Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
September 20, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21922
CRS Report for Congress
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epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Summary
Building capacity and limiting corruption at all levels of Afghan governance are crucial to the
success of a planned transition from U.S.-led NATO forces to Afghan security leadership. The
capacity of the formal Afghan governing structure has increased significantly since the Taliban
regime fell in late 2001, but nepotism is entrenched in Afghan culture and other forms of
corruption are widespread. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has accepted U.S. help to build
emerging anti-corruption institutions, but these same institutions have sometimes caused a Karzai
backlash when they have targeted his allies or relatives. At a donors’ conference in Tokyo on July
8, 2012, donors pledged to aid Afghanistan’s economy through at least 2017, provided
Afghanistan takes concrete, verifiable action to rein in corruption. On July 26, 2012, Karzai
appeared to try to meet his pledges to the Tokyo conference by issuing a “decree on
administrative reforms”—a document of sweeping policy directives intended to curb corruption.
Partly because of corruption in the Afghan security forces, on August 4, 2012, the National
Assembly voted to remove the ministers of interior and of defense; they have been replaced.
Even though the government is weak, President Hamid Karzai has tried to concentrate authority
in Kabul through his constitutional powers of appointment at all levels. Karzai has publicly
denied assertions by opposing faction leaders that he wants to stay in office beyond the 2014
expiration of his second term, but he is said to be trying to identify and support an acceptable
successor. International efforts to curb fraud in two successive elections (for president in 2009
and parliament in 2010) largely failed and many believe election oversight will be little improved
for the 2014 election, although civil society groups are trying to ensure robust competition and
electoral fairness.
There is concern among many observers that fragile governance will founder as the United States
and its partners wind down their involvement in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Some argue that
the informal power structure, which has always been at least as significant a factor in governance
as the formal power structure, will sustain governance beyond 2014 should formal governing
structures falter. However, that outcome might produce even more corruption and arbitrary
administration of justice than is the case now as major faction leaders gain power. Karzai has
failed to marginalize these ethnic faction leaders, in part because they have large constituencies,
but he relies more closely on the loyalty of several close, ethnic Pashtun allies, particularly those
from the Qandahar area. The non-Pashtun faction leaders generally oppose Karzai’s willingness
to make concessions to insurgent leaders in search of a settlement. There are fears that a
reintegration of the Taliban into Afghan politics will further set back progress in human rights and
the rights of women and boost Pashtun power.
Broader issues of human rights often vary depending on the security environment in particular
regions, although some trends prevail nationwide. Women, media professionals, and civil society
groups have made substantial gains since the fall of the Taliban, but traditional attitudes
contribute to the judicial and political system’s continued toleration of child marriages,
imprisonment of women who flee domestic violence, judgments against converts from Islam to
Christianity, and curbs on the sale of alcohol and Western-oriented programming in the Afghan
media. See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S.
Policy, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report R40747, United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan: Background and Policy Issues, by Rhoda Margesson; and CRS Report R41484,
Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth
Katzman.
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Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Contents
Overview: Historic Patterns of Afghan Authority and Politics........................................................ 1
Relations Among Ethnicities and Communities........................................................................ 2
The Pashtuns ....................................................................................................................... 3
The Tajiks............................................................................................................................ 3
The Hazaras......................................................................................................................... 3
The Uzbeks.......................................................................................................................... 4
Relative Lack of Attraction to Formal Political Parties............................................................. 4
Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape............................................................................. 5
Establishment of the Formal Afghan Government Structure: Tending Toward
Centralization ......................................................................................................................... 5
December 2001 Bonn Agreement ....................................................................................... 6
Permanent Constitution Adopted, Sets Up Presidential System ......................................... 6
National Assembly (Parliament) Formation, Powers, and Assertion of Powers ................. 7
Rivalries Within and Outside Governing Institutions................................................................ 9
Karzai’s Presidential Leadership, His Close Advisers, and Staff ........................................ 9
The Opposition: The “Northern Alliance,” Dr. Abdullah, and Karzai Opponents in
the Lower House of Parliament...................................................................................... 13
The Informal Power Structure: Other Power Brokers, “Warlords,” and Local Faction
Leaders ................................................................................................................................. 15
Emerging Power Centers: Civil Society and “Independent” Activists .................................... 21
Ethnic and Factional Cooperation in the Security Sector........................................................ 21
Elections in 2009 and 2010 Widened Political Schisms.......................................................... 23
2009 Presidential Election................................................................................................. 23
September 18, 2010, Parliamentary Elections................................................................... 26
Implications for the United States of the Afghan Elections Disputes ............................... 32
2014 Presidential Elections: Karzai Says He Will Leave Office, Looks for
Successor........................................................................................................................ 32
Afghan Governing Capacity and Performance.............................................................................. 34
Expanding Central Government Capacity............................................................................... 35
The Afghan Civil Service.................................................................................................. 35
The Afghan Budget Process .............................................................................................. 36
Expanding Local (Subnational) Governance........................................................................... 37
The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)............................................ 38
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils ................................................................. 38
District-Level Governance ................................................................................................ 39
Municipal and Village Level Authority............................................................................. 40
U.S. Local Governance Advisory Capacity....................................................................... 40
Reforming Afghan Governance: Curbing Corruption ............................................................. 41
High Level Corruption, Nepotism, and Cronyism ............................................................ 41
Lower-Level Corruption.................................................................................................... 42
Administration Views and Policy on Corruption .............................................................. 42
Anti-Corruption Initiatives................................................................................................ 43
Kabul Bank Scandal and Continuing Difficulties ............................................................. 46
Moves to Penalize Lack of Progress on Corruption.......................................................... 48
Rule of Law Efforts ................................................................................................................. 49
Promoting Human Rights and Civil Society ........................................................................... 50
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Institution-Building: The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
(AIHRC)......................................................................................................................... 51
Religious Influence on Society: National Ulema Council ................................................ 51
Religious Freedom ............................................................................................................ 52
Media and Freedom of Expression/Social Freedoms........................................................ 53
Harsh Punishments............................................................................................................ 54
Human Trafficking ............................................................................................................ 54
Advancement of Women ................................................................................................... 55
Democracy, Human Rights, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues.......................... 59
Effects of a Settlement with the Taliban.................................................................................. 59
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Afghan Ethnicities ............................................................................................. 63
Tables
Table 1. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations .............................................................................. 61
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 63
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 63
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Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Overview: Historic Patterns of Afghan Authority
and Politics
Through differing regimes of widely varying ideologies, Afghanistan’s governing structure has
historically consisted of weak central government unwilling or unable to enforce significant
financial or administrative mandates on all of Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic communities or on the
80% of Afghans who live in rural areas. Many communities are separated by mountains and wide
expanses that can take days to reach and require traditional modes of transportation. The tensions
between the central government and the outlying areas have often mirrored the struggles between
urban, educated “modernizers” and the rural, lesser-educated traditionalists who adhere to strict
Islamic customs. The Taliban government (1996-2001) opposed modernization.
At the national level, Afghanistan had few, if any, Western-style democratic institutions prior to
the international intervention that took place after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United
States. Under the constitution of 1964, King Zahir Shah was to be a constitutional monarch, and
an elected lower house and appointed upper house were set up. The parliament during that era
never reached the expectation of becoming a significant check on the king’s power, although the
period from 1964 until the seizure of power by Mohammad Daoud in a 1973 military coup was
considered a flowering of Afghan democracy. The last lower house elections during that period
were held in 1969. The parliament was suspended outright following the April 1978 Communist
seizure of power. The elected institutions and the 2004 adoption of a constitution were part of a
post-Taliban transition roadmap established by a United Nations-sponsored agreement of major
Afghan factions signed in Bonn, Germany, on December 5, 2001 (“Bonn Agreement”),1 after the
Taliban had fallen. Karzai is the first directly elected Afghan president.
Since the fall of the Taliban, there has also been the growth of civil society, populated largely by
educated Afghans, many of whom returned to Afghanistan from exile when the Taliban fell.
Organizations and groups centered on various issues, including women’s rights, law and justice,
media freedoms, economics and business issues, the environment, and others, have proliferated.
U.S. and partner policy has been to try to empower these groups as a check on government power
and as a guarantor that Afghan democracy will become entrenched.
These newly emerging interest groups have still not been able to displace—or even necessarily
substantially influence—the informal power structure of ethnic, regional, tribal, clan, village, and
district structures that exercise authority at all levels. At the local level, these structures governed
and secured Afghanistan until the late 1970s but were weakened by decades of subsequent war
and Taliban rule. Some traditional local authority figures fled or were killed; others were
displaced by mujahedin commanders, militia leaders, Taliban militants, and others. The local
power brokers who displaced some of the tribal structures are far less popular and are widely
accused of selectively applying Afghan law and of using their authority to enrich themselves.
Some of the traditional tribal councils, which are widely respected but highly conservative in
orientation, remained intact. Some of them continue to exercise their writ rather than accept the
authority of the central government or even local government appointees. Still other community
authorities prefer to accommodate local insurgents, whom they often see as wayward but
reconcilable members of the community, rather than help the government secure their areas.
1 For text, see http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm.
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The informal power structure has decision-making bodies and processes that do not approximate
Western-style democracy but yet have participatory and representative elements. Meetings called
shuras, or jirgas (consultative councils),2 often composed of designated notables, are key
mechanisms for making or endorsing authoritative decisions or dispensing justice. Some of these
mechanisms are practiced by Taliban insurgents in areas under their control or influence. On the
other hand, some see the traditional patterns as competing with and detracting from the
development of the post-Taliban formal power structure—a structure that, with Western guidance,
has generally tried to meet international standards of democratic governance and human rights
practices.
At the national level, one traditional mechanism has carried over into the post-Taliban governing
structure. The convening of a loya jirga, an assembly usually consisting of about 1,500 delegates
from all over Afghanistan, has been used on several occasions. Under the constitution, decisions
of a loya jirga supersede decisions made under any other process, including cabinet meetings or
even elections. In the post-Taliban period, loya jirgas have been convened to endorse Karzai’s
leadership, to adopt a constitution, and to discuss a long-term defense relationship with the United
States. A special loya jirga, called a peace jirga, was held on June 2-4, 2010, to review
government plans to offer incentives for insurgent fighters to end their armed struggle and rejoin
society. Another loya jirga was held during November 16-19, 2011, to endorse proposed Afghan
government conditions on a strategic partnership agreement between Afghanistan and the United
States. However, the constitution specifies who should be delegates at a constitutional loya jirga,
and, in the absence of elected district councils (whose members are mandated to be included), all
of Afghanistan’s post-2004 loya jirgas have been traditional loya jirgas.
Relations Among Ethnicities and Communities
Even though post-Taliban Afghanistan, particularly in urban areas, is modernizing politically and
economically, patterns of political affiliation by family, clan, tribe, village, ethnicity, region, and
comradeship in past battles often supersede relationships based on ideology or views. These
patterns have been evident in every Afghan election since the fall of the Taliban. Most candidates,
including Karzai, have pursued campaign strategies designed primarily to assemble blocs of
ethnic and geographic votes, although some independent candidates have sought to advance
specific new programs and ideas. The traditional patterns have been even more pronounced in
province-based campaigns such as those for provincial councils and the parliament. In these
cases, electorates (the eligible voters of a specific province) are small and candidates can easily
exploit clan and familial relationships.
While Afghans continue to follow traditional patterns of affiliation, there has been a sense among
Afghans that their country now welcomes members of all political and ethnic groups and factions.
There have been very few incidents of ethnic-based violence since the fall of the Taliban, but
jealousies over relative economic and political positions of the different ethnic communities have
sporadically manifested as clashes or political disputes.
2 Shura is the term used by non-Pashtuns to characterize the traditional assembly concept. Jirga is the Pashtun term.
The Afghan constitution provides for a constitutional loya jirga as the highest decisionmaking body, and specifies the
institutions that must be represented at the jirga. If a constitutional jirga cannot be held or is blocked, a traditional jirga
can be convened by the president to discuss major issues, although its ability to render binding decisions on proposals
is unclear.
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The Pashtuns
Ethnic Pashtuns (pronounced POSH-toons, sometimes referred to as Pathans—pah-TAHNS), as
the largest single ethnicity, have historically asserted a “right to rule” Afghanistan. Pashtuns are
about 42% of the population and, with few exceptions, have governed Afghanistan. The sentiment
of the “right to rule” is particularly strong among Pashtuns of the Durrani tribal confederation,
which predominates in the south and is a rival to the Ghilzai confederation, which predominates
in the east and has historically close ties to Pakistan.
Karzai is a Durrani Pashtun. His cabinet and inner advisory circle has come to be progressively
dominated by Pashtuns, both Ghilzai and Durrani, which has largely minimized the advisory
input of the non-Pashtun communities. However, Karzai is credited by some observers for
consulting with other communities, particularly the Tajiks, before issuing decrees or reaching
decisions. The Taliban government was and its insurgency is composed almost completely of
Pashtuns. A table on major Pashtun clans is provided below (see Table 1), as is a map showing
the distribution of Afghan ethnicities (see Figure 1).
The Tajiks
Tajiks are the second-most numerous and second most powerful community in Afghanistan.
Tajiks are an estimated 25% of the population and constitute the core of the “Northern Alliance”
grouping that politically opposes but sometimes works amicably with Karzai. On a few
occasions, Tajiks have ruled Afghanistan, although usually for relatively brief periods. One recent
example was the 1992-1996 presidency of the mujahedin government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, a
Tajik (who was assassinated on September 20, 2011). The Tajiks and the Northern Alliance are
discussed extensively in this paper.
The Hazaras
Many Pashtuns are said to be increasingly resentful of the Hazara Shiite minority (about 10% of
the population) that is advancing economically and politically through education. The Hazaras
have historically been looked down upon by the Pashtuns, who have tended to employ Hazaras as
domestic workers and other lower and lower middle class occupations. Observers report that
many Hazaras, including Hazara women, are earning degrees or pursuing training in information
technology, medical, and other highly skilled professions and that they are becoming dominant in
many of these higher paying sectors of the Afghan economy. Jealousy of Hazara advancement
could have been a factor in the December 6, 2011, bombings of Hazaras in three cities, killing 60,
while they were visiting their mosques to celebrate the Shiite holy day of Ashura. A
Pakistan-based militant group, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, claimed responsibility—possibly in an effort
to stir up sectarian conflict in Afghanistan. Afghan Shiite officials said such tactics would not
work, as there is no inclination toward sectarian conflict in Afghanistan. However, a rare clash
took place between Hazaras and Tajiks in Kabul when a car in procession of Tajiks
commemorating the September 9, 2001, death of their historic leader Ahmad Shah Massoud ran
over a Hazara bicyclist. The clash was said to reflect lingering Hazara resentment of Massoud’s
1993 offensive against then Hazara rivals during the 1992-1996 period of internecine warfare that
preceded the accession of the Taliban regime.
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The Uzbeks
Uzbeks, like the Hazaras, are about 10%. The Uzbek community is Sunni Muslim and speaks a
language akin to Turkish, as well as Dari. The most well-known Uzbek leader in Afghanistan is
Abdul Rashid Dostam, who was allied with Soviet occupation forces but later defected and
helped bring down the Communist regime in Afghanistan in April 1992. Because of their alliance
with the Soviet Union during the occupation period, many Uzbeks in Afghanistan are leftwing
and highly secular.
Relative Lack of Attraction to Formal Political Parties
One major issue that connects post-Taliban and pre-Taliban Afghanistan is that the concept of an
Afghan nation is not as strong as are affiliation by community and clan. There is a popular
aversion to formal “parties” as historically tools of neighboring powers—a perception stemming
from the war against the Soviet Union when seven mujahedin parties were funded by and
considered tools of outside parties. Some of these mujahedin parties remain, such as the mostly
Pashtun Hizb-e-Islam and the mostly Tajik Jamiat Islami, as discussed below. However, most of
the mujahedin era parties have evolved into alternate or broader coalitions. Hizb-e-Islam is a
notable exception to that trend, and it does generally still compete in elections as a distinct party.
Prior to September 2009, when a new political party’s law was adopted, there were 110 registered
political parties. However, a September 2009 law required all parties to reregister and to submit
10,000 signatures, spanning at least 22 provinces to verify their support. By the time of the
September 18, 2010, parliamentary election, only five parties had completed the new registration
process. By late 2011, 38 parties had completed the process, and a total of 21 parties are
represented in the lower house of parliament.
Partly because parties are viewed with suspicion, President Hamid Karzai has not formed his own
party, but many of his supporters in the National Assembly (parliament) belong to a moderate
faction of Hizb-e-Islam that is committed to working within the political system. The grouping
was reduced somewhat by the results of the September 18, 2010, parliamentary elections. The
putative leader of this group is Minister of Economy Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal. A militant faction
of Hizb-e-Islam is loyal to pro-Taliban insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar; it is called Hizb-e-
Islam Gulbuddin (HIG).
Other large parties that do exist, for example the Junbush Melli of Abdul Rashid Dostam, tend to
be identified with specific ethnic (in his case, Uzbeks) or sectarian factions, rather than
overarching themes. A major party is Jamiat Islami (Islamic Society), a party that grouped Tajik
leaders during the anti-Soviet war, although many Tajik leaders still identify with the broader
anti-Taliban “Northern Alliance.” In recent years, key Tajiks have formed broader groupings
discussed later, such as the United Front and the Hope and Change Movement. However, these
parties do not advertise themselves as “ethnic” parties per se, because Article 35 of the Afghan
constitution bans parties based on ethnicity or religious sect.
It was hoped that post-Taliban Afghanistan would produce a substantial number of secular, pan-
ethnic democratic parties. Some large such parties have formed, particularly the Hope and
Change party of Dr. Abdullah, discussed further below. Another secular, pan-ethnic party, the
Rights and Justice Party, was formed by ex-Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar and other
allies in October 2011, also discussed further below. Another party, the Coalition for Reform and
Development, has formed in 2012 to try to ensure that the presidential election in 2014 is fair.
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Smaller secular parties include the Afghanistan Labour and Development Party, the National
Solidarity Party of Afghanistan’s Youth, the Republican Party, and the National Congress Party of
Afghanistan led by Abdul Latif Pedram. Some parties are left wing, such as the National United
Party of Afghanistan, led by former parliamentarian Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, who was in the
Communist era military. However, some believe that all the smaller, idea-based parties remain
weak because the Single, Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system—in which each voter casts a
ballot for only one candidate—favors candidates running as independents rather than as members
of parties. Moreover, Western-style parties are generally identified by specific ideologies, ideas,
or ideals, while most Afghans, as discussed above, retain their traditional affiliations. As a result,
many of the parties that have been formed since the fall of the Taliban have centered around
personalities rather than broad idea-driven platforms.
Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape
U.S. policy since 2001 has been to help expand the capacity of formal Afghan governing
institutions, most of which were nearly non-existent during Taliban rule. No parliament was
functioning during that time, and Afghanistan was run by a small, Qandahar-based group of
Pashtun clerics loyal to Mullah Mohammad Umar, who remained there. Government offices that
were functioning were minimally staffed, and without modern equipment, according to observers.
There were virtually no checks or balances on Mullah Omar’s decision to host Osama bin Laden
in Afghanistan during that time. Since 2007, but with particular focus during the Obama
Administration, U.S. policy has been to not only try to expand Afghan governing capacity and the
ability of the government to deliver services - at the central and local levels - but to push for its
reform, transparency, and oversight. However, the formal governing structure continues to
compete, often unsuccessfully, with the traditional power structures discussed above.
Establishment of the Formal Afghan Government Structure:
Tending Toward Centralization
The 2001 ouster of the Taliban government paved the way for the success of a long-stalled U.N.
effort to form a broad-based Afghan government and for the international community to help
Afghanistan build legitimate governing institutions. In the formation of the first post-Taliban
transition government, the United Nations was viewed as a credible mediator by all sides largely
because of its role in ending the Soviet occupation. During the 1990s, a succession of U.N.
mediators adopted many of former King Zahir Shah’s proposals for a government to be selected
by a traditional assembly, or loya jirga. However, U.N.-mediated cease-fires between warring
factions did not hold. Non-U.N. initiatives made little progress, particularly the “Six Plus Two”
multilateral contact group, which began meeting in 1997 (the United States, Russia, and the six
states bordering Afghanistan: Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan).
Other failed efforts included a “Geneva group” (Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United States)
formed in 2000; an Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) contact group; and prominent
Afghan exile efforts, including discussion groups launched by Hamid Karzai and his clan, former
mujahedin commander Abd al-Haq, and Zahir Shah (“Rome process”). The sections below
discuss the formation of the post-Taliban governing structure of Afghanistan.
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December 2001 Bonn Agreement
Immediately after the September 11 attacks, former U.N. mediator Lakhdar Brahimi was brought
back (he had resigned in frustration in October 1999). U.N. Security Council Resolution 1378
(November 14, 2001) called for a “central” role for the United Nations in establishing a
transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote
stability and aid delivery. After the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the United Nations invited
major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern Alliance and that of the former King—but
not the Taliban—to an international conference in Bonn, Germany.
On December 5, 2001, the factions signed the “Bonn Agreement.”3 It was endorsed by U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001). The agreement was reportedly forged
with substantial Iranian diplomatic help because Iran had supported the military efforts of the
Northern Alliance faction and had leverage to persuade temporary caretaker Rabbani and the
Northern Alliance to cede the top leadership to Hamid Karzai as leader of an interim
administration. Other provisions of the agreement:
• authorized an international peace keeping force to maintain security in Kabul,
and Northern Alliance forces were directed to withdraw from the capital. Security
Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001, and renewed yearly thereafter)
gave formal Security Council authorization for the international peacekeeping
force (International Security Assistance Force, ISAF);
• referred to the need to cooperate with the international community on counter
narcotics, crime, and terrorism; and
• applied the constitution of 1964 until a permanent constitution could be drafted.4
On December 5, 2011, there was an international conference on Afghanistan in Bonn, marking
the 10th anniversary since the 2001 Bonn Conference. The meeting, in part, evaluated governance
progress in Afghanistan since the original convention.
Permanent Constitution Adopted, Sets Up Presidential System
A June 2002 “emergency” loya jirga put a representative imprimatur on the transition; it was
attended by 1,550 delegates (including about 200 women). Subsequently, a 35-member
constitutional commission drafted the constitution, unveiling it in November 2003. It was debated
by 502 delegates, selected in U.N.-run caucuses, at a “constitutional loya jirga (CLJ)” during
December 13, 2003-January 4, 2004. The CLJ, chaired by prominent Islamic scholar and former
interim Afghan leader Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, approved the draft constitution with minor
changes.
The constitution set up a presidential system, with an elected president having relatively broad
powers and a separately elected National Assembly (parliament). Opposing too great a
centralization of power (which would favor Pashtuns), the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance
3 Text of Bonn agreement at http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/files/petersberg.htm.
4 The last pre-Karzai loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a constitution.
Najibullah convened a loya jirga in 1987 to approve pro-Moscow policies, but that gathering was widely viewed by
Afghans as illegitimate.
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failed in its effort to set up a prime ministership in which the elected parliament would select a
prime minister who would run the day-to-day workings of government. In such a system, the
president’s powers would be limited. In the constitution, the faction did achieve some limitation
to presidential powers by assigning major authorities to the parliament, as discussed below. The
Northern Alliance assumed that, in a prime ministerial system, the post of elected president would
be held by a Pashtun but, in a tradition of power sharing, the prime minister post would be held
by a Tajik or other ethnic minority. The constitution and election system (a two round election if
no majority is achieved in the first round) strongly favor the likelihood that an ethnic Pashtun will
be president of Afghanistan.
The president serves a five-year term, with a two-term limit (Article 62). There are two vice
presidents. The president has broad powers. Under article 64, he has the power to appoint all
“high-ranking officials,” which has been interpreted by Karzai to include not only cabinet
ministers but also members of the Supreme Court, judges, provincial governors and district
governors, local security chiefs, and members of supposedly independent commissions such as
the Independent Election Commission and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
(AIHRC). However, these appointments are constitutionally subject to confirmation by the
National Assembly. The president also is commander-in-chief of the Afghan armed forces. In an
outcome still debated, at the CLJ, the opposition did not achieve the right of elected provincial
and district councils to choose their governors.
The constitution made former King Zahir Shah honorary “Father of the Nation,” a title that is not
heritable. Zahir Shah died on July 23, 2007.5 It (Article 58) also set up the Afghanistan
Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) to refer cases of human rights violations to
“the legal authorities.” (See further below on this commission.)
Karzai Elected in First Post-Taliban Presidential Elections in 2004
Security conditions precluded the holding of the first post-Taliban elections simultaneously. The
first election, for president, was held on October 9, 2004, missing a June constitutional deadline.
Turnout was about 80%. On November 3, 2004, Karzai was declared winner (55.4% of the vote)
over his 17 challengers on the first round, avoiding a runoff. He was sworn in to office in
December 2004, about one year before the swearing in of an elected National Assembly; he ruled
by decree during that one year period.
National Assembly (Parliament) Formation, Powers, and Assertion of Powers
The National Assembly outlined by the constitution consists of a 249 all-elected lower house
(Wolesi Jirga, House of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper house (Meshrano Jirga, House
of Elders). The upper house is selected as follows: one-third, or 34 seats, appointed by the
president (for a five-year term); one-third appointed by the elected provincial councils (four-year
term); and one-third appointed by elected district councils (for a three-year term). Of the
president’s appointments, half (17) are mandated to be women.
Because of the difficulty in confirming voter registration rolls and determining district
boundaries, elections for the 364 district councils have not been held to date. Each district
5 Text of constitution at http://arabic.cnn.com/afghanistan/ConstitutionAfghanistan.pdf.
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boundary is likely to be contentious because it will inevitably separate tribes and clans. Until
there are elected district councils, two-thirds of the Meshrano Jirga are selected by the provincial
councils for four year terms. The lower house is mandated to be at least 28% female (68 people),
an average of two for each of the 34 provinces.
Parliamentary and provincial council elections, which were to establish the National Assembly
and the provincial councils, were originally intended for April-May 2005 but were delayed until
September 18, 2005. The elections were based on a “Single Non-Transferable Vote” System;
candidates stood as individuals, not part of a party list. Voting was for one candidate only,
although the number of representatives varied by province, ranging from 2 (Panjshir Province) to
33 (Kabul Province). Other examples include Herat, 17; Nangahar, 14; Qandahar, Balkh, and
Ghazni, 11 seats each.
The National Assembly has become the key formal institution for non-Pashtuns and political
independents to express political opposition to and to exert influence on Karzai. The Assembly
has been set up by the constitution as a relatively powerful body that can, to some extent, check
the powers of the president, although the Northern Alliance and other Karzai critics say it has
insufficient power to brake presidential authority.
Powers of the National Assembly
The lower house has the power to vote no-confidence against ministers (Article 92)—based on a
proposal by 10% of the lower house membership, or 25 parliamentarians. Both the upper and
lower houses are required to pass laws. Under Article 98 of the constitution, the national budget is
taken up by the Meshrano Jirga first and then passed to the Wolesi Jirga for its consideration.
Both houses of parliament, whose budgets are controlled by the Ministry of Finance, are staffed
by about 275 Afghans, reporting to a National Assembly “secretariat.” There are 18 oversight
committees, a research unit, and a library. USAID has helped the Afghanistan National Assembly
build its capabilities with a parliamentary assistance program for Afghanistan.
Assertion of Its Authority
After the National Assembly was inaugurated on December 19, 2005, it immediately
demonstrated institutional strength. One of its first tasks was to review, and either endorse,
amend, or void, the decrees Karzai had issued in the one year he was president and no National
Assembly was operating. In March 2006, it achieved a vote to require Karzai’s cabinet to be
approved individually, rather than en bloc, increasing opposition leverage. However, Karzai
rallied his support and all but 5 of the 25 nominees were confirmed. In May 2006, the opposition
within the Assembly compelled Karzai to change the nine-member Supreme Court, the highest
judicial body, including ousting 74-year-old Islamic conservative Fazl Hadi Shinwari as chief
justice. The proximate justification for the ouster was Shinwari’s age, which was beyond the
official retirement age of 65. He was succeeded as chief justice by Abdul Salam Azimi. (Shinwari
later went on to head the Ulema Council, Afghanistan’s highest religious body, before his death in
2011.)
The process of confirming Karzai’s second-term cabinet—in which many of Karzai’s nominees
were voted down in several nomination rounds during 2010—demonstrates that the Assembly is
an increasingly strong institution that is pressing for competent governance. These principles are
advocated most insistently, although not exclusively, by the younger, more technocratic
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independent bloc in the lower house. The Assembly repeatedly voted down Karzai nominees
following the contentious outcome of the 2009 presidential election, as discussed below.
The Assembly firmly asserted itself on August 4, 2012, by voting to oust Defense Minister Abdul
Rahim Wardak and Interior Minister Bismillah Khan Mohammedi. The move was ostensibly on
the grounds of their failure to reduce alleged corruption in their ministries, or to prevent shelling
of northeastern Afghanistan from the Pakistan side of the border. However, some asserted the
move was an effort to ensure that security contracts were opened to a broader range of bidders.
Others felt the vote was a parliamentary overture to Pakistan, because both ministers have been
highly critical of that country’s hosting of Afghan militants. Karzai said he would abide by the
Assembly vote. Wardak resigned shortly thereafter and was made a “senior adviser.”
Rivalries Within and Outside Governing Institutions
As discussed above, many intersecting trends—including ethnicity, tribal affiliation, geography,
economic interests, and ideologies—determine politics in Afghanistan. These splits manifest
within as well as outside Afghan governing institutions, including the National Assembly.
Although they largely accept that a Pashtun is most likely to hold the top slot in the Afghan
government, non-Pashtuns insist on being—and are—represented at all levels of the central
government. Ethnic minorities have demanded, and have achieved, a large measure of control
over how government programs are implemented in their geographic regions. Although Karzai
has the power to appoint provincial and district governors, in practice he has not appointed
governors of a different ethnicity than the majority of residents of particular provinces and
districts. One notable exception is the governor of Herat, Daud Shah Saba, appointed in 2011; he
is a Pashtun in a province whose major city, Herat, is overwhelmingly Tajik—although many
districts of the province outside the city are majority Pashtun. The Independent Directorate of
Local Governance (IDLG, which recommends to the presidential palace local appointments) often
consults notables of a province on local appointments.
Karzai’s Presidential Leadership, His Close Advisers, and Staff
As president, Karzai is advised by what some observers believe is a narrow spectrum of Pashtuns
in the cabinet and in his presidential office. Some of them are former members of the moderate
wing of the Islamist party Hezb-e-Islam. Among his top aides are his chief of staff, former
Minister of Information and Culture Abdul Karim Kurram, who was appointed in April 2011. The
chief of staff serves as key gatekeeper of access to Karzai. He replaced Mohammad Umar
Daudzai, an Islamic conservative who fought during the anti-Soviet war in more radical Hezb-e-
Islam faction Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and was said to be a skeptic of Western/U.S. influence over
Afghan decision making. On October 23, 2010, The New York Times asserted that Daudzai was
the presidential office’s liaison with Iran for accepting the approximately $2 million per year in
Iranian assistance that is provided as cash. Karzai acknowledged this financial arrangement.
Daudzai was appointed Ambassador to Pakistan in April 2011. Another top palace aide is
minister-counselor Tajj Ayubi. A top communications aide, Waheed Omar, resigned in August
2011, possibly because of the influence of Hizb-e-Islam supporters on Karzai; he was replaced on
an acting basis by Siamak Herawi.
Some of Karzai’s top advisers are well-educated and Westernized. For example, Karzai trusts
such professionals as French-educated physician—now foreign minister—Zalmay Rassoul and
former Foreign Minister and now National Security Adviser Rangin Spanta. Both are Pashtuns.
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Spanta, who served in the government during the Soviet occupation era, was foreign minister
during March 2006-February 2010, and is said to retain some leftwing views. The National
Security Council, headed by Spanta, is located in the presidential palace complex and heavily
populated by ethnic Pashtuns. Two other trusted NSC officials (both Pashtuns) are first deputy
NSC Adviser Ibrahim Spinzada (a Karzai brother-in-law), and Shaida Mohammad Abdali, the
second deputy NSC adviser.
Karzai also surrounds himself with Pashtun tribal and faction leaders from southern Afghanistan,
such as Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh, the former governor of Helmand (until 2005). These
personalities reflect Karzai’s attempts to exert direct control over his home province of Qandahar
and the neighboring large province of Helmand.
An administrative unit that has attracted increasing international attention as a potential center of
more organized policymaking is the Office of Administrative Affairs (OAA), referred to by some
as the General Administrative Office (GAO) or the “cabinet Secretariat.” Some experts say that,
particularly under its current head, a Hazara Shiite named Sadiq Mudabir, it is primarily
administrative, and without any policy coordination role. However, some say it has taken on an
informal judicial role by assessing the legitimacy of citizen, group, and corporate petitions and
forwarding those to the relevant ministries for follow-up action. It is a holdover from the
Communist era, and contains many longtime bureaucrats. During the 1990s it may have had as
many as 1,800 personnel, but has been trimmed during the Karzai era to about 700 staff members.
The operations of the unit are funded primarily by the United Kingdom, but U.S. military and
civilian officials have been assigned to provide advice and assistance to the office as well.
Some observers assert that the apparatus around Karzai require improved focus and organization.
One idea that surfaced in 2009, and which some Afghans still raise, is to prod Karzai to create a
new position akin to a “chief administration officer” who can break through administrative
bottlenecks. One of Karzai’s 2009 election challengers, Ashaf Ghani, was not formally given this
role but advises Karzai on government reform and institution building, and manages the transition
from the United States and NATO to Afghan lead. Ghani has been part of Karzai’s advisory team
for all recent major international conferences on Afghanistan, including the December 5, 2011,
Bonn Conference. Ghani is considered a top contender for president in 2014.
Karzai’s Allies in the Lower House of the National Assembly
In addition to his allies in the presidential palace and the government writ large, as of 2012 Karzai
has about 60-70 core supporters, mostly Pashtuns, in the Wolesi Jirga. Karzai and his aides hoped
to but failed to increase the president’s support base in the September 18, 2010, elections, but
instead the results caused Karzai’s base to shrink by about 20 deputies as compared to his support
in the 2006-2011 lower house. Of his lower house supporters, about half are former members of
the conservative Pashtun-based Hizb-e-Islam party (the same party as that headed by insurgent
leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar). Others in Karzai’s camp in the lower house are followers of Abd-i-
Rab Rasul Sayyaf, a prominent Pashtun Islamic conservative mujahedin era party leader.6 As a
result, Karzai was unable to engineer the selection of Sayyaf to become lower house speaker in
2011, displacing Yunus Qanooni (Tajik). Neither Sayyaf nor Qanooni was unable to obtain
enough votes to become speaker, instead losing to a compromise candidate, Abdul Raouf
Ibrahimi, an Uzbek who is perceived as weak.
6 Sayyaf led the Ittihad Islami (Islamic Union) mujahedin party during the war against the Soviet occupation.
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Several of Karzai’s supporters in parliament are from Qandahar, Karzai’s home province, and
from Helmand province. For example, one pro-Karzai Pashtun who was reelected in the 2010
elections is former militia leader Hazrat Ali (Nangarhar Province), who led the Afghan
component of the failed assault on Osama bin Laden’s purported redoubt at Tora Bora in
December 2001. On the other hand, the 2010 elections resulted in the loss in parliament of Karzai
cousin Jamil Karzai, and Pacha Khan Zadran (Paktia) who, by some accounts, helped Osama bin
Laden escape Tora Bora. A key Karzai brother, discussed further below, is Ahmad Wali Karzai
(chair of the Qandahar provincial council), who was assassinated on July 12, 2011.
Karzai Support Significant in the Upper House
Karzai has relatively fewer critics in the 102-seat Meshrano Jirga (House of Elder, upper house),
partly because of his bloc of 34 appointments (one-third of that body). In 2005, he engineered the
appointment of an ally as speaker: Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, a noted Islamic scholar and former
mujahedin party leader (Afghanistan National Liberation Front, ANLF), who headed the post-
Communist mujahedin government for one month (May 1992). Mojadeddi resigned in February
2010 and was replaced by another Karzai ally, then deputy speaker Fazl Hadi Muslim Yaar.
Karzai also has used his bloc of appointments to the upper house to co-opt potential antagonists
or reward his friends. In 2006, he appointed Northern Alliance military leader Muhammad Fahim
to the upper body, perhaps to compensate for his removal as defense minister, although he
resigned after a few months and later joined the UF. (He was Karzai’s primary running mate in
the 2009 elections and is now first vice president.) In 2006, Karzai also named a key ally, former
Helmand Governor Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh, to the body.
Because it is composed of more elderly, established, notable Afghans who are traditionalist in
their political outlook, the Meshrano Jirga has tended to be more Islamist conservative than the
lower house, advocating a legal system that accords with Islamic law, and restrictions on press
and Westernized media broadcasts.
Karzai was scheduled to make his 34 new upper house appointments (five year terms) prior to the
January 26, 2011, seating of the 2011-2015 parliament. However, Karzai delayed naming his
choices while the 2010 election remained in dispute. Because two-thirds of the body serve four-
year terms—and the provincial councils that were elected in 2009 were able to appoint their 68
members of the upper house—the body continued to operate even though Karzai had not
submitted his 34 appointments. On January 27, 2011, the body reaffirmed Muslim Yaar as upper
house speaker. On February 19, 2011, Karzai made his 34 selections, reappointing 18 incumbents
and appointing 16 new members to the body. In line with the constitution, 17 of Karzai’s
appointments are women.
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Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Hamid Karzai, born December 24, 1957, was selected to lead Afghanistan at the Bonn Conference because he was a
prominent Pashtun leader who had been involved in Taliban-era political talks among exiled Afghans and was viewed
as a compromiser rather than a “strongman.” However, some observers consider his compromises as Afghanistan’s
leader a sign of weakness and criticize him for indulging members of his clan and other allies with appointments. His
term expires in 2014 and he is constitutionally barred from running again; he told parliamentarians in August 2011
that he would abide by the constitutional requirement to step down at that time.
From Karz village in Qandahar Province, Karzai has led the powerful Popolzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns since 1999,
when his father was assassinated, allegedly by Taliban agents, in Quetta, Pakistan. Karzai’s grandfather was head of the
consultative National Council during King Zahir Shah’s reign. He attended university in India and supported the
mujahidin party of Sibghatullah Mojadeddi (still a very close ally) during the anti-Soviet war. He was deputy foreign
minister in the mujahidin government of Rabbani during 1992-1995, but he left the government and supported the
Taliban as a Pashtun alternative to Rabbani. He broke with the Taliban as its excesses unfolded and forged alliances
with other anti-Taliban factions, including the Northern Alliance. Karzai entered Afghanistan after the September 11
attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the Taliban, supported by U.S. Special Forces. He became central to U.S.
efforts after Pashtun commander Abdul Haq entered Afghanistan in October 2001 without U.S. support and was
captured and hung by the Taliban. Karzai was slightly injured by an errant U.S. bomb in late 2001.
With heavy protection, Karzai has survived several assassination attempts since taking office, including rocket fire or
gunfire at or near his appearances. His wife, Dr. Zenat Karzai, is a gynecologist by profession. They have a son,
Mirwais, born in 2008.
Family Dealings
Controversy has surrounded his siblings for allegedly profiting from Karza’is presidency. His half brother, Ahmad Wali
Karzai, was the most powerful political figure in Qandahar Province until his assassination on July 12, 2011. He was
key to President Karzai’s information network in Qandahar. Ahmad Wali was widely accused of involvement in or
tolerating narcotics trafficking, but reportedly also was a paid informant for the CIA; some of his property has been
used by U.S. Special Forces. After Ahmad Wali’s death, Karzai appointed another brother, Shah Wali Karzai, as
Popolzai chief, and he reputedly has become involved in business dealings in Qandahar that have run him afoul of
another brother, Mahmoud Karzai. Mahmoud is reportedly under U.S. Justice Department investigation for al eged
corruption. He has wide business interests in Qandahar and Kabul, including auto dealerships, a coal mine, a cement
factory, apartment houses, and a stake in Kabul Bank, which nearly col apsed in September 2010. Another brother,
Qayyum Karzai, served in parliament during 2005-2008 but resigned in October 2008 for health reasons. He has
reportedly been involved in negotiations with Taliban figures on a political settlement. Other Karzai relatives have
profited extensively from international contracts, including a $2.2 billion U.S. “Host Nation Trucking” contract. The
United States banned contracts to one such firm, Watan Risk Management, as of January 6, 2011; the firm is co-
owned by two Karzai relatives—Rashid and Rateb Popal. The Popal brothers reorganized the company as Watan
Group and this firm is the local partner of China National Petroleum Company on a $3 billion investment, awarded in
2012, to develop oil fields in northern Afghanistan.
U.S.-Karzai Relations
Karzai has periodical y lashed out at what he sees as U.S. and international pressure on him to reduce corruption and
ensure electoral fairness. On April 4, 2010, Karzai suggested that Western meddling in Afghanistan was fueling
support for the Taliban as a legitimate resistance to foreign occupation.7 In October 2011, Karzai said that Afghanistan
would side with Pakistan in the event of a war between Pakistan and the United States. Karzai has criticized U.S.
military night raids, airstrikes, control of detention policies, and U.S. negotiations with Taliban representatives that
bypass the Afghan government, although U.S. policy on many of these issues have often adjusted toward Karzai’s
views. At each downturn in the relationship, top Administration officials have sought to restore the relationship by
reassuring Karzai of U.S. support—a main example of which is the May 1, 2012, Strategic Partnership Agreement.8
Source: CRS.
7 An exact English translation of his April 4 comments, in which he purportedly said that even he might consider
joining the Taliban if U.S. pressure on him continues, is not available.
8 Dreazen, Yochi, and Sarah Lynch. “U.S. Seeks to Repair Karzai Tie.” Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2010.
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The Opposition: The “Northern Alliance,” Dr. Abdullah, and Karzai
Opponents in the Lower House of Parliament
Broadly, the political opposition to Karzai (putting aside insurgents) consists mainly of ethnic
minorities (Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara) who fought the Taliban in a politico-military coalition
called the “Northern Alliance.” Tajik leaders formed the core of the Northern Alliance, and the
Tajiks were centered around the legendary Tajik mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masoud.
Members of the Northern Alliance are generally defined by their association with him. Some refer
to all Tajik members of the Alliance as “Panjshiris” because many of them are, like Masoud, from
the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul. (Masoud, who became legendary for preventing Soviet
occupation forces from conquering the Panjshir Valley, was killed by Al Qaeda supporters two
days before the September 11 attacks on the United States, possibly in conjunction with that plot.)
Many of these Tajik leaders belonged to the Jamiat Islami (Islamic Society) political party, whose
leader was Burhanuddin Rabbani (assassinated September 20, 2011, as discussed throughout). As
such, Rabbani was technically Masoud’s political leader although Masoud was generally
perceived as having a larger following than Rabbani, who was from Badakshan Province (not the
Panjshir Valley). Rabbani served as president during the mujahedin government (1992-1996), and
served briefly again as Afghanistan’s leader during November-December 2001, before Karzai was
inaugurated as interim leader.
Since the constitution was adopted in 2004, leaders of the Northern Alliance have long advocated
amending it to give more power to parliament and to empower the elected provincial councils
(instead of the president) to select governors and mayors. Such steps would ensure maximum
autonomy from Kabul for non-Pashtun areas, and serve as a check and balance on Pashtun
dominance of the central government. The leaders of these factions tend to be vehemently anti-
Pakistan, which they see as supporting Taliban and other insurgent groups to broaden their
influence in future Afghan governments.
In the 112th Congress, legislation introduced October 5, 2011, by Representative Dana
Rohrabacher appears to support the Northern Alliance view of decentralized governance by
urging that it be U.S. policy to support a decentralized, federal political system that “shifts more
power to regions, provinces, and districts and away from a corrupt presidency” and support
constitutional reform that provides for election of mayors, police chiefs, and governors.
On the other hand, the Northern Alliance figures and their allies have differences among
themselves that has rendered them relatively ineffective as an opposition to Karzai. Many
“opposition” figures have often joined Karzai’s government in exchange for autonomy or a share
of business interests. Examples include Vice President Muhammad Fahim and Balkh Governor
Atta Mohammad Noor. A key Tajik figure, Bismillah Khan Mohammedi, was chief of staff of the
Afghan National Army during 2001-2010 and was made interior minister in 2010; he is said to
have appointed Tajik protégés to key positions in the security forces. (As noted above,
Mohammedi was ousted by the National Assembly on August 4, 2012, and a replacement is being
sought.)
Other Northern Alliance figures have worked with Karzai on certain issues—a prominent
example was former President Rabbani. He agreed in October 2010 to assume the chairmanship
of the 70-member High Peace Council—the body that is leading Karzai’s effort to reconcile with
insurgent leaders. Rabbani’s September 20, 2011, assassination by an alleged Taliban operative
widened the rift between Karzai and the Northern Alliance adherents who believe that Karzai’s
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outreach to the Taliban has proved naïve and counterproductive. Rabbani’s son, Salahuddin,
succeeded him. Some suspect the core Northern Alliance concern is that reconciliation will bring
additional Pashtuns into government, increasing the Pashtun dominance of government, or that
the Taliban will be given control of areas that are at least partly inhabited by members of non-
Pashtun minorities. Still, the Karzai strategy of giving high-level appointments to his critics has,
to date, proved successful in keeping his opposition divided and off balance.
The Opposition Movements Led by Dr. Abdullah
Although Rabbani was the elder statesman of the Northern Alliance, he was largely displaced in
recent years by harder line Tajiks such as the overall “leader of the opposition”—former Foreign
Minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. Abdullah is about 53 years old; his mother is Tajik and father is
Pashtun but his identity as the foreign envoy of Ahmad Shah Masoud causes him to be identified
politically as a Tajik. He was dismissed from his foreign minister post by Karzai in a March 2006
cabinet reshuffle and he now heads a private foundation named after Ahmad Shah Masoud.
Dr. Abdullah emerged as Afghanistan’s opposition leader after his unsuccessful challenge against
Karzai for president in the August 2009 election in which widespread fraud was demonstrated. He
is not in parliament but he works to promote his agenda—the cornerstone of which is to establish
a parliamentary system in which the National Assembly would select a powerful prime
minister—through public statements, in direct meetings with Karzai, and through allies in the
lower house, as discussed below. He visited Washington, DC, one week after Karzai’s May 10-14,
2010, visit, criticizing Karzai’s governance at various think tanks and in a meeting with the State
Department. He visited Washington, DC, again in April 2011 and held several meetings with the
Obama Administration, while using several think-tank appearances to criticize Afghan
governance under Karzai. Dr. Abdullah’s representatives have said he is likely to run for president
again in 2014.
The pro-Abdullah/anti-Karzai bloc in parliament has gone through several iterations. During
2007-2009, the bloc called itself the United Front (UF), although some accounts refer to it as the
“National Front” or “United National Front.” It was formed in April 2007 by then Wolesi Jirga
speaker Yunus Qanooni (former adviser to Ahmad Shah Masoud and Northern Alliance stalwart;
he was Karzai’s main challenger in the 2004 presidential election) and the late former Afghan
President Burhanuddin Rabbani. The United Front included some Pashtuns, such as Soviet-
occupation era security figures Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi and Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, head of the
National United Party. Ulumi was not reelected to parliament in 2010.
The United Front bloc underwent changes during 2009-2010 as Abdullah emerged as a national
opposition figure, while other Northern Alliance figures reached accommodations with Karzai. In
late May 2010, Abdullah created a formal, national democratic opposition party called the “Hope
and Change Movement.” Running in the September 18, 2010, elections under that name,
Abdullah supporters sought to increase their numbers in the new Assembly and hold a
commanding position that would enable them to block Karzai initiatives or achieve passage of its
own alternative proposals. The 2010 elections results suggest this objective was not achieved, and
the number of Abdullah supporters is roughly the same as it was in the previous Assembly—
about 60 supporters. This is also a bloc similar in size to Karzai’s core support base. On
December 22, 2011, 10 political parties launched the National Coalition of Afghanistan, under the
leadership of Dr. Abdullah.
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Schisms Within the Northern Alliance Grouping
Some Tajik and other figures outside the Assembly are, if not challenging Abdullah for opposition
leadership, at least emerging as strong voices. In June 2011, several key Northern Alliance
leaders, including Dostam and Hazara figure Mohammad Mohaqiq (see below) joined with
former Vice President Ahmad Zia Masoud (Ahmad Shah Masoud’s brother) to announce a new
opposition group—the National Front of Afghanistan. This group advocates “federalism”—a high
degree of autonomy for Afghan provinces, including appointment of provincial governors by
elected provincial councils. This differs from Dr. Abdullah’s platform of pressing for a
parliamentary system. The National Front grouping also is more skeptical of a peace agreement
with the Taliban than is Dr. Abdullah and his allies. Even before this new opposition was formed,
Ahmad Zia Masoud, as well as ousted intelligence leader Amrollah Saleh (see below), were
increasingly outspoken against a potential settlement with the Taliban.
New Opposition Groupings Form
Truth and Justice Party. On November 4, 2011, a new party, the Truth and Justice Party, launched
itself as a self-proclaimed reformist party consisting of leaders of all of Afghanistan’s various
ethnicities. Unlike the coalition led by Dr. Abdullah, this party is in favor of reconciliation with
the Taliban. Major figures behind it include Karzai’s previous Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif
Atmar, who was dismissed by Karzai in 2010, as well as Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam and
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) Chairwoman Sima Simar, an
ethnic Hazara. Taliban era Deputy Justice Minister Jalaluddin Shinwari joined the party as well.
The Informal Power Structure: Other Power Brokers, “Warlords,”
and Local Faction Leaders
An informal power structure exists outside the formal governing institutions. Karzai has been
compelled to work with this informal power structure of well-funded, locally popular, and
sometimes well-armed faction leaders, even while heading the formal power structure. Some
faction leaders operate in both spheres—holding official positions through constitutional
processes while also exercising influence their home provinces—beyond these formal roles.
Some are Northern Alliance figures and others are Pashtun faction leaders. Some of these faction
leaders—most of whom the United States and its partners regularly deal with and have good
working relations with—cause resentment among some sectors of the population—particularly
emerging civil society activists—and complicate U.S. stabilization strategy. A number of them
own or have investments in Afghan security or other firms that have won business from U.S. and
other donors and fuel allegations of nepotism and other corruption.
Still others argue that U.S. policy since 2007 has further empowered local faction leaders or even
created new factions and militias that never existed before. A variety of expedient local security
initiatives undertaken since 2007, including the Afghan Public Protection Program, its successor
the Afghan Local Police Program, Village Stability Operations, and the Critical Infrastructure
Police, have created new security organs that sometimes operate without full control by central
security organs. These programs are said by critics to have revived the militia concept that was
being dismantled by the international community during 2001-2006. Partly because of
accusations against these irregular forces created by the United States/NATO, in December 2011
Karzai said Afghanistan would dismantle one of them: the Critical Infrastructure Police, which
was created by the Germany-led Regional Command North and was mostly composed of non-
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Pashtun minorities. No Afghan government action was taken against the other forces mentioned,
which are mostly Pashtun. Some Afghans (particularly the Northern Alliance) believe that the
international community’s original strategy of dismantling local power structures in favor of a
monopoly of central government control over armed force has caused the security deterioration
noted since 2006.
Some assert that the Obama Administration’s criticism of Karzai has caused him to become ever
more reliant on factional power brokers. Karzai’s position is that confronting faction leaders
outright would likely cause their followers—who usually belong to ethnic or regional
minorities—to go into armed rebellion. Karzai has long argued that keeping the faction leaders on
the government side is needed in order to keep the focus on combating the Taliban, who are
almost all ethnic Pashtuns.
In February 2007, both houses of parliament passed a law (officially titled the National
Reconciliation, General Amnesty, and National Stability Law) giving amnesty to faction leaders
and others who committed abuses during Afghanistan’s past wars. Karzai sent back to parliament
an altered draft to give victims the right to seek justice for any abuses. Even though the revised
draft contained that amendment, Karzai did not sign the final version in May 2007, leaving the
status unclear. However, in December 2009, the Afghan government published the law in the
official gazette (a process known as “gazetting”), giving it the force of law.
The following sections analyze some of the main faction leaders.
Vice President Muhammad Fahim
Karzai’s choice of Northern Alliance figure Muhammad Fahim as his first vice presidential
running mate in the August 2009 elections might have been a manifestation of Karzai’s growing
reliance on faction leaders, as well as his drive to divide the Northern Alliance. Fahim is a Tajik
from the Panjshir Valley region who was named military chief of the Northern Alliance/UF
faction after Ahmad Shah Masoud’s death. The Fahim choice was criticized by human rights and
other groups because of Fahim’s long identity as a mujahedin commander/militia faction leader. A
New York Times story of August 27, 2009, said that the Bush Administration continued to deal
with Fahim when he was defense minister (2001-2004) despite reports that he was involved in
facilitating narcotics trafficking in northern Afghanistan. Other allegations suggest he has
engineered property confiscations and other benefits to feed his and his faction’s business
interests. During 2002-2007, he reportedly withheld turning over some heavy weapons to U.N.
disarmament officials who have been trying to reduce the influence of local strongmen such as
Fahim. Obama Administration officials have not announced any limitations on dealings with
Fahim now that he is vice president. In August 2010, Fahim underwent treatment in Germany for
a heart ailment.
Fahim’s brother, Abdul Hussain Fahim, was a beneficiary of concessionary loans from Kabul
Bank, a major bank that has faced major losses due to its lending practices, as discussed below.
The Fahim brother is also reportedly partnered with Mahmoud Karzai on coal mining and cement
manufacturing ventures.
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Abdul Rashid Dostam: Uzbeks of Northern Afghanistan
Some observers have cited Karzai’s handling of prominent Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam—
the longtime head of a party called Junbush Melli (National Front) as inconsistent. Dostam,
generally aligned with the Tajiks and part of the Northern Alliance, commands numerous
partisans in his redoubt in northern Afghanistan (Jowzjan, Faryab, Balkh, and Sar-I-Pol
provinces). There, during the Soviet and Taliban years, he was widely accused of human rights
abuses of political opponents. To try to separate him from his armed followers, in 2005 Karzai
appointed him to the post of chief of staff of the armed forces. On February 4, 2008, Afghan
police surrounded Dostam’s villa in Kabul in response to reports that he attacked an ethnic
Turkmen rival, but Karzai did not order his arrest for fear of stirring unrest among Dostam’s
followers. To try to resolve the issue without stirring unrest, in December 2008 Karzai
purportedly reached an agreement with Dostam under which he resigned as chief of staff and
went into exile in Turkey in exchange for the dropping of any case against him.9
Dostam returned to Afghanistan on August 16, 2009, and subsequently held a large pro-Karzai
election rally in his home city of Shebergan. Part of his intent in supporting Karzai was to limit
the influence of a strong rival figure in the north, Balkh Province Governor Atta Mohammad
Noor, see below. Noor is a Tajik but, under a 2005 compromise with Karzai, is in control of a
province that is inhabited by many Uzbeks. Dostam’s support apparently helped Karzai carry
several provinces in the north in the 2009 election, including Jowzjan, Sar-i-Pol, and Faryab. In
January 2010, he was restored to his previous, primarily honorary, position of chief of staff of the
armed forces. Although Dostam was not nominated to a cabinet post in 2010, two members of his
Junbush Melli party were—although they were voted down by the National Assembly because
the Assembly did not want to confirm partisan activists in the cabinet.
Dostam’s failure to secure posts for his allies could account for his decision to join the opposition
grouping formed in June 2011, discussed above. In June 2012, the Karzai government launched a
prosecution of Dostam for allegedly insisting the China National Petroleum Co. (CNPC) hire
Dostam loyalists to security and other jobs on their oil development project in northern
Afghanistan. However, Dostam and those close to him alleged that the prosecution was a Karzai
effort to favor his relatives’ firm, Watan Group, which is the partner of CNPC on the project and
which is therefore in line to provide security and other services to the development. Dostam
continues to alternate his time between Afghanistan and Turkey; he is said to be suffering from
health problems.
Dostam’s reputation is further clouded by his actions during the U.S.-backed war against the
Taliban. On July 11, 2009, the New York Times reported that allegations that Dostam had caused
the death of several hundred Taliban prisoners during the major combat phase of OEF (late 2001)
were not investigated by the Bush Administration. In responding to assertions that there was no
investigation of the Dasht-e-Laili massacre because Dostam was a U.S. ally,10 President Obama
said any allegations of violations of laws of war need to be investigated. Dostam responded to
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (which carried the story) that only 200 Taliban prisoners died
and primarily because of combat and disease, not intentional actions of his forces.
9 CRS e-mail conversation with a then National Security aide to President Karzai, December 2008.
10 This is the name of the area where the Taliban prisoners purportedly died and were buried in a mass grave.
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Atta Mohammad Noor: Balkh Province
Atta Mohammad Noor, another figure generally considered part of the Northern Alliance, has
been the governor of Balkh Province, whose capital is the vibrant city of Mazar-e-Sharif, since
2005. Mazar-e-Sharif is one of the four cities to be transitioned to Afghan security leadership in
June 2011. It is unique in that 60% of the residents of the city have access to electricity 24 hours
per day, a far higher percentage than most other cities in Afghanistan, and higher even than
Kabul. He is an ethnic Tajik and former mujahedin commander who openly endorsed Dr.
Abdullah in the 2009 presidential election. However, Karzai has kept Noor in place because he
has kept the province secure, allowing Mazar-e-Sharif to become a major trading hub, and
because displacing him could cause ethnic unrest. Observers say that Noor exemplifies the local
potentate, brokering local security and business arrangements that enrich Noor and his allies
while ensuring stability and prosperity.11 Some reports say that he commands two private militias
in the province that, in at least two districts (Chimtal and Charbolak), outnumber official Afghan
police, and which prompt complaints of abuses (land seizures) by the province’s Pashtuns.
Mohammed Mohaqiq: Hazara Stalwart
Another faction leader is Mohammad Mohaqiq, a Hazara leader. During the war against the
Soviet Union and then Taliban, Mohaqiq was a commander of Hazara fighters in and around
Bamiyan Province, and a major figure in the Hazara Shiite Islamist party Hezb-e-Wahdat (Unity
Party). The party was supported by Iran during those periods.
Currently, Mohaqiq is aligned with Dostam and hardline Tajik figures. He joined these figures in
forming the National Front of Afghanistan in June 2011. In July 2012, Mohaqiq demanded Karzai
fire the head of the Academy of Sciences for publishing a new national almanac that Mohaqiq
said overstated the percentage of Pashtuns in Afghanistan at 60%. Karzai fired the Academy head
and three others at that institution. Another major Hazara figure, Karim Khalili, tends to work
with Karzai and has served as his second vice president through Karzai’s two terms as president.
Isma’il Khan: Western Afghanistan/Herat
Another Northern Alliance strongman that Karzai has sought to simultaneously engage and
weaken is prominent Tajik political leader and former Herat Governor Ismail Khan. Herat is one
of the four cities that was transitioned to Afghan security leadership in July 2011. In 2006, Karzai
appointed him minister of energy and water, taking him away from his political base in the west.
However, Khan remains influential in the west, and maintaining ties to Khan helped Karzai win
Tajik votes in Herat Province that might otherwise have gone to Dr. Abdullah. Certified results
showed Karzai winning that province, indicating that the deal with Khan was helpful to Karzai.
Still, Khan is said to have several opponents in Herat, and a bombing there on September 26,
2009, narrowly missed his car. U.S. officials purportedly preferred that Khan not be in the cabinet
because of his record as a local potentate, although some U.S. officials credit him with
cooperating with the privatization of the power sector of Afghanistan. Karzai renominated Khan
in his ministry post on December 19, 2009, causing purported disappointment by
parliamentarians and western donor countries who want Khan and other faction leaders
11 Gall, Carlotta, “In Afghanistan’s North, Ex-Warlord Offers Security.” New York Times, May 17, 2010.
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weakened. His renomination was voted down by the National Assembly but he remains in an
acting capacity. Additional questions about Khan were raised in November 2010 when Afghan
television broadcast audio files purporting to contain Khan insisting that election officials alter
the results of the September 18, 2010, parliamentary elections.12 Khan is on the High Peace
Council that is the main body overseeing the reconciliation process with Taliban leaders.
Helmand Province Power Brokers
Karzai’s relationship with a Pashtun strongman, Sher Mohammad Akhundzadeh, demonstrates
the dilemmas facing Karzai in governing Afghanistan. Akhunzadeh was a close associate of
Karzai when they were in exile in Quetta, Pakistan, during Taliban rule. Karzai appointed him
governor of Helmand after the fall of the Taliban, but in 2005, Britain demanded he be removed
for his abuses and reputed facilitation of drug trafficking, as a condition of Britain taking security
control of Helmand. Karzai reportedly has sought to reappoint Akhundzadeh, who Karzai
believes was more successful against militants in Helmand using his local militiamen than Britain
has been with its more than 9,500 troops there. However, Britain and the United States have
prevailed on Karzai not to remove the current governor, Ghulab Mangal, who has won wide
praise for his successes establishing effective governance in Helmand (discussed further under
“Expanding Local (Subnational) Governance”) and for reducing poppy cultivation there.
Akhunzadeh attempted to deliver large numbers of votes for Karzai in Helmand, although turnout
in that province was very light partly due to Taliban intimidation of voters.
An Akhunzadeh ally, Abdul Wali Khan (nicknamed “Koka”), was similarly removed by British
pressure in 2006 as police chief of Musa Qala district of Helmand. However, the Afghan
government insisted on—and obtained—his reinstatement a few years later and his militia
followers subsequently became the core of the 220-person police force in the district. Koka is
mentioned in a congressional report as accepting payments from security contractors who are
working under the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) “Host National Trucking” contract that
secures U.S. equipment convoys. Koka allegedly agreed to secure the convoys in exchange for
the payments.13
Karzai Family: Qandahar Province
Governing Qandahar, a province of about 2 million, of whom about half live in Qandahar city, is
a sensitive issue in Kabul because of President Karzai’s active political interest in his home
province. Qandahar governance is particularly crucial to ongoing U.S. military-led operations to
increase security in surrounding districts, giving the July 12, 2011, assassination of Karzai’s half
brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, crucial significance.
Ahmad Wali was chair of the Qandahar provincial council, a post with relatively limited formal
power, but he was always more powerful than any appointed governor of Qandahar. President
Karzai frequently rotated the governors of Qandahar to ensure that none of them would impinge
on Ahmad Wali’s authority. Perceiving him as the key power broker in the province, many
12 Partlow, Joshua, “Audio Files Raise New Questions About Afghan Elections.” Washington Post, November 11,
2010.
13 House of Representatives. Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform. “Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan.” Report
of the Majority Staff, June 2010.
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constituents and interest groups met him each day to request his interventions on their behalf.
Qandahar governance suffered an additional blow on July 27, 2011, when the appointed mayor of
Qandahar city, Ghulam Haider Hamidi, was assassinated. Hamidi was an Afghan American
accountant by training.
Before Ahmad Wali’s assassination, U.S. officials had been trying to bolster the clout of the
appointed Qandahar governor, Tooryalai Wesa by supporting Wesa’s efforts to equitably distribute
development funds and build local governing structures.14 Karzai had appointed Wesa—a
Canadian-Afghan academic—in December 2008, perhaps hoping that his ties to Canada would
convince Canada to continue its mission in Qandahar beyond 2011. That did not succeed.
The international community expected, and hoped, that the death of Ahmad Wali Karzai would
further empower Governor Wesa. However, Karzai quickly installed another of his brothers, Shah
Wali Karzai, as head of the Popolzai clan and informal Qandahar power broker after Ahmad
Wali’s death. Shah Wali at first lacked the acumen and clout of Ahmad Wali, but reports in mid-
2012 say he has become highly influential, while also becoming involved in significant business
dealings in the province that continue to cast aspersions on the motives and actions of the Karzai
family. Karzai has also used former Qandahar governor Asadullah Khalid (confirmed in
September 2012 as the new intelligence director, as discussed below) as an informal envoy in the
province.
Another power center is Qandahar’s police chief, Colonel Abdul Razziq. He is perceived as
having increasing weight, as well as a reputation for corruption, including siphoning off customs
revenues at the key Spin Boldak crossing from Pakistan. He was appointed to his current post in
March 2011 when his predecessor was killed in an insurgent attack. Razziq’s convoy was
attacked in September 2012, and he was injured, but not severely.
Ghul Agha Shirzai: Eastern Afghanistan/Nangarhar
A key gubernatorial appointment has been Ghul Agha Shirzai as governor of Nangarhar. He is a
Pashtun from the powerful Barakzai clan based in Qandahar Province, previously serving as
governor of that province, where he reportedly continued to exercise influence in competition
with Ahmad Wali Karzai. Ahmad Wali Karzai’s death on July 12, 2011, could prompt Sherzai and
his allies to assert themselves in the province, possibly by trying to convince Karzai to make him
Qandahar governor again.
In Nangarhar, Sherzai is generally viewed as an interloper. But, much as has Noor in Balkh,
Shirzai has exercised effective leadership, particularly in curbing poppy cultivation there. At the
same time, Shirzai is also widely accused of arbitrary action against political or other opponents,
and he reportedly does not remit all the customs duties collected at the Khyber Pass/Torkham
crossing to the central government. He purportedly uses the funds for the benefit of the province,
not trusting that funds remitted to Kabul would be spent in the province. As noted above, Shirzai
had considered running against Karzai in 2009 but then opted not to run as part of a reported
“deal” that yielded unspecified political and other benefits for Shirzai.
14 Partlow, Joshua, “U.S. Seeks to Bolster Kandahar Governor, Upend Power Balance,” Washington Post, April 29,
2010.
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Emerging Power Centers: Civil Society and “Independent”
Activists
Another interest group has emerged since the fall of the Taliban—a product of Afghanistan’s
increasing modernity and the effect of international policies to promote democracy and human
rights. Civil society activists and “independents” in the National Assembly and other institutions
are a growing force in Afghan politics. They are generally intellectuals, businessmen, and
women’s activists who have become more prominent and outspoken since the ousting of the
Taliban regime, with easy access to media outlets. However, although they are articulate and
backed by some democracy-oriented international NGOs, these civil society leaders have
struggled against traditional faction leaders to exert influence over policy. U.S.-based
International Republican Institute (IRI) has helped train the independents in the National
Assembly; the National Democratic Institute (NDI) has assisted the more established factions.
Of the independents that were present in the 2005-2010 parliament, one, the 45-year-old Malalai
Joya (Farah Province), was a leading critic of war-era faction leaders. In May 2007 the lower
house voted to suspend her for this criticism for the duration of her term and she did not seek
reelection in 2010. Ms. Fawzia Koofi, a one time a deputy lower house speaker and declared
presidential candidate for 2014, also remains in the Assembly and an outspoken leader on Afghan
women’s rights.
Others in this independent camp have included Ms. Fauzia Gailani (Herat Province, not returned
to parliament); Ms. Shukria Barekzai, chairwoman of the lower house Defense Committee during
2011; and Mr. Ramazan Bashardost, a former Karzai minister who champions parliamentary
powers and has established a “complaints tent” near the parliament building to highlight and
combat official corruption. (He ran for president in the 2009 elections on an anti-corruption
platform and drew an unexpectedly large amount of votes.) Bashardost was returned to
parliament in the September 2010 election and may run again in 2014.
Some other leading independents are present in the 2011-2015 lower house. They include Rafiq
Shahir from Herat, a well-known civil-society activist; Dr. Saleh Seljuki; and Ahmad Behzad (all
from Herat). Other independents reelected include Shakiba Hashemi and Khalid Pashtun, both
from Qandahar.
Ethnic and Factional Cooperation in the Security Sector
The security organs are considered an arena where Pashtuns, Tajiks, and others, of all factional
affiliations, have worked together relatively well. The National Directorate for Security (NDS, the
intelligence directorate) was headed by a non-Pashtun (Amrollah Saleh, a Tajik) during 2006-
2010, although he was dismissed on June 6, 2010, by Karzai for disagreements over whether and
how to engage insurgent leaders in political settlement negotiations. He was replaced by a
Pashtun, Rehmat Nabil, who had no previous intelligence experience but is perceived as more
consultative than was Saleh. Still, he inherited a service dominated by Tajiks (although some left
when Saleh was ousted) and by a mix of personnel that served during the Soviet occupation era
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(the service was then called Khad), and in the mujahedin government of 1992-1996. During
2002-2007, the Central Intelligence Agency reportedly paid for all of the NDS budget.15
Perhaps to preserve the tradition of ethnic balance in the security sector of government, the chief
of staff of the Afghan National Army, Bismillah Khan Mohmmadi (a Tajik), was named interior
minister on June 26, 2010. He replaced Mohammad Hanif Atmar, a Pashtun, who was fired the
same day and on roughly the same grounds as Saleh (see above for Atmar’s role in an opposition
party formed in November 2011). By all accounts, Khan is widely respected, even among
Pashtuns. The security ministries tend to have key deputies who are of a different ethnicity than
the minister or top official. As noted above, Khan, as well as Defense Minister Wardak, was
removed by the National Assembly on August 4, 2012.
Some observers assert that Tajiks continue to control many of the command ranks of the Afghan
security institutions, giving Pashtuns only a veneer of control of these organizations. U.S.
commanders in Afghanistan say the composition of the national security forces—primarily the
Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police—has been brought broadly into line with the
population. However, Pashtuns from the south (Durranis) remain underrepresented, in part
because of the fears that insurgents might target their relatives if they join the security forces.
Many of the Pashtuns in the security forces are from the Jalalabad area and are of the Ghilzai
Pashtun tribal confederation that is prevalent there and elsewhere in the east.
New Security Chiefs Appointed in September 2012
On September 3, Karzai nominated (1) Bismillah Khan Mohammedi, a prominent Tajik, to
become Defense Minister; (2) Gen. Ghulam Mujtaba Patang, a Pashtun, to be Interior Minister;
(3) Minister of Tribal and Border Affairs Asadullah Khalid, also a Pashtun, to switch posts and
become head of the National Directorate of Security (intelligence directorate); and (4) Azizullah
Din Mohammad to take over Khalid’s ministry. Some expected the National Assembly to vote
down Bismillah Khan because the Assembly had ousted him from the Interior Minister post only
one month earlier. Asadullah Khalid’s confirmation was similarly in doubt because of allegations
he backed torture of prisoners as governor of Qandahar province. Since leaving that office in
2008, Khalid had emerged as a powerful intermediary for Karzai, particularly as an informal
envoy in Qandahar following the 2011 assassination of Karzai’s brother Ahmad Wali. And Khalid
has good relations with the Northern Alliance grouping, boosting his political support in the
National Assembly. Patang, a longtime police official, most recently has headed the Afghan
Public Protection Force, which is taking over security for diplomats and development projects
from private security forces, but has been slow to develop. Despite the concerns above, on
September 16, 2012, the National Assembly approved all three security posts overwhelmingly,
but voted down Din Mohammad. The approvals retained the rough factional balance in the
security sector. Patang’s confirmation represents the appointment of the first professional police
officer to rise to the post of Interior Minister.
15 Filkins, Dexter, and Mark Mazzetti. “Key Karzai Aide in Graft Inquiry is Linked to C.I.A.” New York Times, August
26, 2010.
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Elections in 2009 and 2010 Widened Political Schisms
Elections are widely considered a key harbinger of the durability and extent of Afghanistan’s
political development—and a barometer of the degree to which factional, political, ethnic, and
sectarian rivalries can be reduced. The 2009 presidential and provincial elections were the first
post-Taliban elections run by the Afghan government itself in the form of the Afghanistan
Independent Electoral Commission. Donors, including the United States, invested almost $500
million in 2009 to improve the capacity of the Afghan government to conduct the elections.16
Both it and the September 2010 National Assembly elections were flawed, as discussed below,
and widened rather than reduced differences between Karzai and his opponents.
2009 Presidential Election
The 2009 election was plagued, from the start, by assertions of a lack of credibility of the
Independent Elections Commission. Its commissioners, including then-Chairman Azizullah
Ludin, were selected by, and many were politically close to, Karzai. As a check and balance to
ensure electoral credibility, there was also a U.N.-appointed Elections Complaints Commission
(ECC) that reviewed fraud complaints. Under the 2005 election law, there were three ECC seats
for foreign nationals, appointed by the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General/head
of U.N. Assistance Mission–Afghanistan, UNAMA. The two Afghans on the ECC governing
council17 were appointed by the Supreme Court and Afghanistan Independent Human Rights
Commission, respectively.
Disputes first erupted over the election date. On February 3, 2009, Afghanistan’s Independent
Election Commission (IEC) set August 20, 2009, as the election date (a change from a date
mandated by Article 61 of the Constitution as April 21, 2009, in order to allow at least 30 days
before Karzai’s term expired on May 22, 2009). The IEC decision on the latter date cited Article
33 of the Constitution as mandating universal accessibility to the voting—and saying that the
April 21 date was precluded by difficulties in registering voters, printing ballots, training staff,
advertising the elections, and the dependence on international donor funding, in addition to the
security questions.18 His opponents (led by Dr. Abdullah) insisted that Karzai’s presidency ended
May 22, 2009, and that a caretaker government should run Afghanistan until elections. The IEC
reaffirmed on March 4, 2009, that the election would be held on August 20, 2009. Karzai argued
that the Constitution does not provide for any transfer of power other than in case of election or
death of a president. The Afghan Supreme Court backed that decision on March 28, 2009, and the
Obama Administration publicly backed these rulings.
Election Modalities and Processes
Despite the political dispute between Karzai and his opponents, enthusiasm among the public
appeared high in the run-up to the election. Registration, which updated 2005 voter rolls, was
conducted during October 2008-March 2009. About 4.5 million new voters registered, and about
17 million total Afghans were registered. However, there were widespread reports of registration
16 Report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), September 9, 2010.
17 ECC website, http://www.ecc.org.af/en/.
18 Statement of the Independent Election Commission Secretariat, February 3, 2009, provided to CRS by a Karzai
national security aide.
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fraud (possibly half of all new registrants), with some voters registering on behalf of women who
do not, by custom, show up at registration sites, and others selling registration cards.
Presidential candidates filed to run during April 24—May 8, 2009. A total of 44 registered to run
for president, of which three were disqualified for various reasons, leaving a field of 41 (later
reduced to 32 after several dropped out). In the provincial elections, 3,200 people competed for
420 seats nationwide. Although about 80% of the provincial council candidates ran as
independents, some of Afghanistan’s parties, including Hezb-i-Islam, fielded multiple candidates
in several different provinces. The provincial elections component of the election received little
attention, in part because the role of these councils is unclear. About 200 women competed for the
124 seats reserved for women (29%) on the provincial councils, although in two provinces
(Qandahar and Uruzgan) there were fewer women candidates than reserved seats. In Kabul
Province, 524 candidates competed for the 29 seats of the council.
The European Union, supported by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) sent a few hundred observers, and the International Republican Institute and National
Democratic Institute sent observers as well. About 8,000 Afghans assisted the observation
missions, according to the U.N. Nations Development Program.
Security was a major issue for all the international actors supporting the Afghan elections process,
amid open Taliban threats against Afghans who vote. In the first round, about 7,000 polling
centers were to be established (with each center having multiple polling places, totaling about
29,000), but, of those, about 800 were deemed too unsafe to open, most of them in restive
Helmand and Qandahar provinces. A total of about 6,200 polling centers opened on election day.
The total cost of the Afghan elections in 2009 were about $300 million. Other international
donors contributing funds to close the gap left by the U.S. contribution of about $175 million.
The Political Contest and Campaign
The presidential competition took shape in May 2009. In the election-related deal-making,19
Karzai obtained an agreement from Fahim to run as his first vice presidential running mate. In
doing so, Karzai showed the UF opposition grouping to be split. Karzai, Fahim, and incumbent
second Vice President Karim Khalili (a Hazara) registered their ticket on May 4, 2009, just before
Karzai left to visit the United States. Karzai convinced several prominent Pashtuns not to run,
including Ghul Agha Shirzai, a member of the powerful Barakzai clan; and Anwar al-Haq Ahady,
the former finance minister and Central Bank governor. Anti-Karzai Pashtuns failed to coalesce
around one challenger, such as Former Interior Minister Ali Jalali and former Finance Minister
(2002-2004) and then Karzai critic Ashraf Ghani. Ghani decided to run without Jalali or
prominent representation from other ethnicities in his vice presidential slots.
The UF had difficulty forging a united challenge to Karzai. Dr. Abdullah registered to run with
UF backing. His running mates were Dr. Cheragh Ali Cheragh, a Hazara who did poorly in the
2004 election, and a little known Pashtun, Homayoun Wasefi.
19 Some of the information in this section obtained in CRS interviews with a Karzai national security aide, December
2008.
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Karzai went into the election as a clear favorite, but the key question was whether he would win
in the first round (more than 50% of the vote). Although Karzai was criticized for a campaign that
relied on reaching out to traditional leaders, he did participate in at least one publicly broadcast
debate (August 16, 2009, on state-run Radio Television-Afghanistan, RTA) with two of his rivals
(Abdullah did not participate). Dr. Abdullah campaigned extensively in his key base in the north
and west, which are populated mainly by Tajiks, but he did campaign in some Pashtun-dominated
areas. Both Karzai and Abdullah held large rallies in Kabul and elsewhere.
Ghani had spent much time in the United States and Europe and many average Afghans viewed
him as out of touch. Focusing on urban voters, he made extensive use of the Internet for
advertising and fundraising, and he was advised by James Carville.20
A candidate who polled unexpectedly well was 56-year-old anti-corruption parliamentarian
Ramazan Bashardost, an ethnic Hazara. He ran a low-budget campaign was appealed to reform-
minded Afghans outside his core Hazara base. However, Mohaqiq’s backing (he was allied to
Karzai at that time) apparently helped Karzai carry the Hazara heartland of Bamiyan province.
The Election Results
Taliban intimidation and voter apathy appear to have suppressed the total turnout to about 5.8
million votes cast, or about a 35% turnout, far lower than expected. Twenty-seven Afghans,
mostly security forces personnel, were killed in election-day violence. Some observers said that
turnout among women was primarily because there were not sufficient numbers of female poll
workers to make women feel comfortable enough to vote. In general, however, election observers
reported that poll workers were well trained, and the voting process was orderly.
Clouding the election substantially were the widespread fraud allegations coming from all sides.
Dr. Abdullah held several news conferences after the election, purporting to show evidence of
systematic election fraud by the Karzai camp. The ECC, in statements, stated its belief that there
was substantial fraud likely committed, mostly by Karzai supporters. The final, uncertified total
was released on September 16, 2009, and showed Karzai at 54.6% and Dr. Abdullah at 27.7%.
Bashardost and Ghani received single-digit vote counts (9% and 3% respectively).
Vote Certified/Runoff Mandated
The constitution required that a second-round runoff, if needed, be held two weeks after the
results of the first round are certified. Following the release of the vote count, the complaints
evaluation period began which, upon completed, would yield a “certified” vote result. On
September 8, 2009, the ECC ordered a recount of 10% of polling stations (accounting for as many
as 25% total votes). Polling stations were considered “suspect” if the total number of votes
exceeded the 600 maximum number allotted to each polling station; or where any candidate
received 95% or more of the total valid votes cast at that station. Perhaps reflecting political
sensitivities, the recount consisted of a sampling of actual votes.21
20 Mulrine, Anna, “Afghan Presidential Candidate Takes a Page From Obama’s Playbook,” U.S. News and World
Report, June 25, 2009.
21 “Afghan Panel to Use Sampling in Recount,” USA Today, September 22, 2009.
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On October 20, 2009, the ECC determined, based on its investigation, that about 1 million Karzai
votes, and about 200,000 Abdullah votes, were considered fraudulent and were deducted from
their totals. The final, certified, results of the first round were as follows: Karzai—49.67%
(according to the IEC; with a slightly lower total of about 48% according to the ECC
determination); Abdullah—30.59%; Bashardost—10.46%; Ghani—2.94%; Yasini—1.03%; and
lower figures for the remaining field.22
During October 16-20, 2009, U.S. and international officials, including visiting Senator John
Kerry, met with Karzai to attempt to persuade him to acknowledge that his vote did not exceed
the 50%+ threshold needed for a first-round victory. On October 21, 2009, the IEC accepted the
ECC findings and Karzai conceded the need for a runoff election. A date was set as November 7,
2009. Abdullah initially accepted. In an attempt to produce a fair second round, UNAMA, which
provided advice and assistance to the IEC, requested that about 200 district-level election
commissioners be replaced and that there be fewer polling stations—about 5,800, compared to
6,200 previously—to eliminate polling stations where very few votes were expected to be cast.
Prior to the ECC vote certification, Dr. Abdullah told CRS at a meeting in Kabul on October 15,
2009, that he might be willing to negotiate with Karzai on a “Joint Program” of reforms—such as
direct election of provincial governors—to avoid a runoff. However, some said the constitution
does not provide for a negotiated settlement and that the runoff must proceed. Others said that a
deal between the two, in which Abdullah dropped his candidacy, could have led the third-place
finisher, Bashardost, to assert that he must face Karzai in a runoff. Still others say the issue could
have necessitated resolution by Afghanistan’s Supreme Court.
The various pre-runoff scenarios were mooted on November 1, 2009, when Dr. Abdullah refused
to participate in the runoff on the grounds that problems that plagued the first round were
unresolved. Some believe Abdullah pulled out because he believed he would not prevail in the
second round. On November 2, 2009, the IEC issued a statement saying that, by consensus, the
body had determined that Karzai, being the only candidate remaining in a two-person runoff,
should be declared the winner. The Obama Administration accepted the outcome as “within
Afghanistan’s constitution,” on the grounds that the fraud had been investigated. The United
States, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon (visiting Kabul), and several governments,
congratulated Karzai. Secretary of State Clinton praised Dr. Abdullah for his relatively moderate
speech announcing his pullout. However, the marred elections process was a major factor in a
September-November 2009 high-level U.S. strategy reevaluation because of the centrality of a
credible, legitimate partner Afghan government to U.S. strategy.23
As noted above, the election for the provincial council members were not certified until
December 29, 2009. The council members took office in February 2010.
September 18, 2010, Parliamentary Elections
The split over the conduct of the presidential elections widened in the run-up to the September
18, 2010, parliamentary elections. Mechanisms to prevent fraud were not fully implemented and
the results continue to be disputed as of July 2011, largely paralyzing the institutional functioning
of the Assembly and its role as a check and balance on the Karzai government. As a result, the
22 See IEC website for final certified tallies, http://www.iec.org.af/results.
23 Fidler, Stephen and John W. Miller, “U.S. Allies Await Afghan Review,” Wall Street Journal, September 25, 2009.
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political structure of Afghanistan has continued to fragment, even as the government assumers
greater responsibility in the context of a transition to Afghan security leadership beginning in July
2011. The July 20, 2010, Kabul conference final communiqué included an Afghan government
pledge to initiate, within six months, a strategy for long-term electoral reform.
Election Timing
On January 2, 2010, the IEC had initially set National Assembly elections for May 22, 2010. The
IEC view was that this date was in line with a constitutional requirement for a new election to be
held well prior to the expiry of the current Assembly’s term. However, U.S., ECC, UNAMA, and
officials of donor countries argued that Afghanistan’s flawed institutions would not be able to
hold free and fair elections under this timetable. Among the difficulties noted were that the IEC
lacks sufficient staff, given that some were fired after the 2009 election; that the IEC lacks funds
to hold the election under that timetable; that the U.S. military buildup will be consumed with
securing still restive areas at election time; and that the ECC’s term expired at the end of January
2010. A functioning ECC was needed to evaluate complaints against registered parliamentary
candidates because there are provisions in the election law to invalidate the candidacies of those
who have previously violated Afghan law or committed human rights abuses.
The international community pressed for a delay of all of these elections until August 2010 or,
according to some donors, mid-2011.24 Bowing to funding and the wide range of other
considerations mentioned, on January 24, 2010, the IEC announced that the parliamentary
elections would be postponed until September 18, 2010. Other experts said that the security
issues, and the lack of faith in Afghanistan’s election institutions, necessitated further
postponement.25
About $120 million was budgeted by the IEC for the parliamentary elections, of which at least
$50 million came from donor countries, giving donors leverage over when the election might take
place. The remaining $70 million was funds left over from the 2009 elections. Donors had held
back the needed funds, possibly in an effort to pressure the IEC to demonstrate that it is
correcting the flaws identified in the various “after-action” reports on the 2009 election. With the
compromises and Karzai announcements below, those funds were released as of April 2010.
Election Decree/Reform
With the dispute between the Karzai government and international donors continuing over how to
ensure a free and fair election, in February 2010 Karzai signed an election decree that would
supersede the 2005 election law and govern the 2010 parliamentary election.26 The Afghan
government argued that the decree supersedes the constitutional clause that any new election law
not be adopted less than one year prior to the election to which that law will apply.
24 Trofimov, Yaroslav, “West Urges Afghanistan to Delay Election,” Wall Street Journal, December 11, 2009.
25 Rondeaux, Candace, “Why Afghanistan’s September Elections Ought to Be Postponed.” Washington Post, July 11,
2010.
26 Partlow, Joshua, “Afghanistan’s Government Seeks More Control Over Elections,” Washington Post, February 15,
2010.
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Substantively, some of the provisions of the election decree—particularly the proposal to make
the ECC an all-Afghan body—caused alarm in the international community. Another
controversial element was the registration requirements of a financial deposit (equivalent of about
$650), and that candidates obtain signatures of at least 1,000 voters. On March 14, 2010, after
discussions with outgoing UNAMA head Kai Eide, Karzai reportedly agreed to cede to UNAMA
two “international seats” on the ECC, rather than to insist that all five ECC members be Afghans.
Still, the majority of the ECC seats were Afghans.
The election decree became an issue for Karzai opponents and others in the National Assembly
who seek to assert parliamentary authority. On March 31, the Wolesi Jirga voted to reject the
election decree. However, on April 3, 2010, the Meshrano Jirga decided not to act on the election
decree, meaning that it was not rejected by the Assembly as a whole and governed the September
18, 2010, National Assembly elections. Karzai upheld his pledge to implement the March 2010
compromise with then UNAMA head Eide by allowing UNAMA to appoint two ECC members
and to implement a requirement that at least one non-Afghan ECC member concur in decisions.
Among other steps to correct the mistakes of the 2009 election, the Afghan Interior Ministry
planned instituted a national identity card system to curb voter registration fraud. However,
observers say that registration fraud still occurred. On April 17, 2010, Karzai appointed a new
IEC head, Fazel Ahmed Manawi, a Tajik, who drew praise from many factions (including
“opposition leader” Dr. Abdullah, who is half Tajik and identifies with that ethnicity) for
impartiality. The IEC also barred 6,000 poll workers who served in the 2009 election from
working the 2010 election.
Preparations and the Vote
Preparations for the September 18 election proceeded without major disruption, according to the
IEC. Candidates registered during April 20-May 6, 2010. A list of candidates was circulated on
May 13, 2010, including 2,477 candidates for the 249 seats.27 These figures included 226
candidates who registered but whose documentation was not totally in order; and appeal restored
about 180 of them. On May 30, 2010, in a preliminary ruling, 85 other candidates were
disqualified as members of illegal armed groups. However, appeals and negotiations restored all
but 36 in this latter category. A final list of candidates, after all appeals and decisions on the
various disqualifications, was issued June 22. The final list included 2,577 candidates, including
406 women. Sixty-two candidates were invalidated by the ECC, mostly because they did not
resign their government positions, as required.
Voter registration was conducted June 12-August 12. According to the IEC, over 375,000 new
voters were registered, and the number of eligible voters was about 11.3 million. Campaigning
began June 23. Many candidates, particularly those who are women, said that security difficulties
have prevented them from conducting active campaigning. At least three candidates and 13
candidate supporters were killed by insurgent violence.
On August 24, 2010, the IEC announced that the Afghan security forces say they would only be
able to secure 5,897 of the planned 6,835 polling centers. To prevent so-called “ghost polling
27 The seat allocation per province is the same as it was in the 2005 parliamentary election—33 seats up for election in
Kabul; 17 in Herat province; 14 in Nangarhar, 11 each in Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni; 9 in Badakhshan, Konduz, and
Faryab, 8 in Helmand, and 2 to 6 in the remaining provinces. Ten are reserved for Kuchis (nomads).
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stations” (stations open but where no voters can go, thus allowing for ballot-stuffing), the 938
stations considered not secure were not opened. The IEC announcement stated that further
security evaluation could lead to the closing of still more stations and, on election day, a total of
5,355 centers opened (304 of those slated to open did not, and for 157 centers there was no
information available). In part to compensate, the IEC opened extra polling stations in centers in
secure areas near to those that were closed.
On election day, about 5.6 million votes were cast out of about 17 million eligible voters. Turnout
was therefore about 33%. A major issue suppressing turnout was security. At first, it appeared as
though election-day violence was lower than in the 2009 presidential election. However, on
September 24, NATO/ISAF announced that there were about 380 total attacks, about 100 more
than in 2009. However, voting was generally orderly and the attacks did not derail the election.
Parliamentary Election Outcome
Preliminary results were announced on October 20, 2010, and final, IEC-certified results were to
be announced by October 30, 2010, but were delayed until November 24, 2010, due to
investigation of fraud complaints. While the information below illustrates that there was
substantial fraud, the IEC and ECC have been widely praised by the international community for
their handling of the fraud allegations.
Of the 5.6 million votes cast, the ECC invalidated 1.3 million (about 25%) after investigations of
fraud complaints. The ECC prioritized complaints filed as follows: 2,142 as possibly affecting the
election, 1,056 as unable to affect the result, and 600 where there will be no investigation. Causes
for invalidation most often included ballot boxes in which all votes were for one candidate. About
1,100 election workers were questioned by ECC personnel, and 413 candidates were referred by
the ECC to the Attorney General for having allegedly committed election fraud.
The results, as certified by the IEC, resulted in substantial controversy within Afghanistan and led
to a political crisis. The certified results were as follows.
• About 60% of the lower house (148 out of 249) winners were new members.
• As noted above, Karzai’s number of core supporters was reduced from about 90
to 60-70. This was in part because the number of Pashtuns elected was 94, down
from 120 in the outgoing lower house. Several pro-Karzai candidates lost in
Qandahar Province, and because many Pashtuns did not vote due to security
reasons, in mixed Ghazni Province. The low Pashtun turnout in Ghazni caused
Hazara candidates to win all 11 seats from the province, instead of 6 Pashtuns
and 5 Hazaras in the outgoing lower house; this was a big factor in the reduction
of the number of Pashtuns who won election. Several prominent pro-Karzai
deputies were defeated, including Jamil Karzai, Pacha Khan Zadran, Mahmud
Khan Suleimankhel (Paktika Province), and Muin Mirastyal (Konduz Province).
The Hazara strength had no clear impact because many Hazaras support Karzai,
although their increased political strength has caused ethnic tensions with the
Pashtuns.
• Some observers note that some local militia commanders won election, adding to
or replacing similar figures in past parliaments: the newly elected include
Amanullah Guzar (Kabul) who may have been behind May 2006 rioting in Kabul
against NGO offices; and Haji Abdul Zahir (Nangarhar), a member of the well-
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known “Eastern Shura” once headed by the assassinated Hajji Abdul Qadir and
one-time Kabul Governor Hajji Din Mohammad. Other mujahedin-era figures
were reelected, including Iqbal Safi (Kapisa), Zalmai Mujaddedi (Badakhshan),
Fukkuri Beheshti (Bamiyan), and Shahzada Shahed (Kunar).
• Two ex-Taliban figures, Mullah Salam Rocketi, and Musa Wardak, were
defeated.
• A date of the inauguration of the new parliament was set for January 20, 2011, at
which time, under Afghan law, President Karzai would formally open the session.
Special Tribunal, Related Political Crisis, and Resolution
The certified results triggered a major political crisis, caused primarily by Pashtuns who felt they
lost the election due to fraud. The issue brought the operations of the National Assembly to a
virtual halt, with Karzai ruling by decree, with seven cabinet posts and a few Supreme Court seats
remaining unfilled by permanent appointees, and, as discussed above, with certified election
winners in the Assembly threatening to impeach him in July 2011.
Immediately after the election results were certified, Karzai took steps to address Pashtun
grievances, but with its own interest in increasing the number of Pashtuns elected, in December
2010 the Karzai government (office of the Attorney General) indicted all seven IEC
commissioners as well as the three Afghan members of the ECC. The deputy attorney general that
same month urged election results to be voided and the Afghan Supreme Court to order a recount.
There were weekly demonstrations against the fraud by about 300 candidates who felt deprived of
victory, under a banner called the “Union of Afghan Wolesi Jirga Candidates 2010,” led by
defeated Ghazni candidate Daud Sultanzoy.
On December 28, 2010, at the instruction of the Supreme Court, Karzai issued a decree
empowering a five-member tribunal to review fraud complaints. Many Afghans, including an
independent watchdog group, “Free and Fair Election Foundation,” maintained that the tribunal
had no legal authority under the constitution to review the election. The IEC and ECC, backed by
UNAMA and the international community, insisted that the certified results stand, asserting they
are the only bodies under Afghan electoral law that have legitimate jurisdiction over election
results. Still, on January 19, 2011, the day before the parliament was to convene, the tribunal
leader, Judge Sediqullah Haqiq, announced it would need another month to evaluate the fraud
allegations. On that basis, following the recommendation, the Karzai government postponed the
inauguration of the new parliament by one month.
Defying Karzai and the special tribunal, about 213 of the certified winners met at the
Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul on January 20, 2011, and reportedly decided to take their seats on
Sunday, January 23, 2011, without Karzai’s formal inauguration. Elected deputies at the meeting
said they would try to convene at the parliament building but would meet elsewhere, if blocked.
They elected an interim speaker, Hajji Mohammad Sarwar Osmani, from Farah Province. This
would have rendered unclear the legal status of a self-convened parliament.
During January 20-25, 2011, with the lower house threatening to convene on its own, a
compromise was found. Karzai agreed to inaugurate the lower house on January 26, 2011; that
event took place. However, the ongoing fraud investigation by the special tribunal remained
active, despite insistence by declared winners to terminate it. As noted, after its inauguration, the
lower house elected a compromise candidate, Abdul Raouf Ibrahimi, from the Uzbek community,
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as speaker. This fell short of Karzai’s goal of engineering selection of Sayyaf but accomplished
his aim of denying Qanooni reselection to that post. The upper house was completed as of
February 19, 2011, when Karzai made his 34 appointments.
The special tribunal process continued to investigate and to recount votes in several provinces.
The crisis became acute on June 23, 2011, when the special tribunal ruled that 62 defeated
candidates be reinstated. The National Assembly—containing the 62 people who would lose their
seats if the tribunal’s order were followed—subsequently passed a no-confidence vote against
Attorney General Aloko. On August 10, 2011, Karzai appeared to defuse the eight month-long
crisis; he issued a decree declaring that special court does not have jurisdiction to change election
results, and that such changes are the role of the IEC. Subsequently, on August 21, 2011, the IEC
implemented elements of a compromise urged by UNAMA by ruling that nine winners had won
their seats through fraud and must be removed. This decision, with IEC chairman Manawi
acknowledged was partly due to politics, removed fewer than the 17 that UNAMA had urged but
more than the 5 the IEC reportedly thought would defuse the crisis. Some of the nine newly
declared winners were sworn in on September 4, 2011, and the nine whose victories were
overturned were barred from entering the parliament building. However, in protest of the
decision, about 70 parliamentarians refused to convene and the Assembly was unable to obtain a
quorum to act on legislation or government nominees, including Supreme Court vacancies. The
boycotting parliamentarians ended their protest on October 8, 2011, paving the way for the
National Assembly to resume full function.
2009 and 2010 Elections Alter Karzai-Assembly Relations
The exposure of widespread fraud in the 2009 and 2010 elections appeared to alienate Karzai
from the National Assembly. In the confirmation process of his post-2009 election cabinet,
National Assembly members, particularly the well-educated independents, objected to many of
his nominees as “unknowns,” as having minimal qualifications, or as loyal to faction leaders who
backed Karzai in the 2009 election. Karzai’s original list of 24 ministerial nominees (presented
December 19) was generally praised by the United States for retaining the highly praised
economic team (and most of that team was confirmed). However, overall, only 7 of the first 24
nominees were confirmed (January 2, 2010), and only 7 of the 17 replacement nominees were
confirmed (January 16, 2010), after which the Assembly went into winter recess. Although then
UNAMA head Kai Eide called the vetoing of many nominees a “setback” to Afghan governance,
Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell said on January 6, 2010, that the vetoing by parliament
reflected a “healthy give and take” among Afghanistan’s branches of government. Another five
(out of seven nominees) were confirmed on June 28, 2010, although one was a replacement for
the ousted Interior Minister Atmar.
The differences over cabinet selections continued after the resolution in 2011 of the Assembly
elections, although perhaps with less intensity, suggesting Karzai and the Assembly have sought
to put aside differences and focus on governing. On March 12, 2012, the National Assembly
confirmed most of those ministers who were serving in an acting capacity—including the
controversial Ismail Khan—as well as some new nominees. As noted above, on September 16,
2012, the Assembly approved Karzai’s nominees for heads of the three main security institutions.
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Implications for the United States of the Afghan Elections Disputes
U.S. officials express clear U.S. neutrality in all Afghan elections. However, U.S. officials
remained concerned that the 2009 and 2010 elections, and subsequent political crisis, would
complicate the July 2011 start of the transition to Afghan security leadership, which began in
seven areas (three provinces and four cities). 10,000 U.S. troops were withdrawn in late 2011 and
an additional 23,000 will leave by September 2012. The election fraud and disputes have
purportedly affected the perceptions of the Afghan people about the legitimacy of the Afghan
government and its ability to take the lead on security by the end of 2014, according to current
plans. The August 10, 2011, Karzai decree may serve to alleviate some of these concerns.
Afghans close to Karzai believe that the U.S. posture on the Afghan elections strained relations
between the two countries. In the 2009 presidential election, Karzai reportedly believed the
United States was hoping strong candidates might emerge to replace him. The United States
repeatedly stated its neutrality in all Afghan elections, and Ambassador Timothy Carney headed
the 2009 U.S. election support effort at U.S. Embassy Kabul, tasked to ensure that the United
States was even-handed.
2014 Presidential Elections: Karzai Says He Will Leave Office, Looks for
Successor
Under the constitution, the next presidential elections are to be held by the end of 2014. There is
no clear frontrunner to succeed Karzai, although a number of candidates receive attention from
observers, particularly those who ran before. Some observers say that, in the interests of unity
approaching the 2014 security transition, factions should unify around a single successor who
could be elected by acclamation. It is not clear whether that idea will resonate among major
factions.
The potential Pashtun contenders are Ghul Agha Sherzai, Ashraf Ghani, former Interior Minister
Ali Jalali (a Pashtun), Education Minister Faruq Wardak, and others. Some fear that Karzai may
try to position himself to wield influence in a successor government by endorsing and working on
behalf of one of these Pashtun candidates, and several of them are said to be seeking Karzai’s
backing. Karzai has said he does not want any of his brothers to run to succeed him, but Qayyum
is said to be pondering a run, as is Mahmoud, despite the many allegations of his profiting from
his brother’s presidency. Ghani appeared to confirm his interest in a run in June 2012 by publicly
criticizing corruption in government.
Of the Tajik representatives, those who might run include Dr. Abdullah, Ahmad Zia Masoud, and
Amrollah Saleh. Dr. Abdullah is said to be encouraging Hanif Atmar, a Pashtun mentioned above,
to run as his first vice president in an effort to appeal to Pashtuns. However, a run by him might
conflict with a run by the other Tajiks, and it is likely these figures will try to unite behind one
Tajik representative.
Parliamentarian Fawzia Koofi, mentioned above, has stated in editorials since late 2011 that she
will run, although her gender as well as her Tajik ethnicity would lead most observers to conclude
she is not favored to win. Ramazan Bashardost, a Hazara, is likely to again run on an anti-
corruption platform.
Some Karzai critics have claimed he still plans to alter the constitution to allow himself to run for
a third time, or possibly engineer a loya jirga—invoking national security grounds—to ask him to
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stay in office after 2014. At a June 15, 2011, Senate Appropriations Committee hearing, then
Secretary of Defense Gates said Karzai had abandoned any such thinking and would leave office
in 2014. Some U.S. officials sought to persuade Karzai to make a more public and definitive
declaration to that effect. On August 12, 2011, the palace issued a statement that Karzai had told a
group of parliamentarians that he would end his presidency after his second term. Press reports in
September 2012 say that Karzai has been telling diplomats and others in Kabul that he might not
endorse any candidate or involve himself in the 2014 election in any way—apparently trying to
put to rest other assessments that Karzai wants to wield post-2014 political influence from behind
the scenes. On the other hand, some read his reshuffling on September 20, 2012, of 10 of the 34
provincial governorships as an effort to place loyalists in position to support his favored candidate
in the 2014 election.
Election Timing, Other Ongoing Electoral Issues
The international community is concerned about the 2014 election for its implications for
Afghanistan’s ability to govern beyond the 2014 transition. In April 2012, Karzai acknowledged
that he had begun discussing with aides the possibility of advancing the election to some time in
2013. The public explanation for raising this possibility is that international troops will be leaving
by the end of 2014, and more foreign troops will be available to secure the election in 2013 than
in 2014. However, some might argue that moving the election up gives well-known Karzai
associates a political advantage over lesser known figures. However, Karzai’s July 26, 2012,
administrative reform decree directs the IEC to prepare a plan for registering candidates in 2014,
suggesting Karzai may have dropped consideration of moving the election forward.
The July 8, 2012, Tokyo donors’ conference resulted in the “Tokyo Mutual Accountability
Framework,” which stipulated economic aid incentives for Afghanistan in return for
demonstrating progress in governance and against corruption. One of the Framework’s
stipulations is that Afghanistan conduct “credible, inclusive and transparent Presidential and
Parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2015,” including to “develop, by early 2013, a
comprehensive election timeline through 2015 for electoral preparations and polling dates.” 28
Currently, electoral mechanisms continue to function, but reform is uncertain. As noted above, in
August 2011, Karzai recognized formally the primacy of the IEC in determining the outcome of
an election. IEC Chairman Manawi continues until early 2013, as does the term of IEC
commissioner Abdul Pashaye. On December 19, 2011, Karzai swore in five new commissioners
he appointed, a move that renewed criticism of mechanisms and laws that allow the president to
appoint election officials. That same month the IEC signed a two-year assistance program by
UNDP called ELECT II (Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow). Still, the 2014 election
will require a new election law setting the framework for the IEC and ECC composition, and that
law has not been adopted by the National Assembly to date.
28 http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/article/the-tokyo-declaration-partnership-for-self-reliance-in-afghanistan-
from-transition-to-transf
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Afghan Governing Capacity and Performance29
Some believe that Afghanistan will revert to a terrorist haven unless effective governance is well
established before the transition to Afghan leadership is completed by 2014. U.S. and U.N.
reports assess that there has been progress in the capacity of Afghan institutions to provide
services; however, the low baseline of Afghan capacity means significant work remains. Many of
the shortcomings in governance are attributed to all of the political disputes, alleged corruption,
and the lack of workers trained or skilled in governmental affairs that are discussed below.
In major Afghanistan policy addresses, President Obama has consistently stressed that more
needed to be done to promote the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan government at both
the Kabul and local levels. In the latter statement, he said: “The days of providing a blank check
[to the Afghan government] are over.” The U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement,
signed in Afghanistan on May 1, 2012, commits the United States (beyond 2014) to “support the
Afghan government in strengthening the capacity, self-reliance, and effectiveness of Afghan
institutions and their ability to deliver basic services.” Of the FY2013 request for about $2.3
billion in economic aid to Afghanistan, nearly one-third of the request is for programs to help
promote good governance, human rights, rule of law, political competition, and civil society.
Earlier, the Obama Administration developed about 45 different metrics to assess progress in
building Afghan governance and security, as it was required to do (by September 23, 2009) under
P.L. 111-32, an FY2009 supplemental appropriation.30 UNAMA, headed in Kabul by Jan Kubis,
also evaluates Afghan governance according to numerous metrics. Afghan progress according to
these metrics is presented in reports of the Secretary-General to the U.N. General Assembly, such
as a report released March 5, 2012 (U.N. document number: A/66/728-S/2012/133)
The Tokyo Framework of Mutual Accountability, cited above, issued at the conclusion of the July
8, 2012, Tokyo donors’ conference, makes aid incentives for Afghanistan (portions of $16 billion
pledged through 2015) conditional on several governance measures including:31
• The holding of credible, inclusive, and transparent elections in 2014 and 2015.
• Improved access to justice, and respect for human rights, particularly for women
and children.
• Improved integrity of public financial management and the commercial banking
sector.
• Improved revenue systems and budget execution.
In part to demonstrate that Afghanistan would uphold those commitments, the Karzai
administrative reform decree issued July 26, 2012, requires virtually every ministry and
29 Some information in this section is from the State Department report on human rights in Afghanistan for 2011, May
24, 2012.
30 “Evaluating Progress in Afghanistan-Pakistan” Foreign Policy website, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/
09/16/evaluating_progress_in_afghanistan_pakistan.
31 http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/article/the-tokyo-declaration-partnership-for-self-reliance-in-afghanistan-
from-transition-to-transf
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government body to develop a work plan, complete unfinished tasks, file specified reports, or
carry out specified reforms.32
Expanding Central Government Capacity
The international community has had mixed success in shifting authority in Afghanistan from
traditional leaders and relationships to transparent and effective state institutions. Afghan
ministries have greatly increasing their staffs and technological capabilities (many ministry
offices now have modern computers and communications, for example). Afghan-led
governmental reform and institution-building programs under way, all with U.S. and other donor
assistance, include training additional civil servants, instituting merit-based performance criteria,
basing hiring on qualifications rather than kinship and ethnicity, and weeding out widespread
governmental corruption.
However, the government still faces a relatively small recruitment pool of workers with sufficient
skills and many are reluctant to serve in the provincial offices of the central government
ministries, particularly in provinces where there is still substantial violence. U.S. mentors and
advisers serve in virtually all the Afghan ministries. Afghanistan has also tried to address the
problem of international donors luring away Afghan talent with higher salaries, by pledging at the
July 20, 2010, Kabul conference to reach an understanding with donors, within six months, on a
harmonized salary scale for donor-funded salaries of Afghan government personnel. Discussions
have been held between the Afghan government and donors on this issue.
The Afghan Civil Service
The low level of Afghan bureaucratic capacity is being addressed in a number of ways, but
slowly. There are about 500,000 Afghan government employees, although the majority of them
are in the security forces. A large proportion of the remainder work as teachers. On several
occasions, the United States has funded jobs fairs that have recruited some new civil servants.
To increase the proficiency of government, during late 2010-early 2011, the government instituted
merit-based appointments for senior positions, such as deputy provincial governors and district
governors, and converted those positions to civil servants rather than political appointees.
However, that effort stalled in April-September 2011, according to the October 2011 DOD report,
because Karzai has not yet approved merit-based selectees for 14 deputy governor positions. If
approved, more than three-quarters of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces would have merit-based deputy
governors.
The key institution that is deciding on merit based appointments and standardizing job
descriptions, salaries, bonuses, and benefits is the Afghan Independent Administrative Reform
and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC). The commission has thus far redefined more than
80,000 civil servant job descriptions. The Afghan cabinet drafted a revised civil service law to
institute merit-based hiring and give the IARCSC a legal underpinning; it was ratified by the
National Assembly in late 2011 and replaced a less-specific September 2005 civil service law.
32 Text of the decree “On the Execution of Content of the Historical Speech of June 21, 2012, in the Special Session of
the National Assembly. Provided to CRS by the Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, D.C. July 16, 2012.
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Under a USAID program called the Civilian Technical Assistance Plan, the United States is
providing technical assistance to Afghan ministries and to the IARCSC. From January 2010 until
January 2011, USAID, under a February 2010 memorandum of understanding, gave $85 million
to programs run by the commission to support the training and development of Afghan civil
servants. One of the commission’s subordinate organizations is the Afghan Civil Service Institute,
which trained over 16,000 bureaucrats during 2010-2011, according to the DOD 1230 report, and
which has instituted an internship program for 1,000 interns in national civil service jobs and
2,000 interns in provincial and district offices. On-going training for civil servants is provided by
an arm of the Civil Service Institute called the National Training Directorate (NTD).
According to the November 2011 report from the office of the Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Marc Grossman, USAID programs are helping employees
of the state-owned Afghan power company (DABS) to manage Afghanistan’s power grid and bill
its customers. USAID programs have also trained 250 Ministry of Mines personnel in geology to
try to help develop Afghanistan’s extractive industries sector.
Many Afghan civil service personnel undergo training in India, building on growing relations
between Afghanistan and India. Japan and Singapore also are training Afghan civil servants on
good governance, anti-corruption, and civil aviation. Singapore and Germany will, in 2011,
jointly provide technical assistance in the field of civil aviation. Some of these programs are
conducted in partnership with the German Federal Foreign Office and the Asia Foundation.
The Afghan Budget Process
The international efforts to build up the central government are reflected in the Afghan budget
process. The Afghan government controls its own funds as well as those of directly supplied
donor funds. The Afghan budget year follows the solar year, which begins on March 21 of each
year, which also corresponds to the Persian New Year (Nowruz). In early February 2011, the
National Assembly adopted a 2011 national budget (March 2011-March 2012) in line with its
responsibilities. However, the lack of a quorum in the Assembly in mid- to late-2011 slowed
consideration of a budget for 2012 (March 2012-March 2013), as did an initial voting down of the
2012 budget by the lower house of the National Assembly in March 2012.
The Afghan budget is a “unitary” (centralized) system. Once a budget is adopted by the full
National Assembly (first the upper house and then the lower house, and then signed by Karzai),
the funds are allocated to central government ministries and other central government entities.
Some of the elected provincial councils, appointed provincial governors, and district governors
formulate local budget requirements and help shape the national budget process, but no locality
controls its own budget. These local organs do approve the disbursement of funds by the central
entities (called mustofiats, accounting offices in each of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces). The Tokyo
Mutual Accountability Framework, cited above, includes as one of its benchmarks the
formalization of a provincial budgeting process with more systematic provincial input into the
relevant ministries that formulate the national budget.
All revenue is collected by central government entities which implement the local programs but,
according to experts, contributes to the widespread observation that local officials sometimes
seek to retain or divert locally collected revenues. There are several pilot programs in place,
including the Provincial Budget Pilot Program (PBPP) to improve budgetary planning integration
between the national and provincial levels. To date, four ministries and the IDLG say they have
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made sound progress on this program and several other ministries are to be included in it in 2012-
2013.
Donor Involvement in the Afghan Budget
The Afghan government is expected to take in about $2 billion in total revenue for all of 2012.
Lacking resources, about 90% of total Afghan government expenditures (operating budget and
development budget) was provided by international donors during 2006-2010, according to a
GAO study issued September 2011. Of the 90%, the United States provide 62% and other donors
provided 28% of total expenditures.33 In 2011, donor funds covered 57% of the Afghan
government’s $2.2 billion operating budget.34
Although still wary of misuse, the United States has been slowly accommodating Afghan
demands that aid be channeled through the Afghan government. More than 40% of U.S. aid was
channeled through the Afghan government during FY2011. This is close to the target figure of
50% that was endorsed at the July 20, 2010, Kabul conference, and up from 21% in FY2009,
according to a June 8, 2011, staff report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Evaluating
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan). Increased percentages are predicated on U.S.
assessments of the ability of individual ministries to accurately and transparently administer
donated funds. According to that Foreign Relations Committee staff report, 14 Afghan ministries
have received USAID and State Department funds.
Karzai has repeatedly said that the low level of direct funding has stunted the growth of Afghan
government capacity. Many international development experts concur that only through direct
funding will the Afghan government be able to develop the capacity and eventually the
transparency to govern and deliver services effectively. The Tokyo Framework, cited earlier,
provides incentives for Afghanistan by raising the percentage of donor funds channeled through
the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund in exchange for Afghan governance progress—that
fund gives money directly to Afghan ministries and thus gives the Afghan government substantial
discretion as compared to other donated funds that are spent directly on projects. The Karzai
administrative decree of July 26, 2012, provides for Afghan institutions to begin taking over the
roles of donor-run Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Karzai has long criticized the PRTs
as preventing the Afghan government from expanding its own responsibilities and capacity.
Expanding Local (Subnational) Governance
As U.S. concerns about corruption in the central government increased after 2007, U.S. and allied
policy has increasingly emphasized building local or “subnational” governance. This accords with
U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, which is to build institutions that can govern and secure areas
cleared by U.S. and NATO forces and preventing Taliban reinfiltration. The U.S. shift in
emphasis complements that of the Afghan government, which asserts that it has itself long sought
to promote local governance in Afghanistan’s political and economic development.
33 Government Accountability Office. “Afghanistan’s Donor Dependence.” September 20, 2011.
34 The operating budget is greater than the government revenue because the operating budget includes some donor
funds.
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U.S. and partner country officials, as well as observers, say that local governance, particularly at
the provincial level, is improving and expanding, particularly in areas secured by the 2010 U.S.
“troop surge.” U.S. officials say that Afghans are increasingly forming local councils and building
ties to appointed local leaders in these cleared and secured areas. However, the April 2012 DOD
report on Afghanistan stability (p.71) says subnational bodies “remain unable to provide many
basic government services.” This could be, in part, a result of attempts by Kabul to centralize
decision making—the localities have their own governing bodies but the central government
ministries in the provincial capitals of each province—not the subnational bodies—actually
implement national programs. Local officials often disagree with the Kabul ministry
representatives on priorities or on implementation mechanisms.
The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)
In terms of local governance institution-building, a key institution was empowered in August
2007 when Karzai placed the selection process for local leaders (provincial governors and below)
in a new Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)—and out of the Interior
Ministry. The IDLG was headed until early 2011 by Jelani Popal, a member of Karzai’s Popolzai
tribe and a close Karzai ally. Some international officials say that Popal packed local agencies
with Karzai supporters, where they were able to arrange votes for Karzai in the August 2009
presidential elections. He was replaced by Abdul Khaliq Farahi, a former diplomat who was
kidnapped in Peshawar, Pakistan, and held for nearly three years (2008-2011) allegedly by
militants linked to Al Qaeda.
In terms of donor programming, the IDLG is the implementing partner of the U.N. Development
Program in the Afghanistan Subnational Governance Program II (ASGP-II). It was funded with
$83.6 million from the European Community, Italy, Switzerland, and Britain. Its main
achievement has been to fund national technical assistance for the IDLG.
The IDLG is an implementing partner for the District Delivery Program (DDP), now operating in
32 of the 364 districts of Afghanistan. It is a program created to improve government presence
and service delivery at the district level, and is funded by the United States, Britain, Denmark,
and France. U.S. funding for the program was suspended in July 2011 pending accountability of
expenditures and a request for the IDLG and Ministry of Finance to satisfy several conditions,
and has not reactivated to date.35
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils
Many believe that, even more than institutional expansion, the key to effective local governance
is the appointment of competent and incorruptible governors in all 34 Afghan provinces. U.N.,
U.S., and other international studies and reports all point to the beneficial effects (reduction in
narcotics trafficking, economic growth, lower violence) of some of the strong Afghan civilian
appointments at the provincial level. Provincial governors are still political appointees selected
mostly for loyalty to Karzai although, as noted above, progress is being made in implementing a
merit-based appointment system for deputy provincial governors and district governors. The July
26, 2012, Karzai decree directs the IDLG to open deputy governorships to competition within two
months. The decree also requires the IDLG to fill open positions in the provinces within six
35 DOD report on Afghanistan stability, April 2012, p.73.
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months, to address the many vacancies in the provinces, including in the ministry offices in each
provincial capital. It also requires a review of the performance of provincial governors’
performance in combating corruption and improving governance.
A key example of a successful gubernatorial appointment has been the March 2008 appointment
of Gulab Mangal as Helmand governor. He is from Laghman Province (eastern Afghanistan) and
drew immediate skepticism from the local tribes and power-brokers of the south who repeatedly
have urged Karzai to replace him. But, he has drawn wide praise from the United States and the
international community for taking effective action to convince farmers to grow crops other than
poppy. His leadership accounts for the reduction of cultivation in Helmand that have been noted
since 2009. Mangal has played a key role in convening tribal shuras and educating local leaders
on the benefits of the U.S.-led offensive to remove Taliban insurgents from Marjah town and
install new authorities there. A key Mangal ally, who has reportedly helped bring substantial
stability to the Nawa district, is Abdul Manaf.
On September 20, 2012, acting subsequent to his July 2012 administrative decree, Karzai shuffled
10 out of the 34 provincial governors, asserting that those taken out of their positions had fallen
short on improving governance or combating corruption. Mangal was one of those removed,
causing consternation among some of the international donors who have raved about his
performance in Helmand. He was replaced by the little-known Gen. Mohammad Naeem. Some of
the ousted governors were assigned to different provinces. Other than Helmand, the nine
provinces where governors were changed include Wardak, Kabul, Takhar, Faryab, Baghlan,
Nimruz, Laghman, Lowgar, and Badghis.
Other governors, such as Ghul Agha Shirzai and Atta Mohammad Noor (discussed above) are
considered effective, but have been criticized for exercising excessive independence of central
authority. Many of the other governors are considered weak, ineffective, or corrupt.
Provincial Councils
One problem noted by governance experts is that the role of the elected provincial councils is
unclear. The elections for the provincial councils in all 34 provinces were held on August 20,
2009, concurrent with the presidential elections. The previous provincial council elections were
held concurrent with the parliamentary elections in September 2005. In most provinces, the
provincial councils do not act as true local legislatures and are considered weak compared to the
power and influence of the provincial governors.
Perhaps the most significant role the provincial councils play is in choosing the upper house of
the National Assembly (Meshrano Jirga). In the absence of district councils (no elections held or
scheduled), the provincial councils elected in 2009 have chosen two-thirds (68 seats) of the 102-
seat body. Karzai appointed the remaining 34 seats in February 2011.
District-Level Governance
The April 2012 DOD report on Afghan stability says that there was “measured progress” over the
past six months in developing effective district governance. District governors are appointed by
the president, at the recommendation of the IDLG. However, only a small proportion (about 5%-
10%) of all district governors have been appointed through the merit-based appointment system
in which qualifications are assessed by the IARCSC (see above). In some districts of Helmand
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that had fallen under virtual Taliban control until the July 2009 U.S.-led offensives in the
province, there were no district governors in place at all. Some of the district governors, including
in Nawa and Now Zad district, returned after the U.S.-led expulsion of Taliban militants.
The difficulty plaguing the expansion of district governance, in addition to security issues, is lack
of resources. Only slightly more than half of all district governors (there are 364 districts) have
any staff or vehicles.
District Councils
Another problem in establishing district level governance has been the fact that no elections for
district councils have been held due to boundary and logistical difficulties. In his November 19,
2009, inaugural speech, Karzai said the goal of the government is to hold these elections along
with the 2010 parliamentary elections. However, that was not accomplished and no date for these
elections has been set. As a result, there is no one authoritative district-level representative body,
but rather a collection of groupings established by donor programs. According to the April 2012
DOD report on Afghan stability, the Afghan government has agreed in principle to a roadmap
leading to a single district level body, a roadmap to be endorsed by September 2012, although not
necessarily implying district elections could be held by then.
Municipal and Village Level Authority
As are district governors, mayors of large municipalities are appointed. There are about 42
mayors nationwide, many with deputy mayors. Karzai pledged in his November 2009 inaugural
that “mayoral” elections would be held “for the purpose of better city management.” However, no
municipal elections have been held and none is scheduled.
As noted throughout, there has traditionally been village-level governance by groups of tribal
elders and other notables. That structure remains, particularly in secure areas, while village
councils have been absent or only sporadically active in areas where there is combat. As noted
above, a U.S. official in southern Afghanistan, Henry Ensher, said in January 2011 that councils
have been formed in areas where security has been established by the 2010 U.S. “troop surge.”
The IDLG and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), with advice from
India and other donors, also are empowering localities to decide on development priorities. The
MRRD has formed about 30,000 Community Development Councils (CDCs) nationwide to help
suggest priorities, and these bodies are eventually to all be elected.
U.S. Local Governance Advisory Capacity
As a consequence of the March 2009 Obama Administration review, to help build local governing
capacity, the Administration recruited about 500 U.S. civilian personnel from the State
Department, USAID, the Department of Agriculture, and several other agencies—and many
additional civilians from partner countries joined them—to advise Afghan ministries, and
provincial and district administrations. That effort raised the number of U.S. civilians in
Afghanistan to about 975 by early 2010 and to 1,330 by August 2011. Of these, nearly 400 serve
outside Kabul, up from 67 in early 2009.
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Although many U.S. civilian officials work outside Kabul, there are about 1,100 employees at the
U.S. Embassy in Kabul, from 18 different U.S. government agencies. To accommodate the
swelling ranks, in early November 2010 a $511 million contract was let to Caddell Construction
to expand it, and two contracts of $20 million each were let to construct U.S. consulates in Herat
and Mazar-e-Sharif. The consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif, however, is not in operation because of
concerns about the security of the building where it was to be located.
The Administration also has instituted appointments of “Senior Civilian Representatives”
(SCR),36 who are counterparts to the military commanders of each NATO/ISAF regional
command (there are currently five of them). Each Senior Civilian Representative has 10-30
personnel on his/her team. For example, the SCR for Regional Command South is based at
Qandahar airfield and interacts closely with the military command of the southern sector. The
SCR for Regional Command East (RC-E) is based at Bagram Airfield.
Reforming Afghan Governance: Curbing Corruption37
Partly because many Afghans view the central government as “predatory,” many Afghans and
international donors have questioned Karzai’s leadership. NATO estimates that about $2.5 billion
in total bribes are paid by Afghans each year. Reducing corruption in government is a major focus
of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, cited above, which requires Afghanistan to
“enact and enforce the legal framework for fighting corruption.” Karzai himself has repeatedly
acknowledged that corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan. In a June 21, 2012, speech, he
called on his government to step up the fight against corruption, and fighting corruption is a
cornerstone of Karzai’s July 26, 2012, administrative decree. However, concerns about Karzai’s
leadership on this issue center on implementation and his apparent reluctance to prosecute
officials for corruption—particularly those related to or aligned with him politically. This stands
in contrast to his attempts to vigorously prosecute for corruption those politically opposed to him.
High Level Corruption, Nepotism, and Cronyism
At the upper levels of government, some observers have asserted that Karzai deliberately tolerates
officials who are allegedly involved in illicit activity and supports their receipt of lucrative
contracts from donor countries, in exchange for their political support. Karzai’s brother,
Mahmoud, as discussed above, has apparently grown wealthy through real estate and auto sales
ventures in Qandahar and Kabul, purportedly by fostering the impression he can influence his
brother. Some observers who have served in Afghanistan say that Karzai has appointed some
provincial governors to “reward them” and that these appointments have gone on to “prey”
economically on the populations of that province.
Another trend that has attracted notice among Afghans is that several high officials, despite very
low official government salaries, have acquired ornate properties in west Kabul since 2002. They
allegedly have appropriated to themselves private land, the ownership of which was unclear, for
36 For more information, see U.S. Department of Defense. “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in
Afghanistan,” April 2011; http://www.defense.gov/news/1230_1231Report.pdf, pp. 19-20.
37 For more information, particularly on Rule of Law programs, see CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of
Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman.
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homes, and housing business ventures. Redressing this issue is discussed in the “rule of law”
section below.
Lower-Level Corruption
Observers who follow the issue say that most of the governmental corruption takes place in the
course of performing mundane governmental functions, such as government processing of official
documents (e.g., passports, drivers’ licenses), in which processing services routinely require
bribes in exchange for action.38 Other forms of corruption include Afghan security officials’
selling U.S./internationally provided vehicles, fuel, and equipment to supplement their salaries. In
other cases, local police or border officials may siphon off customs revenues or demand extra
payments to help guard the U.S. or other militaries’ equipment shipments. Other examples
include security commanders placing “ghost employees” on official payrolls in order to pocket
their salaries. Corruption is fed, in part, by the fact that government workers receive very low
salaries (about $200 per month, as compared to the pay of typical contractors in Afghanistan that
might pay as much as $6,500 per month). Many observers say there is a cultural dimension to the
corruption—that it is commonly expected by relatives and friends that those Afghans who have
achieved government positions will protect those relations with favors, appointments, and
contracts.
Administration Views and Policy on Corruption
As noted throughout, there is a consensus within the Administration on the wide scope of the
corruption in Afghan government and the deleterious effect the corruption has on government
popularity and effectiveness. The Administration wrestled throughout 2010 with the degree to
which to press an anti-corruption agenda with the Karzai government, but, in early 2011, the
Administration reportedly decided to prioritize reducing low-level corruption instead of
investigations of high-level allies of Karzai.39 The latter investigations have sometimes come into
conflict with other U.S. objectives by causing a Karzai backlash. In addition, such investigations
may complicate efforts to obtain the cooperation of Afghans who can help stabilize areas of the
country. Some of these Afghans are said to be paid by the CIA for information and other support,
and the National Security Council reportedly issued guidance to U.S. agencies to review this
issue.40
Yet, U.S. officials believe that anti-corruption efforts must be pursued because corruption is
contributing to a souring of Western publics on the mission as well as causing some Afghans to
embrace Taliban insurgents. General Petraeus, the former top U.S. and NATO commander in
Afghanistan, said he made anti-corruption a top priority to support his counter-insurgency
strategy. A key deputy, General H.R. McMaster, formed several DOD task forces to focus on anti-
corruption (Shafafiyat, Task Force Spotlight, and Task Force 2010) from a U.S. military/counter-
insurgency perspective. These task forces, in part, review U.S. contracting strategies to enhance
Afghan capacity and reduce the potential for corruption. The Shafafiyat task force announced in
February 2012 that had caused the restitution of $11.1 million, $25.4 million in fines, and $3.4
38 Filkins, Dexter, “Bribes Corrode Afghan’s Trust in Government,” New York Times, January 2, 2009.
39 Strobel, Warren and Marisa Taylor. “U.S. Won’t Pursue Karzai Allies in Anti-Corruption Campaign.” McClatchy
Newspapers, January 6, 2011.
40 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “A Subtler Takc to Fight Afghan Corruption.” Washington Post, September 13, 2010.
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million in seizures from allegedly fraudulent contractors, and has debarred or suspended more
than 125 American, Afghan, and international workers for alleged fraud.41
Anti-Corruption Initiatives
Obama Administration officials have credited Karzai with allowing the United States and other
donors to help develop oversight bodies to curb corruption. However, the credit is tempered by
the lack of Afghan government provision of resources or attention to building these bodies. These
criticisms were amplified in an April 30, 2012, report by the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). At the July 20, 2010, Kabul conference—following onto
the January 28, 2010, London conference—the Afghan government finalized a National Anti-
Corruption Strategy (“Azimi report”) and committed to enacting 37 laws to curb corruption. Very
few of these laws have been enacted, although the Afghan cabinet has drafted new anti-corruption
and auditing laws and some regulations have been issued by Karzai decree.
• Assets Declarations and Verifications. During December 15-17, 2009, Karzai
held a conference in Kabul to combat corruption. It debated requiring deputy
ministers and others to declare their assets, not just those at the ministerial level.
That requirement was imposed. Karzai himself declared his assets on March 27,
2009. The July 20, 2010, Kabul conference communiqué42 included an Afghan
pledge to verify and publish these declarations annually, beginning in 2010.
According to a U.N. report of March 9, 2011, 1,995 senior Afghan officials had
declared their assets. However, the SIGAR report of April 30, 2012, said that the
government’s progress for verification of the declarations continues to “fall short
of U.S. expectations.”
• A Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee to evaluate the government’s
performance in combating corruption was mandated by the Kabul conference
communiqué to be established within three months of the conference (by October
2010). According to a June 23, 2011, U.N. report, the committee, supported by
UNDP, was inaugurated on May 11, 2011. It was established by decree and is
composed of three Karzai nominees and three international nominees.
• High Office of Oversight. In August 2008 Karzai, with reported Bush
Administration prodding, set up the “High Office of Oversight for the
Implementation of Anti-Corruption Strategy” (commonly referred to as the High
Office of Oversight, HOO) with the power to identify and refer corruption cases
to state prosecutors, and to catalogue the overseas assets of Afghan officials. It is
headed by former IEC head Azizullah Ludin. On March 18, 2010, Karzai, as
promised at the January 28, 2010, international meeting on Afghanistan in
London, issued a decree giving the High Office direct power to investigate
corruption cases rather than just refer them to other offices. However, the SIGAR
reported on April 30, 2012, that the HOO’s core functions either deteriorated or
were ineffective during the first quarter of 2012. The July 26, 2012, Karzai
administrative decree directs the HOO to, within six months, assess “private
institutions’ and government officials’ suspicious wealth” and report those
41 John Ryan. “Task Force Rooting Out Corruption in Afghanistan.” Army Times, February 20, 2012.
42 Communiqué text at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/world/asia/21kabultext.html.
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findings to the president’s office every two months. USAID is providing the
HOO $30 million total during FY2011-FY2013 to build capacity at the central
and provincial level. USAID pays for salaries of six HOO senior staff and
provides some information technology systems as well.
• Establishment of Additional Investigative Bodies: Major Crimes Task Force and
Sensitive Investigations Unit. Since 2008, several additional investigative bodies
have been established under Ministry of Interior authority. The most prominent is
the “Major Crimes Task Force,” tasked with investigating public corruption,
organized crime, and kidnapping. A headquarters for the MCTF was inaugurated
on February 25, 2010, and it has been funded and mentored by the FBI, the DEA,
the U.S. Marshal Service, Britain’s Serious Crimes Organized Crime Agency, the
Australian Federal Police, EUPOL (European police training unit in
Afghanistan), and the U.S.-led training mission for Afghan forces. The MCTF
has 169 investigators, according to U.S. officials.
A related body is the Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU), run by several dozen
Afghan police officers, vetted and trained by the DEA.43 This body led the arrest
in August 2010 of a Karzai NSC aide, Mohammad Zia Salehi, on charges of
soliciting a bribe from the New Ansari Money Exchange in exchange for ending
a money-laundering investigation of the firm. The middle-of-the-night arrest
prompted Karzai, by his own acknowledgment on August 22, 2010, to obtain
Salehi’s release and to say he would establish a commission to place the MCTF
and SIU under more thorough Afghan government control. Following U.S.
criticism that Karzai is protecting his aides (Salehi reportedly was involved in
bringing Taliban figures to Afghanistan for conflict settlement talks), Karzai
pledged to visiting Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry on
August 20, 2010, that the MCTF and SIU would be allowed to perform their
work without political interference. In November 2010, the Attorney General’s
office said it had ended the prosecution of Salehi.
• Anti-Corruption Unit, and an Anti-Corruption Tribunal. These investigative and
prosecution bodies were established by decree in 2009. Eleven judges have been
appointed to the tribunal. The tribunal, under the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, tries cases referred by an Anti-Corruption Unit of the Afghan Attorney
General’s office. However, of the approximately 2,000 cases investigated by the
Anti-Corruption Unit, only 28 officials have been convicted to date. The
Department of Justice suspended its training program for the Anti-Corruption
Unit in early 2012 because of the unit’s “lack of seriousness,” according to the
SIGAR report of April 30, 2012. One of the laws pledged during the July 20,
2010, Kabul conference would be enacted (by July 20, 2011) included one to
legally empower the Anti-Corruption Tribunal and the Major Crimes Task Force.
That has not been enacted by the National Assembly to date.
• Prosecutions and Investigations of High-Level Officials. The Afghanistan
Attorney General’s office has investigated at least 20 senior officials. The April
30, 2012, SIGAR report said there had been no progress by the Attorney General
in undertaking new prosecutions in early 2012. Perhaps to address that criticism,
43 Nordland, Ron and Mark Mazzetti. “Graft Dispute in Afghanistan Is Test for U.S.” New York Times, August 24,
2010.
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new investigations were announced in mid-2012. One such case is that of
Minister of Mines Wahidullah Shahrani, although observers believe his
opponents are actually trying to combat a draft mining law that some see as too
favorable to foreign firms. Accusations in July 2012 against Finance Minister
Omar Zakhiwal appear focused on corruption rather than policy issues: Afghan
media used his bank statements to show unusual payments from outside
organizations. HOO director Ludin has called on Zakhiwal to step down while
the investigation unfolds. Karzai has not publicly defended Zakhiwal against the
accusations. Some of those investigated previously included Commerce Minister
Amin Farhang (for allegedly submitting inflated invoices for reimbursement);
former Minister of Mines Mohammad Ibrahim Adel (who reportedly accepted a
$30 million bribe to award a key mining project in Lowgar Province to China);44
and former Minister of the Hajj Mohammad Siddiq Chakari (for accepting bribes
to steer Hajj-related travel business to certain foreign tourist agencies). Chakari
fled to Britain. Then Deputy Kabul Mayor Wahibuddin Sadat was arrested at
Kabul airport in December 2009 for alleged misuse of authority.
• EITI. Relatedly, Afghanistan has signed up as a candidate to the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) which is intended to ensure that
contracting for Afghanistan’s mineral resources is free of corruption. Afghanistan
hopes to become fully EITI compliant by April 2012. The World Bank gave
Afghanistan a three year grant of $52 million to manage its natural resources
effectively.
• Salary Levels. The government has tried to raise salaries, particularly of security
forces, in order to reduce their inclination to solicit bribes. In November 2009,
the Afghan government announced an increase in police salaries (from $180 per
month to $240 per month). During his term as Interior Minister, Bismillah Khan
was credited by DOD with instituting transparency and accountability in
promotions and assignments.
• Bulk Cash Transfers Out of Afghanistan. At the July 2010 Kabul conference, the
government pledged to adopt regulations and implement within one year policies
to govern the bulk transfers of cash outside the country. This was intended to
grapple with issues raised by reports, discussed below, of officials taking large
amounts of cash out of Afghanistan (an estimated $4.5 billion taken out in 2011).
U.S. officials say that large movements of cash are inevitable in Afghanistan
because only about 5% of the population use banks and 90% use informal cash
transfers (“hawala” system). The late Ambassador Holbrooke testified on July 28,
2010 (cited earlier), that the Afghan Central Bank has begun trying to control
hawala transfers; 475 hawalas have been licensed, to date, whereas none were
licensed as recently as 2009. In June 2010, U.S. and Afghan officials announced
establishment of a joint task force to monitor the flow of money out of
Afghanistan, including monitoring the flow of cash out of Kabul International
Airport. On August 21, 2010, it was reported that Afghan and U.S. authorities
would implement a plan to install U.S.-made currency counters at Kabul airport
to track how officials had obtained their cash (and ensure it did not come from
44 Partlow, Joshua, “Afghanistan Investigating 5 Current and Former Cabinet Members,” Washington Post, November
24, 2009.
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donor aid funds).45 During 2011, the United States tripled the number of
Homeland Security personnel devoted to training Afghan customs and border
employees to curb bulk transfers and smuggling. On March 19, 2012, Central
Bank Governor Noorullah Delawari said the Bank had imposed a $20,000 per
person limit on cash transfers out of the country.
• Auditing Capabilities. The SIGAR has previously assessed that the mandate of
Afghanistan’s Control and Audit Office is too narrow and lacks the independence
needed to serve as an effective watch over the use of Afghan government funds.46
At the Kabul conference, the government pledged to submit to parliament an
Audit Law within six months, to strengthen the independence of the Control and
Audit Office, and to authorize more auditing by the Ministry of Finance. The
government drafted an audit law but, according to the April 30, 2012, SIGAR
report, the National Assembly’s legislative committee rejected the draft law in
early 2012.
• Legal Review. The Kabul conference communiqué committed the government to
establish a legal review committee, within six months, to review Afghan laws for
compliance with the U.N. Convention Against Corruption. Afghanistan ratified
the convention in August 2008.
• Local Anti-Corruption Bodies. Some Afghans have taken it upon themselves to
oppose corruption at the local level. Volunteer local inspectors, sponsored
originally by Integrity Watch Afghanistan, are reported to monitor and report on
the quality of donor-funded, contractor implemented construction projects.
However, these local “watchdog” groups do not have an official mandate, and
therefore their authority and ability to rectify inadequacies are limited.
Kabul Bank Scandal and Continuing Difficulties
The near-collapse of Kabul Bank is a prime example of how well-connected Afghans have
avoided regulations and other restrictions in order to garner personal profit. Mahmoud Karzai is a
major (7%+) shareholder in the large Kabul Bank, which is used to pay Afghan civil servants and
police, and he reportedly received large loans from the bank to buy his position in it. Another big
shareholder was Abdul Hussain Fahim, the brother of First Vice President Fahim and partner of
Mahmoud Karzai on other ventures. The insider relationships were exposed in August and
September 2010 when Kabul Bank reported large losses ($500 million initially) primarily from
shareholder investments in Dubai properties, prompting President Karzai to appoint a Central
Bank official to run the Kabul Bank. However, the government moves did not prevent large
numbers of depositors from withdrawing their money from it.
In response to the crisis, the United States and other donors refused to recapitalize the bank, but it
offered to finance an audit of Afghan banks, including Kabul Bank. The Finance Ministry decided
instead in November 2010 to hire its own auditor—a move that suggested to some that high
Afghan officials seek to avoid sharing the results with international donors. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) suspended its credit program for the Afghan government in November
2010 because of the scandal and demanded the entire Afghan banking industry undergo an
45 Miller, Greg and Joshua Partlow. “Afghans, U.S. Aim to Plug Cash Drain.” Washington Post, August 21, 2010.
46 Madhani, Aamer. “U.S. Reviews Afghan Watchdog Authority.” USA Today, May 12, 2010.
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outside forensic audit and that those responsible be held accountable. That caused the holding up
of $70 million World Bank/Afghan Reconstruction Fund (ARTF) in donor funds due to be paid
June 11, 2011. Other donors suspended as much as $1.8 billion in economic aid because of the
IMF suspension.
Amid Afghan confirmation that the questionable loans of the bank total over $925 million
(including interest due), the IMF—as a condition of resuming its credit program—subsequently
pushed for the bank to be sold. The Central Bank instead agreed to separate the bank’s
performing from non-performing assets and then dissolve or restructure the bank.47 A version of
the plan, which was subject to approval by an Afghan government committee, was formally
approved and announced on April 21, 2011.
The “good bank” (part of the bank with deposits and which still functions) was financed by a
Central Bank loan of $825 million. The Afghan Finance Ministry has promised to pay back the
loan with recovered assets and tax revenues. On October 16, 2011, the National Assembly voted
on a supplemental budget that enabled the Finance Ministry to reimburse the Central Bank loan
over eight years. However, Assembly rejection of the 2012 budget in March 2012 held up an $80
million annual increment for this purpose.
The Afghan government, through its “Financial Dispute Resolution Commission,” continues to
try to recoup the lost funds. Of the estimated $925 million in losses, about $300 million of the
losses are judged by the Afghans as untraceable because of a lack of documentation. As of mid-
2012, the commission has recovered $128 million in cash and $145 million in property, mostly
luxury villas in Dubai.48 Central Bank governor Noorullah Delawari said in April 2012 that the
country plans to sell Kabul Bank in June 2012; that has not occurred to date. Mahmoud Karzai
and Fahim have reportedly repaid their loans from the Bank. The Tokyo Mutual Accountability
Framework, discussed above, requires Afghanistan to continue asset recovery and to strengthen
banking supervision though the Central Bank (Da Afghanistan Bank).
Attempting Accountability
The political fallout also produced some resolution. On January 15, 2011, the office of Afghan
Attorney General Ishaq Aloko announced an investigation into what led to the near-collapse of
the bank and the principals involved. The investigating commission briefed reporters on its
findings on May 30, 2011, placing much of the blame on lax controls by the Central Bank and its
governor, Abdul Qadir Fitrat. The government commission also largely absolved Mahmoud
Karzai of any wrongdoing, saying he had paid off his loans, and naming other key figures, such
as Dostam, as taking out $100,000 in unsecured loans. The following day, Central Bank governor
Fitrat disputed the commission’s conclusions. He had previously told parliament that Mahmoud
Karzai owed $22 million. In part because of his feuding with figures such as Mahmoud Karzai,
Fitrat fled Afghanistan for the United States and announced his resignation on June 27, 2011.
Karzai subsequently barred U.S. advisers from the Central Bank. On December 11, 2011, Karzai
called for the United States to extradite Fitrat to Afghanistan and blamed U.S. officials for
knowing of the Bank’s problems at an early stage but failing to alert Afghan authorities.
47 Ernesto Londono. “Afghan Officials Opt to Dissolve Bank Draped in Scandal.” Washington Post, March 27, 2011.
48 Joshua Partlow. “Afghan Bureaucrat Tasked With Recovering Millions in Bad Loans.” Washington Post, July 7,
2012. Afghanistan Plans to Sell Scandal-Scarred Kabul Bank in June. Bloomberg.com, April 11, 2012.
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In a step toward holding principals accountable, on June 30, 2011, the government announced the
arrest of two former Kabul Bank executives, Sherkhan Farnood and Khalilullah Frouzi, who
allegedly allowed the concessionary loans to the high-level Afghans and their relatives. However,
by late 2011, the detentions of the two had been relaxed and they were frequently sighted at
various public places in Kabul.49 On August 1, 2011, the Attorney General’s office sent the names
of about 15 people allegedly responsible for the scandal to Afghan courts for trial. On April 3,
2012, Karzai ordered a special prosecutor appointed and a special tribunal created to try those
involved in the scandal. On June 2, 2012, at the urging of Karzai’s office, 21 people were indicted
by the special tribunal, including Farnood, Frouzi, Fitrat, nine other government officials, and
nine other bank employees who were allegedly in positions to have known of and reported the
fraud while it was occurring but did not.
The investigations, the recovery of some lost funds, and the start of a forensic audit of the bank
suggested Afghanistan was moving to meet the IMF conditions for the restart of its credit
program. On October 6, 2011, the IMF issued a statement that it would restore its credit program
because of the investigations and because of the Afghan efforts to recover some of the Bank’s
funds. In November 2011, the IMF resumed its program by approving a $133 million loan to
Afghanistan. That move restored the flow of some previously blocked donor funds, including
U.S. contributions to the World Bank-run Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF).
The IMF also wants a timetable for another bank found by the Central Bank to be vulnerable to
collapse, Azizi Bank, to shore up its finances. Another Afghan entity suspected of corruption is
the New Ansari Money Exchange, a large money-trading operation. On February 18, 2011, the
Treasury Department designated the New Ansari, and persons affiliated with it, as major money
laundering entities under the “Kingpin Act,” a designation that bans U.S. transactions with the
designees. The Treasury Department accused the New Ansari and affiliates of serving as a vehicle
for narcotics trafficking organizations.
Moves to Penalize Lack of Progress on Corruption
Several of the required U.S. “metrics” of progress, cited above, involve Afghan progress against
corruption. A FY2009 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 111-32) mandated the withholding of
10% of about $90 million in State Department counter-narcotics funding subject to a certification
that the Afghan government is acting against officials who are corrupt or committing gross human
rights violations. In the 111th Congress, in June 2010, the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of
the House Appropriations Committee deferred consideration of some of the nearly $4 billion in
civilian aid to Afghanistan requested for FY2011, pending the outcome of a committee
investigation of the issue. The subcommittee’s action came amid reports that as much as $3
billion in funds have been allegedly embezzled by Afghan officials over the past several years.50
In part on the basis of the findings of the House Appropriations Committee investigation, the
Senate Appropriations Committee’s FY2011 omnibus appropriation marked up in December 2010
required Administration certifications of progress against corruption as a condition of providing
aid to Afghanistan. Some of this conditionality was included in the FY2011 continuing
appropriations (P.L. 112-10). Aid conditionality based on Afghan performance against corruption,
49 Matthew Rosenberg and Graham Bowley. “Intractable Afghan Graft Hampering U.S. Strategy.” New York Times,
March 8, 2012.
50 Rosenberg, Matthew. “Corruption Suspected in Airlift of Billions in Cash From Kabul.” Wall Street Journal, June
28, 2010.
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on incorporation of women in the reconciliation process, and on reports on progress on the Kabul
Bank scandal, are included in the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 112-74). No U.S.
funding for Afghanistan has been permanently withheld because of this or any other legislative
certification requirement.
Rule of Law Efforts
U.S. efforts to curb corruption go hand-in-hand with efforts to promote rule of law. As of July
2010, the U.S. Embassy has an Ambassador rank official heading a “Rule of Law Directorate.”
U.S. funding supports training and mentoring for Afghan justice officials, direct assistance to the
Afghan government to expand efforts on judicial security, legal aid and public defense, gender
justice and awareness, and expansion of justice in the provinces. According to the SRAP report of
November 2011, USAID’s “Rule of Law Stabilization Program” had, as of then, trained 670
Afghan judges, over half the total in the country. The program also had expanded the Afghan
Supreme Court’s training program for new judges, and supports linkage between the traditional
justice sector and the formal justice system. Some observers say that Afghanistan’s counter-
narcotics courts have demonstrated particular progress in achieving a steady stream of
convictions of drug traffickers.
At the July 20, 2010, Kabul conference, the Afghan government committed to:
• Enact its draft Criminal Procedure Code into law within six months. This is one
of the 37 laws pledged at the Kabul Conference would be enacted, but it has not
been accomplished, to date.
• Improve legal aid services within the next 12 months. A December 10, 2010,
U.N. report said that the Ministry of Justice had opened legal aid offices in some
provinces. The Tokyo Framework, cited earlier, requires Afghanistan to “improve
access to justice for all,” suggesting that implementation has been weak.
• Strengthen judicial capabilities to facilitate the return of illegally seized lands.
This commitment was made partly to address the issue discussed above in which
powerful individuals have appropriated land for their homes and projects.
USAID provided $56 million during FY2005-2009 to facilitate property
registration. An additional $140 million is being provided from FY2010-2014 to
inform citizens of land processes and procedures, and to establish a legal and
regulatory framework for land administration.
• Align strategy toward the informal justice sector (discussed below) with the
National Justice Sector Strategy.
Despite the international focus on the formal justice sector, some estimates say that 80% of cases
are decided in the informal justice system. Many Afghans view the formal sector as riddled with
corruption and unfairness, and continue to use local, informal mechanisms (shuras, jirgas) to
adjudicate disputes—particularly with cases involving local property, familial or local disputes, or
personal status issues In the informal sector, Afghans can usually expect traditional practices of
dispute resolution to prevail, including the traditional Pashtun code of conduct known as
Pashtunwali. Some of these customs, including traditional forms of apology (“nanawati” and
“shamana”) and compensation for wrongs done, are discussed at http://www.khyber.org/articles/
2004/JirgaRestorativeJustice.shtml.
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However, the informal justice system is dominated almost exclusively by males. For example,
some disputes are resolved by families’ offering to make young girls available to marry older men
from the family that is the counter-party to the dispute, resulting in numerous forced marriages
and child marriages. This practice is known as baad.
Some informal justice shuras take place in Taliban-controlled territory, and some Afghans may
prefer Taliban-run shuras when doing so means they will be judged by members of their own
tribe or tribal confederation.
One concern is how deeply the international community should become involved in the informal
justice sector. U.S. programs have focused primarily on the formal justice system, but there has
been increasing attention to the informal system because its use is so prevalent. USAID has
implemented a pilot program to assist local shuras in four districts to establish a system to
transmit their judicial rulings, in writing, to the district government. The rule of law issue is
discussed in substantially greater depth in CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law
and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman.
Promoting Human Rights and Civil Society51
Since 2001, U.S. policy has been to build capacity in human rights institutions in Afghanistan and
to promote civil society and political participation. As do previous years’ State Department
human rights reports, the report on Afghanistan for 2011 attributed the many human rights
deficiencies observed primarily to overall lack of security, loose control over the actions of
Afghan security forces, pervasive corruption, and societal discrimination particularly against
women. A Human Rights Watch statement issued on the eve of the December 5, 2011, Bonn
Conference was highly critical, saying that “ten years later [after the first Bonn Conference
setting a transition from the Taliban era], many basic rights are still ignored or downplayed.
While there have been improvements, the rights situation is still dominated by poor governance,
lack of rule of law, impunity for militias and police, laws and policies that harm women, and
conflict-related abuses.”
On the other hand, there has been a significant proliferation of organizations that demand
transparency about human rights deficiencies. Prominent examples of Afghan NGO’s that
monitor and agitate for improved human rights practices include the Afghanistan Human Rights
and Democracy Organization, and the Research Institute for Women, Peace and Security. The
December 5, 2011, Bonn Conference was preceded by meetings (December 2-3, 2011, in Bonn)
of Afghan civil society activists, intended to help assess the progress of Afghan governance and
highlight the role of civil society in governance. It is in part the work of these groups that has
produced responses by the government. For example, Afghanistan’s National Directorate of
Security (intelligence directorate but with arrest powers), which has widely been accused of
detainee abuse and torture, established in late 2011 a “human rights unit” to investigate these
allegations. On June 2, 2012, Karzai ordered disarmed a local security unit whose members were
accused of raping an 18-year old woman in Konduz Province. On July 9, 2012, Afghan forces
were sent to track down Taliban militants who had executed a woman for adultery in Parwan
Province.
51 Information in this section is primarily from Department of State. 2011 Human Rights Report: Afghanistan, May 24,
2012; http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dynamic_load_id=186457#wrapper.
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Institution-Building: The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights
Commission (AIHRC)
One of the institutional human rights developments since the fall of the Taliban has been the
establishment of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). It is headed
by a woman, Sima Simar, a Hazara Shiite from Ghazni Province. It acts as an oversight body over
alleged human rights abuses but its members are appointed by the government and some believe
it is not as aggressive or independent as some had hoped. However, its members are appointed by
the president and, as an indication of government interference, in December 2011, Karzai
dismissed its deputy chairman Ahmad Nader Nadery for his outspoken writings alleging abuses
by traditional allies of Karzai. Nadery heads another civil society watchdog organization, the Free
and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan, which was highly critical of Karzai and his allies
for the 2009 and 2010 election fraud.
The July 20, 2010, Kabul conference communiqué contained a pledge by the Afghan government
to begin discussions with the AIHRC, within six months, to stabilize its budgetary status. It
pledged to provide $1 million per year, but has provided only half that amount. A December 10,
2010, U.N. Secretary General report says the Afghan cabinet has approved inserting a line item in
the annual Afghan budget for the AIHRC, but the March 5, 2012, report of the Secretary General
said the National Assembly has not regularized the AIHRC status within the national budget
framework. USAID has given the AIHRC about $10 million per year since the fall of the Taliban.
Religious Influence on Society: National Ulema Council
Counterbalancing the influence of post-Taliban modern institutions such as the AIHRC are
traditional bodies such as the National Ulema Council. The Council consists of the 150 most
respected and widely followed clerics throughout Afghanistan, but it represents a network of
about 3,000 clerics nationwide. It has increasingly taken conservative positions to limit free
expression and social freedoms, such as the type of television and other media programs available
on private media outlets.
In August 2010, 350 clerics linked to the Council voted to demand that Islamic law (Sharia) be
implemented (including such punishments as stoning, amputations, and lashings) in order to
better prevent crime. The government did not implement the recommendation, which would
require amending the Afghan constitution, which does not implement Sharia. The Council’s
March 2, 2012, backing of Sharia interpretations of the rights of women is discussed below in the
section on women’s rights.
The government (Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs) is also involved in regulating religious
practices. Of Afghanistan’s approximately 125,000 mosques, 6,000 are registered and funded by
the government. Clerics in these mosques are paid about $100 per month and, in return, are
expected to promote the government line. In April 2012, the Ministry decreed that it would fire
government-funded clerics who refuse to heed warnings and preach violence or incitement.
Riots over Quran Burnings and Anti-Islamic Video: 2011 and 2012
As an illustration of Afghanistan’s Islamic conservatism, riots have broken out in two successive
years over what some Afghans perceived as U.S. disrespect of Islam. On April 2, 2011, hundreds
of Afghans rioted in the normally quiet (and non-Pashtun) city of Mazar-e-Sharif to protest the
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burning of a Quran by a Florida pastor a few weeks earlier. The rioters, who had been instigated
by the sermons of three mullahs (Islamic preachers) at the city’s signature Blue Mosque, stormed
the U.N. compound in the city and killed at least 12 people, including 7 U.N workers. Over the
next several days, similar, but less violent, demonstrations took place in Qandahar and other
Afghan cities until sentiment calmed. Earlier, in September 2010, some National Ulema Council
figures organized protests against plans by the Florida pastor to burn Qurans, although that
burning was not conducted following international and U.S. criticism of the pastor.
A more serious eruption occurred in late February 2012 over the mistaken U.S. discarding of
Qurans used by detainees at Bagram Airfield. Riots and protests occurred in several cities,
including the normally peaceful and pro-U.S. north. The public reaction to the Quran burning was
more intense than it was following the March 11, 2012, killing of 16 Afghans allegedly by a U.S.
soldier, Robert Bales, who is in U.S. military custody.
On September 17, 2012, several hundred Afghans rioted outside a U.S. training facility east of
Kabul city to protest a video produced in the United States (“Innocence of Muslims”) that mocks
the Prophet Muhammad. Afghan police protected the facility from assault from the crowd.
These perceived U.S. slights may account for some of the killings of U.S. military personnel by
Afghan security forces over the past few years. The so-called “green on blue” attacks have caused
tensions between Afghan forces and their U.S. mentors, and prompted U.S. commanders to
impose counter-measures that potentially complicate the U.S. effort to accelerate the transition to
Afghan security before the end of 2014.
Religious Freedom
The July-December 2010 International Religious Freedom report (released September 13, 2011)52
says that respect for religious freedom declined throughout the reporting period, particularly for
Christian groups and individuals. Members of minority religions, including Christians, Sikhs,
Hindus, and Baha’i’s, often face discrimination; the Supreme Court declared the Baha’i faith to
be a form of blasphemy in May 2007. Northeastern provinces have a substantial population of
Islamailis, a Shiite Muslim sect often called “Seveners” (believers in the Seventh Imam as the
true Imam). Many Ismailis follow the Agha Khan IV (Prince Qarim al-Husseini), who chairs the
large Agha Khan Foundation that has invested heavily in Afghanistan.
One major case that drew international criticism was a January 2008 death sentence, imposed in a
quick trial, against 23-year-old journalist Sayed Kambaksh for allegedly distributing material
critical of Islam. On October 21, 2008, a Kabul appeals court changed his sentence to 20 years in
prison, a judgment upheld by another court in March 2009. He was pardoned by Karzai and
released on September 7, 2009.
A positive development is that Afghanistan’s Shiite minority, mostly from the Hazara tribes of
central Afghanistan (Bamiyan and Dai Kundi provinces) can celebrate their holidays openly, a
development unknown before the fall of the Taliban. Some Afghan Shiites follow Iran’s clerical
leaders politically, but Afghan Shiites tend to be less religious and more socially open than their
co-religionists in Iran. The Hazaras are also advancing themselves socially and politically through
52 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168240.htm.
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education in such fields as information technology.53 The former Minister of Justice, Sarwar
Danesh, is a Hazara Shiite, the first of that community to hold that post. He studied in Qom, Iran,
a center of Shiite theology. (Danesh was voted down by the parliament for reappointment on
January 2, 2010, and again on June 28 when nominated for Minister of Higher Education.) The
justice minister who was approved on January 16, 2010, Habibullah Ghalib, is part of Dr.
Abdullah’s faction, but not a Shiite Muslim. Ghaleb previously (2006) was not approved by the
Wolesi Jirga for a spot on the Supreme Court. There was unrest among some Shiite leaders in late
May 2009 when they learned that the Afghan government had dumped 2,000 Iranian-supplied
religious texts into a river when an Afghan official complained that the books insulted the Sunni
majority.
Several conversion cases have earned international attention. An Afghan man, Abd al-Rahman,
who had converted to Christianity 16 years ago while working for a Christian aid group in
Pakistan, was imprisoned and faced a potential death penalty trial for apostasy—his refusal to
convert back to Islam. Facing international pressure, Karzai prevailed on Kabul court authorities
to release him (March 29, 2006). His release came the same day the House passed H.Res. 736
calling on protections for Afghan converts. In May 2010, the Afghan government suspended the
operations of two Christian-affiliated international relief groups claiming the groups were
attempting to promote Christianity among Afghans—an assertion denied by the groups (Church
World Service and Norwegian Church Aid). Another case arose in May 2010, when an amputee,
Said Musa, was imprisoned for converting to Christianity from Islam, an offense under Afghan
law that leaves it open for Afghan courts to apply a death sentence under Islamic law (Shariah).
The arrest came days after the local Noorin TV station broadcast a show on Afghan Christians
engaging in their rituals. Following diplomatic engagement by governments and human rights
groups, Musa was quietly released from prison on February 24, 2011, and reportedly went to
Italy, where he is seeking asylum.
Media and Freedom of Expression/Social Freedoms
Afghanistan’s conservative traditions have caused some backsliding in recent years on media
freedoms, which were hailed during 2002-2008 as a major benefit of the U.S. effort in
Afghanistan. In those years, numerous television channels, newspapers, and other media forms
were established, giving Afghanistan some of the freest press in the region. Media has expanded
to the point where the government has taken steps in 2012 to launch a communications satellite to
help with broadcast speed and breadth of dissemination.
However, a press law was passed in September 2008 that gave independence to the official media
outlets but also contained a number of content restrictions and required that new newspapers and
electronic media be licensed by the government. According to the State Department report on
human rights for 2011, there continues to be intimidation and sometimes violence against
journalists who criticize the central government or powerful local leaders, and some news
organizations and newspapers have occasionally been closed for incorrect or derogatory reporting
on high officials.
USAID programs have trained investigative journalists to do more reporting on official
corruption and other issues. The United States has provided funding and advice to an Afghan
53 Oppel, Richard Jr. and Abdul Waheed Wafa, “Hazara Minority Hustles to Head of the Class in Afghanistan,” New
York Times, January 4, 2010.
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Government Media Information Center that the Afghan government uses to communicate with
the public. However, possibly as part of an effort to transition more tasks to the Afghans, or
possibly as a sign of frustration with Karzai criticism of some U.S. military operations, U.S.
advisers were pulled from the Center in late December 2011.
Separately, Islamic conservatives (such as the Ulema Council, parliamentarian Sayyaf, and Shiite
cleric Ayatollah Asif Mohseni), have sometimes asserted control over media content. This has
been an attempt to curb the popularity of such post-Taliban networks as Tolo Television. With the
Council’s backing, in April 2008 the Ministry of Information and Culture banned five Indian-
produced soap operas on Tolo Television on the grounds that they are too risqué, although the
programs were restored in August 2008 under a compromise that brought in Islamic-oriented
programs from Turkey. In 2011, pressure from Islamic conservatives caused Tolo to remove a
soap opera called “Forbidden Love.” Tolo has also aired programs with women performers—
presentations that raise eyebrows among religious conservatives—and about official corruption.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s “Radio Azadi” service for Afghanistan has distributed 20,000
solar powered radios to poor (and usually illiterate) Afghans to improve their access to
information. In general, the government does not restrict access to the Internet, but it does ban
access to pornographic web sites.
Regarding broader social freedoms, as another example of the growing power of the Islamist
conservatives, alcohol is increasingly difficult to obtain in restaurants and stores, although it is
not banned for sale to non-Muslims. There were reports in April 2010 that Afghan police had
raided some restaurants and prevented them from selling alcoholic beverages at all. On the other
hand, some point to the fact that rock bands have appeared publicly in high profile shows in 2011
as evidence of increasing modernity.
Harsh Punishments
The State Department reports widespread examples of torture, rape, and other abuses by officials,
security forces, detention center authorities, and police. In September 2011, U.S. and partner
transfers of prisoners to some Afghan facilities were suspended because of alleged torture by
Afghan prison authorities. Afghanistan’s Interior Ministry and National Directorate of Security
denied the allegations, which included assertions that prisoners were being beaten with rubber
hoses or given electric shocks. In October 2007, Afghanistan resumed enforcing the death penalty
after a four-year moratorium, executing 15 criminals. In August 2010, the issue of stoning to
death as a punishment arose when Taliban insurgents ordered a young couple who had eloped
stoned to death in a Taliban-controlled area of Konduz Province. Although the punishment was
not meted out by the government, it was reported that many residents of the couple’s village
supported the punishment.
Human Trafficking
For the third year in a row, Afghanistan was again placed in Tier 2: Watch List in the State
Department report on human trafficking issued on June 19, 2012 (Trafficking in Persons Report
for 2012). However, Afghanistan was given a waiver for an automatic downgrade to Tier 3 (the
downgrade is automatic after a country is “watch-listed” for three consecutive years). The waiver
was based on a the government’s writing of a plan that, if implemented, would qualify as a
significant effort to comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. The
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government is assessed in the 2012 report as not complying with minimum standards for
eliminating trafficking, and not showing evidence of increasing efforts to address the issue.
The State Department report says that women from China, some countries in Africa, Iran, and
some countries in Central Asia are being trafficked into Afghanistan for sexual exploitation,
although, according to the report, trafficking within Afghanistan is more prevalent than
trafficking across its borders. The report asserts that some families knowingly sell their children
for forced prostitution, including for bacha baazi, a practice in which wealthy men use groups of
young boys for social and sexual entertainment. The report added that some members of the
Afghan National Security Forces have sexually abused boys as part of the bacha baazi practice.
The United States has spent about $500,000 to eliminate human trafficking in Afghanistan since
FY2001.
Advancement of Women
Women and women’s groups are a large component of the burgeoning of civil society in post-
Taliban Afghanistan. Freedoms for women have greatly expanded since the fall of the Taliban
with their elections to the parliament and their service at many levels of government. The Afghan
government pursues a policy of promoting equality for women under its National Action Plan for
Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA). The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework requires
Afghanistan to implement the NAPWA and all of its past commitments and laws to strengthen the
rights of women and provide services to them.
The major institutional development since 2001 was the formation in 2002 of a Ministry of
Women’s Affairs dedicated to improving women’s rights, although numerous accounts say the
ministry’s influence is limited in part because of the relative ineffectiveness of minister Husn
Banu Ghazanfar. It promotes the involvement of women in business ventures, and it plays a key
role in trying to protect women from domestic abuse by running 11women’s shelters across
Afghanistan. However, the Afghan government, in January 2011, launched a plan to regulate the
shelters by placing them under government control. This has raised concerns that the government
might seek to limit the access to the shelters by some women and in some areas. Women’s rights
groups in Afghanistan expressed outrage over a June 2012 statement by Afghanistan’s justice
minister that the shelters encourage “immorality and prostitution.”
One of the most prominent civil society groups operating in post-Taliban Afghanistan is the
Afghanistan Women’s Network. It has at least 3,000 members and its leaders say that 75 non-
governmental organizations work under its auspices. In addition, the Afghanistan Independent
Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and a private group, Afghanistan Human Rights and
Democracy Organization, focus extensively on rights for Afghan women.
Among the most notable accomplishments since 2001, women are performing jobs that were
rarely held by women even before the Taliban came to power in 1996, including in the new police
force. The first Afghan female pilots arrived for training in the United States in July 2011. There
are over 200 female judges and nearly 500 female journalists working nationwide. Women are
legally permitted to drive, and press reports say an increasing number of Afghan women,
although mainly in Kabul and other main cities, are learning how to drive and exercising that
privilege. The wearing of the full body covering called the burqa is no longer obligatory, and
fewer women are wearing it than was the case a few years ago. In November 2010, the
government opened a USAID-funded women-only park in Kabul called “Women’s Garden”
where women can go, without male escort, and undertake fitness and job training activities.
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Some groups, such as Human Rights Watch, report backsliding on women’s rights since 2008,54
although the State Department human rights report for 2011 says that the situation of women in
Afghanistan improved “marginally” during 2011. Numerous abuses, such as denial of educational
and employment opportunities, continue primarily because of Afghanistan’s conservative
traditions. This is particularly prevalent in rural areas, and less so in larger urban areas.
• More than 70% of marriages in Afghanistan are forced, despite laws banning the
practice, and a majority of brides are younger than the legal marriage age of 16.
• The practice of baad, in which women are given away to marry someone from
another clan to settle a dispute, remains prevalent,.
• There is no law specifically banning sexual harassment, and women are routinely
jailed for zina—a term meaning adultery, and a crime under the penal code, and
that includes running away from home, defying family choice of a spouse,
eloping, or fleeing domestic violence. Under the penal code, a man convicted of
“honor killing” (of a wife who commits adultery) cannot be sentenced to more
than two years in prison. One case receiving substantial attention in December
2011 has involved a woman who was jailed for having a child outside wedlock
even though the child was a product of rape. In order to save face for herself and
her family, the woman is contemplating marrying the rapist.
Many Afghan women are concerned that the efforts by Karzai and the international community to
persuade insurgents to end their fight and rejoin the political process (“reintegration and
reconciliation” process) could result in backsliding on women’s rights. Most insurgents are highly
conservative Islamists who oppose the advancement of women that has occurred. They are
perceived as likely to demand some reversals of that trend if they are allowed, as part of any deal,
to control territory, assume high-level government positions, or achieve changes to the Afghan
constitution. Karzai has said that these concessions are not envisioned, but skepticism remains,
and some Afghan officials close to Karzai do not rule out the possibility of amending the
constitution to accommodate some Taliban demands. Women have been a target of attacks by
Taliban supporters, including attacks on girls’ schools and athletic facilities.
Major Legal Developments
Some Afghan laws passed over the past few years have affected women, both positively and
negatively. The Afghan government tried to accommodate Shiite leaders’ demands in 2009 by
enacting (passage by the National Assembly and signature by Karzai in March 2009) a “Shiite
Personal Status Law,” at the request of Shiite leaders. The law was intended to provide a legal
framework for members of the Shiite minority in family law issues. However, the issue turned
controversial when international human rights groups and governments—and Afghan women in a
demonstration in Kabul—complained about provisions that would appear to sanction marital rape
and which would allow males to control the ability of females in their family to go outside the
home. President Obama publicly called these provisions “abhorrent.” In early April 2009, taking
into account the outcry, Karzai sent the law back to the Justice Ministry for review, saying it
would be altered if it were found to conflict with the Afghan constitution. The offending clauses
were substantially revised by the Justice Ministry in July 2009, requiring that wives “perform
54 “We Have the Promises of the World: Women’s Rights in Afghanistan,” Human Rights Watch, December 2009,
http://www.wluml.org/sites/wluml.org/files/hrw_report_2009.pdf.
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housework,” but also apparently giving the husband the right to deny a wife food if she refuses
sex. The revised law was passed by the National Assembly in late July 2009, signed by Karzai,
and published in the official gazette on July 27, 2009, although it remains unsatisfactory to many
human rights and women’s rights groups.
On August 6, 2009, perhaps in an effort to address some of the criticisms of the Shiite law, Karzai
issued, as a decree, the “Elimination of Violence Against Women” (EVAW) law. Minister of
Women’s Affairs Ghazanfar told CRS in October 2009 that the bill was long contemplated and
not related to the Shiite status law.55 It was enacted by the National Assembly as a law as of
December 2010; it had been held up by the Assembly for final passage because some Islamic
conservatives, such as Sayyaf (cited above), reportedly object to the provisions of the law
criminalizing child marriages. A U.N. report on human rights in Afghanistan, released January 18,
2012 (A/HRC/19/47), says the EVAW law implementation has been weakened by some Supreme
Court rulings and other Afghan legal decisions.
The optimism that greeted the EVAW law was further reduced on March 2, 2012, when the
Ulema Council issued a pronouncement saying women should be forced to wear the veil and be
forbidden from traveling without a male chaperone. The pronouncement did reiterate support for
the rights of women to inherit and own property, and to choose their marital partners. On March
6, 2012, Karzai endorsed the Ulema Council statement.
Women in Key Positions
Despite conservative attitudes, women have moved into prominent positions in all areas of
Afghan governance, although with periodic setbacks. Three female ministers were in the 2004-
2006 cabinet: former presidential candidate Masooda Jalal (Ministry of Women’s Affairs), Sediqa
Balkhi (Ministry for Martyrs and the Disabled), and Amina Afzali (Ministry of Youth). Karzai
named three women to cabinet posts on January 9, 2010, including Afzali (to Labor and Social
Affairs). Of the three, only Afzali was immediately confirmed; the other two (Minister of Health
and Minister of Women’s Affairs) were kept on in acting capacities and confirmed in subsequent
years. Afghanistan has one female ambassador and Karzai has a female deputy chief of staff,
Homaira Ludin-Etemadi. In the December 16, 2009, nomination list, Karzai proposed a woman to
head a new Ministry of Literacy, but parliament did not vote on this nomination because it had
not yet acted to approve formation of the ministry. In March 2005, Karzai appointed a former
minister of women’s affairs, Habiba Sohrabi, as governor of Bamiyan province, inhabited mostly
by Hazaras.
One woman (Masooda Jalal) ran in the 2004 presidential election, and two ran for president in the
August 20, 2009, election. In the latter, each received less than one-half of 1%. As noted above,
parliamentarian Fawzia Koofi already has declared she will run in 2014, and there are likely to be
additional female candidates.
In the National Assembly, the constitution reserves for women at least 17 of the 102 seats in the
upper house and 68 of the 249 seats in the lower house of parliament. There were 23 serving in
the outgoing upper house, 6 more than Karzai’s mandated bloc of 17 female appointees. There
were 68 women in the previous lower house (when the quota was 62), meaning 6 were elected
without the quota. The number elected in the September 18, 2010, election is 69, one more than
55 CRS meeting with the Minister of Women’s Affairs, October 13, 2009.
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the quota. (For the election, about 400 women ran—about 16% of all candidates.) The target ratio
is ensured by reserving an average of two seats per province (34 provinces) for women—the top
two female vote getters per province. (Kabul province reserves 9 female seats.) In the National
Assembly, a woman, Shukria Barekzai, was chair of the Defense Committee of the elected lower
house during 2011. Some NGOs and other groups believe that the women elected by the quota
system are not viewed as equally legitimate parliamentarians.
About 300 women were delegates to the 1,600-person “peace jirga” that was held during June 2-
4, 2010, which endorsed an Afghan plan to reintegrate insurgents who want to end their fight. The
High Peace Council to oversee the reconciliation process, which met for the first time on October
10, 2010, has 9 women out of 70 members, although these women report that their views are not
taken into account to any significant extent in the Council. At U.S. and other country urging, a
woman was part of the official Afghan delegation to the major international conference on
Afghanistan in Bonn on December 5, 2011; she was selected at a meeting of civil society activists
in Bonn, a day before the major conference begins.
U.S. and International Posture on Women’s Rights
U.S. officials say that its policy is to promote women’s rights in Afghanistan rigorously. The
Administration has and is following its “Strategy for Assistance to Women in Afghanistan, 2010-
2013.”56 U.S. officials said aid allocations are geared toward that strategy. Specific earmarks for
use of U.S. funds for women’s and girls’ programs in Afghanistan are contained in recent annual
appropriations, and these earmarks have grown steadily. The United States provided $159 million
to programs for Afghan women in FY2009, slightly more than the $150 million earmarked, and
about $225 million for FY2010, more than the $175 earmarked.57 For FY2010, assistance was
provided in the following “pillars” of the U.S. Strategy: health ($87 million); education ($31
million); economy, work, and poverty ($54.6 million); legal protection and human rights ($12
million); and leadership and political participation ($43 million). Amounts were similar for
FY2011. U.S. funding has been used, in part, to help finance over 830,000 microloans to women
during 2004-2011, and they have used these funds to establish 175,000 small businesses,
according to the SRAP report released November 2011.
These strategy pillars, and specific programs funded by them, are discussed in annual State
Department reports on U.S. aid to women and girls. However, an audit issued in July 2010 by the
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction found that the State Department and
USAID did not provide complete and consistent information about the reported activities in
which women and girls were intended beneficiaries.
The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (AFSA, P.L. 107-327) authorized $15 million per
year (FY2003-FY2006) for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. Those monies are donated to the
Ministry from Economic Support Funds (ESF) accounts controlled by USAID. S. 229, the
Afghan Women Empowerment Act of 2009, introduced in the 111th Congress, would authorize
$45 million per year in FY2010-FY2012 for grants to Afghan women, for the ministry of
Women’s Affairs ($5 million), and for the AIHRC ($10 million).
56 A draft of this strategy document was provided to CRS by the State Department, April 21, 2011.
57 For prior years, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman, in the section on aid to Afghanistan, year by year.
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Democracy, Human Rights, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues
U.S. funding for democracy, governance, and rule of law programs has grown, in line with the
Obama Administration strategy for Afghanistan. During FY2002-FY2012, USAID spent about
$1.5 billion on democracy, governance, rule of law and human rights, and elections support.
The following was spent by USAID (using Economic Support Funds) for FY2012 and
appropriated in P.L. 112-74 (Consolidated Appropriation)
$546.5 million for overall democracy and human rights-related funding including:
• $435.5 million for good governance;
• $31 million for rule of law and human rights (not including INCLE funds);
• $37 million for political competition and consensus building; and
• $43 million for civil society.
For FY2013, the ESF democracy and governance request (ESF) is $578.2 million, including:
• $447.2 million for good governance;
• $31.5 million for rule of law and human rights (not including INCLE);
• $64.3 million for political competition and consensus-building;
• $35.2 million for civil society.
For tables on U.S. aid to Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban
Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
Effects of a Settlement with the Taliban
A major U.S. and Afghan initiative—to reach a conflict-ending settlement with the Taliban—is
likely to affect all of the issues discussed in this paper: Afghan politics, future elections, the
performance of the government along all its metrics, and the human rights situation. Many in the
international community, including within the Obama Administration, initially withheld
endorsement of the concept, fearing it might result in the incorporation into the Afghan political
system of insurgent leaders who retain ties to Al Qaeda and will roll back freedoms instituted
since 2011. The minority communities in the north, women, intellectuals, and others remain
skeptical that their freedoms can be preserved if there is a political settlement with the Taliban.
These groups fear that the Taliban could be given major ministries, seats in parliament, or even
tacit control over territory as part of any deal. Secretary Clinton said in India on July 20, 2011,
that any settlement must not result in and undoing of “the progress that has been made [by
women and ethnic minorities] in the past decade.” To respond to those fears, Afghan and U.S.
officials say that the outcome of a settlement would require the Taliban to drop at least some of its
demands that (1) foreign troops leave Afghanistan; (2) a new “Islamic” constitution be adopted;
and (3) Islamic law be imposed.
Following the 2010 U.S. shift to supporting a settlement, an “Afghan High Peace Council”
intended to oversee the settlement process was established on September 5, 2010. Its 70 members
met for the first time under the leadership of senior Northern Alliance figure/former President
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Burhanuddin Rabbani on October 10, 2010. Rabbani was appointed because of Karzai’s
perception that he could bring skeptical Tajiks and other minorities to support reconciliation.
These minority figures, as noted above, fear that reconciliation with the Taliban will strengthen
Pashtun control of government to the detriment of the non-Pashtun minorities. Rabbani earned
substantial respect among all factions for his diligent work in this role; for example he led High
Peace Council visits to Pakistan and other regional countries, and established provincial
representative offices of the Council in at least 27 provinces. On the other hand, some of the nine
women on the Council say their views were routinely dismissed. On September 20, 2011,
Rabbani was assassinated by a Taliban infiltrator posing as an intermediary. On April 14, 2012,
the High Peace Council members voted Rabbani’s son, Salahuddin, as his replacement.
Prior to the Rabbani killing, U.S., Taliban, and Afghan representatives had proliferated. In May
2011, it was reported that U.S. officials had met at least three times in 2011 with Tayeb Agha, a
figure believed close to Mullah Umar. In late June 2011, those meetings were confirmed by then-
Secretary of Defense Gates, who said the talks had been led by the State Department and have
been facilitated by Germany and Qatar. However, the process stalled after the Rabbani
assassination and Pakistan’s boycott of the December 5, 2011, Bonn Conference over a
November 26, 2011, security incident in which U.S. forces killed 24 Pakistani border troops.
In December 2011, as tensions over these issues abated, U.S. officials resumed the process,
including pursuing the opening of a Taliban political office in Qatar to facilitate talks. The
discussion of a Taliban office in Qatar came amid reports that U.S. officials had been meeting
Taliban figures more frequently than was previously believed. The Taliban office has not formally
opened to date, but some Taliban figures are operating from Qatar informally, as discussed below.
The United States also revealed it had discussed “confidence-building measure” in the form of
transferring captives from the Guantanamo detention facility to a form of house arrest in Qatar—
to be conducted simultaneous with the Taliban release of the one U.S. prisoner of war, it holds,
Bowe Bergdahl. The United States also demanded a public Taliban statement severing its ties to
Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups, possibly as a prelude to a limited battlefield ceasefire. There
were also discussions of transitioning the talks from U.S.-led to Afghan government-led, although
the Taliban was reluctant to undertake such talks because doing so would recognize the
government’s legitimacy. A release of Taliban captives would require U.S. congressional
notification. The Taliban figures to be released to Qatar include some, such as Mullah
Mohammad Fazl who were major figures in the Taliban regime (Fazl was deputy defense
minister). H.Res. 529 expresses opposition to their release. The confidence-building measures did
not take place, and talks stalled in March 2012 reportedly over Qatar’s failure to fully assure the
United States that the detainees would be able to escape custody. Some U.S. officials say that all
sides were not close to serious negotiations on the core issues of any political settlement.
Still, the reconciliation issue appears to be alive and active. An April 15, 2012, attack by militants
on several locations in Kabul and other provinces soured the Afghan government on talks, as did
the May 2012 assassination of another key intermediary, Arsala Rahmani—a former Taliban
official who reconciled with the government and served in the Afghan parliament. But, these were
counterbalanced by a February 2012 statement by Pakistani leaders that, for the first time,
publicly encouraged Taliban leaders to negotiate a settlement to the conflict. In late June 2012,
Afghan government officials and Taliban representatives held talks at two meetings—one in
Paris, and one an academic conference in Kyoto, Japan, on reconciliation issues. At the Kyoto
meeting, the Afghan government was represented by Mohammad Stanekzai, a member of the
High Peace Council, and the Taliban was represented by Din Mohammad, a member of the
Taliban political council who had traveled from Qatar. The Kyoto meeting appeared to represent
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an acceptance by the Taliban of direct talks with Afghan government officials. In August 2012,
Afghan officials reportedly held talks with high-ranking Taliban figure Mullah Abdul Ghani
Bradar,58 who was arrested by Pakistan in February 2010, purportedly to halt between Bradar and
Afghan intermediaries. Pakistan’s decision to grant Afghan officials access to Bradar, at his
prison in Pakistan, signaled that Pakistan wants to play a more active role in the reconciliation
process. Some Afghan officials express optimism the talks will yield a settlement eventually,
particularly if the Afghan government provides assurances of security for Taliban leaders who
reconcile.
Table 1. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations
Clan/Tribal
Confederations Location
Example
Durrani
Mainly southern Afghanistan:
Qandahar, Helmand, Zabol, Uruzgan,
Nimruz
Popalzai
Qandahar
Hamid Karzai, president of Afghanistan; Jelani Popal,
former head of the Independent Directorate of
(Zirak branch
Local Governance; Mul ah Bradar, the top aide to
of Durrani
Mullah Umar, captured in Pakistan in Feb. 2010.
Pashtun)
Two-thirds of Qandahar’s provincial government
posts held by Zirak Durrani Pashtuns
Alikozai
Qandahar
Mullah Naqibullah (deceased, former anti-Taliban
faction leader in Qandahar)
Barakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Ghul Agha Shirzai (Governor, Nangarhar Province)
Achakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Abdul Razziq, Police Chief, Qandahar Province
Alozai
Helmand (Musa Qala district)
Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh (former Helmand
governor); Hajji Zahir, former governor of Marjah
Noorzai
Qandahar
Noorzai brothers, briefly in charge of Qandahar
after the fall of the Taliban in November 2001
Ghilzai
Eastern Afghanistan: Paktia, Paktika,
Khost, Nangarhar, Kunar
Ahmadzai
Mohammed Najibullah (pres. 1986-1992); Ashraf
Ghani, Karzai adviser, Finance Minister 2002-2004
Hotak
Mullah Umar, but hails from Uruzgan, which is
dominated by Durranis
Taraki
Nur Mohammed Taraki (leader 1978-1979)
Kharoti
Hafizullah Amin (leader September-
December1979); Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, founder of
Hezb-e-Islami (Gulbuddin), former mujahedin party
leader now anti-Karzai insurgent.
Zadran
Paktia, Khost
Pacha Khan Zadran; Insurgent leader Jalaluddin
Haqqani
58 “Afghan Officials Meet Key Taliban Figure in Pakistan.” Reuters.com, August 12, 2012.
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Clan/Tribal
Confederations Location
Example
Kodai
Mangal
Paktia, Khost
Ghulab Mangal (Governor of Helmand Province)
Orkazai
Shinwari
Nangarhar province
Fasl Ahmed Shinwari, former Supreme Court Chief
Justice
Mandezai
Sangu Khel
Sipah
Wardak
Wardak Province
Abdul Rahim Wardak (Defense Minister)
(Pashtu-speaking
non-Pashtun)
Afridis
Tirah, Khyber Pass, Kohat
Zaka khel
Jawaki
Adam khel
Malikdin, etc
Yusufzais
Khursan, Swat, Kabul
Akozais
Malizais
Loezais
Khattaks
Kohat, Peshawar, Bangash
Akorai
Terai
Mohmands
Near Khazan, Peshawar
Baizai
Alimzai
Uthmanzais
Khawazais
Wazirs
Mainly in Waziristan
Darwesh khel
Bannu
Source: This table was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information Research Specialist, CRS.
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Figure 1. Map of Afghan Ethnicities
Source: 2003 National Geographic Society, http://www.afghan-network.net/maps/Afghanistan-Map.pdf. Adapted
by Amber Wilhelm, CRS.
Notes: This map is intended to be illustrative of the approximate demographic distribution by region of
Afghanistan. CRS has no way to confirm exact population distributions.
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
Acknowledgments
The table of major Pashtun tribes was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information Research
Specialist, CRS.
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