Organization of American States: Background
and Issues for Congress
Peter J. Meyer
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
July 31, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42639
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The Organization of American States (OAS) is the oldest multilateral regional organization in the
world. It was founded in 1948 by the United States and 20 Latin American nations to serve as a
forum for addressing issues of mutual concern. Over time, the organization expanded to include
all 35 independent countries of the Western Hemisphere (though Cuba currently is excluded from
participation). The organization’s areas of focus have also shifted over time, evolving in
accordance with the priorities of its member states. Today, the OAS concentrates on four broad
objectives: democracy promotion, human rights protection, economic and social development,
and regional security cooperation. It carries out a wide variety of activities to advance these goals,
often providing policy guidance and technical assistance to member states.
Since the organization’s foundation, the United States has sought to utilize the OAS to advance
critical economic, political, and security objectives in the Western Hemisphere. Although OAS
actions frequently reflected U.S. policy during the 20th Century, this has changed to a certain
extent over the past decade as Latin American and Caribbean governments have adopted more
independent foreign policies. While the organization’s goals and day-to-day activities are still
generally consistent with U.S. policy toward the region, the United States’ ability to advance its
policy initiatives within the OAS has declined. Nevertheless, the United States has remained the
organization’s largest donor, contributing $61.4 million in FY2011—equivalent to 36% of the
total 2011 OAS budget.
As OAS decisions have begun to reflect the increasing independence of its member states, U.S.
policymakers occasionally have expressed concerns about the direction of the organization. Some
Members of Congress assert that the OAS, as it currently operates, advances policies that run
counter to U.S. interests, and that the United States should withhold funding until the organization
changes. Others maintain that the OAS remains an important forum for advancing U.S. relations
with the other nations of the hemisphere and that U.S. policy should seek to strengthen the
organization and make it more effective. Issues receiving congressional attention in recent years
have included Cuba’s potential inclusion in the OAS, the organization’s activities to protect
democracy and human rights, the creation of regional organizations that could serve as
alternatives to the OAS, and constraints on the organization’s budget.
The debate over the OAS and its utility for advancing U.S. interests has continued to unfold in the
112th Congress. In addition to raising issues of concern in congressional hearings and other
forums, Members have introduced several legislative initiatives that include provisions related to
the OAS. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012, P.L. 112-74, provides funding for the
organization during the current fiscal year, while S. 3241 and H.R. 5857 would provide funding
for the OAS in FY2013. H.R. 2583 would have prohibited the United States from providing its
assessed contribution (membership dues) to the OAS in FY2012, and H.R. 6067 includes
provisions that would transfer 50% of the United States’ assessed contribution to specific OAS
programs designed to advance democracy and security objectives starting in FY2013. H.R. 6067
also includes provisions that would forbid U.S. contributions to the OAS if Cuba is allowed to
participate in the organization prior to transitioning to democracy. Another bill, H.R. 2542, would
withhold 20% of all U.S. contributions to the OAS unless the organization takes action to assess
the state of democracy in Venezuela and Nicaragua. H.Res. 312, introduced in June 2011, would
call for U.S. ratification of several of the inter-American human rights treaties.
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Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background...................................................................................................................................... 3
History and Purpose .................................................................................................................. 3
Institutional Bodies.................................................................................................................... 4
General Assembly ............................................................................................................... 4
Permanent Council .............................................................................................................. 4
General Secretariat .............................................................................................................. 5
Budget ....................................................................................................................................... 5
Current Priorities ............................................................................................................................. 7
Democracy Promotion............................................................................................................... 8
Electoral Observation Missions .......................................................................................... 8
Institutional Strengthening .................................................................................................. 9
Collective Defense of Democracy..................................................................................... 10
Human Rights Protection ........................................................................................................ 10
Economic and Social Development......................................................................................... 12
Regional Security Cooperation................................................................................................ 13
Anti-drug Efforts ............................................................................................................... 13
Anti-terrorism Efforts........................................................................................................ 14
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 15
Reintegration of Cuba into the Inter-American System .......................................................... 15
Application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter .......................................................... 18
Reform of the Inter-American Human Rights System ............................................................ 21
Regional Alternatives to the OAS ........................................................................................... 23
OAS Budget Constraints ......................................................................................................... 25
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 27
Tables
Table 1. Organization of American States Budget, 2009-2012........................................................ 6
Table 2. U.S. Funding for the OAS, FY2009-FY2013 .................................................................... 6
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 28
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Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
In the first session of the 112th Congress, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted an
amendment to the FY2012 Foreign Relations Authorization Act (H.R. 2583, Sec. 102 b.) that
would have prohibited the United States from providing its assessed contribution (membership
dues) to the Organization of American States (OAS). The author of the amendment,
Representative Mack, argued that scarce resources should not be directed to an organization that
he asserts inhibits freedom and democracy in the hemisphere.1 In FY2012, the assessed U.S.
contribution is an estimated $49.6 million, equivalent to over 31% of the total 2012 OAS budget.2
H.R. 2583 did not advance in the House and was not taken up in the Senate. However, the move
reignited a congressional debate over the role of the OAS in the Western Hemisphere and its
utility for advancing U.S. objectives in the region.
In 1948, the United States helped found the OAS in order to establish a multilateral forum in
which the nations of the hemisphere could engage one another and address issues of mutual
concern. In subsequent decades, OAS decisions often reflected U.S. policy as other member
states sought to maintain close relations with the dominant economic and political power in the
hemisphere. This was especially true during the early Cold War period, when the United States
was able to secure OAS support for initiatives that were controversial in the region, such as a
1962 resolution to exclude Cuba from active participation as a result of its adherence to Marxism-
Leninism and association with the communist bloc. OAS actions again aligned closely with U.S.
policy in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War as a result of strong consensus among
member states in support of initiatives designed to liberalize markets and strengthen democratic
governance.3
According to many foreign policy analysts,4 the ability of the United States to exert authority and
shape outcomes in the Western Hemisphere—a region critical to U.S. economic, political, and
security interests—has declined over the past decade. This is the result of a number of trends.
Citizens throughout Latin America and the Caribbean have elected ideologically diverse leaders,
bringing an end to the post-Cold War policy consensus. At the same time, many countries in the
region have enjoyed considerable economic growth, grown more confident in addressing their
own challenges, and diversified their commercial and diplomatic relations. These developments
1 Congressman Connie Mack, “In Foreign Affairs Authorization, Mack Stands Firm on Policy of Fiscal Discipline and
Supporting Allies, Not Enemies,” Press Release, July 21, 2011.
2 CRS calculations based on U.S. Department of State, Executive Budget Summary, Function 150 & Other
International Programs, Fiscal Year 2013, February 13, 2012; Organization of American States (OAS), Program-
Budget of the Organization, 2012, August 2011.
3 George Meek, “U.S. Influence in the Organization of American States,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World
Affairs, vol. 17, no. 3 (August 1975), pp. 311-325; Carolyn M. Shaw, “Limits to Hegemonic Influence in the
Organization of American States,” Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 45, no. 3 (Autumn 2003), pp. 59-92; Pedro
Ernesto Fagundes, “A Atuação da Organização dos Estados Americanos (OEA) nas Crises Políticas Contemporâneas,”
Meridiano, vol. 47, no. 117 (April 2010), pp. 30-32.
4 See, for example, Inter-American Dialogue, Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America, April
2012, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf; Russell Crandall, “The Post-
American Hemisphere: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, no. 3
(May/June 2011), pp. 83-95; and Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. Latin America Relations: A New Direction for a
New Reality, Independent Task Force Report No. 60, New York, 2008,
http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/LatinAmerica_TF.pdf.
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have enabled countries in the region to pursue more independent foreign policies that are less
deferential to the United States.5
The relative decline of U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere has manifest itself within the
OAS on a number of high profile decisions in recent years. In 2009, broad consensus among the
rest of the member states led the United States to sign onto a compromise to repeal the 1962
resolution that suspended Cuba from participating in the OAS (but linked its participation to
democracy and human rights).6 More recently, U.S. officials pushed to end Honduras’ suspension7
from the OAS for over a year before member states finally agreed to readmit the country in June
2011. Moreover, calls by U.S. officials to strengthen the Inter-American Democratic Charter and
more strongly oppose efforts by some governments to roll back liberal democracy have yet to be
embraced by most other member states.8
U.S. policymakers have responded to the United States’ declining ability to advance its policy
preferences within the OAS in a number of ways. Some Members of Congress allege that the
OAS has allied itself with anti-U.S. regimes, and is weakening democracy in Latin America.9
Accordingly, they maintain that support for the OAS runs counter to U.S. objectives in the
hemisphere, and that the United States should withhold funding from the organization. Others
disagree, arguing that OAS actions continue to closely align with U.S. priorities in many cases,
and that defunding the OAS would amount to the United States turning its back on the Western
Hemisphere. They maintain that weakening the one multilateral forum that includes every
democratic nation of the hemisphere would strengthen the hands of anti-U.S. regimes while
further weakening U.S. influence in the region.10
As Congress continues to debate the utility of the OAS for advancing U.S. policies and considers
appropriations and other legislation related to the organization, it might examine OAS activities
in the hemisphere and how well those activities align with U.S. objectives. This report briefly
looks at the history of the OAS and its principal institutional bodies; examines the organization’s
funding and current priorities; and discusses a number of policy issues that have drawn
congressional interest in recent years, including the reintegration of Cuba into the inter-American
system, application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, potential reforms of the inter-
American human rights system, the establishment of regional organizations that could serve as
possible alternatives to the OAS, and OAS budget constraints.
5 Michael Shifter, “Managing Disarray: The Search for a New Consensus,” in Which Way Latin America? Hemispheric
Politics Meets Globalization, eds. Andrew F. Cooper and Jorge Heine (United Nations University Press, 2009);
Brookings Institution, Rethinking U.S.-Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World,
Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, Washington, DC, November 2008,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/1124_latin_america_partnership/1124_latin_america_partners
hip.pdf; and Peter Hakim, “The United States and Latin America: The Neighborhood has Changed,” International
Spectator, vol. 46, no. 4 (December 2011), pp. 63-78.
6 Mike Leffert, “Organization of American States Reinstates Cuba by Consensus Despite U.S. Objections,” Latin
America Data Base, NotiCen, June 4, 2009. For more information, see “Reintegration of Cuba into the Inter-American
System” below.
7 Member states unanimously voted to suspend Honduras in July 2009 following the ouster of President Manuel
Zelaya.
8 “Clinton Thumps Table Over OAS,” Latin News Daily, June 8, 2010.
9 Josh Rogin, “House Panel Votes to Defund the OAS,” Foreign Policy: The Cable, July 20, 2011.
10 Ibid; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Markup on
H.R. 3401 and H.R. 2542, Hearing, 112th Cong., 1st sess., December 15, 2011, Serial No. 112-115 (Washington: GPO,
2011), http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/72103.pdf; also see “Dissenting Views” in H.Rept. 112-223.
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Background
History and Purpose
The OAS charter was adopted on April 30, 1948, in Bogotá, Colombia, though multilateral
relations among the countries of the Western Hemisphere go back much further. A series of inter-
American conferences that began in the 1820s led to the creation of the International Union of
American Republics in 1890. Originally created to collect and distribute commercial information,
the International Union of American Republics was renamed the Pan American Union in 1910. In
1933, following the launch of President Franklin Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbor” policy, the United
States and other nations in the hemisphere signed the Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States, which formally recognized the equality of states and the principle of non-intervention in
one another’s internal affairs. Close cooperation during World War II considerably strengthened
hemispheric ties, which were reinforced in the post-war period with the adoption of the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) in 1947. The OAS Charter and American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man were signed a year later by the United States and 20
other countries11 in the region to legally codify the institutions and principles that had come to
form the inter-American system.
Although the OAS initially sought to address border disputes and collective security issues, it has
expanded its activities into other areas over time. In 1959, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights was created to carry out the provisions of the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man. During the 1960s, the OAS greatly expanded its economic, social, cultural,
scientific, and technological programs, placing a strong emphasis on development following the
1961 launch of President Kennedy’s “Alliance for Progress.” Abuses by authoritarian
governments prompted the creation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 1978, and
growing concern over narcotics trafficking led to the establishment of the Inter-American Drug
Abuse Control Commission in 1986. The OAS acknowledged the challenges posed by regional
and international terrorism by creating the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism in 1999,
and recognized the near universal commitment to democracy in the region through the adoption
of the Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001.12
According to the OAS Charter, as amended, the purpose of the organization is to:
• strengthen the peace and security of the continent;
• promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the
principle of nonintervention;
• prevent possible causes of difficulties and ensure the pacific settlement of
disputes that may arise among member states;
11 The OAS has expanded over time. All 35 independent nations in the hemisphere have now signed the charter.
12 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Inter-American
Relations: A Collection of Documents, Legislation, Descriptions of Inter-American Organizations, and Other Material
Pertaining to Inter-American Affairs, Joint Committee Print, Prepared by the Congressional Research Service, 100th
Cong., 2nd sess., December 1988, S.Prt. 100-168 (Washington: GPO, 1989); O. Carlos Stoetzer, The Organization of
American States, 2nd ed. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993); OAS, “Our History,”
http://www.oas.org/en/about/our_history.asp.
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• provide for common action on the part of those states in the event of aggression;
• seek the solution of political, juridical, and economic problems that may arise
among them;
• promote, by cooperative action, their economic, social, and cultural development;
• eradicate extreme poverty, which constitutes an obstacle to the full democratic
development of the peoples of the hemisphere; and
• achieve an effective limitation of conventional weapons that will make it possible
to devote the largest amount of resources to the economic and social
development of member states.13
Institutional Bodies
The OAS is composed of a variety of councils, committees, and other institutional organs, some
of which are autonomous. There are three primary bodies, however, that are responsible for
setting and carrying out the agenda of the OAS: the General Assembly, the Permanent Council,
and the General Secretariat.
General Assembly
The General Assembly14 is the principal policy-making organ of the OAS. It meets annually15 to
debate current issues, approve the organization’s budget, and set policies to govern the other OAS
bodies. The General Assembly is composed of the delegations of each of the 34 participating
member states,16 with each state having a single vote. It is empowered to adopt most decisions
with the affirmative votes of an absolute majority of the member states; however, some decisions,
including the adoption of the agenda and the approval of budgetary matters, require the
affirmative votes of two-thirds of the member states. In practice, the General Assembly tends to
operate by consensus. The most recent General Assembly was held in Cochabamba, Bolivia on
June 3-5, 2012.
Permanent Council
The day-to-day business of the OAS is conducted by the Permanent Council, which meets
regularly throughout the year at the organization’s headquarters in Washington, DC. Among other
activities, the Permanent Council works to maintain friendly relations among member states,
assists in the peaceful settlement of disputes, carries out decisions assigned to it by the General
Assembly, regulates the General Secretariat when the General Assembly is not in session,
receives reports from the various bodies of the inter-American system, and submits
recommendations to the General Assembly. Additionally, the Permanent Council is empowered
by the Inter-American Democratic Charter to undertake necessary diplomatic initiatives in the
13 OAS, Charter of the Organization of American States, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/charter.html.
14 The annual General Assembly was created through a 1970 amendment to the OAS Charter, replacing the
International Conference of American States that had previously met every five years.
15 A special session of the General Assembly can be convoked by a two-thirds vote of the Permanent Council.
16 Although the OAS technically has 35 member states, Cuba is currently excluded from actively participating in the
OAS. See “Reintegration of Cuba into the Inter-American System” below for more information.
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event of an unconstitutional alteration of government. Each OAS member state appoints one
representative to the Permanent Council, and each member state has a single vote. The
affirmative votes of two-thirds of the member states are required for most Permanent Council
decisions. Like the General Assembly, however, the Permanent Council tends to operate by
consensus.
General Secretariat
The General Secretariat, directed by the Secretary General and the Assistant Secretary General, is
the permanent body charged with implementing the policies set by the General Assembly and the
Permanent Council. The Secretary General and the Assistant Secretary General are elected by the
General Assembly and serve five-year terms with the possibility of one re-election. According to
the OAS Charter, the Secretary General serves as the legal representative of the organization and
is allowed to participate in all OAS meetings with a voice but without a vote. The Secretary
General is also empowered to establish offices and hire personnel to implement OAS mandates.
Some analysts maintain that—given the virtual paralysis of the organization that can result from
differences among states and the need for consensus—“the effectiveness of the OAS critically
depends on the consistent, vigorous, and sometimes risk-taking leadership of the Secretary
General.”17 The current Secretary General, José Miguel Insulza of Chile, was first elected in
2005, and was reelected to a second term in March 2010.
Budget
The OAS budget is expected to total $158.3 million in 2012 (see Table 1). The largest portion of
the budget is the Regular Fund, which primarily supports the operations of the General
Secretariat. The budget is principally financed through the assessed contributions, or membership
dues, of OAS member states. Assessed contributions are calculated based on gross national
income, with adjustments for debt burden and low per capita income.18 Since 1997, the OAS has
sought to supplement the Regular Fund by collecting specific funds—voluntary contributions
from member states and other international donors that are directed to specific projects or
programs. Some voluntary contributions are also directed to the Special Multilateral Fund of the
Inter-American Council for Integral Development (FEMCIDI), which finances national and
multinational development projects. Contributions to the specific funds and FEMCIDI have
accounted for roughly half of the total OAS budget in recent years. Both the Regular Fund and
contributions to specific funds and FEMCIDI have declined substantially since 2009. (For more
information on the declining budget, see “OAS Budget Constraints” below).
17 Inter-American Dialogue, Responding to the Hemisphere's Political Challenges: Report of the Inter-American
Dialogue Task Force on the Organization of American States, June 2006, p.7,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/OAS_2006.pdf.
18 Currently, the maximum contribution any nation could be assessed against the budget is 59.47% and the minimum is
0.022%. OAS document, AG/RES. 2696 (XLI-O/11), Financing of the 2012 Program-Budget of the Organization,
June 7, 2011.
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Table 1. Organization of American States Budget, 2009-2012
(Millions of current U.S. dollars)
2009
2010
2011
2012
Regular Fund
90.1 90.1 85.3 85.4
Specific
96.0 87.9 84.6 72.9
Funds &
FEMCIDI
Total
186.1 178.0 169.9 158.3
Source: OAS, Office of the Secretary General, Program-Budgets of the Organization, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012.
The United States is the top source of funding for the OAS. It contributed $61.4 million in
FY2011—equivalent to over 36% of the total 2011 OAS budget. This included $48.1 million for
its assessed contribution to the Regular Fund and $13.3 million in voluntary contributions to
specific funds (see Table 2). According to preliminary OAS calculations, the largest member state
donors after the United States in calendar year 2011 were Canada ($22.1 million), Brazil ($7.9
million), Mexico ($7.5 million), Argentina ($3.1 million), and Colombia ($1.5 million). The
largest donors outside of the OAS membership include Spain ($6.1 million), Netherlands ($3.5
million), and Sweden ($1.5 million).19
Table 2. U.S. Funding for the OAS, FY2009-FY2013
(Millions of current U.S. dollars)
FY2009
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012 (est.)
FY2013 (req.)
Regular Fund
46.8 47.1 48.1 49.6 51.1
Specific Funds
15.1 17.6 13.3 9.0 7.0
[Development
[5.5] [5.0] [4.8] [3.5] [4.3]
Fund]
[Democracy
[3.5] [3.0] [3.0] [4.5] [2.7]
Fund]
[Other]a [6.1]
[9.6]
[5.5]
[na]
[na]
Total
61.8 64.7 61.4 58.6 58.1
% of OAS
33.2 36.3 36.1 na na
Budgetb
Source: Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for FY2011, FY2012, and FY2013; U.S. Mission to
the OAS, “Other Funding Contributions to OAS Programs/Projects,” provided to CRS in February 2012.
Notes: U.S. contributions to the Regular Fund are provided through the Contributions to International
Organizations (CIO) account, and voluntary contributions for the OAS Development and Democracy Funds are
provided through the International Organization and Programs (IO&P) account.
a. Since these voluntary contributions are not included in the annual budget request and are provided over the
course of each fiscal year, it is not yet known what the total U.S. funding will be in FY2012 or FY2013.
19 OAS, OAS Quarterly Resource Management Report: Preliminary and Unaudited, December 31, 2011. Non-
hemispheric nations can be granted “permanent observer status” which permits them to participate in OAS activities
and to contribute to OAS programs. Currently, there are 68 “permanent observer” nations.
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b. Calculated using total U.S. contributions per fiscal year as a percentage of the annual OAS budget. The OAS
sets its budget by calendar years.
Most U.S. voluntary contributions are funded through the OAS Development Assistance Fund
(hereafter Development Fund) and the OAS Fund for Strengthening Democracy (hereafter
Democracy Fund). Much of the financial support for the Development Fund is directed to
FEMCIDI to strengthen programs with a regional impact on poverty reduction. Other funding
supports U.S. strategic goals at the Summits of the Americas20 and projects such as the Inter-
American Social Protection Network and U.S.-Brazil biofuels cooperation in third countries. The
Democracy Fund provides assistance for a number of activities in the region, including electoral
observation missions, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and technical assistance
for member state electoral bodies.
In addition to its contributions to the Development and Democracy Funds, which are included in
annual appropriations requests, the United States generally provides voluntary contributions to
various other OAS programs over the course of each fiscal year. In recent years, these additional
contributions have supported programs such as the Inter-American Drug Abuse Commission, the
Inter-American Committee against Terrorism, and the Energy and Climate Partnership of the
Americas. According to the U.S. Mission to the OAS, U.S. voluntary contributions provide the
United States with leverage to support initiatives that advance U.S. strategic goals and interests in
the organization and region.21
Current Priorities
Upon taking office in May 2005, Secretary General Insulza identified democracy, human rights,
integral development, and multidimensional security as the “fundamental pillars of the OAS.”22
He has reaffirmed his commitment to those pillars since winning reelection in 2010, asserting that
the priorities that will guide his second term include:
• strengthening democratic governance by promoting respect for the rule of law
and institutions, independent and effective justice systems, full freedom of
expression for all citizens, and transparency and accountability by public
officials;
• enhancing the human rights system by promoting respect for and compliance
with its decisions, ratification of the American Convention of Human Rights by
all countries, and the continued struggle against all forms of discrimination;
• striking a better balance between democracy-building and integral development
efforts by focusing activities on the mandates of the Summits of the Americas
20 The Summits of the Americas are institutionalized gatherings where the heads of state and government of the
Western Hemisphere meet and discuss how to address common challenges. They have taken place every three to four
years since 1994. The Sixth Summit of the Americas was held in Cartagena, Colombia in April 2012. The OAS serves
as the technical secretariat for the Summits of the Americas, and is responsible for carrying out mandates issued by the
member states.
21 U.S. Mission to the OAS, “OAS Programs and Initiatives Receiving Direct USG/USOAS Funding,” provided to CRS
in February 2012.
22 OAS document, CP/doc. 4071/05, Meeting the Political Priorities of the Organization of American States, December
14, 2005, p.1.
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with respect to poverty and decent work, migration, competitiveness, energy, the
environment and climate change, technological development, and education; and
• contributing to the enhancement of multidimensional security in the Americas by
focusing efforts on the serious public security crisis generated by trafficking in
drugs, arms, and persons; money laundering; and organized crime.23
These priorities are relatively consistent with the Obama Administration’s policy toward
the region, which is designed to strengthen effective democratic institutions; promote
economic and social opportunity; secure a clean energy future; and ensure citizen
security.24
Democracy Promotion
The OAS has taken a much more active role in promoting and defending democracy since the end
of the Cold War and the return to civilian governance in most of the hemisphere. Member states
approved a series of instruments designed to support democratic governance,25 culminating in the
adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter on September 11, 2001. The charter asserts
that the peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an
obligation to promote and defend it.26 The OAS has sought to uphold these commitments through
a number of activities, which include support for, and observation of, elections; technical
assistance and other programs to foster institutional development and good governance; and the
coordination of collective action when democratic institutions are threatened. While many
analysts assert that the OAS has played an important role in normalizing democratic governance
in the region,27 some scholars maintain that the organization is selective in its defense of
democracy.28
Electoral Observation Missions
One of the primary ways in which the OAS promotes democracy is through electoral observation
missions. Since 1989, when member states authorized the Secretary General to dispatch election
observation missions to nations that request them, the OAS has observed more than 160 electoral
23 Secretary General José Miguel Insulza, “Remarks by Secretary General of the OAS, Inaugural Ceremony Fortieth
Regular Session of the General Assembly,” June 6, 2010.
24 For more information on U.S. policy and interests in the hemisphere, see CRS Report R42360, Latin America and
the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress in 2012, coordinated by Mark P. Sullivan.
25 In 1991, the OAS General Assembly adopted resolution 1080, which instructs the Secretary General to convoke the
Permanent Council or the General Assembly in the event of an interruption of democratic governance in a member
state. The following year, the OAS became the first regional political organization to allow the suspension of a member
state for the forceful overthrow of a democratically constituted government when it ratified an amendment to its charter
known as the Washington Protocol.
26 OAS, Inter-American Democratic Charter, http://www.oas.org/OASpage/eng/Documents/Democractic_Charter.htm.
27 See, for example, Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL), "Election Monitoring in the Americas,"
FOCALPoint, vol. 9, no. 1 (February 2010); and Pablo Policzer, The Next Stage of Democracy Promotion, FOCAL,
Note Politique, July 2010.
28 See, for example, Craig Arceneaux and David Pinion-Berlin, “Issues, Threats, and Institutions: Explaining OAS
Responses to Democratic Dilemmas in Latin America,” Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 49, no. 2 (2007), pp.
1-31; and Barry S. Levitt, “A Desultory Defense of Democracy: OAS Resolution 1080 and the Inter-American
Democratic Charter,” Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 48, no.3 (2006), pp. 93-123.
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Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress
processes in 24 countries in the hemisphere.29 Over the years, the OAS has earned a reputation for
impartiality and technical competence, playing an important role in the legitimization of electoral
processes as many Latin American and Caribbean countries transitioned from authoritarian rule to
representative democracy.30 Some analysts have been critical of OAS observation missions in
certain instances, however, maintaining that the organization has occasionally offered legitimacy
to flawed elections.31
Today, the objectives of OAS electoral observation missions include observing electoral
processes; encouraging citizen participation; verifying compliance with election laws; ensuring
electoral processes are conducted in impartial, reliable, and transparent manners; and making
recommendations to improve electoral systems. The OAS observes several electoral processes
every year, but each mission must be invited by the country holding the election and must solicit
separate funding from the international donor community. In 2011, the OAS monitored 12
electoral processes in 11 countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,
Jamaica, Nicaragua, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Lucia.32
Institutional Strengthening
The OAS also promotes democracy by providing technical assistance to member states designed
to strengthen institutions and improve good governance. Among other activities, the
organization’s Secretariat for Political Affairs conducts research, provides training in public
management, analyzes risk factors for democratic instability, and promotes cooperation among
government officials. It also supports conflict resolution efforts. The OAS Mission to Support the
Peace Process in Colombia, for example, provides verification and advisory support to the
Colombian government regarding the demobilization and reintegration into society of illegal
armed groups.33
In 1996, OAS member states adopted the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption.34 The
convention is designed to improve government transparency by strengthening anti-corruption
laws and facilitating cooperation among member states. Under the follow-up mechanism on the
implementation of the convention, member states submit themselves to a reciprocal review
process that evaluates how well they are implementing the convention, formulates
recommendations for improving anti-corruption efforts, and facilitates the exchange of
information to harmonize the region’s anti-corruption legal frameworks.35
29 Rubén M. Perina, “The Future of Electoral Observation,” Americas Quarterly, (Spring 2012).
30 U.S. Permanent Mission to the OAS, “Democracy Promotion & Human Rights,”
http://www.usoas.usmission.gov/democracy.html.
31 See, for example, David Rosnick, The Organization of American States in Haiti: Election Monitoring or Political
Intervention?, Center for Economic and Policy Research, Washington, DC, August 2011,
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/haiti-oas-2011-10.pdf; and Perina, 2012, op.cit.
32 OAS, “Electoral Observation Section,” http://www.oas.org/en/spa/deco/moe.asp.
33 OAS, “Secretariat for Political Affairs,” http://www.oas.org/en/spa/default.asp; U.S. Permanent Mission to the OAS,
“Democracy Promotion & Human Rights,” http://www.usoas.usmission.gov/democracy.html.
34 President Clinton submitted the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption to the Senate, for its advice and
consent, in April 1998 (Treaty Doc. 105-39), and the Senate agreed to the resolution in July 2000. The text of the treaty
is available at: http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-58.html.
35 OAS, “Anti-Corruption Portal of the Americas,” http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/FightCur.html.
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Collective Defense of Democracy
In addition to supporting elections and institutional strengthening activities, the OAS undertakes
diplomatic initiatives designed to protect and restore democracy. As noted above, by adopting the
Inter-American Democratic Charter, OAS member states accepted an obligation to promote and
defend democratic governance. Disagreements among member states regarding when it is
appropriate for the OAS to apply the provisions of the Democratic Charter, however, have limited
the organization’s actions. Article 20 of the Democratic Charter—which allows for collective
action “in the event of an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously
impairs the democratic order in a member state”—has been invoked by the OAS on only three
occasions,36 each of which followed the ouster of a president. In other instances, such as conflicts
between branches of government or the erosion of liberal democratic institutions by
democratically-elected leaders, member states generally have been unwilling to support bold
OAS actions, deferring instead to the principle of non-intervention.37 (For more discussion of the
charter and its application, see “Application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter” below).
Human Rights Protection
Many analysts consider the inter-American human rights system to be the most effective part of
the OAS.38 Unlike most of the organization’s bodies, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights are autonomous, allowing them
to execute their mandates to promote and protect human rights39 without needing to establish
consensus among member states on every action. Consequently, advocates maintain, the two
bodies are able to take on the “pivotal role of condemnation and early warning in response to
situations that undermine the consolidation of democracy and rule of law” in the hemisphere.40
In the first decades after its 1959 inception, the IACHR’s documentation of human rights
violations brought international attention to the abuses of repressive regimes. Although the human
rights situation in the hemisphere has improved significantly as countries have transitioned away
from dictatorships to democratic governments, the IACHR continues to play a significant role.
Among other actions, the IACHR receives, analyzes, and investigates individual petitions
alleging human rights violations. In recent years, it has received roughly 1,500 such petitions
annually.41 It also issues requests to governments to adopt “precautionary measures” in certain
cases where individuals or groups are at risk of suffering serious and irreparable harm to their
36 Article 20 of the Democratic Charter was invoked: after President Hugo Chávez was temporarily removed from
power in Venezuela in 2002, several months after Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide went into exile in 2004, and
following the ouster of President Manuel Zelaya in Honduras in 2009.
37 Arceneaux and Pinion-Berlin, 2007, op. cit.
38 See, for example, Victoria Amato, “Taking Stock of the Reflection on the Workings of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights,” Aportes: Magazine of the Due Process of Law Foundation, vol. 5, no. 16 (June 2012),
p. 5; and “Chipping at the Foundations: The Regional Justice System Comes Under Attack from the Countries Whose
Citizens Need It Most,” Economist, June 9, 2012.
39 The human rights that the nations of the hemisphere have agreed to respect and guarantee are defined in the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the various
other inter-American human rights treaties available at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/basic_documents.asp.
40 Ariel E. Dulitzky, "Twenty Reflections on the Process of Reflection," Aportes: Magazine of the Due Process of Law
Foundation, vol. 5, no. 16 (June 2012), p. 11.
41 Santiago Canton, “The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 50 Years of Advances and the New
Challenges that Await,” Americas Quarterly, (Summer 2009).
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human rights. The IACHR receives several hundred petitions for precautionary measures
annually, and in 2011, it issued requests to governments in 60 cases.42 Additionally, the IACHR
observes the general human rights situations in member states, conducting on-site visits to carry
out in-depth analyses; publishing special reports when warranted; and noting in its annual report
which countries’ human rights situations deserve special attention, follow-up, and monitoring. In
its most recent annual report (issued in April 2012 and covering 2011), the IACHR made special
note of the human rights situations in Colombia, Cuba, Honduras, and Venezuela.43 (For
information on potential reforms of the IACHR, see “Reform of the Inter-American Human
Rights System” below).
Since 1990, the IACHR has created rapporteurships to draw attention to emerging human rights
issues and certain groups that are particularly at risk of human rights violations due to
vulnerability and discrimination. There are currently nine rapporteurships, which focus on
freedom of expression, human rights defenders, and the rights of women, children, indigenous
peoples, afro-descendants, prisoners, migrant workers, and lesbian, gay, trans, bisexual and
intersex persons. These rapporteurships have been rather effective at drawing attention to
potential abuses. In February 2012, for example, the Special Rapporteur for the Freedom of
Expression immediately expressed deep concern after Ecuador’s National Court of Justice
affirmed criminal and civil judgments against three newspaper executives and a journalist that
had been found guilty of “criminal defamation of an authority” for publishing a column critical of
President Rafael Correa. The Rapporteur’s vocal criticism helped initiate a wave of international
outcry, which likely contributed to President Correa’s decision not to enforce the sentences.44
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, created in 1978, is an autonomous judicial
institution charged with interpreting and applying the American Convention on Human Rights.
Currently, 21 of the OAS member states accept the court’s jurisdiction; the United States does
not.45 According to a number of analysts, the Inter-American Court has played an important role
in the development of international human rights case law, securing justice for individual victims
while facilitating structural changes to prevent future violations.46
For example, the court has issued landmark rulings requiring states to investigate human rights
violations and punish those responsible, regardless of any amnesty laws that they may have
adopted. In February 2011, the court maintained this principle when ruling on the case of María
Claudia García Iruretagoyena de Gelman. Ms. Gelman was an Argentine citizen who was
detained by the Argentine military, transferred to Uruguay during the country’s dictatorship, had
her daughter taken from her shortly after giving birth, and then disappeared while in the custody
of the Uruguayan security forces. In addition to awarding monetary damages to the daughter of
Ms. Gelman, the court ordered Uruguay to carry out a full investigation of the case, and comply
with its obligations under inter-American human rights treaties by ensuring that the country’s
42 Ibid; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), “Precautionary Measures,”
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp.
43 IACHR, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2011, April 9, 2012,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2011/TOC.asp.
44 Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression, “UN and IACHR Special Rapporteurs for Freedom of
Expression State Deep Concern Over Decision to Affirm Judgment Against Journalists in Ecuador,” Press Release,
February 16, 2012; “Correa Pardons El Universo,” Latin News Daily, February 28, 2012.
45 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2011, San
José, Costa Rica, 2012, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/informes/ingles.pdf.
46 See, for example, Viviana Krsticevic, “The Promise of Protecting All,” Americas Quarterly, (Summer 2009).
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amnesty law is not an obstacle to investigating and punishing human rights violations.47 In
October 2011, the Uruguayan Congress passed legislation to amend—and effectively overturn—
the country’s amnesty law, with proponents arguing that it was necessary in order to comply with
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ ruling.48
Economic and Social Development
Although the region has made considerable strides in terms of economic growth and social
inclusion, poverty and inequality levels remain high in many countries, and the OAS continues to
support development efforts. The organization’s Department of Economic Development, Trade
and Tourism, for example, supports efforts to enhance the productivity and competitiveness of
economic actors in the region, with particular emphasis on micro, small, and medium-sized
enterprises (MSMEs). It provides assistance to MSMEs designed to strengthen their capacities’ to
take advantage of trade and tourism opportunities, and encourages the use of science and
technology to foster sustainable growth.49
The Special Multilateral Fund of the Inter-American Council for Integral Development
(FEMCIDI) also supports development efforts. It was established in 1997 to address the most
urgent needs of member states, especially those with smaller and more vulnerable economies.
FEMCIDI projects are designed to strengthen institutions, build human capacity, and act as a seed
fund for more far-reaching development programs. While projects receiving FEMICIDI funding
during the 2011-2012 cycle are focused in the areas of education, culture, and science and
technology, the fund also supports development efforts related to trade, labor, tourism, the
environment, and economic diversification.50
The Inter-American Social Protection Network is one of the more recent efforts by the OAS to
foster economic and social development in the hemisphere. It was launched in September 2009 as
a forum for member states to share experiences and best practices with regards to social
protection systems. Over the past two decades, several countries in the region have implemented
conditional cash transfer programs51 or other innovative initiatives that have proven successful at
reducing poverty and inequality. Through the Inter-American Social Protection Network, the
OAS intends to facilitate the introduction of such programs to countries that have yet to establish
effective social protection policies.52
47 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Caso Gelman Vs. Uruguay: Sentencia, February 24, 2011.
48 “Uruguay Overturns Amnesty for Military-era Crimes,” BBC News, October 27, 2011.
49 OAS, Executive Secretariat for Integral Development, Department of Economic Development, Trade and Tourism,
Promoting Economic Development in the Americas, http://www.oas.org/en/sedi/dedtt/docs/brochure/progs_e.pdf.
50 OAS, “FEMCIDI - Special Multilateral Fund of the Inter-American Council for Integral Development,”
http://www.oas.org/en/sedi/femcidi/.
51 Conditional cash transfer programs, such as Brazil’s Bolsa Familia, generally provide a cash stipend to poor families
that commit to certain conditions, such as ensuring that their children are attending school and receiving preventative
medical care. They are designed to provide short-term poverty alleviation while building human capital for long-term
development.
52 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, “Remarks at the Launch of the Inter-American Social Protection
Network (IASPN),” U.S. Department of State, September 22, 2009; OAS, “OAS Assistant Secretary General Calls on
Countries and International Organizations to Support the Inter-American Social Protection Network,” Press Release,
August 10, 2011.
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Regional Security Cooperation
In recent years, the OAS has dedicated greater attention to hemispheric security issues as member
states have become increasingly concerned about transnational criminal threats. In 2005, the OAS
created the Secretariat for Multidimensional Security in an attempt to address these security
issues in a more comprehensive manner and better coordinate member states’ efforts. The
Secretariat supports a wide variety of activities, including efforts to combat gangs, prevent human
trafficking, and remove land mines. Two issues that fall under the umbrella of regional security
cooperation and may be of particular interest to Congress are illicit narcotics and terrorism.
Anti-drug Efforts
Concerns that the production, trafficking, and consumption of illegal narcotics posed a serious
threat to the entire Western Hemisphere led OAS member states to establish the Inter-American
Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD by its Spanish acronym) in 1986.53 The commission’s
primary purpose is to develop and promote a comprehensive anti-drug policy for the region.
CICAD’s most recent hemispheric drug strategy was adopted in May 2010. It defines the world
drug problem as “a complex, dynamic and multi-causal phenomenon” that requires “shared
responsibility among all states.”54 The strategy includes over 50 guidelines for member states in
the areas of institutional strengthening, demand reduction, supply reduction, control measures,
and international cooperation. It also includes some policy shifts from the previous strategy, such
as calling on member states to treat drug addiction as a public health matter and explore treatment
and rehabilitation as alternatives to criminal prosecution.
In addition to formulating strategy, CICAD assists OAS member states in strengthening their anti-
drug policies. It conducts research, develops and recommends legislation, and provides technical
assistance and specialized training. CICAD also conducts assessments of member states’ progress
through its multilateral evaluation mechanism. Each member state is required to submit reports
documenting their efforts to combat drug trafficking and related activities, which are then
evaluated by a multidisciplinary group of experts who are appointed by each of the member states
but do not evaluate their own countries. The experts identify strengths and weaknesses and offer
recommendations.55 For example, each of the five evaluations of the United States conducted
since the 1999-2000 review period has noted that the country has yet to ratify the Inter-American
Convention Against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition,
Explosives and other Related Materials (CIFTA by its Spanish acronym), and has recommended
that it do so.56
53 For more information on drug trafficking in the region, see CRS Report R41215, Latin America and the Caribbean:
Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.
54 CICAD, Hemispheric Drug Strategy, May 2010,
http://www.cicad.oas.org/Main/Template.asp?File=/main/aboutcicad/basicdocuments/strategy_2010_eng.asp.
55 CICAD’s country evaluations are available at:
http://www.cicad.oas.org/Main/Template.asp?File=/mem/reports/default_eng.asp.
56 The Clinton Administration signed CIFTA in November 1997 and submitted the convention to the Senate, for its
advice and consent, in June 1998 (Treaty Doc 105-49); the convention has never been acted upon. President Obama has
called on the Senate to ratify CIFTA. The text of the treaty is available at:
http://foreign.senate.gov/download/?id=E998994C-749B-4724-9AAA-82ACEB6A4850.
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Although some analysts contend that CICAD simply reinforces “Washington’s hard-line
approach” to illicit narcotics,57 others assert that the commission and its multilateral evaluation
mechanism have been instrumental in building trust and establishing common ground for
cooperation between the United States and other OAS member states.58 For example, several
regional leaders expressed frustration with the results of U.S.-backed counternarcotics policies in
the lead up to the April 2012 Summit of the Americas. The heads of state attending the Summit
called for the OAS to analyze the results of current policies and explore new approaches that may
be more effective. The policy review is occurring within CICAD and is intended to ensure that
the hemisphere moves forward with a unified approach. Secretary General Insulza expects
CICAD to present proposals to OAS member states by early 2013.59
Anti-terrorism Efforts
In the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the OAS took action to
strengthen hemispheric cooperation against terrorism.60 The OAS was the first international
organization to formally condemn the attacks of September 11, adopting a Permanent Council
resolution on September 19 that called the terrorist actions an “attack against all States of the
Americas.”61 It also adopted a resolution, at Brazil’s request, to invoke the Rio Treaty—the
collective security pact of the Western Hemisphere.62 A Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs63 adopted another resolution on September 21, which included provisions that
called on OAS member states to “pursue, capture, prosecute, and punish...the perpetrators,
organizers, and sponsors” of the terrorist acts; deny terrorist groups the ability to operate within
their territories; and strengthen anti-terrorism cooperation.64 In June 2002, OAS member states
adopted the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, through which they committed to take
action against the financing of terrorism, ratify U.N. anti-terrorism instruments, improve
cooperation among law enforcement, and deny asylum to suspected terrorists.65
57 Adam Isacson, “Conflict Resolution in the Americas: The Decline of the OAS,” World Politics Review, May 22,
2012.
58 Betty Horwitz, “The Role of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD): Confronting the
Problem of Illegal Drugs in the Americas,” Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 52, no. 2 (Summer 2010).
59 OAS document, CA-VI/DP-1/2 Statement by the President of the Republic, Juan Manuel Santos Calderon,
Following the Close of the Sixth Summit of the Americas, April 15, 2012; OAS, “Secretary General Insulza: ‘The Sixth
Summit Showed That Although There is No Common Policy, the Americas have a Common Agenda.’” Press Release,
April 24, 2012.
60 For more information on terrorism issues in the region, see CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues,
by Mark P. Sullivan.
61 OAS document, CP/RES. 796 (1293/01), Convocation of the Twenty-Third Meeting of the Consultation of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs, September 19, 2011.
62 OAS document, CP/RES. 797 (1293/01), Convocation of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the Consultation of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs to Serve as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance, September 19, 2011.
63 According to Article 61 of the OAS Charter, a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs may be called
“in order to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common interest to the American States, and to serve as the
Organ of Consultation.” Article 65 of the Charter states that “in case of an armed attack on the territory of an American
State or within the region of security delimited by the treaty in force, the Chairman of the Permanent Council shall
without delay call a meeting of the Council to decide on the convocation of the Meeting of Consultation.”
64 OAS document, RC.23/RES. 1/01, Strengthening Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate
Terrorism, September 21, 2011.
65 President Bush submitted the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism to the Senate, for its advice and consent,
(continued...)
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Cooperation on terrorism issues has continued through the reinvigorated Inter-American
Committee on Terrorism (CICTE by its Spanish acronym). CICTE was established in 1999 and
serves as the primary forum for cooperation on terrorism issues within the hemisphere. It
provides a range of technical assistance and capacity building programs to assist member states in
preventing, combating, and eliminating terrorism, and meeting their commitments under the
Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism. These programs support efforts in five areas:
border controls, critical infrastructure protection, counter-terrorism legislative assistance, crisis
management exercises, and promotion of international cooperation and partnerships.66 According
to the U.S. Department of State, CICTE serves as an important regional focus for cooperation on
terrorism-related matters in the Western Hemisphere.67
Issues for Congress
Congress plays an important role in determining U.S. policy toward the OAS. As noted above, the
United States provides over a third of the organization’s funding. Congress appropriates funds for
the assessed contribution of the United States, as well as voluntary contributions to support
specific projects in the hemisphere. Congress is also involved in the development of inter-
American treaties, as any conventions negotiated by the executive branch must be submitted to
the Senate for ratification. Moreover, Congress is charged with providing oversight of how U.S.
funds are spent. Members of Congress frequently voice concerns over OAS actions (or lack
thereof), and recommend changes in policy. Policy issues that have drawn particular interest from
some Members of Congress in recent years include the potential reintegration of Cuba into the
inter-American system, the application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, efforts to
reform the inter-American human rights system, the rise of alternative regional organizations, and
OAS budget constraints.
Reintegration of Cuba into the Inter-American System68
Background
Cuba was one of the founding members of the OAS, and as a signatory to the OAS Charter,
remains a member of the organization. It has been excluded from participation since 1962,
however, as a result of a decision at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs to suspend Cuba for its adherence to Marxism-Leninism and alignment with the
communist bloc.69 The resolution to exclude Cuba was controversial at the time it was adopted,
(...continued)
in November 2002 (Treaty Doc. 107-18), and the Senate agreed to the resolution in October 2005. The text of the treaty
is available at: http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-66.html.
66 James Patrick Kiernan, “Multidimensional Security in the Americas,” Americas, vol. 63, no. 3 (May/June 2011).
67 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2010,
August 18, 2011.
68 For more information on Cuba, its exclusion from the OAS, and U.S. policy toward the country, see CRS Report
R40193, Cuba: Issues for the 111th Congress, and CRS Report R41617, Cuba: Issues for the 112th Congress, by Mark
P. Sullivan.
69 OAS document, Ser. C/II.8, Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, January 22-31, 1962.
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and the reintegration of Cuba into the inter-American system has remained a frequent source of
contention among the countries of the hemisphere ever since.
At its June 2009 General Assembly, the OAS repealed the 1962 resolution that suspended Cuba
from participation. The reintegration of Cuba into the inter-American system was not originally
on the agenda for the 2009 General Assembly, but it emerged as a prominent issue after
dominating discussions at the April 2009 Summit of the Americas,70 and Secretary General
Insulza and a number of member states asserted that the Cold War-era resolution was
anachronistic.71 Although there was a general consensus among member states regarding the
repeal of the 1962 resolution, there was considerable disagreement regarding when and how
Cuba’s eventual return to the OAS should take place. Some countries pushed for immediate
reintegration while others, including the United States, argued that Cuba should first have to meet
certain conditions. On the final day of the General Assembly, member states unanimously
adopted a compromise resolution that repealed the 1962 resolution, and stated that Cuba's
participation in the OAS “will be the result of a process of dialogue initiated at the request of the
Government of Cuba, and in accordance with the practices, purposes, and principles of the
OAS,”72 which include representative democracy and respect for human rights. Although the
Cuban government declared the action a “major victory,” it has stated that it has no interest in the
OAS, and has made no effort to initiate a dialogue about its participation.73
Debate over Cuba’s participation in the inter-American system was reignited in the lead up to the
Sixth Summit of the Americas, which was held in Cartagena, Colombia in April 2012. Although
the summits traditionally have only included the participating members of the OAS, and the OAS
serves as the technical secretariat for the summit process, the Summits of the Americas are not
officially part of the OAS. The Cubans expressed interest in attending the Cartagena Summit after
President Correa of Ecuador suggested that the countries of the Bolivarian Alliance for the
Americas (ALBA74 by its Spanish acronym) would boycott if Cuba were not invited.75 The
Obama Administration opposed Cuba’s inclusion in the Cartagena Summit,76 and noted that the
countries of the hemisphere declared at the 2001 Quebec Summit that “strict respect for the
democratic system” is “an essential condition” for inclusion in the Summits of the Americas.77 In
an attempt to diffuse the situation, President Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia, the summit host,
informed the Cubans that they would not be invited to Cartagena as a result of the lack of
consensus, but that Cuba’s future participation would be discussed.78 At the summit, every
country in the hemisphere—with the exceptions of Canada and the United States—reportedly
70 OAS document, CA-V/DP-1/09, Statement by the Chairman of the Fifth Summit of the Americas, the Honourable
Patrick Manning, Prime Minister of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, April 19, 2009.
71 Frances Robles, “OAS Chief Calls for Cuba’s Reinstatement,” Miami Herald, April 16, 2009.
72 OAS document, AG/RES. 2438 (XXXIX-O/09), Resolution on Cuba, June 3, 2009.
73 “Cuba Says No to OAS Membership,” Voice of America, June 4, 2009; OAS, “Statement of the OAS Secretary
General on the Summit of the Americas,” Press Release, February 7, 2012.
74 ALBA is a Venezuelan-led, socially-oriented trade block. It includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica,
Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Venezuela.
75 “Cuba Quiere Estar en Cumbre de las Américas de Cartagena,” Agence France Presse, February 6, 2012.
76 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, remarks during U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Assessing
U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities Amidst Economic Challenges: The Foreign Relations Budget for Fiscal Year 2013,
Hearing, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., February 29, 2012, Serial No. 112-132 (Washington: GPO, 2012), p. 11,
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/73119.pdf.
77 Declaration of Quebec City, April 2001, http://www.summit-americas.org/iii_summit/iii_summit_dec_en.pdf.
78 “Santos’ Deft Diplomacy Saves Summit from Derailment,” Latin American Weekly Report, March 8, 2012.
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voiced support for Cuba’s inclusion at the next Summit of the Americas, which is scheduled to be
held in Panama in 2015.79
Policy Considerations
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the country
through sanctions while providing support to the Cuban people. Although Members of Congress
generally have agreed on the overall goals of U.S. policy—to help bring democracy and respect
for human rights to the island—they have disagreed about how best to achieve those objectives.
Some argue that maintaining strict sanctions is the only way to produce change in Cuba. Others
argue that the United States is more likely to encourage reforms in the country by gradually
increasing engagement or even swiftly normalizing relations.
Congressional debate surrounding the potential reintegration of Cuba into the inter-American
system has largely reflected the disagreements over broader U.S. policy toward the island.
Members of Congress who support efforts to isolate Cuba have opposed any attempt to
reintegrate the country into the inter-American system. Some Members have called for the United
States to boycott the Summit of the Americas if Cuba is allowed to participate.80 Likewise, a bill
introduced in June 2012, H.R. 6067 (Ros-Lehtinen), includes provisions that would prohibit U.S.
contributions to the OAS if Cuba is allowed to participate in the organization or the Summits of
the Americas before transitioning to democracy. Conversely, some Members who support greater
U.S. engagement with Cuba have celebrated efforts that could pave the way to the country’s
inclusion in hemispheric institutions.81
Congressional actions related to Cuba’s reintegration into the inter-American system could have
broader implications for U.S. interests in the hemisphere. Congressional pressure designed to
keep Cuba out of hemispheric institutions until it embraces democracy may continue to be
successful given the desire of most countries in the region to maintain close relations with the
United States and the OAS’s reliance on consensus decision-making. However, such a policy also
sets the United States against a nearly hemispheric-wide consensus to allow Cuban participation
in the Summits of the Americas, and could continue to be a distraction at regional meetings and
an obstacle to more cohesive hemispheric relations. If Cuba is allowed to participate in the
Summits of the Americas, the United States and the rest of the region could use the meetings to
engage Cuba while still maintaining democracy and human rights as requirements for
participation in the OAS itself. At the same time, by removing democratic governance as a
precondition for participation in the summits, the nations of the hemisphere could send a signal
that their commitment to democracy is less than absolute.
79 Frank Bajak and Vivian Sequera, “US, Canada Alone at Summit in Cuba Stance,” Associated Press, April 15, 2012.
80 See, for example, Chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, remarks during U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Assessing U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities Amidst Economic Challenges: The Foreign Relations Budget for
Fiscal Year 2013 , Hearing, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., February 29, 2012, Serial No. 112-132 (Washington: GPO, 2012),
p. 11, http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/73119.pdf; and Representative David Rivera, remarks during U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Western Hemisphere Budget Review
2013: What Are U.S. Priorities?, Hearing, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., April 25, 2012.
81 See, for example, Office of Representative José Serrano, “Serrano Commends OAS Revocation of 1962 Anti-Cuba
Resolution,” Press Release, June 3, 2009.
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Application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter
Background
As noted above, OAS member states adopted the Inter-American Democratic Charter in
September 2001. The Democratic Charter begins by asserting that the peoples of the Americas
have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it. It
continues by noting that, in addition to free and fair elections, respect for human rights, the rule of
law, political pluralism, and the separation of powers are all essential elements of representative
democracy. The Democratic Charter calls on the OAS to promote democracy by carrying out
electoral observation missions (when requested) and programs designed to promote democratic
values and good governance. It also establishes mechanisms for collective action by member
states when a nation’s democratic institutions are under threat or have been overturned. The
Democratic Charter states that “an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order” in a
member state is “an insurmountable obstacle to its government’s participation” in the OAS, and
allows the General Assembly to vote on suspension if diplomatic initiatives to restore democracy
are unsuccessful.82
Since its adoption, there has been considerable debate within the hemisphere about how the
provisions of the Inter-American Democratic Charter should be applied. While observers have
called on member states to invoke the collective action mechanisms of the charter on numerous
occasions, the OAS has only done so in a few cases. Analysts have identified three main inter-
related factors that have limited the operational scope of the Democratic Charter:
• tension between the principle of non-intervention enshrined in the OAS Charter83
and the obligation to defend democracy through collective action;
• the lack of precise criteria for defining when a country has experienced a
breakdown in the democratic order, and
• the inability of powers outside the executive branch to effectively access the
OAS.84
Although OAS member states accepted that democratic breakdowns justify collective action
when they adopted the Democratic Charter, they also placed limits on the charter’s application in
order to defend the principle of non-intervention. The OAS is not allowed to intervene in
situations where democratic institutions appear to be threatened unless the country requests
assistance, and collective action without a member state’s consent can only take place after a
rupture in the democratic order has already taken place.85 In Honduras, for example, polarization
between governmental institutions had been building for several months before President Zelaya
was arrested by the military and forced into exile in June 2009. The Honduran government did
82 OAS, Inter-American Democratic Charter, http://www.oas.org/OASpage/eng/Documents/Democractic_Charter.htm.
83 Article 19 of the OAS Charter states, “No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for
any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only
armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its
political, economic, and cultural elements.”
84 OAS document, CJI/RES. 160 (LXXV-O/09), Follow-up on the Application of the Inter-American Democratic
Charter, August 12, 2009, p.23.
85 See Chapter IV of the Democratic Charter, “Strengthening and Preservation of Democratic Institutions.”
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not request OAS assistance until shortly before the ouster, however, and Zelaya was removed
from office a day before an OAS Special Commission was due to arrive in the country to assess
the situation and attempt to resolve the conflict through dialogue.86 Consequently, the member
states were unable to take collective action in Honduras until the country was already in crisis.
The unanimous decision to suspend87 Honduras from the OAS and subsequent diplomatic efforts
were incapable of reversing the situation.88
The Democratic Charter’s failure to define what constitutes “an unconstitutional interruption of
the democratic order” has further limited its application. In several countries in the region,
democratically-elected leaders have engaged in actions that generally follow constitutional
procedures but eliminate checks and balances considered by many analysts to be integral to
representative democracy. Since the Democratic Charter is not clear about whether such actions
are violations, member states have been unwilling to take action, deferring instead to the principle
of non-intervention. In December 2010, for example, the outgoing Venezuelan Congress granted
President Hugo Chávez the power to legislate by decree for 18 months. Although the stated
purpose of the so-called “enabling law” was to speed recovery efforts after destructive storms in
2010, President Chávez utilized the law to approve over 50 measures ranging from rewriting the
labor code to nationalizing the gold industry.89 Secretary General Insulza and other observers
asserted that the law violated the spirit and letter of the Democratic Charter,90 however, member
states chose not to invoke it.91
The composition of the OAS has served as a third barrier to applying the Democratic Charter. The
members of the Permanent Council, who are charged with assessing democratic crises under the
charter, represent their nations’ executive branches. Accordingly, they have interpreted the
Democratic Charter’s requirement that the OAS receive consent from “the government
concerned” prior to intervention to mean consent from the nation’s executive power. As a result,
other branches of government and civil society groups are effectively unable to invoke the
charter’s collective action mechanisms. In Ecuador, for example, President Lucio Gutierrez
dissolved the Supreme Court of Justice in December 2004. Although some within the country
called for the Democratic Charter to be invoked, OAS member states took no action. It was only
in April 2005, after the Ecuadoran Congress had removed Gutiérrez and the new president,
Alfredo Palacio, requested OAS assistance, that member states sent a mission to the country.92
86 OAS, “Engagement in Honduras, November 2008-July 2009,” July 2009.
87 Honduras was the first member state to be suspended under the Inter-American Democratic Charter. OAS member
states did not lift the suspension until June 1, 2011, after an election had taken place and the Honduran government had
dropped criminal charges against Zelaya and allowed him to return to the country.
88 For more information on the political crisis in Honduras, see CRS Report R41064, Honduran Political Crisis, June
2009-January 2010, and CRS Report RL34027, Honduran-U.S. Relations, by Peter J. Meyer.
89 Ezequiel Minaya, “Chavez’s Decree Powers Expire, but Not Before Heavy Use,” Dow Jones International News,
June 18, 2012.
90 “Faced with the Democratic Charter, Chávez Beats a Hasty Retreat,” Latin American Security & Strategic Review,
January 2011.
91 For more information on democracy in Venezuela, see CRS Report R40938, Venezuela: Issues for Congress, by
Mark P. Sullivan.
92 OAS document, CP/doc. 4184/07, The Inter-American Democratic Charter, April 4, 2007, p.14.
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Policy Considerations
Democracy promotion has long been a goal of U.S. policy toward Latin America and the
Caribbean. Congress has supported successive administrations’ efforts, appropriating foreign
assistance designed to strengthen democratic governance and institutions as well as civil society
in order to hold governments accountable. In recent years, Members of Congress have lauded the
significant advances that have occurred in most of the hemisphere while raising concerns about
the declining quality of democracy in a few nations. 93
The role of the OAS in promoting democracy has been more contested. Some Members assert
that “the OAS has proven unable or unwilling” to uphold its democratic commitments,94 and have
offered a number of policy proposals designed to encourage a broader application of the
Democratic Charter. One initiative in the 112th Congress, H.R. 2542 (Mack, as reported out of the
House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere), for example, would withhold 20% of U.S.
assessed and voluntary contributions to the OAS for every Permanent Council meeting that takes
place without the Inter-American Democratic Charter being invoked to assess democracy in
Venezuela and Nicaragua. Similarly, a report to the House Appropriations Committee’s version of
the FY2013 State Department and foreign aid appropriations bill, H.R. 5857 (H.Rept. 112-494),
would direct the State Department to report on its efforts “to push the OAS to uphold all aspects
of the Charter.”
Other Members of Congress argue that, despite its flaws, the OAS is “the best thing we have to
ensure democracy in the Western Hemisphere.”95 They maintain that the organization’s electoral
observation missions and human rights bodies continue to carry out crucial work that strengthens
democracy in member states, and that the United States should coordinate more closely with U.S.
allies in the region to improve the organization. They also note that democracy activists in some
of the countries facing difficult political situations have called for continued U.S. support for the
OAS. Members of Venezuela’s democratic opposition, for example, has reportedly asserted that
cutting U.S. funding for the OAS would “jeopardize the opportunity to restore democracy and the
rule of law” in their nation.96
Although there is agreement among many Members of Congress that the OAS should apply the
Democratic Charter more broadly, there appears to be little appetite in the region—even among
U.S. allies—for such actions. Given the asymmetrical power relations and the long history of
U.S. intervention in the hemisphere, many nations are wary of establishing precedents for foreign
involvement in internal affairs.97 Indeed, they have often utilized the OAS to engage in defensive
93 See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Peace Corps and Global Narcotics Affairs, The State of Democracy in the Americas, Hearing, 112th Cong., 1st sess.,
June 30, 2011.
94 Representative Connie Mack, remarks during U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee
on the Western Hemisphere, Markup on H.R. 3401 and H.R. 2542, Hearing, 112th Cong., 1st sess., December 15,
2011, Serial No. 112-115 (Washington: GPO, 2011).
95 Representative Eliot Engel, remarks during U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on
the Western Hemisphere, Markup on H.R. 3401 and H.R. 2542, Hearing, 112th Cong., 1st sess., December 15, 2011,
Serial No. 112-115 (Washington: GPO, 2011).
96 Mary Beth Sheridan, “Venezuelan Opposition Resists Republican Measure,” Washington Post, August 6, 2011.
97 OAS document, CJI/RES. 160 (LXXV-O/09), Follow-up on the Application of the Inter-American Democratic
Charter, August 12, 2009, p.27.
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multilateralism designed to constrain unilateral U.S. action.98 Given this aversion to intervention,
the collective action mechanisms of the Democratic Charter are unlikely to be invoked in the near
term except in cases of democratic breakdowns that resemble traditional coups d’état.
Reform of the Inter-American Human Rights System
Background
Despite the inter-American human rights system’s reputation as one of the most effective parts of
the OAS, member states have regularly evaluated the work of the IACHR and recommended
potential reforms to the commission. A 2008-2009 review, for example, led the IACHR to adopt
new rules of procedure related to granting precautionary measures, processing petitions of alleged
human rights violations, referring cases to the Inter-American Court, and holding public hearings
on human rights conditions in member states. In June 2011, just a year and a half after the
IACHR’s new rules of procedure went into effect, the OAS Permanent Council initiated another
evaluation of the commission by creating the “Special Working Group to Reflect on the Workings
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with a View to Strengthening the Inter-
American System for the Protection of Human Rights.”99
Although the special working group was ostensibly established to strengthen the inter-American
human rights system, some civil society groups fear it could do the opposite.100 The impetus for
the working group’s creation—Brazil’s negative reaction to an IACHR precautionary measure
request101—suggested that the review might be more focused on constraining the actions of the
commission than supporting it. Some OAS member states’ presentations to the special working
group reinforced this perception. They included calls to adopt more stringent criteria for granting
precautionary measures, shift the focus of the IACHR’s work away from individual cases toward
general human rights promotion, remove the independent budget and staff of the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, and end the practice of identifying countries that have
human rights situations that deserve special attention in the IACHR’s annual report.102
The report that the special working group ultimately issued in December 2011 and the OAS
Permanent Council approved in January 2012 provoked a mixed reaction in the hemisphere.
While civil society groups welcomed some aspects of the report, they asserted that other portions
98 Thomas Legler, "Multilateralism and Regional Governance in the Americas," in Latin American Multilateralism:
New Directions (Ottawa: FOCAL, 2010), p. 13,
http://www.focal.ca/images/stories/Multilateralism_Compilation_Latin_American_Multilateralism_New_Directions_s
m.pdf.
99 IACHR, Position Document on the Process of Strengthening of the Inter-American System for the Protection of
Human Rights, April 8, 2012, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/pdf/PosicionFortalecimientoENG.pdf.
100 Diego Urdaneta, “OEA Aprueba Mejoras para la CIDH, pero ONG Denuncian Intento de Erosionarla,” Agence
France Presse, January 25, 2012.
101 In April 2011, the IACHR issued a precautionary measure that ordered Brazil to halt construction on a hydroelectric
dam in order to protect indigenous communities. Brazil denounced the measure as “unjustifiable,” withdrew its
Ambassador to the OAS, and withheld its assessed contribution. Ministério das Relações Exteriores, “Solicitação da
Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Humanos (CIDH) da OEA,” Nota à Imprensa N° 142, April 5, 2011; Amato, June
2012, op.cit., p.5.
102 OAS document, GT/SIDH-17/11 rev.1, Compilation of Presentations by Member States on the Topics of the
Working Group, November 7, 2011.
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“could trigger a process of weakening the inter-American human rights system.”103 The report
recognized that autonomy and independence are essential for the IACHR to carry out its mission,
recommended that member states adopt the inter-American human rights treaties to assure the
universality of the system, and called on the OAS to gradually increase the resources allocated to
the human rights bodies. At the same time, the report included some member state suggestions
that human rights defenders viewed as problematic. For example, it recommended that the
IACHR broaden (and thereby potentially weaken) the chapter of its report that currently identifies
the countries experiencing the greatest difficulties in protecting human rights by including every
country in the region and considering economic, social, and cultural rights in addition to civil and
political rights.104
Efforts to reform the inter-American human rights system are ongoing. Currently, all of the
recommendations included in the special working group’s report are non-binding, leaving the
IACHR itself to decide which changes to adopt. However, the 2012 OAS General Assembly
approved a resolution that welcomed the special working group’s report, and instructed the
Permanent Council to draw up proposals for its application to be presented to a special session of
the General Assembly no later than the first quarter of 2013. The United States attached a
footnote that indicated it would not block consensus on the resolution, but asserted that no efforts
should be undertaken to force the implementation of the non-binding recommendations.105
Policy Considerations
Members of Congress generally have expressed support for the inter-American human rights
system and opposition to any attempts to weaken it. A Senate Appropriations Committee report to
its version of the FY2012 State Department and foreign aid appropriations bill, S. 1601 (S.Rept.
112-85), for example, noted the “invaluable role of the IACHR in providing justice for victims of
human rights violations,” and expressed concern about “reports of efforts at the OAS to weaken
the authority of the IACHR in ways that would limit its autonomy and effectiveness.” Likewise,
the conference report to the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-74, H.Rept. 112-
331), stipulated that $2 million of the funds included in the bill be directed to the IACHR.
Congress might direct voluntary contributions to the inter-American human rights system once
again in FY2013. The Senate Appropriations Committee’s report to its version of the FY2013
State Department and foreign aid appropriations bill, S. 324 (S.Rept. 112-172), would direct $2
million to the IACHR, including at least $500,000 for the Office of the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression.
Some Members of Congress have suggested that the United States could better assert leadership
on human rights issues in the hemisphere by ratifying the various human rights treaties. For
103 Instituto de Defensa Legal; Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales; Due Process of Law Foundation; Centro de
Estudios de Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad; Conectas Direitos Humanos; Fundación Construir, Position of Civil Society
Organizations of the Americas on the Final Report of the Special Working Group to Reflect on the Workings of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with a view to Strengthening the Inter-American Human Rights System,
January 21, 2012.
104 Ibid; OAS document, AG/doc. 5310/12 Report of the Special Working Group to Reflect on the Workings of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights With a View to Strengthening the Inter-American Human Rights System
for Consideration by the Permanent Council, May 26, 2012.
105 OAS document, AG/RES. 2761 (XLII-O/12) Follow-Up on the Recommendations Contained in the “Report of the
Special Working Group to Reflect on the Workings of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with a View to
Strengthening the Human Rights System,” June 5, 2012.
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example, a resolution introduced in June 2011, H.Res. 312 (John Lewis), includes provisions that
would express the sense of the House of Representatives that “the United States should fully
support the inter-American human rights system, especially hemispheric conventions regarding
the rights of all persons, women, children, the disabled, marginalized communities, and the right
of expression.” To date, the United States has signed only one106 of the inter-American human
rights treaties, the American Convention on Human Rights, which the Carter Administration
submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent in 1978 (Treaty Doc. 95-21).107 The Senate has
yet to act on the treaty. Concerns that were raised in the past with regards to the American
Convention on Human Rights and other international human rights treaties included potential
conflicts with current laws and international interference in U.S. domestic affairs. While some
legal analysts have suggested that any provisions that create conflicts or concerns could be dealt
with by appending formal reservations to the treaty, others have asserted that doing so would
reinforce a sense in the region that the U.S. government acts hypocritically on human rights
issues.108
Regional Alternatives to the OAS
Background
Over the years, countries in the Western Hemisphere have formed a number of regional
organizations designed to promote economic integration and political cooperation. These include
blocs originally created to advance trade relations such as the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM), the Andean Community of Nations (CAN by its Spanish acronym), and the
Common Market of the South (Mercosur by its Spanish acronym), as well as organizations with
more political orientations such as the leftist Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA by its
Spanish acronym), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR by its Spanish acronym),
and the recently formed Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC by its
Spanish acronym). While these groups vary in size, purpose, and effectiveness, none of them
include the United States or Canada.
As countries of the hemisphere have become more independent and regional organizations have
proliferated, a number of governments have suggested that the newer organizations should take
on some of the roles that have traditionally been played by the OAS. Some leaders in the region
assert that the OAS is dominated by the United States, and is little more than a tool for U.S.
foreign policy. Consequently, they argue that the nations of the hemisphere would be better
served by replacing the OAS with CELAC, which includes all of Latin America and the
Caribbean but excludes the United States and Canada.109 Others in the region are opposed to
106 The United States also adopted the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in 1948. The U.S.
government argues that the declaration does not create legally-binding obligations and thus cannot be violated. See:
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Response of the Government of the United States of America to Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights Report 85/100 of October 23, 2000 Concerning Mariel Cubans (Case 9903),”
http://www.cidh.org/Respuestas/USA.9903.htm.
107 The text of the treaty, as received in the Senate, is available at:
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/download/?id=C0C737E4-51E1-407B-8449-761FF02BE220.
108 For a variety of views, concerns, and recommendations regarding the American Convention on Human Rights, see
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, International Human Rights Treaties, Hearings, 96th Cong.,
1st sess., November 14, 15, 16, and 19, 1979 (Washington: GPO, 1980).
109 “The Caracas Consensus,” Latin News Daily, December 2, 2011; Maye Primera, “Chávez Fracasa en el Intento de
(continued...)
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replacing the OAS, but have suggested that the smaller regional blocs may be able to complement
the organization’s work. Moreover, they argue that the these organizations may be more effective
than the OAS in certain cases, such as mediating disputes within their sub-regions.110 UNASUR,
for example, helped resolve internal political conflicts in Bolivia in 2008 and Ecuador in 2010.111
While many analysts acknowledge that the newer regional organizations can play important roles
in the hemisphere, they also note that these groups have their own flaws. There is considerable
variation among the regional organizations, however, most lack strong, independent, and well-
financed secretariats capable of receiving mandates and carrying out programs.112 Instead, they
often rely on high-level diplomacy and presidential summits, which can be useful for promoting
political dialogue, but rarely result in significant, ongoing initiatives. Given these limitations, a
number of analysts maintain that the OAS remains the pre-eminent political institution of the
hemisphere. An Inter-American Dialogue task force on the OAS, for example, asserted that “no
other organization has the necessary credibility and mandate to bring together the collective
influence of the hemisphere’s countries to resolve disputes among member states, encourage
compromise among governments on salient regional issues, credibly monitor national
government performance on sensitive concerns, and press countries to change when they violate
hemispheric norms.”113
Policy Considerations
The rise of regional alternatives to the OAS presents both potential opportunities and challenges
for the United States. One potential benefit of such organizations might be an increase in burden-
sharing in the hemisphere. As the newer organizations evolve, they may be able to take on more
responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in their sub-regions, which could enable
Congress to dedicate scarce U.S. resources to other priorities. A division of labor among various
organizations might also enable the OAS to better concentrate its efforts on its core agenda and
thereby carry out its mandates more effectively.
At the same time, an increasing role for other multilateral organizations could lead to a weaker,
more divided OAS. If other organizations take on larger roles in the hemisphere, the role of the
OAS would likely decline. Some Members of Congress argue that such a development could
weaken U.S. influence in the hemisphere since the OAS is the only multilateral organization in
which the United States is a member and shapes policy decisions.114 Moreover, the proliferation
(...continued)
que Latinoamérica Prescinda de la OEA,” El País (Argentina), December 3, 2011.
110 “Mercosur y UNASUR Pueden Ser ‘Más Efectivos’ que la OEA (Amorim),” Agence France Presse, September 11,
2010; “Insulza: ‘Organismos Subregionales Pueden Ser Más Efectivos que OEA’,” Agence France Presse, September
20, 2010.
111 “Latin America Goes It Alone as Bolivian Conflict Explodes,” Latin News Weekly Report, September 18, 2008;
“Resolution of Ecuadorean Crisis is a Victory for UNASUR,” Latin American Regional Report: Brazil & Southern
Cone, October 2010.
112 Thomas Legler and Lesley Burns, "Introduction," in Latin American Multilateralism: New Directions (Ottawa:
FOCAL, 2010), p. 6.
113 Inter-American Dialogue, June 2006, op.cit., p. 6.
114 See, for example, Representative Eliot Engel, remarks during U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Western Hemisphere Budget Review 2013: What Are U.S. Priorities?,
Hearing, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., April 25, 2012.
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of regional organizations could further weaken the hemisphere’s ability to speak with one voice.
For example, Mercosur and Unasur determined that the rapid June 2012 impeachment of
Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo constituted a break in the democratic order and sought to
isolate the country by suspending it from participation.115 Meanwhile, OAS Secretary General
Insulza drafted a report that concluded that the impeachment did not constitute a coup d’état, and
member states have reportedly decided not to suspend Paraguay.116
The impetus behind the creation of some of the new regional organizations also has implications
for the United States. Latin American leaders have established new multilateral institutions for a
number of reasons, one of which is the lingering view of many in the region that the OAS is an
institution dominated by the United States. Even as some Members of Congress assert that the
organization acts against U.S. interests, a number of policymakers in the broader region argue that
the OAS imposes U.S. policies. Given these views, some analysts maintain that “any reform to
the OAS that begins in Washington, especially in the U.S. Congress, can have the potential to
backfire” and provoke opposition in the hemisphere.117
OAS Budget Constraints
Background
The OAS has faced persistent budget shortfalls for a number of years. Member states’
contributions to the Regular Fund have remained relatively stagnant for much of the past two
decades as a result of member states’ reluctance to adjust the country quotas. At the same time,
member states have required the OAS to provide annual cost of living increases to its employees,
and have given the organization an increasing number of mandates. A recent review found that
the OAS currently has over 1,800 mandates addressing nearly every issue facing the nations of
the hemisphere.118 This combination of frozen funding levels and increasing costs and
responsibilities has created a structural deficit at the OAS.
After taking office in 2005, Secretary General Insulza repeatedly warned that the OAS would be
forced to cut programs if member states remained unwilling to increase their assessed
contributions. OAS member states approved a quota adjustment in 2006, which slightly improved
the organization’s financial situation. Annual expenditures continued to exceed revenues,
however, and the OAS had to use resources from its reserve fund and member state payments of
back dues to bridge the gap. These financial reserves were exhausted by 2009, leaving the
General Secretariat with no choice but to enact substantial budget cuts. Between 2009 and 2012,
the total OAS budget declined by 15% (not adjusted for inflation) and the General Secretariat cut
Regular Fund staff by 14%.119
115 “Brazil Calls OAS to Consider Mercosur and Unasur Statements on Paraguay,” MercoPress, July 13, 2012.
116 OAS, “Report by the Mission of the OAS Secretary General and Delegation to the Republic of Paraguay – Non
Official Version,” Press Release, July 10, 2012; “OAS Will Not Sanction Paraguay, Says Ambassador Following
Informal Meeting,” MercoPress, July 23, 2012.
117 Mauricio Cárdenas, remarks during Latin America's New Political Landscape and the Future of the Organization of
American States, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, March 15, 2010.
118 OAS document, CAAP/GT/RVPP-110/11, Chair’s Note on Methodology and Workplan for the CAAP Working
Group on Review of OAS Programs, August 8, 2011.
119 OAS, Office of the Secretary General, Program-Budget of the Organization, 2012, August, 2011; OAS document,
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Despite the considerable cuts enacted since 2009, the financial situation of the OAS remains
precarious. Even temporary delays in receiving expected revenues can lead to cash shortfalls
since the organization has exhausted its reserve fund. In 2011, for example, the OAS was forced
to borrow from its Scholarship and Training Program Fund in order to sustain daily operations
after Brazil withheld its contributions over a disagreement with the IACHR. According to the
most recent report of the Board of External Auditors, the OAS ended the 2011 fiscal year with a
deficit of $2.9 million. The organization also faces costs in excess of $39 million for the repair
and updating of its property as a result of years of deferring maintenance.120
According to OAS officials and many outside analysts, the organization’s recurring budgetary
problems are “a demoralizing institutional weakness” that constrains the organization’s ability to
plan ahead, recruit and retain top level staff, and establish priorities.121 The unwillingness of
member states to increase contributions to the Regular Fund has made the OAS more reliant on
voluntary funds that vary from year to year. OAS officials maintain that this change has made it
more difficult for the organization to make medium- and long-term plans. They also maintain that
this uncertainty makes it difficult to recruit staff and keep more qualified personnel, which in turn
has weakened the organization’s institutional identity.122 Moreover, significant personnel cuts in
recent years have reduced the organization’s capacity, and further cuts would likely force the
OAS to reduce the breadth and depth of its activities.123
Policy Considerations
OAS budget constraints offer an opportunity for Members of Congress to reflect on the utility of
U.S. participation in the organization. Those who support the OAS’s activities and would like the
organization to be as effective as possible might consider steps to shore up the organization’s
finances, such as increasing appropriations or enacting legislation to ensure U.S. funds are used
more efficiently. A bill introduced in the 111th Congress, S. 3087 (Menendez), for example, would
have called on the OAS to review and prioritize the organization’s core functions; calculate costs
and identify funding sources prior to adopting any new mandates; and adopt a transparent,
results-based budget process guided by international public sector accounting standards. On the
other hand, those who think the United States receives few benefits from its participation in the
OAS may question why the United States continues to provide the largest portion of the
organization’s budget. They might suggest that the OAS look to other member states for funding
increases, and consider directing U.S. appropriations to institutions or programs that they believe
are better able to advance U.S. interests.
The current constraints on the OAS budget also could provide significant leverage to Congress.
According to some analysts, the organization’s reliance on voluntary contributions has resulted in
(...continued)
CP/INF. 6248/11, Proposal for Financing the 2012 Program-Budget of the Organization of American States, May 13,
2011.
120 OAS document, JAE/doc. 42/12, Report to the Permanent Council: Annual Audit of Accounts and Financial
Statements for the Years Ended December 31, 2011 and 2010; April 25, 2012; “SOS por la OEA,” Semana (Colombia),
March 24, 2012.
121 Inter-American Dialogue, June 2006, op. cit. p.8.
122 OAS document, CP/INF. 6248/11, Proposal for Financing the 2012 Program-Budget of the Organization of
American States, May 13, 2011.
123 OAS document, JAE/doc. 42/12, April 2012, op.cit.
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the OAS increasingly prioritizing its efforts based on the preferences of donors.124 By directing
contributions to programs that advance U.S. objectives in the hemisphere, Congress could
provide incentives for the OAS to prioritize activities that Members support. The House adopted
legislation that could have facilitated such efforts during the 111th Congress. The bill, H.R. 2410
(Berman), included provisions to establish a Fund to Promote Multilateralism in the Americas
that could be utilized to provide voluntary contributions to the OAS “to carry out programs and
activities that support the interests of the United States.” In the 112th Congress, a bill introduced
in June 2012, H.R. 6067 (Ros-Lehtinen) also includes provisions to direct U.S. appropriations to
specific OAS programs. Rather than creating a separate pool of funding, it would transfer 50% of
the United States’ assessed contribution to the IACHR, CICAD, CICTE, and the Fund for
Strengthening Democracy. While directing U.S. funds to specific programs may increase the
OAS’s responsiveness to congressional priorities, the organization could lose some of its
legitimacy in the region if other member states believe it is no longer addressing their concerns
and is simply advancing U.S. policy.
In addition to directing appropriations to certain OAS activities, Congress could utilize its
leverage by threatening to withhold funding for the organization. As noted above, Members of
Congress have introduced several pieces of legislation that would withhold funding from the
OAS under various circumstances. While such actions could put considerable pressure on the
OAS to act, they also carry substantial risk to ongoing OAS activities. As Brazil demonstrated in
2011, even temporarily withholding funding could force the organization to take drastic actions or
bring its operations to a halt. Moreover, unless the United States chooses to renounce its
membership in the OAS, it has an obligation under the OAS Charter, which it signed in 1948 and
ratified in 1951, to pay its assessed dues.
Outlook
In 1948, Alberto Lleras Camargo, the first Secretary General of the OAS, asserted “the
organization...is what the member governments want it to be and nothing else.”125 This has held
true throughout the organization’s history with the OAS engaging in activities and adopting new
areas of focus in accordance with the decisions of member states. As an organization composed of
35 diverse nations that operates based on consensus, however, the OAS is often slow to arrive at
decisions and prone to inaction. This is especially the case when the hemisphere is ideologically
polarized or addressing contentious topics. Nevertheless, even when member states are incapable
of establishing consensus on a given issue, the OAS continues to carry out a variety of activities
to advance the organization’s broad objectives: democracy promotion, human rights protection,
economic and social development, and regional security cooperation.
As the organization’s largest financial contributor and the hemisphere’s most powerful nation, the
United States remains influential within the OAS. The organization’s objectives in the region are
largely consistent with those of the United States, and many of its activities complement U.S.
efforts. At the same time, OAS actions (or the lack thereof) do not always align with the
organization’s stated objectives, and the United States’ ability to advance its policy initiatives in
the organization has declined over the past decade. These conflicting tendencies are likely to
124 Inter-American Dialogue, June 2006, op. cit., p.8.
125 U.S.-Latin American Policymaking: A Reference Handbook, ed. David W. Dent (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1995), p.27.
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continue in the coming years, spurring on the congressional debate over the utility of the OAS for
advancing U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere.
Author Contact Information
Peter J. Meyer
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
pmeyer@crs.loc.gov, 7-5474
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