendoza.”
Cuban Government’s Change of Repressive Tactics
Human right groups across the board maintain that even though the number of long-term political
prisoners has declined, Cuba’s human rights situation nevertheless has deteriorated since 2011,
with the number of short-term detentions increasing significantly. In early May 2011, Cuban
dissident Juan Wilfredo Soto Garcia died three days after he reportedly was beaten by police,
although Cuban authorities maintain that he died of natural causes.33 The press rights groups
Committee to Protect Journalists issued a report in early July 2011 detailing continued Cuban
government persecution of independent journalists through arbitrary arrests, beatings, and
intimidation.34

30 “Cuba: Raúl Castro ‘Regrets’ Political Prisoner Death, Blames United States,” CubaDebate, Havana (Open Source
Center) February 24, 2010; Tracy Wilkinson, “Castro ‘Lamenting’ Dissident’s Death,” Los Angeles Times, February
25, 2010; Juan O. Tamayo, “Raúl Castro: Hunger Striker’s Death ‘Lamentable,’” Miami Herald, February 25, 2010.
31 Amnesty International, “Cuban Authorities ‘Responsible’ for Activist’s Death on Hunger Strike,” January 20, 2012.
32 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement of the Press Secretary on the Death of Cuban Activist
Wilmar Villar,” January 20, 2012.
33 Juan O. Tamayo, “Cuba Denies Police Beating of Dissident,” Miami Herald, May 10, 2011.
34 Karen Phillips, “After the Black Spring, Cuba’s New Repression,” Committee to Protect Journalists, July 6, 2011,
available at http://www.cpj.org/reports/2011/07/after-the-black-spring-cubas-new-repression.php.
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The Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation (CCDHRN) reports that
there were at least 4,123 short-detentions for political reasons in 2011, compared to at least 2,074
in 2010, almost double. Short-detentions of dissidents for political reasons have increased further
in 2012, with 5,105 such detentions through September, according to the CCDHRN. This
included 1,158 detentions in March alone surrounding the visit of Pope Benedict XVI.35
In March 2012, Amnesty International published a report maintaining that “the Cuban
government wages a permanent campaign of harassment and short-term detentions of political
opponents to stop them from demanding respect for civil and political rights.” The report
maintained that the release of dozens of political prisoners in 2011 “did not herald a change in
human rights policy.” AI asserted that “the vast majority of those released were forced into exile,
while in Cuba the authorities were determined to contain the dissidence and government critics
with new tactics,” including intimidation, harassment, surveillance, and “acts of repudiation,” or
demonstrations by government supporters targeting government critics.36
On June 7, 2012, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics held a hearing on the human rights situation in
Cuba, featuring Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson
along with three human rights activists testifying from Cuba.37 One of the human rights activists
testifying from Cuba, Jorge Luis García Pérez (also known as Antúnez), was subsequently
arrested and beaten on June 9 by Cuban police in the province of Villa Clara and released five
days later. Several U.S. Senators strongly criticized the Cuban government, including Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John F. Kerry, who condemned “any efforts to intimidate
Mr. Pérez or any other Cuban citizen into silence.”38
March 2012 Visit of Pope Benedict39
Pope Benedict XVI visited Cuba from March 26-28, 2012, the first papal visit since the visit of
Pope John Paul II in 1998. The Pope’s visit coincided with the 400th anniversary of Our Lady of
Charity (La Virgen de Caridad del Cobre), the patron saint of Cuba. After a trip to Mexico, the
pontiff’s visit to Cuba began in the eastern city of Santiago, where he celebrated mass in the Plaza
of the Revolution, and visited the shrine of Our Lady of Charity in the town of El Cobre outside
Santiago. The Pope then traveled to Havana, where he celebrated an outdoor mass in the Plaza of
the Revolution and also met with church and Cuban government officials. While the purpose of

35 CCDHRN, “Cuba: Algunos Actos de Represion Politica Durante Septiembre de 2012,” October 2, 2012, available at
http://www.hispanocubana.org/archivos_pdfs/20121002_163234_derechos_id217_overview_septiembre_comision_20
12_2.pdf
36 Amnesty International, Routine Repression, Political Short-Term Detentions and Harassment in Cuba,” available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR25/007/2012/en/647943e7-b4eb-4d39-a5e3-
ea061edb651c/amr250072012en.pdf
37 Testimony and webcast of the hearing is available at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/the-path-to-
freedom_countering-repression-and-strengthening-civil-society-in-cuba
38 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Kerry Responds to Beating of Cuban Dissidents After Testifying to
Foreign Relations Committee,” Press Release, June 12, 2012.
39 More extensive analysis from CRS is available in the following Congressional Distribution Memorandum: Cuban
Catholic Church and March 26-28, 2012, Visit of Pope Benedict XVI, which is available upon request from the author,
Mark Sullivan (ext. 7-7689; msullivan@crs.loc.gov). The memorandum prepared before the Pope’s visit, provides
more background on the Catholic Church in Cuba, the Vatican’s interaction with the Cuban government, and a
discussion of the potential implications of the Pope’s visit.
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the Pope’s visit was pastoral (some 60% to 70% of Cubans are Catholic), the trip also highlighted
the increased social and political profile of the Catholic Church in Cuba and its efforts in recent
years to influence the Cuban government.
Cuba’s Catholic Church became more openly critical of the Cuban government in 1993 when
Cuban bishops issued a pastoral letter opposing limitations on freedom, excessive surveillance by
state security, and imprisonment and harassment of dissidents. For many observers, the bishops’
statement reflected a new era in which the Church would be more openly critical of the
government. Pope John Paul elevated Archbishop of Havana Jaime Ortega to the position of
Cardinal in 1994, which raised the profile of the Church in Cuba. Since then, Ortega has been
widely commended for reinvigorating the Cuban Catholic Church—the role of Caritas Cuban, the
Church’s social assistance agency, has expanded throughout Cuba under Ortega. In late 2010, the
Catholic Church opened up its first seminary in Cuba in more than 50 years. Cuban bishops have
not refrained from speaking out on the need for change in Cuba, and Church publications—such
as Palabra Nueva (New Word) and Espacio Laical (Space for Laity)—have become a way for the
Church to broaden the debate in Cuba on social and economic problems facing the country.40
Beginning in 2010, the Cuban Catholic Church under Cardinal Ortega took on a prominent role in
engaging with the Cuban government over political prisoners—this led to the release of more
than 125 prisoners, with the majority going to Spain. In anticipation of Pope Benedict’s visit, as
noted above, the Cuban government pardoned almost 3,000 prisoners in late December 2011,
although only seven were reported to be political prisoners.41
During his March 2012 trip to Cuba, Pope Benedict urged Cubans during his homily in Santiago
“to build a renewed and open society, a better society, one more worthy of humanity, and which
better reflects the goodness of God.”42 In Havana, the Pope invoked 19th century Cuban priest
Father Felix Varela (a candidate for sainthood) as someone who offers a “path to a true social
transformation ... to form virtuous men and women in order to forge a worthy and free nation.”
Emphasizing reconciliation, the Pope asserted that “Cuba and the world need change, but this will
occur only if each one is in a position to seek the truth and chooses the way of love, sowing
reconciliation and fraternity.”43 At the end of his visit, in reference to U.S. economic sanctions,
the Pope criticized “restrictive economic measures, imposed from outside the country,” as an
“unfair burden to the Cuban people.”44
Some Cuban dissidents, as well as some in the Cuban American community, criticized the Pope
for not more forcefully confronting the Cuban government during his visit. The Pope did not meet
with any dissidents or human rights activists during his visit or speak out about the increased
government harassment surrounding his visit. As a result, some in the dissident community felt
the Church lost credibility a result of the Pope’s visit. Other dissidents, however, emphasize the
record of the Cuban Catholic Church in supporting political prisoners and their families and for
the support provided to the Ladies in White. They point to the Church’s role in opening space for

40 See the website of Palabra Nueva, available at http://www.palabranueva.net/, and the website of Espacio Laical,
available at http://espaciolaical.org/
41 “2,991 Inmates Benefit from Cuba’s Pardons,” Agence France Presse, December 28, 2011.
42 “Full Text of Pope Benedict XVI’s Homily in Santiago de Cuba,” Miami Herald, March 26, 2012.
43 “Full Text of Pope Benedict XVI’s Homily in Havana,” Miami Herald, March 28, 2012.
44 “Full Text of Pope Benedict XVI’s Farewell Speech at Jose Martí Airport,” Miami Herald, March 28, 2012.
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increased public dialogue, including criticism of the government, on economic and social issues,
through Church publications.
Cardinal Jaime Ortega also has received criticism from some dissidents and Cuban Americans for
not more openly confronting the government. In particular, he was criticized for remarks in April
2012 at Harvard University in which he defended the government’s eviction of 13 dissidents
occupying a Havana church who were demanding a papal audience. Ortega described the
protestors as “former delinquents” with “no culture,” words that brought strong criticism from
dissidents in Cuba as well as Cuban Americans.45 Most surprising, however, was the criticism of
the Cardinal in an editorial by the director of the Office of Cuban Broadcasting that oversees
Radio and TV Marti, Carlos García-Pérez, who referred to the Cardinal in an editorial as a
“lackey” of the Cuban government.46 (The strong language in the editorial by a U.S. government
official raised considerable criticism itself, including from some Members of Congress, who
called for the Administration to reject the comments against Ortega.)47 Defenders of Cardinal
Ortega maintain that while he made some unfortunate statements at Harvard, he has a strong
record of support for political prisoners and creating a space for dialogue and debate in Cuba.48
Looking ahead, given that the Catholic Church is Cuba’s largest independent civil society group,
it is likely that it will continue to have a significant voice as Cuba confronts economic and
political change in the years ahead.
Death of Human Rights Activist Oswaldo Payá
On July 22, 2012, prominent Cuban democracy and human rights activist Oswaldo Payá was
killed in a car accident in the eastern province of Granma. Also killed in the crash was Cuban
dissident Harold Cepero while two Europeans accompanying Payá and Cepero were injured—
Angel Carromero Barrios, a leader of the Spanish Popular Party’s youth organization, was
driving, while Jens Aron Modig, president of the Swedish Christian Democrats youth wing, was a
passenger along with Payá and Cepero.
Payá founded the Christian Liberation Movement 1988, an opposition civil society group that
advocates peaceful democratic change and respect for human rights. He is probably best known
for his work founding the Varela Project in 1996. Named for the 19th century priest, Felix Varela,
who advocated independence from Spain and the abolition of slavery, the Varela Project collected
thousands of signatures supporting a national plebiscite for political reform in accordance with a
provision of the Cuban Constitution. The referendum, if granted, would have call for respect for
human rights, an amnesty for political prisoners, private enterprise, and changes to the country’s
electoral law that would result in free and fair elections.

45 Juan Carlos Chávez, “Opposition Members Take Exception to Remarks at Harvard by Cardinal Jaime Ortega
Alamino, Archbishop of Havana,” Miami Herald, April 26, 2012.
46 William Booth, “U.S. Broadcaster Call Archbishop a Castro “Lackey,” Washington Post, May 6, 2012. The editorial
no longer appears on the website of Radio/TV Martí, but is available at
http://porcubaparacuba.blogspot.com/2012/05/editorial-de-radio-y-tv-marti-acerca.html
47 See a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, a member of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, from
five Members of Congress, May 8, 2012, available at http://www.democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/ortegaletter.pdf
48 See for example, Jorge Domínguez, “The Church in Cuba and the Work of Cardinal Ortega,” Espacio Laical
(reproduced in Progreso Weekly), June 20, 2012; and Fulton A. Armstrong, “A Failure to Communicate, Why is the
Obama Administration Using Its Radio Station to Attack the Catholic Church?” Foreign Policy, June 1, 2012.
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In May 2002, organizers of the Varela Project submitted 11,020 signatures to the National
Assembly calling for a national referendum. This was more than the 10,000 required under
Article 88 of the Cuban Constitution. Former President Jimmy Carter noted the significance of
the Varela Project in his May 14, 2002 address in Havana that was broadcast in Cuba. Carter
noted that “when Cubans exercise this freedom to change laws peacefully by a direct vote, the
world will see that Cubans, and not foreigners, will decide the future of this country.”49 In
response to the Varela Project, the Cuban government orchestrated its own referendum in late
June 2002 that ultimately led to the National Assembly amending the Constitution to declare
Cuba’s socialist system irrevocable. The Varela Project persevered despite the 2003 human rights
crackdown, which included the arrest of at least 21 Project activists. In October 2003, Oswaldo
Payá delivered more than 14,000 signatures to Cuba’s National Assembly, again requesting a
referendum on democratic reforms.
Payá’s death prompted expressions of sympathy from around the world, including from Pope
Benedict XVI. The White House called Payá “a tireless champion for greater civic and human
rights in Cuba” and asserted that “we continue to be inspired by Payá’s vision and dedication to a
better future for Cuba, and believe that his example and moral leadership will endure.”50 The
State Department maintained that Cuba had “lost one of its most important voices of political
dissent and strongest proponents of fundamental freedoms for the people of his homeland.”51
Several Members of Congress issued statements regarding Payá’s death. These included House
Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinin, who said that Payá’s
“leadership and passion within the dissident community will never be forgotten and will be a
model for those who follow his path to a free and democratic Cuba,”52 and Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry who stated that Payá’s “legacy will be an enduring
inspiration to Cubans seeking freedom and democratic reforms.”53 S.Res. 525, introduced by
Senator Bill Nelson on July 24, 2012, and approved by the Senate on July 31, recognizes and
honor Payá’s life and exemplary leadership and calls on the Cuban government to allow an
impartial, third-party investigation into the circumstances surrounding Payá’s death. The
resolution also condemns the Cuban government for the detention of almost 50 pro-democracy
activists following Payá’s memorial service.
On October 15, 2012, a Cuban court convicted Carromero Barrios of vehicular manslaughter and
sentenced him to four years in prison. Carromero had denied that he was speeding, and
maintained that signs for road work in the area were poorly marked.54 The Spanish politician
reportedly will not appeal the conviction; instead, diplomatic efforts reportedly will be made to

49 “Text of Jimmy Carter’s Speech, Broadcast Live to Cuban People,” Associated Press, May 15, 2002.
50 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the Press Secretary on the Death of Oswaldo Payá,” July
23, 2012, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/07/23/statement-press-secretary-death-
oswaldo-pay
51 U.S. Department of State, “Death of Cuban Christian Democratic Movement Leader Oswaldo Payá,” Press
Statement, July 23, 2012, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/07/195356.htm
52 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Oswaldo Payá’s Fight for a Free, Democratic Cuba Will Continue, Ros-
Lehtinen Says,” July 23, 2012.
53 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Kerry Statement on the death of Oswaldo Payá,” July 23, 2012.
54 Mimi Whitefield, “Spaniard is Sentenced to Four Years for Car Crash that Killed Cuban Dissident Payá,” Miami
Herald, October 15, 2012.
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repatriate Carromero to Spain.55 Swedish politician Jens Aron Modig maintained that he was
asleep at the time of the accident, and was allowed to return to Sweden soon after the accident.
Economic Conditions and Reform Efforts
Cuba’s economy is largely state-controlled, with the government owning most means of
production and employing over 80% of the labor force. Key sectors of the economy that generate
foreign exchange include the export of professional services (largely medical personnel to
Venezuela); tourism, which has grown significantly since the mid-1990s, with 2.53 million
tourists visiting Cuba in 2010; nickel and cobalt mining, with the Canadian mining company
Sherritt International involved in a joint investment project; and a biotechnology and
pharmaceutical sector that supplies the domestic healthcare system and has fostered a significant
export industry. Remittances from relatives living abroad, especially from the United States, have
also become a significant source of hard currency, with more than $1 billion sent to Cuba
annually in remittances from families living abroad. The once-dominant sugar industry has
declined significantly over the past 20 years; in 1990, Cuba produced 8.4 million tons of sugar
while in 2012 it produced just 1.4 million tons.56
After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Russian financial assistance to Cuba practically
ended, and as a result, Cuba experienced severe economic deterioration from 1989 to 1993, with
estimates of economic decline ranging from 35% to 50%. Since then, however, there has been
considerable improvement. From 1994 to 2000, as Cuba moved forward with some limited
market-oriented economic reforms, economic growth averaged 3.7% annually.
Economic growth was especially strong in the 2004-2008 period (see Figure 2) registering an
impressive 11.2% in 2005 (despite widespread damage caused by Hurricanes Dennis and Wilma),
12.1% in 2006, and 7.3% in 2007 before slowing to 4.1% in 2008.57 The economy benefitted
from the growth of the tourism, nickel, and oil sectors, and support from Venezuela and China in
terms of investment commitments and credit lines. Cuba also benefits from a preferential oil
agreement with Venezuela, which provides Cuba with more than 90,000 barrels of oil a day.
Cuba’s economic growth subsequently slowed to 1.4% in 2009. The global financial crisis had a
negative effect on the Cuban economy because of lower world prices for nickel and a reduction in
tourism from Canada and Europe. Cuba was also still recovering from the devastation wrought by
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008, particularly in the agricultural sector. As a result of the
economic downturn, the government announced austerity measures that included energy rationing
and cutbacks in transportation and some food programs.
Economic growth, however, has improved somewhat since 2010, with 2.4% growth in 2010 and
2.7% growth in 2011, and a forecast of 3% growth in 2012. Beyond that, some observers

55 “Madrid—Carromero No Recurrirá su Condena para Acelerar las Gestiones de su Repatriación,” Europa Press,
October 25, 2012.
56 Information and statistics were drawn from several sources: U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Cuba,”
April 28, 2011; Economist Intelligence Unit, “Cuba Country Profile,” 2008, and “Cuba Country Report,” March 2011;
Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas, “Anuario Estadístico de Cuba, 2010”; Marc Frank, “Cuban Sugar Harvest Shows
Limits of Reforms,” Reuters News, May 31, 2012; and “Factbox: Cubans Get Ready for Private Sector Expansion,”
Reuters News, September 23, 2010.
57 “Cuba Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), January 2011.
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maintain that Cuba’s economic reform efforts to expand the private sector and boost productivity
should help increase sustain economic growth rates over 4% for several years.58
Over the years, Cuba has expressed pride for the nation’s accomplishments in health and
education. According to the U.N. Development Program’s 2011 Human Development Report, life
expectancy in Cuba in 2011 was 79.1 years and adult literacy was estimated at almost 100%. The
World Bank estimates that Cuba’s per capita income level or $5,550 (2010) is in the upper-
middle-income range, higher than many other countries in the Americas.59
Figure 2. Cuba: Real GDP Growth (percentage), 2004-2012
14.0%
12.1%
12.0%
11.2%
10.0%
8.0%
7.3%
5.8%
6.0%
4.1%
4.0%
2.4%
2.7%
3.00%
2.0%
1.4%
0.0%
2004
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
2012
(est.)

Source: “Cuba Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, January 2009 and October 2012.
Reform Efforts in the 1990s
When Cuba’s economic slide began in 1989, the government showed little willingness to adopt
any significant market-oriented economic reforms, but in 1993, faced with unprecedented
economic decline, Cuba began to change policy direction and implemented a number of policy
measures. Beginning in 1993, Cubans were allowed to own and use U.S. dollars and to shop at
dollar-only shops previously limited to tourists and diplomats. Self-employment was authorized
in more than 100 occupations in 1993, most in the service sector, and by 1996 more than 200,000
Cubans had become small entrepreneurs.60

58 “Cuba Country Report,” EIU, October 2012.
59 World Bank, World Development Report 2012, p. 402.
60 Philip Peters, A Viewer’s Guide to Cuba’s Economic Reform, Lexington Institute, May 2012, p. 12.
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In 1993, the government divided large state farms into smaller, more autonomous, agricultural
cooperatives (Basic Units of Cooperative Production, UBPCs). It opened agricultural markets in
1994, where farmers could sell part of their produce on the open market, and it also permitted
artisan markets for the sale of handicrafts. In 1995, the government allowed private food catering,
including home restaurants (paladares), in effect legalizing activities that were already taking
place, and approved a new foreign investment law that allows fully owned investments by
foreigners in all sectors of the economy with the exception of defense, health, and education. In
1996, it authorized the establishment of free trade zones with tariff reductions typical of such
zones. In 1997, the government enacted legislation to reform the banking system and established
a new Central Bank (BCC) to operate as an autonomous and independent entity.
After Cuba began to recover from its economic decline in the early 2000s, however, the
government began to backtrack on some of its reform efforts. Regulations and new taxes made it
extremely difficult for many of the nation’s self-employed, with the result that the number of
small entrepreneurs declined to about 150,000. Some home restaurants were forced to close
because of the new regulations. In 2004, the Cuban government limited the use of dollars by state
companies for any services or products not considered part of their core business.
Reform Efforts Under Raúl Castro
When Raúl Castro assumed provisional power in July 2006, there was some expectation that the
government would be more open to economic policy changes, and a debate about potential
economic reforms reemerged in Cuba. On July 26, 2007, in a speech commemorating Cuba’s
revolutionary anniversary, Raúl Castro acknowledged that Cuban salaries were insufficient to
satisfy needs, and maintained that structural changes were necessary in order to increase
efficiency and production. In the aftermath of the speech, Cuban public expectations for
economic reform increased as thousands of officially sanctioned meetings were held in
workplaces and local PCC branches around the country where Cubans were encouraged to air
their views and discuss the future direction of the country. Complaints focused on low salaries
and housing and transportation problems, and some participants advocated legalization of more
private businesses.61
After Raúl Castro officially assumed the presidency in 2008, his government announced a series
of economic changes. In his first speech as president in February 2008, Raúl promised to make
the government smaller and more efficient, to review the potential revaluation of the Cuban peso,
and to eliminate excessive bans and regulations that curb productivity.62 In March, the
government announced that it would lift restrictions on the sales of consumer products such as
computers, microwaves, and DVD and video players as well as on the use of cell phones.
The government also announced that it would begin revamping the state’s wage system by
removing the limit that a state worker can earn. This was an effort to boost productivity and to
deal with one of Cuba’s major economic problems: how to raise wages to a level where basic
human needs can be satisfied. The promised revamp of the wage system, however, has been
delayed. The problem of low wages in Cuba is closely related to another major economic
challenge in Cuba: how to unify the two official currencies circulating in the country—the Cuban

61 Frances Robles, “Cubans Urged to Vent Views,” Miami Herald, October 2, 2007.
62 “Cuba: Full Text of Raúl Castro’s National Assembly Address,” Cubavisión, Havana (as translated by Open Source
Center) February 24, 2008.
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convertible peso (CUC) and the Cuban peso, which trade at 24 to 1 CUC. Most people are paid in
Cuban pesos, and the average monthly wage in Cuba is about 448 pesos (about 19 U.S. dollars),63
but for increasing amounts of consumer goods, convertible pesos are used. Cubans with access to
foreign remittances or who work in jobs that give them access to convertible pesos are far better
off than those Cubans who do not have such access.
In March 2011, President Castro tasked outgoing Minister of Economy and Planning Marino
Murillo (replaced by Vice Minister Adel Yzquierdo Rodriguez) with the job of overseeing the
implementation of the country’s economic reforms. Some press reports have referred to Murillo
as the country’s new economic czar. Murillo has been in charge of coordinating the economic
policy committee for the party congress, and as vice president of the Council of Ministers, he will
continue to oversee the Ministry of Economy and Planning and other economic agencies. Murillo
reportedly is a key member of Raúl Castro’s inner circle.64
As noted above, Cuba’s Communist Party held its sixth congress from April 16-19, 2011,
focusing on making changes to Cuba’s economic model. Some 1,000 party delegates analyzed
and debated the Draft Guidelines for Social and Economic Policy (Proyecto de Lineamientos de
la Política Económica y Social) that were issued in November 2010.65 The guidelines are an
expansive list of economic goals or aspirations, rather than a plan of action. As originally set forth
in November, the guidelines numbered 291, but as approved at the party congress, the guidelines
consist of 313 goals or objectives.66
While the guidelines do not have any reference with regard to sequencing or how the objectives
may be implemented, they include some potentially significant economic reforms that, if realized,
could significantly alter Cuba’s state-dominated economic model. These include the liquidation of
state enterprises with sustained financial losses (#17), advancement toward the unification of
Cuba’s two currencies (#55), the gradual development of a tax system as an efficient means to
distribute income (#60), creation of special development zones for foreign investment (#102),
expansion of the non-state sector as an alternative means of employment (#168), and an orderly
and gradual elimination of the ration system (#174). Some economic analysts maintain that the
proposed changes set forth in the guidelines are too limited and too late to deal with the severity
of Cuba’s difficult economic situation.67
Cuba’s National Assembly approved the guidelines in a legislative session held in early August
2011. Among other government actions taken during the second half of 2011, the government
permitted the sale of cars beginning in October and the sale of homes in November. A new

63 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2011, Cuba,” May 24, 2012.
64 “Cuba’s Murillo Made New Economic Tzar,” LatinNews Daily, March 28, 2011.
65 A full-text version of the Guidelines in English is available at http://www.walterlippmann.com/pcc-draft-economic-
and-social-policy-guidelines-2010.html.
66 Lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social Del Partido y la Revolución, VI Congreso del Partido Comunista de
Cuba, approved April 18, 2011, available at http://thecubaneconomy.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Lineamientos-
de-la-Pol%C3%ADtica-econ%C3%B3mica-y-Social-del-Partido-y-la-Revoluci%C3%B3n-Aprobado-el-18-de-abril-
de-2011.-VI-Congreso-del-PCC.pdf. In addition, the Cuban Communist Party published a report comparing the original
291 guidelines to the final 313 guidelines and how they changed. See Información Sobre el Resultado del Debate de los
Lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social Del Partido y la Revolución, VI Congreso del Partido Comunista de
Cuba, May 2011, available at http://www.cubadebate.cu/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/tabloide_debate_lineamientos.pdf
67 Espinosa Chepe, op. cit.
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program began in December 2011 whereby Cubans will be able to take out small peso loans from
state banks, and will allow small businesses to open commercial bank accounts.68
Agricultural Sector Reform
A significant reform effort under Raúl Castro has focused on the agricultural sector, a vital issue
because Cuba reportedly imports some two-thirds of its food needs.69 In an effort to boost food
production, the government began in 2008 to give farmers more discretion over how to use their
land and what supplies to buy. The government also began a program of turning idle land into
productive use through a land grant program, whereby private farmers and cooperatives can apply
for land. Under the program, the government reportedly granted some 200,000 leases as of May
2012.70 In September 2012 the government approved measures to revitalize quasi-autonomous
farming cooperatives (UBPCs, first established in 1993), which have performed poorly, by
increasing their autonomy.71 In October 2012, the government announced new rules increasing
the amount of land that private farmers may lease, from about 40 to about 67 hectares.72
Despite the government’s agricultural reform efforts, food production has been significantly
below targets. The non-sugar agriculture sector contracted some 2.5% in 2010,73 and in 2011,
while production increased for some agricultural crops, overall food production was less than it
was some 5 years earlier in 2007. At the same time, the government reported that food prices rose
some 20% in 2011 because of reduced imports and stagnating farm production. 74 Coffee
production reportedly has declined some 25% in 2012, despite efforts to renovate neglected
plantations.75
Problems in the agricultural sector focus on an entrenched system whereby famers depend on the
state for fuel, pesticides, fertilizers, and other resources in exchange for a majority of what they
produce. The government’s inability to provide enough resources to farmers has hampered
production, and its domination of the distribution process has hampered the delivery of products
to market. In March 2011, the government began granting micro credits to new farmers in an
effort to increase lagging food production, although the program reportedly is not extensive
enough to have an effect on production.
On June 18, 2012, the Cuban government reimposed duties on imported food that had been lifted
in 2008 after several hurricanes hurt domestic production. While over the long term, the
reimposition of the tax could stimulate domestic production, in the short to medium term, the tax
could affect the flow of food parcels brought by visiting Cuban Americans. It could also affect the
hundreds of private restaurants and caterers that have sprung up over the past two years.

68 Mimi Whitefield, “Cuba Stacks Up the Building Blocks of a New Economy,” Miami Herald, January 1, 2012;
“Loans for Capitalism and Jobs for the Boys,” Latin American Caribbean & Central America Report, December 2011.
69 Helen Popper, “Cuban Farm Reforms Sow Seeds of Enterprise,” Reuters News, December 17, 2009.
70 Jeff Franks, “Factbox, Key Political Risks to Watch in Cuba,” Reuters News, May 8, 2012.
71 “Cuba Announces Measures to Save Agricultural Cooperatives,” EFE News Service, September 11, 2012.
72 “Cuba Opens Way to Larger Private Farms on Fallow Government Land,” AP Newswire, October 23, 2012.
73 Marc Frank, “Cuba Reports Food Output up 8.7% in 2011,” Reuters News, February 16, 2012.
74 Marc Frank, “Cuba Growing Less Food than 5 Ys Ago Despite Agriculture,” Reuters News, August 31, 2012.
75 Marc Frank, “Cuba’s Coffee Recovery Suffers Setback,” Reuters News, October 17 2012.
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With regard to the sugar sector, in the fall of 2011, the government eliminated its Ministry of
Sugar, and turned the industry into a state-run holding company incorporating 26 subsidiary
companies. Cuba’s once dominant sugar sector produced some 8 million tons of sugar annually,
but only produced 1.2 million tons in 2011 and 1.4 million tons for the 2012 harvest. While the
2012 harvest was an improvement over the 2011 harvest, it was still below expectations. Analysts
maintain that the sugar industry continues to be plagued by such problems of weak incentives, not
enough decentralization, and a lack of capital and investment.76
Growth of the Private Sector
In September 2010, the Cuban government announced a series of potentially significant reforms
designed to reduce the public sector and increase private enterprise. The government announced
that by the end of March 2011 it would identify half a million state workers who would be laid
off, with most expected to find work in the expanding private sector. The layoffs reportedly
would affect all public sector employees, including in the public service and state-owned
enterprises. Over the next five years, a total of 1.2 million state employees would be cut (out of
about 4.3 million state workers).77 The government also announced an expansion of self-
employment, identifying 178 categories of work allowed with 83 of those allowing small
businesses to hire non-family members.78 The self-employment categories cover a wide range of
employment from “carpenters, gardeners, artisans, and animal trainers to small businesses such as
home-based bed and breakfasts, rental property, restaurants, pizzerias, and snack shops.”79 New
tax provisions would generate income for the government and include a new sales tax and social
security tax.
The Cuban government’s implementation of layoffs in the state sector has lagged considerably, so
much so that President Castro acknowledged in February 2011 that more time was needed to meet
the government’s initial goal of laying off half a million state employees. State payrolls were
reportedly cut by 140,000 in 2011, and will be cut by 110,000 more in 2012.80
The number of self-employed rose to more than 380,000 Cubans as of June 2012.81 This
compares to just over 157,000 self-employed at the end of 2010.82 Some economic analysts,
however, contend that the new categories of self-employment are too limited and still include
considerable restrictions and taxes designed to impede the growth of small businesses.83 In May
2011, the government announced new plans to cut taxes and lift other restrictions in order to
stimulate the private sector, while in December 2011, the government announced that more retail

76 Marc Frank, “Cuban Sugar Harvest Shows Limits of Reforms,” Reuters News, May 31, 2012.
77 “Cuba Country Report,” EIU, October 2010.
78 Juan O. Tamayo, “Cuba Unveils Plan to Overcome Its Economic Crisis,” Miami Herald, September 25, 2010.
79 Marc Frank, “Raúl Castro’s Shock Therapy for Cuban Economy,” ABC News, November 8, 2010.
80 Philip Peters, A Viewer’s Guide to Cuba’s Economic Reform, Lexington Institute, May 2012, p. 26.
81 “Cuba’s Private Sector Continues to Expand Under Economic Reform,” Xinhua News Agency, July 2, 2012.
82 “Cuba Issues More Than 113,000 Self-Employment Licenses,” EFE News Service, March 4, 2011.
83 See for example: Oscar Espinosa Chepe, Cambios en Cuba: Pocos, Limitados y Tardios, Havana Cuba, February
2011, available at http://reconciliacioncubana.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/cambios-en-cuba.pdf; and Archibald R.M.
Ritter, “Raúl Castro’s New Economic Strategy: Context, Viability and Prospects,” presentation at the Inter-American
Dialogue, Washington, D.C., March 11, 2011, available at http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=
2603&s
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services (such as appliance and watch repair and locksmith and carpentry shops) would be open
to the private sector beginning in 2012.84
In 2012, Cuba has been experimenting in several provinces with private sector contracting for
services (landscaping, construction, food, and other services) from state companies. In July 2012,
Cuba’s economic czar Marino Murillo said that Cuba would expand this pilot by converting some
222 small and medium state companies into non-state cooperatives involving such activities as
food services and transportation.85
To date, Cuba’s efforts to create a burgeoning private sector and reduce its bloated public sector
have been slower than expected and have not stimulated economic growth. The government has
the goal of moving from a state-dominated to a mixed economy. According to a top government
and party official, Esteban Lazo Hernández, Cuba wants to move about half of its economic
activity from the state sector to the non-state sector over the next four to five years, with the
private sector eventually accounting for about 40%-45% of gross domestic product.86
In mid-2012, however, the government began taking actions that could hurt the country’s
emerging private sector and call into question the government’s overall commitment to the
development of private sector activity. As noted above, in mid-June 2012, the government
reimposed taxes on imported food, which could affect private restaurants and caterers depending
on imported food. On July 2, 2012, the Cuban government quietly published regulations
announcing that, beginning in September 2012, significantly higher duties would be imposed on
other imported goods carried or shipped to individuals in Cuba. The new duties amount to about
$10 a kilogram or more for goods, significantly higher than the current rate of about $0.50 a
kilogram.87 Many small entrepreneurs that depend on the imported goods could be threatened by
the new duties, and many Cubans are reportedly angered by the government’s action.88
Damage from Hurricane Sandy
Hurricane Sandy struck eastern Cuban early on October 25, 2012, causing significant damage in
the provinces of Santiago, Holguin, and Guantanamo. Eleven Cubans were killed in the storm,
with damage to over 188,000 homes, including more than 15,000 totally destroyed, according to a
United Nations emergency team.89 In particular, the city of Santiago was significantly affected,
with power outages, damages to homes, and disruption to water services. The U.N. team reported
that almost 100,000 hectares (some 247,000 acres) of crops were affected, especially sugar cane.

84 “Cuba Cuts Taxes to Spur Private-Sector Growth,” Reuters, May 27, 2011; Marc Frank, “Cuba Makes More
Reforms to Retail Sector,” Reuters News, December 26, 2011.
85 Peter Orsi, “Cuba Economy Czar: 222 Experimental Non-State Cooperatives to be Launched by Year’s End,” AP
Newswire, July 23, 2012.
86 Marc Frank, “Cuba Plans Massive Shift to “Non-state” Sector,” Reuters, April 23, 2012.
87 Andrea Rodriguez, “Cuba Sharply Hikes Tax on Imported Goods in Blow to Small Business Owners, Other
Islanders,” Associated Press, July 17, 2012. The changes were announced in Cuba’s Gaceta Oficial ( Official Gazette)
on July 2, 2012.
88 Marc Frank, “Big Increase in Customs Fees Angers Many Cubans,” Washington Post, July 20, 2012.
89 United Nations, United National Emergency Technical Team, Cuba, Situation Report No. 7, “Sandy,” October 30,
2012.
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The storm also reportedly did severe damage to Cuba’s coffee production. It is unclear how the
damage to the agricultural sector will affect Cuba’s food supplies.90
In terms of international response, the International Red Cross issued an emergency appeal in
early November for 12.2 million Swiss francs (U.S. $12.97 million) to support the Cuban Red
Cross to help some 35,000 vulnerable families.91 The United Nations World Food Programme
also announced in early November that it would be providing food rations to help almost half a
million Cubans affected by Hurricane Sandy, with relief concentrated in the municipality of
Santiago. A number of countries – including Venezuela, Bolivia, Russia, and Ecuador – have
provided shipments of assistance to Cuba in the aftermath of the hurricane. Several U.S.
humanitarian aid organizations, including many church affiliated groups such as Catholic Relief
Services, are providing assistance to Cuba in the aftermath of the hurricane.
For additional information on the Hurricane Sandy relief effort in Cuba, see the following
ReliefWeb website administered by the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA): http://reliefweb.int/disaster/tc-2012-000180-hti

For Additional Reading on the Cuban Economy
Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, Annual Proceedings, available at
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/.
The Cuban Economy, La Economia Cubana, website maintained by Arch Ritter, from Carlton University,
Ottawa, Canada, available at http://thecubaneconomy.com/profile/.
Philip Peters, “A Viewer’s Guide to Cuba’s Economic Reform,” Lexington Institute, May 2012, available at
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Cuba/ResearchProducts/ViewersGuide.pdf; and
“Cuba’s Entrepreneurs: Foundation of a New Private Sector,” July 2012, available at
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Cuba/ResearchProducts/CubaEntrepreneurs.pdf
Rafael Romeu, “Cuba: Reform Continues,” in Latin American Economic Perspectives, All Together Now: The Challenge
of Regional Integration, Latin American Initiative at Brookings, April 2012, available on pp. 60-68 in the following pdf:
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/4/latin%20america%20perspectives/04_latin_america_e
conomic_perspectives.pdf.
Revista Temas (Havana), links to the Cuban journal’s articles on Economy and Politics, in Spanish available at
http://www.temas.cult.cu/catalejo.php
Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas, Cuba, (Cuba’s official economic statistics) available at http://www.one.cu/
Cuba’s Foreign Relations
During the Cold War, Cuba had extensive relations with and support from the Soviet Union, with
billions of dollars in annual subsidies to sustain the Cuban economy. This subsidy system helped
fund an activist foreign policy and support for guerrilla movements and revolutionary
governments abroad in Latin America and Africa. With an end to the Cold War, the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, and the loss of Soviet financial support, Cuba was forced to abandon its
revolutionary activities abroad.

90 Jeff Franks, “Factbox—Key Political Risks to Watch in Cuba,” Reuters News, November 5, 2012.
91 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, “Emergency Appeal Cuba: Hurricane Sandy,”
November 5, 2012.
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Figure 3. Cuban Exports by Country of Destination, 2010
Russia
Others
Ivory Coast Brazil
1%
12%
2%
1%
Venezuela
France
38%
2%
Spain
3%
Singapore
4%
Netherlands
8%
China
15%
Canada
14%

Source: Created by CRS based on information from República de Cuba, Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas,
Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2010, http://www.one.cu/aec2010/esp/08_tabla_cuadro.htm.
As its economy reeled from the loss of Soviet support, Cuba was forced to open up its economy
and economic relations with countries worldwide, and developed significant trade and investment
linkages with Canada, Spain, other European countries, and China. In recent years, Venezuela—
under populist President Hugo Chávez—has become a significant source of support for
subsidized oil imports and investment for Cuba. In 2010, Cuba’s leading trading partners in terms
of Cuban exports were Venezuela, China, Canada, and the Netherlands (see Figure 3), while the
leading sources of Cuba’s imports were Venezuela, China, Spain, Brazil, and the United States
(see Figure 4).
Relations with Russia, which had diminished significantly in the aftermath of the Cold War, were
strengthened with the November 2008 visit of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to Havana,
the visit of several Russian warships to Cuba in December 2008, and Raúl Castro’s visit to Russia
in January 2009. Castro visited Russia again from July 10-13, 2012, with the goal reportedly to
increase and diversify trade and investment. While trade relations between the two countries are
not significant, two Russian energy companies are involved in oil exploration in Cuba. Gazprom
is in partnership with the Malaysian state oil company Petronas and have conducted deepwater oil
drilling off of Cuba’s western coast, while the Russian oil company Zarubezhneft is scheduled to
begin drilling in Cuban coastal waters (not deepwater) south of The Bahamas’ Andros Island in
November 2012 (also see “Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development” below).
Relations with China have also increased in recent years. Chinese President Hu Jintao visited
Cuba in November 2008, signing a dozen agreements, while Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping
visited Cuba in June 2011. During the Xi Jinping visit, China signed a letter of intent to invest in
upgrading a Cuban oil refinery in Cienfuegos. In July 2012, President Castro visited Cuba on a
four-day visit beginning July 4; the two countries reportedly signed eight cooperation agreements
and talks reportedly focused on trade and investment issues. (After China, Castro visited Vietnam
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on a four-day trip. The two countries have long had good relations, and some observers speculate
that Cuba looks to Vietnam for potential lessons in implementing economic reforms.)
Figure 4. Cuban Imports by Country of Origin, 2010
Germany
Russia
3%
2%
Vietnam
Others
Venezuela
2%
17%
41%
Canada
3%
Mexico
3%
Italy
3%
Brazil
China
4%
Spain
11%
United States
7%
4%

Source: Created by CRS based on information from República de Cuba, Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas,
Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2010, http://www.one.cu/aec2010/esp/08_tabla_cuadro.htm.
With El Salvador’s restoration of relations with Cuba in June 2009, all Latin American nations
now have official diplomatic relations with Cuba. Cuba has increasingly become more engaged in
Latin America beyond the already close relations with Venezuela. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio
Lula da Silva visited Cuba twice in 2008 while President Dilma Rouseff visited in January 2012.
Cuba is a member of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, (ALBA), a Venezuelan-led
integration and cooperation scheme founded in 2004. Cuba became a full member of the Rio
Group of Latin American and Caribbean nations in November 2008, and a member of the
succeeding Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELCAC) that was officially
established in December 2011 to boost regional cooperation and cooperation.
Cuba expressed interest in attending the sixth Summit of the Americas in April 2012 in
Cartagena, Colombia, but ultimately was not invited to attend. The United States and Canada
expressed opposition to Cuba’s participation. Previous summits have been limited to the
hemisphere’s 34 democratically elected leaders, and the OAS (in which Cuba does not
participate) has played a key role in summit implementation and follow-up activities. Several
Latin American nations have vowed not to attend the next Summit of the Americas to be held in
Panama in 2015 unless Cuba is allowed to participate.
Cuba was excluded from participation in the OAS in 1962 because of its identification with
Marxism-Leninism, but in early June 2009, the OAS overturned the 1962 resolution in a move
that could eventually lead to Cuba’s reentry into the regional organization in accordance with the
practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS. While the Cuban government welcomed the OAS
vote to overturn the 1962 resolution, it asserted that it would not return to the OAS. (For further
background, see a section on “Cuba and the OAS” in CRS Report R40193, Cuba: Issues for the
111th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.)
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Cuba is an active participant in international forums, including the United Nations and the
controversial United Nations Human Rights Council. Since 1991, the U.N. General Assembly has
approved a resolution each year criticizing the U.S. economic embargo and urging the United
States to lift it. Cuba also has received support over the years from the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), both of which have offices in Havana. Cuba was a founding member of
the World Trade Organization, but it is not a member of the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, or the Inter-American Development Bank. Cuba hosted the 14th summit of the Non-
aligned Movement (NAM) in 2006, and held the Secretary Generalship of the NAM until its July
2009 summit in Egypt.
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
Background on U.S.-Cuban Relations92
In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro began to build a
repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward close relations with the Soviet
Union. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-Cuban relationship is illustrated by such
events and actions as U.S. covert operations to overthrow the Castro government culminating in
the ill-fated April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis in which the United
States confronted the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba;
Cuban support for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments in
Africa and the Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans to the United
States in the so-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than 30,000 Cubans who were
interdicted and housed at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo and Panama; and the February 1996
shootdown by Cuban fighter jets of two U.S. civilian planes operated by the Cuban American
group Brothers to the Rescue, which resulted in the death of four U.S. crew members.
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the island nation
through comprehensive economic sanctions, including an embargo on trade and financial
transactions. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), first issued by the Treasury
Department in July 1963, lay out a comprehensive set of economic sanctions against Cuba,
including a prohibition on most financial transactions with Cuba and a freeze of Cuban
government assets in the United States. The CACR have been amended many times over the
years to reflect changes in policy, and remain in force today.
These sanctions were made stronger with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 (P.L. 102-
484, Title XVII) and with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-
114), the latter often referred to as the Helms/Burton legislation. The CDA prohibits U.S.
subsidiaries from engaging in trade with Cuba and prohibits entry into the United States for any
sea-borne vessel to load or unload freight if it has been involved in trade with Cuba within the
previous 180 days. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, enacted in the aftermath of
Cuba’s shooting down of two U.S. civilian planes in February 1996, combines a variety of
measures to increase pressure on Cuba and provides for a plan to assist Cuba once it begins the

92 For further background on U.S. policy, see some of the archived CRS reports on Cuba listed in Appendix C of this
report, including CRS Report RL30386, Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events 1959-1999.
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transition to democracy. Most significantly, the law codified the Cuban embargo, including all
restrictions under the CACR. This provision is especially noteworthy because of its long-lasting
effect on U.S. policy options toward Cuba. The executive branch is circumscribed in lifting or
substantially loosening the economic embargo without congressional concurrence until certain
democratic conditions are met, although the CACR includes licensing authority that provides the
executive branch with some administrative flexibility (e.g., travel-related restrictions in the
CACR have been eased and tightened on numerous occasions). Another significant sanction in
the law is a provision in Title III that holds any person or government that traffics in U.S.
property confiscated by the Cuban government liable for monetary damages in U.S. federal court.
Acting under provisions of the law, however, Presidents Clinton, Bush, and now Obama have
suspended the implementation of Title III at six-month intervals.
In addition to sanctions, another component of U.S. policy, a so-called second track, consists of
support measures for the Cuban people. This includes U.S. private humanitarian donations,
medical exports to Cuba under the terms of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, U.S. government
support for democracy-building efforts, and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to
Cuba. In addition, the 106th Congress approved the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for agricultural exports to Cuba,
albeit with restrictions on financing such exports. This led to the United States becoming one of
Cuba’s largest suppliers of agricultural products.
Clinton Administration’s Easing of Sanctions
The Clinton Administration made several changes to U.S. policy in the aftermath of Pope John
Paul II’s 1998 visit to Cuba, which were intended to bolster U.S. support for the Cuban people.
These included the resumption of direct flights to Cuba (which had been curtailed after the
February 1996 shootdown of two U.S. civilian planes), the resumption of cash remittances by
U.S. nationals and residents for the support of close relatives in Cuba (which had been curtailed
in August 1994 in response to the migration crisis with Cuba), and the streamlining of procedures
for the commercial sale of medicines and medical supplies and equipment to Cuba.
In January 1999, President Clinton announced several additional measures to support the Cuban
people. These included a broadening of cash remittances to Cuba, so that all U.S. residents (not
just those with close relatives in Cuba) could send remittances to Cuba; an expansion of direct
passenger charter flights to Cuba from additional U.S. cities other than Miami (direct flights later
in the year began from Los Angeles and New York); and an expansion of people-to-people
contact by loosening restrictions on travel to Cuba for certain categories of travelers, such as
professional researchers and those involved in a wide range of educational, religious, and sports
activities.
Bush Administration’s Tightening of Sanctions
The George W. Bush Administration essentially continued the two-track U.S. policy of isolating
Cuba through economic sanctions while supporting the Cuban people through a variety of
measures. However, within this policy framework, the Administration emphasized stronger
enforcement of economic sanctions and further tightened restrictions on travel, remittances, and
humanitarian gift parcels to Cuba. The Administration established an interagency Commission for
Assistance to a Free Cuba in late 2003 tasked with identifying means to help the Cuban people
bring about an expeditious end of the dictatorship” and to consider “the requirements for United
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States assistance to a post-dictatorship Cuba.”93 In issuing its first report in May 2004, the
Commission made recommendations to tighten restrictions on family visits and other categories
of travel and on private humanitarian assistance in the form of remittances and gift parcels.94 The
Administration subsequently issued these tightened restrictions in June 2004, while in February
2005, it tightened restrictions on payment terms for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. The
Commission issued a second and final report in July 2006 that made recommendations to hasten
political change in Cuba toward a democratic transition and led to a substantial increase in U.S.
funding to support democracy and human rights efforts in Cuba.
The Bush Administration continued to emphasize a continuation of the sanctions-based approach
toward Cuba pending political change in Cuba. When Raúl Castro officially became head of state
in February 2008, then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice issued a statement urging “the Cuban
government to begin a process of peaceful, democratic change by releasing all political prisoners,
respecting human rights, and creating a clear pathway towards free and fair elections.”95 In
remarks on Cuba policy in March 2008, President Bush maintained that in order to improve U.S.-
Cuban relations, “what needs to change is not the United States; what needs to change is Cuba.”
The President asserted that Cuba “must release all political prisoners ... have respect for human
rights in word and deed, and pave the way for free and fair elections.”96
Debate on the Direction of U.S. Policy
Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objectives of U.S. policy
toward Cuba—to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island—there have
been several schools of thought about how to achieve those objectives. Some have advocated a
policy of keeping maximum pressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while
continuing efforts to support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referred
to as constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are hurting
the Cuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue. Still others call for a swift
normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S. embargo. Legislative initiatives
introduced over the past decade have reflected these three policy approaches.
Over the past decade, there have been efforts in Congress to ease U.S. sanctions, with, one or
both houses at times approving amendments to appropriations measures that would have eased
U.S. sanctions on Cuba. Until 2009, these provisions were stripped out of final enacted measures,
in part because of presidential veto threats. In March 2009, as noted above, Congress took action
to ease some restrictions on travel to Cuba, marking the first time that Congress has eased Cuba
sanctions since the approval of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of
2000.
In light of Fidel Castro’s departure as head of government, many observers called for a
reexamination of U.S. policy toward Cuba. In this new context, two broad policy approaches have
been advanced to contend with political change in Cuba: a status-quo approach that maintains the

93 U.S. Department of State, “Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba,” White House Fact Sheet, December 8, 2003.
94 See the Commission’s May 2004 report, available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB192.pdf
95 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “Statement on Cuba’s Transition,” February 24,
2008.
96 White House, “President Bush Delivers Remarks on Cuba,” March 7, 2008.
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U.S. dual-track policy of isolating the Cuban government while providing support to the Cuban
people; and an approach aimed at influencing the attitudes of the Cuban government and Cuban
society through increased contact and engagement.
In general, those who advocate easing U.S. sanctions on Cuba make several policy arguments.
They assert that if the United States moderated its policy toward Cuba—through increased travel,
trade, and diplomatic dialogue—then the seeds of reform would be planted, which would
stimulate and strengthen forces for peaceful change on the island. They stress the importance to
the United States of avoiding violent change in Cuba, with the prospect of a mass exodus to the
United States and the potential of involving the United States in a civil war scenario. They argue
that since the demise of Cuba’s communist government does not appear imminent, even without
Fidel Castro at the helm, the United States should espouse a more pragmatic approach in trying to
bring about change in Cuba. Supporters of changing policy also point to broad international
support for lifting the U.S. embargo, to the missed opportunities for U.S. businesses because of
the unilateral nature of the embargo, and to the increased suffering of the Cuban people because
of the embargo. Proponents of change also argue that the United States should be consistent in its
policies with the world’s few remaining communist governments, including China and Vietnam,
and also maintain that moderating policy will help advance human rights.
On the other side, opponents of changing U.S. policy maintain that the current two-track policy of
isolating Cuba, but reaching out to the Cuban people through measures of support, is the best
means for realizing political change in Cuba. They point out that the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 sets forth the steps that Cuba needs to take in order for the
United States to normalize relations. They argue that softening U.S. policy at this time without
concrete Cuban reforms would boost the Castro government, politically and economically, and
facilitate the survival of the communist regime. Opponents of softening U.S. policy argue that the
United States should stay the course in its commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba,
and that sustained sanctions can work. Opponents of loosening U.S. sanctions further argue that
Cuba’s failed economic policies, not the U.S. embargo, are the causes of Cuba’s difficult living
conditions.
Obama Administration Policy
Overview
Since taking office, the Obama Administration has lifted restrictions on travel and remittance to
Cuba for Cuban Americans, moved to reengage Cuba on migration and other bilateral issues, and
in January 2011 announced further steps to ease restrictions on purposeful travel and non-family
remittances. At the same time, the Administration has continued other embargo restrictions on
trade and financial transactions. The Administration also has continued to express significant
concern about the human rights situation in Cuba, although it welcomed the Cuban government’s
release of political prisoners. Since December 2009, a key impediment to improved relations has
been Cuba’s detention of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) subcontractor
Alan Gross, who was ultimately convicted on March 12, 2011, and sentenced to 15 years in
prison. While the United States and Cuba are cooperating on such issues as antidrug efforts and,
through multilateral channels, on disaster preparedness and cooperation in the event of an oil
spill, improvement of relations in other areas will likely be stymied until Alan Gross is released
from prison.
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Policy Developments in 2009
During the 2008 electoral campaign, President Obama had pledged to lift restrictions on family
travel to Cuba as well as restrictions on Cuban Americans sending remittances to Cuba. At the
same time, he also pledged to maintain the embargo as a source of leverage to bring about change
in Cuba. However, Obama also asserted that if the Cuban government takes significant steps
toward democracy, beginning with the freeing of all political prisoners, then the United States
would take steps to normalize relations and ease the embargo. He also maintained that, after
careful preparation, his Administration would pursue direct diplomacy with Cuba without
preconditions, but only when there is an opportunity to advance U.S. interests and advance the
cause of freedom for the Cuban people.97
In April 2009, just before the fifth Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, the Obama
Administration announced several significant measures to ease U.S. sanctions on Cuba. The
President announced that all restrictions on family travel and on remittances to family members in
Cuba would be lifted. This superseded the action taken by Congress in March that had essentially
reverted family travel restrictions to as they were in 2004 before they were tightened. The
Administration also announced that measures would be taken to increase telecommunications
links with Cuba and to expand the scope of eligible humanitarian donations through gift parcels.98
At the Summit of the Americas, President Obama maintained that “the United States seeks a new
beginning with Cuba.” While recognizing that it will take time to “overcome decades of
mistrust,” the President said “there are critical steps we can take toward a new day.” He stated
that he was prepared to have his Administration “engage with the Cuban government on a wide
range of issues—from drugs, migration, and economic issues, to human rights, free speech, and
democratic reform.”99 The President maintained that he was “not interested in talking just for the
sake of talking,” but said he believed that U.S.-Cuban relations could move in a new direction.
In the aftermath of the Summit, there appeared to be some momentum toward improved relations.
In June 2009, the State Department turned off the electronic billboard at the U.S. Interests Section
in Havana that had been had been set up in 2006 and had featured news and pro-democracy
messages that irked the Cuban government. Earlier in the year, the Cuban government had taken
down anti-U.S. billboards around the U.S. mission. In July 2009, Cuba and the United States also
restarted the semi-annual migration talks that had been suspended by the United States in 2004.
To date, four rounds of talks have been held and have included issues beyond migration issues
(for more details, see “Migration Talks” below). In September 2009, the United States and Cuba
held talks in Havana on resuming direct mail service between the two countries that included
discussion on issues related to the transportation, quality, and security of mail service.100

97 “Remarks of Senator Barack Obama, Renewing U.S. Leadership in the Americas,” May 23, 2008, and “Renewing
U.S. Leadership in the Americas,” Factsheet, June 6, 2008, BarackObama.com.
98 White House, “Fact Sheet: Reaching Out to the Cuban People,” April 13, 2009.
99 White House, “Remarks by the President At the Summit of the Americas Opening Ceremony,” April 17, 2009.
100 Since the early 1960s, mail to and from Cuba has arrived via third countries, which results in extensive delays in
mail between the two countries. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-484, Title XVII, §1705(f)) has a
provision requiring the U.S. Postal Service to take necessary actions to provide direct mail service to and from Cuba,
including, in the absence of common carrier service between the 2 countries, the use of charter service providers. Past
U.S. attempts to negotiate such service were rejected by Cuba, reportedly because Cuba wanted the issue to be part of a
larger normalization of commercial air traffic. Both the Clinton and Bush Administrations had called for negotiations to
restore direct mail service.
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Relations took a turn for the worse in late 2009, however, when Alan Gross, an American
subcontractor working on USAID-funded Cuba democracy projects in Cuba, was arrested in
Havana in early December.
Policy Developments in 2010
As Cuba’s human rights situation deteriorated during the first half of 2010, the Obama
Administration expressed significant concern. In the semi-annual migration talks in February,
U.S. officials urged Cuban officials to provide imprisoned hunger striker Orlando Zapata Tamayo
with all necessary medical care. After Zapata’s death, U.S. officials called attention to the more
than 200 political prisoners held by Cuba and called for their immediate release.101 As noted
above, President Obama issued a statement on March 24, 2010, expressing deep concern about
the human rights situation in Cuba, including the death of Zapata, and the repression of the Ladies
in White. He asserted that these events underscore that “Cuban authorities continue to respond to
the aspirations of the Cuban people with a clenched fist.” The President called for the end of
repression, the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners, and respect for the
basic rights of the Cuban people. The President noted that he has taken steps during the year to
reach out to the Cuban people and to signal his desire to seek a new era in relations with the
government of Cuba. He asserted that he remains “committed to supporting the simple desire of
the Cuban people to freely determine their future and to enjoy the rights and freedoms that define
the Americas, and that should be universal to all human beings.”102
In response to the Cuban Catholic Church’s July 7, 2010, announcement that the remaining 52
political prisoners of the “group of 75” originally arrested in March 2003 would be released,
Secretary of State Clinton said that it was “a positive sign” and that the United States welcomed
it.103 A subsequent State Department statement maintained that “this is a positive development
that we hope will represent a step towards increased respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms in Cuba.”104
During the year, Members of Congress raised significant concern about Mr. Gross’s continued
detention. State Department officials continued to raise the issue with Cuban government, and on
the one-year anniversary of his December 2009 incarceration, the State Department maintained
that his continued detention was “a major impediment to advancing the dialogue between our two
countries.”105
Policy Developments in 2011
On January 14, 2011, the White House announced new measures to ease travel restrictions further
and allow all Americans to send remittances to Cuba. According to the White House statement,

101 U.S. Department of State, Philip J. Crowley, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Death of Cuban
Dissident Orlando Zapata Tamayo,” February 24, 2010.
102 White House, “Statement by the President on the Human Rights Situation in Cuba,” March 24, 2010.
103 “Secretary of State Clinton Holds Media Availability with Jordan Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh,” CQ Newsmaker
Transcripts, July 8, 2010.
104 U.S. Department of State, “Release of Cuban Political Prisoners,” Press Statement, July 13, 2010.
105 U.S. Department of State, “One Year Continued Incarceration of Alan Gross,” Philip J. Crowley, Assistant
Secretary Bureau of Public Affairs, December 3, 2010.
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the measures will (1) increase purposeful travel to Cuba related to religious, educational, and
journalistic activities; (2) allow any U.S. person to send remittances to non-family members in
Cuba and make it easier for religious institutions to send remittances for religious activities; and
(3) allow all U.S. international airports to provide services to licensed charter flights to and from
Cuba. In most respects, these new measures appear to be similar to policies that were undertaken
by the Clinton Administration in 1999, but were subsequently curtailed by the Bush
Administration in 2003 and 2004.
In March 2011, after Alan Gross was convicted and sentenced to 15 years in prison, Secretary of
State Clinton called for Gross to be released, at the very least, on humanitarian terms.106 Upon
Cuba’s release of the last of “group of 75” political prisoners in late March, the State Department
maintained that the release was a “step in the direction,” but also urged “the Cuban government to
release all remaining political prisoners and allow them to choose whether to remain in Cuba.”107
According to Secretary of State Clinton in May 2011, the Obama Administration believes “that
the best way to advance fundamental rights in Cuba … is to support exchanges and constructive
relationships,” and “that’s why we have eased our restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba.”
The Secretary maintained that more could be done if there were evidence that there was an
opportunity to do so from the Cuban side “because we want to foster these deeper connections
and we want to work for the time when Cuba will enjoy its own transition to democracy.”108
In response to questions on Cuba at a September 28, 2011, public forum, President Obama
maintained that his Administration has not yet seen “the kind of genuine spirit of transformation
inside of Cuba that would justify us eliminating the embargo.” The President said his
Administration has tried “to send a signal that we are open to a new relationship with Cuba if the
Cuban government starts taking the proper steps to open up its own country and … provide the
space and the respect for human rights that would allow the Cuban people to determine their own
destiny.” He maintained that “if we see positive movement we will respond in a positive way.”109
The Obama Administration continued to express concern about the human rights situation in
Cuba as well as the imprisonment of Alan Gross. In December 2011, as reports of increased
Cuban government repression against human rights and democracy activists, the State
Department issued a statement calling “for an immediate end to the harassment and violence
against Cuban citizens who are peaceful critics of the government.”110 On the two-year
anniversary of the incarceration of Alan Gross in early December 2011, the State Department
again called for his release, while just before Christmas the State Department expressed deep

106 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Interview with Jose Diaz-Balart of
Telemundo, March 18, 2011.
107 U.S. Department of State, “Cuba Releases Last Two Political Prisoners from 2003 Black Spring Crackdown,” Press
Statement, March 25, 2011.
108 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks at the 41st Washington Conference
on the Americas,” May 11, 2011.
109 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President in an “Open For Questions” Roundtable,”
September 28, 2011, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/28/remarks-president-open-
questions-roundtable; Also see “U.S. Cuba Seek Improved Relations, But Stumbling Blocks Remain,” Miami Herald,
September 28, 2011.
110 U.S. Department of State, “The Cuban Government Should Respect Human Rights Week Activities,” December 14,
2011.
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disappointment that the Cuban government did not include Gross among the 2,900 prisoners
released on humanitarian grounds.111
Policy Developments in 2012
President Obama issued a statement in the aftermath of the January 19, 2012, death of Cuban
hunger striker Wilman Villar Mendoza, maintaining that “Villar’s senseless death highlights the
ongoing repression of the Cuban people and the plight faced by brave individuals standing up for
the universal rights of all Cubans.”112
In its March 2012 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, the State Department
generally lauded Cuba’s antidrug efforts. It stated that the United States was still reviewing a draft
bilateral counternarcotics accord presented by Cuba, and that such an accord, if structured
appropriately, “could advance the counternarcotics efforts undertaken by both countries.” (See
“Anti-Drug Cooperation” below.)
The State Department released its 2011 human rights report on May 24, 2012, in which it reported
on a significant increase in the number of short-term detentions in Cuba, along with other
numerous human rights abuses. (See “Human Rights” below.)
In June 7, 2012, congressional testimony, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere
Affairs Roberta Jacobson set forth a clear-cut description of U.S. policy toward Cuba in which
she expressed strong U.S. support for democracy and human rights activists in Cuba and
defended the Obama’s Administration policy on travel and remittances.113 The Assistant Secretary
asserted that “the Obama Administration’s priority is to empower Cubans to freely determine
their own future.” She maintained that “the most effective tool we have for doing that is building
connections between the Cuban and American people, in order to give Cubans the support and
tools they need to move forward independent of their government.” The Assistant Secretary
maintained that “the Administration’s travel, remittance and people-to-people policies are helping
Cubans by providing alternative sources of information, taking advantage of emerging
opportunities for self-employment and private property, and strengthening civil society.” In
support of U.S. funding for democracy and human rights in Cuba, she contended that U.S. policy
“recognizes the importance of engaging with the pro-democracy and human rights activists who
have been working for years to expand the political and civil rights of all Cubans.”
With regard to the human rights situation in Cuba, Jacobson lauded the release of dozens of
political prisoners, but maintained that their release “did not effect a fundamental change in the
Cuban government’s poor record on human rights.” She asserted that “the Cuban government has
continued to punish political dissent, increasingly using repeated, short-term, arbitrary detentions
to prevent citizens from assembling peacefully and freely expressing their opinions.” Jacobson

111 U.S. Department of State, Press Statements, “Two-Year Mark of the Continued Incarceration of Alan Gross,”
December 2, 2011, and “Cuban Prisoner Release Announcement,” December 24, 2011.
112 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement of the Press Secretary on the Death of Cuban Activist
Wilmar Villar,” January 20, 2012.
113 Testimony of Roberta S. Jacobson, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics, at a hearing entitled
“The Path to Freedom: Countering Repression and Strengthening Civil Society,” June 7, 2012, available at
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2012/191935.htm
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also highlighted the continued imprisonment of Alan Gross, and vowed that the Administration
would continue to seek his immediate release.
On June 12, 2012, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and the U.S.
Department of Justice announced a $619 million settlement with a Dutch bank, ING, for violating
U.S. sanctions against Cuba, Burma, Sudan, Libya, and Iran. The Cuba sanction violations were
the most extensive and stemmed from ING’s processing of over 20,000 financial transactions
involving Cuba valued at more than $1.6 billion between October 2002 and July 2007. The fine
was the largest ever imposed for these types of sanction violations.114
Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations
U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances
Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key and often contentious component of U.S. efforts to
isolate the communist government of Fidel Castro for much of the past 40 years. Over time there
have been numerous changes to the restrictions and for five years, from 1977 until 1982, there
were no restrictions on travel. Restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba are part of the
CACR, the overall embargo regulations administered by the Treasury Department’s Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
Under the Bush Administration, enforcement of U.S. restrictions on Cuba travel increased, and
restrictions on travel and on private remittances to Cuba were tightened. In March 2003, the
Administration eliminated travel for people-to-people educational exchanges unrelated to
academic course work. In June 2004, the Administration significantly restricted travel, especially
family travel, and the provision of private humanitarian assistance to Cuba in the form of
remittances and gift parcels.
Under the Obama Administration, Congress took action in March 2009 easing restrictions on
family travel and on travel related to U.S. agricultural and medical sales to Cuba (FY2009
omnibus appropriations measure, P.L. 111-8, Sections 620 and 621 of Division D). As
implemented by the Treasury Department, family travel was allowed once every 12 months to
visit a close relative for an unlimited length of stay. The definition of “close relative” was
expanded to mean any individual related to the traveler by blood, marriage, or adoption who is no
more than three generations removed from that person. Travel related to the marketing and sale of
agricultural and medical goods to Cuba was allowed pursuant to a general license. (Note: For a
general license, there is no need to obtain specific permission from OFAC, while a specific
license requires application and review by OFAC on a case by case basis.)
In April 2009, the Obama Administration went even further when it announced several significant
measures to ease U.S. sanctions on Cuba. Fulfilling a campaign pledge, President Obama
announced that all restrictions on family travel and on remittances to family members in Cuba
would be lifted. This significantly superseded the action taken by Congress in March 2009 that

114 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Center, “U.S. Treasury Department Announces $619 Million Settlement
with ING Bank, N.V.,” June 12, 2012; and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, “ING Bank N.V.
Agrees to Forfeit $619 Million for Illegal Transactions with Cuban and Iranian Entities,” June 12, 2012.
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had essentially reverted family travel restrictions to as they had been before they were tightened
in 2004. Under the new policy announced by the Administration, limitations on the frequency and
duration of family visits and the 44-pound limitation on accompanied baggage were removed.
Family travelers are now able spend the same as allowed for other travelers (provided it does not
exceed the Department of State’s per diem rate allowance for Havana, currently $166 per day).
With regard to family remittances, the previous limitation of no more than $300 per quarter was
removed with no restriction on the amount or frequency of the remittances. Authorized travelers
are once again authorized to carry up to $3,000 in remittances.115 Regulations for the above policy
changes were issued by the Treasury and Commerce Departments on September 3, 2009.
In January 2011, the Obama Administration made a series of changes further easing restrictions
on travel and remittances to Cuba. On January 11, the White House announced that President
Obama had directed the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Homeland Security to make changes
to regulations and policies “in order to continue efforts to reach out to the Cuban people in
support of their desire to freely determine their country’s future.”116 The policy changes were
subsequently enacted through modifications to existing regulations of the Departments of
Treasury and Homeland Security published in the Federal Register on January 28, 2011.117
The January 2011 measures:
• (1) increased purposeful travel to Cuba related to religious, educational, and
journalistic activities (general licenses are now authorized for certain types of
educational and religious travel; people-to-people travel exchanges are
authorized via a specific license);
• (2) allowed any U.S. person to send remittances to non-family members in Cuba
and make it easier for religious institutions to send remittances for religious
activities (general licenses are now authorized for both); and
• (3) allowed all U.S. international airports to become eligible to provide services
to licensed charter flights to and from Cuba.
In most respects, these new measures were similar to policies that were undertaken by the Clinton
Administration in 1999, but were subsequently curtailed by the Bush Administration in 2003 and
2004. An exception is the expansion of airports to service licensed flights to and from Cuba.
While the new travel regulations immediately went into effect for those categories of travel
falling under a general license category, OFAC delayed processing applications for new travel
categories requiring a specific license (such as people-to-people exchanges) until it updated and
issued guidelines.118 These ultimately were issued in April 2011: Comprehensive Guidelines for
License Applications to Engage in Travel-related Transactions Involving Cuba.119

115 White House, “Fact Sheet: Reaching Out to the Cuban People,” April 13, 2009.
116 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Reaching Out to the Cuban People,” January 14, 2011, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/14/reaching-out-cuban-people
117 Department of the Treasury, “Cuban Assets Control Regulations,” Vol. 76, No. 19 Federal Register 5072-5078,
January 28, 2011; Department of Homeland Security, “Airports of Entry or Departure for Flights to and from Cuba,”
Vol. 76, No. 19 Federal Register 5058-5061, January 28, 2011.
118 CRS correspondence with the Treasury Department, March 17, 2011.
119 Subsequently revised in May 2012, and available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/
Documents/cuba_tr_app.pdf
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To date, the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), has
announced its approval of 12 additional airports eligible to provide passenger air service between
the United States and Cuba, bringing the total number of airports approved to 15. The newly
authorized airports are Atlanta, Baltimore-Washington (BWI), Chicago O’Hare, Dallas-Fort
Worth, Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood, Houston, New Orleans, Oakland (CA), Pittsburgh,
Southwest Florida International Airport (Fort Myers), San Juan (Puerto Rico), and Tampa.120
Major arguments made for lifting the Cuba travel ban altogether are that it abridges the rights of
ordinary Americans to travel; it hinders efforts to influence conditions in Cuba and may be aiding
Castro by helping restrict the flow of information; and Americans can travel to other countries
with communist or authoritarian governments. Major arguments in opposition to lifting the Cuba
travel ban are that more American travel would support Castro’s rule by providing his
government with potentially millions of dollars in hard currency; that there are legal provisions
allowing travel to Cuba for humanitarian purposes that are used by thousands of Americans each
year; and that the President should be free to restrict travel for foreign policy reasons.
People-to-People Travel
By July 2011, OFAC confirmed that it had approved the first licenses for U.S. people-to-people
organizations to bring U.S. visitors to Cuba, and the first such trips began in August 2011.121 On
July 25, 2011, however, prior to the trips beginning, OFAC issued an advisory maintaining that
misstatements in the media had suggested that U.S. policy allows for virtually unrestricted group
travel to Cuba, and reaffirmed that travel conducted by people-to-people travel groups licensed
for travel to Cuba must “certify that all participants will have a full-time schedule of educational
exchange activities that will result in meaningful interaction between the travelers and individuals
in Cuba.” The advisory stated that authorized activities by people-to-people groups are not
“tourist activities,” and pointed out that the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act
of 2000 prohibits OFAC from licensing transactions for tourist activities.122
In March 2012, OFAC published an announcement regarding advertising for people-to-people
travel, noting that all advertisements must state the name of the licensed organization conducting
the travel and that the organization must use the name under which their OFAC travel was
licensed unless the group requests and receives a license amendment from OFAC to use an
alternative name. The announcement also stated that advertising that appeared to suggest that the
people-to-people trips were focused on activities that travelers may undertake off hours (after
their daily full-time schedule of people-to-people activities) may give an incorrect impression and
prompt OFAC to contact the licensed organization and conduct an investigation. It maintained
that people-to-people organizations that failed to meet requirements of their licenses may have
their licenses revoked or be issued a civil penalty up to $65,000 per violation.123

120 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, “Approved U.S. Ports of Entry for Flights
to and from Cuba,” June 21, 2011.
121 Peter Orsi, “U.S. Licensing Travel Operators to Start Up Legal Cuba Trips, Treasury Department Says,” Associated
Press, July 1, 2011; Mimi Whitefield, “People-to-People Tours to Cuba Take Off Thursday,” Miami Herald, August
10, 2011; and Jeff Franks, “Purposeful Cuba Trips Resume,” Chicago Tribune, August 18, 2011.
122 U.S. Department of the Treasury, OFAC, “Cuba Travel Advisory,” July 25, 2011, available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba_trav_adv.pdf
123 U.S. Department of the Treasury, OFAC, “Advertising Educational Exchange Travel to Cuba for People-to-People
Contact,” March 9, 2012, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
(continued...)
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In May 2012, the Treasury Department tightened its restrictions on people-to-people travel by
making changes to its license guidelines. The revised guidelines reflect similar language to the
March 2012 announcement described above regarding advertising. The revised guidelines also
require an organization applying for a people-to-people license to describe how the travel “would
enhance contact with the Cuban people, and/or support civil society in Cuba, and/or promote the
Cuban people’s independence from Cuban authorities.” Just as in 2011, the guidelines require
applicants to certify that the predominant portion of activities engaged in will not be with
prohibited Cuban government or Cuban Communist Party officials (as defined in 31 CFR
515.337 and 31 CFR 515.338), but the changes in May 2012 require that the sample itinerary for
the proposed travel needs to specify how meetings with such officials advance purposeful travel
by enhancing contact with the Cuban people, supporting civil society, or promoting independence
from Cuban authorities.124
In September 2012, various press reports cited a slowdown in the Treasury Department’s approval
or reapproval of licenses for people-to-people travel since the agency had issued new guidelines
in May. Companies conducting such programs complained that the delay in the licenses was
forcing them to cancel trips and even to lay off staff.125 By early October 2012, however,
companies conducting the people-to-people travel maintained that they were once again receiving
license approvals.
Legislative Proposals Regarding Travel and Remittances
In the 112th Congress, interest on the issue of Cuba travel and remittances is continuing, with
legislation introduced to roll back some of the easing of restrictions and some bills introduced to
further ease travel restrictions or lift them altogether.
FAA Reauthorization. During consideration of the FAA reauthorization bill, S. 223, in February
2011, an amendment was submitted, but never considered, S.Amdt. 61 (Rubio), that would have
prohibited an expansion of flights to locations in countries that are listed on the Department of
State list of states that sponsor international terrorism (which includes Cuba).
FY2012 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations. The House
Appropriations Committee version of the FY2012 Financial Services and General Government
Appropriations bill, H.R. 2434 (§901), introduced July 7, 2011, would have rolled back President
Obama’s easing of restrictions on remittances and family travel. (The Senate Appropriations
Committee version of the measure, S. 1573, did not contain a similar provision.) Specifically, the
provision in H.R. 2434 would have repealed any amendments to certain sections of the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations (CACR)126 relating to family travel (31 CFR 515.560(a)(1) and 31
CFR 515.561), carrying remittances to Cuba (31 CFR 515.560(c)(4)(i)), and sending remittances
to Cuba (31 CFR 515.570). According to the provision, such regulations would be restored and

(...continued)
center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/cuba_ppl_notice.aspx
124 U.S. Department of the Treasury, OFAC, “Comprehensive Guidelines for License Applications to Engage in Travel-
Related Transactions Involving Cuba,” Revised May 10, 2012, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba_tr_app.pdf
125 Damien Cave, “Licensing Rules Slow Tours to Cuba,” New York Times, September 16, 2012; Paul Haven, “U.S.
Travel Outfits Say Rules for Legal Travel to Cuba Getting Tighter,” Associated Press, September 13, 2012.
126 The CACR are found at 31 CFR Part 515.
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carried out as in effect on January 19, 2009, “notwithstanding any guidelines, opinions, letters,
Presidential directives, or agency practices relating to such regulations issued or carried out after
such date.” The intent of the provision appears to have been to ensure that these specific
regulations remained as they were in effect on January 19, 2009.
The provision would have rolled back President Obama’s easing of restrictions on family travel
and family remittances in 2009 and his easing of restrictions on remittances for non-family
members and religious institutions in 2011. Pursuant to the provision: family travel would have
been limited to once every three years for a period of up to 14 days to visit immediate family
members only, and would have required a specific license from OFAC; licensed travelers would
have been allowed to carry just $300 in remittances compared to the $3,000 currently allowed;
family remittances would have been limited to $300 per quarter compared to no limits today;
non-family remittances restored by the Obama Administration in 2011, up to $500 per quarter,
would not have been allowed; and the general license for remittances to religious organizations
would have been eliminated, although such remittances would have been permitted via specific
license on a case-by-case basis.127
The White House’s Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 2434, issued July 13, 2011, stated
that the Administration opposed Section 901 because it would reverse the President’s policy on
family travel and remittances, and that the President’s senior advisors would recommend a veto if
the bill contained the provision. According to the statement, Section 901 “would undo the
President’s efforts to increase contact between divided Cuban families, undermine the
enhancement of the Cuban people’s economic independence and support for private sector
activity in Cuba that come from increased remittances from family members, and therefore isolate
the Cuban people and make them more dependent on Cuban authorities.”128
In December 2011, a legislative battle ensured over the potential inclusion of a Cuba provision
from Section 901 of H.R. 2434 in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2012, H.R. 2055, a
“megabus” bill that combined nine fill-year appropriations measures, including the FY2012
Financial Services and General Government bill. Ultimately, congressional leaders agreed not to
include the Cuba provision in the “megabus bill,” and also decline to include a second provision
in the bill that would have continued to clarify, for the third year in a row, the definition of
“payment of cash in advance” for U.S. agricultural and medical exports to Cuba so that the
payment would be due upon delivery in Cuba as opposed to being due before the goods left U.S.
ports. The While House reportedly had exerted pressure not to include the Cuba provision that
would have rolled back the Administration’s easing of restrictions on travel and remittances.
Dropping the “payment of cash in advance” provision appears to have been a political tradeoff
made to compensate for the travel rollback provision being dropped.
FY2012 Foreign Relations Authorization Act. In additional action, on July 21, 2011, the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs marked up H.R. 2583, the FY2012 Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, with a provision (§1126 of the reported bill) that would require the President
to fully enforce all U.S. regulations on travel to Cuba as in effect on January 19, 2009, and
impose the corresponding penalties against individuals determined to be in violation of such

127 For activities authorized under a general license, there is no need to obtain special permission from OFAC, while for
those activities requiring a specific license, OFAC reviews applications on a case-by-case basis.
128 Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy, H.R.
2434—Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2012, July 13, 2011.
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regulations. The provision was added by a Rivera amendment, approved 36-6, that had the intent
of reinstating tighter travel restrictions as they existed under the Bush Administration in January
2009.
Amendments to the Cuban Adjustment Act. Two additional measures introduced in August
2011 would amend the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (CAA, P.L. 89-732) in order to curb travel
to Cuba by Cubans who have recently emigrated to the United States. Introduced on August 1,
2011, H.R. 2771 (Rivera), would amend the CAA to increase to five years the period during
which a Cuban national must be physically present in the United States in order to qualify for
adjustment of status to that of a permanent resident. The legislation also would provide that an
alien shall be ineligible for adjustment to permanent resident status if the alien returns to Cuba
after admission or parole into the United States before becoming a U.S. citizen. H.R. 2831
(Rivera), introduced August 30, 2011, would also provide that an alien from Cuba shall be
ineligible for adjustment to permanent resident status under the CAA if he or she returns to Cuba
before becoming a U.S. citizen; the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Immigration on Policy Enforcement, held a hearing on the bill on May 31, 2012 (available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/Hearings%202012/hear_05312012_3.html).
Initiatives To Ease Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. In contrast to measures aimed at
rolling back the Obama Administration’s policy, several initiatives have been introduced in the
112th Congress that would lift travel restrictions. H.R. 1886 would prohibit restrictions on travel
to Cuba. H.R. 1888, in addition to removing some restrictions on the export of U.S. agricultural
products to Cuba, would also prohibit Cuba travel restrictions. Two initiatives that would lift the
overall Cuba embargo, H.R. 255 and H.R. 1887, also would lift restrictions on travel and
remittances to Cuba. H.R. 380 would prohibit the Treasury Department from making any funds to
implement, administer, or enforce regulations requiring specific licenses for travel-related
transactions directly related to educational activities in Cuba.
(For additional information, see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and
Remittances, by Mark P. Sullivan.)
U.S. Agricultural Exports and Sanctions
U.S. commercial agricultural exports to Cuba have been allowed for several years, but with
numerous restrictions and licensing requirements. The 106th Congress passed the Trade Sanctions
Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 or TSRA (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for
one-year export licenses for selling agricultural commodities to Cuba, although no U.S.
government assistance, foreign assistance, export assistance, credits, or credit guarantees are
available to finance such exports. TSRA also denies exporters access to U.S. private commercial
financing or credit; all transactions must be conducted in cash in advance or with financing from
third countries. TSRA reiterates the existing ban on importing goods from Cuba but authorizes
travel to Cuba, under a specific license, to conduct business related to the newly allowed
agricultural sales.
From 2002 through 2010, the United States was the largest supplier of food and agricultural
products to Cuba, although the level of U.S. exports declined annually over the past three years
(2009-2011) and in 2011 Brazil’s agricultural exports to Cuba superseded those of the United
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States.129 Cuba has purchased over $4.1 billion in products from the United States since 2001.
U.S. exports to Cuba rose from about $7 million in 2001 to $404 million in 2004 and to a high of
$712 million in 2008, far higher than in previous years, in part because of the rise in food prices
and because of Cuba’s increased food needs in the aftermath of several hurricanes and tropical
storms that severely damaged the country’s agricultural sector.
Beginning in 2009, however, U.S. exports to Cuba declined considerably, amounting to $533
million in 2009 (25% lower than 2008), and $368 million in 2010 (a 31% drop from 2009). In
2011, U.S. exports to Cuba declined to $363 million, just a 1.23% drop from 2010.130 Among the
reasons for the decline, analysts cite Cuba’s shortage of hard currency, credits and other
arrangements offered by other governments, overall financial support provided by Venezuela.131
(See Figure 5.)
To date in 2012, the level of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba has increased. Through June 2012,
U.S. exports to Cuba amounted to $256 million, a 38% increase from the same period in 2011.
Leading U.S. exports were corn and poultry.
In February 2005, OFAC amended the Cuba embargo regulations to clarify that TSRA’s term of
“payment of cash in advance” means that the payment must be received by the seller or the
seller’s agent prior to the shipment of the goods from the port at which they are loaded. U.S.
agricultural exporters and some Members of Congress strongly objected that the action
constituted a new sanction that violated the intent of TSRA and could jeopardize millions of
dollars in U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba. OFAC Director Robert Werner maintained that the
clarification “conforms to the common understanding of the term in international trade.”132
Facing congressional pressure, on July 29, 2005, OFAC clarified that, for “payment of cash in
advance” for the commercial sale of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba, vessels can leave U.S.
ports as soon as a foreign bank confirms receipt of payment from Cuba. OFAC’s action was
aimed at ensuring that the goods would not be vulnerable to seizure for unrelated claims while
still at the U.S. port. Supporters of overturning OFAC’s February 22, 2005, amendment, such as
the American Farm Bureau Federation, reportedly were pleased by the clarification but indicated
that they would still work to overturn the February 2005 rule.133

129 Global Trade Atlas, derived by looking at reporting partners exports to Cuba.
130 Department of Commerce statistics, as presented by Global Trade Atlas.
131 Juan Tamayo, “Big Drop in U.S. Agricultural Sales to Cuba,” Miami Herald, July 29, 2010; Marc Frank, “U.S.
Food Sales to Cuba Continued Decline in 2011,” Reuters News, February 22, 2012; U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic
Council, Inc. “Economic Eye on Cuba ,” June 2012.
132 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Testimony of Robert Werner, Director, OFAC, before the House Committee on
Agriculture, March 16, 2005.
133 Christopher S. Rugaber, “Treasury Clarifies Cuba Farm Export Rule, and Baucus Relents on Nominees,”
International Trade Reporter, August 4, 2005.
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Figure 5. U.S. Exports to Cuba, 2001-2011
(U.S. $ millions)
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
U.S. $ mil.
7
146
259
404
369
340
447
712
533
368
363

Source: Adapted by CRS from the Global Trade Atlas, which uses Department of Commerce Statistics.
In December 2009, Congress took action in the FY2010 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L.
111-117) to define, during FY2010, “payment of cash in advance” as payment before the transfer
of title to, and control of, the exported items to the Cuban purchaser. This overturned OFAC’s
February 2005 clarification that payment had to be received before vessels could leave U.S. ports.
The Administration issued regulations implementing this provision in early March 2010. The
regulations maintained that the definition applied to items delivered by September 30, 2010, or
delivered pursuant to a contract entered into by September 30, 2010, and shipped within 12
months of the signing of the contract.134
While the 111th Congress did not complete action on the FY2011 Financial Services and General
Government Appropriations measure, it approved a series of short-term continuing resolutions
and then in April 2011 ultimately approved a full-year measure (P.L. 112-10) under conditions
provided in enacted FY2010 appropriations measures. This continued the “payment of cash in
advance” provision through FY2011. Several additional legislative initiatives introduced in the
111th Congress would have permanently made this change, but no action was completed on these
measures. H.R. 4645 (Peterson), reported out of the House Agriculture Committee in June 2010,
in addition to addressing travel restrictions, would have permanently changed the definition of
“payment of cash in advance” and would have allowed direct transfers between U.S. and Cuban
financial institutions for payment for products sold to Cuba under TSRA.

134 Federal Register, March 10, 2010, pp. 10996-10997.
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Legislative Proposals Regarding Agricultural Exports to Cuba
In the first session of the 112th Congress, both the House Appropriations Committee-approved
and Senate Appropriations Committee-approved versions of the FY2012 Financial Services and
General Government Appropriations measure, H.R. 2434 and S. 1573 respectively, had a
provision (§618 of the House bill and §620 of the Senate bill) that would have continued to
clarify the definition of “payment of cash in advance” during FY2012 for U.S. agricultural and
medical sales to Cuba.
The Senate bill, S. 1573, had another Cuba provision (§624) related to payment for U.S. exports
to Cuba. The provision would have prohibited restrictions on direct transfers from a Cuban
financial institution to a U.S. financial institution in payment for licensed agricultural and medical
exports to Cuba. The provision was added during the Senate Appropriations Committee’s markup
on September 15, 2011, when the committee approved an amendment offered by Senator Jerry
Moran by a vote of 20-10. During debate on the direct transfers provision, supporters argued that
restrictions on direct transfers have made U.S. agricultural sales more costly and complicated for
U.S. businesses, while opponents maintained that the United States should not open up such
direct financial linkages while Cuba is on the State Department’s list of states sponsoring
international terrorism.135
Ultimately none of the Cuba provisions related to financing for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba
were included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2012, H.R. 2055 (P.L. 112-74), a
“megabus” bill that included the FY2012 Financial Services and General Government bill. As
discussed above, dropping the provisions appear to have been a tradeoff to compensate for not
including a provision that would have rolled back the Obama Administration’s lifting of some
restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba.
In the second session of the 112th Congress, no Cuba provisions related to U.S. exports to Cuba
are expected in either the House or Senate versions of the FY2013 Financial Services and General
Government Appropriations bills, H.R. 6020 and S. 3301 respectively; both measures were
reported out of committee without any Cuba policy provisions. Senator Jerry Moran indicated
during an Appropriations Subcommittee markup of the Senate bill in June 2012 that he was
“taking a hiatus” from advocating an easing of restrictions on financing for payments for U.S.
agricultural exports to Cuba “until Cuba deals with the detention of Alan Gross,” the USAID
subcontractor imprisoned in Cuba since late 2009. Senator Moran expressed hope that his action
would “put pressure on Cuba to release” Gross.136 (Also see “December 2009 Imprisonment of
Alan Gross” below.)
Two other introduced bills in the 112th Congress, H.R. 833 (Conaway) and H.R. 1888 (Rangel),
would permanently change the definition of “payment of cash in advance” for export sales to
Cuba under TSRA and would also allow direct transfers between Cuban and U.S. financial
institutions for payment for products sold to Cuba under TSRA. No action has been taken on
these measures.

135 Charlene Carter, “Financial Services Spending Bill Advanced by Senate Panel,” CQ Markup & Vote Coverage,
September 15, 2011.
136 Juan O. Tamayo, “Senators Who Favor More Trade with Cuba Plan Halt Advocacy to Push for Alan Gross
Release,” Miami Herald, June 19, 2012; and Ben Weyl, “Lawmakers Pledge Not to Fight This Year Over Trade With
Cuba,” CQ Today, July 9, 2012.
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In general, some groups favor further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba. U.S.
agribusiness companies that support the removal of restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba
believe that U.S. farmers are missing out on a market so close to the United States. Some
exporters want to change U.S. restrictions so that they can sell agriculture and farm equipment to
Cuba.137 Agricultural exporters who support the lifting of the prohibition on financing contend
that allowing such financing would help smaller U.S. companies increase their exports to Cuba
more rapidly.138 On July 19, 2007, the U.S. International Trade Commission issued a report,
requested by the Senate Committee on Finance, concluding that the U.S. share of Cuba’s
agricultural, fish, and forest imports would rise from one-third to between one-half and two-thirds
if trade restrictions were lifted. (See the full report, available at http://www.usitc.gov/
ext_relations/news_release/2007/er0719ee1.htm.)
Opponents of further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba maintain that U.S. policy
does not deny such sales to Cuba, as evidenced by the large amount of sales since 2001.
Moreover, according to the State Department, since the Cuban Democracy Act was enacted in
1992, the United States has licensed billions of dollars in private humanitarian donations.
Opponents further argue that easing pressure on the Cuban government would in effect be lending
support and extending the duration of the Castro regime. They maintain that the United States
should remain steadfast in its opposition to any easing of pressure on Cuba that could prolong the
Castro regime and its repressive policies. Some agricultural producers that export to Cuba support
continuation of the prohibition on financing for agricultural exports to Cuba because it ensures
that they will be paid.
Trademark Sanction139
For over a decade, the United States has imposed a sanction that denies protection for trademarks
connected with businesses confiscated from their owners by the Cuban government. A provision
in the FY1999 omnibus appropriations measure (§211 of Division A, Title II, P.L. 105-277,
signed into law October 21, 1998) prevents the United States from accepting payment for
trademark registrations and renewals from Cuban or foreign nationals that were used in
connection with a business or assets in Cuba that were confiscated, unless the original owner of
the trademark has consented. The provision prohibits U.S. courts from recognizing such
trademarks without the consent of the original owner. The measure was enacted because of a
dispute between the French spirits company, Pernod Ricard, and the Bermuda-based Bacardi Ltd.
Pernod Ricard entered into a joint venture in 1993 with the Cuban government to produce and
export Havana Club rum. Bacardi maintains that it holds the right to the Havana Club name
because in 1995 it entered into an agreement for the Havana Club trademark with the Arechabala
family, who had originally produced the rum until its assets and property were confiscated by the
Cuban government in 1960. Although Pernod Ricard cannot market Havana Club in the United
States because of the trade embargo, it wants to protect its future distribution rights should the
embargo be lifted.

137 “Ag Groups Split Over Trade With Cuba,” Congress Daily AM, National Journal, February 11, 2003.
138 “Farm Equipment Exports Likely to Face Tough Opposition from White House, Congress,” Cuba Trader, Vol. III,
No. 7, February 17, 2003.
139 For background information, see archived CRS Report RS21764, Restricting Trademark Rights of Cubans: WTO
Decision and Congressional Response, by Margaret Mikyung Lee, March 9, 2004.
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The European Union initiated World Trade Organization dispute settlement proceedings in June
2000, maintaining that the U.S. law violates the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS). In January 2002, the WTO ultimately found that the trademark
sanction violated WTO provisions on national treatment and most-favored-nation obligations in
the TRIPS Agreement.
On March 28, 2002, the United States agreed that it would come into compliance with the WTO
ruling through legislative action by January 3, 2003.140 That deadline was extended several times
since no legislative action had been taken to bring Section 211 into compliance with the WTO
ruling. On July 1, 2005, however, in an EU-U.S. bilateral agreement, the EU agreed that it would
not request authorization to retaliate at that time, but reserved the right to do so at a future date,
and the United States agreed not to block a future EU request.141 On August 3, 2006, the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office announced that Cuba’s Havana Club trademark registration was
“cancelled/expired,” a week after OFAC had denied a Cuban government company the license
that it needed to renew the registration of the trademark.142 On March 29, 2011, the U.S. Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia upheld the decision to deny the renewal of the trademark,143
while in May 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case, effectively letting stand the
denial to renew the trademark.144
Bacardi began marketing Havana Club rum in the United States in 2006 in limited quantities in
Florida, and Pernod Ricard filed suit that the representation of the origin of the rum was
misleading. In April 2010, a U.S. District Court in Delaware ruled in Bacardi’s favor that the
labeling was not misleading, and this was reaffirmed by a U.S. Court of Appeals on August 4,
2011.145
In Congress, two different approaches have been advocated to bring Section 211 into compliance
with the WTO ruling. Some want a narrow fix in which Section 211 would be amended so that it
also applies to U.S. companies instead of being limited to foreign companies. Advocates of this
approach argue that it would affirm that the United States “will not give effect to a claim or right
to U.S. property if that claim is based on a foreign compensation.”146 Others want Section 211
repealed altogether. They argue that the law endangers over 5,000 trademarks of over 500 U.S.
companies registered in Cuba.147

140 “U.S., EU Agree on Deadline for Complying with Section 211 WTO Finding,” Inside U.S. Trade, April 12, 2002.
141 World Trade Organization (WTO), “United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,
Understanding between the European Communities and the United States,” WT/DC176/16, July 1, 2005; WTO,
Dispute Settlement Body, “Minutes of Meeting, Held in the Centre William Rappard on 20 July 2005,”
WT/DSB/M/194, August 26, 2005; and “Japan, EU Suspend WTO Retaliation Against U.S. in Two Cases,” Inside U.S.
Trade, July 15, 2005;
142 “PTO Cancels Cuban ‘Havana Club’ Mark; Bacardi Set to Sell Rum Under Same Mark,” International Trade Daily,
August 10, 2006.
143 “Pernod Ricard: Havana Club International Encouraged by Dissenting Opinion of Judge Silberman Will Seek
Rehearing by Full Court of Appeals,” Business Wire, March 29, 2011.
144 “Supreme Court Rejects Havana Club Cert Petition,” International Trade Reporter, May 14, 2012.
145 Anandashankar Mazumdar, “Court Rejects Claim that ‘Havana Club’ Ruling Erred in Discounting Survey
Evidence,” International Trade Reporter, August 18, 2011.
146 Brian Lehman, testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, hearing on “An Examination of Section
211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,” July 13, 2004.
147 “USA-Engage Joins Cuba Fight,” Cuba Trader, April 1, 2002.
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The House Committee on the Judiciary held a March 3, 2010, hearing on the “Domestic and
International Trademark Implications of HAVANA CLUB and Section 211 of the Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 2009.” (See http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_100303.html.)
Several legislative initiatives were introduced during the 111th Congress reflecting these two
approaches to bring Section 211 into compliance with the WTO ruling, but no action was taken
on these measures. In the 112th Congress, two bills have been introduced, S. 603 (Nelson, Bill)
and H.R. 1166 (Issa), that would apply the narrow fix so that the sanction applies to all nationals,
while three broader bills that would lift U.S. sanctions on Cuba—H.R. 255 (Serrano), H.R. 1887
(Rangel), and H.R. 1888 (Rangel)—each includes a provision repealing Section 211. The July
2005 EU-U.S. bilateral agreement, in which the EU agreed not to retaliate against the United
States, but reserved the right to do so at a later date, has reduced pressure on Congress to take
action to comply with the WTO ruling.
Anti-Drug Cooperation
Cuba is not a major producer or consumer of illicit drugs, but its extensive shoreline and
geographic location make it susceptible to narcotics smuggling operations. Drugs that enter the
Cuban market are largely the result of onshore wash-ups from smuggling by high-speed boats
moving drugs from Jamaica to the Bahamas, Haiti, and the United States or by small aircraft from
clandestine airfields in Jamaica. For a number of years, Cuban officials have expressed concerns
over the use of their waters and airspace for drug transit and about increased domestic drug use.
The Cuban government has taken a number of measures to deal with the drug problem, including
legislation to stiffen penalties for traffickers, increased training for counternarcotics personnel,
and cooperation with a number of countries on anti-drug efforts.
According to the State Department’s 2012 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
(INCSR), issued March 7, 2012, Cuba has a number of anti-drug-related agreements in place with
other countries, including 39 judicial agreements regarding judicial proceedings and extradition,
32 bilateral counterdrug agreements, and 2 memoranda of understanding. Since 1999, Cuba’s
Operation Hatchet has focused on maritime and air interdiction and the recovery of narcotics
washed up on Cuban shores. As reported in the INCSR, Cuba interdicted 9.01 metric tons of
illegal narcotics in 2011 (including 8.3 metric tons from wash-ups). Since 2003, Cuba has
aggressively pursued an internal enforcement and investigation program against its incipient drug
market with an effective nationwide drug prevention and awareness campaign, Operation Popular
Shield.
Over the years, there have been varying levels of U.S.-Cuban cooperation on anti-drug efforts. In
1996, Cuban authorities cooperated with the United States in the seizure of 6.6 tons of cocaine
aboard the Miami-bound Limerick, a Honduran-flag ship. Cuba turned over the cocaine to the
United States and cooperated fully in the investigation and subsequent prosecution of two
defendants in the case in the United States. Cooperation has increased since 1999 when U.S. and
Cuban officials met in Havana to discuss ways of improving anti-drug cooperation. Cuba
accepted an upgrading of the communications link between the Cuban Border Guard and the U.S.
Coast Guard as well as the stationing of a U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) at
the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. The Coast Guard official was posted to the U.S. Interests
Section in September 2000, and since that time, coordination has increased.
In the 2012 INCSR, the State Department reported that Cuba maintained a significant level of
anti-drug cooperation with the United States in 20111. The Coast Guard shares tactical
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information related to narcotics trafficking on a case by case basis, and responds to Cuban
information on vessels transiting through Cuban territorial seas suspected of smuggling. Bilateral
cooperation led to multiple at-sea interdictions in 2011. The Cuban Border Guard reported 45
real-time reports of “go-fast” narcotics trafficking events in 2011 to the U.S. Coast Guard, and its
e-mail and phone notifications have increased in quality, according to the INCSR, occasionally
including photographs of suspected vessels involved in narcotics trafficking.
Cuba maintains that it wants to cooperate with the United States to combat drug trafficking, and
on various occasions has called for a bilateral anti-drug cooperation agreement with the United
States.148 In the 2011 INCSR (issued in March 2011) the State Department acknowledged that
Cuba had presented the U.S. government with a draft bilateral accord for counternarcotics
cooperation that is still under review. According to the State Department in the INCSR:
“Structured appropriately, such an accord could advance the counternarcotics efforts undertaken
by both countries.” The report maintained that greater cooperation among the United States,
Cuba, and its international partners—especially in the area of real-time tactical information-
sharing and improved tactics, techniques, and procedures—would likely lead to increased
interdictions and disruptions of illegal trafficking. These positive U.S. statements regarding a
potential bilateral anti-drug cooperation agreement and greater multilateral cooperation in the
region with Cuba were reiterated in the 2012 INCSR.
At a February 1, 2012, hearing before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control on
U.S.-Caribbean security cooperation, Caucus Chairman Senator Dianne Feinstein stated that “this
limited cooperation we do have between our Coast Guard and Cuban authorities has been very
useful, and I hope we can find ways to increase our counternarcotics cooperation with Cuba.”149
The caucus released a report on September 13, 2012, in which Senator Feinstein recommended
that the Obama Administration consider taking four steps to increase U.S. collaboration with
Cuban on counternarcotics: 1) expand the U.S. Coast Guard and law enforcement presence at the
U.S. Interests Section in Havana; 2) establish protocols for direct ship-to-ship communication
between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Cuban Border Guard; 3) negotiate a bilateral
counternarcotics agreement with Cuba; and 4) allow for Cuba’s participation in the U.S.-
Caribbean Security Dialogue.150
Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development151
Cuba is working toward potential development of its offshore oil resources. While the country has
proven oil reserves of just 0.1 billion barrels, the U.S. Geological Survey estimates that offshore

148 On March 12, 2002, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cuban Interests Section in Washington delivered
three diplomatic notes to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana and the State Department in Washington proposing
agreements on drug interdiction, terrorism, and migration issues. See “Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
Prominent Drug Trafficker Arrested in our Country,” Information Office, Cuban Interests Section, March 17, 2002;
“Cuba Offers to Sign Anti-Drug Pact,” Miami Herald, April 8, 2006.
149 “Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control Holds Hearing on Drug-Related Violence in the Caribbean and
U.S. Security Assistance Through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, February 1,
2012.
150 U.S. Congress, Senate United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Preventing a Security Crisis
in the Caribbean, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., September 2012, pp. 38-40, available at
http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve/?File_id=90bb66bc-3371-4898-8415-fbfc31c0ed24
151 For background information, see CRS Report R41522, Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S.
Policy Considerations, by Mark P. Sullivan.
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reserves in the North Cuba Basin could contain an additional 4.6 billion barrels of undiscovered
technically recoverable crude oil.
The Spanish oil company Repsol, in a consortium with Norway’s Statoil and India’s Oil and
Natural Gas Corporation, began offshore exploratory drilling in late January 2012, using an oil rig
known as the Scarabeo-9 (owned by an Italian oil services provider, Saipem, a subsidiary of the
Italian oil company ENI). On May 18, 2012, however, Repsol announced that its exploratory well
came up dry, and the company subsequently announced in late May that it would likely leave
Cuba.
Subsequently, in late May 2012, the Scarabeo-9 oil rig was used by the Malaysian company
Petronas in cooperation with the Russian company Gazprom to explore for oil in a block off the
coast of western Cuba. On August 6, 2012, however, Cuba announced that that the well was
found not to be commercially viable because of its compact geological formation.
In early September 2012, the Venezuelan oil company, PdVSA, announced that it had started
exploring for oil off the coast of western Cuba, but on November 2, 2012, Cuba announced that
the well was not commercially viable. The Scarabeo-9 oil rig reportedly will next be used to drill
off the coast of Brazil, and it is uncertain when it will return to Cuba.152
Cuba has three additional offshore projects with foreign oil companies—PetroVietnam, Sonangol
(Angola), and ONGC (India). (See Figure 6 for a map of Cuba’s offshore oil blocks.) In addition,
a Russian company, Zarubezhneft, has plans to drill its first exploratory well in a north coastal
block (not deepwater) east of Havana near the Bahamas in November 2012.
If oil is found, some experts estimate that it would take at least three to five years before
production would begin. While it is unclear whether offshore oil production could result in Cuba
becoming a net oil exporter, it could reduce Cuba’s current dependence on Venezuela for oil
supplies.
Most observers, however, maintain that the failure to discover oil in the three wells drilled by the
Scrrabeo-9 oil rig in 2012 is a significant setback for the Cuban government’s efforts to develop
its deepwater offshore hydrocarbon resources.153
In the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, some Members of
Congress and others expressed concern about Cuba’s development of its deepwater petroleum
reserves so close to the United States. They are concerned about oil spill risks and about the status
of disaster preparedness and coordination with the United States in the event of an oil spill.
Dealing with these challenges is made more difficult because of the long-standing poor state of
relations between Cuba and the United States. If an oil spill did occur in the waters northwest of
Cuba, currents in the Florida Straits could carry the oil to U.S. waters and coastal areas in Florida,
although a number of factors would determine the potential environmental impact. If significant
amounts of oil did reach U.S. waters, marine and coastal resources in southern Florida could be at
risk.

152 Peter Orsi, “Cuba Says 3rd Deep-Water Oil Well Sunk This Year Not Commercially Viable,” AP Newsire,
November 2, 2012.
153 “Cuba Offshore Oil Search Fails for a Third Time,” Agence France Presse, November 2, 2012; “PdVSA Has Third
Dry Well in Cuba Deepwater Exploration: Report,” Platts Commodity News, November 2, 2012.
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Figure 6. Cuba’s Offshore Oil Blocks


Source: Originally adapted by CRS from Jorge R. Piñon, presentation give at the Inter-American Dialogue,
Washington, DC, October 8, 2010. Subsequently updated by CRS.
Notes: Petrobras (Brazil) signed an agreement for exploration of block N37 in October 2008, but announced its
withdrawal in March 2011. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) had been reported in the past
to be negotiating several offshore blocks, N19-N22 and N30.
The final report of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore
Drilling, issued in January 2011, maintained that since Mexico already drills in the Gulf of
Mexico and Cuba has expressed an interest in deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, that it is
in the U.S. national interest to negotiate with these countries to agree on a common, rigorous set
of standards, a system of regulatory oversight, and operator adherence to an effective safety
culture, along with protocols to cooperate on containment and response strategies in case of a
spill.154

154 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Deepwater, The Gulf Oil
Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, Report to the President, p. 254 and p. 300. See the full text of the report at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf
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With regard to disaster response coordination, while the United States and Cuba are not parties to
a bilateral agreement on oil spills, both countries are signatories to multilateral agreements that
commit the two parties to prepare for and cooperate on potential oil spills. Under the auspices of
the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United States and Cuba have participated in
several regional meetings (including Mexico in November 2011; Bahamas in December 2011;
Curacao in February 2012; Jamaica in April 2012; and Mexico in August 2012) regarding oil spill
prevention, preparedness, and response that have allowed information sharing among nations,
including the United States and Cuba.
U.S. oil spill mitigation companies can be licensed by the Treasury and Commerce Departments
to provide support and equipment in the event of an oil spill. One such example is a Florida-based
company, Clean Caribbean & Americas, which has had licenses to be involved in Cuba since
2001. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard has obtained licenses from Treasury and Commerce that
allow it “to broadly engage in preparedness and response activities, and positions” the agency “to
direct an immediate response in the event of a catastrophic oil spill.”155 Some energy and policy
analysts, however, have called for the Administration to ease regulatory restrictions on private
companies for the transfer of U.S. equipment and personnel to Cuba needed to prevent and
combat a spill if it occurs.
Interest in Cuba’s offshore oil development has continued in the 112th Congress, with interest
focused on a potential oil spill, and attempts to sanction foreign companies investing in or
supporting Cuba’s oil development. To date, eight legislative initiatives have been introduced that
take different approaches:
• H.R. 372 (Buchanan), introduced January 20, 2011, would amend the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to deny
leases and permits to persons who engage in activities with the government of
any foreign country that is subject to any U.S. government sanction or embargo.
The intent of the legislation is to sanction companies involved in Cuba’s oil
development, although the scope of the legislation is much broader and could
affect other oil companies, including U.S. companies, not involved in Cuba.
• S. 405 (Nelson, Bill), introduced February 17, 2011, would require a company
that is conducting oil or gas operations off the coasts of Cuba to submit an oil
response plan for their Cuba operations and demonstrate sufficient resources to
respond to a worst case scenario oil spill if the company wanted to lease drilling
rights in the United States. The bill would also require the Secretary of the
Interior to carry out an oil spill risk analysis and planning process for the
development and implementation of oil spill response plans for nondomestic oil
spills in the Gulf of Mexico. The Secretary of the Interior would be required,
among other things, to include recommendations for Congress on a joint
contingency plan with the countries of Mexico, Cuba, and the Bahamas to ensure
an adequate response to oil spills located in the eastern Gulf of Mexico.

155 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation, Offshore Drilling in Cuba and the Bahamas: The U.S. Coast Guard's Oil Spill Readiness and Response
Planning, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., January 30, 2012, 112-70 (Washington: GPO, 2012). Testimony of Rear Admiral
William Baumgartner, Commander, Seventh District, and Rear Admiral Cari Thomas, Director of Policy Response,
U.S. Coast Guard, available at http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyCGMT/2012-01-30-
BaumgartnerThomas.pdf
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• H.R. 2047 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced May 26, 2011, would impose visa
restrictions on foreign nationals and economic sanctions on companies that help
facilitate the development of Cuba’s offshore petroleum resources. The bill
would exclude from the United States aliens who invest $1 million or more that
contributes to the enhancement of the ability of Cuba to develop its offshore oil
resources. It would also require the imposition of sanctions (two or more from a
menu of listed sanctions) if the President determined that a person had made an
investment of $1 million on or after January 10, 2005, that contributed to Cuba’s
offshore oil development. The language of H.R. 2047 was also included in
Section 105 of H.R. 6067 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced June 29, 2012.
• Both H.R. 3393 (Rivera) and S. 1836 (Menendez), introduced respectively on
November 7 and 9, 2011, would amend the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 to clarify
that the Act applies to oil spills by foreign offshore units that occur in water
beyond the exclusive economic zone of the United States.
• H.R. 4135 (Flake), the Western Hemisphere Energy Security Act of 2012,
introduced March 5, 2012, would authorize U.S. companies to engage in
exploration and extraction activities or oil spill prevention and clean-up activities
in Cuba’s offshore oil sector contiguous to the U.S. exclusive economic zone. It
would also allow for the export of all equipment and travel needed for such
activities. The bill would also allow for the importation of hydrocarbon resources
from Cuba.
• The House version of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R.
4310 (McKeon), approved May 18, 2012, has a provision (§803) that would
prohibit the Department of Defense (DOD) from contracting for the procurement
of goods and services with any person that has business operations with a state
sponsor of terrorism. The provision was added to the bill by voice vote during
House floor consideration of an en bloc amendment, H.Amdt. 1119 (McKeon),
that included Amendment No. 94 (Rivera), which became Section 803 of the bill.
According to the sponsor, the amendment would affect Repsol from partnering
with Cuba in oil exploration efforts while at the same time benefiting from DOD
contracts.
Three congressional oversight hearings have been held in the 112th Congress on the issue of
Cuba’s offshore oil development and the implications for the United States. On October 18, 2011,
the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee hearing held a hearing on Outer Continental
Oil Spill Response Capabilities featuring officials from the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of
the Interior, and private witnesses.156 On November 2, 2011, the House Natural Resources
Committee, Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources, held a hearing that also featured
Coast Guard and Department of the Interior officials and private witnesses.157 On January 30,
2012, the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard

156 For testimony from the October 18, 2011, hearing, see the website of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources, available at http://energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/hearings-and-business-meetings?ID=f37547ef-039b-
373a-dc68-113595376178.
157 For testimony, see the website of the November 2, 2011, hearing of the House Natural Resources Committee,
Energy and Mineral Resources Subcommittee, available at http://naturalresources.house.gov/Calendar/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=260052.
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and Maritime Transportation, held a field hearing on the issue in Miami, FL, featuring testimony
from the Coast Guard, Department of the Interior, and the state of Florida.158
Terrorism Issues159
Cuba was added to the State Department’s list of states sponsoring international terrorism in 1982
(pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979) because of its alleged ties to
international terrorism and support for terrorist groups in Latin America, and it has remained on
the list since that time. Cuba had a long history of supporting revolutionary movements and
governments in Latin America and Africa, but in 1992, Fidel Castro said that his country’s
support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the past. Cuba’s change in policy was in large part
due to the breakup of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the loss of billions of dollars in annual
subsidies to Cuba, and led to substantial Cuban economic decline.
Critics of retaining Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover from the Cold War.
They argue that domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list and maintain
that Cuba’s presence on the list diverts U.S. attention from struggles against serious terrorist
threats. Those who support keeping Cuba on the terrorism list argue that there is ample evidence
that Cuba supports terrorism. They point to the government’s history of supporting terrorist acts
and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa. They point to the government’s continued
hosting of members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice.
The State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2011 report (issued July 31, 2012)
maintained that “current and former members of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) continued
to reside in Cuba,” and that “press reporting indicated that the Cuban government provided
medical care and political assistance” to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
At the same time, the report maintained that there “was no indication that the Cuban government
provided weapons or paramilitary training for either ETA or the FARC.” With regard to ETA, the
State Department reported that three suspected ETA members were arrested in Venezuela after
sailing there from Cuba and were deported back to Cuba in September 2011– one of the men,
Jose Ignacio Echarte, is believed to have ties to the FARC and is a fugitive from Spain, which has
requested his extradition.160
In more recent developments in 2012, Cuba has been playing a role in hosting exploratory talks
between the FARC and Colombian government of President Juan Manuel Santos. Conversations
began in Cuba with the FARC in early 2012, and formal peace talks began in Norway on October
18, 2012, and are scheduled to continue in Cuba in mid-November 2012.
Another issue noted in the 2011 terrorism report is that the Cuban government continues “to
permit fugitives wanted in the United States to reside in Cuba,” and provides such support as
housing, food ration books, and medical care. In the 112th Congress, legislation has been

158 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation, Offshore Drilling in Cuba and the Bahamas: The U.S. Coast Guard's Oil Spill Readiness and Response
Planning, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., January 30, 2012, 112-70 (Washington: GPO, 2012). Testimony available at
http://transportation.house.gov/hearings/hearingdetail.aspx?NewsID=1500.
159 For background information, see archived CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, by
Mark P. Sullivan, August 22, 2006.
160 “Spain Requests Extradition of ETA Suspect from Cuba,” Agence France Presse, October 14, 2011.
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introduced, H.Res. 226 (King), that would call for the immediate extradition or rendering of all
fugitives from justice who are receiving safe harbor in Cuba in order to escape prosecution or
confinement for criminal offenses committed in the United States.
Both the President and Congress have powers to take a country off the state sponsors of terrorism
list. As set forth in Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, a country’s retention on the list
may be rescinded in two ways. The first option is for the President to submit a report to Congress
certifying that there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the
government and that the government is not supporting acts of international terrorism and is
providing assurances that it will not support such acts in the future. The second option is for the
President to submit a report to Congress, at least 45 days in advance justifying the rescission and
certifying that the government has not provided any support for international terrorism during the
preceding six-months, and has provided assurances that it will not support such acts in the future.
If Congress disagrees with the President’s decision to remove a country from the list, it could
seek to block the rescission through legislation.
Congress also has the power on its own to remove a country from the terrorism list. For example,
legislation introduced on Cuba in the 111th Congress, H.R. 2272 (Rush), included a provision that
would have rescinded the Secretary of State’s determination that Cuba “has repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism.”
Cuba has been the target of various terrorist incidents over the years. In 1976, a Cuban plane was
bombed, killing 73 people. In 1997, there were almost a dozen bombings in the tourist sector in
Havana in which an Italian businessman was killed and several others were injured. Two
Salvadorans were convicted and sentenced to death for the bombings in March 1999 (although
the sentences were commuted in 2010 to 30 years in prison), and three Guatemalans were
sentenced to prison terms ranging from 10 to 15 years in January 2002 for plans to conduct
bombings in 1998. Cuban officials maintain that Cuban exiles funded the bombings.
In November 2000, four anti-Castro activists were arrested in Panama for a plot to kill Fidel
Castro. One of the accused, Luis Posada Carriles, is also alleged to be involved in the 1976 Cuban
airline bombing and the series of bombings in Havana in 1997 noted above.161 The four stood trial
in March 2004 and were sentenced on weapons charges to prison terms ranging from seven to
eight years. In late August 2004, Panamanian President Mireya Moscoso pardoned the four men
before the end of her presidential term. Three of the men are U.S. citizens and traveled to Florida,
where they received strong support from some in the Cuban American community, while Posada
reportedly traveled to another country.
Posada entered the United States illegally in 2005. In subsequent removal proceedings, an
immigration judge found that Posada could not be removed to Cuba or Venezuela because of
concerns that he would face torture, and he was thereafter permitted to remain in the United
States pending such time as he could be transferred to a different country. Posada subsequently
applied for naturalization to become a U.S. citizen. This application was denied, and criminal
charges were brought against him for allegedly false statements made in his naturalization
application and interview. Although a federal district court dismissed the indictment in 2007, its
ruling was reversed by an appellate court in 2008. In April 2009, the United States filed a
superseding indictment, which included additional criminal charges based on allegedly false

161 Frances Robles, “An Old Foe of Castro Looks Back on His Fight,” Miami Herald, September 4, 2003.
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statements made by Posada in immigration removal proceedings concerning his involvement in
the 1997 Havana bombings. His trial originally was set to begin in August 2009, but was
rescheduled three times until it finally began in January 2011.162 Ultimately, Posada was acquitted
of the perjury charges in April 2011, an action that was strongly criticized by Cuban officials.
On July 7, 2010, Venezuelan authorities extradited to Cuba an alleged Posada associate,
Salvadoran citizen Francisco Chávez Abarca, who was charged with involvement in one of the
1997 bombings in Havana.163 Chávez Abarca had been imprisoned from 2005 to 2007 in El
Salvador for running a car theft ring, but charges ultimately were dropped, reportedly because of
a botched investigation, and he was set free. On July 1, 2010, he was arrested in Venezuela upon
entering the county and allegedly confessed to plans to organize protests in Venezuela around the
time of the country’s legislative elections in September 2010.164 In late September 2010, the
Cuban government released Chávez Abarca’s video confessions and reenactment of the
bombings, as well as his alleged association with Luis Posada, in a public information campaign
featured in the Cuban media as well as abroad. According to Chávez Abarca, Posada recruited
him in El Salvador for the Cuba bombings, and paid him $2,000 for each bomb that went off.
Only one of the bombs that Chávez Abarca planted actually detonated, on April 12, 2007, in the
bathroom of a disco at the Melia Cohiba hotel in Havana. In late December 2010, Chávez Abarca
was sentenced to 30 years in prison for his role in the bombings.
U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights
Since 1996, the United States has provided assistance—through the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), the State Department, and the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED)—to increase the flow of information on democracy, human rights, and free enterprise to
Cuba. USAID’s Cuba program has supported a variety of U.S.-based non-governmental
organizations with the goals of promoting a rapid, peaceful transition to democracy, helping
develop civil society, and building solidarity with Cuba’s human rights activists.165
These efforts are largely funded through Economic Support Funds (ESF) in the annual foreign
operations appropriations bill. From FY2001-FY2012, Congress appropriated almost $197
million in funding for Cuba democracy efforts. This included $45.3 million for FY2008, and $20
million in each fiscal year from FY2009 through FY2012. The Administration’s FY2013 request
is for $15 million. Generally, as provided in appropriations measures, ESF has to be obligated
within two years. (For a brief description of USAID’s Cuba program along with a listing of
current USAID grantees, see http://www.usaid.gov/where-we-work/latin-american-and-
caribbean/cuba/our-work.)
FY2010. Congress fully funded the Administration’s $20 million FY2010 ESF request for Cuba
democracy programs in the conference report (H.Rept. 111-366) to the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2010 (H.R. 3288/P.L. 111-117). According to the State Department’s FY2010

162 For additional information, see “Background on Luis Posada Carriles,” CRS Congressional Distribution
Memorandum, December 8, 2010, prepared by Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, and Michael
John Garcia, Legislative Attorney. Available from the authors.
163 Christopher Toothaker, “Venezuela Extradites Suspected Terrorist to Cuba to Face Bombing Charges,” AP
Newswire, July 7, 2010.
164 Frances Robles, “Mystery Man in Terror Plots Points at Miami Exiles,” Miami Herald, October 18, 2010.
165See USAID’s Cuba program website: http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/country/cuba/.
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Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, U.S. assistance programs focus on
providing humanitarian assistance to victims of repression, strengthening civil society, weakening
the information blockade, and helping Cubans to create space for dialogue about democratic
change and reconciliation. Both House-passed H.R. 3081 and Senate Appropriations Committee-
reported S. 1434, the FY2010 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, recommended full funding of the Administration’s $20 million request.
In April 2011, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry placed a hold on the
funding. He maintained that he would oppose the spending until a full review of the programs
was complete and contended that there was no evidence that programs are helping the Cuban
people.166 Senator Patrick Leahy, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee’s
Subcommittee on the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, also
reportedly placed a hold on the assistance. By early August 2011, however, both holds had been
lifted.167
FY2011. The Administration again requested $20 million in ESF for FY2011 to support
democracy and human rights projects. According to the Administration’s request, the assistance
focuses on providing humanitarian assistance to prisoners of conscience and their families,
strengthening civil society, supporting issue-based civic action movements and coalitions, and
promoting fundamental freedoms, especially freedom of expression and freedom of the press. The
Senate version of the State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations measure, S. 3676,
reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 29, 2010 (S.Rept. 111-237), would
have provided that $2 million of the ESF appropriated for Cuba be transferred and merged with
funds for the National Endowment for Democracy for democracy programs in Cuba. Congress
did not complete action on FY2011 appropriations until April 2011 when it approved a full-year
appropriations measure (P.L. 112-10). In August 2011, the Administration made known its
FY2011 foreign aid allocations by country, which included the full $20 million for Cuba
democracy assistance that had been requested.
As notified to Congress in April 2012, of the $20 million, USAID will administer $8.9 million,
the State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affair will administer $1.6 million, and
the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) will administer
$9.5 million, of which $4 million will be transferred to the National Endowment for Democracy.
In terms of programs for the $20 million, $12.43 million will be used for democracy, civil society
and media programs; $4.7 million will be used to support human rights initiatives; and $2.87
million will be used for program support.
FY2012. The Administration once again requested $20 million in ESF for FY2012 with the
promotion of democratic principles the core goal of assistance, and Congress supported the full
amount in the conference report to the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.Rept. 112-
331 to H.R. 2055, P.L. 112-74). The budget request stated that there is an increased effort to
manage programs more transparently, focus efforts on Cuba, and widen the scope of the civic
groups receiving supports. According to the Administration’s request, U.S. assistance aims to
strengthen a range of independent elements of Cuban civil society, including associations and

166 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Press Room, Chairman’s Press, “Chairman Kerry Delays Additional Spending
on “Democracy Promotion” Programs in Cuba,” April 1, 2011.
167 Juan O. Tamayo, “Leahy Lifts Hold on Democracy Funds for Cuba,” Miami Herald, August 3, 2011; Donna
Cassata, “Democratic Lawmaker, State Department End Impasse Over Money for Cuba Democracy Program,”
Associated Press, August 2, 2011.
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labor groups, marginalized groups, youth, legal associations, and women’s networks. The
programs are designed to increase the capacity for community involvement of civil society
organizations and networking among the groups. The program also supports Cuban efforts to
document human rights violations, provides humanitarian assistance to political prisoners and
their families, and builds leadership skills of civil society leaders. Finally, the budget request
maintains that U.S. assistance also supports the dissemination of information regarding market
economies and economic rights.
The Senate Appropriations Committee-reported version of the FY2012 Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations bill, S. 1601 (S.Rept. 112-85) would
have provided $15 million in ESF for Cuba ($5 million less than the request), including
humanitarian and democracy assistance, support for economic reform, private sector initiatives,
and human rights. In its report to the bill, the committee maintained that it expected that funds
would be made available, and programs carried out, in a transparent manner. The committee also
would have directed that the USAID Administrator provide regular updates to the committee on
the number of Cubans who receive assistance and the types of assistance. In contrast to the Senate
bill, a draft House Appropriations Committee bill and report (marked up by the Subcommittee on
State, Foreign Operations, and Relations Programs on July 27, 2011) would have recommended
$20 million in ESF for Cuba (the full Administration’s request), and would have directed that the
funds be used only for democracy-building, and not for business promotion, economic reform,
social development or other purposes expressly authorized by Section 109(a) of the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114). (See the draft committee report,
available at http://appropriations.house.gov/UploadedFiles/FY12-SFOPSCombinedReport-
CSBA.pdf.)
FY2013. For FY2013, the Administration requested $15 million for human rights and democracy
programs for Cuba. According to the request, “U.S. assistance will continue to support human
rights and civil society initiatives that promote basic freedoms, particularly freedom of
expression. Programs will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to prisoners of conscience
and their families, as well as strengthen independent Cuban civil society, and promote the flow of
uncensored information to, from, and within the island.”168
The Senate Appropriations Committee-reported version of the FY2013 State Department, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, S. 3241 (S.Rept. 112-172) would provide
$15 million in ESF for Cuba (the same as the Administration’s request), including “for
humanitarian assistance, support for economic reform, private sector initiatives, democracy, and
human rights.” In contrast, the House Appropriations Committee-reported version of the bill,
H.R. 5857 (H.Rept. 112-94) would provide $20 million in ESF ($5 million more than the
Administration’s request), but would transfer and merge the aid with funds available to the
National Endowment for Democracy “to promote democracy and strengthen civil society in
Cuba.” The report to the House bill maintains that assistance “shall not be used for business
promotion, economic reform, social development, or other purposes not expressly authorized by
section 109(a)” of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (P.L. 104-114). Both the
Senate and House bills would continue the long-standing prohibition on direct funding assistance
to the government Cuba, and would require that any assistance to Cuba be provided through the
regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.

168 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2013, Annex: Regional
Perspectives, April 3, 2012, p. 768.
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Congress did not complete action on FY2013 appropriations before the beginning of the fiscal
year, but in September 2012, it approved a continuing appropriations resolution (H.J.Res. 117,
P.L. 112-175) that continues FY2013 funding through March 27, 2013, at the same rate for
projects and activities in FY2012, plus an across-the-board increase of 0.612%.
National Endowment for Democracy. Until FY2008, NED’s democratization assistance for
Cuba had been funded largely through the annual Commerce, Justice, and State (CJS)
appropriations measure, but is now funded through the State Department, Foreign Operations and
Related Agencies appropriations measure.
According to NED, its Cuba funding in recent years has been as follows: $1.4 million in FY2008
for 11 projects; $1.5 million in FY2009 for 10 projects; $2.4 million in FY2010 for 15 projects;
and $1.65 million in FY2011 for 13 projects. NED reported in its 2011 annual report (the most
recent available) that it funding the following organizations and projects for Cuba in that fiscal
year: Afro-Cuban Alliance Inc; Center for a Free Cuba; Committee for Free Trade Unionism;
Cuban Democratic Directorate; CubaNet News Inc.; Grupo Internacional para la Responsibilidad
Social Corporativa en Cuba; Instituto Político para La Libertad Perú; National Democratic
Institute for International Affairs; Observatorio Cubano de Derechos Humanos; People in Need;
People in Peril Association; Civic Education; and Rule of Law.169
As noted above, for FY2011, the State Department notified Congress in April 2012 that $4
million in ESF (of the $20 million appropriated by Congress for Cuba programs) would be
transferred to the National Endowment for Democracy, almost doubling the amount of NED
funding for Cuba programs compared to FY2010. The funds are to be used for grants to (1)
support independent, democratic civil society activists on the island; (2) cultivate the analytical
capacity of existing civil society actors; and (3) promote greater knowledge of and adherence to
international norms regarding political, civic, and fundamental human rights.
In addition, as noted above, the House Appropriations Committee-reported version of the FY2013
foreign aid appropriations measure, H.R. 5857 (H.Rept. 112-94) would appropriate $20 million in
ESF for Cuba democracy funding, but would transfer and merge the aid with funds available to
the NED. Such an amount would be greater than the $14.19 million that NED proposed to spend
on program activity in the entire Latin America/Caribbean region for FY2013.
Oversight of U.S. Democracy Assistance to Cuba
In November 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report examining U.S.
democracy assistance for Cuba from 1996 to 2005, and concluded that the U.S. program had
significant problems and needed better management and oversight. According to GAO, internal
controls, for both the awarding of Cuba program grants and oversight of grantees, “do not provide
adequate assurance that the funds are being used properly and that grantees are in compliance

169 See more on the projects available from NED’s website at
http://www.ned.org/publications/annual-reports/2011-annual-report/latin-america-and-
the-caribbean/cuba

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with applicable law and regulations.”170 Investigative news reports on the program maintained
that high shipping costs and lax oversight had diminished its effectiveness.171
GAO issued a second report examining USAID’s Cuba democracy program in November
2008.172 The report lauded the steps that USAID had taken since 2006 to address problems with
its Cuba program and improve oversight of the assistance. These included awarding all grants
competitively since 2006, hiring more staff for the program office since January 2008, and
contracting for financial services in April 2008 to enhance oversight of grantees. The GAO report
also noted that USAID had worked to strengthen program oversight through pre-award and
follow-up reviews, improving grantee internal controls and implementation plans, and providing
guidance and monitoring about permitted types of assistance and cost sharing.
The GAO report also maintained, however, that USAID had not staffed the Cuba program to the
level needed for effective grant oversight. GAO also noted the difficulty of assessing USAID’s
action to improve its Cuba program because most of its actions to improve the program were only
taken recently. Procurement reviews completed in August 2008 by the new financial services
contractor identified internal control, financial management, and procurement weaknesses at three
grantees. GAO recommended that USAID (1) ensure that its Cuba program office is staffed at the
level that is needed to fully implement planned monitoring activities; and (2) periodically assess
the Cuba program’s overall efforts to address and reduce grantee risks, especially regarding
internal controls, procurement practices, expenditures, and compliance with laws and regulations.
In April 2011, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry said that he had asked
GAO to undertake another investigation of the Cuba program regarding its legal basis and
effectiveness.173
December 2009 Imprisonment of Alan Gross
On December 4, 2009, Cuban authorities arrested an American subcontractor, Alan Gross,
working for Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI), a Bethesda-based company that had received a
contract from USAID to help support Cuban civil society organizations. Gross was arrested at
Jose Martí International Airport in Havana when he was planning to leave the country. He
reportedly was distributing communications equipment (including satellite phone equipment) to
Jewish organizations in Cuba.
The head of Cuba’s National Assembly, Ricardo Alarcon, asserted in January 2010, that the
contractor was working for American intelligence, but U.S. officials strongly denied the
accusation.174 A State Department spokesman maintained that the contractor “is not associated
with our intelligence services” and noted that “Cuba has a history of mischaracterizing what

170 U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Democracy Assistance for Cuba Needs Better Management and
Oversight, GAO-07-147, November 2006.
171 Oscar Corral, “Federal Program to Help Democracy in Cuba Falls Short of Mark,” Miami Herald, November 14,
2006, and “Is U.S. Aid Reaching Castro Foes?” Miami Herald, November 15, 2006.
172 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Foreign Assistance: Continued Efforts Needed to Strengthen USAID’s
Oversight of U.S. Democracy Assistance for Cuba, GAO-09-165, November 2008.
173 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Press Room, Chairman’s Press, “Chairman Kerry Delays Additional Spending
on “Democracy Promotion” Programs in Cuba,” April 1, 2011.
174 William Booth, “Contractor is U.S. Secret Agent, Cuban Legislator Says,” Washington Post, January 7, 2010.
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Americans and NGOs in Cuba are doing.”175 According to a statement by DAI, “the detained
subcontractor was not working for any intelligence service … he was working with a peaceful,
non-dissident civic group—a religious and cultural group recognized by the Cuban government—
to improve its ability to communicate with its members across the island and overseas.”176
Numerous U.S. officials have raised the issue of Alan Gross’s detention with the Cuban
government, including at the semi-annual bilateral migration talks, and have called for his release.
In March 2010, some 40 House Members called for Mr. Gross’s release in a letter to the Cuban
government, warning that improved relations between the United States and Cuba would not be
possible until he is released.177 The letter maintained that Mr. Gross’s work in Cuba with the
Jewish community “emanated from his desire to make a positive impact for others of faith on the
island.” A number of other Members and Senators have also called for Mr. Gross’s immediate
release. In June 2010, Secretary of State Clinton met with family members of Mr. Gross, and
issued a statement expressing deep concern about his welfare. The Secretary maintained that
Gross’s continued detention “is harming U.S.-Cuba relations,” and that his release would be
viewed favorably.178 In September 2010, then-Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs Arturo Valenzuela met with Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez in
New York to encourage the release of Mr. Gross.179
In early December 2010, on the one-year anniversary of Mr. Gross’s detention, the State
Department again issued a statement calling for his release, and maintaining that “the continued
detention of Alan Gross is a major impediment to advancing the dialogue between our two
countries.”180 At the fourth round of migration talks held on January 12, 2011, in Havana, the U.S.
delegation again raised the issue and called for Mr. Gross’s immediate release. The head of the
U.S. team at the talks, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere
Roberta Jacobson, subsequently met with Gross on January 13. Subsequent press reports
maintained that a senior State Department official was “cautiously optimistic” that Gross would
be released.181
On February 4, 2011, a Cuban court in Havana officially charged Gross with “actions against the
independence and territorial integrity of the state” pursuant to Article 91 of Cuba’s Penal Code,
and the prosecution asked for a 20-year sentence. The two-day trial began on March 4, and on
March 12, Gross was convicted and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Gross’s lawyer had asked for
the Cuban government to release Gross as a humanitarian gesture, maintaining that his health

175 “State Department Holds Regular News Briefing,” CQ Newsmaker Transcripts, January 7, 2010.
176 Frances Robles, “U.S. Says Contractor Arrested in Cuba is No Spy,” Miami Herald, January 8, 2010; and
Development Alternatives Inc. “Updated Statement from DAI President and CEO Dr. James Boomgard Regarding
Detainee in Cuba,” January 7, 2010.
177 “Congressmen urge Cuba to Release Jailed U.S. Aid Worker Who Helped Jewish Community,” States News
Service, March 24, 2010.
178 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Continued Incarceration of Alan Gross,”
June 17, 2010.
179 U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, October 18, 2010; and Juan O. Tamayo, “Cuba, U.S. Talk on Jailed
American,” Miami Herald, October 19, 2010.
180 U.S. Department of State, “One Year Continued Incarceration of Alan Gross,” Philip J. Crowley, Assistant
Secretary Bureau of Public Affairs, December 3, 2010.
181 Esteban Israel, “U.S. Hopeful Citizen Held in Cuba to be Tried, Freed,” Reuters News, January 13, 2011.
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continues to deteriorate and noting that his elderly mother was recently diagnosed with lung
cancer, and his daughter was recovering from cancer treatment.182
The State Department issued a statement deploring the ruling, and calling on the Cuban
government to immediately and unconditionally release him.183 Secretary of State Clinton
maintained that Gross should be released, at the very least, on humanitarian terms, and expressed
hope that the Cuban government would do that.184 In March 2011, former U.S. President Jimmy
Carter visited with Gross during a visit to Cuba. A private U.S. delegation visiting Cuba met with
Gross in early June 2011, reporting that Gross had lost some 95 pounds according to his own
estimation and that while he was in good spirits he is anxious to come home and does not want to
be forgotten.185
Cuba’s Supreme Court heard arguments for Gross’s appeal on July 22, 2011, but the court
rejected the appeal on August 5, 2011. An Administration statement called on the Cuban
government to release Gross “immediately and unconditionally to allow him to return to his
family and bring an end the long ordeal that began well over a year ago.”186 In early September
2011, former New Mexico Government Bill Richardson traveled to Cuba in an effort to seek the
release of Gross, but was unsuccessful. In a subsequent New York Times interview, Cuban Foreign
Minister Bruno Rodriguez reportedly suggested that Cuba and the United States could resolve the
Gross case “from a humanitarian point of view and on the basis of reciprocity.”187
On the second anniversary of Gross’s imprisonment in December 2011, 72 House Members from
both parties sent a letter to the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, DC, expressing hope that
the Cuban government would release Mr. Gross “on humanitarian grounds immediately.” The
letter also stated that “Mr. Gross’s continued incarceration is viewed by Members of Congress,
regardless of their political views on Cuba, as a major setback in bilateral relations,” and that “it
is unlikely any further positive steps can or will be taken by the Obama Administration or this
Congress as long as Mr. Gross remains in a Cuban jail.”188 As noted above, the State Department
again called for Gross’s release on the second anniversary of his imprisonment, and also
expressed deep disappointment in late December 2011 that the Cuban government did not include
Gross among the 2,900 prisoners released on humanitarian grounds.189
In February 2012, investigative press reporting by the Associated Press detailed the various trips
undertaken by Alan Gross to Cuba and the equipment that he brought into the country, including a
specialized mobile phone chip that reportedly would make it virtually impossible to track satellite

182 Juan Tamayo, “Gross Trial Opens in Cuba with ‘Vigorous’ Defense,” Miami Herald, March 4, 2011.
183 U.S. Department of State, “Statement on Sentencing of Alan Gross,” March 12, 2011.
184 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Interview with Jose Diaz-Balart of
Telemundo, March 18, 2011.
185 Peter Orsi, “U.S. Delegation Meets with American Jailed in Cuba,” Associated Press, June 9, 2011.
186 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement from National Security Council Spokesman Tommy Vietor
on Alan Gross,” August 5, 2011.
187 Randal C. Archibold, “Cuban Minister Leaves a Door Open to American’s Release,” New York Times, September
24, 2011.
188 Office of Representative Chris Van Hollen, “Van Hollen Leads Bipartisan Congressional Letter Urging Release of
Alan Gross,” Press Release, December 1, 2011, available at http://vanhollen.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?
DocumentID=270870
189 U.S. Department of State, Press Statements, “Two-Year Mark of the Continued Incarceration of Alan Gross,”
December 2, 2011, and “Cuban Prisoner Release Announcement,” December 24, 2011.
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phone transmissions.190 For some observers, the investigative report raises questions about the
nature of USAID-supported democracy programs, including whether the agency should be
involved in such secretive work that could pose dangers to those implementing such programs.
Others stress that it is important for the agency to be able to support democracy programs even in
hostile countries.191
In April 2012, there had been some hope that Cuba would positively respond to a humanitarian
request by Alan Gross to visit his elderly sick mother in the United States for a period of two
weeks, but this did not occur. In contrast, a U.S. federal judge in Florida granted René González,
one of the “Cuban five” spies, the right to visit his dying brother in Cuba for two weeks. Cuba is
now explicitly linking the release of Alan Gross to the release of the “Cuban five,” while the
United States rejects the linkage, maintaining there is no equivalence between the cases.192 (For
more on the “Cuban five,” see “Cuban Spies in the United States” below).
In September 2012, Judy Gross, the wife of Alan Gross, expressed concern in media reports about
the health of her husband and fears that he would not survive continued imprisonment. In early
October 2012, Judy Gross expressed concern that her husband could have cancer, while the
Cuban government maintains that he does not.
Radio and TV Marti
U.S.-government sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba—Radio and TV Martí—
began in 1985 and 1990 respectively. According to the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)
FY2013 Budget Request, Radio and TV Martí “inform and engage the people of Cuba by
providing a reliable and credible source of news and information.” The BBG’s Office of Cuba
Broadcasting “uses a mix of media, including shortwave, medium wave, direct-to-home satellite,
flash drives, and DVDs to help reach audiences in Cuba.”193
Until October 1999, U.S.-government funded international broadcasting programs had been a
primary function of the United States Information Agency (USIA). When USIA was abolished
and its functions were merged into the Department of State at the beginning of FY2000, the BBG
became an independent agency that included such entities as the Voice of America (VOA), Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting
(OCB), which manages Radio and TV Marti. OCB is headquartered in Miami, FL. Legislation in
the 104th Congress (P.L. 104-134) required the relocation of OCB from Washington, DC, to south
Florida. The move began in 1996 and was completed in 1998.
Radio Martí broadcasts on short and medium wave (AM) channels for 24 hours six days per
week, and for 18 hours one day per week utilizing transmission facilities in Marathon, FL, and

190 Desmond Butler, “AP Impact; Trip Reports Reveal Jailed American Subcontractor’s USAID Internet Efforts in
Cuba,” AP Newswire, February 13, 2012.
191 “American’s Arrest in Cuba Could Have Impact,” NPR Weekend, All Things Considered, February 12, 2012; and
“Imprisoned American in Cuba Renews Debate on Whether U.S. Agency’s Tactics Are Too Sensitive,” AP Newswire,
February 12, 2011.
192 U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, May 11, 2012, available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/05/189753.htm
193 See the full text of the Broadcasting Board of Governors FY2013 budget request, available at http://www.bbg.gov/
wp-content/media/2012/02/FY-2013-BBG-Congressional-Budget-Request-FINAL-2-9-12-Small.pdf
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Greenville, NC, according to the BBG. It also transmits to Cuba 24 hours daily through Hispasat
satellite television and the internet.
TV Martí programming has been broadcast through multiple transmission methods over the
years. From its beginning in 1990 until July 2005, it was broadcast via an aerostat (blimp) from
facilities in Cudjoe Key, Florida for four and one-half hours daily, but the aerostat was destroyed
by Hurricane Dennis. From mid-2004 until 2006, TV Martí programming was transmitted for
several hours once a week via an airborne platform known as Commando Solo operated by the
Department of Defense utilizing a C-130 aircraft. In August 2006, OCB began to use contracted
private aircraft to transmit prerecorded TV Martí broadcasts six days weekly, and by late October
2006 the OCB inaugurated an aircraft-broadcasting platform known as AeroMartí with the
capability of transmitting live broadcasts. OCB currently uses two privately contracted airplanes
for AeroMartí to transmit broadcasts two and one-half hours for five days weekly. Broadcasts are
also transmitted via the internet and satellite television.
In September 2011, the BBG awarded a contract to a Maryland firm to design and operate a text
messaging system that can distribute up to 24,000 messages per week from OCB broadcasters to
mobile phone users in Cuba, including the use of techniques to circumvent censorship.194 (Cuba
has complained that the system would be able to flood Cuban cellular telephone users in open
violation of Cuban laws and international agreements.)195
Funding for Cuba Broadcasting
From FY1984 through FY2011, about $668 million was spent for broadcasting to Cuba. In recent
years, funding amounted to $29.630 million in FY2010, $28.416 million in FY2011, and an
estimated $28.062 million in FY2012. The FY2013 request is for $23.594 million.
FY2011. The BBG requested $29.179 million for Cuba broadcasting in FY2011, about $1 million
less than that appropriated in FY2010. The Senate version of the State Department and Foreign
Operations appropriations measure, S. 3676, reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on
July 29, 2010 (S.Rept. 111-237), recommended $28.789 million for broadcasting to Cuba
($390,000 less than the request of $29.179 million). In the report to the bill, the committee also
stated that it did not support closing the Greenville Station in North Carolina that transmits the
Cuba broadcasts, expanding TV Martí’s transmission on DirecTV, or expanding and renovating
the TV Martí studio until the Broadcasting Board of Governors submits a multi-year strategic
plan for broadcasting to Cuba. Congress did not complete final action on FY2011 appropriations
until April 2011 when it approved a full-year appropriations measure (P.L. 112-10). According to
the BBG, enacted actual FY2011 funding for Cuba broadcasting amounted to $28.416 million.
FY2012. The Administration requested $28.475 million for Cuba broadcasting in FY2012. The
Senate Appropriations Committee version of the FY2012 State Department, Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs Appropriations measure, S. 1601 (S.Rept. 112-85), recommended $28.181
million in funding for Cuba broadcasting, $294,000 less than the request. In contrast, a draft
House Appropriations Committee report and bill (marked up by the House Appropriations

194 See information on the BBG contract available, awarded September 23, 2011, by the BBG at https://www.fbo.gov/
index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=98ec01c39584ddd3631450c952eb2eea&tab=core&_cview=1
195 Juan Tamayo, “Radio/TV Martí Sending News to Cuban Cells,” Miami Herald, October 3, 2011; “EEUU Financia
Software Para Invadir a Cuba de Span a Través de Celulares,” Cubadebate, October 2, 2011.
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Committee’s Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs on July 27,
2011) recommended $30.175 million for Cuba broadcasting, $1.7 million more than the request.
(See the draft committee report, available at http://appropriations.house.gov/UploadedFiles/
FY12-SFOPSCombinedReport-CSBA.pdf.) In final FY2012 appropriations action in the FY2012
Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 2055, P.L. 112-74), Congress approved full funding of the
Administration’s $28.475 million request for broadcasting to Cuba. The BBG’s estimate for
FY2012 funding is $28.062 million.
FY2013. The Administration requested $23.594 million for Cuba broadcasting in FY2013, almost
$4.5 million lower than FY2012 funding. According to the BBG’s budget request, program
reductions are possible because of OCB’s planned streamlining in the planning and execution of
news coverage and reliance on additional technical support from the BBG’s International
Broadcasting Bureau.
The Senate Appropriations Committee-reported FY2013 State Department, Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, S. 3241 (S.Rept. 112-172), would provide $23.4
million ($194,000 less than the Administration’s request), while the House Appropriations
Committee-reported bill, H.R. 5857 (H.Rept. 112-494), would provide $28.062 million ($4.468
million more than the Administration’s request and the same amount provided in FY2012). As
already noted, Congress has not completed action FY2013 appropriations, but in September 2012
it approved a continuing appropriations resolution (H.J.Res. 117, P.L. 112-175) that continues
FY2013 funding through March 27, 2013, at the same rate for projects and activities in FY2012
plus an across-the-board increase of 0.612%.
Additional Legislation in the 112th Congress. Aside from annual spending bills, two bills were
introduced in the 112th Congress, S. 476 (Pryor) and H.R. 1317 (McCollum), that would
discontinue Radio and TV Martí broadcasts to Cuba by repealing the original authorization
legislation for both programs, the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act and the Television
Broadcasting to Cuba Act. In addition, during House consideration of H.R. 1, the FY2011 Full-
Year Continuing Appropriations Act, two Cuba-related amendments were submitted—
Amendment No. 51 (McCollum) and Amendment No. 369 (Flake), both printed in the
Congressional Record on February 14, 2011—that would have eliminated funding for Radio and
TV Marti, but the amendments were never considered.
Controversies
Both Radio and TV Martí have at times been the focus of controversies, including questions
about adherence to broadcast standards. There have been various attempts over the years to cut
funding for the programs, especially for TV Martí, which has not had much of an audience
because of Cuban jamming efforts. In December 2006, press reports alleged significant problems
in the OCB’s operations, with claims of cronyism, patronage, and bias in its coverage.196 In
February 2007, the former director of TV Martí programming pled guilty in U.S. federal court to
receiving more than $100,000 in kickbacks over a three-year period from a vendor receiving
OCB contracts.197

196 Oscar Corral, “Radio, TV Martí Face Another Government Audit,” Miami Herald, December 18, 2006, and
“Problems Dog Broadcaster,” Miami Herald, December 19, 2006.
197 Jay Weaver, “TV Martí Executive Admits Taking Kickbacks,” Miami Herald, February 14, 2007.
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Over the years, there have been various government studies and audits of the OCB, including
investigations by the GAO, by a 1994 congressionally established Advisory Panel on Radio and
TV Martí, by the State Department Office Inspector General (OIG) in 1999, and by the combined
State Department/BBG Office Inspector General in 2003 and 2007.198
In July 2008, GAO issued a report that criticized OCB’s practices in awarding two contracts to
Radio Mambí and TV Azteca as lacking discipline required to ensure transparency and
accountability. According to GAO, the approach for awarding the Radio Mambí and TV Azteca
contracts did not reflect sound business practices.199
In January 2009, GAO issued a report asserting that the best available research suggests that
Radio and TV Martí’s audience is small, and cited telephone surveys since 2003 showing that less
than 2% of respondents reported tuning in to Radio or TV Martí during the past week. With
regard to TV Martí viewership, according to the report, all of the IBB’s telephone surveys since
2003 show that less than 1% of respondents said that they had watched TV Martí during the past
week. According to the GAO report, the IBB surveys show that there was no increase in reported
TV Martí viewership following the beginning of AeroMartí and DirecTV satellite broadcasting in
2006.The GAO report also cited concerns with adherence to relevant domestic laws and
international standards, including the domestic dissemination of OCB programming,
inappropriate advertisements during OCB programming, and TV Martí’s interference with Cuban
broadcasts.200 GAO testified on its report in a hearing held by the House Subcommittee on
International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
on June 17, 2009.
In April 2010, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority issued a staff report that
concluded that Radio and TV Martí “continue to fail in their efforts to influence Cuban society,
politics, and policy.” The report cited problems with adherence to broadcast standards, audience
size, and Cuban government jamming. Among its recommendations, the report called for the IBB
to move the Office of Cuba Broadcasting back to Washington and integrate it fully into the Voice
of America.201

198 See the following reports and audits: U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Broadcasts to Cuba, TV Marti
Surveys are Flawed, GAO/NSIAD-90-252, August 1990; U.S. GAO, TV Marti, Costs and Compliance with Broadcast
Standards and International Agreements, GAO/NSIAD-92-199, May 1992; U.S. GAO, Letter to Hon. Howard L.
Berman and Hon. John F. Kerry regarding Radio Marti broadcast standards, GAO/NSIAD-93-126R, February 17,
1993; Advisory Panel on Radio and TV Marti, Report of the Advisory Panel on Radio and TV Marti, Three Volumes,
March 1994; U.S. GAO, Radio Marti, Program Review Processes Need Strengthening, GAO/NSIAD-94-265,
September 1994; U.S. GAO, U.S. Information Agency, Issues Related to Reinvention Planning in the Office of Cuba
Broadcasting, GAO/NSIAD-96-110, May 1996; U.S. Department of State, Office of the Inspector General, Review of
Policies and Procedures for Ensuring that Radio Marti Broadcasts Adhere to Applicable Requirements, 99-IB-010,
June 1999; U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General, Review of
the Effectiveness and Implementation of Office of Cuba Broadcasting’s New Program Initiatives, Report No. IBO-A-
03-01, January 2003, and Report of Inspection, Office of Cuba Broadcasting, Report No. ISP-IB 07-35, June 2007.
199 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Broadcasting to Cuba, Weaknesses in Contracting Practices Reduced
Visibility into Selected Award Decisions,” GAO-08-764, July 2008.
200 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Broadcasting to Cuba, Actions Are Needed to Improve Strategy and
Operations, GAO-09-127, January 2009.
201 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Cuba: Immediate Action Is Needed To Ensure the
Survivability of Radio and TV Marti, committee print, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., April 29, 2010, S.Prt. 111-46
(Washington: GPO, 2010).
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In December 2011, GAO issued a report examining the extent to which the BBG’s strategic plan
for broadcasting required by the conference report to the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations
measure (H.Rept. 111-366 to H.R. 3288/P.L. 111-117) met the requirements established in the
legislation. As described in the conference report, the BBG strategic plan was required to include
(1) an analysis of the current situation in Cuba and an allocation of resources consistent with the
relative priority of broadcasting to Cuba as determined by the annual Language Service Review
and other factors, including input form the Secretary of State on the relative U.S. interest of
broadcasting to Cuba; (2) the estimated audience sizes in Cuba for Radio and TV Martí and the
sources and relative reliability of the data on which such estimates are based; (3) the annual
operating cost (and total cost over the life of the contract) of any and all types of TV transmission
and the effectiveness of each in increasing such audience size; (4) the principal obstacles to
increasing such audience size; (5) an analysis of other options for disseminating news and
information to Cuba, including DVDs, the Internet, and cell phones and other handheld electronic
devices and a report on the cost effectiveness of each; and (6) an analysis of the program
efficiencies and effectiveness that can be achieved through shared resources and cost saving
opportunities in radio and television production between Radio and TV Martí and the Voice of
America.
GAO found that the BBG’s strategic plan lacked key information. Of the six requirements set
forth in the conference report, the GAO found that the BBG’s strategic plan fully addressed item
(4) regarding the principal obstacles to increasing audience sized, but only partially addressed the
other five items called for by Congress. The GAO report stated that while the BBG faces
challenges obtaining some of the information, such as audience size, it can develop and provide
more information to assist Congress, including an analysis of the cost savings opportunities of
sharing resources between Radio and TV Martí and the Voice of America’s Latin America
Division.202
Another controversy that occurred in early May 2012 involved an editorial by OCB Director
Carlos García-Pérez in which he strongly criticized Cuban Cardinal Jaime Ortega and referred to
the Cardinal as a “lackey” of the Cuban government.203 As noted above (see “March 2012 Visit of
Pope Benedict”), the strong language was criticized by several Members of Congress, who called
for the Administration to reject the comments against Cardinal Ortega.204
The editorial raises significant questions about the editorial policy of OCB as well as OCB’s
adherence to broadcast standards.205 BBG’s Director of Communications and External Affairs
Lynne Weil maintains that such “editorials, unless otherwise stated, represent the views of the
broadcasters only and not necessarily those of the U.S. government.”206 Yet such a controversial

202 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Broadcasting Board of Governors Should Provide Additional Information
to Congress Regarding Broadcasting to Cuba, December 13, 2011, available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/
586869.pdf
203 William Booth, “U.S. Broadcaster Call Archbishop a Castro “Lackey,” Washington Post, May 6, 2012. The editorial
no longer appears on the website of Radio/TV Martí, but is available at
http://porcubaparacuba.blogspot.com/2012/05/editorial-de-radio-y-tv-marti-acerca.html
204 See a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, a member of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, from
five Members of Congress, May 8, 2012, available at http://www.democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/ortegaletter.pdf
205 Authorization legislation establishing both Radio and TV Martí require broadcasting to Cuba to be in accordance
with all Voice of America standards to ensure the broadcast of programs which are objective, accurate, balanced, and
which present a variety of views (§3(b) of P.L. 98-111, as amended, and §243(b) of P.L. 101-246, as amended).
206 William Booth, “U.S. Broadcaster Call Archbishop a Castro “Lackey,” Washington Post, May 6, 2012.
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editorial authored by the director of OCB could easily lead one to conclude that the views
articulated were those of the U.S. government. Questions for U.S. policymakers to consider
include the following: What exactly is the editorial policy of OCB and who should be presenting
the editorials? Should OCB be required to follow editorial guidelines similar to those of the Voice
of America, where editorials express the policies of the U.S. government? Should OCB be
presenting editorials that take sides in controversial debates occurring within the Cuban dissident
community?
Migration Issues207
1994 and 1995 Migration Accords
Cuba and the United States reached two migration accords in 1994 and 1995 designed to stem the
mass exodus of Cubans attempting to reach the United States by boat. On the minds of U.S.
policymakers was the 1980 Mariel boatlift in which 125,000 Cubans fled to the United States
with the approval of Cuban officials. In response to Fidel Castro’s threat to unleash another
Mariel, U.S. officials reiterated U.S. resolve not to allow another exodus. Amid escalating
numbers of fleeing Cubans, on August 19, 1994, President Clinton abruptly changed U.S.
migration policy, under which Cubans attempting to flee their homeland were allowed into the
United States, and announced that the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy would take Cubans rescued at
sea to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Despite the change in policy, Cubans
continued fleeing in large numbers.
As a result, in early September 1994, Cuba and the United States began talks that culminated in a
September 9, 1994, bilateral agreement to stem the flow of Cubans fleeing to the United States by
boat. In the agreement, the United States and Cuba agreed to facilitate safe, legal, and orderly
Cuban migration to the United States, consistent with a 1984 migration agreement. The United
States agreed to ensure that total legal Cuban migration to the United States would be a minimum
of 20,000 each year, not including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. In a change of policy, the
United States agreed to discontinue the practice of granting parole to all Cuban migrants who
reach the United States, while Cuba agreed to take measures to prevent unsafe departures from
Cuba.
In May 1995, the United States reached another accord with Cuba under which the United States
would parole the more than 30,000 Cubans housed at Guantanamo into the United States, but
would intercept future Cuban migrants attempting to enter the United States by sea and would
return them to Cuba. The two countries would cooperate jointly in the effort. Both countries also
pledged to ensure that no action would be taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a
consequence of their attempt to immigrate illegally. On January 31, 1996, the Department of
Defense announced that the last of some 32,000 Cubans intercepted at sea and housed at
Guantanamo had left the U.S. Naval Station, most having been paroled into the United States.

207 For additional background on migration issues through mid-2009, see CRS Report R40566, Cuban Migration to the
United States: Policy and Trends, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
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Coast Guard Interdictions
Since the 1995 migration accord, the U.S. Coast Guard has interdicted thousands of Cubans at sea
and returned them to their country, while those deemed at risk for persecution have been
transferred to Guantanamo and then found asylum in a third country or eventually the United
States. Those Cubans who reach shore are allowed to apply for permanent resident status in one
year, pursuant to the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-732). In short, most interdictions,
even in U.S. coastal waters, result in a return to Cuba, while those Cubans who touch shore are
allowed to stay in the United States. This so-called “wet foot/dry foot” policy has been criticized
by some as encouraging Cubans to risk their lives in order to make it to the United States and as
encouraging alien smuggling. Others maintain that U.S. policy should welcome those migrants
fleeing communist Cuba whether or not they are able to make it to land.
The number of Cubans interdicted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard rose from 666 in FY2002 to a
high of 2,868 in FY2007. In the three subsequent years, maritime interdictions declined
significantly to 422 by FY2010 (see Figure 7). Major reasons for the decline were reported to
include the U.S. economic downturn, more efficient coastal patrolling, and more aggressive
prosecution of migrant smugglers.208 Over the past two fiscal years, however, the number of
Cubans interdicted by the Coast Guard has risen. In FY2011, the number of interdictions
increased to 985, and in FY2012, the number increased further to 1,275.209 Speculation on the
reasons for the increase include Cuba’s deteriorating economic and political situation; the Coast
Guard’s more efficient methods of interdiction; and the easing of the economic situation in the
United States, making it easier for the payment of fees to migrant smugglers.210
U.S. prosecution against migrant smugglers in Florida has increased in recent years with
numerous convictions. There have been several violent incidents in which Cuban migrants have
brandished weapons or in which Coast Guard officials have used force to prevent Cubans from
reaching shore. In late December 2007, a Coast Guard official in Florida called on the local
Cuban American community to denounce the smuggling and stop financing the trips that are
leading to more deaths at sea.211 In July 2010, three Cuban nationals (two living in Florida and
one in Mexico) were charged in a U.S. federal court in Tampa with conspiracy, kidnapping, and
extortion involving the abduction of Cuban migrants in Mexico.212 The Cuban government also
has taken forceful action, including prison sentences of up to three years against those engaging
in alien smuggling.

208 Alfonso Chardy and Juan Tamayo, “Exodus of Cubans Slowing,” Miami Herald, October 6, 2010.
209 U.S. Coast Guard, Alien Migrant Interdiction, Coast Guard Office of Law Enforcement, “Total Interdictions, Fiscal
Year 1982 to Present,” October 23, 2012.
210 Alfonso Chardy and Juan O. Tamayo, “Illegal Cuban Migration, After Years of Decline, Is Up Again,” Miami
Herald, Miami Herald, October 8, 2011; Alfonso Chardy and Juan O. Tamayo, “Number of Cubans Trying to Enter
U.S. Increases,” Miami Herald, June 17, 2012.
211 Laura Morales, “Exiles Urged to Stem Tide of Cubans,” Miami Herald, December 29, 2007.
212 Alfonso Chardy, “Cubans from Miami Charged in Migrant-Abduction Case,” Miami Herald, July 10, 2010.
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Figure 7. Maritime Interdiction of Cubans, FY2002-FY2012
3500
3000
2,810
2,868
2,712
2500
2,216
2000
1,555
1500
1,225
1,275
985
1000
799
666
422
500
0
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Source: CRS presentation of United States Coast Guard data. United States Coast Guard, Alien Migrant
Interdiction, “Coast Guard Migrant Interdictions—Fiscal Year 1982-Present,” October 23, 2012; current
statistics available at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/FlowStats/FY.asp.
Arrivals of Unauthorized Cubans to the United States
Despite the U.S. Coast Guard’s maritime interdiction program, thousands of unauthorized Cubans
reach the United States each year, either by boat or at land ports of entry. U.S. Border Patrol
apprehensions (largely coastal Florida) of unauthorized Cubans were 910 in FY2009, 712 in
FY2010, and 959 in FY2011. These statistics are significantly lower than the FY2005-FY2008
period when Border Patrol apprehensions of Cubans averaged over 3,700 each year.213
Arrival of unauthorized Cubans at U.S. ports of entry—the majority from Mexico—averaged
over 7,400 each year from FY2009-FY2011, although it showed a slightly rising trend from 7,053
in FY2009 to 7,798 in FY2011. Comparatively, however, the statistics are much lower than the
average of almost 11,000 Cubans arriving at ports of entry annually from FY2005-FY2008.214 In
October 2008, Mexico and Cuba negotiated a migration accord in an attempt to curb the irregular
flow of migrants through Mexico.215 The agreement calls for Mexico to accept all unauthorized
immigrants detained by Mexican authorities.

213 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, “Apprehensions by the U.S. Border Patrol:
2005-2010,” July 2011; FY2011 statistics provided to CRS by U.S. Border Patrol.
214 Statistics on arrivals of unauthorized Cubans at U.S. ports of entry provided to CRS from U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, August 24, 2012. Also see CRS Report R40566, Cuban Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends,
by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
215 Diego Cevallos, “Migration: More and More Cubans Entering U.S. Through Mexico,” Inter Press Service News
(continued...)
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Cuba Alters Its Policy Regarding Exit Permits
On October 16, 2012, the Cuban government announced that it would be updating its migration
policy, effective January 14, 2013, by eliminating the longstanding policy of requiring an exit
permit and letter of invitation from abroad for Cubans to travel abroad. Cubans would be able to
travel abroad with just an updated passport and a visa issued by the country of destination, if
required. The practice of requiring an exit permit has been extremely unpopular in Cuba and the
government has been considering doing away for the practice for some time.
On its face, Cuba’s action can be viewed as a human rights improvement, but how significant that
improvement is will depend on how the law is implemented. The Cuban government has already
said that it will fight against “brain drain,” and that the new policy would not apply to scientists,
athletes, and other professionals. It also remains to be seen whether the government will allow
political dissidents to leave the country and return. Prominent dissident and Internet blogger
Yoani Sánchez has said that she would attempt to test the change in policy on its first day. (Also
see “Internet Bloggers” above.)
A U.S. State Department spokesman said that it welcomes any changes that would allow Cubans
to depart from and return from their country freely. According to the State Department, Cuba’s
announced change is consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in that everyone
should have the rights to leave any country, including their own, and return.216 At the same time,
however, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs has cautioned that it is
uncertain yet how the changes are to be implemented. She raised questions regarding whether
Cuba would impose some controls on passports and whether everyone would be free to travel.217
Legislative Initiatives Regarding Cuban Migration
In the 112th Congress, two legislative initiatives have been introduced, H.R. 2771 and H.R. 2831
(Rivera), that would amend the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 with the objective of curbing
travel to Cuba by Cubans who have recently emigrated to the United States. H.R. 2771 would
amend the CAA to increase to five years the period during which a Cuban national must be
physically present in the United States in order to qualify for adjustment of status to that of a
permanent resident. The legislation also would provide that an alien shall be ineligible for
adjustment to permanent resident status if the alien returns to Cuba after admission or parole into
the United States before becoming a U.S. citizen. H.R. 2831 would also provide that an alien
from Cuba shall be ineligible for adjustment to permanent resident status under the CAA if he or
she returns to Cuba before becoming a U.S. citizen. The House Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Immigration on Policy Enforcement, held a hearing on H.R. 2831 on May 31,
2012. (Also see discussion above on “U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances.”)

(...continued)
Agency, June 17, 2008.
216 U.S. Department of State, “Daily Press Briefing,” October 16, 2012.
217 U.S. Department of State, Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta S. Jacobson, “Preview of the
Pathways for Prosperity/America’s Competiveness Forum in Cali, Colombia, October 23-25,” October 18, 2012.
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Migration Talks
Semi-annual U.S.-Cuban talks alternating between Cuba and the United States had been held
regularly on the implementation of the 1994 and 1995 migration accords until they were
suspended after the State Department cancelled the 20th round of talks scheduled for January
2004. At the time, the State Department maintained that Cuba refused to discuss five issues
identified by the United States: (1) Cuba’s issuance of exit permits for all qualified migrants; (2)
Cuba’s cooperation in holding a new registration for an immigrant lottery; (3) the need for a
deeper Cuban port used by the U.S. Coast Guard for the repatriation of Cubans interdicted at sea;
(4) Cuba’s responsibility to permit U.S. diplomats to travel to monitor returned migrants; and (5)
Cuba’s obligation to accept the return of Cuban nationals determined to be inadmissible to the
United States.218 In response to the cancellation of the talks, Cuban officials maintained that the
U.S. decision was irresponsible and that Cuba was prepared to discuss all of the issues raised by
the United States.219
Under the Obama Administration, Cuba and the United States agreed to restart the biannual
migration talks (in addition to talks on direct mail service), and since mid-2009, there have been
four rounds of talks. For the first three rounds, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Western Hemisphere Affairs Craig Kelly headed the U.S. team while Deputy Foreign Minister
Dagoberto Rodriguez led the Cuban team. The first round was held on July 14, 2009, in New
York City. The State Department outlined its four objectives in the talks: ensuring that the U.S.
Interests Section in Havana is able to operate effectively; gaining access to a deep-water port for
the safe return of Cuban migrants picked up at sea; ensuring that U.S. diplomats are able to
monitor the welfare of those Cubans who are sent back to the island; and gaining Cuban
government acceptance of Cubans who are excluded from the United States because they have
committed crimes.220 Cuba reportedly proposed a new immigration agreement and more effective
cooperation to combat alien smuggling, and also made known its opposition to the so-called “wet
foot/dry foot policy.”221
The second round of talks was held on February 19, 2010, in Havana. According to the
Department of State, “engaging in these talks underscores our interest in pursuing constructive
discussions with the government of Cuba to advance U.S. interests of mutual concern.” It
maintained that the United States views the talks “as an avenue to achieve practical, positive
results that contribute to the full implementation of the [Migration] Accords and to the safety of
citizens of both countries.”222 Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained that the meeting
took place in an atmosphere of respect and included discussion of some aspects of a new draft
migration accord proposed by Cuba at the in the July 2009 round of talks.223 Cuba also reportedly
raised the issue of improving and expanding the Cuban Interests Section in Washington. During
the talks, U.S. officials urged Cuban officials to provide political prisoner Orlando Zapata

218 U.S. Department of State. State Department Regular Briefing, Richard Boucher. January 7, 2004.
219 “Migration Talks Cancelled,” Miami Herald, January 8, 2004.
220 William Gibson, “U.S. to Cuba: Take Back Criminals,” South Florida Sun-Sentinel, July 15, 2009. Pursuant to a
1984 agreement, Cuba agreed to accept 2,746 convicted Cuban criminals. Many have been deported since then, but
there are reportedly more than 600 remaining to be deported. See Alfonso Chardy, “Some Non-Mariel Cubans Can Be
Deported,” Miami Herald, June 29, 2011.
221 “Migration Talks with Cuba Put Off to February,” Washington Post, December 4, 2009.
222 U.S. Department of State, “Cuba Migration Talks,” February 19, 2010.
223 “Statement by the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” IPR Strategic Information Database, February 22, 2010.
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Tamayo all necessary medical care, and also raised the case of USAID subcontractor Alan Gross
detained in Cuba since early December 2009 and called for his release.
The third round of talks was held on June 18, 2010, in Washington, DC. In addition to migration
issues, the U.S. team separately raised the case of Alan Gross and called for his immediate
release. A day before the meeting, Secretary of State Clinton met with family members of Alan
Gross and issued a statement expressing deep concern about his welfare and poor health and
maintaining that his “continued detention … is harming U.S.-Cuba relations.”224
A fourth round of migration talks took place in Havana on January 12, 2011, with the U.S. side
led by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Roberta Jacobson
and the Cuban side again led by Deputy Foreign Minister Dagoberto Rodríguez. The State
Department maintained that the talks were productive, covering a broad range of topics of mutual
interest, including the importance of continued U.S. commitment to promote safe, legal, and
orderly migration.225 The Cuban delegation maintained the meeting recognized the significant
reduction in risky illegal departures from Cuba because of efforts by both countries to deal with
migrant smuggling and illegal migration. Dagoberto Rodríguez maintained that “it was a fruitful
exchange aimed at moving on to the establishment of more effective mechanisms of cooperation
to combat illegal migrant smuggling.”226 The U.S. delegation again raised the issue of the
continued detention of Alan Gross and called for his immediate release. Roberta Jacobson
subsequently met with Gross on January 13.
Cuban Spies in the United States
Over the past decade, a number of individuals, including three U.S. government officials, have
been convicted in the United States on charges involving spying for Cuba. Most recently in June
2009, the FBI arrested a retired State Department employee and his wife, Walter Kendall Myers
and Gwendolyn Steingraber Myers, for spying for Cuba for three decades. The two were accused
of acting as agents of the Cuban government and of passing classified information to the Cuban
government. In November 2009, the Myerses pled guilty to the spying charges, and in July 2010
Kendall Myers was sentenced to life in prison while Gwendolyn Myers was sentenced to 81
months.227
In May 2003, the Bush Administration ordered the expulsion of 14 Cuban diplomats (seven from
New York and seven from Washington, DC), maintaining that they were involved in monitoring
and surveillance activities.228

224 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Continued Incarceration of Alan Gross,”
June 17, 2010.
225 U.S. Department of State, “Cuba Migration Talks,” Press Statement, January 12, 2011, and “Daily Press Briefing,”
January 13, 2011.
226 Cuban Interest Section, “Press Release Issued by the Cuban Delegation to the Round of Migration Talks Between
Cuba and the United States,” Havana, January 12, 2011.
227 Del Quentin Wilber, “Former U.S. Official, Wife Admit to 30 Years of Spying for Cuba,” Washington Post,
November 21, 2009; and Spencer S. Hsu, “Man Who Spied for Cuba Gets Life,” Washington Post, July 18, 2010.
228 “U.S. Orders Expulsion of 14 Cuban Diplomats,” Dow Jones International News, May 13, 2003; Juan O. Tamayo,
“Names of 7 Expelled Cuban Spies Revealed,” Miami Herald, September 21, 2011.
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On September 21, 2001, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst Ana Montes was arrested on
charges of spying for the Cuban government. Montes reportedly supplied Cuba with classified
information about U.S. military exercises and other sensitive operations.229 Montes ultimately
pled guilty to spying for the Cuban government for 16 years, during which she divulged the
names of four U.S. government intelligence agents working in Cuba and information about a
“special access program” related to U.S. national defense. She was sentenced in October 2002 to
25 years in prison in exchange for her cooperation with prosecutors as part of a plea bargain. In
response to the espionage case, the State Department ordered the expulsion of four Cuban
diplomats (two from Cuba’s U.N. Mission in New York and two from the Cuban Interests Section
in Washington, DC) in November 2002.
In June 2001, five members of the so-called “Wasp Network” who were originally arrested in
September 1998 were convicted on espionage charges by a U.S. Federal Court in Miami.
Sentences handed down for the so-called “Cuban five” in December 2001 ranged from 15 years
to life in prison for three of the five. (In addition to the five, a married couple in the “Wasp
Network” was sentenced in January 2002 to prison terms of seven years and three and one-half
years for their participation in the spy network.) The group of five Cuban intelligence agents—
Gerardo Hernández, Ramón Labañino, Antonio Guerrero, Fernando González, and René
González—penetrated Cuban exile groups and tried to infiltrate U.S. military bases. The Cuban
government vowed to work for the return of the “Cuban five” who have been dubbed “Heroes of
the Republic” by Cuba’s National Assembly. In December 2008, Cuban President Raúl Castro
offered to exchange some imprisoned Cuban political dissidents for the “Cuban five,” an offer
that was rejected by the State Department, which maintained that the dissidents should be
released immediately without any conditions.230
In June 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court chose not to hear an appeal of the case of the “Cuban five”
in which their lawyers were asking for a new trial outside Miami before an unbiased jury.
However, later in 2009, sentences for three of the five were reduced: Antonio Guerrero had his
life sentence reduced to almost 22 years; Ramón Labañino had his life sentence reduced to 30
years; and Fernando González had his 19-year sentence reduced to 18 years.231 Gerardo
Hernández, convicted of murder conspiracy for his role in the 1996 Brothers to the Rescue
shootdown, is serving two life sentences. Finally, René González, who received a 15-year
sentence, was released from prison in early October 2011, but still has to serve three years of
probation; a judge has ruled that he must serve it in the United States. Cuba had asked for
González to be returned to Cuba upon his release from prison so that he could be reunited with
his wife and family for humanitarian reasons. In late March 2012, González was allowed by a
federal judge in Florida to visit his dying brother in Cuba for a period of two weeks, after which
he returned to the United States.

229 Bill Miller and Walter Pincus, “Defense Analyst Accused of Spying for Cuba,” Woman Passed Classified
Information on Military Exercises, FBI Says,” Washington Post, September 22, 2001.
230 Marco Sibaja, “Raul Castro Offers To Free Dissidents in Exchange for Alleged Cuban Spies Jailed in U.S.,”
Associated Press Newswires, December 18, 2008.
231 Ian Urbina, “Judge Reduces Sentence for One of Cuban Five,” New York Times, October 14, 2009; and Jay Weaver,
“Cuban Spy’s Life Sentence Reduced to 30 Years,” Miami Herald, December 9, 2009.
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Legislative Initiatives in the 112th Congress
Enacted Measures
P.L. 112-10 (H.R. 1473). Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act,
2011. Continues funding in FY2011 for Cuba broadcasting (Radio and TV Martí) and Cuba
democracy programs. Continues provision in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L.
111-117), including a continuation during FY2011 of the clarifying provision regarding “payment
of cash in advance” for licensed agricultural and medical exports to Cuba. Both Senate and House
passed the bill on April 14, 2011; President signed into law April 15, 2011.
P.L. 112-74 (H.R. 2055). Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012. The bill was originally
introduced as the FY2012 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies
Appropriations bill in May 2011, and subsequently approved by the House and Senate,
respectively, in June and July 2011. On December 15, 2011, the bill became the vehicle for a
FY2012 “megabus” appropriations measure, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, that
combined nine full-year appropriations bills. The conference report for the bill (H.Rept. 112-331)
was filed on December 15, 2011, and approved by the House and Senate on December 16 and 17,
2011, respectively. The President signed the measure into law on December 23, 2011.
As enacted, the measure continues funding for Cuba broadcasting and Cuba democracy funding.
The conference report to the bill provides full funding for the Administration’s request of $28.475
million for Cuba broadcasting, and supports the Administration’s request for $20 million in ESF
for Cuba democracy and human rights funding.
Before the approval of the measure, a legislative battle ensued over the potential inclusion of two
Cuba provisions. The first had been in the House Appropriations Committee-approved version of
the FY2012 Financial Services Appropriations bill, H.R. 2434, and would have rolled back to
January 2009 the Obama Administration’s actions easing restrictions on remittances and on
family travel. The second provision also had been in H.R. 2434, as well as in the Senate
Appropriations Committee-approved version of the FY2012 Financial Services Appropriations
bill, S. 1573, and would have continued to clarify—for the third year in a row—the definition of
“payment of cash in advance” for U.S. agricultural and medical exports to Cuba so that the
payment would be due upon delivery in Cuba as opposed to being due before the goods left U.S.
ports. (The text of these two Cuba provisions were also included in Division C, Section 632 and
Section 634, of H.R. 3671, a “megabus” appropriations bill introduced by House Republicans on
December 14, 2011.)
Ultimately congressional leaders agreed to not include the two Cuba provisions in H.R. 2055. The
White House reportedly had exerted strong pressure not to include the Cuba provision that would
have rolled back the Administration’s easing of restrictions on travel and remittances. Dropping
the second provision on the definition of “payment of cash in advance” for U.S. agricultural and
medical products appears to have been a political tradeoff made to compensate for the travel
rollback provision being dropped.
P.L. 112-175 (H.J.Res. 117). Continuing Appropriations Resolution, FY2013. Continues funding
for FY2013 for all 12 regular appropriations (including the State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Appropriations bill) though March 27, 2013, at the same rate for projects and
activities in FY2012 plus an across-the-board increase of 0.612%. This continues funding for
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Cuba democracy programs and Cuba broadcasting. Introduced September 10, 2012; House
passed (329-91) September 13 and Senate passed (62-30) September 22. Signed into law
September 28, 2012.
S.Res. 366 (Menendez). Honors the life of dissident and democracy activist Wilman Villar
Mendoza and condemns the Castro regime for the death of Wilman Villar Mendoza. Introduced
February 1, 2012; Senate passed by Unanimous Consent February 1, 2012.
S.Res. 525 (Nelson, FL). As approved, the resolution: recognizes and honors the life and
exemplary leadership of Oswaldo Payá; offers heartfelt condolences to the family, friends, and
loved ones of Payá; praises the bravery of Payá and his colleagues for collecting more than
11,000 signatures in support of the Varela Project; calls on the United States to continue policies
that promote respect for the fundamental principles of religious freedom, democracy, and human
rights in Cuba; calls on the Cuban government to provide its citizens with internationally
accepted standards for civil and human rights and the opportunity to vote in free and fair
elections; calls on the Cuban government to allow an impartial, third-party investigation into the
circumstances surrounding the death of Payá; and condemns the Cuban government for the
detention of nearly 50 pro-democracy activists following the memorial service for Oswaldo Payá.
Introduced July 24, 2012; Senate passed, as amended by S.Amdt. 2740 (proposed by Senator
Lieberman for Senator Nelson, FL), by Unanimous Consent July 31, 2012.
Additional Initiatives
H.R. 1 (Rogers). Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011. House passed February 19,
2011. Two Cuba-related amendments submitted—Amendment No. 51 (McCollum) and
Amendment No. 369 (Flake), both printed in the Congressional Record on February 14, 2011—
would have eliminated funding for Radio and TV Marti, but were never considered.
H.R. 255 (Serrano). Cuba Reconciliation Act. Would lift the trade embargo on Cuba. Introduced
January 7, 2011; referred to Committees on Foreign Affairs, Ways and Means, Energy and
Commerce, Financial Services, Judiciary, Oversight and Government Reform, and Agriculture.
H.R. 256 (Serrano). Baseball Diplomacy Act. Would waive certain prohibitions with respect to
nationals of Cuba coming to the United States to play organized professional baseball. Introduced
January 7, 2011; referred to Committees on Foreign Affairs and Judiciary.
H.R. 372 (Buchanan). Would amend the Outer Continental Shelf Act to authorize the Secretary
of the Interior to deny leases and permits to persons who engage in activities with the government
of any foreign country that is subject to any sanction or an embargo established by the U.S.
government. Introduced January 20, 2011; referred to the Committee on Natural Resources.
H.R. 380 (Lee). Pursuit of International Education (PIE) Act of 2011. Would provide that no
funds made available to the Department of the Treasury may be used to implement, administer, or
enforce regulations to require specific licenses for travel-related transactions directly related to
educational activities in Cuba. Introduced January 20, 2011; referred to the Committee on Foreign
Affairs.
H.R. 833 (Conaway). Agricultural Export Enhancement Act of 2011. Would remove obstacles to
legal sales of U.S. agricultural commodities to Cuba, as authorized by the Trade Sanctions
Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000. Section 2 would define the term “payment of cash
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in advance” under TSRA as “the payment by the purchaser of an agricultural commodity or
product and the receipt of such payment by the seller” prior to the transfer of title and the release
of control of such commodity or product to the purchaser. Section 3 would authorize direct
transfers between Cuban and U.S. financial institutions for product sales under TSRA. Introduced
February 28, 2011; referred to the Committees on Financial Services, Foreign Affairs, and
Agriculture.
H.R. 1317 (McCollum). Stop Wasting Taxpayer Money on Cuba Broadcasting Act. Would repeal
the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act (22 USC 1465 et seq.) and the Television Broadcasting to
Cuba Act (22 USC 1465aa et seq.). Introduced April 1, 2011; referred to the Committee on
Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 1886 (Rangel). Export Freedom to Cuba Act. Would prohibit restrictions on travel to Cuba.
Introduced May 12, 2011; referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
H.R. 1887 (Rangel). Free Trade with Cuba Act. Would lift the trade embargo by repealing and
amending certain laws. Introduced May 12, 2011; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
and in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, the Judiciary,
Financial Services, Oversight and Government Reform, and Agriculture.
H.R. 1888 (Rangel). Promoting American Agricultural and Medical Exports to Cuba Act of 2011.
Would facilitate the export of U.S. agricultural products to Cuba, remove impediments to the
export of medical devices and medicines to Cuba, and prohibit restrictions on travel to Cuba.
Introduced May 12, 2011; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the
Committees on Ways and Means, the Judiciary, Agriculture, and Financial Services.
H.R. 2047 (Ros-Lehtinen). Caribbean Coral Reef Protection Act of 2011. Amends the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act to exclude from the United States aliens who invest $1
million or more that contributes to the enhancement of the ability of Cuba to develop petroleum
resources located off its coast. Would also require the imposition of sanctions if the President
determined that a person had invested $1 million or more in any 12-month period since January
10, 2005, that contributes to the enhancement of the ability of Cuba to develop petroleum
resources off its coast. Introduced May 26, 2011; referred to Committee on the Judiciary, and in
addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Financial Services, and Oversight and
Government Reform.
H.R. 2434 (Emerson)/S. 1573 (Durbin). FY2012 Financial Services and General Government
Appropriations. H.R. 2434 introduced July 7, 2011, and reported by the House Appropriations
Committee (H.Rept. 112-136). S. 1573 introduced September 15, 20111, and reported by the
Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 112-79). Both bills had a provision (§618 of H.R.
2434 and §620 of S. 1573) that would have continued to clarify the definition of “payment of
cash in advance” for U.S. agricultural and medical sales to Cuba to “be interpreted as payment
before the transfer of title to, and control of, the exported items to the Cuban purchaser.” The
Senate bill had another Cuba provision (§624) that would have prohibited restrictions on direct
transfers from a Cuban financial institution to a U.S. financial institution in payment for licensed
agricultural and medical exports to Cuba. The House bill had another Cuba provision (§901) that
would have repealed any amendments to certain sections of the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations relating to family travel (31 CFR 515.560(a)(1) and 31 CFR 515.561), carrying
remittances to Cuba (31 CFR 515.560(c)(4)(i)), and sending remittances to Cuba (31 CFR
515.570) made since January 2009. The provision would have rolled back President Obama’s
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easing of restrictions on family travel and remittances in 2009 and the President’s easing of
restrictions on remittances for non-family members and religious institutions in 2011.
None of the Cuba provision in H.R. 2434 or S. 1573 were included in the FY2012 “megabus”
appropriations measure, P.L. 112-74 (H.R. 2055), described above. In November 2011, an attempt
to include the Senate version of the Financial Services appropriations measure, S. 1573, in a
“minibus” with two other full-year appropriations measures and a short-term continuing
resolution failed in part because of disagreement over the Cuba provision that would have
allowed direct transfers from a Cuban financial institution to a U.S. financial institution to pay for
U.S. agricultural and medical exports to Cuba.
H.R. 2583 (Ros-Lehtinen). FY2012 Foreign Relations Authorization Act. Introduced July 19,
2011; reported by House Committee on Foreign Affairs (H.Rept. 112-223) July 23, 2011. Section
1126 would require the President to fully enforce all U.S. regulations as in effect on January 19,
2009, on travel to Cuba, and impose the corresponding penalties against individuals determined
to be in violation of such regulations. The provision became part of the bill during the
committee’s markup on July 21, 2011, when the committee approved (36-6) an amendment
offered by Representative Rivera. (The Rivera amendment was a second degree amendment to an
amendment offered by Representative Meeks that was subsequently was approved by voice vote.)
The intent of the Rivera amendment was to reinstate travel restrictions as they existed under the
Bush Administration in January 2009.
H.R. 2771 (Rivera). Would amend the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-732) to increase
to five years the period during which a Cuban national must be physically present in the United
States in order to qualify for adjustment of status to that of a permanent resident. Would also
provide that an alien shall be ineligible for adjustment to permanent resident status if the alien
returns to Cuba after admission or parole into the United States. Introduced August 1, 2011;
referred to House Committee on the Judiciary.
H.R. 2831 (Rivera). Would amend the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-732) to make an
alien ineligible for adjustment under the act if the aliens returns to Cuba after admission or parole
into the United States. Requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to rescind the status of an
alien who obtained adjustment of status if the alien returns to Cuba before being becoming a U.S.
citizen. Introduced August 30, 2011; referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee
on Immigration Policy and Enforcement held hearing May 31, 2012 (testimony and webcast
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/Hearings%202012/hear_05312012_3.html).
H.R. 4135 (Flake). Western Hemisphere Energy Security Act of 2012. The bill would permit
U.S. companies to participate in hydrocarbon exploration and extraction activities from any
portion of foreign maritime exclusive economic zone that is contiguous to the exclusive economic
zone of the United States. It would also allow for the export of all equipment and travel needed
for such activities, and would allow for the importation of hydrocarbon resources from Cuba
Introduced March 5, 2012; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 4310 (McKeon)/S. 3254 (Levin). National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013. H.R.
4310 introduced March 29, 2012; House passed (299-120) May 18, 2012. As approved, Section
803 would prohibit the Department of Defense from contracting for the procurement of goods and
services with any person that has business operations with a state sponsor of terrorism. The
provision was added to the bill by voice vote during May 17, 2012, House floor consideration.
H.Amdt. 1119 (McKeon), an en bloc amendment considering of several amendments, including
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Amendment No. 94 (Rivera), which became Section 803 of the bill. S. 3254, introduced June 4,
2012, does not have a similar provision.
H.R. 5857 (Granger)/S. 3241(Leahy). FY2013 State Department, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2013. H.R. 5857 introduced and reported (H.Rept. 112-
494) May 25 by the House Committee on Appropriations. S. 3241 introduced and reported
(S.Rept. 112-172) by the Senate Committee on Appropriations May 24, 2012.
Both bills would continue the long-standing prohibition on direct funding assistance to the
government Cuba, and would require that any assistance to Cuba be provided through the regular
notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.
The House bill would provide $20 million in ESF ($5 million more than the Administration’s
request), but would transfer and merge the aid with funds available to the National Endowment
for Democracy to promote democracy and strengthen civil society in Cuba. The Senate bill would
provide $15 million in ESF for Cuba (the same as the Administration’s request), including for
humanitarian assistance, support for economic reform, private sector initiatives, democracy, and
human rights.
With regard to Cuba broadcasting, the House bill would provide $28.062 million ($4.468 million
more than the Administration’s request and the same amount provided in FY2012), while the
Senate bill would provide $23.4 million ($194,000 less than the Administration’s request).
Congress did not finish action on the measure before the beginning of FY2013, but instead
approved a continuing appropriation resolution, P.L. 112-175 (H.J.Res. 117) described above, that
continues funding for through March 27, 2013, at the same rate for projects and activities in
FY2012 plus an across-the-board increase of 0.612%.
H.R. 6067 (Ros-Lehtinen). Western Hemisphere Security Cooperation Act of 2012. Introduced
June 29, 2012; referred to Committees on Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, Financial Services, and
Oversight and Government Reform. Includes numerous provisions on Cuba, including Section
104, which would require notifications relating to travel by Cuban government officials within or
to the United States; Section 105, which would impose visa restrictions and economic sanctions
on those involved in facilitating the development of Cuba’s offshore petroleum resources (similar
to language of H.R. 2047 described above); and Section 201, which would impose restrictions on
nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba.
H.Res. 226 (King). Would call for the immediate extradition or rendering to the United States of
convicted felon William Morales and all other fugitives from justice who are receiving safe
harbor in Cuba in order to escape prosecution or confinement for criminal offenses committed in
the United States. Introduced April 14, 2011; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.Res. 536 (Diaz-Balart). Would condemn the murder of Wilman Villar Mendoza and honor his
sacrifice in the cause of freedom for the Cuban people. Introduced February 2, 2012; referred to
Committee on Foreign Affairs.
S. 223 (Rockefeller). FAA Air Transportation Modernization and Safety Improvement Act.
Senate approved February 17, 2011. S.Amdt. 61 (Rubio), submitted February 10, 2011, but never
considered, would have prohibited an expansion of flights to locations in countries that are state
sponsors of terrorism.
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S. 405 (Nelson, Bill). Gulf Stream Protection Act of 2011. Section 2 of the bill would require that
if a company that is conducting oil or gas operations off the coasts of Cuba wants to lease drilling
rights in the United States, then the company would have to submit an oil response plan for their
Cuba operations and would have to demonstrate sufficient financial and other resources to
respond to a worst case scenario oil spill in Cuban waters that would affect the waters of the
United States. Section 3 of the bill would require the Secretary of the Interior, within 180 days of
the enactment of the bill, to carry out an oil spill risk analysis and planning process for the
development and implementation of oil spill response plans for nondomestic oil spills in the Gulf
of Mexico. The Secretary of the Interior would be required, among other things, to consult with
the Secretary of State and, to the maximum extent practicable, include recommendations for
Congress on a joint contingency plan with the countries of Mexico, Cuba, and the Bahamas to
ensure an adequate response to oil spills located in the eastern Gulf of Mexico. Introduced
February 17, 2011; referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
S. 476 (Pryor). Broadcast Savings Act. Would discontinue Radio and TV Martí broadcasts to
Cuba by repealing the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act and the Television Broadcasting to Cuba
Act. Introduced March 3, 2011; referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
S. 603 (Nelson, FL)/H.R. 1166 (Issa). Similar, but not identical bills, would modify the
prohibition by U.S. courts of certain rights relating to certain marks, trade names, or commercial
names. S. 603 introduced March 16, 2011; referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 1166
introduced March 17, 2011; referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
S. 1601 (Leahy). FY2012 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations. Introduced September 22, 2011; reported by the Senate Appropriations
Committee (S.Rept. 112-85). As reported by the committee, the bill would have provided that $15
million in ESF may be provided for Cuba, including humanitarian and democracy assistance,
support for economic reform, private sector initiatives, and human rights. In its report to the bill,
the committee maintained that it expected that funds would be made available, and programs
carried out, in a transparent manner. The committee also directed that the USAID Administrator
provide regular updates to the committee on the number of Cubans who receive assistance and
the types of assistance. In the report to the bill, the committee recommended $28.181 million in
funding for Cuba broadcasting, $294,000 less than the Administration’s request.
A draft House Appropriations Committee report and bill (marked up by the Subcommittee on
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs on July 27, 2011) would have recommended
$20 million in ESF for Cuba, and would have directed that the funds be used only for democracy-
building, and not for business promotion, economic reform, social development or other purposes
expressly authorized by Section 109(a) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of
1996 (P.L. 104-114). The draft report would also have recommended $30.175 million for Cuba
broadcasting, $1.7 million more than the Administration’s request. (See the draft committee
report, available at http://appropriations.house.gov/UploadedFiles/FY12-
SFOPSCombinedReport-CSBA.pdf.)
Ultimately, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, (P.L. 112-74; H.Rept. 112-331)
described above, Congress fully funded the Administration’s FY2012 request of $28.475 million
for Cuba broadcasting and supported the Administration request of $20 million in ESF for Cuba
democracy funding.
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S.Res. 140 (Rubio). Would commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs operation and
commend members of Assault Brigade 2506. Introduced April 12, 2011; referred to Committee
on Foreign Relations.
S.Res. 342 (Rubio). Would honor the life and legacy of Laura Pollan, a founder of the “Ladies in
White” human right group in Cuba. Introduced December 1, 2011; reported by the Committee on
Foreign Relations February 14, 2012.


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Appendix A. Selected Executive Branch Reports
and Web Pages
Background Note, Cuba, State Department
Date: November 7, 2011
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/cuba/191090.htm
U.S. Relations with Cuba, Fact Sheet, State Department
Date: June 21, 2012
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2013, Annex: Regional
Perspectives (pp. 768-769 of pdf), State Department
Date: April 3, 2012
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/185015.pdf
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2011, Cuba, State Department
Date: May 24, 2012
Full Text:
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dynamic_load_id=186505
Country Reports on Terrorism 2011 (State Sponsors of Terrorism chapter), State Department
Date: July 31, 2012
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195547.htm
Cuba Country Page, State Department
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/p/wha/ci/cu/
Cuba Country Page, U.S. Agency for International Development
Full Text: http://www.usaid.gov/where-we-work/latin-american-and-caribbean/cuba/our-work
Cuba Sanctions, Treasury Department
Full Text: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/cuba.aspx
Cuba: What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions Against Cuba, Treasury Department,
Office of Foreign Assets Control
Date: January 24, 2012
Full Text: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba.pdf
International Religious Freedom Report, 2011, Cuba, State Department
Date: July 30, 2012
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?dlid=192965#wrapper
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2012, Vol. I, Cuba (pp. 185-187), State
Department
Date: March 2012
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/187109.pdf
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Trafficking in Persons Report 2012 (Cuba, pp. 133-134 of pdf), State Department
Date: June 19, 2012
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/192594.pdf
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Appendix B. Earlier Developments in 2012 and 2011
On June 7, 2012, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics, held a hearing on Cuba’s human rights situation
in which Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson expressed
strong U.S. support for democracy and human rights activists in Cuba and defended the Obama’s
Administration policy on travel and remittances. The hearing also included three human rights
activists testifying from Cuba, one of whom—Jorge Luis García Pérez (also known as
Antúnez)—was subsequently arrested and beaten on June 9 and held for five days. Several U.S.
Senators strongly condemned Cuba’s action, including Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Chairman John Kerry.
On May 31, 2012, the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration on
Policy Enforcement, held a hearing on H.R. 2831 (Rivera), a bill that would amend the Cuban
Adjustment Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-732) by providing that an alien from Cuba would be ineligible
for adjustment to permanent resident status if he or she returns to Cuba before becoming a U.S.
citizen. The intent of the bill is to curb travel to Cuba by those who have recently emigrated from
Cuba.
On May 24, 2012, the State Department released its 2011 human rights report, which maintained
that Cuba’s “principal human rights abuses were: abridgement of the rights of citizens to change
their government; government threats, intimidation, mobs, harassment, and detentions to prevent
citizens from assembly peacefully; and a significant increase in the number of short-term
detentions.”
On May 18, 2012, the Spanish oil company Repsol, which had begun exploratory drilling for oil
off of Cuba’s north coast in January 2012, announced that its exploratory well came up dry. On
the same day, the House approved its version of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act,
H.R. 4310, with a provision that would prohibit the Department of Defense from contracting for
the procurement of goods and services with any person that has business operations with a state
sponsor of terrorism. The provision would affect Repsol from partnering with Cuba in oil
exploration efforts while at the same time benefiting from DOD contracts. Repsol subsequently
announced in late May that it would likely leave Cuba.
On May 17, 2012, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere, held a hearing entitled “Cuba’s Global Network of Terrorism, Intelligence, and
Warfare,” (available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearings/view/?1440).
On March 26-28, 2012, Pope Benedict XVI visited Cuba, arriving first in Santiago and then
traveling to Havana. The last papal visit was 1998, when Pope John Paul II visited the island.
On March 7, 2012, the State Department released its 2012 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report, which maintained that “greater communication and cooperation among the U.S.,
its international partners and Cuba, particularly in the area of real-time tactical information-
sharing and improved tactics, techniques and procedures, would likely lead to increased
interdictions and disruptions of illegal trafficking.” The report maintained that the United States
was still reviewing a draft bilateral counternarcotics accord presented by Cuba, and that such an
accord, if structured appropriately, “could advance the counternarcotics efforts undertaken by
both countries.”
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On February 22, 2012, Cuban police detained dissidents in Havana and in the eastern provinces
of Guantánamo, Holguín, and Santiago de Cuba to disrupt any demonstrations to commemorate
the two-year anniversary of the death of hunger striker Orlando Zapata Tamayo on February 23.
On February 9, 2012, the nongovernmental Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National
Reconciliation reported that there were at least 631 short-term detentions for political reasons in
January 2012 while there were at least 4,123 such detentions in 2011, almost double the number
in 2010. (See the report, available at http://www.cubanet.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/
OVERVIEW-ENERO-2012.pdf.)
On February 1, 2012, the Senate passed S.Res. 366 by Unanimous Consent, “honoring the life of
dissident and democracy activist Wilman Villar Mendoza and condemning the Castro regime of
the death of Wilman Villar Mendoza.” The 31-year-old died on January 19, 2012, following a 50-
day hunger strike after he was convicted of “contempt” of authority in November 2011 and
sentenced to four years in prison after participating in a peaceful demonstration.
On January 31, 2012, the Spanish oil company Repsol began exploratory drilling off of Cuba’s
northern coast about 50 miles northwest of Havana.
On January 30, 2012, the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee
on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, held a Florida field hearing on the issue of offshore
drilling in Cuba and the Bahamas that examined oil spill readiness and response planning.
On January 28-29, 2012, the Cuban Communist Party held a national conference focusing on
internal party changes. The party confirmed two five-year term limits for top positions in the
party and government, although analysts expressed disappointment that more significant reforms
were not addressed.
On December 13, 2011, the Government Accountability Office issued a report on Cuba
broadcasting that stated that a congressionally mandated strategic plan by the Broadcasting Board
of Governors lacked key information, with five of six components required by Congress only
partially addressed (the report is available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/586869.pdf).
On November 2, 2011, the House Natural Resources Committee, Subcommittee on Energy and
Mineral Resources, held a hearing examining offshore drilling by Cuba and the Bahamas. (See
http://naturalresources.house.gov/Calendar/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=260052.)
On October 18, 2011, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee hearing held a
hearing on the status of response capabilities and readiness for oil spills in foreign waters adjacent
to U.S. waters. (See http://energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/hearings-and-business-meetings?
ID=f37547ef-039b-373a-dc68-113595376178.)
On October 7, 2011, René González, one of the so-called “Cuban five” convicted in U.S. court
for involvement in spying, was released from prison after serving 13 years of a 15-year sentence.
González will still need to serve three years of probation, and a judge has ruled that he must serve
it in the United States.
On September 28, 2011, in response to questions at a roundtable discussion, President Obama
indicated that his Administration has tried “to send a signal that we are open to a new relationship
with Cuba if the Cuban government starts taking the proper steps to open up its own country and
… provide the space and the respect for human rights that would allow the Cuban people to
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determine their own destiny.” (See the President’s remarks, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/28/remarks-president-open-questions-
roundtable.)
On August 18, 2011, more than 40 members of the Ladies in White human rights group in
Havana were attacked by a government-orchestrated mob. The group had been attempting to
stage a protest to call attention to the recent harassment of their colleagues in the city of Santiago
in eastern Cuba. On September 24, pro-government supporters prevented the Ladies in White
from marching to Mass on the feast day of the Virgin of Mercy.
On August 18, 2011, the State Department issued its 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. The
section on Cuba maintained that the government “maintained a public stance against terrorism
and terrorist financing, but there was no evidence that it had severed ties with elements from the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and recent media reports indicate some
current and former members of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) continue to reside in
Cuba.” (See the report, available at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/index.htm.)
On August 5, 2011, Cuba’s Supreme Court rejected the appeal of Alan Gross, the USAID
subcontractor imprisoned in Cuba since late 2009 and convicted in March 2011 for “actions
against the independence and territorial integrity of the state” and sentenced to 15 years in prison.
A White House Statement called for his immediate and unconditional release.
On July 21, 2011, during its markup of H.R. 2583, the FY2012 Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs approved (36-6) a Rivera amendment that would
require the President to fully enforce all U.S. regulations on travel to Cuba as in effect on January
19, 2009, and impose the corresponding penalties against individuals determined to be in
violation of such regulations. The intent of the amendment was to reinstate tighter travel
restrictions as they existed under the Bush Administration in January 2009.
On July 13, 2011, the White House’s Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 2434, the
FY2012 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations bill, stated that the
Administration opposes Section 901 because it would reverse the President’s policy on family
travel and remittances, and that the President’s senior advisors would recommend a veto if the bill
contained the provision.
On July 13, 2011, more than 40 Cuban dissidents issued a document dubbed the “People’s Path,”
that advocates for a peaceful transition toward a democratic system and for an assembly to
rewrite the constitution.
On June 24, 2011, during markup of the House FY2012 Financial Services and General
Government Appropriations bill (subsequently introduced as H.R. 2434), the House
Appropriations Committee approved an amendment by voice vote that would repeal amendments
to the Cuba embargo regulations made since January 19, 2009, regarding family travel, carrying
remittances to Cuba, and sending remittances to Cuba. The provision, which became Section 901
of the bill, would roll back President Obama’s easing of restrictions on family travel and
remittances in 2009 and his easing of restrictions on remittances for non-family members and
religious institutions in 2011.
From April 16-19, 2011, the Cuban Communist Party held its sixth party congress, focusing on
making changes to Cuba’s economic model.
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On April 8, 2011, the State Department issued its 2010 human rights reports on countries
worldwide. The report documented continued significant human rights abuses, including
harassment, beatings, and threats against political opponents by government-organized mobs and
state security officials; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary detention of human
rights advocates and members of independent organizations; selective prosecution and denial of
fair trial; pervasive monitoring of private conversations; and severe limitations on freedom of
speech and press. (See the full State Department human rights report on Cuba, available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/wha/154501.htm.)
On March 30, 2011, former President Jimmy Carter completed a three-day trip to Cuba, where he
had meetings with President Castro, Catholic Cardinal Jaime Ortega, and several human rights
activists. He also visited imprisoned U.S. government subcontractor Alan Gross.
On March 23, 2011, the Cuban government released the last two of the “group of 75” political
prisoners who were incarcerated in March 2003 in a severe crackdown on political dissidents.
Overall, more than 125 political prisoners have been released since mid-2010.
On March 12, 2011, a Cuban court convicted and sentenced USAID subcontractor Alan Gross to
15 years in prison for “actions against the independence and territorial integrity of the state.”
Gross has been imprisoned since December 2009, when he was arrested after distributing
communications equipment to Jewish organizations in Cuba.
On March 3, 2011, the State Department issued its 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report (INCSR), which maintained that the United States was reviewing a draft bilateral accord
for counternarcotics cooperation that Cuba had presented. The report maintained that such an
accord, if structured appropriately, “could advance the counternarcotics efforts undertaken by
both countries.”
On January 28, 2011, the Departments of Homeland Security and Treasury published changes to
their Cuba regulations in the Federal Register (pp. 5058-5061 and pp. 5072-5078) designed to
increase purposeful travel to Cuba (including people-to-people exchanges), allow any U.S. person
to send remittances to non-family members in Cuba, and allow all U.S. international airports to
apply to provide licensed charter flights to and from Cuba. The Treasury Department has not yet
finalized guidelines for the new regulations so that applications for travel requiring specific
licenses are not yet being processed.
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Appendix C. CRS and GAO Reports
Active CRS Reports Discussing Cuba
CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report R40566, Cuban Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends, by Ruth Ellen
Wasem.
CRS Report R41522, Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S. Policy
Considerations, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report R40139, Closing the Guantanamo Detention Center: Legal Issues, by Michael John
Garcia et al..
CRS Report R40754, Guantanamo Detention Center: Legislative Activity in the 111th Congress,
by Michael John Garcia.
CRS Report R42008, Financial Services and General Government: FY2012 Appropriations,
coordinated by Garrett Hatch.
CRS Report R41340, Financial Services and General Government (FSGG): FY2011
Appropriations, coordinated by Garrett Hatch.
CRS Report R40801, Financial Services and General Government (FSGG): FY2010
Appropriations, coordinated by Garrett Hatch.
CRS Report RL34523, Financial Services and General Government (FSGG): FY2009
Appropriations, coordinated by Garrett Hatch.
CRS Report RL33200, Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean, by Clare
Ribando Seelke.
CRS Report RL32014, WTO Dispute Settlement: Status of U.S. Compliance in Pending Cases, by
Jeanne J. Grimmett.
Archived CRS Reports
CRS Report RS20450, The Case of Elian Gonzalez: Legal Basics, by Larry M. Eig.
CRS Report RL33622, Cuba’s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches, by Mark
P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RS22742, Cuba’s Political Succession: From Fidel to Raúl Castro, by Mark P.
Sullivan.
CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report R40193, Cuba: Issues for the 111th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
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CRS Report RL33819, Cuba: Issues for the 110th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL32730, Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL31740, Cuba: Issues for the 108th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL30806, Cuba: Issues for the 107th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan and Maureen
Taft-Morales.
CRS Report RL30628, Cuba: Issues and Legislation In the 106th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan
and Maureen Taft-Morales.
CRS Report RL30386, Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events 1959-1999, by Mark P.
Sullivan.
CRS Report RL33499, Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions:
Status and Implementation, by Remy Jurenas.
CRS Report RS22094, Lawsuits Against State Supporters of Terrorism: An Overview, by Jennifer
K. Elsea.
CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K.
Elsea.
CRS Report 94-636, Radio and Television Broadcasting to Cuba: Background and Issues
Through 1994, by Susan B. Epstein and Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RS21764, Restricting Trademark Rights of Cubans: WTO Decision and
Congressional Response, by Margaret Mikyung Lee.
Selected GAO Reports
Broadcasting Board of Governors Should Provide Additional Information to Congress Regarding
Broadcasting to Cuba, December 13, 2011, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/586869.pdf.
Broadcasting to Cuba: Actions are Needed to Improve Strategy and Operations, U.S.
Government Accountability Office, January 2009, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09127.pdf.
Broadcasting to Cuba: Observations Regarding TV Martí’s Strategy and Operations, Statement of
Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade before the Subcommittee on International
Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S.
Government Accountability Office, June 17, 2009, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09758t.pdf.
Foreign Assistance: Continued Efforts Needed to Strengthen USAID’s Oversight of U.S.
Democracy Assistance for Cuba, U.S. Government Accountability Office, November 2008,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09165.pdf.
Foreign Assistance: U.S. Democracy Assistance for Cuba Needs Better Management and
Oversight, U.S. Government Accountability Office, November 2006, http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d07147.pdf.
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U.S. Embargo on Cuba: Recent Regulatory Changes and Potential Presidential or Congressional
Actions, U.S. Government Accountability Office, September 17, 2009, http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d09951r.pdf.

Author Contact Information

Mark P. Sullivan

Specialist in Latin American Affairs
msullivan@crs.loc.gov, 7-7689


Acknowledgments
Susan G. Chesser, Information Research Specialist, produced the statistical figures presented in
this report, and contributed to the appendices.
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