Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
October 18, 2012
Congressional Research Service
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Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy

Summary
The September 11, 2012, terrorist attacks on the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi
underscored the serious security challenges facing Libya’s citizens, their newly elected leaders,
and U.S. diplomats. U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other U.S. personnel were
killed after armed individuals attacked and burned buildings on the main mission compound and
subsequently attacked a second annex site where U.S. personnel had been evacuated. Libyan
officials and citizens have condemned the murder of U.S. personnel and investigations have
begun. Armed non-state groups continue to operate in many areas of the country. On August 27,
the U.S. State Department had warned U.S. citizens against visiting Libya and stated that “inter-
militia conflict can erupt at any time or any place in the country.”
Libya’s post-conflict transition is underway, as Libyans work to consolidate change from the 40-
year dictatorship of Muammar al Qadhafi to a representative government based on democratic
and Islamic principles. Recent flare-ups in violence have coincided with a number of important
steps in the country’s political transition. On July 7, 2012, Libyan voters chose 200 members of a
General National Congress (GNC) in the country’s first nationwide election in nearly 50 years.
The GNC has elected its leadership and is now overseeing national government affairs. The GNC
elected a prime minister-designate in September, but later removed him in a no-confidence vote
after his proposed cabinet list was rejected. The GNC selected Ali Zeidan as prime minister
designate on October 14, and is expected to determine the method for selecting members of a
drafting committee to prepare a new constitution. If voters approve a constitution in a
referendum, then new elections are to be held by mid-2013, bringing a nearly two-year transition
to a close. Security conditions are the immediate concern of Libyans and their leaders.
In the wake of the July election, Libya’s interim leaders remain answerable to a wide range of
locally and regionally organized activists, locally elected and appointed committees, prominent
personalities, tribes, militias, and civil society groups seeking to shape the transition and
safeguard the revolution’s achievements. Many Libyans have hoped that the elected GNC and the
yet-to-be-appointed cabinet will enjoy greater legitimacy that will enable them to act decisively
on security issues and other key areas, such as fiscal affairs and post-conflict justice and
reconciliation. However, the insecurity prevalent in Libya complicates important issues, including
debates over the centralization of government authority, the provision of security, the proper role
for Islam in political and social life, and related concerns about the potential for Libyan territory
to be exploited by terrorists, arms traffickers, and criminal networks.
The proliferation of military weaponry from unsecured stockpiles—including small arms,
explosives, and shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles (MANPADs)—remains a serious concern.
The Obama Administration has been implementing a program with Libyan authorities to retrieve
and disable weapons, including MANPADs. U.S. officials believe that nuclear materials and
chemical weapons components are secure (including previously undeclared chemical weapons),
and Libyan leaders have recommitted to destroying the remnants of Qadhafi’s chemical arsenal.
As of October 2012, the U.S. government has allocated more than $200 million in assistance for
Libya since the start of the uprising in 2011. Attacks on U.S. personnel and facilities have
disrupted U.S. aid programs temporarily. However, since the attacks, U.S. officials have proposed
expanded security cooperation to Libyan officials and underscored a U.S. commitment to
partnership with Libya. As Libyans work to shape their future, Congress and the Obama
Administration have the first opportunity since the 1960s to fully redefine U.S.-Libyan relations.
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Contents
Overview and Analysis .................................................................................................................... 1
Assessment ................................................................................................................................ 1
Attacks on U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi ........................................................................... 3
Political Developments and Challenges .................................................................................... 5
Domestic and Regional Security Issues..................................................................................... 8
Militia Integration and Security Sector Reform .................................................................. 8
U.S. Security Policy Considerations ................................................................................... 9
U.S. Assistance Programs and Related Legislation................................................................... 9
FY2013 Appropriations and Pending Funding Issues....................................................... 10
Background.................................................................................................................................... 15
Libyan History, Civil War, and Political Change..................................................................... 15
July 2012 General National Congress Election and Results ................................................... 17
Constitutional Assembly and Federalism Debate.................................................................... 18
Security and Human Rights Challenges .................................................................................. 19
Weapons Proliferation and Related Concerns ................................................................... 19
Chemical Weapons Destruction and Nuclear Material...................................................... 21
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) ............................................................ 22
Economic Issues ...................................................................................................................... 22
Libyan Assets .................................................................................................................... 22
Trade, Investment, and Energy.......................................................................................... 23
International Criminal Court (ICC) and United Nations Human Rights Council
Investigations........................................................................................................................ 24
Legislation in the 112th Congress ............................................................................................ 25

Figures
Figure 1. Libya at a Glance............................................................................................................ 13
Figure 2. Libya Uprising and Conflict Timeline............................................................................ 14
Figure 3. Libya’s Proposed Transition Timeline............................................................................ 14

Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Libya FY2010-FY2013...................................................................... 12

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 27

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Overview and Analysis
Assessment
After the swell of confidence and international recognition that followed the announcement of
Libya’s liberation in late 2011, Libya’s citizens, revolutionaries, and Transitional National
Council (TNC) leadership moved haltingly down a path of political transition and economic
recovery during the first half of 2012. Political parties and civil society organizations—long
banned—have emerged in large numbers, and a lively political atmosphere now exists, as
reflected in the preparation for and conduct of Libya’s first national election in nearly 50 years on
July 7, 2012. The election of an interim 200-member General National Congress (GNC) to
replace the appointed TNC marked an important step on the planned transition timeline (see
Figure 3 below). Many Libyans and outside observers have expressed hope that the elected
interim Congress will appoint a cabinet that will be able to leverage its democratic legitimacy to
act decisively on key issues. Like their TNC predecessors, Libya’s new interim leaders face a
number of chronic challenges, some of which have been exacerbated by the consequences of the
violent revolution and complicated by the legacies of Qadhafi’s patronage- and fear-based rule.
Some expert observers of Libya’s domestic politics have emphasized the general weakness and
fractured condition of Libya’s political landscape after 40 years of idiosyncratic abuse by Qadhafi
and his supporters. Qadhafi purposely undermined state institutions, including the military, and
manipulated tribal, regional, and political groups to maintain power. The 2011 conflict
empowered local groups and weakened the capacity of state security bodies. Transitional
authorities have inherited weak national government institutions, and competition among some
groups has intensified during the transition. Political support for interim leaders among some
Libyans has waned in light of the government’s failure to rapidly improve basic services, ensure
security, or deliver expected financial support via salaries, subsidies, and relief payments. While
cognizant of these challenges, U.S. officials applauded the conduct of the July 2012 election,
welcomed the newly elected GNC, and, through early September, had not described ongoing
political debates and intermittent security incidents as grave threats to the transition.
As the recent attacks on U.S. facilities and personnel illustrate, security conditions remain the
immediate priority for Libyans and the United States. The anti-U.S. attacks in Benghazi were the
latest in a series of incidents involving international targets in several cities, including violent
attacks that targeted the United Kingdom’s Ambassador, the International Committee of the Red
Cross, and U.S. facilities in Benghazi in 2012. These attacks, the destruction of religious
buildings by Salafist1 militia groups, assassinations of former regime security officials, and the
persistence of isolated armed conflicts have raised serious questions about the ability of the
interim authorities to ensure order.
As of October 2012, militia groups remained active and influential, with some acknowledging
and participating in government efforts to assert central security authority. Public displays of
weapons, attacks on international targets, and isolated armed clashes underscore the threats posed
by some groups. Security officials continue to rely on irregular forces to provide security in much
of the country, including in Benghazi. A looming military confrontation between militia forces

1 The term Salafist refers to conservative Sunni Muslims that advocate for personal and/or public adoption of the
practices of Mohammed and the first three generations of Muslims (al salaf al saalih).
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based in the city of Misuratah and alleged pro-Qadhafi elements in the town of Bani Walid has
preoccupied national leaders in recent weeks. Differences of opinion over regional representation
and the balance of power between national and local authorities may become a subject of greater
debate and potential source of conflict as the transition continues.
On August 27, 2012, the U.S. State Department issued a travel warning for Libya that stated:
“Inter-militia conflict can erupt at any time or any place in the country…. There have also been
several reports of militias briefly apprehending and detaining foreigners due to perceived or
actual violations of Libyan law. The Embassy’s ability to intervene in such cases remains limited,
as these groups are neither sanctioned nor controlled by the Libyan government.” Following the
Benghazi attack, that warning was amended on September 12, 2012, to encourage all U.S.
citizens to depart Libya and “use extreme caution” if remaining in or travelling to Libya.
Libya’s borders and hundreds of suspected weapons sites remained loosely secured, although
limited efforts to secure them have begun, with the support of the United Nations Support
Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the United States, and other governments. The proliferation of
small arms, man-portable air defense missile systems (MANPADS), and some heavy weaponry
among Libyans and beyond Libya’s borders has led some counterterrorism and arms trafficking
experts, as well as officials in neighboring countries, to express concern about the conflict’s
longer-term implications for security in Libya and the region. Most security experts expect that
unexploded ordnance, explosive remnants, and looted weaponry will present a domestic and
regional challenge for many years. Officials in the United States and Europe have expressed
concern about the potential for violent extremists to benefit from conditions in Libya and are
seeking to maintain counterterrorism cooperation with the post-Qadhafi government.
To date, widespread political violence has not emerged or disrupted the transition. With the
exception of some violent attempts to disrupt voting in eastern Libya, domestic and international
observers reported that voting in the July 2012 election was administered professionally and
transparently, without critical interruptions or serious irregularities.2 Over 60% of registered
voters participated. The results showed a strong performance by former TNC interim-Prime
Minister Mahmoud Jibril’s Alliance of National Forces, which won 39 of 80 “political entity”
(party-list) seats, followed by the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Justice and Construction party,
which won 17 seats. The 120 individual candidates elected include a variety of activists, locally
prominent persons, and party affiliates. The winners continue to negotiate among themselves, and
they have elected a GNC President and an interim Prime Minister-designate to propose a cabinet.
Taken together, these factors suggest that securing U.S. interests in Libya may require sustained
attention and commitment of resources. Prior to and in the wake of the Benghazi attacks,
Administration officials have argued that U.S. policy must remain flexible and engaged with
transitional authorities in order to effectively shape and respond to developments. Administration
officials and Members of Congress may choose to reexamine U.S. interests in Libya; discuss
possible outcomes for Libya’s transition and their potential implications; and define the
authorities for and costs of potential U.S. responses.

2 European Union Election Assessment Team, Preliminary Statement, July 9, 2012; Carter Center Election Observation
Mission Preliminary Statement, July 9, 2012; Shahed Network for Election Monitoring, Statement on Election Day -
Morning Period, July 7, 2012. Author served as an international election observer with the Carter Center Election
Observation Mission in Ajdabiya and Benghazi in eastern Libya.
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Attacks on U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi
U.S. Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens and three other U.S. personnel were killed on
September 11, 2012 during an assault by armed terrorists on two U.S interim diplomatic sites in
Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city. U.S. officials have provided preliminary accounts of the
events that suggest an initial armed assault by dozens of heavily armed attackers on the main
special mission compound led to the separation of U.S. personnel in a fire and caused the deaths
of Ambassador Stevens and State Department information officer Sean Smith.3 A large number of
attackers subsequently assaulted a separate U.S. annex compound to which U.S. personnel had
been evacuated, killing two more U.S. personnel and wounding several others. Ambassador
Stevens’ body was retrieved from a local hospital and remaining U.S. personnel were evacuated
from the Benghazi airport. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “American and
Libyan security personnel battled the attackers together.”4 Various accounts suggest Libyan
government-affiliated militia units known as the Shield Brigade and the 17th February Martyrs
Brigade responded to the attack and supported the evacuation of U.S. personnel on behalf of the
Libyan government.5 Additional U.S. personnel have been deployed to Libya to secure U.S.
facilities.6 Non-emergency U.S. personnel have been evacuated and injured U.S. personnel have
been treated in Germany and the United States.
As of October 18, the exact circumstances of the attacks and the identity of the perpetrators have
not been fully confirmed or disclosed. The attacks coincided with the 11th anniversary of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States and the formal acknowledgment by Al
Qaeda leaders of the death of former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and Al Qaeda
commander Abu Yahya Al Libi, a native of eastern Libya who was killed in a targeted strike in
Pakistan in June 2012. Libyan eyewitness accounts from Benghazi suggest that armed members
of the Salafist militia group Ansar al Sharia were present during the first attack, although the
group’s leaders have issued statements denying that they ordered their members to participate or
use force.7 At a September 14 press conference, the group denied that their personnel participated
in the attacks, and they have resisted government efforts to disband them in the aftermath of the
attacks.
In June 2012, another armed Salafist group—the Imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman
Brigades—reportedly claimed responsibility for a bomb attack that damaged the entrance of one
U.S. compound in Benghazi in an attack meant as a retaliation for Al Libi’s death. The group had

3 State Department Briefing to Update on Recent Events in Libya, September 12, 2012; State Department Background
Briefing on Libya, October 9, 2012; Testimony of Undersecretary of State Patrick Kennedy and Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Charlene Lamb before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, October 10, 2012.
4 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks on the Deaths of American Personnel in Benghazi, Libya,
Washington, DC, September 12, 2012.
5 Reuters, “Libya rescue squad ran into fierce, accurate ambush,” September 12, 2012.
6 CNN.com, U.S. Increases Embassy Security Worldwide After Libya Attack, September 12, 2012.
7 The statement said, “What is important is that it was a popular uprising in which all Libyans participated in support of
the religion of the Lord of all creation, and in support of the master of all messengers, may the best of prayers and
salutations be upon our Prophet. The Ansar al-Shari'ah Brigade did not participate in this popular uprising as an
independent entity. Rather, it was performing its duty in the Al-Jala Hospital and other places where the Brigade was
entrusted with some duties. The Brigade did not participate as independent entity acting upon some orders. Rather, it
was a spontaneous and popular uprising in response to what the West did.” See also U.S. Open Source Center (OSC)
Report GMP20120912094001, “Libya: Ansar Al-Shari'ah Video Statement on US Consulate Attack in Benghazi,”
YouTube in Arabic, English, September 12, 2012.
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previously threatened to deliver a “message to the Americans disturbing the proud skies over
Derna,” referring to reported U.S. military surveillance flights over eastern Libya.8 Ansar al
Sharia denied any involvement in the June attack, and in July one of its leaders told the
Washington Post that the group disapproved of the June attack, but said that, “if it had been our
attack on the U.S. Consulate, we would have flattened it.”9
Libyan General National Congress President Mohammed Yusuf al Magariaf has linked Al Qaeda
to the attacks in interviews and stated his view that the attacks were planned to correspond with
September 11 and avenge Al Libi’s death.10 Al Qaeda’s regional affiliate-Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM)-released a statement praising the September 11, 2012 attack, but did not claim
credit for planning or helping to execute it.11 On September 19, U.S. National Counterterrorism
Center Director Matthew Olsen said in Senate testimony that the Administration did not have
“specific intelligence that there was significant advanced planning or coordination for this
attack,” but analysts were “still developing facts and still looking for any indications of
substantial advanced planning.”12
As of September 28, the U.S. intelligence community had concluded publicly that the incident
was a “deliberate and organized terrorist attack carried out by extremists,” and that, “It remains
unclear if any group or person exercised overall command and control of the attack, and if
extremist group leaders directed their members to participate. However, we do assess that some
of those involved were linked to groups affiliated with, or sympathetic to Al Qaeda.”13 The latter
assessment could refer to members of any or all of the above mentioned groups acting in
cooperation and coordination or individually and independently. Recent press reports have cited
Libyan sources as identifying members of Ansar al Sharia as having been present at the
compound during the assault.14 The widespread possession of military weaponry and experience
among Libyan militias and the relative absence of official security forces in Benghazi and other
cities suggests that motivated groups or individuals could have attempted such an attack with
relatively little notice or required planning.
In congressional testimony on October 10, Undersecretary of State for Management Patrick
Kennedy referred to the attack as “an unprecedented assault by dozens of heavily armed men.” A
State Department security officer testified that he “had not seen an attack of such ferocity and

8 Brigade statement posted to Facebook, May 2012. During 2012, some Libyan social media web-pages and Arabic-
language online forums have featured discussions of photos reportedly taken by Libyans of U.S. military aircraft above
eastern Libya.
9 Tara Bahrampour, “As Libya Holds post-Gaddafi Election, Islamists’ Strength to be Tested,” Washington Post, July
3, 2012.
10 U.S. Open Source Center Report EUP20120927029008, “Libya's Al-Magariaf: US Ambassador's Assassination
'Planned by Al-Qa'ida',” Le Point (Paris), September 27, 2012.
11 OSC Report GMP20120918836001, "Al Fajr Releases AQIM's Statement Praising Attack on U.S. Consulate in
Benghazi," September 18, 2012.
12 NCTC Director, Testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, September
19, 2012.
13 Statement by the Director of Public Affairs for the Director of National Intelligence Shawn Turner, September 28,
2012.
14 David Kirkpatrick, “Election-Year Stakes Overshadow Nuances of Libya Investigation,” New York Times, October
15, 2012; Ibid., “Libya Singles Out Islamist as a Commander in Consulate Attack, Libyans Say,” New York Times,
October 17, 2012, and, Margaret Coker, “Militant Suspected in Attack in Libya Remains At Large,” Wall Street
Journal
, October 17, 2012.
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intensity previously in Libya, nor in my time with the diplomatic security service.” As a result of
the unstable security environment in Libya, many U.S. government personnel have been
withdrawn from the country and press reports suggest that U.S. investigators have faced
difficulties in accessing the sites of the attacks. The Pentagon has confirmed that U.S. military
personnel accompanied U.S. investigators to Benghazi for a brief visit on October 4.15
The attack casts a pall over the otherwise generally positive story of U.S.-Libyan cooperation
throughout the anti-Qadhafi revolution and during the transition period, and has raised questions
about the near-term future of the relationship. Ambassador Stevens served in Benghazi as the
special U.S. representative to the Libyan opposition during the revolution and in his role as
ambassador was overseeing a robust range of assistance programs and engagement efforts
designed to support Libya’s democratic transition. U.S. and Libyan officials have condemned the
attack and vowed to pursue those responsible. Secretary Clinton stated “The friendship between
our countries, borne out of shared struggle, will not be another casualty of this attack. A free and
stable Libya is still in America’s interest and security, and we will not turn our back on that, nor
will we rest until those responsible for these attacks are found and brought to justice.”16 GNC
President Magariaf and his colleagues disavowed the “criminal attack” and have launched an
investigation. Some Libyan citizens staged demonstrations condemning the attack and carried
signs that rejected violence and expressed remorse for the death of Ambassador Stevens, who was
personally popular among Libyans for his direct public engagement and his image as a strong
supporter of Libya’s revolution and transition. The State Department has dispatched Laurence
Pope to Tripoli to assume the role of U.S. Chargé d’ Affairs to Libya.
Political Developments and Challenges
The attacks occurred at a particularly sensitive political juncture for Libya. Voters elected the
200-member GNC on July 7, 2012, in the first national election in nearly 50 years. GNC
members elected Mohamed Magariaf as GNC President in August and elected Mustafa Abu
Shugur as interim prime minister-designate on September 12. Both spent considerable amounts of
time in the United States while members of opposition movements in exile. Abu Shugur spent
weeks negotiating with political groups over the makeup of a new cabinet, but was removed in a
vote of no confidence after his proposed cabinet lists drew criticism from some elected officials
and members of the public. Abu Shugur struggled to reach consensus on the cabinet plan with
Mahmoud Jibril, the former interim Prime Minister and narrow runner-up to Abu Shugur in last
month’s election. Jibril’s National Forces Alliance won nearly half of the 80 party list seats in the
recent election, and Jibril reportedly sought assurances that his coalition’s policy preferences will
be reflected in the interim cabinet’s programs. The Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Justice and
Construction Party along with powerful interest groups from various Libyan cities sought to
influence the selection of a new prime minister-designate and will have opportunities to vote on
the composition of a new cabinet. The GNC voted to select Ali Zeidan as prime minister
designate on October 14. Anecdotal reporting from Libya suggests that some groups and
movements may withhold support for the government based on the individuals selected for
cabinet positions.

15 According to reports citing unnamed U.S. officials, the U.S.S. Laboon and the U.S.S. McFaul were redirected to the
Libyan coast. Lolita C. Baldor, “U.S. officials: DoD moving 2 warships to Libya,” Associated Press, September 12,
2012. See also Statement by Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs George Little, October 4, 2012.
16 Secretary of State Clinton, Remarks on the Deaths of American Personnel in Benghazi, Libya, September 12, 2012.
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Once a cabinet is agreed upon, the GNC is expected to turn to a series of challenging policy
issues, including determining the method for selecting members of a drafting committee to
prepare a new constitution. Many Libyans have hoped the elected GNC and the yet-to-be-
appointed cabinet will enjoy greater legitimacy that will enable them to act decisively on security
issues. Those hopes have been tested as Libya has been reeling from deteriorating security
conditions in the wake of the election. Attacks on international targets, a series of aggressive
attacks by armed Salafists on religious buildings around the country, and an assassination
campaign against senior security officers have fueled widespread criticism of interim leaders
since early 2012.
The government’s response to the attack on the U.S. mission in Benghazi will be an even greater
test of elected Libyan officials and their ability and willingness to assert state authority, which to
date have been very much in question. In order to investigate and punish those responsible,
Libyan security authorities are likely to have to confront armed non-state actors in a political
context in which some Libyans may question the legitimacy of the elected government to do so
and in which other Libyans may view anti-U.S. protests as legitimate or the attack as having been
somehow justified.
Key steps in the transition process, such as cabinet selection and debate over constitutional issues,
are now further complicated by the need to respond to the security threats clearly illustrated by
the attack. Among the most pressing and potentially divisive political issues are:
Islam and the State: Most Libyans support a prominent role for Sunni Islamic traditions in
public life, but differ in their personal preferences and interpretations of their faith. Libyan social
norms are relatively conservative and traditional, and Libyans remain engaged in a long-running
public debate about the proper role for Islam in public life. In the past, that debate led to violence
between the Qadhafi government and armed Islamist opponents. In the present, the debate has
taken on new urgency given the opportunity to define a new constitution. Calls for and against
strict interpretations and enforcement of sharia have featured regularly in public discourse since
the fall of the Qadhafi regime. Libyans hold a wide array of views on these questions and are now
freely sharing them. During January 2012, public gatherings in the low thousands emerged in
Benghazi and Misuratah to demand that sharia be codified and enforced as the primary
component of Libya’s new constitution. Salafist groups such as Ansar al Sharia and Hizb al
Tahrir, which support that position, are growing more organized and have been increasingly
publicly active. Muslim Brotherhood leaders have indicated they “are calling for the
establishment of a civilian state but with an Islamic reference.”17
In an October 2012 interview GNC President Magariaf said, “We want to build a constitutional,
democratic, civil, and secular state. But this does not mean at all that the constitution or any laws
and legislation should contain anything that clashes with or is in contradiction to Islamic sharia
and its objectives.”18 He called for separation of religion and state “in the sense that parliament,
the government, and the authorities, under this constitution, are the bodies that define the laws,
legislation, and decisions, and that they are not issued by a religious body.” His remarks sparked
an outcry from Libyan Islamists, and while he did not fully retract them, President Magariaf said

17 OSC Report GMP20120305825005, “Libyan Brotherhood Leader Urges Creation of Civil State With Islamic
Reference,” March 5, 2012.
18 OSC Report GMP20121001825001, “Libya: Interview with National Congress Speaker Muhammad al-Muqaryaf,”
Al Hayah (London), October 1, 2012.
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publicly that it was inappropriate for him to have made the original statements because of the
responsibilities of his position and the limits on his authority to determine constitutional
principles. In July 2012, the TNC issued a declaration advising the newly elected government and
the yet-to-be appointed constitutional committee to preserve sharia as the principal source of
legislation under the new constitution and to not submit the matter to a national referendum.19
Federalism and Regional Politics: Discussions about federalism in Libya combine general
debates about centralized administration versus decentralization and specific historical claims of
inequality among Libya’s regions. A widely espoused commitment to national unity and solidarity
has defined much of the political rhetoric of the post-Qadhafi transition period. Nevertheless,
some eastern Libyans fear that a consolidation of power at the national level will continue a
political pattern under Qadhafi that they believe marginalized the east and neglected its
development. As such, procedures for selecting a new constitutional drafting body have been
amended twice, each time in an effort to respond to calls from activists in eastern Libya
concerned that the constitution would be drafted on the basis of proportional differences in
population rather than equal regional representation. The TNC’s allocation of seats for the GNC
election granted more populous western Libya more seats than the east or the south, but fewer
seats than a directly proportional ratio would have guaranteed. Broader debate focuses on the
relative merits of administrative decentralization or regional autonomy in a federal system.
National reaction to easterners’ demands has been mixed at best. Many Libyans have embraced
calls for decentralization while expressing concern that the political assertion of regional identity
and calls by some easterners for autonomy risk dividing the country and may spark renewed
conflict.20 Similar debates, concerns, and risks featured prominently during Libya’s founding as a
unified state under United Nations auspices in the early 1950s. Resentment of the centralization
of state authority, first under the easterner-dominated monarchy in the 1960s and then under
Qadhafi from the 1970s onward, divided Libyans on regional lines. GNC President Magariaf is a
native of Ajdabiya in eastern Libya.
Security and the Rule of Law: Qadhafi used the security bodies of the state to crush political
dissent and interfere in the daily lives of Libyans. As a result, debates among Libyans over the
relative powers of security authorities and the rule of law are very sensitive. The dispersion of
authority in the hands of armed groups and the existence of what one analyst has called “local
monopolies of violence” further complicates matters.21 Deteriorating security conditions in
general and clashes in the wake of the Benghazi attacks have intensified these debates. The GNC
reportedly has begun debate on a draft emergency law that could grant the government limited
powers to curtail political rights and use force to establish public order.22 Critics of the law argue
it risks restoring Qadhafi-era abuses. Supporters highlight proposed legislative checks on the
scope and duration of emergency powers and argue that the gravity of the current security
challenges facing the country demands immediate action.

19 TNC Decree Number 7 of 2012, July 5, 2012.
20 UNSMIL’s Ian Martin said in his July 2012 report that “the strength of feeling regarding past marginalization of the
east is widely shared there and requires political solutions.” S/PV.6807, July 18, 2012.
21 Jacob Mundy, “Militia Politics in Libya's National Elections,” Foreign Policy Magazine – Middle East Channel
Blog, July 5, 2012.
22 Libya Herald (Tripoli), “Congress draft State of Emergency Law Published,” September 27, 2012.
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Domestic and Regional Security Issues
Security conditions are the immediate and overarching concern for Libyan authorities. Armed
non-state groups continue to operate in many areas of the country, government authorities rely on
militias to provide security for key cities and facilities, and the country’s borders, infrastructure,
and military sites are unevenly secured. The September 11, 2012, terrorist attacks on U.S. interim
diplomatic offices in Benghazi underscored the serious security challenges that have faced
Libya’s citizens and leaders since the end of the revolution. Since late 2011, sporadic outbreaks of
violence among rival militia groups, criminals, and armed citizens have shaken Libyans’
confidence in transitional leaders and in each other. From one perspective, the number of security
disruptions is smaller than might otherwise be expected in a post-conflict environment awash in
weapons and dominated by dozens of armed groups with varying relationships to state authority.
From another perspective, the level of crime, the continuing independence of local militia, the
broad availability of weapons, and the relative limitations of national security bodies suggest that
Libya’s security remains a function of Libyans’ self-restraint rather than the capability of national
security authorities.
Militia Integration and Security Sector Reform
In July 2012, the U.N. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) judged that, “Libya’s revolutionary
brigades do not seek to remain in separate existence and to challenge State authority,” and the
affiliation of several prominent militia groups with the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of
Interior-sponsored Supreme Security Committees (SSCs) supports that view. Nevertheless,
UNSMIL also argued that “efforts to date to integrate revolutionaries and brigades have lacked an
overall concept and coordination, and need urgent review as part of the security reform agenda
for the police and defense forces, including integrated border security and management.”23 Many
Libyans and outside observers see the identification of cabinet ministers for Defense and Interior
be an important first step in such a process.
While the outstanding issues are formidable, Libyan authorities have moved since the Benghazi
attacks to assert greater control over militia groups, collect weapons from civilians, and intensify
discussion of a comprehensive security sector reform strategy. After large anti-militia
demonstrations on September 16, the government ordered armed groups to formally submit to
state authority and named military officers to serve as commanders of some prominent militias.
Some security officials have been replaced, and turnout reportedly was high at September 30
public weapons collection events in Tripoli and Benghazi.24 UNSMIL personnel remain engaged
with Libyan security officials on efforts to draft and implement a security sector reform plan. A
white paper on the subject reportedly was developed prior to the election, but it has not been
publicly released or discussed. Some reports suggest that the SSCs may be dissolved by the end
of 2012, potentially as part of a renewed effort to incorporate militia volunteers into formal
security forces.

23 U.N Document S/PV.6807, July 18, 2012.
24 Authorities praised individuals and groups turning in weapons (including explosives, machine guns, and tanks), and
some events offered chances to win cars, televisions, computers, and other prizes.
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U.S. Security Policy Considerations
U.S. officials must weigh demands for a response to the immediate threats posed by the
perpetrators of the attack along with longer-term concerns for Libya’s stability, the success of its
nascent democratic institutions, and the future of U.S.-Libyan relations. Decisions about
responding to the incident are complicated by the relative weakness of the Libyan state security
apparatus and the risk of inflaming public opinion or undermining the image of the elected
Libyan government through a direct or overt U.S. security response. Press accounts in recent
months have detailed reported unmanned aerial surveillance operations over areas of eastern
Libya where violent extremist organization are suspected of operating. Some Libyan observers,
including extremist groups, have been critical of these reported operations. A Ministry of Interior
official who has subsequently been replaced told reporters that Islamist militia groups fired on
U.S. unmanned aircraft sent to survey the attack site.25
Press reports suggest that senior U.S. national security officials have been considering a range of
options for combating the influence of AQIM, reportedly through increased security assistance
for regional governments and/or direct action. It is unclear what legal authority the President
might cite if he seeks to militarily target AQIM or any non-Al Qaeda affiliated entities in Libya or
elsewhere in the region.26 On September 14, President Obama reported to Congress, “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” that he had authorized the deployment of security forces from
U.S. Africa Command to Libya and “for the purpose of protecting American citizens and
property.”27 The notification states, “These security forces will remain in Libya… until the
security situation becomes such that they are no longer needed.”
U.S. military intervention in Libya through the offensive use of U.S. ground forces or remote
strikes would likely be politically controversial in Libya and could jeopardize Libyan public
support for the interim government. Press reports suggest that the Department of Defense directed
two U.S. Navy vessels toward the Libyan coast after the attack. Rescinding or conditioning U.S.
security assistance to Libya may provoke criticism among some Libyans and limit channels for
U.S. engagement with authorities that could partner with the United States in pursuing the
Benghazi attackers and conducting other counterterrorism and security missions.
U.S. Assistance Programs and Related Legislation
The attacks in Benghazi and the deaths of U.S. personnel are reshaping public and official
debates in Washington about U.S. policy toward Libya. Many Members of Congress welcomed
the announcement of Libya’s liberation, the formation of the interim TNC government, and the
July 2012 national GNC election, while expressing concern about security in the country, the
proliferation of weapons, and the prospects for a smooth political transition. To date, the Obama
Administration and Congress have agreed to support a range of security and transition support
assistance programs in Libya, some of which respond to specific U.S. security concerns about
unsecured weapons and border security. Identifying and bringing those involved in the Benghazi

25 Reuters, “Libya closes Benghazi airport after Islamists fire at U.S. drones,” September 14, 2012.
26 P.L. 107-40 authorizes the President “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations,
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against
the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”
27 Letter from the President regarding the War Powers Resolution Report for Libya, September 14, 2012.
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attack to justice has become a decisive issue in the bilateral relationship, as has confronting any
Al Qaeda affiliated groups present in Libya. Securing stockpiles of Libyan conventional and
chemical weapons also remains an issue of broad congressional concern, as does ensuring that
transitional authorities act in accordance with international human rights standards in pursuing
justice and handling detainees. Unidentified State Department officials told the press that
Secretary Clinton offered to expand security assistance to Libya in her September 2012 meetings
in New York with Libyan GNC President Mohammed Magariaf.
Administration officials and congressional decision makers have worked together to identify and
reprogram an array of previously appropriated funding to respond to developments in Libya since
2011. Congress has enacted legislation encouraging cost-matching by Libya, given its resource
wealth, and prohibiting U.S. grant funding of rehabilitation or reconstruction of infrastructure in
Libya using FY2012 funds. Congress continues to exercise oversight over U.S. diplomatic,
security, and assistance efforts in Libya and is considering appropriation and authorization
requests and notifications related to Libya programs. Members may also debate Libya’s regional
influence, whether as a political example or a potential source of instability.
On a practical level, the evacuation of all non-emergency personnel from Libya has interrupted
some ongoing assistance programs at least temporarily. Beyond that, some Members of Congress
have called on future U.S. assistance to be made contingent upon full Libyan cooperation in the
Benghazi investigation—or absolute cuts in aid as a response to the attacks, while others have
demanded a wholesale suspension of foreign aid to Libya, Egypt, and other countries, and still
others are, including senior Administration officials are advising that the attackers should not be
permitted to damage U.S. efforts to help Libya transition to democracy.
FY2013 Appropriations and Pending Funding Issues
For FY2013, the Obama Administration requested $150,000 in Foreign Military Financing
(FMF), $250,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding, and $1.25
million in Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) funding to
continue engagement programs with Libyan security forces and to improve border security. In
August and September 2012, the Administration notified Congress of its intent to reprogram $4
million in funds from the FY2012 Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund and $7.8 million
in FY2012 Defense Operation and Maintenance Funds to support Global Security Contingency
Fund programs for Libya. One program would support the creation of Libyan Special Operations
Forces “to conduct special operations missions, including counterterrorism operations to fight Al
Qaeda and its affiliates.” The other seeks to enhance border security management. As of October
18, Congress was reviewing the fund reprogramming notifications. A full program notification
had not yet been submitted for review. Other U.S. funding for assistance programs in Libya is
reviewed in Table 1 below.28
The FY2013 Continuing Appropriations Resolution (P.L. 112-175) applies the conditions placed
on FY2012 assistance to Libya and other countries to interim FY2013 spending. Those conditions
include notification of the Appropriations Committees of planned obligations of funds for Libya
programs. Spending levels from FY2012 accounts for Libya were set through consultation
between the executive branch and Congress rather than specified in legislation. As such,

28 For general descriptions of current programs, see Office of the Special Coordinator for Middle East Transitions, Fact
Sheet - U.S. Government Assistance to Libya, Washington, DC, August 14, 2012.
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established inter-branch consultation and notification mechanisms will remain the primary venue
for determining the use of any FY2013 funding for Libya under the continuing resolution, which
expires March 27, 2013.
In addition, a portion of a requested $770 million Middle East North Africa Incentive Fund
(MENA-IF) also may benefit Libyans, if appropriated. As of October 2012, the House
Appropriations Committee had declined to include funding for the MENA-IF initiative in its
version of the FY2013 Foreign Operations appropriations bill (H.R. 5857). The Senate
Appropriations Committee included $1 billion for the MENA-IF, an increase over the
Administration’s request (S. 3241).
As noted above, some Members of Congress have sought to condition or rescind U.S. assistance
funding for Libya in aftermath of the attacks. Recent legislative action related to these issues
includes:
• On September 19, Senator Rand Paul introduced S. 3576 which would have
prohibited the obligation or expenditure of funds for assistance to the
governments of Egypt, Libya, Pakistan, and other governments of countries
where U.S. diplomatic facilities have been “attacked, trespassed upon, breached,
or attempted to be attacked, trespassed upon, or breached on or after September
1, 2012.” The bill failed on a 10-81 vote. The bill would have allowed for
suspension of the prohibition following a certification and request by the
executive branch. The President would have had to certify that host nations were
cooperating with the United States in investigating incidents, working to improve
local security, and that persons involved in the organizing, planning, or executing
of related incidents have been identified by U.S. law enforcement officials and
are in U.S. custody. Representative Jeffery Landry introduced companion
legislation (H.R. 6452) in the House of Representatives.
• On September 12 and 13, Senator Rand Paul offered amendments to S. 3457
(S.Amdt. 2815 and S.Amdt. 2838) to prohibit the obligation or expending of
funds for Pakistan, Egypt, Yemen, or Libya.
• S.Res. 556, introduced by Senator James Inhofe, would express “the sense of the
Senate that foreign assistance funding to the Governments of Libya and Egypt
should be suspended until the President certifies to Congress that both
governments are providing proper security at United States embassies and
consulates pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.”
• H.Res. 783, introduced by Representative Michael McCaul, would express the
sense of the House of Representatives that “the President should immediately
suspend all United States foreign assistance” to Libya and Egypt, “until the
Governments of Libya and Egypt formally apologize to the United States and
condemn in the strongest possible terms the savage attacks on United States
diplomats in Benghazi, Libya, and Cairo, Egypt, and assure the safety of United
States diplomats in Libya and Egypt.”

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Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Libya FY2010-FY2013
(thousands of dol ars, fiscal year of appropriation unless noted)
Account/Program FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
Estimate
Request
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
- - - TBD
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
150 - 150 150
International Military Education and Training (IMET)
319 - 200 50
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and




Related Programs (NADR)
Anti-Terrorism Assistance (NADR-ATA)
-
-
800
1,000
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance
- 500 1,300 250
(NADR-EXBS)
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)
3,530 3,145
-

Middle East Response Fund (MERF)
- 25,615 -
-
USAID Middle East Regional Funding
- 175 - -
Democracy Fund
- 600 - -
Development Assistance
- 470 - -
Humanitarian Funding




Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA)
-
25,000
-
-
International Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
-
13,300
-
-
International Disaster Assistance (FFP)
-
15,700
-
-
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)
-
35,000
8,800
-
Weapons Abatement Programs (NADR subaccounts)




Counterterrorism Engagement (CTE)
95
-
-
-
Conventional Weapons Reduction (CWD)
-
5,750
-
-
Global Threat Reduction (CTR)
500
-
350
-
Nonproliferation Disarmament Fund (NDF)a -
34,300
-
-
Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI)
-
9
-
-
Transition Assistance (USAID-OTI)
- 4,000 1,500 -
Department of Defense Nonlethal Support
25,000 -
-
-
Drawdown Authorityb
Global Security Contingency Fundc
- - 11,800 -
Estimated Total (subject to change)
29,594
132,064
24,900
1,450
Source: U.S. Department of State communication to CRS, June 2012; congressional notification documents.
a. NDF funds reprogrammed from multiple fiscal years - FY2003, FY2004, FY2009 and FY2010.
b. During the 2011 conflict, the Administration notified Congress of its intent to offer up to $25 million in
nonlethal material support to groups in Libya. U.S. officials argued that the rebels’ most pressing needs were
command and control, communications, training, organization, and logistics support.
c. Funds pending approval of reprogramming from FY2012 Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund and
FY2012 Defense Operations and Maintenance funds.
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Figure 1. Libya at a Glance

Source: Prepared by Amber Hope Wilhelm, CRS Graphics Specialist.

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Figure 2. Libya Uprising and Conflict Timeline

Source: CRS.
Figure 3. Libya’s Proposed Transition Timeline

Source: Prepared by Amber Hope Wilhelm, CRS Graphics Specialist. Derived from Transitional National
Council draft charter, August 2011 and United Nations U.N. Support Mission in Libya reporting.
Note: Subject to revision.
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Background
Libyan History, Civil War, and Political Change
The North African territory that now composes Libya has a long history as a center of Phoenician,
Carthaginian, Greek, Roman, Berber, and Arab civilizations. Modern Libya is a union of three
historically distinct regions—northwestern Tripolitania, northeastern Cyrenaica or Barqa, and the
more remote southwestern desert region of Fezzan. In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire
struggled to assert control over Libya’s coastal cities and interior. Italy invaded Libya in 1911 on
the pretext of liberating the region from Ottoman control. The Italians subsequently became
mired in decades of colonial abuses against the Libyan people and faced a persistent anti-colonial
insurgency. Libya was an important battleground in the North Africa campaign of the Second
World War and emerged from the fighting as a ward of the Allied powers and the United Nations.
On December 24, 1951, the United Kingdom of Libya became one of Africa’s first independent
states. With U.N. supervision and assistance, a Libyan National Constituent Assembly drafted and
agreed to a constitution establishing a federal system of government with central authority vested
in King Idris Al Sanussi. Legislative authority was vested in a Prime Minister, a Council of
Ministers, and a bicameral legislature. The first parliamentary election was held in February
1952, one month after independence. The king banned political parties shortly after
independence, and Libya’s first decade was characterized by continuous infighting over taxation,
development, and constitutional powers.
In 1963, King Idris replaced the federal system of government with a unitary monarchy that
further centralized royal authority, in part to streamline the development of the country’s newly
discovered oil resources. Prior to the discovery of marketable oil in 1959, the Libyan government
was largely dependent on economic aid and technical assistance it received from international
institutions and through military basing agreements with the United States and United Kingdom.
The U.S.-operated air base at Wheelus field outside of Tripoli served as an important Strategic
Air Command base and center for military intelligence operations throughout the 1950s and
1960s. Oil wealth brought rapid economic growth and greater financial independence to Libya in
the 1960s, but the weakness of national institutions and Libyan elites’ growing identification with
the pan-Arab socialist ideology of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser contributed to the
gradual marginalization of the monarchy. Popular criticism of U.S. and British basing agreements
grew, becoming amplified in wake of Israel’s defeat of Arab forces in the 1967 Six Day War.
King Idris left the country in mid-1969 for medical reasons, setting the stage for a military coup
in September, led by a young, devoted Nasserite army captain named Muammar al Qadhafi.
The United States did not actively oppose the coup, as Qadhafi and his co-conspirators initially
presented an anti-Soviet and reformist platform. Qadhafi focused intensely on securing the
immediate and full withdrawal of British and U.S. forces from military bases in Libya, which was
complete by mid-1970. The new government also pressured U.S. and other foreign oil companies
to renegotiate oil production contracts and some British and U.S. oil operations eventually were
nationalized. In the early 1970s, Qadhafi and his allies gradually reversed their stance on their
initially icy relationship with the Soviet Union and extended Libyan support to revolutionary,
anti-Western, and anti-Israeli movements across Africa, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. These
policies contributed to a rapid souring of U.S.-Libyan political relations that persisted for decades
and was marked by multiple military confrontations, state-sponsored acts of Libyan terrorism
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against U.S. nationals, covert U.S. support for Libyan opposition groups, Qadhafi’s pursuit of
weapons of mass destruction, and U.S. and international sanctions.
Qadhafi’s policy reversals on WMD and terrorism led to the lifting of international sanctions in
2003 and 2004, followed by economic liberalization, oil sales, and foreign investment that
brought new wealth to some Libyans. After U.S. sanctions were lifted, the U.S. business
community gradually reengaged amid continuing U.S.-Libyan tension over terrorism concerns
that were finally resolved in 2008. During this period of international reengagement, political
change in Libya remained elusive. Government reconciliation with imprisoned Islamist militants
and the return of some exiled opposition figures were welcomed by some observers as signs that
suppression of political opposition had softened. The Qadhafi government released dozens of
former members of the Al Qaeda-affiliated Libyan Islamist Fighting Group (LIFG) and the
Muslim Brotherhood from prison in the years prior to the revolution as part of its political
reconciliation program. The Bush Administration praised Qadhafi’s cooperation with U.S.
counterterrorism efforts against Al Qaeda and the LIFG.
Qadhafi’s international rehabilitation coincided with new steps by some pragmatic government
officials to maneuver within so-called “red lines” and propose minor reforms. However, the
shifting course of those red lines increasingly entangled would-be reformers in the run-up to the
outbreak of unrest in February 2011. Ultimately, inaction on the part of the government in
response to calls for guarantees of basic political rights and for the drafting of a constitution
suggested a lack of consensus, if not outright opposition to meaningful change among hardliners.
This inaction set the political stage for the revolution that overturned Qadhafi’s four decades of
rule and led to his grisly demise in October 2011.
Political change in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt helped bring long-simmering Libyan reform
debates to the boiling point in January and early February 2011. The 2011 revolution was
triggered in mid-February by a chain of events in Benghazi and other eastern cities that quickly
spiraled out of Qadhafi's control. The government's loss of control in these cities became
apparent, and broader unrest emerged in other regions. A number of military officers, their units,
and civilian officials abandoned Qadhafi. Qadhafi and his supporters denounced their opponents
as drug-fueled traitors, foreign agents, and Al Qaeda supporters. Until August 2011, Qadhafi and
his forces maintained control over the capital, Tripoli, and other western cities. The cumulative
effects of attrition by NATO airstrikes against military targets and a coordinated offensive by
rebels in Tripoli and from across western Libya then turned the tide, sending Qadhafi and his
supporters into retreat and exile. September and early October 2011 were marked by sporadic and
often intense fighting in and around Qadhafi's birthplace, Sirte, and the town of Bani Walid and
neighboring military districts. NATO air operations continued as rebel fighters engaged in battles
of attrition with Qadhafi supporters.
Qadhafi's death at the hands of rebel fighters in Sirte on October 20 brought the revolt to an
abrupt close, with some observers expressing concern that a dark chapter in Libyan history ended
violently, leaving an uncertain path ahead. The self-appointed interim Transitional National
Council (TNC) and its cabinet took initial steps toward improving security and reforming national
institutions. As noted above, voters elected an interim General National Congress (GNC) in July
2012. The GNC assumed power on August 8, 2012, and it will determine the process for drafting
a new constitution.

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July 2012 General National Congress Election and Results
On July 7, 2012, Libyan voters chose 200 members of the General National Congress in the
country’s first national election since 1965. Domestic and international observers praised officials
and voters for the conduct of the election, noting the short time frame and significant logistical
challenges that Libyans overcame. Of the 2.8 million voters who registered to vote, roughly 62%
voted in the July election, with turnout consistent across most areas of the country. A combination
of national and local security officials and militia groups provided security for election sites, with
local volunteers serving as election administrators at over 1,500 polling locations. Local conflict
delayed voting in the southern town of Kufrah, and, in the east, armed groups attempted to disrupt
the election by destroying sensitive voting materials and attacking polling sites in Ajdabiya,
Benghazi, and other areas. Local authorities employed ad hoc security responses, and, with U.N.
support, national authorities replaced critical material in time for voting to proceed.29
The election featured a mixed electoral system of 120 individual candidate seats and 80 political
entity list seats. Seats were distributed nationally on the basis of population, with western Libyan
districts receiving 100 seats, eastern districts receiving 60 seats, and southern districts receiving
40 seats. Debate over the electoral system in the run-up to the election revolved around this
regional distribution of seats (see below) as well as the best ways to encourage the selection of
nationally oriented figures rather than advocates for discrete local, tribal, or party agendas.
Advocates for individual candidacy argued that a party-dominated system would empower better-
organized or better-funded groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood-backed Justice and
Construction Party. Advocates of greater party representation argued that individual candidates
would reflect the elite interests of the wealthy and of local families and tribes at the expense of
average Libyans and groups with national perspectives.30
The mixed electoral system appears to have succeeded in yielding a group of representatives that
balances party and local interests and creates opportunities for negotiating coalitions across party
and regional lines. The body of elected individual candidates is made up of locally prominent
individuals, political activists, and some national figures, while the successful political entity lists
reflect the range of competing trends in Libya’s emerging political order. The Alliance of National
Forces, a coalition of civil society organizations led by former interim Prime Minister Mahmoud
Jibril, won 39 of the 80 political entity seats and performed particularly well in Benghazi, Tripoli,
and other urban areas. The Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Justice and Construction Party won 17
seats and was most successful in Tripoli, central Misuratah, and south-western Libya. Overall, 21
political entities won seats, of which 15 entities received only one seat. Margins of victory for
both individual candidates and political entities varied, with some candidates and entities
leveraging local notoriety to score decisive victories and other candidates winning based on
narrower margins of a few hundred votes or less. Women won 33 seats, 32 of which were
“political entity” seats. Political entities were required to alternate male and female candidates on
district lists as well as alternate their top list candidates by gender to better ensure female
representation.
Many media outlets have characterized the election result and the subsequent defeat of Justice
and Construction Party-backed prime minister candidates as a signal that Islamist political parties

29 The author served as an international election observer in Ajdabiya and Benghazi.
30 Abd al Sattar Hutaytah, “Libyan Parties Marginalized Amidst The Rise of The Role of Tribal And Militia Leaders,”
Al Sharq al Awsat (London), January 31, 2012.
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are less popular in Libya than they are in neighboring Egypt or Tunisia. However, the timing and
unique circumstances surrounding the July election and the performance of Islamist candidates in
subsequent internal GNC elections may make that judgment premature. Most political entities
and candidates emphasized national unity during the July election rather than seeking to define
themselves in religious terms or advance Islamist priorities. Libya remains a relatively
conservative society and many political figures and entities make frequent reference to Islam and
its role in Libyan social and political life. Topics such as the role of religious law in the legal
system are shaping debate over the new constitution. Historically, Libyan Islamist groups have
not played the same role in political life as they have in other Arab countries; their political
fortunes may improve as they increase their public profile and campaign more directly on issues
that resonate with conservative Libyan voters.
Constitutional Assembly and Federalism Debate
The next major step in Libya’s transition process is the drafting and approval of a new
constitution. To date, the transition has followed steps laid out in an interim constitutional
declaration issued by the Transitional National Council (TNC) in August 2011. The interim
constitution has been amended to reflect political developments over the last year, particularly
with regard to resurgent debates about federalism and regional representation in national
decision-making bodies. These issues have lurked in the background of Libyan politics since the
creation of the state in 1951. The independent kingdom of Libya united three provinces with
different historical experiences and political identities under the leadership of the eastern-Libya
based Al Senussi monarchy. Rivalry among the regions shaped the original constitution drafting
process and limited the effectiveness of the federal system it created. Resentment of the
centralization of the state, first under the easterner-dominated monarchy in the 1960s and then
under Qadhafi from the 1970s onward, subtly divided Libyans on regional lines.
A widely espoused commitment to national unity and solidarity has defined much of the political
rhetoric of the post-Qadhafi transition period. Nevertheless, some in eastern Libya fear that a
consolidation of power at the national level will continue a pattern that they claim marginalized
the east and neglected its development. As such, procedures for selecting a new constitutional
drafting body have been amended twice, each time in an effort to respond to calls from activists
in eastern Libya concerned that the constitution would be drafted on the basis of proportional
differences in population rather than equal regional representation. The TNC’s allocation of seats
for the General National Congress (GNC) election granted more populous western Libya more
seats than the east or the south, but fewer seats than a directly proportional ratio would have
guaranteed.
• In March 2012, the TNC amended Article 30 of the interim constitutional
declaration to state that the soon-to-be-elected GNC would select a body from
outside its membership to draft a constitution made up of 60 members “in the
manner of” the 60-member committee that drafted Libya’s 1951 constitution.31
The 1951 constitutional committee drew 20 members equally from each of
Libya’s three constituent regions—Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica.
• In July 2012, just days before the national election, the TNC issued a further
amendment stating that the constitutional committee would be directly elected by

31 Transitional National Council, Constitutional Amendment Number 1 of 2012, March 13, 2012.
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voters rather than chosen by the GNC.32 The move came as activists in eastern
Libya continued to protest the proportional division of seats for the GNC
elections by regional population.
Among the first decisions the elected GNC faces is whether or not to reverse the TNC’s 11th-hour
change to the GNC’s role in selecting the constitutional drafting committee. Critics of the TNC
decision point to the delay that a new election would insert in the transition process, which could
be problematic given the increasing popular demands for action on key issues. Supporters of the
TNC decision argue that accommodating key political concerns in the foundational decisions that
will shape Libya’s new constitution may be the best way to ensure that aggrieved parties do not
have grounds to fundamentally reject the transition process in the future.
Security and Human Rights Challenges
Since late 2011, sporadic outbreaks of violence among rival militia groups, criminals, and armed
citizens have shaken Libyans’ confidence in transitional leaders and in each other. From one
perspective, the number of security disruptions is smaller than might otherwise be expected in a
post-conflict environment awash in weapons and dominated by dozens of armed groups with
varying relationships to state authority. From another perspective, the level of crime, the
continuing independence of local militia, the broad availability of weapons, and the relative
limitations of national security bodies suggest that Libya’s security remains a function of
Libyans’ self-restraint rather than the capability of security authorities. According to UNSMIL,
“Libya’s revolutionary brigades do not seek to remain in separate existence and to challenge State
authority,” but “efforts to date to integrate revolutionaries and brigades have lacked an overall
concept and coordination, and need urgent review as part of the security reform agenda for the
police and defense forces, including integrated border security and management.”33
International human rights entities and the United Nations have observed and criticized examples
of torture, unacceptable detention conditions, and extrajudicial punishment by official security
entities and militia groups across Libya. The TNC directed militia groups to abstain from abusing
prisoners or settling scores with arms, and the GNC-appointed government is likely to continue to
rely on militia groups to secure some areas of the country and hold Qadhafi-era detainees until
national security forces are more developed. In March 2012, UNSMIL estimated that between
5,000 and 6,000 detainees remained in the custody of militia groups. In July 2012, UNSMIL
argued that the elected Libyan government should urgently act to improve its judicial capacity in
order to grant detainees access to trial, obviate the need for extra-judicial action by militia groups,
and bolster the rule of law.34 Some minority groups and tribes associated with the Qadhafi regime
remain internally displaced and have been targeted by rival groups, such as former residents of
Tawergha, members of the Mashasha tribe, and the Tuareg and Tebu ethnic groups.
Weapons Proliferation and Related Concerns
The Libyan military’s massive small arms and heavy weapons stockpiles have been looted and
dispersed both within Libya and beyond its borders, creating local and regional security concerns.

32 Transitional National Council, Constitutional Amendment Number 3 of 2012, July 5, 2012.
33 U.N Document S/PV.6807, July 18, 2012.
34 U.N Document S/PV.6807, July 18, 2012.
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Authorities in several countries, including Egypt, Niger, Algeria, Israel,35 and Tunisia, have
expressed concerns about the smuggling of Libyan weaponry across or toward their borders, and
continuing smuggling incidents and arrests reflect the broad scope of the threat. Particular
concern has been focused on the potential smuggling of shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles
(MANPADS). U.N. and U.S. officials have not indicated that they have seen evidence that
MANPADS have been smuggled out of Libya, but believe such leakage cannot be ruled out.36
According to U.N. officials, Libyan efforts to secure the country’s borders are hampered by a lack
of internal coordination. Southern borders remain the least secure, and frequent closures of the
border with Tunisia reflect the limits of coordination with neighboring countries.
U.S.-Libyan efforts to mitigate the threats posed by the proliferation of weaponry from Libyan
military stockpiles are proceeding under the terms of a bilateral agreement on weapons abatement
signed in late 2011. The U.S. government has deployed Quick Reaction Forces of expert civilian
personnel to Libya who are embedded with Libyan military units. As of late January, they had
inspected over 120 storage areas and 1,500 bunkers, accounting for over 5,000 MANPADS
systems.
The State Department-led interagency MANPADS Task Force plans to oversee a three-phase
MANPADS accounting, recovery, and threat mitigation program for Libya and the region, to
include inventory, border control assistance, and airport security assessments.37 Their efforts are
complicated by the fact that NATO airstrikes targeted weapons depots where large numbers of the
systems may have been stored, and these systems and other weapons have been subsequently
destroyed, disrupted, or buried. The dispersal of some systems among Libyan militia and the
reluctance of Libyans to disarm are also challenges.38 In July, Assistant Secretary of State for
Political Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro was quoted as saying that Libyan “militias have control

35 According to unnamed Israeli officials, “thousands” of weapons have entered Gaza from Libya, including “SA-7
anti-aircraft missiles and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs),” but the weaponry is “not a major qualitative
enhancement” for Gaza-based armed groups. Israeli officials also have stated that “weapons are available in Libya as a
result of the unstable situation there, and Hamas has exploited it to buy weapons from Libyan smugglers.” CRS cannot
independently verify these statements, and the Obama Administration has not commented on the record regarding
reports of arms shipments from Libya to Gaza. See Reuters, “Israel sees Libya as New Source of Arms for Gaza,” July
21, 2011; and Reuters, “Israel Says Gaza Gets Anti-Plane Arms from Libya,” August 29, 2011.
36 U.N. Special Representative Ian Martin told the U.N. Security Council in late January that “there is as yet little
evidence that MANPADS have been smuggled out of Libya in significant numbers.” U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
for Political-Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro stated in remarks at the Stimson Center in Washington DC in early
February 2012 that the U.S. government had not seen evidence of MANPADS leaving Libya to date although it was all
but impossible to be certain. Remarks by Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
Stimson Center, Washington, DC, February 2, 2012. In late February, Algerian authorities reported that they had
discovered a cache of over forty Russian-made shoulder-fired surface to air missiles near the eastern desert town of In
Amenas, southwest of the Libyan border town of Ghadames. The cache reportedly consisted of 15 SA-24 and 28 SA-7
missiles. Lamine Chikhi, “Exclusive: Algeria seizes missiles smuggled from Libya: source,” Reuters, February 18,
2012; Sihem Balhi, “Un stock découvert à In Amenas : Des missiles libyens anti-avion sur le territoire Algérien,”
Dernieres Nouvelles D'Algérie, February 19, 2012.
37 Remarks by Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Stimson Center,
Washington, DC, February 2, 2012.
38 In March 2012, the U.N. Secretary General reported that, “The full magnitude of the arms problem remains unknown
because access to stockpiles controlled by ‘brigades’ remains a challenge; no reliable records exist of pre-conflict
weapons stocks; and details of weapons destroyed, transferred or used during the conflict are not available.” U.N.
Document S/2012/129, March 1, 2012. For a comprehensive assessment of these challenges, see International Human
Rights Clinic (IHRC), CIVIC and Center for American Progress, “Explosive Situation: Qaddafi’s Abandoned Weapons
and the Threat to Libya’s Civilians,” August 2012.
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of the MANPADS ... and other loose weapons.”39 UNSMIL has reported that U.N.-assisted
Libyan efforts “to develop safe arms and ammunition storage areas” have been “inhibited by
unclear allocations of responsibility and lack of coordination among various Libyan actors.”40
Chemical Weapons Destruction and Nuclear Material
The security of Libya’s stockpiles of declared chemical weapons material and its remaining
nuclear materials have been the subject of sustained scrutiny.41 In August 2011, the State
Department reported that prior to the conflict, Libya had destroyed over 50% of its declared
mustard agent stocks and over 40% of its declared liquid chemical weapons precursors. In late
2010, Libya had restarted the long-delayed destruction of its declared mustard agent and
precursor stockpiles, although technical problems and the outbreak of the conflict resulted in
Libya missing its May 2011 destruction deadline.
Libya destroyed the munitions for dispersing mustard agent that it had declared in 2004, and
during the 2011 conflict, U.S. officials repeatedly stated publicly that they believed the remaining
sulfur mustard agent and precursor stockpiles were secure.42 The non-weaponized nature of the
declared sulfur mustard agent and precursor materials had suggested that the material posed a
smaller threat than otherwise may have been the case.43 The TNC formally notified the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on November 1, 2011, that it had
located what it believed to be undeclared chemical weapons. The OPCW has now verified that
the materials consist of sulfur mustard agent and artillery shells that are chemical munitions. The
Qadhafi government reportedly omitted the materials from its original declaration to the OPCW
in contradiction to the basic commitments it made as part of the normalization of its relations with
the United States and Europe.44
Libyan forces control the sites where the materials of concern are stored, and transitional leaders
have committed to upholding Libya’s commitment to destroy chemical weapons materials under

39 John T. Bennett, “U.S. Official: No Evidence Of ‘MANPADS Leakage’ In Syria,” U.S. News and World Report -
Dotmil Blog, July 27, 2012.
40 U.N Document S/PV.6807, July 18, 2012.
41 For an overview of Libya’s declared chemical weapons and nuclear materials see U.S. State Department, Condition
(10)(C) Report—Compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction
, August 2011; and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya
, GOV/2008/39, September 12, 2008.
42 The declared chemical materials are stored at Rabta, southwest of Tripoli and Ruwagha, near the Al Jufrah Air Force
Base in central Libya. According to the U.S. State Department, identified mustard and nerve agent precursors present in
Libya included pinacolyl alcohol, isopropanol, phosphorus trichloride, 2-chloroethanol, tributylamine, and thionyl
chloride. See State Department, Office of the Spokesperson, “Libya: Securing Stockpiles Promotes Security,” August
26, 2011.
43 For example, Colonel David Lapan, a Pentagon spokesman argued that “Even if not weaponized, there’s still a threat,
but it’s a smaller threat than if it is weaponized.” Agence France Presse, “Libya Has Mustard Gas, Lacks Delivery
Systems: Monitor,” March 10, 2011.
44 The revelation that Qadhafi withheld information about chemical agents and munitions and that the OPCW and U.S.
and European intelligence services appear to have had no knowledge of the omission raises questions about intelligence
and one aspect of the rationale for the Qadhafi government’s international rehabilitation. R. Jeffrey Smith, Joby
Warrick, and Colum Lynch, “Iran may have sent Libya shells for chemical weapons,” Washington Post, November 20,
2011.
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the mantle of the OPCW.45 Libya’s previously declared stockpiles were required to be destroyed
in full by April 2012 under a renegotiated OPCW deadline. In April 2012, transitional officials
submitted an amended destruction plan under which destruction operations would resume in
March 2013, with the goal of complete destruction of the remaining stockpiles and materials by
December 2016.46
Libya’s nuclear materials also have been subject to international and U.S. oversight and joint
operations that removed highly enriched uranium and other proliferation-sensitive items. Libya’s
research reactor east of Tripoli at Tajura was converted with U.S. assistance in 2006 to operate
using low-enriched uranium. Libya also possesses a stored stockpile of at least several hundred
tons of uranium oxide yellowcake, reportedly stored near Sabha. UNSMIL considers the sale or
transfer of 6,400 barrels of uranium yellowcake remaining in Libya to be a “key priority.”
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)
The United Nations Support Mission in Libya continues to operate under the mandate outlined in
Security Council Resolution 2009 and extended through March 2013 by Resolution 2040. The
United Kingdom’s Ian Martin served as UNSMIL director through August 2012, continuing the
work he began in mid-2011 as the Secretary-General’s special adviser for post-conflict and
transition issues in Libya. In September 2012, Tarek Mitri of Lebanon replaced Martin as the
U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Libya. Mitri is a Greek-Orthodox academic
and formerly served as Minister of Culture and Minister of Information in Lebanon.
To date, UNSMIL activities have included electoral advisory support, transitional justice
consultation, and public security and economic needs assessments. On December 2, 2011, the
Security Council tasked UNSMIL with “assisting and supporting Libyan national efforts to
address the threats of proliferation of all arms and related materiel of all types, in particular man-
portable surface to air missiles.” The Obama Administration did not request specific FY2013
funding to support UNSMIL, but the mission is funded through assessed contributions of U.N.
member states, including the United States.47
Economic Issues
Libyan Assets
During 2011, the United States and others froze tens of billions of dollars in Libyan state assets,
and the Obama Administration placed targeted sanctions on Libyan oil companies and other

45 The OPCW has stated that “the new authorities inherited the obligations of the old regime,” and that the OPCW “will
continue to work with the Libyan authorities to verify and destroy any newly declared stocks.” AFP, “Libya’s NTC
Pledges To Destroy Chemical Weapons: OPCW” November 4, 2011, and OPCW, “OPCW Inspectors Return to
Libya,” November 4, 2011.
46 According to the OPCW, “The OPCW will continuously maintain rotating teams of 5-6 inspectors at Ruwagha
throughout the destruction process, which OPCW officials expect should be completed for Libya’s Category 1
chemical weapons within 6 months after operations resume.” OPCW, “Canada Provides OPCW its Largest-Ever
Donation to Expedite Destruction of Chemical Weapons in Libya,” April 24, 2012; and OPCW, Libya: Facts and
Figures, accessed August 3, 2012.
47 The United Nations Department of Political Affairs is responsible for UNSMIL.
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entities in support of Executive Order 13566 and U.N. Security Council resolutions 1970 and
1973. The TNC has identified up to $170 billion in Libyan assets that were blocked worldwide,
and it has sought access to those funds over the last 12 months. U.N. Security Council Resolution
2009 reiterated the Security Council’s intent to ensure that frozen assets are made available as
soon as possible to and for the benefit of the Libyan people and established a number of
conditions and mechanisms to regulate the return of assets. The U.S. Department of the
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued general licenses that authorize
new transactions with Libyan state entities and maintain the asset freeze established under
Executive Order 13566 on named individuals and a handful of state entities. In December 2011,
the Obama Administration unblocked over $30 billion of roughly $37 billion in frozen Libyan
assets, building on a previous transfer of $1.5 billion in assets for the benefit of the Libyan people
and the TNC.48
Trade, Investment, and Energy
Libya’s economy is dominated by the oil sector, although in recent years some growth in other
sectors had increased along with private domestic and foreign investment. In general, Libya’s per
high capita income and significant infrastructure needs are seen to present considerable
investment potential if security conditions can be stabilized. The value of U.S. exports to Libya
declined from $665.5 million in 2010 to $307.2 million in 2011. The value of U.S. imports from
Libya declined from $2.1 billion in 2010 to $645 million in 2011. The U.S. Treasury Department
has removed restrictions on transactions between U.S. persons and Libyan private firms and most
public entities.
Libya’s oil production and export infrastructure survived the revolution relatively unscathed,
although some facility damage, the departure of large numbers of laborers and skilled technicians,
and the lack of maintenance during the conflict were expected to limit the speed with which
production and exports would be restarted.49 However, efforts to restore operations have
proceeded rapidly. Prior to the conflict, Libya was exporting 1.3 million barrels of oil per day; in
July 2012, Libyan officials reported that overall production (which includes domestic
consumption) was roughly 1.56 million barrels per day.50 The U.S. Energy Information
Administration has projected that Libyan output could return to pre-conflict levels by the end of
2012, but Libyan officials hope to reach the target by the end of October. The importance of oil
exports for Libya cannot be overstated, as the IMF reported in February 2011 that over 90% of
state revenue came from the hydrocarbon sector in 2010.

48 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, General License No. 11 with respect to Unblocking the Government of Libya,
its Agencies, Instrumentalities, and Controlled Entities, and the Central Bank of Libya, With Certain Exceptions,
December 2011; U.S. Department of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Lifting Sanctions on the Government of Libya,
December 16, 2011; and State Department, Office of the Spokesperson, Unfreezing Assets to Meet the Critical
Humanitarian Needs of the Libyan People, Washington, DC, August 25, 2011.
49 The oil terminal at Brega reportedly suffered the most damage, along with support infrastructure elsewhere.
50 Marie-Louise Gumuchian and Ali Shuaib, “Libya sees return to pre-war oil output in October,” Reuters, July 26,
2012.
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International Criminal Court (ICC) and United Nations
Human Rights Council Investigations51

Prior to Muammar al Qadhafi’s death, some observers argued that the prospect of an International
Criminal Court (ICC) trial made it less likely that he would have agreed to relinquish power or to
have surrendered to the opposition.52 The death of Muammar al Qadhafi, the arrest in Libya of his
son Sayf al Islam, and, until recently, the detention of former intelligence chief Abdullah al
Senussi in Mauritania have complicated efforts to prosecute these individuals on charges of
crimes against humanity issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC).53 Outstanding ICC
arrest warrants notwithstanding, TNC officials have asserted their intention to prosecute Sayf al
Islam al Qadhafi and Abdullah al Senussi in Libyan courts. Al Senussi has been extradited from
Mauritania, where authorities had signaled they intended to try him on fraudulent passport
charges rather than comply with requests to extradite him. Libya has filed an admissibility
challenge with the ICC to that effect in the case of Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi. He remains in the
custody of the Zintan militia, ostensibly until the completion of a national prison facility to house
high-level detainees.54 Some observers have speculated that leaders in Zintan may be seeking to
leverage Sayf al Islam’s detention for national influence. Four ICC personnel were detained in
June and July 2012 after Zintan security officials suspected them of passing messages to or from
Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi.
On March 8, 2012, the U.N. Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry issued its final
report on the Libyan conflict and concluded that crimes against humanity and war crimes were
committed.55 With regard to government forces, an official summary of its findings stated,
international crimes, specifically crimes against humanity and war crimes, were committed
by Qadhafi forces in Libya. Acts of murder, enforced disappearance, and torture were
perpetrated within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population. The Commission found additional violations including unlawful killing,
individual acts of torture and ill-treatment, attacks on civilians, and rape.56

51 For more information on the ICC and Africa, see CRS Report R41116, The International Criminal Court (ICC):
Jurisdiction, Extradition, and U.S. Policy
, by Emily C. Barbour and Matthew C. Weed and CRS Report RL34665,
International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues, coordinated by Alexis Arieff.
52 For example, see International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V): Making
Sense of Libya,” Middle East/North Africa Report No. 107, June 6, 2011.
53 On June 27, 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for three
individuals: Muammar al Qadhafi, his son Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi, and intelligence chief Abdullah al Senussi, for
“crimes against humanity committed against civilians” not including “war crimes committed during the armed conflict
that started at the end of February.” For more information, see U.N. Document S/PV.6528, Provisional Record of the
6528th meeting of the Security Council, May 4, 2011, and ICC Prosecutor’s Office, Public Redacted Version of
Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam
Gaddafi, and Abdullah Al Senussi,” May 16, 2011.
54 OSC Report GMP20120218950038, “Libya: TNC Chief Gives Interview on Revolutionaries, Sayf al-Islam,”
February 17, 2012.
55 The commission members are Cherif Bassiouni of Egypt, Asma Khader of Jordan, and Philippe Kirsch of Canada.
See U.N. Document A/HRC/17/44, “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate all alleged
violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” June 1, 2011.
56 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, A/HRC/19/68, March 8,
2011.
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With regard to opposition forces, the commission found that
the thuwar (anti-Qadhafi forces) committed serious violations, including war crimes and
breaches of international human rights law, the latter continuing at the time of the present
report. The Commission found these violations to include unlawful killing, arbitrary arrest,
torture, enforced disappearance, indiscriminate attacks, and pillage.
The commission previously found in its June 2011 interim report that it did not believe “that the
violations committed by the opposition armed forces were part of any ‘widespread or systematic
attack’ against a civilian population such as to amount to crimes against humanity.” However, in
the March 2012 report, the commission stated that it was “deeply concerned that no independent
investigations or prosecutions appear to have been instigated into killings committed by thuwar.”
On October 17, 2012, Human Rights Watch published a report that purports to implicate
Misuratah-based “militias in the apparent execution of dozens of detainees following the capture
and death of Muammar Gaddafi one year ago.” The report states that, “Libyan authorities have
failed to carry out their pledge to investigate the death of Gaddafi, Libya’s former dictator, his son
Mutassim, and dozens of others in rebel custody.”
Legislation in the 112th Congress
Pending FY2013 Foreign Operations appropriations legislation and proposed legislation to
condition or rescind U.S. assistance discussed could have significant effects on U.S.-Libya
relations. Debate concerning the future of U.S. policy toward Libya is being shaped by the events
of the transition period, and may increasingly reflect issues that were prominent prior to the
uprising, including U.S. counterterrorism priorities, economic opportunities in Libya, security
cooperation, and human rights. In addition to the legislation outlined above in response to the
Benghazi attack, other recent legislation adopted includes:
• The FY2012 State Department and Foreign Operations appropriation (Division I
of P.L. 112-74), which provides up to $20 million in bilateral Economic Support
Fund (ESF) account assistance “to promote democracy, transparent and
accountable governance, human rights, transitional justice, and the rule of law in
Libya, and for exchange programs between Libyan and American students and
professionals.” The law prohibits the use of FY2012 funding for non-loan-based
rehabilitation or reconstruction of infrastructure in Libya. The committee report
on the Senate version of the bill directs the use of NADR account funding for
disarmament and securing Libyan weapons stockpiles.
• The FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81), which was
amended (S.Amdt. 1180) to include, in Section 1235, a requirement that the
Director of National Intelligence submit to Congress an assessment “that
accounts for the disposition of, and the threat to United States citizens and
citizens of allies of the United States posed by man-portable air-defense systems
that were in Libya as of March 19, 2011.” The law also requires the
Administration to develop a strategy for mitigating potential related threats and
submit a detailed report to Congress, in unclassified and classified form.
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• Section 598 of P.L. 112-81 also reflects language introduced in S. 1822, and
directs the Secretary of Defense to assess the feasibility and cost of identifying,
exhuming, repatriating, and reinterring the remains of U.S. service members
buried in Tripoli, Libya, who were killed in the explosion aboard the USS
Intrepid
in Tripoli Harbor in 1804.
Other legislation introduced in the 112th Congress related to Libya includes:
• H.R. 3725, which would direct the President to vest blocked Libyan assets “to
defray the full costs of Operation Odyssey Dawn and United States participation
in NATO Operation Unified Protector and any associated humanitarian efforts
undertaken on behalf of the Libyan people,” and “to satisfy and pay in full all
final awards of compensation to United States nationals ordered by the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission in its Libya Claims Program pursuant to the
Libyan Claims Resolution Act (P.L. 110-301) and the International Claims
Settlement Act of 1949 (22 U.S.C. 1621 et seq.).”
• S. 1520, which would restrict the transfer of blocked Libyan assets to Libyan
authorities for other than humanitarian purposes until the President certifies to
Congress that the Libyan government is fully cooperating with requests for
information and ongoing investigations related to the bombing of Pan Am flight
103 and any other terrorist attacks attributable to the Qadhafi government.

U.S. Military Operations in Libya and Congressional Debate
Debate between Congress and the Obama Administration about congressional authorization and the cost of U.S.
military operations in Libya diminished during 2011 as the prospect of a sustained military campaign requiring
extended U.S. investment and force deployments became less likely. In early 2011, some Members of Congress
questioned the President’s authority to commit U.S. forces to the conflict; criticized the extent of the President’s
consultation with Congress; and sought a clear definition of U.S. objectives, costs, and operations. Some Members
became increasingly assertive in their efforts to force President Obama to seek explicit congressional authorization
for continued U.S. military involvement. A number of proposed resolutions and amendments to appropriations and
authorization bills sought to require reporting on U.S. strategy and operations or to proscribe limits on the
authorization or funding for continued U.S. military operations in Libya. Others sought to authorize the continued use
of U.S. Armed Forces in support of NATO operations, short of the use of ground troops. On June 3, 2011, the
House adopted H.Res. 292 (Rol no. 411), which directed the Administration to provide documents on consultation
with Congress and a report “describing in detail United States security interests and objectives, and the activities of
United States Armed Forces, in Libya since March 19, 2011.” The Administration submitted the report on June 15,
2011. The House of Representatives rejected other resolutions seeking to authorize or de-authorize continuing U.S.
participation in Operation Unified Protector. U.S. and NATO military operations ended in late October 2011. As of
September 30, 2011, U.S. military operations in Libya had cost $1.1 billion.
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Author Contact Information

Christopher M. Blanchard

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428

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