Extending Unemployment Compensation
Benefits During Recessions
Julie M. Whittaker
Specialist in Income Security
Katelin P. Isaacs
Analyst in Income Security
October 11, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34340
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions

Summary
This report describes the history of temporary federal extensions to unemployment benefits from
1980 to the present. Among these extensions is the Emergency Unemployment Compensation
(EUC08) program created by P.L. 110-252 (amended by P.L. 110-449, P.L. 111-5, P.L. 111-92,
P.L. 111-118, P.L. 111-144, P.L. 111-157, P.L. 111-205, P.L. 111-312, P.L. 112-78, and P.L. 112-
96).
This report contains five sections. The first section provides background information on
unemployment compensation (UC) benefits. It also provides a brief summary of UC benefit
exhaustion and how exhaustion rates are related to the business cycle.
The second section provides the definition of a recession as well as the determination process for
declaring a recession. It also provides information on the timing of all recessions since 1980.
The third section summarizes the legislative history of federal extensions of unemployment
benefits. It includes information on the permanently authorized extended benefit (EB) program as
well as information on temporary unemployment benefit extensions. It also includes a brief
discussion on the role of extended unemployment benefits as part of an economic stimulus
package.
The fourth section provides figures examining the timing of recessions and statistics that may be
considered for determining extending unemployment benefits.
The fifth section briefly discusses previous methods for financing these temporary programs. In
particular it attempts to identify provisions in temporary extension legislation that may have led
to increases in revenue or decreases in spending related to unemployment benefits.
This report will be updated to reflect new laws extending unemployment benefits.

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Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions

Contents
Unemployment Compensation and Exhaustion of Benefits ............................................................ 1
UC Benefits and Duration ......................................................................................................... 1
Monitoring Search, Generosity of Unemployment Benefits, and Disincentives to
Find Work......................................................................................................................... 2
UC Benefit Exhaustion.............................................................................................................. 3
Recessions........................................................................................................................................ 4
Determination of a Recession.................................................................................................... 4
Most Recent Recession Began December 2007 and Ended June 2009............................... 5
Recessions from 1980 to Present............................................................................................... 5
Federal Programs of Extended Unemployment Compensation....................................................... 5
Extended Benefit Program (Determined at the State Level) ..................................................... 5
EB Provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.......................... 6
Temporary EB Trigger Modifications in P.L. 111-312........................................................ 7
Temporary Federal Extensions of Unemployment Benefits: Congressional
Intervention in Recessions...................................................................................................... 7
Temporary Extended UC Benefits as Economic Stimulus ........................................................ 8
Assessing the Labor Market: Determining When to Intervene........................................................ 9
Improving the UC System as an Automatic Stabilizer .............................................................. 9
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation’s 1994 Findings and
Recommendations for the Extended Benefit Program..................................................... 9
Using the Insured Unemployment Rate vs. Total Unemployment Rate.................................. 10
National, State, and Sub-State Triggers................................................................................... 10
Increases in Unemployment of at Least 1 Million Unemployed as Compared with the
Same Month in the Previous Year ........................................................................................ 11
Other Measures: Changes in UC Benefits Exhaustions and Changes in Long-Term
Unemployment ..................................................................................................................... 14
Congressional Interest in “Paying for Temporary Benefits”.......................................................... 17
Increases in Revenues or Decreases in Expenditures Related to Temporary
Unemployment Benefit Legislation ..................................................................................... 17
Congressional Interest in the 112th Congress: “Maximum Length of Total UI Benefits
over Time” .................................................................................................................................. 18

Figures
Figure 1. Economic Recessions, Percentage of Regular UC Beneficiaries to All
Unemployed, and UC Benefit Exhaustees, January 1979-July 2012 ........................................... 4
Figure 2. Recessions, Changes in Unemployment Compared with the Same Month in
Previous Year, Unemployment Rates, and Temporary Federal Benefit Availability,
January 1979-July 2012.............................................................................................................. 13
Figure 3. Recessions, Changes in Regular UC Benefit Exhaustions Compared with the
Same Month in Previous Year, and Unemployment Rates, January 1979-July 2012................. 15
Figure 4. Recessions, Changes in Long-Term Unemployment Compared with the Same
Month in Previous Year, and Unemployment Rates, January 1979-July 2012........................... 16
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Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions


Tables
Table A-1. Summary of Extended Unemployment Compensation Programs................................ 19
Table A-2. Details: Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) Benefits .................................... 22
Table A-3. Details: Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) Benefits of 1991 ............. 23
Table A-4. Details: Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) Benefits of 2008 ......... 24
Table A-5. Timing of Recessions, 12-Month Change of at Least One Million, and
Extended Unemployment Benefits, 1990-2012.......................................................................... 27
Table A-6. Funding Temporary Unemployment Programs............................................................ 28
Table A-7. Potential Maximum Available Weeks of Unemployment Benefits, 1935-
Present ........................................................................................................................................ 31

Appendixes
Appendix. Related Tables .............................................................................................................. 19

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 35

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Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions

Unemployment Compensation and
Exhaustion of Benefits
The cornerstone of an unemployed worker’s income support is the joint federal-state
Unemployment Compensation (UC) 1 program, which may provide income support through the
payment of UC benefits. The underlying framework of the UC system is contained in the Social
Security Act. Title III of the act authorizes grants to states for the administration of state UC laws,
Title IX authorizes the various components of the federal Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF), and
Title XII authorizes advances or loans to insolvent state UC programs. UC is financed by federal
taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and by state payroll taxes under the State
Unemployment Tax Acts (SUTA).
The federal government funds federal and state UC program administration, the federal share
(50% under permanent law) of Extended Benefit (EB) payments, 100% of the Emergency
Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program, and federal loans to insolvent state UC
programs. States fund regular state UC benefits and the state share (50%) of EB payments. The
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5, as amended) temporarily provides
for 100% federal funding of EB through December 31, 2012.
UC Benefits and Duration
Workers who lose their jobs face serious long-term economic implications. In general, they face a
substantially reduced probability of full-time employment and an increased probability of part-
time employment. Those workers who find new full-time employment on average experience
significantly decreased earnings relative to what they earned before they lost employment.
The UC program pays benefits to workers in covered employment who become involuntarily
unemployed for economic reasons and meet state-established eligibility rules. The UC program
generally does not provide UC benefits to the self-employed, to those who are unable to work, or
to those who do not have a recent earnings history. States usually disqualify claimants who lost
their jobs because of inability to work or unavailability for work, who voluntarily quit without
good cause, who were discharged for job-related misconduct, or who refused suitable work
without good cause.
This temporary unemployment insurance benefit is designed to be sufficient to meet an
unemployed worker’s basic obligations until the worker finds a new position. Generally, benefits
are based on wages for covered work over a 12-month period. The entitlement formula varies by
state, typically requiring a substantial work history and replacing up to 50% of workers’ wages.
Generally, the maximum benefit amount is capped (often half of the average wage in the state or
less), which lowers the average national replacement rate to 32.5% of the average weekly wage in
the last quarter of 2011.

1 For more information on UC, CRS Report RL33362, Unemployment Insurance: Programs and Benefits, by Julie M.
Whittaker and Katelin P. Isaacs. For information on the most recent temporary federal unemployment benefit
extension, see CRS Report R42444, Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08): Current Status of Benefits, by
Julie M. Whittaker and Katelin P. Isaacs.
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Weekly maximums in July 2012 ranged from $133 (Puerto Rico) to $653 (Massachusetts) and, in
states that provide dependents’ allowances, up to $979 (Massachusetts). In July 2012, the average
weekly benefit was $299. Benefits are available for up to 26 weeks in most states (30 weeks in
Massachusetts; 28 weeks in Montana; 25 weeks in Arkansas and Illinois; 20 weeks in Michigan,
Missouri, and South Carolina; 12-23 weeks in Florida, depending on the state unemployment
rate; 14-20 weeks in Georgia, depending on the state unemployment rate). The average regular
UC benefit duration in July 2012 was 17.4 weeks, with almost half (48%) of all beneficiaries
exhausting their regular benefits. In July 2012, approximately 3.18 million unemployed workers
received regular state UC benefits in a given week. In 2011, on average, 27% of all U.S.
unemployed workers received regular state unemployment benefits (when all extended
unemployment benefits are included that percentage increases to 54%).
Generally, the UC recipiency rate (the ratio of unemployed receiving UC benefits to all
unemployed) rises during economic recessions (as workers with strong labor market experience
are laid-off) and falls during economic expansions (as new entrants to the labor market begin to
comprise a greater proportion of the unemployed).2
Monitoring Search, Generosity of Unemployment Benefits, and Disincentives
to Find Work
The difficulty in monitoring job search intensity creates the risk the unemployed will abuse a
system designed to alleviate the worst financial aspects of job loss. Although most economists
would agree that UC benefits create some disincentives to find work quickly, these disincentives
are somewhat balanced by a relatively low replacement rate of wages by UC benefits and a
recognition that proper allocation of human resources and human capital requires adequate job
search time.3
The job-search behavior of the unemployed can be influenced by changing the timing, generosity,
and duration of UC benefits. Higher benefit levels and easier program requirements for benefits
will cause recipients to be less willing to accept jobs and may alleviate some of the social stigma
from being unemployed.4 The availability of benefits may create a disincentive to search for and
accept reemployment, increasing unemployment and unemployment duration.5 Economic
research has suggested that this disincentive effect is relatively small and not a particularly large
contributor to the high unemployment rates found during economic recessions.6

2 The percentage of UC beneficiaries as compared to all unemployed workers is commonly referred to as the
“recipiency rate.” The exhaustion rate measures the proportion of all UC benefit recipients who exhaust their UC
eligibility and do not find a job within that period.
3 For a recent summary of available research on this topic, see CRS Report R41676, The Effect of Unemployment
Insurance on the Economy and the Labor Market, by Thomas L. Hungerford.
4 For a detailed survey of the disincentive effect, see Gary Burtless, “Unemployment Insurance and Labor Supply: A
Survey,” in W. Lee Hansen and James Byers, eds., Unemployment Insurance (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1990).
5 Congressional Budget Office, “Options for Responding to Short-Term Economic Weakness,” January 2008.
6 For example, Karen Campbell and James Sherk, Extended Unemployment Insurance – No Economic Stimulus,
Heritage Foundation, Center for Data Analysis Report #08-13, November 18, 2008, find that an increase in potential
duration of 20 additional weeks of unemployment benefits leads to a .22 percentage point increase in the
unemployment rate. See also, Bruce Meyer, “Unemployment and workers’ compensation programmes: rationale,
design, labour supply and income support,” Fiscal Studies, vol. 23, no. 1 (2002), pp. 1-49. See also Rajeev Chetty,
“Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance,” Journal of Public Economy, vol. 116, no. 2
(continued...)
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UC Benefit Exhaustion
The limited duration of UC benefits (generally 26 weeks7) will result in some unemployed
individuals exhausting their UC benefits before finding work or voluntarily leaving the labor
force for other reasons such as retirement, disability, family care, or education. Empirical research
suggests that workers who exhaust benefits search at similar or higher levels of intensity as those
workers who do find employment before benefit exhaustion.8 All state programs attempt to
identify potential benefit exhaustees through a state specific profiling system. Workers who are
identified as likely to become unemployed long-term may be offered intensive employment
services.9
Figure 1 displays the percentage of UC beneficiaries both as a percentage of all unemployed
workers (the “recipiency rate”) and as the number of UC benefit exhaustees since 1979. (Please
note that Figure 1 uses different numerical scales for the recipiency rate and for the exhaustion
rate. Because the correspondence between the two scales was determined by scaling size rather
than by a particular economic correspondence, readers should not place any significance in the
two lines crossing each other. The scale for the recipiency rate is located on the left-hand y-axis.
The scale for the UC benefit exhaustees is located on the right-hand y-axis.)
The proportion of UC recipients who exhaust their benefits varies according to economic
conditions, state benefit duration formulas, and the composition of the labor force. Some evidence
suggests that an aging workforce may have increased the proportion of unemployed workers who
are long-term unemployed; at the same time, this aging workforce may also have contributed to
the decrease in the overall unemployment rate.10

(...continued)
(2008), pp. 173-234.
7 Benefits are available for up to 26 weeks in most states (30 weeks in Massachusetts; 28 weeks in Montana; 25 weeks
in Arkansas and Illinois; 20 weeks in Michigan, Missouri, and South Carolina; 12-23 weeks in Florida, depending on
the state unemployment rate; 14-20 weeks in Georgia, depending on the state unemployment rate).
8 Walter Corson and Mark Dynarski, A Study of Unemployment Insurance Recipients and Exhaustees: Findings from a
National Survey, U.S. Department of Labor Employment and Training Administration, Unemployment Insurance
Occasional Paper 90-3, 1990.
9 These services may include training on job search, job counseling, and funding for educational and skill-enhancing
courses.
10 For details on these trends, see CRS Report RL32757, Unemployment and Older Workers, by Julie M. Whittaker.
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Figure 1. Economic Recessions, Percentage of Regular UC Beneficiaries to All
Unemployed, and UC Benefit Exhaustees, January 1979-July 2012
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Jan-79 Jan-82 Jan-85 Jan-88 Jan-91 Jan-94 Jan-97 Jan-00 Jan-03 Jan-06 Jan-09 Jan-12

Source: Congressional Research Service. Data are from Department of Labor, Employment and Training
Administration. http://www.doleta.gov/unemploy/chartbook.cfm.
Recessions
Determination of a Recession
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)—not the federal government—declares
when a recession began.11 A recession is a significant decline in economic activity spread across
the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in measures of real gross domestic
product (GDP), real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales.12 A

11 For a detailed explanation on the determination of recessions, see CRS Report R40052, What is a Recession and Who
Decided When It Started? , by Brian W. Cashell.
12 The NBER explicitly states that it considers real GDP to be the single measure that comes closest to capturing what it
means by “aggregate economic activity.” Therefore, it places considerable weight on real GDP and other output
measures. Thus, the NBER takes into account employment but not unemployment or unemployment rates when
determining recessionary periods. The NBER’s approach is summarized at http://www.nber.org/cycles/recessions.html.
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recession begins just after the economy reaches a peak of activity and ends as the economy
reaches its trough. Between a trough and a peak, the economy is in an expansion.
Most Recent Recession Began December 2007 and Ended June 2009
The NBER maintains a time line of the U.S. business cycle. This chronology identifies the dates
of peaks and troughs that frame economic recessions or expansions. According to NBER, a peak
was reached in December 2007, marking the end of the expansion that began in November 2001
and thus marking the beginning of the recession that ended in June 2009.
Recessions from 1980 to Present
Since 1980, there have been five separate periods that the NBER has identified as recessions:
January 1980-July 1980; July 1981-November 1982; July 1990-March 1991; March 2001-
November 2001; and the December 2007-June 2009 recession.
Federal Programs of Extended Unemployment
Compensation
The Unemployment Compensation program’s two main objectives are to provide temporary and
partial wage replacement to involuntarily unemployed workers and to stabilize the economy
during recessions.13 These objectives are reflected in the current UC program’s funding and
benefit structure. When the economy grows, UC program revenue rises through increased tax
revenues while UC program spending falls as fewer workers are unemployed and receive
benefits. The effect of collecting more taxes while decreasing spending on benefits dampens
demand in the economy. This also creates a surplus of funds or a “cushion” of available funds for
the UC program to draw upon during a recession. In a recession, UC tax revenue falls and UC
program spending rises as more workers lose their jobs and receive UC benefits. The increased
amount of UC payments to unemployed workers dampens the economic effect of lost earnings by
injecting additional funds into the economy.
In response to economic recessions, the federal government sometimes has augmented the regular
UC benefit with both permanent (the Extended Benefit program) and temporary extensions
(including the Emergency Unemployment Compensation program) of the duration of
unemployment benefits.
Extended Benefit Program (Determined at the State Level)
The Extended Benefit (EB) program was established by the Federal-State Extended
Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970 (EUCA), P.L. 91-373 (26 U.S.C. 3304, note). EUCA
may extend receipt of unemployment benefits (extended benefits) at the state level if certain
economic situations exist within the state. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, P.L.

13 See, for example, President Franklin Roosevelt’s remarks at the signing of the Social Security Act:
http://www.ssa.gov/history/fdrstmts.html#signing.
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97-35, among other items, amended the EUCA to require that claimants have worked at least 20
weeks of full-time insured employment or the equivalent in insured wages.
The EB program is triggered when a state’s insured unemployment rate (IUR)14 or total
unemployment rate (TUR)15 reaches certain levels. All states must pay up to 13 weeks of EB if
the IUR for the previous 13 weeks is at least 5% and is 120% of the average of the rates for the
same 13-week period in each of the 2 previous years. There are two other optional thresholds that
states may choose. (States may chose one, two, or neither of the additional options.) If the state
has chosen the option, they would provide the following:
• Option 1: an additional 13 weeks of benefits if the state’s IUR is at least 6%,
regardless of previous years’ averages.
• Option 2: an additional 13 weeks of benefits if the state’s TUR is at least 6.5%
and is at least 110% of the state’s average TUR for the same 13-weeks in either
of the previous two years; an additional 20 weeks of benefits if the TUR is at
least 8% and is at least 110% of the state’s average TUR for the same 13-weeks
in either of the previous two years.
The EB program imposes additional restrictions on individual eligibility for benefits. It requires
that a worker be actively searching and available for work. Furthermore, the worker may not
receive benefits if the worker refused an offer of suitable work. Finally, claimants must have
recorded at least 20 weeks of full-time insured employment or the equivalent in insured wages
during their base period (the four quarters of earnings used to determine UC benefit eligibility).
EB Provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
As amended, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5, also known as
ARRA or the 2009 stimulus package) contained several provisions affecting unemployment
benefits. Among these provisions was a temporary change increasing the federal share to 100% in
the cost sharing agreement for EB through December 2011. (The permanent funding arrangement
is 50% federal funding and 50% state funding.) ARRA also provided a supplemental $25 weekly
benefit through May 2010 for recipients of unemployment benefits, including EB. Finally, ARRA
also allows states, at their option, to temporarily change the eligibility requirements for the EB
program in order to expand the number of persons eligible for EB benefits.16

14 The IUR is the three-month average ratio of persons receiving UC benefits to the number of persons covered by UC.
The IUR is substantially different than the total unemployment rate (TUR) because it excludes several important
groups: self-employed workers, unpaid family workers, workers in certain not-for-profit organizations, and several
other, primarily seasonal, categories of workers. In addition to those unemployed workers whose last jobs were in the
excluded employment, the insured unemployed rate excludes the following: those who have exhausted their UC
benefits; new entrants or reentrants to the labor force; disqualified workers whose unemployment is considered to have
resulted from their own actions rather than from economic conditions; and, eligible unemployed persons who do not
file for benefits.
15 The TUR is a three-month average of the unemployment rate published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics: that is, the
ratio of the total number of unemployed persons divided by the total number of employed and unemployed persons.
16 For additional information, see CRS Report R40368, Unemployment Insurance Provisions in the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009, by Alison M. Shelton and Julie M. Whittaker.
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Temporary EB Trigger Modifications in P.L. 111-312
P.L. 111-312 made some temporary, technical changes to certain triggers in the EB program. P.L.
111-312, as amended, allows states to temporarily use lookback calculations based on three years
of unemployment rate data (rather than the current lookback of two years of data) as part of their
mandatory IUR and optional TUR triggers if states would otherwise trigger off or not be on a
period of EB benefits. Using a two-year versus a three-year EB trigger lookback is an important
adjustment because some states are likely to trigger off of their EB periods in the near future
despite high, sustained—but not increasing—unemployment rates.
States implement the lookback changes individually by amending their state UC laws. These state
law changes must be written in such a way that if the two-year lookback is working and the state
would have an active EB program, no action would be taken. But if a two-year lookback is not
working as part of an EB trigger and the state is not triggered on to an EB period, then the state
would be able to use a three-year lookback. This temporary option to use three-year EB trigger
lookbacks expires the week ending on or before December 31, 2012. No state currently has an
active EB program based upon this modification. Currently, only New York has an active EB
program. (The TUR statistic for New York is 110% of the same period in the previous year.)
Temporary Federal Extensions of Unemployment Benefits:
Congressional Intervention in Recessions
During some economic recessions, Congress has created federal temporary programs of extended
unemployment compensation. Congress acted eight times—in 1958, 1961, 1971, 1974, 1982,
1991, 2002, and 2008—to establish these temporary programs of extended UC benefits. These
programs extended the time an individual might claim UC benefits (ranging from an additional 6
to 63 weeks) and had expiration dates. Some extensions took into account state economic
conditions; many temporary programs considered the state’s total TUR or the state’s IUR or both.
Historically, these programs started operation after the trough of a recession had passed (i.e., after
the recession had officially ended). This is due to several reasons. One cause is that NBER often
announces that a recession has begun three or more months after what is later determined to be
the official start. Another cause to this lag in response time is that often the severity of the
recession and its impact on unemployment levels does not become apparent until several quarters
after the recession begins.
The 1958 and the 1961 programs were proposed and enacted after the trough of those recessions
but before the unemployment rate had peaked. The 1971 program was enacted after the end of the
recession in November 1970. Both the 1974 and 1982 programs also became effective toward the
end of those recessions. The 1991 program was enacted eight months after the 1990-1991
recession trough but eight months before the unemployment rate peaked. Likewise, the 2002
program was enacted after the recession had ended but before the unemployment rate peaked. The
current Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program of 2008 was enacted seven
months after the most recent recession began.17

17 For a detailed description of the EUC08 program, see CRS Report RS22915, Temporary Extension of Unemployment
Benefits: Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08), by Katelin P. Isaacs and Julie M. Whittaker.
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Table A-1 located in the Appendix briefly summarizes these temporary programs18 as well as the
permanently authorized EB program. The 1982 Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) and
1991 Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) programs had extremely complicated—
and changing—benefit triggers. Table A-2 and Table A-3 (also located in the Appendix) provide
detailed information on benefit triggers for those two temporary programs. Table A-4 provides
information on the current EUC08 program benefits and triggers.
Temporary Extended UC Benefits as Economic Stimulus
In the 110th Congress, congressional and popular debate examined the relative efficacy of
expansion of UC benefits and duration compared with other potential economic stimuli. In his
January 22, 2009, congressional testimony, the Director of the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) stated that increasing the value or duration of UC benefits may be one of the more
effective economic stimulus plans.19 This is because many of the unemployed are severely cash
constrained and would be expected to rapidly spend any increase in benefits that they may receive
and that the certainty of this behavior was very high.20 Mark Zandi of Moody’s Economy.com
estimated multiplier effects for several different policy options, including extending
unemployment benefits. Unemployment benefits had one of the highest estimated effects (1.64,
where all proposed interventions ranged from 0.25 to 1.73).21
Others pointed out that increasing either the value or length of UC benefits may, however,
discourage recipients from searching for work and from accepting less desirable jobs or that their
spouses might forestall seeking additional work.22 A rationale for making any extension in
unemployment benefits temporary would be to mitigate disincentives to work, as the extension
would expire once the economy improves and cyclical unemployment declines.

18 The summary does not include P.L. 108-11, which created the special “TEUC-A” program. That temporary program
was in response to the unemployment of airline workers resulting from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
subsequent security measures, and the Iraq war. Signed into law on April 16, 2003, the program provided up to 39
weeks of extended benefits to individuals whose regular UC was based on qualifying employment with a certified air
carrier, at a facility in an airport, or with a producer or supplier of products or services for an air carrier. The program
had two tiers of benefits, known as TEUC-A and TEUC-AX and were authorized through the week ending before
December 29, 2003.
19 See CBO Testimony of Peter Orszag on Options for Responding to Short-Term Economic Weakness before the
Committee on Finance United States Senate on January 22, 2008; http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8932/01-22-
TestimonyEconStimulus.pdf.
20 For another paper that takes this position, see the following: Douglas W. Elmendorf and Jason Furman, If, When,
How: A Primer on Fiscal Stimulus, January 2008, available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/
0110_fiscal_stimulus_elmendorf_furman.aspx.
21 Mark Zandi, “Washington Throws the Economy a Rope,” Dismal Scientist, Moody’s Economy.com, January 22,
2009. The multiplier estimates the increase in total spending in the economy that would result from a dollar spent on a
given policy option. Zandi does not explain how these multipliers were estimated, other than to say that they were
calculated using his firm’s macroeconomic model. Therefore, it is difficult to offer a thorough analysis of the estimates.
22 For example, Karen Campbell and James Sherk, Extended Unemployment Insurance-No Economic Stimulus,
Heritage Foundation, Center for Data Analysis Report #08-13, November 18, 2008. See also Martin Feldstein’s
testimony before the Committee on Finance United States on January 24, 2008, in which he stated that “[w]hile raising
unemployment benefits or extending the duration of benefits beyond 26 weeks would help some individuals ... it would
also create undesirable incentives for individuals to delay returning to work. That would lower earnings and total
spending.” Available at http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/testimony/2008test/012408mftest.pdf.
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Assessing the Labor Market:
Determining When to Intervene
A variety of measures are typically used to assess the state of the labor market.23 These measures
may include statistics that are absolute measures, such as employment and unemployment levels,
as well as relative measures, such as the insured unemployment rate and the total unemployment
rate.
A vigorous debate on how to determine when the federal government should intervene by
extending unemployment benefits has been active for decades. Generally, this debate has
examined the efficacy of using the IUR or TUR as triggers for extending unemployment benefits.
The debate also has examined whether the intervention should be at a national or state level.
Recently, serious consideration of other measures of the labor market has become increasingly
common. In particular, the increase in the number of unemployed from the previous year has
emerged in several proposals as a new trigger for a nationwide extension of unemployment
benefits.
Improving the UC System as an Automatic Stabilizer
The President’s 2010 Budget proposal suggested changes to the UC system through the
modification of the EB program in order to make the program more responsive to changing
economic conditions.24 While little information was provided as to the specifics of the legislation,
the broad description echoes the recommendations of the Advisory Council on Unemployment
Compensation first published in 1994.25 The President’s 2011, 2012, and 2013 Budget proposals
did not have similar proposals.
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation’s 1994 Findings and
Recommendations for the Extended Benefit Program
The Advisory Council stated that the changing demographics of the workforce—coupled with
state funding problems—had led to a decline in UC recipients. This had, in turn, caused the IUR
to be a less reliable indicator of economic conditions at the state level and thus reduced the
likelihood that the EB program would be active in the states during economic recessions. The
Advisory Council also found that the temporary federal extensions of unemployment benefits
have been “extremely inefficient” as they were neither well timed nor well targeted.
The Advisory Council generally supported that the EB program use a state TUR of 6.5% as an
indicator of economic conditions meriting an active EB program.26 They also suggested that any

23 For a detailed explanation of the more common employment measures, see CRS Report RL32642, Employment
Statistics: Differences and Similarities in Job-based and Person-based Employment and Unemployment Estimates, by
Julie M. Whittaker.
24 See the http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/fy2010_new_era/Department_of_Labor.pdf.
25 Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation, “1994 Findings and Recommendations: Extended Benefits,” in
Collected Findings and Recommendations: 1994-1996. Reprinted from Annual Reports of the Advisory Council on
Unemployment Compensation to the President and Congress (Washington, DC, 1996).
26 The Advisory Council also suggested that a modified IUR that also included those who had exhausted UC benefit in
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
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Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions

indicator not use historical comparisons or thresholds (e.g., 110% of previous year’s level), which
the Advisory Council labeled as “not helpful” since the threshold triggers caused the activation of
the EB program to occur later and deactivate earlier than what the Advisory Council believed was
appropriate.
The Advisory Council did not comment on the cost-sharing provisions of the current EB program.
Finally, the Advisory Council suggested raising the FUTA tax base from $7,000 to $8,500 in
order to raise the additional funds needed by this suggested change. The President’s 2012 and
2013 budget proposals included measures that would have increased the federal unemployment
tax base to $15,000 while lowering the tax rate.
Using the Insured Unemployment Rate vs. Total
Unemployment Rate
The Federal-State Extended Benefit Program, created by P.L. 91-373, originally assessed the
labor market through both insured and “total” unemployment rates and included both national and
state level triggers for extended UC benefits. The EB’s federal trigger27 was eliminated by the
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-499). That act also required that the IUR measure
not include those who had exhausted benefits or who were receiving EB. This effectively made
the IUR statistic a less generous measure of unemployment.
Since the adoption of the permanent EB program in 1970, there has been considerable debate
concerning the relative merits of the IUR versus the TUR as an EB trigger. The IUR is defined as
the 13-week moving average of continuing regular UC claims divided by the average number of
individuals in UC-covered employment. This means that the IUR itself is an output of the UC
program.
Because the calculation of the IUR is based upon the number of individuals currently receiving
UC benefits, each state’s IUR depends on various noneconomic factors, including state eligibility
rules and administrative practices. Thus, the IUR is not a precise reflection of the health of a
state’s economy.
In comparison, the TUR is defined as the number of all unemployed individuals actively seeking
work divided by the size of the civilian labor force. The TUR represents a larger population than
the IUR, because it counts as unemployed all those who are out of work and actively looking for
work, on layoff, or waiting to start a new job within 30 days.
National, State, and Sub-State Triggers
A perennial question concerns the appropriate level at which to measure changes in
unemployment. Generally this debate has centered on the EB program and whether the EB trigger
should be based on national, regional, state or sub-state data. At the beginning of the most recent

(...continued)
the IUR calculation would be superior to the current IUR calculation.
27 The federal trigger was an IUR of at least 4.5% for 3 consecutive months.
Congressional Research Service
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Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions

recession (but before the recession had been identified), the debate on the EB triggers was
expanded to question what measure should be used if a new temporary extension of UC benefits
were to be enacted. In particular, should Congress act as it has in the most recent recessions and
create a nationwide extension of UC benefits with a nod to higher unemployment states through
an additional “high-unemployment” trigger? Or would it be more appropriate and a better use of
scarce resources to target only those states with current economic difficulties?
In the most recent recession, Congress first created a temporary program that did not target states
based upon state unemployment rates (P.L. 110-252). Eventually, Congress expanded the
temporary program and targeted much of the expansion of benefits to the unemployed in states
that had higher levels of unemployment (first in P.L. 110-449 and then again in P.L. 111-92).
The argument in favor of a national trigger is that the definition of a recession is national in
scope, and the federal government’s interest in reversing an economic decline is national as well.
However, recessions have often been primarily regional in impact. Thus, a national trigger can
result in the payment of extended benefits to individuals in states that do not face unusually weak
labor markets.
There have also been proposals to create triggers on either a regional or a sub-state level. The
logic behind the sub-state or regional triggers is that they might improve the targeting of benefits
because state boundaries are often of little relevance to the workings of labor markets. There can
be considerable labor market differences between urban and rural areas within a state or among
urban areas within a state. Furthermore, some labor markets are located in more than one state. A
statewide trigger can deny benefits to areas facing severe labor market problems because other
regions of the state are not facing the same conditions. There are a variety of arguments against
regional and sub-state triggers. It would be difficult to define appropriate regional or sub-state
boundaries, and it is unclear whether these newly defined regions would be any less arbitrary than
current state boundaries. In addition, there are significant obstacles to be overcome in the
financing and administration of an EB program on the basis of regional or sub-state areas,
because the state has always been the operational unit for UC. There is also concern regarding the
accuracy and availability of regional or sub-state data and the costs of data improvements that
would be needed.28
Increases in Unemployment of at Least 1 Million Unemployed as
Compared with the Same Month in the Previous Year
In the 110th Congress, debate moved away from using the IUR or TUR as a trigger for a national
program. Serious consideration of other measures of the labor market has become increasingly
common. In particular, the increase in the number of unemployed from the previous year emerged
in several proposals for new triggers in a nationwide extension in unemployment benefits.
H.R. 4934, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 2008, was introduced on
January 15, 2008. This bill would have extended UC benefits for up to 26 weeks when the

28 The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation advised against the use of substate or regional data in
determining the availability of extended benefits. Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation, Collected
Findings and Recommendations: 1994-1996, 1996, p. 5.
Congressional Research Service
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Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions

number of unemployed persons 16 years of age or older increased by at least 1 million individuals
as compared with the same month of the previous year.
Table A-5, located in the Appendix, provides information on the timing of the recessions,
changes in unemployment of at least 1 million compared with same month in the previous year,
and federal enactment of the temporary extensions of benefits. During this period, the temporary
extensions of unemployment benefits take effect between 4 and 14 months after the onset of the
recession. The first changes in unemployment compared with the same month in the previous
year of at least 1 million occur between 3 and 5 months after the onset of the recession.
Therefore, if the “1 million” trigger had been in place in the past, the extension of UC benefits
would have been triggered between 8 to 12 months earlier than actually occurred.
Figure 2 provides a graphical presentation of the information that was summarized in Table A-4,
and it includes data on the unemployment rate.
Please note that Figure 2 uses different numerical scales for changes in unemployment levels and
for the unemployment rate. Because the correspondence between the two scales was determined
by page size rather than by a particular reason, readers should not place any significance in the
two lines crossing each other. The scale for the changes in unemployment levels compared with
same month in the previous year is located on the left-hand y-axis. The scale for the
unemployment rate is located on the right-hand y-axis.
Congressional Research Service
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Figure 2. Recessions, Changes in Unemployment Compared with the Same Month in Previous Year, Unemployment Rates, and
Temporary Federal Benefit Availability, January 1979-July 2012
7000
15
FSC Begins
5000
10
EUC08 Begins
FSC Ends
EUC91 Begins
t
EUC91 Ends
en
3000
TEUC Begins
TEUC Ends
5
loym
p
ate
em
n
1000
R
U
ds)
ent
in
0
m
ge
usan
o
oy
an
pl
h -1000
(th
em
n
th C
U
n
o
-5
M -3000
12-
Recession
-10
12-Month Change in Number of Unemployed
-5000
Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment Rate
-7000
-15
Jan- Jan-80 Jan-81 Jan- Jan-83 Ja
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
n
an-85 Jan-86 Jan-87 Jan
an-
an-90 Jan-
an-92 Jan-93 Jan-94 Jan- an- an-97 Jan- an-99 Jan
an-01 Jan-
an-03 Jan
an-
an-06 Jan- an-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan- an-
79
82
-84
-88
89
91
95
9
-
-
6
98
00
02
04
05
07
11
12

Source: CRS figure. Timing of recessions from National Bureau of Economic Research. Estimated changes in unemployment compared to same month in the previous year
from the Current Population Survey data, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
CRS-13
Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions

Other Measures: Changes in UC Benefits Exhaustions and Changes
in Long-Term Unemployment
Beyond the IUR, TUR, and changes in the total number of unemployed, several other measures of
unemployment are often used in assessing the severity of employment conditions. These
measures include the number of unemployed workers who exhaust UC benefits and the number
of workers who have been unemployed for more than 26 weeks (the number of long-term
unemployed).
Figure 3 shows the change in the number of exhaustion of UC benefits. Figure 4 shows the
change in the number of workers who have been unemployed for more than 26 weeks. Generally,
both the changes in the numbers of exhaustees and the changes in the number of long-term
unemployed peak after the end of a recession.

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Figure 3. Recessions, Changes in Regular UC Benefit Exhaustions Compared with the Same Month in Previous Year, and
Unemployment Rates, January 1979-July 2012
500,000
15
400,000
FSC Begins
10
300,000
EUC08 Begins
h Previous Year
FSC Ends
EUC91 Begins
nt
EUC91 Ends
TEUC Ends
TEUC Begins
200,000
5
Same Mo
o 100,000
ate
R
ared t
p
ent
0
0
m
Com
loy
p
em
stion -100,000
n
U
-5
-200,000
lar UC Exhau
-300,000
Recession
Regu
-10
12-Month Change in Regular UC Exhaustions
-400,000
ange in
Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment Rate
Ch
-500,000
-15
Jan-Jan-Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja J J J J J Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja J J J J J Ja Ja Ja Ja J J J J J J Ja
n- n- n n n n an- an- an- an- an- n- n n n n an- an- an- an- an- n- n- n n an- an- an- an- an- an- n-
79 8
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12

Source: CRS figure. Timing of recessions from National Bureau of Economic Research. Estimated changes in UC benefit exhaustion compared to same month in previous
year from the Employment and Training Administration, Department of Labor. Unemployment rate from the Current Population Survey data, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Department of Labor.
CRS-15



























































































































































































































































Figure 4. Recessions, Changes in Long-Term Unemployment Compared with the Same Month in Previous Year, and
Unemployment Rates, January 1979-July 2012
4500
15
3500
red
EUC08 Begins
FSC Begins
10
2500
FSC Ends
s) Compa
EUC91 Begins
EUC91 Ends TEUC Begins
ek
TEUC Ends
e
ar
W
e 1500
5
6+
s Y
2
u
e
(
vio
Rat
re
500
ment
P
oy
in
0
ment
h
oy
nt
-500
empl
o
n
empl
U
M
n
U
rm
ame -1500
S
-5
g-Te
to
Lon
-2500
Recession
in
nge
-10
12-Month Change in Long-Term Unemployment
-3500
Cha
Seasonal y Adjusted Unemployment Rate
-4500
-15
Jan Jan Ja Ja Jan Jan Jan Ja Jan Jan Jan Ja Jan Jan Jan Ja Jan Jan Jan Ja Jan Jan Jan Ja Ja Jan Jan Ja Ja Jan Jan Ja Ja Jan
-
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
79 -8 -8 -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-0 -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0
1 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01
2 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12

Source: CRS figure. Timing of recessions from National Bureau of Economic Research. Estimated changes in long-term unemployment compared with same month in
previous year and unemployment rate from the Current Population Survey data, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
CRS-16
Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions

Congressional Interest in “Paying for
Temporary Benefits”
Increases in Revenues or Decreases in Expenditures Related to
Temporary Unemployment Benefit Legislation
Debate in the 111th Congress included substantial interest in whether benefit extension legislation
should include measures to “pay for” the proposals and be subject to House and Senate PAYGO
requirements or whether these extensions should be considered “emergency” measures and
exempt from the PAYGO requirements.29 With the exceptions of P.L. 110-449, P.L. 112-78, and
P.L. 112-96, all laws that create, extend, or alter the EUC08 program have been treated as
emergency expenditures or have been part of larger appropriation legislation. P.L. 110-449
expanded the EUC08 program from two to four tiers (from potential maximum duration of 33
weeks to 53 weeks) but did not extend the authorization of the program. The law included a 1.5-
year extension of the FUTA surtax.
Historical comparisons with previous extensions of temporary unemployment benefits are
difficult because of differing internal House and Senate PAYGO rules that have changed over
time.30 Table A-6 in the Appendix lists all public laws that have created or altered these
temporary unemployment benefit programs. The second column lists all decreases in federal
expenditures or increases in federal tax revenues that are related to unemployment benefits within
these laws. The last column includes explanatory notes that may put the laws into better context
within this particular discussion.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) identified 10 laws that included reduced expenditures
or increased revenues related to temporary unemployment benefits.31 Five laws increased the
federal unemployment tax (FUTA) on employers. One law increased income tax on
unemployment benefits received by individuals. Two laws increased the estimated withholding
requirements for certain corporate income taxes. One law began to require interest payments from
the states for federal loans to allow states to continue to provide regular UC benefits to their
workers. P.L. 112-78 required new fees be paid when certain new federally guaranteed mortgages
were issued. P.L. 112-96 did not declare the temporary benefits to be emergency spending and did
include some offsets, including the auction of spectrum licenses and increased contributed to
federal retirement plans. Some of the other laws did have reduced expenditures or increased
revenues but are not included in this tally because (1) they were part of large appropriation bills
and generally not subject to PAYGO rules or (2) CRS was unable to directly link these measures

29 For example, see the text of consideration of S.Amdt. 3355. Senator Bunning stated “…As every struggling family
knows, we cannot solve a debt problem by spending more. We must get our debt problems under control, and there is
no better time than now. That is why I have been down here demanding that this bill be paid for. I support the programs
in the bill we are discussing, and if the extension of those programs were paid for, I would gladly support the bill.”
30 See CRS Report R41157, The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010: Summary and Legislative History, by Bill
Heniff Jr.
31 In particular, either the increase was directly associated with unemployment benefits (e.g., increases in FUTA) or
was an increase in revenue in a law where the only major increased expenditure was in altering the benefit structure or
authorization time limit of the temporary unemployment benefit.
Congressional Research Service
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Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions

to any type of unemployment benefits. CRS did not attempt to identify whether these reductions
in expenditures or increases in revenues fully offset the expected costs of the changes in
expenditures on temporary unemployment benefits.
Congressional Interest in the 112th Congress:
“Maximum Length of Total UI Benefits over Time”
Debate in the 112th Congress has included substantial interest in whether the total number of
weeks of UI benefits available to workers is overly generous as compared with previous
recessions. The EUC08 program has been amended 10 times by P.L. 110-449, P.L. 111-5, P.L.
111-92, P.L. 111-118, P.L. 111-144, P.L. 111-157, P.L. 111-205, P.L. 111-312, P.L. 112-78, and
P.L. 112-96. This temporary unemployment insurance program provides additional weeks of
unemployment benefits to certain workers who have exhausted their rights to regular UC benefits
through a sequential array of four tiers, each of which is an individual entitlement.
On February 22, 2012, President Barack Obama signed P.L. 112-96, the Middle Class Tax Relief
and Job Creation Act of 2012, into law. P.L. 112-96 extended the authorization for EUC08
through the week ending on or before January 2, 2013. It also substantially altered the structure of
the program, creating three distinct EUC08 benefit time periods during the remainder of 2012:
March through May 2012, June through August 2012, and September through December 2012.
EUC08 tier duration and availability in states vary across each of these time periods. In addition,
EUC08 tier requirements that establish particular unemployment rate thresholds in order that the
state have an active tier II, tier III, and tier IV also change.
As of this report update, in states that have adopted the “TUR” EB trigger and have
unemployment above 9%, up to 93 weeks of unemployment benefits may be available to
unemployed workers (although only New York has an active EB program).
In comparison, the next highest maximum potential duration of unemployment benefits was
during the Temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation (TEUC) program in 2002 and
2003, when up to a total of 72 weeks for unemployment insurance (UC + EB + TEUC) were
available in some states. Table A-7 in the Appendix lists the total number of potential maximum
available weeks of unemployment benefits available to the unemployed since 1935.
Congressional Research Service
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Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions

Appendix. Related Tables
Table A-1. Summary of Extended Unemployment Compensation Programs
Duration of
Trigger
Financing
Program Public
Law Dates
Benefits
Mechanism
Authority
Temporary
P.L. 85-441
[Reach back to
Lesser of 50% of
None. Interest
free
Unemployment
6/1957]
the regular UC
loans to state
Compensation
6/1958 to
benefit
accounts; if a
(TUC)
6/1959
entitlement or
state failed to
13 weeks.
repay loan by
1/1/63 the FUTA
tax in the state
was raised to
repay the loan.
Temporary
P.L. 87-6
[Reach back to
Lesser of 50% of
None. FUTA
funds.
Extended
06/1960]
the regular UC
Unemployment
04/1961 to
benefit
Compensation
03/1962
entitlement or
(TEUC)
13 weeks.
Federal-State
P.L. 91-373
Permanently
Lesser of 50% of
National:
50% state SUTA
Extended
(Amended
Authorized
the regular UC
IUR: seasonally
funds.
Benefits Act of
several times.
benefit
adjusted rate of
50% federal
1970 (EB)
See also P.L. 96-
entitlement or
at least 4.5% for
FUTA funds.
499 and P.L. 97-
13 weeks.
3 consecutive
35 below.)
months
State:
IUR: at least 5%
and 120% of
corresponding
period in prior 2
years
Emergency
P.L. 92-224 and
1/1972 to
Lesser of 50% of
National:
Federal FUTA
Unemployment
P.L. 92-329
3/1973
the regular UC
IUR: seasonally
funds and
Compensation
benefit
adjusted rate of
general revenue.
(Magnuson Act)
entitlement or
at least 4.5%
13 weeks.
State:
IUR: adjusted for
exhaustions of at
least 4% and
120% of prior 2
years
Federal
P.L. 93-572,
1/1975 to
(Varied.)
National:
Federal FUTA
Supplemental
P.L. 94-12,
1/1978
Provided up to
IUR: seasonally
funds for
Benefits (FSB)
P.L. 94-45, and
26 weeks of
adjusted rate of
benefits paid
P.L. 95-19
benefits.
at least 4.5%
before 4/1977;
State:
federal general
IUR: at least 5%
revenue for
and 120% prior
benefits paid on
2 years
or after
4/1/1977.
Congressional Research Service
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Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions

Duration of
Trigger
Financing
Program Public
Law Dates
Benefits
Mechanism
Authority
Amendments to
P.L. 96-499, P.L.
Permanently
P.L. 96-499
National EB
50% state SUTA
Federal-State
97-35, and P.L.
Authorized
tightened
trigger
funds and
Extended
102-318
search and
eliminated.
Benefits Act (EB)
refusal of work
State:
50% federal
requirements.
IUR: at least 5%
FUTA funds.
P.L. 97-35
and 120% prior
eliminated the
13-week period
national trigger,
in the previous 2
removed EB
years; at state
recipients from
option IUR of at
IUR calculations,
least 6.0%;. At
and required
state option
that claimant
TUR of at least
worked at least
6.5% State TUR
20 weeks
and 110% of
recently. P.L.
prior 13-week
102-318 added
period in either
the state TUR
or both of two
option which
preceding years;
allowed for up
an additional 7
to 20 weeks of
weeks of EB if
EB duration.
TUR is at least is
8% and 110% of
either two
preceding
comparable
periods.
Federal
P.L. 97-248,
[Reach back to
Varied. See
Varied. See
Federal FUTA
Supplemental
P.L. 97-424,
6/1982]
Table A-2.
Table A-2.
funds and
Compensation
P.L. 98-21,
9/1982 to
general revenue.
(FSC)
P.L. 98-118,
6/1985
P.L. 98-135, and
P.L. 99-15.
(P.L. 99-272,
some
recipients in
Pennsylvania.)
Emergency
P.L. 102-164,
[Reach back to
Varied. See
Introduced
Federal FUTA
Unemployment
P.L. 102-182,
2/1991]
Table A-3.
“average” IUR, a
funds for
Compensation
P.L. 102-244,
13-week
benefits paid
(EUC)
P.L. 102-318,
11/1991 to
[Note:
comparison
before 7/5/1992
4/1994
Supersedes
measure.
and after
P.L. 103-6, and
rather than
10/2/1993; with
P.L. 103-152
supplements the
Varied. See
certain
EB program.
Table A-3.
exceptions,
Governors had
federal general
the option of
revenue for
triggering “off”
benefits paid on
EB benefits.]
or after 7/5/1992
but before
10/3/1993.
Congressional Research Service
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Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions

Duration of
Trigger
Financing
Program Public
Law Dates
Benefits
Mechanism
Authority
Temporary
P.L. 107-147,
[Reach back to
TEUC: Up to 13
TEUC was
Federal FUTA
Extended
P.L. 108-1, and
3/2001]
weeks.
available
funds.
Unemployment
P.L. 108-26
3/2002 to
High
nationally.
Compensation
3/2004
unemployment
TEUC-X was
(TEUC, TEUC-
states (TEUC-
determined by
X)

X); up to an
state level: if the
additional 13
EB program was
weeks.
triggered on; or
if the EB
program would
have been
triggered on if
section 203(d) of
the Federal-State
Unemployment
Compensation
Act of 1970
were amended
to read IUR: at
least 4% and
120% of the
prior 2 years.
Emergency
P.L. 110-252,
[Reach back to
Varied. See
Tier I of EUC08
Federal FUTA
Unemployment
P.L. 110-449,
5/2007]
Table A-4.
is nationally
funds. Benefits
Compensation
P.L. 111-5,
7/2008-3/2012
available.
after February
of 2008 (EUC08) P.L. 111-92,
(scheduled end)
Depending on
17, 2009, were
P.L. 111-118,
date, Tier II, Tier paid by general
P.L. 111-144,
III & Tier IV
revenue.
P.L. 111-157, P.L.
EUC08 are
111-205,
determined at
P.L. 111-312,
the state level.
P.L. 112-78,
See Table A-4
P.L. 112-96
for details.
Source: CRS.
Congressional Research Service
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Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions

Table A-2. Details: Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) Benefits
Public Law
Benefit Tiers
Dates in Effect (first claim date)
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
10 weeks: EB activated in state after
9/12/1982-1/8/1983.
Act (P.L. 97-248), signed 9/2/1982.
6/1/1982
8 weeks: EB inactive in state; IUR at
least 3.5%
6 weeks: all other states.
Surface Transportation Act of 1982
16 weeks: IUR of 6% or higher
1/9/1983-3/31/1983.
(P.L. 97-424), signed 1/6/1983.
14 weeks: EB activated on or after
6/1/1983 but IUR below 6%
12 weeks: IUR at least 4.5%
10 weeks: IUR at least 3.5% but less
than 4.5%
8 weeks: all other states
Social Security Amendments of 1983
First FSC payments on 4/1/1983 or
4/1/1983-10/18/1983.
(P.L. 98-21), signed 4/20/1983.
later:
14 weeks: IUR of 6% or higher
12 weeks: IUR of at least 5% but less
than 6%
10 weeks: IUR of at least 4% but less
than 5%
8 weeks: All other states
Additional entitlements for FSC
recipients before 4/1/1983
10 weeks: IUR at least 6%
8 weeks: IUR at least 4% but less
than 6%
6 weeks: all other states
Federal Supplemental Compensation
FSC first payments on 10/19/1983 or
10/19/1983-3/31/1985.
Amendments of 1983 (P.L. 98-135),
later:
(No benefits past 6/1985).
signed 10/24/1983.
14 weeks: IUR of 6% or higher
12 weeks: IUR of at least 5% but less
than 6%
10 weeks: IUR of at least 4% but less
than 5%
8 weeks: all other states
Additional entitlements for FSC
recipients after 3/31/1983 but before
10/19/1983
5 weeks: if all remaining benefits are
for weeks before 10/19/1983
4 weeks: IUR of at least 5%
2 weeks: all other states
Source: CRS.
Congressional Research Service
22
Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions

Table A-3. Details: Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) Benefits
of 1991
Public Law
Benefit Tiers
Dates in Effect (first claim date)
Emergency Unemployment
20 weeks: States with TUR of 9.5%
Superseded by P.L. 102-182.
Compensation Act (P.L. 102-164),
or higher or IUR of 5% or higher.
signed 11/15/1991.
13 weeks: States with IUR of 4% or
higher or IUR of 2.5% or higher and
UC exhaustion rate of 29% or
higher.
6 weeks: All other states.
Termination of Application of Title
Claims filed before 6/14/1992
11/17/1991-7/3/1992.
IV of the Trade Act of 1974 to
33 weeks: States with TUR of 9% or
Czechoslovakia and Hungary (P.L.
higher or IUR of 5% or higher.
102-182), signed 12/4/1991; and
26 weeks: Al other states.
Emergency Unemployment Benefits
Claims filed on or after 6/14/1992
Extension (P.L. 102-244), signed
20 weeks: States with TUR of 9% or
2/7/1992.
higher or IUR of 5% or higher.
13 weeks: Al other states.
[Note: P.L. 102-182 authorized
benefit periods of 20 and 13 weeks;
P.L. 102-244 authorized an additional
13 weeks for each tier.]
Unemployment Compensation
26 weeks: States with TUR of 9% or
6/14/1992-3/6/1993.
Amendments of 1992 (P.L. 102-318),
higher or IUR of 5% or higher
signed 7/3/1992.
20 weeks: Al other states.
[Note: If national TUR fell below
7.0% benefits were to be phased
down. This condition was not met.]
Emergency Unemployment
Claims filed before 9/12/1993
3/7/1993-10/2/1993.
Compensation Amendments of 1993 26 weeks: states with TUR of 9% or
(P.L. 103-6), signed 3/4/1993.
higher or IUR of 5% or higher
20 weeks: al other states
Claims filed on or after 9/12/1993
(triggered by national TUR falling
below 7% for 2 consecutive months)
15 weeks: States with TUR of 9% or
higher or IUR of 5% or higher.
10 weeks: Al other states.
Unemployment Compensation
13 weeks: States with TUR of 9% or
10/3/1993-2/5/1994
Amendments of 1993 (P.L. 103-152),
higher or IUR of 5% or higher.
(No benefits past 4/30/1994)
signed 11/25/1993
7 weeks: All other states.
[Note: This law also made
permanent changes to the EB
program to make its benefits more
widely available after the expiration
of EUC.]
Source: CRS.
Congressional Research Service
23
Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions

Table A-4. Details: Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) Benefits
of 2008
Public Law
Benefit Tiers and Availability
Dates in Effect and Financing
Supplemental Appropriations Act of
13 weeks (al states)
7/6/2008-3/28/2009
2008, Title IV Emergency
(No benefits past 7/4/2009)
Unemployment Compensation (P.L.

110-252), signed June 30, 2008
Funded by federal Emergency
Unemployment Compensation
Account (EUCA) funds within
Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF).
Unemployment Compensation
Tier I: 20 weeks (all states)
11/23/2008-3/28/2009
Extension Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-449),
Tier II: 13 additional weeks (33 weeks
(No benefits past 8/29/2009)
signed November 21, 2008
total) if state total unemployment rate

(TUR) is 6% or higher or insured
Funded by federal EUCA funds within
unemployment rate (IUR) is 4% or
UTF.
higher.
American Recovery and Reinvestment
Same as above.
2/22/2009-12/26/2009
Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5), signed

(No benefits past 6/5/2010)
February 17, 2009
[Act included several other

interventions that augmented UC
Funded by general fund of the
benefits: the Federal Additional
Treasury. (Additionally, the FAC
Compensation (FAC) benefit of
program is funded by the general fund
$25/week; at state option, EB benefit
of the Treasury. The 100% financing of
year could be calculated based upon
the EB program is funded by the
exhausting EUC08 benefits; 100%
EUCA funds within the UTF.)
federal financing of EB program; and
the first $2,400 of unemployment
benefits were excluded from income
tax in 2009.]
Worker, Homeowner, and Business
Tier I: 20 weeks (all states)
11/8/2009-12/26/2009
Assistance Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-92),
Tier II: 14 additional weeks (34 weeks
(No benefits past 6/5/2010)
signed November 6, 2009
total, all states)

Tier III: 13 additional weeks if state
Funded by general fund of the
TUR is 6% or higher or IUR is 4% or
Treasury. Extended FUTA surtax
higher (47 weeks total)
through June 2011. The estimated
Tier IV: 6 additional weeks if state
revenues col ected from FUTA surtax
TUR is 8.5% or higher or IUR is 6% or
provision were $2.578 billion and
higher (53 weeks total)
offset the estimated direct spending

costs for unemployment insurance
[Act included 1.5 year extension of the provisions of $2.42 billion.
Federal Unemployment Tax Act
(FUTA) surtax.]
Department of Defense Appropriations
Same as above.
12/27/2009-2/27/2010
Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-118), signed
(No benefits past 7/31/2010)
December 19, 2009

Funded by general fund of the
Treasury.
Temporary Extension Act of 2010 (P.L.
Same as above.
2/28/2010-4/3/2010
111-144), signed March 2, 2010
(No benefits past 9/4/2010)

Funded by general fund of the
Treasury.
Congressional Research Service
24
Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions

Public Law
Benefit Tiers and Availability
Dates in Effect and Financing
The Continuing Extension Act of 2010
Same as above.
4/4/2010 (retroactive)-5/29/2010
(P.L. 111-157), signed April 15, 2010
(No benefits past 11/6/ 2010)

Funded by general fund of the
Treasury.
The Unemployment Compensation
Same as above.
5/30/2010 (retroactive)-11/27/2010
Extension Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-205),

(No benefits past 4/30/2011)
signed July 22, 2010
[Note this did not include an

extension of the Federal Additional
Funded by general fund of the
Compensation (FAC) benefit of
Treasury.
$25/week for those receiving UC,
EUC08, EB, Disaster Unemployment
Assistance, or Trade Adjustment
Assistance. The FAC expired on June
2, 2010.]
The Tax Relief, Unemployment
Same as above.
11/28/2010 (retroactive)-12/31/2011
Insurance Reauthorization, and Job
(No benefits past 6/9/2012)
Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312),

signed December 17, 2010
Funded by general fund of the
Treasury.
The Temporary Payroll Tax Cut
Same as above.
1/1/2012-2/18/2012
Continuation Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-78),
(No benefits past 8/11/2012)
signed December 23, 2011

Funded by general fund of the
Treasury.
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job
Tier I: 20 weeks (all states)
2/19/2012-5/26/2012
Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96),
Tier II: 14 additional weeks (34 weeks

signed February 22, 2012
total, all states)
Funded by general fund of the
Tier III: 13 additional weeks if state
Treasury.
TUR is 6% or higher or IUR is 4% or
higher (47 weeks total)
Tier IV: 6 additional weeks if state
TUR is 8.5% or higher or IUR is 6% or
higher (53 weeks total); 16 weeks if no
EB and al other conditions met (63
weeks total)
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job
Tier I: 20 weeks (all states)
5/27/2012-9/1/2012
Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96),
Tier II: 14 additional weeks if TUR is

signed February 22, 2012
6% or higher (34 weeks total, all
Funded by general fund of the
states)
Treasury.
Tier III: 13 additional weeks if state
TUR is 7% or higher or IUR is 4% or
higher (47 weeks total)
Tier IV: 6 additional weeks if state
TUR is 9.0% or higher or IUR is 6% or
higher (53 weeks total)
Congressional Research Service
25
Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions

Public Law
Benefit Tiers and Availability
Dates in Effect and Financing
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job
Tier I: 14 weeks (all states)
9/2/2012-12/29/2012
Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96),
Tier II: 14 additional weeks if TUR is
(No benefits past 12/29/2012)
signed February 22, 2012
6% or higher (28 weeks total)

Tier III: 9 additional weeks if state
Funded by general fund of the
TUR is 7% or higher or IUR is 4% or
Treasury.
higher (37 weeks total)

Tier IV: 10 additional weeks if state
TUR is 9.0% or higher or IUR is 6%
(47 weeks total)
Note: no phase down.
Source: CRS.
Congressional Research Service
26

Table A-5. Timing of Recessions, 12-Month Change of at Least One Million, and Extended Unemployment Benefits, 1990-2012

1980 Recession
1981-1982 Recession
1990-1991 Recession
2001 Recession
2007 Recession
No
Months
Months
Months
P.L. 107-
Months
P.L. 110-
Months
Temporary
after
P.L. 97-
after
P.L. 102-
after
147,
after
252,
after
Federal
Recession
248, FSC
Recession
164, EUC
Recession
TEUC
Recession
EUC08
Recession
Extension
Begins
Benefits
Begins
Benefits
Begins
Benefits
Begins
Benefits
Begins
Date began
January 1980
—
July 1981
—
July 1990
—
March
— December —
2001
2007
First 12-month increase in
April 1980
3 months
November
4 months
November
4 months
August
5 months
March 2008
3 months
unemployment of at least 1
1981
1990
2001
million
Congress first enacts
Nonea NA
August
13 months
August
13 months
February
11 months
June 2008
6 months
extension
1982
1991
2002
Program becomes active
None
NA
September
14 months
November
16 months
March
12 months
July 2008
7 months
1982
1991b,c
2002
End recession
July 1980
6 months
November
16 months
March
8 months
November
8 months
June 2009
18 Months
1982
1991
2001
Last change of at least 1
March 1981
14 months
April 1983
21 months
September
17 months
September
20 months
May 2010
17 Months
mil ion more unemployed
1992
2002
Authorization ended (does
NA NA
March
44 months
February
42 months
January
34 months
Scheduled:
Scheduled:
not include phase out)
1985
1994
2004
December
60 months
2012
Source: CRS. Timing of recessions from National Bureau of Economic Research http://www.nber.org/cycles.html. Estimated increases of one million unemployed use data
from the Current Population Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics; http://www.bls.gov/data/home.htm.
a. The individual eligibility for the federal-state EB program was tightened by P.L. 96-499. The federal EB trigger was eliminated and the calculation of IUR was altered to
be less generous by P.L. 97-35.
b. H.R. 3201 was passed on August 2, 1991; the President signed the bill (P.L. 102-107) but did not declare an emergency; thus, no benefits were available. Congress sent
S. 1722 to the President who vetoed it on October 1, 1991. For a statement on the reasons for the veto, see http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=
20097.
c. Although P.L. 102-164 was signed into law on November 15, 1991, it was immediately superseded by two other laws: P.L. 102-182, signed 12/4/1991, and P.L. 102-244,
signed February 7, 1992. P.L. 102-182 authorized benefit periods of 20 and 13 weeks depending on state economic conditions; P.L. 102-244 authorized an additional 13
weeks for each tier.
CRS-27

Table A-6. Funding Temporary Unemployment Programs
Revenue Increases or Expenditure Decreases
Public Law
Related to Unemployment Benefits
Notes
Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958,
None.
This was a loan to the states for an additional 13 weeks
(P.L. 85-441)
of temporary state unemployment benefits. Loan had to
be repaid.
Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act Temporary Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) increase of 0.4% for 1962 and

of 1961, (P.L. 87-6)
0.25% for 1963.
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1971,
None.

(P.L. 92-224)
[No title] (P.L. 92-329)
An increase in FUTA tax from 3.2% to 3.28% in 1973.

Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1974
None.

(P.L. 93-572)
Tax Reduction Act (P.L. 94-12)
None.
Large bill with many tax reductions.
Emergency Compensation and Special Unemployment
None.

Assistance Extension Act of 1975 (P.L. 94-45), signed
June 30, 1975.
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1977
None.

(P.L. 95-19), signed April 12, 1977.
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
Large bill. Offsets included: Increased FUTA wage base of individual annual earnings
(P.L. 97-248)
paid by employers from $6,000 to $7,000. Increased gross FUTA tax from 3.4% to
3.5% (employers in states with approved UI laws continued to receive 2.7% credit
against FUTA tax so net tax is 0.8%); effective date: 1/1/1983. Increased gross
FUTA tax from 3.5% to 6.2% (this included a permanent tax of 0.6% plus a an
extension of a temporary 0.2% surtax that was to continue until all general
revenue advances to EUCA were repaid; the offset for state employers increased
to 5.4% so net FUTA tax remained at 0.8% until al general revenue advances to
EUC have been rapid and then dropped to 0.6%); state experience rating schedules
were required to have a maximum rate of at least 5.4%; effective date: 1/1/1985
but 5-year phase-in period. Reduced income thresholds limiting inclusion of state
and federal UI benefits in adjusted gross income to $12,000 (from $20,000) for
single taxpayers and to $18,000 (from $25,000) for married taxpayers filing jointly
(waived estimated tax penalties for 1982 attributed to this change); effective for
benefits paid on or after 1/1/1982.
Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982
Large bill. None.
Unable to identify UC specific offsets. However, bill
(P.L. 97-424)
revised the authorization of Highway appropriations
which included increased fuel taxes.
CRS-28

Revenue Increases or Expenditure Decreases
Public Law
Related to Unemployment Benefits
Notes
Social Security Amendments of 1983 (P.L. 98-21)
Required states to pay interest, when due, as a condition for al the State’s
The “cap” on automatic FUTA credit reductions
employers to continue to receive offset credit against the FUTA tax and for the
(available if certain solvency requirements are met)
State to continue to receive grants for administration; effective date: 4/1/1983.
which was scheduled to expire at the end of CY 1987,
was made permanent.
Federal Supplemental Compensation Extension of 1983
None.

(P.L. 98-118)
Federal Supplemental Compensation Amendments of
None.
Study to examine how to prevent retirees and prisoners
1983 (P.L. 98-135)
from receiving unemployment compensation.
[No title] (P.L. 99-15)
None.

Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991
None.
In order for EUC to be implemented, the President had
(P.L. 102-107)
to submit to Congress a separate declaration of a
budget emergency that, in effect, would have allowed
off-budget financing. Although the President signed the
legislation into law, he did not issue the emergency
declaration and thus the new program was inoperative
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991
Among other financing provisions: extension of 0.2% FUTA surtax for one
Superseded by P.L. 102-182.
(P.L. 102-164)
additional year (through 1996); making estimated tax payment conform more
closely to a taxpayers’ liability; making permanent the tax refund offset program for
collecting non-tax debts owed to the federal government; and improving the
collection of guaranteed student loans in default.
Termination of Application of Title IV of the Trade Act
None.

of 1974 to Czechoslovakia and Hungary (P.L. 102-182)
To increase the number of weeks for which benefits are
Amended Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provisions to provide for a temporary

payable under the Emergency Unemployment
increase in the amount of certain corporate estimated tax payments, by setting the
Compensation Act of 1991, and for other purposes
applicable percentage for such annualized payments at 95% of the tax liability for
(P.L. 102-244)
each of 1993 through 1996 (rather than 94% for 1993 and 1994, and 95% in 1995
and 1996).
Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1992
Amended the IRC to extend by one year, through December 31, 1996, a phaseout

(P.L. 102-318)
of personal exemptions for certain high income taxpayers.
Revised IRC requirements for corporate estimated tax payments. Required large
corporations to base their estimated tax payments on an increased percentage of
their current year tax liability as follows: (1) 97% for taxable years beginning after
June 30, 1992, and before 1997 (rather than 95% or 93%, determined on an actual
or annual basis); and (2) 91% for taxable years beginning in 1997 and thereafter
(rather than 90%).
CRS-29

Revenue Increases or Expenditure Decreases
Public Law
Related to Unemployment Benefits
Notes
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Amendments
None.

of 1993 (P.L. 103-6)
Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1993
None.

(P.L. 103-152)
Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002
None.

(P.L. 107-147)
[No title] (P.L. 108-1), signed January 8, 2003.
None.

Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 2003
None.

(P.L. 108-26)
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008, Title IV
None.

Emergency Unemployment Compensation (P.L. 110-252)
Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2008
None.

(P.L. 110-449)
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
None.

(P.L. 111-5),
Worker, Homeowner, and Business Assistance Act of
Extended 0.2% FUTA surtax an additional 1.5 years (through June 2011).

2009 (P.L. 111-92)
Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2010
None.
Large bill, EUC08 funding was declared emergency
(P.L. 111-118)
spending.
The Temporary Extension Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-144)
None.

The Continuing Extension Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-157)
None.

The Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of
None.

2010 (P.L. 111-205)
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization,
None.

and Job Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312)
The Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of
Required the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to require

2011 (P.L. 112-78)
each government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) (the Federal National Mortgage
Association [Fannie Mae] and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
[Freddie Mac]) to charge a guarantee fee in connection with any guarantee of the
timely payment of principal and interests on securities, notes, and other obligations
based on or backed by mortgages on residential real properties designed
principally for the occupancy of from one to four families.
CRS-30

Revenue Increases or Expenditure Decreases
Public Law
Related to Unemployment Benefits
Notes
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012
Large bill, EUC08 was not declared emergency spending. The bill included offsets;

(P.L. 112-96)
for example, the auction of spectrum licenses and increased federal retirement
contributions.
Source: CRS.
Notes: Some of these laws reduced expenditures or increased revenues but (1) they were part of large appropriation bills and generally not subject to PAYGO rules or (2)
CRS was unable to directly link these measures to any type of unemployment benefits.
CRS did not attempt to identify whether these reductions in expenditures or increases in revenues ful y offset the expected costs of the changes in expenditures on
temporary unemployment benefits.
Table A-7. Potential Maximum Available Weeks of Unemployment Benefits, 1935-Present
Total Weeks of
Permanent Programs
Temporary Programsa
Unemployment
Benefits (Regular,
Extended, and
Regular
Temporary
Unemployment
Extended Benefits
Benefits
Dates
Benefitsa
(EB) Programb
Program Name
Duration of Program Benefits
Programs)
8/14/1935 to present (first
Up to 26 weeks



Up to 26 weeks (in
regular unemployment
the absence of
benefit check sent out
temporary programs
8/17/36)
that provide
additional weeks of
benefits)
6/23/58 to 6/30/59
Up to 26 weeks

Temporary Unemployment
Up to 13 weeks
Up to 39 weeks
(reachback to 6/30/57)
Compensation (TUC)
(P.L. 85-441)
4/8/61 to 6/30/62
Up to 26 weeks

Temporary Extended
Up to 13 weeks
Up to 39 weeks
(reachback to 6/30/60)
Unemployment Compensation
(TEUC)
(P.L. 87-6)
CRS-31

Total Weeks of
Permanent Programs
Temporary Programsa
Unemployment
Benefits (Regular,
Extended, and
Regular
Temporary
Unemployment
Extended Benefits
Benefits
Dates
Benefitsa
(EB) Programb
Program Name
Duration of Program Benefits
Programs)
10/10/1970 to 3/6/01 (P.L 91-
Up to 26 weeks
EB Program

Up to 39 weeks (in
373 enacted 8/10/70; national-
Created. Up to 13
the absence of
level trigger available after
weeks of EB benefits
temporary programs
1/1/1972; states given from
if either national- or
that provide
10/10/1970 to 1/1/1972 to
state-level triggers
additional weeks of
include state-level EB trigger in
are reachedc
benefits)
state programs, although many
states acted sooner)
1/30/72 to 3/31/73
Up to 26 weeks
Up to 13 weeks of EB Temporary Compensation (TC)
Up to 13 weeks
Up to 52 weeks
(no reachback)
benefits if either
(P.L. 92-224, P.L. 92-329)
national- or state-
level triggers are
reached c
1/1/75 to 2/1/78
Up to 26 weeks
Up to 13 weeks of EB Federal Supplemental Benefits
1/75-3/75
Up to 13 weeks
Up to 52 weeks
(no reachback)
benefits if either
(FSB)
national- or state-
(P.L. 93-572, P.L. 94-12, P.L. 94-45,
3/75-3/77
Up to 26 weeks
Up to 65 weeks
level triggers are
P.L. 95-19)
4/77-2/78
Up to 13 weeks
Up to 52 weeks
reached c
9/12/82 to 6/30/85
Up to 26 weeks
Up to 13 weeks of EB Federal Supplemental
9/82-12/82
Up to 10 weekse
Up to 49 weeks
(reachback to 6/1/82)
benefits if state-level
Compensation (FSC)
triggers reached (EB
(P.L. 97-248, P.L. 97-424, P.L. 98-
1/83-3/83
Up to 16 weekse
Up to 55 weeks
national trigger was
21, P.L. 98-118, P.L. 98-135, P.L.
4/83-6/85
Up to 14 weekse
Up to 53 weeks
eliminated in 1981)c
99-15)
11/17/91 to 4/30/94
Up to 26 weeks
Up to 13 weeks of EB Emergency Unemployment
11/91-2/92
Up to 20 weekse
Up to 46 weeks
(reachback to 2/91)
benefits if state-level
Compensation (EUC)
triggers reached
(P.L. 102-164, P.L. 102-244, P.L.
2/92-6/92
Up to 33 weekse
Up to 59 weeks
(national trigger
102-318, P.L. 103-6, P.L. 103-152)
6/92-9/93
Up to 26 weekse
Up to 52 weeks
eliminated in 1981)c
Note: EUC benefits were reduced
9/93-10/93
Up to 15 weekse
Up to 41weeks

by any EB benefits received
10/93-4/94
Up to 13 weekse
Up to 39 weeks
CRS-32

Total Weeks of
Permanent Programs
Temporary Programsa
Unemployment
Benefits (Regular,
Extended, and
Regular
Temporary
Unemployment
Extended Benefits
Benefits
Dates
Benefitsa
(EB) Programb
Program Name
Duration of Program Benefits
Programs)
3/7/93 to present
Up to 26 weeks
New, Optional TUR

Up to 46 weeks in
Trigger Provides up
states that have
to 20 Weeks of EB
adopted optional
Benefits (P.L. 102-
TUR trigger (in the
318). In states
absence of temporary
without the optional
programs providing
TUR trigger, EB
additional weeks of
benefits remain
benefits)
capped at 13 weeksd
3/9/02 to 12/31/03
Up to 26 weeks
Up to 20 weeks in
Temporary Extended
Up to 26 weekse,f
Up to 72 weeks
(reachback to 3/15/01)
states that have
Unemployment Compensation
adopted optional
(TEUC)
TUR trigger,d
(P.L. 107-147, P.L. 108-1, P.L. 108-
otherwise up to 13
11, P.L. 108-26)f
weeks (state may opt
to trigger off EB if the
state is on TEUC)
7/08 to present
Up to 26 weeks
Up to 20 weeks in
Emergency Unemployment
7/08-11/08
Up to 13 weeks
Up to 59 weeks
(reachback to 5/07)
states that have
Compensation Act of 2008
adopted optional
(EUC08)
11/08-11/09
Up to 33 weekse
Up to 79 weeks
TUR triggerd,g,h
(P.L. 110-252, P.L. 110-449, P.L.
11/09 -2/12
Up to 53 weekse,h
Up to 99 weeksh
otherwise up to 13
111-5, P.L. 111-92, P.L. 111-118,
weeks
P.L. 111-144, P.L. 111-157, P.L.
2/12-5/12
Up to 63 weekse,h
Up to 99 weeksh
111-205, P.L. 111-312, P.L. 112-78,
6/12-8/12
Up to 53 weekse,h
Up to 99 weeksh,i
P.L. 112-96)
9/12-12/12
Up to 47 weekse,h
Up to 93 weeksh
Sources: This table was originally constructed by Alison Shelton. The information is from the U.S. Department of Labor, “Chronology of Federal Unemployment
Compensation Laws” and “Special Extended Benefit Programs.” Both documents are available at http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/laws.asp#FederalLegislation.
a. In 1940, only 1 state paid up to 26 weeks of regular unemployment benefits and 13 states paid no more than a maximum of 15 weeks of benefits. By 1950, 13 states
paid up to 26 weeks of benefits. By 1960, 32 states paid up to 26 weeks of benefits and 9 states paid more than 26 weeks of benefits (these states generally paid
around 30 weeks of benefits). During the 1990s, most states that had previously paid more than 26 weeks of benefits reduced the maximum number of available weeks
to 26, as a result of state trust fund insolvency and the introduction of the Extended Benefits program in the 1970s. Source: July 9, 2009, e-mail from Jerry Hildebrand,
CRS-33

Chief of the Division of Legislation, Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. In 2011, several states enacted legislation to decrease the
maximum number of weeks of regular state UC benefits. Until recently, all states paid at least up to 26 weeks of UC benefits to eligible, unemployed individuals with
Montana paying up to 28 weeks of benefits and Massachusetts paying up to 30 weeks of benefits. In 2011, six states passed legislation to decrease their maximum UC
benefit durations. Arkansas, Missouri, and South Carolina have made state UC law changes that are already in effect. Michigan, Illinois, and Florida legislated state law
changes that will be effective in January 2012.
b. The permanent Extended Benefits program and certain temporary programs use unemployment rate thresholds, or “triggers,” to determine whether the programs
should be activated either at the state or national levels, depending on the program and the historical time period. The two unemployment rate triggers that have been
used are the IUR and the TUR. The IUR is the number of unemployment insurance beneficiaries divided by the number of workers covered by unemployment
insurance. The TUR is the number of unemployed workers (i.e., actively seeking work) divided by the total number of workers (employed and unemployed).
c. The Extended Benefits program initial y had both national and state-level triggers. EB was activated nationwide twice: (1) from February 23, 1975 through July 2, 1977;
and (2) from July 20, 1980 through January 24, 1981. During periods when EB was not available national y, the EB state-level trigger requirements sometimes caused EB
to be unavailable in states with persistently high unemployment. The state-level trigger requirements were therefore suspended seven times between October 1972
and December 1976. Revisions to the EB program in 1981 kept the maximum number of available weeks at 13 but eliminated the national-level trigger. The 1981
revisions also established more restrictive criteria for activating EB at the state level, through two provisions: (1) raising IUR thresholds that states need to reach to
trigger onto EB; and (2) modifying the IUR calculation in a way that results in lower state IURs (specifically, eliminating EB claimants from the definition of
unemployment insurance beneficiaries in the numerator of the IUR calculation). The 1981 changes to the EB program also added a second, optional, trigger for 13
weeks of benefits that states could adopt, effective for weeks after September 25, 1982.
d. The Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1992 (P.L. 102-318) al owed states to make EB more widely available by adopting a third, optional trigger that
would provide for 13 or 20 additional weeks of benefits depending on the state’s TUR. Some, although not all, states cross the EB program’s TUR trigger thresholds
before crossing the program’s IUR trigger. This is because of differences among states in unemployment insurance coverage (for example, the number of non-insured
self-employed workers in the state) and also differences in states’ eligibility rules and administrative practices that can limit the number of unemployment beneficiaries
(the numerator in the IUR calculation, see footnote b).
e. The figure shown is the maximum number of benefit weeks that were available under the program during the given time period. Certain temporary programs,
however, used benefit “tiers” to provide more benefit weeks to states with relatively higher unemployment rates than to states with relatively lower unemployment
rates. For example, the FSC program provided up to five different tiers of benefit durations within a single time period. The FSC and TEUC programs, besides linking
the number of benefit weeks to state unemployment rates, also linked the number of available benefit weeks in a state to whether or not the state’s EB program had
triggered on. The EUC08 program provided a single tier of benefits when it was first became effective in July 2008; this was expanded to two tiers of benefits in
November 2008 and to four tiers of benefits in November 2009.
f.
The TEUC program also provided an additional 13-26 weeks of benefits to certain unemployed airline employees.
g. P.L. 111-312 made technical changes to certain triggers in the EB program. P.L. 111-312 al ows states to temporarily use lookback calculations based on three years of
unemployment rate data (rather than the permanent law lookback of two years of data) as part of their mandatory IUR and optional TUR triggers if states would
otherwise trigger off or not be on a period of EB benefits. This authorization for this option was extended by P.L. 112-78 and P.L. 112-96. The authorization now is set
to expire on the week ending on or before December 31, 2012.
h. In 2011 and 2012, several states enacted legislation to decrease the maximum number of weeks of regular state UC benefits. Changes in UC benefit duration have
consequences for the duration of federal unemployment benefits that may be available to unemployed workers. State UC benefit duration is an underlying factor in the
calculation of duration for additional federal unemployment benefits. Thus, the reduction of the maximum duration of regular UC benefits reduces the number of
weeks available to unemployed workers in the federal extended unemployment programs (including the Emergency Unemployment Compensation [EUC08] and EB).
See CRS Report R41859, Unemployment Insurance: Consequences of Changes in State Unemployment Compensation Laws, by Katelin P. Isaacs, for a list of these states and
estimates of the impact of the reductions on total potential weeks of unemployment insurance.
i.
P.L. 112-96 capped the maximum number of weeks to not exceed 99.
CRS-34
Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions


Author Contact Information

Julie M. Whittaker
Katelin P. Isaacs
Specialist in Income Security
Analyst in Income Security
jwhittaker@crs.loc.gov, 7-2587
kisaacs@crs.loc.gov, 7-7355


Congressional Research Service
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