Honduran-U.S. Relations
Peter J. Meyer
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
July 25, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34027
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Honduran-U.S. Relations
Summary
Porfirio Lobo was inaugurated president of Honduras in January 2010, assuming power after
seven months of domestic political crisis and international isolation that had resulted from the
June 2009 ouster of President Manuel Zelaya. While the strength of Lobo’s National Party in the
legislature has enabled his administration to pass much of its policy agenda, Lobo has had limited
success in resolving the many challenges facing Honduras. Efforts to foster political
reconciliation, for example, have helped Honduras secure international recognition but have only
partially diminished domestic polarization. Lobo is relatively unpopular over halfway through his
four-year term with 59% of Hondurans disapproving of his performance in office in May 2012.
The poor security and human rights situation in Honduras has continued to deteriorate under
President Lobo. Honduras has one of the highest homicide rates in the world, and common crime
remains widespread. Moreover, human rights abuses—which increased significantly in the
aftermath of Zelaya’s ouster—have persisted. A number of inter-related factors have likely
contributed to this situation, including the increasing presence of organized crime, weak
government institutions, and widespread corruption. Although the government has adopted a
number of policy reforms designed to address these challenges, conditions have yet to improve.
Lobo also inherited a weak economy with high levels of poverty and inequality. Honduras
suffered an economic contraction of 2.1% in 2009 as a result of the combined impact of the
global financial crisis and domestic political crisis. Since taking office, Lobo has secured much
needed support from the international financial institutions, and has pushed a number of structural
reforms through Congress designed to restore macroeconomic stability and strengthen public
finances. Despite the government’s tight fiscal policies, the economy grew by 3.7% in 2011 and is
expected to grow 4.1% in 2012. In an attempt to improve social conditions, Lobo has begun
implementing a new conditional cash transfer program. Considerable development challenges
remain, however, as over two-thirds of Honduras’ 7.8 million citizens live in poverty.
Although relations were strained during the political crisis, the United States has traditionally had
a close relationship with Honduras. Broad U.S. policy goals in the country include a strengthened
democracy with an effective justice system that protects human rights and promotes the rule of
law, and the promotion of sustainable economic growth with a more open economy and improved
living conditions. To advance these policy objectives, the United States provides Honduras with
foreign assistance, maintains significant security and commercial ties, and engages on
transnational issues such as migration and human trafficking.
The 112th Congress has expressed considerable interest in Honduras, particularly with regards to
the state of democracy, human rights abuses, security challenges, and the treatment of U.S.
businesses. In December 2011, Congress adopted the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012,
P.L. 112-74, which contains a provision requiring the State Department to withhold 20% of the
aid appropriated for the Honduran security forces until certain human rights conditions are met.
The appropriations committees in both houses of Congress have included similar provisions in
their FY2013 appropriations bills for the State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs, H.R. 5857 and S. 3241. Additional legislation introduced in June 2011, H.R. 2200,
would limit U.S. assistance to Honduras unless the President certifies that the Government of
Honduras has settled all outstanding expropriation claims brought by U.S. companies.
This report examines current conditions in Honduras as well as issues in U.S-Honduran relations.
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Contents
Political Situation............................................................................................................................. 1
Background................................................................................................................................ 1
Political Crisis ..................................................................................................................... 3
2009 Election ...................................................................................................................... 4
Lobo Administration (2010-Present) ......................................................................................... 6
Political Reconciliation ....................................................................................................... 6
International Recognition.................................................................................................... 9
2013 Election............................................................................................................................. 9
Security and Human Rights Conditions......................................................................................... 11
Criminal Threats, Weak Institutions, and Corruption.............................................................. 12
Public Security Policies........................................................................................................... 14
Economic and Social Conditions................................................................................................... 16
Crises and Recovery................................................................................................................ 16
Social Indicators ...................................................................................................................... 17
Issues in U.S.-Honduran Relations ................................................................................................ 18
Foreign Assistance................................................................................................................... 19
Bilateral Assistance ........................................................................................................... 19
Additional Aid................................................................................................................... 20
Human Rights Conditions on Assistance .......................................................................... 22
Security Cooperation............................................................................................................... 23
Counternarcotics Cooperation........................................................................................... 23
Military Ties ...................................................................................................................... 24
Port Security...................................................................................................................... 25
Trade and Investment .............................................................................................................. 25
Migration Issues ...................................................................................................................... 27
Temporary Protected Status............................................................................................... 27
Deportations ...................................................................................................................... 28
Trafficking in Persons.............................................................................................................. 29
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Honduras.............................................................................................................. 2
Figure 2. Party Affiliation in the Unicameral Honduran National Congress................................... 5
Figure 3. Honduran Homicide Rate, 2000-2011............................................................................ 11
Figure 4. Suspected Drug Trafficking Flights, 2011...................................................................... 23
Tables
Table 1. Bilateral U.S. Assistance to Honduras, FY2008-FY2013................................................ 20
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Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 29
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Political Situation
Background
Honduras, a Central American nation of 7.8 million people, has suffered from political instability
and authoritarian governance for much of its history. The military has traditionally played a large
role in domestic politics, and essentially controlled the national government from 1963 until
1971, and again from 1972 until 1982. Hondurans elected a national constituent assembly to draft
a new constitution in 1980, and the country returned to civilian rule in 1982 following
presidential and legislative elections. Nevertheless, the military continued to operate as an
autonomous institution. While Honduras did not experience a civil conflict like those in El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, the Honduran military pursued hard-line anticommunist
security policies and was responsible for human rights abuses in the 1980s. According to the
National Commissioner for Human Rights, the Honduran security forces systematically engaged
in arbitrary detentions, torture, and extrajudicial executions, disappearing at least 179 people
between 1980 and 1992.1 During the 1990s, successive Honduran administrations took steps to
reduce the power of the military. Mandatory military service was abolished, the police and several
state-owned enterprises were removed from military control, and—after the ratification of
constitutional reforms in 1999—the military was subordinated to a civilian-appointed defense
minister.
The Liberal (Partido Liberal, PL) and National (Partido Nacional, PN) Parties have dominated
Honduran politics since the military relinquished political control in 1982. Both political parties
are considered to be ideologically center-right; however, the PL includes a small center-left wing.
The parties are oriented around personalist factions and are largely viewed as vehicles for
patronage.2 According to a number of analysts, “the objective of political competition between
the two parties has not been a competition for policies or programs, but rather a competition for
personal gain in which the public sector is turned into private benefit.”3 The PL has traditionally
had the broadest political base in the country, winning five of the eight presidential elections held
since 1982. Three smaller parties—the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata
Cristiano, DC), the Innovation and Unity Party (Partido Inovación y Unidad, PINU), and the
Democratic Unification party (Unificación Democrática, UD)—also participate in elections and
hold a few seats in the National Congress.
1 Comisionado Nacional de los Derechos Humanos (CONADEH), Los Hechos Hablan por Sí Mismos: Informe
Preliminar sobre los Desaparecidos en Honduras, 1980-1993, Second Edition, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, May 2002. An
English language translation is available at http://www.cja.org/downloads/Honduras_Report-
_%22The_Facts_Speak_for_Themselves%22.pdf.
2 J. Mark Ruhl, “Honduras Unravels,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 21, no. 2 (April 2010).
3 Honduras: A Country Study, ed. Tim L. Merrill, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Federal Research
Division, 1995), p.174. Several more recent studies of the Honduran party system offer similar analysis. See, for
example, Ramón Romero, “Los Partidos Políticos y el Estado Hondureño: Evidencias de la Miopía Partidaria,” in
Golpe de Estado: Partidos, Instituciones, y Cultura Política (Tegucigalpa: Centro de Documentación de Honduras,
2010), pp. 23-54; and Leticia Salomón, “Honduras: Golpe de Estado, Sistema de Partidos y Recomposición
Democrática,” in Honduras: Retos y Desafíos de la Reconstrucción Democrática (Tegucigalpa: Centro de
Documentación de Honduras, 2011), pp. 1-22.
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Figure 1. Map of Honduras
Source: CRS.
Manuel Zelaya of the PL was elected president in November 2005, narrowly defeating the PN’s
Porfirio Lobo. As a wealthy landowner who founded a center-left faction within the PL, Zelaya
was regarded as a moderate when he was inaugurated to a four-year term in January 2006.4 As his
term progressed, however, Zelaya advanced a number of populist policies, including a 60%
increase in the minimum wage in December 2008.5 Zelaya also forged closer relations with
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, joining initiatives such as PetroCaribe, which provides oil at
preferential discounted rates, and the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (Alternativa
Bolivariana para las Américas, ALBA), a socially-oriented trade block.6 Although Zelaya’s
populist policies helped him maintain support among certain sectors of Honduran society, they
alienated many within the traditional economic and political elite. Likewise, his administration’s
inability to achieve concrete results on a number of issues of importance—such as poverty and
violent crime—significantly weakened his public standing.
4 “Manuel Zelaya to Head Honduras and Redefine His Party,” Latin America Data Base, NotiCen, December 15, 2005;
“Country Profile: Honduras,” Economist Intelligence Unit, November 14, 2006.
5 “Elevan a L.5500 el Salario Mínimo en Honduras,” El Heraldo (Honduras), December 24, 2008.
6 It should be noted that the National Congress ratified Honduras’ entrance into both PetroCaribe and ALBA.
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Political Crisis7
On June 28, 2009, the Honduran military detained President Zelaya and flew him to forced exile
in Costa Rica. The ouster followed several months of political polarization between Honduran
governmental institutions resulting from Zelaya’s intention to hold a non-binding referendum and
eventually amend the constitution. While Zelaya insisted that the referendum was nothing more
than an opinion poll to consult the Honduran populace on the possibility of voting to convene a
constituent assembly,8 others in Honduras maintained that it was an unconstitutional attempt to
perpetuate himself in power. In the aftermath of Zelaya’s expulsion, the Honduran Supreme
Court9 produced documents asserting that an arrest warrant for President Zelaya had been issued
in secrecy on June 26, 2009 as a result of his noncompliance with judicial rulings suspending all
activities related to the referendum.10 Likewise, the Honduran National Congress ratified the
ouster by accepting an alleged letter of resignation, which Zelaya declared fraudulent, and
passing a decree that disapproved of Zelaya’s conduct, removed him from office, and named the
head of Congress, Roberto Micheletti, the president of Honduras for the remainder of Zelaya’s
term.11
The legality of Zelaya’s removal has been heavily debated; however, most legal and political
analysts—including the Truth and Reconciliation Commission appointed to investigate the
ouster—have declared Zelaya’s removal a “coup d’état.”12 They assert that although Zelaya
disobeyed judicial rulings by attempting to carry out the non-binding referendum, the Honduran
military denied the president due process by expelling him from the country. Additionally, they
maintain that the Honduran National Congress did not have any legal authority to remove Zelaya
from office, and the interim government of Roberto Micheletti was therefore unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, Micheletti and his supporters have insisted that he took office through a
“constitutional succession.”13
After assuming office in late June 2009, Micheletti remained in power for nearly seven months.
He worked with the Honduran National Congress to pass a budget that severely reduced
government expenditures, and enacted measures that annulled more than a dozen decrees and
reforms approved under Zelaya.14 Micheletti also maintained tight control of Honduran society.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), an autonomous body of the
7 For a more detailed examination of the Honduran political crisis, see CRS Report R41064, Honduran Political Crisis,
June 2009-January 2010.
8 The non-binding referendum would have asked Hondurans, “Do you agree that in the general elections of 2009, a
fourth ballot box should be installed in which the people decide on the convocation of a National Constituent
Assembly?” “Llegó el Día de Verdad,” El Tiempo (Honduras), June 28, 2009.
9 It should be noted that although the Honduran judicial system is nominally independent, in practice, it is “subject to
patronage, corruption, and political influence” according to the U.S. State Department’s Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices for 2011.
10 Poder Judicial de Honduras, Expediente Judicial Relación Documentada Caso Zelaya Rosales, July 2009.
11 “El Decreto de la Separación de Zelaya,” El Heraldo (Honduras), June 28, 2009.
12 See, for example, Edmundo Orellana, “El 28 de Junio y la Constitución,” La Tribuna (Honduras), August 1, 2009;
Tim Johnson, “All Parties Broke Law in Honduras Coup, Envoy Wrote,” McClatchy Newspapers, November 28, 2010;
and Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación, Para que los Hechos No se Repitan: Informe de la Comisión de la
Verdad y la Reconciliación, San José, Costa Rica, July 2011, http://www.cvr.hn/home/noticias/hojas-de-prensa/para-
que-los-hechos-no-se-repitan-informe-de-la-comision-de-la-verdad-y-la-reconciliacion-cvr/.
13 Roberto Micheletti, “Moving Forward in Honduras,” Washington Post, September 22, 2009.
14 “Honduras: Micheletti Prepares to Leave on High Note,” Latin News Weekly Report, January 21, 2010.
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Organization of American States (OAS), asserts that serious violations of human rights occurred
during the Micheletti government, including “deaths; an arbitrary declaration of a state of
emergency; suppression of public demonstrations through disproportionate use of force;
criminalization of public protest; arbitrary detentions of thousands of persons; cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment and grossly inadequate conditions of detention; militarization of Honduran
territory; a surge in incidents of racial discrimination; violations of women’s rights; serious and
arbitrary restrictions on the right to freedom of expression; and grave violations of political
rights.”15 Although some sectors of Honduran society strongly supported Micheletti and the
ouster of Zelaya, polling suggests that the majority of Hondurans did not.16
2009 Election
On November 29, 2009, Honduras held a general election to fill nearly 3,000 posts nationwide,
including the presidency and all 128 seats in the unicameral National Congress. Former President
of Congress and 2005 PN presidential nominee Porfirio Lobo easily defeated his closest rival,
former Vice President Elvin Santos of the PL, 56.6% to 38.1%. Three minor party candidates won
a combined 5.3% of the presidential vote.17 Lobo’s PN also won an absolute majority in the
unicameral National Congress, with 71 of the 128 seats.
The election was a major defeat for the PL, which has traditionally had the broadest base of
support in Honduras. On top of its poor presidential showing, it won just 45 seats in Congress,
down from 62 in 2005 (see Figure 2 below).18 Some analysts assert that Hondurans held the PL
responsible for the country’s political crisis as a result of Zelaya and Micheletti both belonging to
the party. Likewise, traditional PL supporters were divided over the political crisis, leading some
from the Zelaya-allied faction to stay home on election day.19
15 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Honduras: Human Rights and the Coup D'état, December
30, 2009, http://cidh.org/countryrep/Honduras09eng/Toc.htm.
16 See, for example, Orlando J. Pérez, José René Argueta, and Mitchell A. Seligson, Cultura Política de la Democracia
en Honduras, 2010, Vanderbilt University, Latin American Public Opinion Project, October 2010,
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/honduras/2010-Cultura_politica_Honduras_smaller3.pdf; and Universidad
Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas, Instituto Universitario de Opinion Publica (IUDOP), Los Hondureños y
Hondureñas Opinan Sobre la Situación Política y Evalúan el Primer Año de Gestión de Porfirio Lobo, Boletín de
Prensa, Año XXV, No.1, San Salvador, January 19, 2011, http://www.uca.edu.sv/publica/iudop/Web/2010/
boletinHonduras.pdf.
17 “TSE Confirma el Triunfo de ‘Pepe’ en las Elecciones,” El Heraldo (Honduras), December 21, 2009.
18 “Final Results in Honduras,” Latin News Daily, December 22, 2009.
19 Noé Leiva, “El Partido Liberal de Zelaya, el Gran Perdedor de los Comicios Hondureños,” Agence France Presse,
November 30, 2009; “Partido Liberal Sacrificó el Poder para Salvar Democracia,” La Tribuna (Honduras), December
3, 2009.
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Figure 2. Party Affiliation in the Unicameral Honduran National Congress
(2005 and 2009 Election Results)
Source: CRS.
There has been considerable debate—both in Honduras and the international community—
concerning the legitimacy of the November 2009 election as a result of it being held under the
Micheletti government. Supporters of the election note that the electoral process was initiated,
and the members of the autonomous Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) were chosen, prior to
Zelaya’s ouster. They also note that the candidates were selected in internationally observed
primary elections in November 2008,20 and that election day was largely21 free of political
violence.22 Nonetheless, some Hondurans and international observers have argued that the
Micheletti government’s suppression of opposition media and demonstrators prevented a fair
electoral campaign from taking place. This led to boycotts and a number of left-leaning
candidates for a variety of offices withdrawing from the election.23 It also led organizations that
traditionally observe elections in the hemisphere, such as the OAS, the European Union, and the
Carter Center, to cancel their electoral observation missions. Critics of the election also assert that
the electoral turnout, which was just under 50% (five points lower than 2005), demonstrated a
rejection of the election by the Honduran people. Supporters of the election counter this assertion
by arguing that Lobo won more absolute votes in 2009 than Zelaya did in 2005, and that the
20 Former Vice President Elvin Santos was originally ruled constitutionally ineligible to run by the TSE, but became the
PL presidential nominee after his stand-in-candidate, Mauricio Villeda, won the PL primary and Congress passed a
special decree to allow his candidacy.
21 A demonstration in San Pedro Sula by those opposed to the government of Roberto Micheletti was forcefully
dispersed on election day.
22 José Saúl Escobar Andrade, Enrique Ortez Sequeira, and David Andrés Matamoros Batso, “Honduran Elections,”
Remarks at the Inter-American Dialogue, Washington, DC, October 22, 2009; International Republican Institute,
“Hondurans Turn Out to Polls in Credible Elections: IRI’s Preliminary Statement on Honduras’ 2009 National
Elections,” November 30, 2009.
23 “Seguidores de Zelaya No Particparán en Elecciones Aunque Haya Restitución,” EFE News Service, November 8,
2009; “Renuncian Importantes Dirigentes del Liberalismo,” El Tiempo (Honduras), November 22, 2009.
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electoral rolls are artificially inflated—distorting the turnout rate—as a result of Honduras not
purging the rolls of those who have died or migrated abroad.24
Lobo Administration (2010-Present)
Porfirio Lobo was inaugurated president of Honduras in January 2010, assuming power after
seven months of domestic political crisis and international isolation that had resulted from the
June 2009 ouster of President Zelaya. Over halfway through his four-year term, President Lobo
continues to face daunting challenges. His efforts to lead Honduras out of the country’s political
crisis have produced mixed results. While initiatives such as the creation of a truth commission,
the passage of a political reform measure, and an agreement to allow former President Zelaya to
return to the country have won support from the international community, they have only partially
reduced domestic polarization. Lobo’s popularity has also suffered as a result of the perception
that the government has made little progress in addressing the public’s most pressing concerns:
deteriorating security conditions and high levels of unemployment and poverty. Although the
strength of Lobo’s National Party in the legislature has enabled his administration to secure
passage of several policies designed to address these issues, Hondurans have seen few
improvements thus far (see “Security and Human Rights Conditions” and “Economic and Social
Conditions” below). In May 2012, 59% of Hondurans disapproved of President Lobo’s
performance in office.25
Political Reconciliation
President Lobo has taken a number of steps to ease political polarization in Honduras. After being
inaugurated in late January 2010, Lobo arranged safe passage out of the country for former
President Zelaya26 and immediately signed a bill providing political amnesty to Zelaya and those
who removed him from office. The amnesty covers political and common crimes committed prior
to and after the removal of Zelaya, but does not include acts of corruption or violations of human
rights.27 President Lobo also appointed a national unity cabinet with representatives of each of the
five political parties holding seats in the National Congress, and pledged to engage in dialogue
with all sectors of Honduran society. Additionally, Lobo established a truth commission that
investigated the events surrounding the 2009 ouster, passed a constitutional reform to grant
greater power to citizen initiatives, and forged an agreement with former President Zelaya that
facilitated his return to Honduras.
Truth Commission
In April 2010, President Lobo established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate
the events surrounding the ouster of President Zelaya and to make recommendations to prevent
similar events from occurring in the future.28 Reflecting the political polarization in Honduras, the
24 “Honduras: Tug of War Between Opposition and De Facto Regime Regarding Flow of Voters,” Latin America Data
Base, NotiCen, December 3, 2009; “Final Results in Honduras,” Latin News Daily, December 22, 2009.
25 “Hondurans Disapprove of President Lobo,” Latin News Daily, May 24, 2012.
26 Zelaya had clandestinely returned to Honduras in September 2009, but was unable to leave the Brazilian Embassy
where he had taken refuge.
27 “Congreso Aprueba Amnistía para Delitos Políticos Comunes Conexos,” El Tiempo (Honduras), January 27, 2010.
28 The creation of a truth commission had previously been agreed to by Zelaya and Micheletti as part of the
(continued...)
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Truth and Reconciliation Commission was criticized throughout its operations by several sectors
of Honduran society. Some conservatives feared it could be used as a means to promote the
constitutional reforms that Zelaya proposed in the lead up to the country’s political crisis.29 At the
other end of the ideological spectrum, the leftist National Popular Resistance Front (Frente
Nacional de Resistencia Popular, FNRP)—an umbrella group of those who were opposed to
Zelaya’s removal—viewed the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as an attempt to
“whitewash” the ouster. As a result, Zelaya called on officials from his government not to
cooperate and the FNRP established an alternative commission.30
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission issued its final report in July 2011. Among other
findings, the report asserts: (1) Zelaya refused to recognize or obey orders from the judicial
branch and other governmental institutions; (2) the Honduran military partially acted on a judicial
order in detaining Zelaya but the high command’s decision to force the president into exile
violated due process and thus amounted to a coup d’état; (3) the Honduran National Congress had
no power to remove President Zelaya or name a substitute and therefore the government of
Roberto Micheletti was illegal; (4) there is no reliable evidence that President Zelaya intended to
dissolve Congress, remain in office, or directly install a national constituent assembly after
holding the non-binding referendum; (5) the November 2009 elections were legitimate; and (6)
members of the Honduran military and police killed at least 12 citizens as a result of the
disproportionate use of force to suppress political demonstrations during the Micheletti
government. The report also provides a number of recommendations to avoid similar crises in the
future. These include reforming the constitution to establish clear impeachment procedures, and
investigating, processing, and punishing those responsible for the human rights abuses that took
place in the aftermath of the ouster.31
Constitutional Reform
Since his inauguration, Lobo has also engaged various sectors of Honduran society about
potential political and constitutional reforms. As noted above, President Zelaya was advocating
constitutional reform at the time of his ouster. Zelaya, the FNRP, and others assert that the current
constitution—adopted in 1982 by a constituent assembly elected under a military government—
reinforces the political and economic exclusion of the majority of the Honduran population. They
maintain the only way to overcome this exclusion is to convene a democratic and inclusive
constituent assembly to draft a new constitution.32 Lobo, who never ruled out the idea of abstract
constitutional changes as a candidate, called for a national dialogue to discuss potential reforms in
October 2010. In February 2011, the Honduran National Congress approved a measure that
amended the constitutional provisions governing referendums and plebiscites to allow such
(...continued)
Tegucigalpa-San José Accord, which they signed in late October 2009 in a failed attempt to end the political crisis.
Although the accord fell apart almost immediately, Lobo has implemented several of its provisions since taking office.
29 Germán Reyes, “Lobo Pide No Temer a Comisión de Verdad y Avala Consulta para Constituyente,” Agencia EFE,
May 4, 2010.
30 “Zelaya Calls on Former Officials Not to Collaborate with Truth Commission,” ACAN-EFE, June 8, 2010;
“Honduran Resistance Sets Up Alternative Commission,” Latin News Weekly Report, July 1, 2010.
31 Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación, 2011, op.cit.
32 “Rafael Alegría: Queremos Constituyente Democrática y Popular,” La Tribuna (Honduras), July 4, 2011.
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citizen initiatives to address “issues of fundamental importance to national life,” potentially
including changes to the currently unalterable portions of the constitution.33
Much like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Lobo’s efforts around the issue of
constitutional reform have largely failed to reduce polarization. The FNRP and others assert that
the changes made thus far are insufficient. They note that any reforms suggested through citizen
initiatives would need to be approved by the National Congress, an institution they maintain
represents entrenched interests that benefit from the status quo. Consequently, they have
continued to push for a constituent assembly capable of drafting a new constitution.34 Likewise,
conservative elements within the traditional parties and civil society have reacted to Lobo’s
efforts with suspicion. While conceding that abstract changes may be necessary, they are opposed
to the idea of convoking a constituent assembly or any attempt to change the unalterable portions
of the constitution. They also have accused Lobo of seeking reelection and catering to small
radical groups instead of addressing real issues of national importance.35
Return of Zelaya
Although Lobo ensured Zelaya’s safe passage out of the country shortly after taking office,
Zelaya was not able to freely return to Honduras until May 2011. Following Lobo’s inauguration,
a number of countries joined with domestic groups like the FNRP in calling on President Lobo to
create the conditions necessary to allow Zelaya to return to Honduras. Lobo encouraged Zelaya to
return from exile but insisted that the former president would have to stand trial for the charges
that were brought against him following his ouster, including fraud, falsification of public
documents, and embezzlement of $2.95 million from the presidency and the Honduran Fund for
Social Investment. Zelaya insisted that the charges were politically motivated and refused to
return until they were dropped. On May 2, 2011, a Honduran court of appeals voted 2-1 to annul
the criminal charges against Zelaya due to procedural irregularities.36
With criminal charges out of the way, former President Zelaya entered into a dialogue with
President Lobo that was mediated by President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and President Juan
Manuel Santos of Colombia. On May 22, 2011, Lobo and Zelaya signed the “Accord for National
Reconciliation and the Consolidation of the Democratic System in Honduras.” Among other
provisions, the accord (1) guarantees the right of Zelaya and his exiled supporters to return to
political life in Honduras; (2) reaffirms that the Honduran government has an obligation to protect
human rights; (3) ensures that the FNRP can register as a political party; and (4) reiterates that the
recent reforms to the Honduran constitution guarantee citizens’ rights to seek national plebiscites
on issues of fundamental importance.37
33 “Honduras Congress Approves Referendums,” Latin News Daily, February 18, 2011.
34 “Rafael Alegría: Queremos Constituyente Democrática y Popular,” La Tribuna (Honduras), July 4, 2011; Frente
Amplio de Resistencia Popular, “Posicionamiento Frente Amplio de Resistencia Popular,” July 9, 2011.
35 “Anduray Postula Movimiento para Defender Constitución,” La Tribuna (Honduras), June 13, 2011; “‘Lobo y
Hernández Gastan 2,000 Millones en Política’,” La Prensa (Honduras), July 11, 2011; Unión Cívica Democrática,
“Posición de la Unión Cívica Democrática Relacionada con la Reforma del Articulo 5 de la Constitución de la
República,” November 11, 2010.
36 “Zelaya Free to Roam,” Latin News Daily, May 3, 2011; “Honduras: Zelaya Ruling Removes Final Hurdle – Or
Does It?” Latin News Weekly Report, May 5, 2011
37 “Acuerdo para la Reconciliación Nacional y la Consolidación del Sistema Democrático en la República de
Honduras,” La Tribuna (Honduras), May 23, 2011.
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International Recognition
Following the ouster of President Zelaya, Honduras was diplomatically isolated by the
international community. Although trade continued with the exception of a 48-hour blockade by
some Central American countries, the Micheletti government was not recognized by a single
nation. On July 4, 2009, the member states of the OAS invoked Article 21 of the Inter-American
Democratic Charter and unanimously voted to suspend Honduras from the organization for an
unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order.38 Honduras also lost the support of the
international financial institutions, which withheld access to loans and other transfers.
As a result of the November 2009 election and Lobo’s reconciliation attempts upon taking office,
much of the international community—including the United States, the European Union, most
Central American nations, and the international financial institutions—quickly recognized the
Lobo Administration. Many South American nations, however, expressed concerns that restoring
formal relations with Honduras would set a dangerous precedent in the region since Zelaya was
never returned to office. They excluded Honduras from regional gatherings and refused to lift the
country’s suspension from the OAS. Moreover, they indicated that recognition would be
dependent on conditions on the ground, including the ability of former President Zelaya to return
home peacefully.39
On June 1, 2011, four days after Zelaya returned from exile, Honduras was finally able to rejoin
the OAS. Noting the importance of the “Accord for National Reconciliation and the
Consolidation of the Democratic System in Honduras” negotiated between Lobo and Zelaya, the
OAS member states voted 32-1 to lift the suspension.40 Nearly all of the countries that had
previously refused to do so also began to restore official ties with Honduras. Ecuador, which was
the only country to vote against lifting the suspension, reportedly refuses to restore diplomatic
relations “so long as those serving in the Honduran government participated in the coup outright
and remain in complete impunity.”41
2013 Election
Although nearly a year and a half remain in President Lobo’s term, attention in Honduras is
increasingly turning to what could be an extremely volatile election in 2013. Polls conducted over
the past year have consistently found high levels of dissatisfaction with democracy in Honduras.
They have also found little or no confidence in almost every governmental and political
institution in the country. Political parties are among the least trusted, with several polls finding
nearly 60% of Hondurans have no confidence in them.42 As confidence in the parties has eroded,
38 Organization of American States, Resolution on the Suspension of the Right of Honduras to Participate in the OAS,
OEA/Ser.P, AG/Res/2 (XXXVII-E/09), Washington, DC, July 4, 2009.
39 “Insulza Dice que Reintegro de Honduras a OEA está Atado a Exilio de Zelaya,” Agence France Presse, February
11, 2011.
40 Organization of American States, Participation of Honduras in the Organization of American States, OEA/Ser.P,
AG/Res.1 (XLI-E/11), Washington, DC, June 1, 2011.
41 “Ecuador President Won’t Restore Ties with Honduras,” Agence France Presse, June 2, 2011.
42 See Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas (UCA) and Equipo de Reflexión, Investigación y
Comunicación, Compañía de Jesús (ERIC-SJ), Percepciones Sobre la Situación Hondureña en el Año 2011, January
2012, http://www.enlaceacademico.org/uploads/media/BOLETIN_SONDEO_2011.pdf; Centro de Estudios para la
Democracia (CESPAD), Segunda Encuesta de Opinion Ciudadana: La Continuada Crisis del Bipartidismo y la
Creciente Insatisfacción Ciudadana con la Democracia, September 2011, http://cespad.org/documentos/encuestas/
(continued...)
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so too has Hondurans’ traditional affiliation with the PL and PN.43 Moreover, public approval of
President Lobo and the PN-controlled National Congress is relatively low, and the PL remains
divided over the 2009 ouster of President Zelaya.44
Given these dynamics, the 2013 election could present an opportunity for third party political
forces or anti-system candidates to make political gains. Several new parties have registered with
the TSE over the past year. Former President Zelaya and several sectors of the FNRP launched
the Liberty and Re-foundation (Libertad y Refundación, LIBRE) party, under which they hope to
unite FNRP members and disillusioned former supporters of the PL. Human rights advocate
Andres Pavón and sectors of the FNRP that distrust Zelaya formed the Broad Political Electoral
Resistance Front (Frente Amplio Político Electoral en Resistencia, FAPER). Salvador Nasralla, a
television personality and sports commentator, created the Anti-Corruption Party (Partido
Anticorrupción, PAC) as a platform for a presidential run. And retired General Romeo Vásquez
Velásquez, the commander of the Honduran armed forces when Zelaya was deposed, founded the
Honduran Patriotic Alliance (Alianza Patriótica Hondureña, APH), a self-described civic-military
group.
These new parties will face a number of challenges. First and foremost, they lack the clientelist
networks and political party machinery of the established parties. Moreover, the cynicism of
Hondurans toward politics may be difficult to overcome. Voter abstention has increased in each
election since 1997, and those abstaining constituted a majority in 2009.45 To be successful, the
new parties will need to convince the dissatisfied majority that electoral democracy is capable of
producing real changes in Honduras. Almost 65% of Hondurans surveyed in December 2011,
however, described the new political parties as “more of the same.”46
Party primaries to select candidates for the 2013 election are scheduled to be held on November
18, 2012. President Lobo is ineligible for reelection and eight candidates are running in the PN
primary to replace him. The top contenders include President of Congress Juan Orlando
Hernández, who is backed by Lobo; Ricardo Alvarez, the mayor of Tegucigalpa; and Miguel
Pastor, who served as secretary of public works, transportation, and housing from 2010 to 2012.
The top candidates for the PL nomination are Yani Rosenthal, who served as Zelaya’s Minister of
the Presidency, and Mauricio Villeda, who served as one of Micheletti’s negotiators during the
2009 political crisis. Although LIBRE will hold primary elections for most offices, its five
internal factions have agreed to back Zelaya’s wife, Xiomara Castro, for president. FAPER will
also participate in the primaries while the other smaller parties (APH, DC, PAC, PINU, and UD)
reportedly intend to skip the primary election but compete in the 2013 general election.47
(...continued)
Segunda%20encuesta%20de%20opinion%20cespad.pdf; and Neil Nevitte, Democracy in Honduras: Political Values
and Civic Engagement in 2011, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and Hagamos
Democracia, July 2011, http://www.ndi.org/files/Democracy-in-Honduras-2011.pdf.
43 Ruhl, April 2010, op.cit.
44 UCA & ERIC-SJ, January 2012, op.cit; CESPAD, September 2011, op.cit; Nevitte, July 2011, op.cit.
45 NDI, 2009 Honduran General Elections: International Election Assessment Mission Final Report, Washington, DC,
January 27, 2010, p. 13, http://www.ndi.org/files/
NDI_Honduras_Final_Report_International_Election_Assessment_Mission_%20English.pdf.
46 UCA & ERIC-SJ, January 2012, op.cit.
47 “Movimientos de Tres Partidos Políticos a Cacería de Votos,” La Tribuna (Honduras), May 20, 2012; “600 Millones
Costarían Primarias,” La Tribuna (Honduras), July 24, 2012.
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Security and Human Rights Conditions
Honduras has long struggled to address high levels of crime and violence, but the deterioration in
security conditions has accelerated in recent years. Homicide rates have risen rapidly, from an
already high 51 murders per 100,000 residents in 2000 to a world-topping 82 per 100,000 in
2010.48 Preliminary statistics suggest that the homicide rate continued to climb in 2011, reaching
nearly 92 per 100,000 residents (see Figure 3 below).49 Common crime is also widespread. In
2011, 36% of Hondurans reported they or a family member had been the victim of a crime in the
past year.50 In addition to the extensive human cost, the deteriorating security situation has taken a
toll on the Honduran economy. The World Bank reportedly estimates that crime and violence cost
the country the equivalent of 10% of gross domestic product (GDP) annually.51
Figure 3. Honduran Homicide Rate, 2000-2011
Source: CRS presentation of data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Homicide
Statistics 2012,” and UNODC, Global Study on Homicide, 2011.
Many observers have been particularly concerned by a surge in violence against journalists and
political and social activists. The frequency of such attacks increased in the aftermath of the June
2009 ouster of President Zelaya, and the attacks have continued under President Lobo. At least 31
members of the press have been killed in Honduras since 2003, with 24 of the murders occurring
48 United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Study on Homicide, 2011. http://www.unodc.org/
documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf.
49 UNODC, “Homicide Statistics 2012,” available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html..
50 Marta Lagos and Lucía Dammert, La Seguridad Ciudadana: El Problema Principal de América Latina, Corporación
Latinobarómetro, May 9, 2012, p. 29, available at http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/LATContenidos.jsp.
51 “World Bank: Crime, Violence Cost Honduras 10 Percent of GDP Annually,” Associated Press, March 28, 2012.
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during President Lobo’s term.52 Many others have been threatened, harassed, or attacked, with
those who report on or criticize the 2009 ouster, drug trafficking, government corruption, and
human rights abuses being the most frequent targets. Human rights organizations have also
documented attacks against environmentalists, indigenous activists, human rights defenders, land
rights activists, political organizers, unionists, and members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) community.53 In the Bajo Aguan region of Honduras, for example, at least 60
people have been killed over the past three years as violence has escalated in a long-running land
dispute between peasant farmers and large landowners.54 There are indications that members of
the Honduran security forces may have been involved in some of these threats and attacks;
however, it is difficult to determine the extent of such involvement since most of the cases have
never been investigated.
Criminal Threats, Weak Institutions, and Corruption
A number of inter-related factors have likely contributed to the worsening security and human
rights situation. One aspect is the increasing presence of organized crime. An estimated 36,000
Honduran youth have ties to street gangs such as Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the 18th Street
Gang (M-18).55 These organizations engage in a wide variety of criminal activities, including
kidnapping and extortion.56 Honduras also serves as a drug-trafficking corridor as a result of its
location between cocaine-producing countries of South America and the major consumer market
in the United States. U.S.-backed security efforts over the past two decades have weakened
Colombian cartels and restricted trafficking through the Caribbean, providing incentives for
Mexican cartels to move into Central America. Consequently, more sophisticated transnational
criminal organizations, such as the Sinaloa cartel and Los Zetas, have now established a presence
in Honduras.57 Given that two-thirds of Hondurans live below the poverty line,58 a large portion
of the population may be susceptible to recruitment by these and other criminal groups.
Institutional weaknesses and corruption in the Honduran government have also contributed to
deteriorating security and human rights conditions. In 2011, the Honduran National Police had
14,500 officers and a budget of $151 million (0.9% of GDP)59—a force strength and resources
that analysts maintain are “grossly insufficient for the efficient policing of a country the size of
Honduras.”60 The police force also suffers from widespread corruption, with analysts asserting
52 CONADEH, “Lista de Periodistas Ejecutados,” Press Release, May 2012; Reporters Without Borders, “Radio
Reporter Gunned Down and TV Journalist Shot at for Second Time,” July 13, 2012.
53 At least 75 such activists were reportedly murdered between June 2009 and March 2011. IACHR, Annual Report of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2011, April 9, 2012, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2011/
TOC.asp.
54 Noé Leiva, “Se Aviva Conflicto por la Tierra en Honduras,” Agence France Presse, July 20, 2012.
55 UNODC, Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire, May 2007, http://www.unodc.org/
documents/data-and-analysis/Central-america-study-en.pdf.
56 For more information, see CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
57 Patrick Corcoran, “Mexican Cartels Expand into Honduras,” InSight Crime, April 14, 2011.
58 United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin
America, 2011, November 2011, p.13, http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/5/45175/2011-819_PSI-Summary-
WEB.pdf.
59 Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina (RESDAL), Índice de Seguridad Pública y Ciudadana en América
Latina : El Salvador, Guatemala y Honduras, 2011.
60 “Country Risk Assessment: Honduras,” IHS Jane’s Defense and Security Intelligence and Analysis, February 8,
(continued...)
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that some officers have moved beyond taking bribes or tipping off criminals to actually
participating in crimes and acting as enforcers for criminal interests.61 Some 67% of Hondurans
believe that the police force is involved in crime.62 Moreover, recent press investigations suggest
that corruption and criminality may run to the very top of the organization.63
Partially as a result of the serious flaws in the police force, Honduran presidents have repeatedly
turned to the armed forces to provide internal security. The Honduran military, however, has its
own limitations. In 2010, Honduras had roughly 8,600 military personnel, and a defense budget
of $172 million (1.1% of GDP). The Honduran military is almost entirely dependent on
international donors for functioning equipment and technology since less than 1% of the defense
budget is invested in maintenance and procurement.64 Corruption is also a problem. The military
has been linked to drug trafficking in Honduras since the 1980s,65 and recent reports suggest
some sectors continue to engage in illicit activities.66 Although the military is more respected than
the police force, it enjoys the confidence of less than 36% of Hondurans.67
Other justice sector institutions are prone to similar problems. According to the National
Commissioner for Human Rights, 80% of crimes that are reported are never even investigated.68
This reportedly stems from the failure of public prosecutors, who are charged with coordinating
investigations, to work effectively with the police to carry them out.69 Although most criminals
are never brought to justice, the Honduran prison system is still overcrowded. While Honduras’
hard-line anti-gang laws make it relatively easy to detain suspected gang members, the judiciary
is incapable of dealing with the volume of cases.70 Consequently, Honduran prisons, which have
capacity for 8,000 inmates, currently hold 13,000 prisoners—60% of whom have not been
convicted.71
This lack of capacity and susceptibility to corruption goes well beyond the security forces and
justice sector. The patronage system, which allows the political parties to place their supporters in
(...continued)
2012.
61 Edward Fox, “Dynamics of Honduran Police Corruption Narrow Chance for Reform,” InSight Crime, January 31,
2012; Diego Jiménez, “‘El Incendio en Comayagua Evidencia el Colapso del Sistema,’” La Nación (Costa Rica),
February 26, 2012.
62 UCA & ERIC-SJ, January 2012, op.cit.
63 Frances Robles, “Graft, Greed, Mayhem Turn Honduras into Murder Capital of World,” Miami Herald, January 22,
2012; Daniel Valencia Caravantes, “Así es la Policía del País Más Violento del Mundo,” El Faro (El Salvador), March
19, 2012; and Katherine Corcoran and Martha Mendoza, “New Honduras Top Cop Once Investigated in Killings,”
Associated Press, June 1, 2012.
64 RESDAL, Comparative Atlas of Defence in Latin America and Caribbean, 2010.
65 Mark B. Rosenberg, “Narcos and Politicos: Politics of Drug Trafficking in Honduras,” Journal of Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2/3, (Summer-Autumn 1988).
66 Geoffrey Ramsey, “Cable: Honduran Military Supplied Weaponry to Cartels,” InSight Crime, April 25, 2011; “In
Brief – Honduras: Soldiers Done for Munitions Theft,” Latin News Daily, June 26, 2012.
67 In comparison, 23.3% of Hondurans express confidence in the police force. UCA & ERIC-SJ, January 2012, op.cit.
68 CONADEH, “Impunidad,” Press Release, April 2012.
69 “Policías y Fiscales son un ‘Desastre’ en la Investigación Criminal,” El Heraldo (Honduras), April 11, 2012; “La
Investigación es Problema de País, Admite Directora de Fiscalías en Honduras,” El Heraldo, (Honduras), April 15,
2012.
70 Hannah Stone, “Honduras Prison Fire Tells of Repressive Anti-Gang Policies,” InSight Crime, February 16, 2012.
71 “Honduras Crea Instituto para Atender Severa Crisis de las Cárceles,” Agence France Presse, April 11, 2012.
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government positions after each election, has prevented the development of a professional civil
service. As a result, Honduran officials often lack technical expertise and rarely engage in long-
term strategic planning.72 Likewise, Honduras ranks near the bottom of the Western Hemisphere
in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index, suggesting public-sector
corruption is relatively widespread.73 This apparently includes infiltration by organized crime.
According to Alfredo Landaverde—a well-respected anti-corruption advocate and former head of
the Anti-Narcotics Commission who was assassinated in December 201174—10% of the members
of the Honduran National Congress are involved in drug-trafficking.75
Public Security Policies
Recent Honduran presidents have implemented varying anti-crime strategies, but none of them
have achieved much success. During his term, President Ricardo Maduro (2002-2006) increased
the size of the police force, sent the military into the streets, and implemented hard-line anti-gang
policies that made membership illegal and punishable with 12 years in prison. Although the
crackdown won popular support and initially reduced crime, its success was short-lived. President
Zelaya (2006-2009) replaced the previous administration’s zero-tolerance policy with dialogue
and other efforts to reintegrate gang members into society. Failure to achieve concrete results,
however, led the Zelaya Administration to shift its emphasis toward more traditional law
enforcement operations. The deterioration in security conditions accelerated in the aftermath of
Zelaya’s ouster, as Roberto Micheletti (2009-2010) reoriented the security forces away from
combating organized crime to controlling the population.76 Some analysts assert that the ouster
also exacerbated the situation by reinforcing the general sense of impunity in Honduras.77
Since taking office, President Lobo has undertaken a number of initiatives in an attempt to
improve security conditions in Honduras. Working with the National Congress, he has enacted
significant changes in the country’s legal framework. These include a law against terrorism
finance; a reform to allow 48-hour detentions; regulations to allow asset forfeiture and
wiretapping; and a constitutional amendment to allow the extradition of Honduran citizens in
cases of drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism. Lobo and the National Congress also
increased taxes on the mining, telephone, and other industries to increase funding for security
efforts. The tax package was partially rolled back, however, as a result of fierce private sector
opposition.78 Many of these legal changes are still in the process of implementation.
In reaction to a series of scandals in which the police were implicated in murders and other
criminal activities, Honduran officials established two commissions to reform the police force
72 Romero, 2010, op.cit.
73 On a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean), Honduras receives a score of 2.6. Transparency International,
Corruption Perceptions Index 2011, 2011, http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/.
74 Just days before he was assassinated, Landaverde appeared on a television program and stated that he had a list of
Honduran officials tied to organized crime and drug-trafficking.
75 Tim Johnson, “Drug Gangs Muscle into New Territory: Central America,” McClatchy Newspapers, April 21, 2011.
76 James Bosworth, Honduras: Organized Crime Gaining Amid Political Crisis, Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars, Working Paper Series on Organized Crime in Central America, December 2010,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Bosworth.FIN.pdf.
77 See, for example, Annie Murphy, “‘Who Rules in Honduras?’ Coup’s Legacy of Violence,” National Public Radio,
February 12, 2012.
78 “Honduras Cuts Security Tax After Angering Businesses,” Reuters, September 14, 2011.
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and other justice sector institutions. In December 2011, the National Congress created the
Directorate for the Investigation and Evaluation of the Police Career. It will replace the former
Internal Affairs Unit of the police, which was reported to be rather ineffective.79 In January 2012,
the National Congress established a Public Security Reform Commission. It is empowered to
investigate the police, the public prosecutor’s office, and the judiciary, and suggest reforms to
strengthen the institutions and reduce corruption.80 Although the commissions were slow to begin
operations, leading some observers to question the Honduran government’s commitment to
justice sector reform,81 both are now carrying out investigations.82
Following in the footsteps of his predecessors, Lobo has also ordered the armed forces into the
streets to support internal security efforts. He has deployed the military to carry out joint
operations with the police on several occasions, and in late November 2011, the Honduran
National Congress approved a decree to temporarily allow military personnel to carry out raids,
make arrests, disarm people, and act against police officers that are involved in criminal
activities. The emergency decree providing the military with broad policing powers has been
extended twice, and is now scheduled to remain in force into September 2012.83 Some Honduran
officials have suggested making the military’s role in policing permanent, either by amending the
constitution or creating a new gendarmerie-style force.84
A number of analysts have raised concerns about this increasing reliance on the military for
domestic security. Some assert that the military has begun to carve out a larger role for itself in
internal affairs since playing a leading role in the 2009 ouster of President Zelaya, and argue that
this is a worrying trend since the military repeatedly took control of the country prior to 1982 and
was only subordinated to civilian control in the late 1990s.85 U.S. military officials argue that
utilizing the Honduran military for domestic security matters “is a necessary initial step to help
curb the rising tide of violence,” but maintain that such an approach “is unsustainable in the long
term.”86
Although some of these security policies—such as police reform—could improve human rights
conditions in Honduras, the Honduran government has offered few initiatives specifically
designed to do so. President Lobo has created a new Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, and
provided the Human Rights Unit in the Attorney General’s Office with an independent budget for
79 “Cisma en la Policía Nacional: 60 Días de Escándalos,” El Tiempo (Honduras), December 22, 2011.
80 “Honduras: Lobo Makes Move to Purge Police,” Latin American Weekly Report, February 2, 2012.
81 “Proceso de Depuración Policial en Honduras está Estancado,” La Prensa (Honduras), April 11, 2012; “‘Gobeirno
Siembra la Incertidumbre,’” La Prensa (Honduras), April 5, 2012.
82 “Fiscal Denuncia Campaña de Odio,” El Heraldo (Honduras), June 26, 2012; “Solcitarán Estudio de la Declaración
Jurada de Bienes de 21 Policías,” El Heraldo (Honduras).
83 “Gobierno de Honduras Extiende Facultades Policiales a Militares por 90 Días Más,” El Heraldo (Honduras), June
26, 2012.
84 “Honduras: Lobo Leans Towards a Permanent Military-Security Role,” Latin American Regional Report: Caribbean
& Central America, April 2012; “Honduras Politics: Quick View – New Measures are Put in Place to Combat Crime,”
Economist Intelligence Unit, June 29, 2012.
85 See, for example, Thelma Mejía, “Honduras: Putting Defense in the Hands of Civilians,” Inter Press Service,
October 4, 2011; and Geoffrey Ramsey, “New Powers for Honduran Military Will Not Clean Up Law Enforcement,”
InSight Crime, November 30, 2011.
86 General Douglas M. Fraser, United States Air Force Commander, Posture Statement Before the 112th Congress,
House Armed Services Committee, United States Southern Command, March 6, 2012, p. 24, http://armed-
services.senate.gov/statemnt/2012/03%20March/Fraser%2003-13-12.pdf.
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the first time. Lobo has also acknowledged that the Honduran government lacks investigatory
capacity, and has requested international assistance to resolve human rights cases.87 Human rights
organizations maintain that these efforts have been insufficient. They criticize the Lobo
Administration for repeatedly dismissing the possibility that attacks against journalists and
activists might be related to the victims’ professions or activism, and for failing to hold
accountable those responsible for such attacks.88
Economic and Social Conditions
With a gross national income (GNI) of $15.3
billion (2011) and a per capita income of $1,970,
Honduras in Brief
Honduras is classified by the World Bank as a
Approximate Size: Slightly larger than Virginia
lower-middle-income developing country.89 The
Population (2011): 7.8 million
Honduran economy has historically been dependent
Ethnic Groups: 90% Mestizo (mixed Amerindian
on agricultural exports such as coffee and bananas.
and European), 7% Amerindian, 2% black, 1% white
While these commodities remain important, the
Religions: 65% Roman Catholic, 35% Protestant
Honduran economy has grown more diversified as
a result of significant growth in nontraditional
Official Language: Spanish
sectors such as shrimp farming and the
GNI (Atlas Method, 2011): $15.3 billion
maquiladora, or export-processing industry. In
GNI per Capita (Atlas Method, 2011): $1,970
1998, Honduras was devastated by Hurricane
Mitch, which killed more than 5,000 people and
Poverty Rate (2010): 67.4%
caused billions of dollars in damage. The economy
Indigence Rate (2010): 42.8%
contracted by 1.4% in 1999, but rebounded with
Adult Literacy Rate (2007): 84%
average annual growth of 5% between 2000 and
2008.90 During the same time period, international
Life Expectancy (2010): 73 years
financial institutions provided Honduras with $2.4
Infant Mortality (2010): 20 per 1,000 live births
billion in debt relief to free government resources
Sources: World Bank, U.S. State Department
for poverty alleviation efforts. 91
(size, ethnic groups, and religions), and the U.N.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (poverty and indigence rates).
Crises and Recovery
The global financial crisis and domestic political crisis took a significant toll on Honduras. As an
open economy that is closely tied to the United States, Honduras is sensitive to international
downturns. By early 2009, Honduras was experiencing significant declines in remittances,
87 “Honduras Pide Ayuda a Colombia, España, y EEUU en Investigación Sobre DDHH,” Agence France Presse,
January 27, 2011.
88 Human Rights Watch, World Report, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-chapter-honduras;
Committee to Protect Journalists, Attacks on the Press in 2011, 2012, http://www.cpj.org/
attacks_on_the_press_2011.pdf.
89 World Bank, “Data: Honduras,” http://data.worldbank.org/country/honduras.
90 “Honduras: Country Data,” Economist Intelligence Unit, February 2011.
91 International Monetary Fund (IMF), “IMF and World Bank Support US$1 Billion in Debt Service Relief for
Honduras,” Press Release No. 05/76, April 5, 2005; Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), “IDB Governors
Approve $4.4 Billion in Debt Relief for Bolivia, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua,” Press Release, March 16,
2007.
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tourism, and export earnings as a result of the global financial crisis and U.S. recession.92 The
ouster of President Zelaya exacerbated these economic problems, as the international community,
which had been expected to finance 20% of the government’s budget,93 imposed a series of
economic sanctions on Honduras. International financial institutions withheld access to loans and
other transfers, the European Union and United States terminated some foreign aid, and
Venezuela stopped supplying the country with subsidized oil. Domestic opponents of the ouster
placed additional pressure on the economy, engaging in strikes, transportation blockades, and
other measures designed to paralyze economic activity. Curfews implemented by the Micheletti
government to suppress demonstrations by the political opposition further inhibited economic
activity as workers were unable to reach their places of employment. These external and internal
shocks contributed to an economic contraction of 2.1% in 2009.94
Upon taking office in January 2010, President Lobo inherited a weak economy and a growing
budget deficit. He entered into negotiations with the international financial institutions, and
quickly secured an emergency stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
as well as much needed development financing from the World Bank and Inter-American
Development Bank. Under the agreements, Lobo committed to undertaking structural reforms
designed to restore macroeconomic stability and strengthen public finances. The Honduran
National Congress has approved several of the structural changes, including a tax reform
designed to increase revenue, an energy reform to more narrowly target subsidies, a reform of
public sector pension funds designed to make them more sustainable, and a measure de-indexing
teachers’ wages from changes in the minimum wage in an effort to slow the growth of
expenditure on public sector salaries.95 These changes, along with improving economic
conditions in the United States, have helped narrow the Honduran central government’s deficit
from 6.2% of GDP in 2009 to an estimated 3.4% of GDP in 2012. Despite these tight fiscal
policies, the economy grew by 3.7% in 2011 and is expected to grow by 4.1% in 2012.96 The
recovery remains fragile, however, and the government’s budget constraints leave little room for
counter-cyclical spending should the international economic situation worsen.
Social Indicators
Honduras remains one of the poorest and most unequal countries in Latin America. Nevertheless,
international debt relief and higher levels of economic growth over the past decade have allowed
the Honduran government to dedicate more resources to poverty alleviation efforts. Between
2002 and 2009, public social spending increased from 9.5% of GDP to 11.4% of GDP.97 During
the same time period, poverty fell from about 77% to 66% and indigence fell from about 54% to
42%. Both poverty and indigence slightly increased in the aftermath of the global financial crisis
92 “Honduras: Country Report” Economist Intelligence Unit, April 2009.
93 Robin Emmott, “Aid Freeze in Post-Coup Honduras Hurting Poor,” Reuters, November 12, 2009.
94 “Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, May 2012.
95 “Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, December 2010; IMF, Honduras: Letter of Intent,
Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding, September 10,
2010; IMF, “Statement by an IMF Mission at the Conclusion of its Visit to Honduras,” Press Release No.12/43,
February 9, 2012.
96 “Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, May 2012.
97 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America, 2010, November 2010, p.156, http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/1/
41801/PSI2010-Chapter-III-Social-Spending.pdf.
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and domestic political crisis, however, reaching 67% and 43%, respectively, in 2010.98 The
reduction in the poverty rate has not been accompanied by a reduction in income disparities. The
top 10% of Hondurans received 43% of all income in 2010, which is more than the bottom 80%
combined and a level virtually unchanged from 1999.99 Likewise, there continue to be significant
barriers to social mobility. According to a 2010 World Bank report, just 51% of the basic housing
and education services necessary to succeed in life are available and distributed equitably among
Honduran children.100
The Lobo Administration is currently implementing policy reforms designed to strengthen the
Honduran social protection system. When Lobo took office, Honduras had a number of social
assistance programs that offered varying levels of coverage and were not well coordinated. Lobo
has begun consolidating several of these programs under his Bono 10,000 initiative, which
provides an annual stipend of 10,000 Lempiras (about $525) to families in extreme poverty. In
exchange, the families agree to keep their children in school and attend regular preventative
health check-ups. The program currently reaches at least 229,000 households, and is expected to
incorporate 600,000 families by the end of 2014. The World Bank expects Bono 10,000 to have a
significant impact on household income, but is concerned that Honduras may not be able to
sustain the program once it reaches its full projected coverage.101
Issues in U.S.-Honduran Relations
The United States has had close relations with Honduras over many years. The bilateral
relationship became especially close in the 1980s when Honduras returned to civilian rule and
became the lynchpin for U.S. policy in Central America. At that time, the country was a staging
area for U.S.-supported excursions into Nicaragua by the Contra forces attempting to overthrow
the leftist Sandinista government. Economic linkages also intensified in the 1980s after Honduras
became a beneficiary of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which provided duty-free importation of
Honduran goods into the United States. Bilateral economic ties have further expanded since the
entrance into force of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA-DR) in 2006.
Relations between the United States and Honduras were strained in 2009 because of the country’s
political crisis. The Obama Administration quickly condemned the June 28 ouster, and, over the
course of the following months, leveled a series of diplomatic and economic sanctions designed
to pressure Honduran officials to restore Zelaya to power. The Administration limited contact
with the Honduran government, suspended some foreign assistance, minimized cooperation with
the Honduran military, and revoked the visas of members and supporters of the Micheletti
government. Micheletti reacted angrily to U.S. policy toward Honduras, reportedly declaring, “it
isn’t possible for anyone, no matter how powerful they are, to come over here and tell us what we
98 ECLAC, November 2011, op.cit.
99 ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2011, December 2011, p. 68,
http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/8/45608/LCG2513b.pdf.
100 José R. Molinas et al., Do Our Children Have a Chance? The 2010 Human Opportunity Report for Latin America
and the Caribbean, World Bank, Conference Edition, Washington, DC, 2010, p. 52, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTLACREGTOPPOVANA/Resources/840442-1260809819258/6645553-1273515611898/Livro2010_final1.pdf.
101 World Bank, Project Information Document, Appraisal Stage: HN-Social Protection, Report No.AB5677, May 17,
2010; World Bank, Information Status & Results: Honduras Social Protection, Report No.ISR5625, July 12, 2011.
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have to do.”102 In November 2009, the Administration shifted the emphasis of U.S. policy from
reversing Zelaya’s removal to ensuring the legitimacy of previously scheduled elections.
Although some analysts argued that the policy shift allowed those behind the ouster to
consolidate their hold on power, Administration officials maintained that elections had become
the only realistic way to bring an end to the political crisis.103
Relations have improved considerably since the inauguration of President Lobo, whose efforts to
foster national reconciliation in Honduras led the United States to restore foreign assistance and
resume cooperation on other issues. Current U.S. policy objectives in Honduras include (1)
improving the human-rights climate, especially regarding allegations that journalists and other
individuals have been targeted for their political views; (2) combating high levels of corruption,
crime, and drug-trafficking; and (3) promoting and implementing social and economic reforms to
boost growth and reduce poverty and inequality levels that are among the highest in the
hemisphere.104 To advance these policy objectives, the United States provides Honduras with
foreign assistance, maintains significant security and commercial ties, and engages on
transnational issues such as migration and human trafficking.
Foreign Assistance
The United States has provided considerable amounts of foreign assistance to Honduras over the
past three decades. In the 1980s, the United States provided about $2.5 billion (constant 2010
dollars) in economic and military aid to Honduras as the country supported U.S. policy objectives
in the region. In the 1990s, U.S. assistance to Honduras began to wane as regional conflicts
subsided and competing foreign assistance needs grew in other parts of the world. Hurricane
Mitch changed that trend as the United States provided significant amounts of aid to help the
country recover from the 1998 storm. As a result of the influx of aid, total U.S. assistance to
Honduras for the 1990s amounted to around $1.2 billion (constant 2010 dollars). With Hurricane
Mitch funds expended by the end of 2001, U.S. foreign aid levels to Honduras again began to
decline. From 2000 to 2009, total U.S. assistance to Honduras amounted to just over $900 million
(constant 2010 dollars).105
Bilateral Assistance
U.S. bilateral assistance to Honduras supports a variety of projects designed to strengthen
democracy and the rule of law, enhance citizen security, improve health systems, increase food
security, and conserve the environment. Recent bilateral U.S. assistance to Honduras amounted to
$50.3 million in FY2010, $56 million in FY2011, and is scheduled to total an estimated $57
million in FY2012. Honduras would receive $58.2 million under the Obama Administration’s
request for FY2013. This includes $49 million in Development Assistance, $5.5 million for
102 Carlos Salinas, “Honduran De Facto Leader Vows to Cling to Power Over US Objections,” El País (Spain), August
5, 2009.
103 Ginger Thompson, “U.S. Tries to Salvage Honduras Accord,” New York Times, November 10, 2009.
104 Testimony of Craig Kelly, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, before the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, March 18, 2010.
105 These figures represent actual obligations, not appropriations, from all U.S. agencies. U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-
September 30, 2010, 2012.
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Global Health Programs, $3 million in Foreign Military Financing, and $650,000 for International
Military Education and Training (see Table 1 below). Most assistance to the country is managed
by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Department of State.
Table 1. Bilateral U.S. Assistance to Honduras, FY2008-FY2013
(U.S. $ in thousands)
FY2012
FY2013
Account FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011
(Estimate)
(Request)
DA
15,149 21,382 37,491 42,266 46,266 49,000
GHP (USAID)
12,035
11,750
11,000
10,988
8,000
4,500
GHP
(State)
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
P.L.
480
10,150
5,771 0 0 0 0
INCLE 744 0 0 0 0 0
IMET
936 329 777 765 700 650
FMF 496
0
0
998
1,000
3,000
Total
40,510 40,232 50,268 56,017 56,966 58,150
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Years 2010,
2011, 2012, and 2013, http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/index.htm.
Notes: DA=Development Assistance; GHP=Global Health Programs; P.L. 480=Food For Peace;
INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; IMET=International Military Education and
Training; and FMF=Foreign Military Financing.
Additional Aid
Honduras receives some U.S. aid beyond the bilateral assistance noted above. Additional sources
of U.S. assistance in recent years include the Central America Regional Security Initiative, the
Department of Defense, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the Peace Corps.
Central America Regional Security Initiative106
Honduras receives some assistance provided to Central America through the Central America
Regional Security Initiative (CARSI, formerly known as Mérida-Central America), which is
funded through the State Department’s Western Hemisphere Regional account. In addition to
providing the seven nations of Central America with equipment, training, and technical assistance
to support immediate law enforcement and interdiction operations, CARSI is designed to
strengthen the capacities of governmental institutions to address security challenges and the
underlying conditions that contribute to them. Congress has appropriated $496.5 million for the
countries of Central America through CARSI since FY2008, and the Obama Administration has
requested an additional $107.5 million to be provided through CARSI in FY2013. It is unclear
what percentage of that funding goes to Honduras since the State Department has not provided a
public breakdown of CARSI funding by country.
106 For more information, see CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and
Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.
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CARSI supports a wide variety of activities in Honduras. Some U.S. agencies are using CARSI
funds to establish and support specially-vetted units and task forces. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) vetted units and a U.S.-
Honduran joint Financial Crimes Task Force receive equipment and training in support of
complex investigations into drug trafficking, money laundering, and arms and bulk cash
smuggling. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) leads a Transnational Anti-Gang unit
designed to interrupt criminal gang activity. A Special Victims Task Force—consisting of vetted
members of the Honduran National Police, the Public Ministry, and U.S. advisors—is looking
into high profile violent crime cases, such as the persecution of journalists and members of the
LGBT community. Other CARSI-funded efforts to strengthen Honduran institutions include
support for a joint Criminal Investigative School, and border and prison management reforms.
CARSI funds are also being utilized to support civil society and municipal government
prevention programs. At least 25 community outreach centers have been established to provide
vocational training, employment resources, and other opportunities for at-risk youth.107
Department of Defense
The U.S. Department of Defense provides Honduras with additional security assistance. Congress
has authorized the Department of Defense to provide certain types of support for foreign
counterdrug efforts, including training, equipment, infrastructure, transportation, reconnaissance,
and intelligence analysis.108 In recent years, this has included the construction of Honduran naval
bases in Caratasca and on the island of Guanaja, both of which are designed to enhance
Honduras’ capabilities to detect and interdict illicit drug shipments in high volume maritime
trafficking corridors.109 Estimated direct and indirect Department of Defense counternarcotics
support totaled $8.5 million in FY2011, and is expected to total $4.9 million in FY2012, and $4.4
million in FY2013.110
Millennium Challenge Corporation
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) provided Honduras with a five-year, $205
million111 economic growth compact, which was completed in September 2010. The compact had
two components: a rural development project to provide farmers with skills to grow and market
new crops, and a transportation project to improve roads and highways to link farmers and other
businesses to ports and major production centers in Honduras.112 In January 2011, MCC
announced that it would not be renewing the compact. Although Honduras passed 16 of 20
indicators on the MCC scorecard, it performed below the median on corruption, which is a “pass-
fail” indicator for compact eligibility. Nevertheless, MCC has declared Honduras eligible for a
107 U.S. Embassy in Honduras, “Current CARSI Projects in Honduras,” March 6, 2012.
108 For more information on Department of Defense counterdrug authorities, see CRS Report RL34543, International
Drug Control Policy, by Liana Sun Wyler.
109 “Central America: Behind the Growing Presence of the US,” Latin American Security & Strategic Review, July
2010; U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2010 DoD Foreign Counterdrug Activity Report, April 4, 2011.
110 These are estimates as the Department of Defense budgets its counternarcotics assistance by program rather than by
country. U.S. Department of Defense, Counternarcotics (CN) Support for Foreign Countries, February 17, 2012.
111 The compact was originally for $215 million, but the final $10 million was terminated as a result of the 2009 ouster
of President Zelaya.
112 Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), “Honduras Compact: Raising Incomes, Realizing Dreams” November
3, 2010.
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Threshold Program of up to $20 million in FY2012. The Threshold Program would likely address
economic growth and policy barriers to a second compact.113
Peace Corps
The Peace Corps, which had been active in Honduras since 1963, pulled all 158 of its volunteers
out of Honduras in January 2012 as a result of security concerns.114 The volunteers worked on
projects related to HIV/AIDS prevention and child survival; protected area management; water
and sanitation; and business, municipal, and youth development. The Peace Corps conducted a
thorough assessment of the program and security conditions in Honduras in February 2012, and is
currently analyzing the feasibility of establishing a smaller program in the country. More than
5,500 Americans have served in Honduras since the program was founded.115
Human Rights Conditions on Assistance
Since the 2009 ouster of President Zelaya, Members of Congress have expressed serious concerns
about the human rights situation in Honduras. A provision in the Consolidated Appropriations Act
of 2012 (P.L. 112-74) requires the State Department to withhold some assistance for the
Honduran security forces until certain human rights conditions are met. According to the
legislation, 20% of the funds appropriated for the Honduran military and police forces must be
withheld until the Secretary of State reports that: “the Government of Honduras is implementing
policies to protect freedom of expression and association, and due process of law; and is
investigating and prosecuting in the civilian justice system, in accordance with Honduran and
international law, military and police personnel who are credibly alleged to have violated human
rights, and the Honduran military and police are cooperating with civilian judicial authorities in
such cases.” The restriction does not apply to “assistance to promote transparency, anti-
corruption, and the rule of law within the military and police forces.” Nor does it apply to any of
the security support being provided by the U.S. Department of Defense.
The appropriations committees in both houses of Congress have included similar provisions in
their FY2013 appropriations bills for the State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs. S. 3241 (Leahy), which was introduced in the Senate on May 24, 2012, would
maintain the reporting requirements and exceptions enacted in FY2012, but would increase the
percentage of aid to the Honduran military and police that the State Department must withhold to
25%. H.R. 5857 (Granger), which was introduced in the House on May 25, 2012, would maintain
the withholding and reporting requirements from FY2012 while adding an additional exception
for “assistance to combat drug trafficking and related violence.”
113 MCC, “Report on Selection of Eligible Countries for Fiscal Year 2012,” December 2011.
114 “158 Peace Corps Volunteers Leave Honduras,” Associated Press, January 16, 2012.
115 Peace Corps, “Frequently Asked Questions: Peace Corps Operations in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala,”
May 2012.
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Security Cooperation
U.S.-Honduran security cooperation goes well beyond the provision of foreign assistance. Among
other initiatives, the two countries work together on counternarcotics efforts, maintain close
military ties, and cooperate on port security issues.
Counternarcotics Cooperation
Honduras is a major transshipment point for illicit narcotics. The U.S. government estimates that
20% of the illicit flow of drugs to the United States is transported through the air,116 and 79% of
cocaine smuggling flights departing South America land in Honduras (see Figure 4).117 Such
flights reportedly spiked during the country’s political crisis as the Micheletti government
reoriented security forces toward controlling the population and the United States reduced
assistance and limited contact with Honduran officials.118 Remote areas that lack state presence,
such as the Mosquitia region along Honduras’ northeastern coast, have been particularly
vulnerable to drug trafficking flights. After the planes land in Honduras, the cocaine continues on
toward the United States on subsequent flights or through maritime corridors and overland routes.
Figure 4. Suspected Drug Trafficking Flights, 2011
Source: CRS adaptation of image provided by Joint Interagency Task Force-South, 2012.
116 Information provided to CRS by Joint Interagency Task Force-South, 2012.
117 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report (INCSR), March 7, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2012/vol1/
184100.htm#Honduras.
118 Bosworth, December 2010, op.cit.
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Coordination between the U.S. and Honduran governments on counternarcotics efforts has
improved substantially since President Lobo took office. A high-level task force, co-chaired by
Lobo and the U.S. Ambassador, convenes quarterly to oversee and direct coordination on security
issues. Additional counternarcotics support reportedly has been provided through the DEA’s
Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team (FAST) program, which deploys detachments of
military-trained special agents to train, mentor, and work with specially vetted members of local
security forces.119 This closer cooperation was demonstrated during Operation Anvil, a 90-day air
interdiction program that ran from mid-April to mid-July 2012. Under the operation, six
helicopters that the State Department had provided to Guatemala through CARSI were transferred
to Honduras to intercept suspected drug smuggling flights. The helicopters were piloted by
Guatemalans and contractors, and carried vetted members of the Honduran police as well as DEA
advisors.
Closer U.S.-Honduran counternarcotics cooperation has improved drug interdiction, but it has
also generated controversy. In 2011, the Honduran government (with U.S. support) interdicted
over 22 metric tons of cocaine, which is four times the amount interdicted in 2010.120 Under
Operation Anvil, Honduran and U.S. authorities reportedly interdicted at least five planes and 2.3
metric tons of cocaine.121 The operation also led to at least six deaths, however, sparking backlash
among some sectors of Honduran society. A May 2012 raid killed four people and wounded
several others when security forces aboard a U.S. helicopter fired on a riverboat. While the boat
passengers maintain they were innocent civilians traveling the river at night, U.S. officials assert
that the security forces fired in self-defense. They also assert that no DEA agents fired their
weapons during the incident.122 DEA agents killed two suspected traffickers in separate raids in
June and July 2012. The agents maintain they fired in self-defense during both incidents; one
suspect allegedly reached for a weapon while the other was shot “after making a threatening
gesture.’123
Military Ties
The United States maintains a troop presence of about 600 military personnel known as Joint
Task Force (JTF) Bravo at Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras. JTF Bravo was first established in
1983 with about 1,200 troops who were involved in military training exercises and in supporting
U.S. counterinsurgency and intelligence operations in the region. In the aftermath of Hurricane
Mitch in 1998, U.S. troops provided extensive assistance in the relief and reconstruction effort.
Today, U.S. troops in Honduras support such activities as disaster relief, medical and
humanitarian assistance, counternarcotics operations, and search and rescue operations that
benefit Honduras and other Central American countries. Regional exercises and deployments
involving active duty and reserve components also provide training opportunities for thousands of
U.S. troops.
119 Charlie Savage, Randal C. Archibold, and Ginger Thompson, “D.E.A. Squads Extend Reach of Drug War,” New
York Times, November 7, 2011.
120 INCSR, 2012, op.cit.
121 Mariano Castillo, “Behind Deadly Confrontations in Honduras, a New Anti-Drug Strategy,” CNN, July 12, 2012.
122 Katherine Corcoran and Alberto Arce, “Operation Anvil: U.S. Drug Strategy Led to Deadly Honduras Raid,”
Associated Press, June 25, 2012; U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Drug Enforcement
Administration Investigation Honduras,” June 6, 2012.
123 Charlie Savage, “Man is Killed by U.S. Agent in Drug Raid in Honduras,” New York Times, June 24, 2012; U.S.
Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Update on Incident in Honduras (Taken Question),” July 9, 2012.
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The Honduran military’s role in the June 2009 ouster of President Manuel Zelaya led some to
reassess the state of U.S.-Honduran military cooperation. Some analysts questioned the
effectiveness of such cooperation, arguing that military-to-military contact does not appear to
have obtained its desired outcomes given that the Honduran military reportedly cut off contact
with the United States prior to the ouster.124 The events led the United States to temporarily
suspend joint military activities as well as some military assistance to the country.125 U.S.-
Honduran military cooperation resumed following the election of President Lobo, however, with
the United States restoring aid and training efforts.126
Port Security
Honduras and the United States have also cooperated on port security. For the United States, port
security emerged as an important element of homeland security in the aftermath of the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Honduras views such cooperation as important in order to ensure the
speedy export of its products to the United States, which in turn could increase U.S. investment in
the country. In March 2006, U.S. officials announced the inclusion of the largest port in
Honduras, Puerto Cortés, in the U.S. Container Security Initiative (CSI). CSI is operated by U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and uses a security regime to ensure that all containers
that pose a potential risk for terrorism are identified and inspected at foreign ports before they are
placed on vessels destined for the United States. Honduras also participates in the Department of
Energy’s Megaports Initiative, which supplies ports with equipment capable of detecting nuclear
or radioactive materials, and the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI), which deploys equipment capable
of scanning containers for radiation and information risk factors before they are allowed to depart
for the United States. Puerto Cortés was one of six ports around the world chosen to be part of the
first phase of the SFI.
Trade and Investment
U.S. trade and investment linkages with Honduras have increased significantly since the early
1980s. In 1984, Honduras became one of the first beneficiaries of the Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI), a unilateral U.S. preferential trade arrangement providing duty-free importation for many
goods from the region. In the late 1980s, Honduras benefitted from production-sharing
arrangements with U.S. apparel companies for duty-free entry into the United States of certain
apparel products assembled in Honduras. As a result, maquiladoras or export-assembly
companies flourished, most concentrated in the north coast region. The passage of the Caribbean
Basin Trade Partnership Act in 2000, which provided Caribbean Basin nations with North
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)-like preferential tariff treatment, further boosted the
maquila sector. Trade relations expanded most recently as a result of the Dominican Republic-
Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), which has significantly
liberalized trade in goods and services since entering into force with Honduras in April 2006.127
124 See, for example, Adam Isacson, “When Your Aid Recipients Stop Taking Your Calls,” Center for International
Policy, June 28, 2008.
125 John J. Kruzel, “U.S. Limits Contact with Honduran Military,” American Forces Press Service, July 2, 2009; U.S.
Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “U.S. Assistance to Honduras,” July 7, 2009.
126 “Honduras: Ties with US Return to Normal,” Latin News Weekly Report, April 22, 2010.
127 For more information on CAFTA-DR, see CRS Report R42468, The Dominican Republic-Central America-United
States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA DR): Developments in Trade and Investment, by J. F. Hornbeck.
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Total trade between the United States and Honduras has increased 44% since the implementation
of CAFTA-DR, with U.S. exports to Honduras growing by 67% and U.S. imports from Honduras
growing by 21%. Since a large portion of Honduran exports entered the United States duty free
prior to implementation of the agreement, analysts had predicted that CAFTA-DR would lead to a
relatively larger increase in U.S. exports. Total two-way trade amounted to $10.6 billion in 2011,
$6.1 billion in U.S. exports to Honduras and $4.5 billion in U.S. imports from Honduras. Similar
to previous trade arrangements, CAFTA-DR has provided substantial benefits to the Honduran
maquila sector. Textiles and apparel (assembled products from the maquila sector) account for
60% of U.S. imports from Honduras. Likewise, textile and apparel inputs, such as yarns and
fabrics, account for a substantial portion of U.S. exports to Honduras. Other major U.S. exports to
Honduras include oil and machinery.128
U.S. foreign direct investment in Honduras has also increased since the implementation of
CAFTA-DR. Total U.S. foreign direct investment exceeded $1 billion in 2010, up 27% from $787
million in 2006.129 The most significant U.S. investments are in the maquila, manufacturing,
tourism, agriculture, telecommunications, and energy sectors. According to the U.S. State
Department, relatively low labor costs, proximity to the U.S. market, and Central America’s
largest port (Puerto Cortés) make Honduras attractive to investors. At the same time, high levels
of crime, a weak judicial system, corruption, low levels of educational attainment, and poor
infrastructure hamper investment.130 Some Members of Congress have raised questions about the
investment climate in Honduras as a result of several cases where U.S.-owned companies
allegedly have been driven out of business as a result of anticompetitive practices or have been
expropriated without compensation.131 On June 15, 2011, a bill (H.R. 2200, Rohrabacher) was
introduced to limit U.S. assistance to Honduras unless the President certifies that the Government
of Honduras has settled all outstanding expropriation claims brought by U.S. companies.
Despite the increases in trade and investment, some analysts have expressed concerns about the
implementation of CAFTA-DR. Labor rights provisions have been of particular concern to many
in the United States and Honduras. According to the U.S. State Department, Honduran law
provides for unionization and collective bargaining, but places some restrictions on those rights
and frequently fails to enforce them. In 2011, “employers commonly threatened to close
unionized factories and harassed or dismissed workers seeking to unionize, including firing
leaders soon after unions were formed to prevent the union from functioning.” Moreover, “there
was credible evidence that apparel assembly factory employers continued with impunity to
blacklist employees seeking to form unions.”132
In March 2012, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO) joined with Honduran trade unions to file a petition with the U.S. Department of
Labor. The petition asserts that the government of Honduras has failed to effectively enforce its
128 U.S. Department of Commerce data, as presented by Global Trade Atlas, April 2012.
129 U.S. Department of Commerce, “U.S. Direct Investment Abroad Tables,” Survey of Current Business, September
2011.
130 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, 2011 Investment Climate Statement -
Honduras, March 2011, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2011/157290.htm.
131 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Next Steps for
Honduras, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., March 18, 2010, Serial No. 111-94 (Washington: GPO, 2010).
132 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2011 – Honduras, May 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dlid=
186524#wrapper.
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labor laws and comply with its commitments under CAFTA-DR, and calls on the U.S.
government to engage Honduras on these issues to ensure future compliance.133 The Labor
Department’s Office of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA) accepted the petition in May 2012,
initiating a review of up to 180 days to determine the accuracy of the charges. When the review is
complete, OTLA will issue a public report with its findings and recommendations.134
Migration Issues
Migration issues are central to the U.S.-Honduran relationship as more than 625,000 Hispanics of
Honduran origin—the equivalent of nearly 8% of the Honduran population—reside in the United
States. Some 428,000 (68%) of the Hondurans in the United States are foreign born, 79% of
whom have arrived since 1990.135 Immigration from Honduras to the United States is primarily
driven by high levels of poverty and unemployment. Given the persistence of those conditions,
nearly a third of Honduran citizens who still live in their home country would like to emigrate.136
In addition to relieving social pressure, emigration plays an important role in the Honduran
economy. Remittances from migrant workers abroad are the largest single source of foreign
exchange for Honduras. They more than tripled between 2002 and 2008 before declining in 2009
as a result of the global financial crisis and U.S. recession, which left many Honduran immigrants
unemployed.137 Remittances have since recovered, however, growing by 13% in 2011 to reach
$2.9 billion (equivalent to 17% of GDP).138 The United States and Honduras have sought to
maximize the development impact of remittance flows under the Building Remittance Investment
for Development Growth and Entrepreneurship (BRIDGE) Initiative that was launched in
September 2010. Under the initiative, the United States and Honduras partner with financial
institutions to leverage the remittances they receive to obtain lower-cost, longer-term financing in
international capital markets and fund investments in infrastructure, public works, and
commercial development.139
Temporary Protected Status
Since Hurricane Mitch struck Honduras in 1998, the U.S. government has provided temporary
protected status (TPS) to allow eligible Hondurans—who may otherwise be deported—to stay in
the United States. Originally slated to expire in July 2000, TPS has now been extended 10 times.
133 AFL-CIO, “The AFL-CIO Joins Honduran Trade Unions in Filing a Petition with Department of Labor against
Honduran Government for Failing to Enforce Labor Laws under Trade Agreement,” Press Release, March 29, 2012.
134 Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, “Dominican Republic-Central America-United States
Free Trade Agreement; Notice of Determination Regarding Review of Submission #2012-01,” 77 Federal Register
30329-30330, May 22, 2012.
135 Daniel Dockterman, Hispanics of Honduran Origin in the United States, Pew Hispanic Center, Statistical Profile,
Washington, DC, May 26, 2011.
136 UCA & ERIC-SJ, January 2012, op.cit.
137 “Roundtable Discussion: Outlook for Remittances to Latin America in 2010,” Inter-American Dialogue, April 12,
2010; “Latin America: Remittances Slide,” Economist Intelligence Unit, January 26, 2009.
138 Rene Maldonado, Natasha Bajuk, and Maria Luisa Hayem, Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean:
Regaining Growth, Inter-American Development Bank, Multilateral Investment Fund, Washington, DC, 2012,
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getDocument.aspx?DOCNUM=36723460.
139 Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “U.S. BRIDGE Initiative Commitments with El Salvador and
Honduras,” September 22, 2010.
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The most recent TPS extension came on November 4, 2011, when the Secretary of Homeland
Security announced that the United States would continue to provide TPS for an additional 18
months, expiring on July 5, 2013 (prior to this extension, TPS would have expired January 5,
2012). According to the Federal Register notice on the most recent extension, the Secretary of
Homeland Security determined that the extension was warranted because there continues to be a
substantial, but temporary, disruption of living conditions in Honduras resulting from Hurricane
Mitch, and Honduras remains temporarily unable to adequately handle the return of its
nationals.140 An estimated 66,000 Hondurans residing in the United States benefit from TPS.141
Deportations
Deportations to Honduras have increased significantly over the past decade. Approximately
23,800 Hondurans were deported from the United States in FY2011, making Honduras one of the
top recipients of deportees on a per capita basis.142 Increasing deportations from the United States
have been accompanied by similar increases in deportations from Mexico, a transit country for
Central American migrants bound for the United States. Honduran policymakers are concerned
about their country’s ability to absorb the large volume of deportees, as it is often difficult for
those returning to the country to find gainful employment. Individuals who do not speak Spanish,
who are tattooed, who have criminal records, and/or who lack familial support face additional
difficulties re-integrating into Honduran society. In addition to these social problems, leaders are
concerned that remittances may start to fall if the current high rates of deportations continue.143
Some analysts contend that increasing U.S. deportations of individuals with criminal records has
exacerbated the gang problem in Honduras and other Central American countries. They maintain
that gang-deportees have “exported” a Los Angeles gang culture to Central America, and that
they have recruited new members from among the local populations.144 U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) does not provide receiving countries with the complete criminal
records or gang affiliations of deportees, however, it may provide them with some information
regarding deportees’ criminal histories and gang affiliations when specifying why the deportees
were removed from the United States. Likewise, receiving countries may contact the FBI to
request criminal history checks on particular criminal deportees once they have arrived. Nearly
half of the Hondurans deported from the United States in FY2011 were removed on criminal
grounds.145
140 Department of Homeland Security, “Extension of the Designation of Honduras for Temporary Protected Status and
Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for Honduran TPS Beneficiaries,” 76 Federal
Register 68488-68493, November 4, 2011.
141 For more information on TPS, see CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy
and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem and Karma Ester.
142 Information provided to CRS by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Office of Congressional Relations, October 31, 2011.
143 Pamela Constable, “Deportees’ Bittersweet Homecoming; Migration is Boon, Bane for Honduras,” Washington
Post, June 27, 2007.
144 Ana Arana, “How the Street Gangs Took Central America,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005.
145 Information provided to CRS by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Office of Congressional Relations, October 31, 2011.
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Trafficking in Persons
According to the State Department’s 2012 Trafficking in Persons Report, Honduras is primarily a
source and transit country for men, women, and children trafficked for the purpose of commercial
sexual exploitation and forced labor. Many victims are recruited from rural areas with promises of
employment and later subjected to forced prostitution in urban and tourist locales such as
Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, and the Bay Islands. Destination countries for trafficked Honduran
women and children include Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, and the United States.
There are also foreign victims of commercial sexual exploitation in Honduras, most having been
trafficked from neighboring countries, including economic migrants en route to the United States.
Recently, there have also been reports of rural families leasing out children for forced labor, and
urban gangs coercing young males to transport drugs.
The State Department maintains that Honduras does not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking, however, it notes that the government is making
significant efforts to do so. As a result, Honduras is considered a so-called “Tier 2” country. The
State Department report lauds the Honduran government for passing a comprehensive anti-
trafficking law that prohibits all forms of trafficking, includes sufficiently stringent punishments,
and establishes more robust victim protections. Nevertheless, the report asserts that the Honduran
government’s victim services remain inadequate, and its efforts against forced labor remain weak.
The State Department’s recommendations for Honduras include vigorously implementing the new
anti-trafficking law, increasing efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking offenses, and
ensuring dedicated funding to provide specialized services and shelter to trafficking victims.146
Author Contact Information
Peter J. Meyer
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
pmeyer@crs.loc.gov, 7-5474
146 U.S. Department of State, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Trafficking in Persons Report, June
2012, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2012/index.htm.
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