Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
August 9, 2012
Congressional Research Service
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Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
Summary
Libya’s post-conflict transition is underway, as Libyans work to consolidate change from the 40-
year dictatorship of Muammar al Qadhafi to a representative government based on democratic
and Islamic principles. On July 7, 2012, Libyan voters chose 200 members of a General National
Congress (GNC) in the country’s first nationwide election in nearly 50 years. The GNC will
oversee national government affairs, appoint a new cabinet, and determine the method for
selecting members of a drafting committee to prepare a new constitution. If voters approve a
constitution in a national referendum, then new elections are to be held by mid-2013, bringing a
nearly two-year transition process to a close.
In the wake of the July election, Libya’s interim leaders remain answerable to a wide range of
locally and regionally organized activists, locally elected and appointed committees, prominent
personalities, tribes, militias, and civil society groups seeking to shape the transition and
safeguard the revolution’s achievements. The shift from an appointed interim government to
elected leaders may provide the government more democratic legitimacy and better enable it to
make decisions in key areas, such as security, fiscal affairs, and post-conflict justice and
reconciliation. Libyans are debating the proper balance of local, regional, and national authority
and the proper role for Islam in political and social life.
Security conditions are mostly stable, although armed non-state groups continue to operate in
many areas of the country amid periodic flare-ups in a number of local conflicts. In some cases,
these groups work to provide security in coordination with national authorities and in other cases
they operate on an independent basis. Interim leaders have issued orders calling for armed groups
to hand over land and facilities to state authorities, and registration of former revolutionary
fighters for recruitment and/or retraining is underway. It remains unclear whether armed groups
will more fully embrace reintegration campaigns under the newly elected government.
The proliferation of military weaponry from unsecured Libyan stockpiles—including small arms,
explosives, and shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles (MANPADs)—remains a serious concern in
Libya and in neighboring countries. Security Council Resolution 2017 specifically addresses this
threat. The Obama Administration is implementing a program with Libyan authorities to retrieve
and disable certain types of weapons, including MANPADs. Non-government reporting indicates
that arms depots remain unsecured. U.S. officials believe that nuclear materials and chemical
weapons components are secure (including previously undeclared chemical weapons), and
Libyan leaders have recommitted to destroying the remnants of Qadhafi’s chemical arsenal.
On March 12, 2012, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council extended the mandate of the
U.N. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) for one year in order to assist the transitional
authorities with security and administrative challenges. U.N. Security Council resolutions also set
conditions for the sale of arms and training to the Libyan government and partially lift a U.N.
mandated asset freeze for certain purposes. The U.S. Treasury Department has issued licenses that
authorize the release of over $30 billion in formerly blocked assets belonging to Libyan entities.
As of August 2012, the United States government has provided more than $200 million in
assistance to Libya since the start of the uprising in 2011, including $89 million in humanitarian
assistance, $40 million for weapons abatement, and $25 million in nonlethal assistance from
Department of Defense stockpiles. As Libyans work to shape their future, Congress and the
Administration have the first opportunity since the 1960s to fully redefine U.S.-Libyan relations.
Congressional Research Service
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
Contents
Background...................................................................................................................................... 1
Assessment ...................................................................................................................................... 4
Issues Before Congress.................................................................................................................... 5
Legislation in the 112th Congress .............................................................................................. 6
Key Developments and Issues ......................................................................................................... 9
General National Congress Election and Results .................................................................... 10
Constitutional Assembly and Federalism Debate.................................................................... 12
Security and Human Rights Challenges .................................................................................. 13
Weapons Proliferation and Related Concerns ................................................................... 13
Chemical Weapons Destruction and Nuclear Material...................................................... 14
Islam and Politics in Libya ...................................................................................................... 16
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) ............................................................ 17
Libyan Assets and Oil Exports ................................................................................................ 17
Libyan Assets .................................................................................................................... 17
Libya’s Oil Production, Exports, and Revenue ................................................................. 17
International Criminal Court (ICC) and United Nations Human Rights Council
Investigations........................................................................................................................ 18
Figures
Figure 1. Libya At a Glance............................................................................................................. 2
Figure 2. Libya Uprising and Conflict Timeline.............................................................................. 3
Figure 3. Libya’s Proposed Transition Timeline.............................................................................. 3
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Libya FY2010-FY2013........................................................................ 7
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 19
Congressional Research Service
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
Background
Political change in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt helped bring long-simmering Libyan reform
debates to the boiling point in January and early February 2011. In recent years, leading Libyans
had staked out a broad range of positions about the necessary scope and pace of reform, while
competing for influence and opportunity under the watchful eye of hard-liners aligned with the
enigmatic leader of the 1969 anti-monarchy revolution, Muammar al Qadhafi. Qadhafi had long
insisted that he held no formal government position, but by all accounts he maintained his 40-
plus-year hold on ultimate authority, until his death in October 2011, as the “reference point” for
Libya’s byzantine political system. Ironically, that system cited “popular authority” as its
foundational principle and organizing concept, but it denied Libyans the most basic political
rights. Tribal relations and regional dynamics, particularly long-held resentments of Qadhafi
among residents in the east, continue to influence Libyan politics. Rivalries are emerging among
locally organized revolutionary groups with differing experiences during Qadhafi’s rule and the
2011 uprising. Political groups with differing priorities are now vying to shape Libya’s transition.
Qadhafi’s claimed policy reversals on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism led to
the lifting of most international sanctions in 2003 and 2004, followed by economic liberalization,
oil sales, and foreign investment that brought new wealth to some in Libya. U.S. business
gradually reengaged amid continuing U.S.-Libyan tension over terrorism concerns that were
finally resolved in 2008. During this period of international reengagement, political change in
Libya remained elusive and illusory. Some observers argued that Qadhafi supporters’ suppression
of opposition had softened, as Libya’s international rehabilitation coincided with steps by some
pragmatists to maneuver within so-called “red lines.” The shifting course of those red lines had
been increasingly entangling reformers in the run-up to the outbreak of unrest in February 2011.
Some Libyans and outside observers welcomed government efforts to rehabilitate imprisoned
Islamists and allow the return of some exiled opposition figures. Ultimately, inaction on the part
of the government in response to calls for guarantees of basic political rights and for the drafting
of a constitution suggested a lack of consensus, if not outright opposition to meaningful reform.
The 2011 revolution was triggered in mid-February by a chain of events in Benghazi and other
eastern cities that quickly spiraled out of Qadhafi’s control. The government’s loss of control in
these cities became apparent, and broader unrest emerged in other regions. A number of military
officers, their units, and civilian officials abandoned Qadhafi. Qadhafi and his supporters
denounced their opponents as drug-fueled traitors, foreign agents, and Al Qaeda supporters. Until
August 2011, Qadhafi and his forces maintained control over the capital, Tripoli, and other
western cities. The cumulative effects of attrition by NATO airstrikes against military targets and
a coordinated offensive by rebels in Tripoli and from across western Libya then turned the tide,
sending Qadhafi and his supporters into retreat and exile. September and early October 2011 were
marked by sporadic and often intense fighting in and around Qadhafi’s birthplace, Sirte, and the
town of Bani Walid and neighboring military districts. NATO air operations continued as rebel
fighters engaged in battles of attrition with Qadhafi supporters.
Qadhafi’s death at the hands of rebel fighters in Sirte on October 20 brought the revolt to an
abrupt close, with some observers expressing concern that a dark chapter in Libyan history ended
violently, leaving an uncertain path ahead. The self-appointed interim Transitional National
Council (TNC) and its cabinet took initial steps toward improving security and reforming national
institutions. Voters elected an interim General National Congress (GNC) in July 2012. The GNC
assumed power on August 8 and will determine the process for drafting a new constitution.
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