Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
June 29, 2012
Congressional Research Service
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www.crs.gov
95-1013
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy

Summary
The uprising that began in Bahrain on February 14, 2011, at the outbreak of the uprisings that
swept several Middle Eastern leaders from power, began a political crisis that appears to defy
resolution. The crisis is far more intense than previous periods of unrest in Bahrain and
demonstrates that the grievances of the Shiite majority over the distribution of power and
economic opportunities were not satisfied by the efforts instituted during 1999-2010, or by any
reform measures announced since the uprising began. The bulk of the Shiite majority in Bahrain
says it demands a constitutional monarchy in which an elected parliament produces the
government, but the Sunni minority believes the Shiites want nothing less than outright rule.
In March 2011, Bahrain’s government rejected U.S. advice by inviting direct security assistance
from other Gulf Cooperation Council countries, declaring a state of emergency, forcefully
suppressing demonstrations, and arresting dissident leaders and pro-opposition health care
workers. Although the state of emergency ended on June 1, 2011, a “national dialogue” held in
July 2011 reached consensus on only a few modest political reforms. Hopes for resolution were
raised by a pivotal report by a government-appointed “Independent Commission of Inquiry”
(BICI) on the unrest, released November 23, 2011, which was critical of the government’s actions
against the unrest as well as the opposition’s responses to government proposals early in the
crisis. The government asserts it has implemented many of the BICI recommendations—an
assertion largely corroborated on March 20, 2012, by a national commission appointed to oversee
implementation—and says it will institute the remainder. However, stalemate on more substantial
political reforms—a product of hardened positions on both the government and opposition
sides—has stoked continued demonstrations and dashed hopes that a solution is in sight. A
proposed closer union with Saudi Arabia, announced May 14, 2012, would strengthen the Saudi
ability to limit any Bahrain government compromise with Bahrain’s Shiites. Some fear that the
unrest could evolve into violent insurgency.
The Obama Administration has not called for a change of the Al Khalifa regime but it has
criticized the regime’s use of force against protesters and urged further political reform and
sustained government engagement in dialogue with the opposition. The U.S. position on Bahrain
has been criticized by those who believe the United States is downplaying regime abuses because
the U.S. security relationship with the Al Khalifa regime is critical to U.S. efforts to secure the
Persian Gulf. Bahrain has provided key support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S. naval
headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years and by providing facilities for U.S. war efforts in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Beyond the naval facility, the United States signed a formal defense pact with
Bahrain in 1991 and has designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally,” entitling it to sales of
sophisticated U.S. weapons systems. Partly to address criticism from human rights advocates and
some Members of Congress, the Administration put on hold a proposed sale of armored vehicles
and anti-tank weapons. However, in mid-May 2012 the Administration announced a resumption
of sales to Bahrain of arms that it can use to protect itself against Iran and support U.S. operations
in the Persian Gulf. Consumed by its own crisis, Bahrain has joined with but deferred to other
GCC powers to resolve uprisings in Libya, Syria, and Yemen.
Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain, having largely run out of crude oil reserves, is
poorer than most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies. In September 2004, the United States and
Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it was signed January 11,
2006 (P.L. 109-169). The unrest has further strained Bahrain’s economy.
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Contents
The Political Structure, Reform, and Human Rights ....................................................................... 1
Some Separation of Powers Established by King Hamad ......................................................... 2
Post-Charter Elections and Political Groups ............................................................................. 3
2002 Elections..................................................................................................................... 4
2006 Elections: Allegations of Gerrymandering and “Importing Sunnis”.......................... 4
The 2010 National Assembly and Municipal Election: Prelude to the Uprising................. 5
2011 Uprising: Origin, Developments, and Prognosis .............................................................. 7
Government Tactics Change, As Do Protester Demands .................................................... 7
The Saudi-led Intervention and Crackdown........................................................................ 8
Post-GCC Intervention Situation/End of State of Emergency ............................................ 9
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) Formed, National Dialogue
Held................................................................................................................................ 10
BICI Report on Handling of the Unrest: Reaction and Implementation ........................... 12
U.S. Posture on the Uprising............................................................................................. 16
Other Human Rights Issues ..................................................................................................... 18
Women’s Rights ................................................................................................................ 19
Religious Freedom ............................................................................................................ 19
Labor Rights...................................................................................................................... 19
Human Trafficking ............................................................................................................ 20
Executions and Torture...................................................................................................... 20
U.S.-Bahrain Security and Foreign Policy Relations..................................................................... 20
U.S. Navy Headquarters in Bahrain ........................................................................................ 21
Bilateral Defense Pact ............................................................................................................. 22
Cooperation With U.S. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan ................................................... 22
Post-September 11 and Post-Saddam Cooperation ........................................................... 23
U.S. Arms Transfers and Military Aid..................................................................................... 23
Purchases With National Funds......................................................................................... 24
September 2011 Humvee and TOW Sale.......................................................................... 25
Anti-Terrorism Cooperation .................................................................................................... 27
Relations with and Cooperation Against Iran.......................................................................... 27
Bahrain-Iran Gas Development Deal and Other Economic Ties....................................... 29
Other Foreign Policy Issues..................................................................................................... 29
Qatar Territorial Disputes.................................................................................................. 30
Arab-Israeli Issues............................................................................................................. 31
Economic Issues ............................................................................................................................ 31

Figures
Figure 1. Bahrain ........................................................................................................................... 34

Tables
Table 1. Comparative Composition of National Assembly.............................................................. 6
Table 2. Some Basic Facts About Bahrain..................................................................................... 32
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Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Bahrain............................................................................................... 33

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 34

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The Political Structure, Reform, and Human Rights1
The Al Khalifa family, which is Sunni Muslim and generally not as religiously conservative as the
leaders of neighboring Saudi Arabia, has ruled Bahrain since 1783. The family’s arrival from the
Saudi peninsula to take control ended a century of domination by Persian settlers. The Al Khalifa
subsequently received political protection from Britain, which was the dominant power in the
Gulf until the early 1970s. Bahrain became independent from Britain in August 1971 after a 1970
U.N. survey (some refer to its as a “referendum”) determined that its inhabitants preferred
independence to Iranian control.
Bahrain is led by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa (about 61 years old), who succeeded his father,
Shaykh Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifa, upon his death in March 1999. Educated at Sandhurst Military
Academy in Britain, King Hamad was previously commander of the Bahraini Defense Forces
(BDF). The King is considered to be a reformer, but some observers consider him a relatively
weak leader unwilling to override hardline, anti-reform Khalifa family members.
The Kings’s son, Shaykh Salman bin Hamad, about 42 years old, is crown prince. Shaykh Salman
is U.S.- and U.K.-educated and, like the king, has long been considered a proponent of
accommodation with Bahrain’s Shiite majority—about 60%-70% of the approximately 1 million
person citizenry.2 There are, additionally, an estimated 235,000 expatriates in Bahrain, according
to the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook July 2011 estimate. About 25% of the
population is age 14 or younger.
The king’s uncle (the brother of the late ruler), Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, has
been in position since Bahrain’s independence in 1971. He is about 78 years old but believed to
be in stable health. Along with other family hard-liners including Minister of the Royal Court
Khalid bin Ahmad Al Khalifa,3 his brother the Commander of the BDF Khalifa bin Ahmad Al
Khalifa,4 and Interior Minister Rashid bin Abdullah Al Khalifa, the Prime Minister has long been
skeptical of political accommodation with the Shiites. The Royal Court Minister’s protégé,
Ateyatallah Al Khalifa, is considered an emerging and increasingly influential hardliner.
Some see the Prime Minister as less fixed in his position than other hardliners in that he would be
willing to accept a political settlement with the Shiite opposition. The hardline family members
reportedly believe that the concessions that King Hamad made to the Shiite majority prior to the
2011 unrest caused the Shiites to increase their political demands rather than satisfy them. The
more reform-minded within the ruling family – which include deputy Prime Minister Muhammad

1 Much of the information in this section is from State Department reports: 2011 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices (May 24, 2012); the International Religious Freedom Report for July—December 2010 (September 13, 2011);
and the Trafficking in Persons Report for 2012 (June 19, 2012). CRS has no means to independently investigate the
human rights situation in Bahrain or confirm allegations of specific human rights abuses there.
2 Government officials dispute that the Shiite community is as large a majority as the 70% figure used in most
factbooks and academic work on Bahrain. The Shiite community in Bahrain consists of the more numerous “Baharna,”
who are of Arab ethnicity and descended from Arab tribes who inhabited the area from pre-Islamic times. Shiites of
Persian ethnicity are less numerous, and arrived in Bahrain over the past 400 years. They speak Persian and generally
do not integrate with the Baharna or with Sunni Arabs.
3 The name of this official is similar to that of the Foreign Minister, Khalid bin Ahmad bin Mohammad Al Khalifa.
4 Together, Khalid and Khalifa are known as the “khawalids,” – they hail from a brank of the Al Khalifa family that is
traced to an ancestor Khalid bin Ali Al Khalifa.
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bin Mubarak Al Khalifa (possible successor to the current Prime Minister) assert that the level of
unrest reached in 2011 would have occurred long ago had the king’s reforms not been enacted.
Al Khalifa family members have consistently held at least half of all ministerial slots, including
all strategic ministry positions. Even before the 2011 unrest that has seen most senior Shiites in
government resign, there were only 4 Shiite ministers out of 23 cabinet positions (plus one out of
the four deputy prime ministers), and those ministries run by Shiites have been considered less
critical. Shiites have also been highly underrepresented in the security forces, serving mainly in
administrative tasks.
The reforms instituted by King Hamad, although well short of the hopes and expectations the
Shiite majority had when he took office, are far more extensive than those made by his father
Amir Isa during his rule. In December 1992, Amir Isa established a 30-member appointed
Consultative Council to comment on proposed laws. In June 1996, he expanded it to 40 members.
These reforms did not come close to quieting the demands of either Shiites or Sunnis for the
restoration of an elected national assembly, even though Bahrain’s Sunnis are considered less
hungry for “democracy” than are the Shiites. An elected assembly was provided for under the
1973 constitution but abolished in August 1975 because of fear of sectarian competition and
tensions over control of the body. In the years just prior to Shaykh Hamad’s accession to rule,
there was daily anti-government violence during 1994-1998, mostly but not exclusively by
Shiites.
Some Separation of Powers Established by King Hamad
As Hamad’s first reform steps, he changed his title to “King” from “Amir”—a change that
implies more accountability to the population, and held a referendum (February 14, 2002) on a
new “National Action Charter (including a constitution).” However, the Shiite majority
population criticized the new constitution because it established that the elected Council of
Representatives (COR)5 and the all-appointed Shura (Consultative) Council were to be of equal
size (40 seats each). Together, they constitute a National Assembly (parliament). There is no
“quota” for females in the National Assembly.
• Even with constitutional amendments adopted in May 2012 that gave the
Assembly greater authority (discussed later), the Assembly still serves as only a
partial check on government power.
• The king, through the prime minister, makes all cabinet appointments and thus
exercises direct rule. The National Assembly does not appoint—or have power to
reject—cabinet appointments, although it now has the power to reject the
government’s four year work plan (and therefore the whole cabinet).
• The COR can, by a two-thirds majority, vote no-confidence against sitting
ministers, leading to their removal. The COR can also, by a similar super-
majority, declare that it cannot “cooperate” with the prime minister, but the king
subsequently must rule on whether to dismiss the prime minister or disband the
COR. None of these actions has occurred since the COR was formed.

5 This body is also referred to as the Council of Deputies (Majles al-Nawwab).
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• The king has the authority to amend the constitution. Either chamber can draft
and pass legislation but enactment in to law is subject to concurrence by the
king.6 His “veto” can be overridden by a two-thirds majority vote of both
chambers.
The government has tended to appoint generally more educated and pro-Western members to the
Shura Council, and it is generally more supportive of the government than is the elected COR.
This explains why the opposition has always sought more powers for the COR, and not the Shura
Council.
The National Assembly has tended to address primarily economic and social issues, and not
national security issues. For example, in May 2010, it voted to ban sale of alcohol to Muslims,
although subject to implementing regulations made by the king, through the government. Other
legislation considered in the National Assembly in recent years included bills to combat cyber
crime, regulate the pharmaceutical sector, regulate the press, create an anti-corruption body, and
establish a higher council on social security. However, many of these bills stalled in the 2006-
2010 parliament due to lack of consensus and broader Sunni-Shiite tensions, and have remained
stalled as political crisis engulfed Bahrain since 2011.
Post-Charter Elections and Political Groups
Another long-standing dispute between the government and the opposition has been over the
organization of elections to the COR. Even though the COR has limited powers, the Shiite
opposition has sought to establish electoral processes that would allow Shiites to translate their
numbers into political strength. Elections have been held every four years since 2002, each time
marked by substantial tension over perceived governmental efforts to block achievement of a
Shiite majority in the COR. In the COR elections, if no candidate in a contested district wins
more than 50% in the first round, a runoff is held one week later.
Formal political parties are banned, but factions compete as “political societies,” which serve as
the functional equivalent of parties for election purposes:
• The most prominent Shiite political socieity is Wifaq (formally, the Al Wifaq
National Islamic Society, also known as the Islamic National Accord
Association). It is a large faction, operationally led by Shaykh Ali al-Salman,
who is about 38 years old, that forms the core of the Shiite opposition. In part
because he is a cleric, Shaykh Salman has not run in any parliamentary elections,
and he is considered open to a compromise. Shaykh Salman was slightly injured
by security forces action during a protest in June 2012. Many consider Isa Qasim,
a 75-year-old fiery Shiite cleric, as de-facto leader of the opposition. Qasim is
considered resistant to many proposals to settle the crisis.
• Another Shiite faction, Al Haq (Movement of Freedom and Democracy), is out
lawed because of its calls for a change of regime rather than reform. It is viewed
as far harder line than Wifaq but also much smaller in membership, by most
accounts. Al Haq’s leaders are perceived as having closer ties to Iran and to

6 Before the May 2012 constitutional amendments, only the COR could draft legislation.
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Islamist movements in the Middle East than do those of Wifaq. Its key leaders are
Dr. Abduljalil Alsingace, who is wheelchair-bound, and Mr. Hassan Mushaima
• A small Shiite faction, the Bahrain Islamic Action Society, is outlawed because it
is a successor to the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB), a party
purportedly linked to Iran that allegedly committed or planned extremist actions
in the 1980s and 1990s.
• Waad (“promise”) is a left-leaning secular political society whose members are
both Sunni and Shiite.
• Among exclusively Sunni political societies, there are two that are considered
Islamist. Minbar (Arabic for “platform), which is an offshoot of the Muslim
Brotherhood, and Al Asala, which is a harder-line “Salafist” political society. As
noted below, in the 2006-2010 parliament, Asala and Minbar members held a
combined 15 seats. In June 2011, another Sunni grouping formed as a response to
the Shiite-led 2011 uprising, organized as a pro-government political society
called the National Unity Gathering/National Unity Association.
2002 Elections
The first elections under the Charter were held in October 2002. In the 2002 election, many Shiite
opposition political societies, including Wifaq, boycotted the elections on the grounds that setting
the COR and the Shura Council at the same size dilutes popular will. The 2002 boycott lowered
turnout (about 52%) and helped Sunnis win two-thirds of the 40 COR seats. Of the 170 total
candidates, 8 were women, but none of the women was elected.
2006 Elections: Allegations of Gerrymandering and “Importing Sunnis”
As was widely expected by experts, Sunni-Shiite tensions escalated again in the run-up to the
November 25, 2006, parliamentary and municipal elections. The tension was aggravated by the
Shiite perception that a once-repressed Shiite majority came to power in Iraq through U.S.-
backed elections and that the Bahraini majority was entitled to a similar result. In the fall of 2006,
some Shiites protested, particularly after allegations, some of which were publicly corroborated
by a government adviser (Salah al-Bandar) in August 2006 in a report to an outside human rights
organization, that the government was adjusting election districts so as to favor Sunni candidates.
It was also alleged that the government issued passports to Sunnis in an attempt to shift the
demographic balance to the Sunnis’ advantage.
In the November 2006 elections, two Shiite opposition societies, Wifaq and the National
Democratic Action Association, participated, raising voter turnout to 72%. Al Haq boycotted. The
opposition, led by Wifaq, won 17 seats, virtually all those it contested, and became the largest
single bloc in the COR, although still short of a majority.
The government was heartened that Sunni Muslims won 23 total seats. Of those, 8 were won by
secular Sunnis and 15 were won by Islamist Sunnis (8 from the Salafists trend and 7 Muslim
Brotherhood members). Only one woman (Latifa al Qaoud, who was unopposed in her district)
won, out of 18 female candidates (up from 8 in the 2002 elections). As evidence of continued
friction, Wifaq boycotted the speakership contest, and incumbent COR Speaker Khalifa al-
Dhahrani was reelected speaker.
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The king subsequently named a new Shura Council with 20 Shiites, 19 Sunnis, and 1 Christian (a
female). Ten women were appointed. However, the Shiites appointed were not all aligned with
opposition factions, and several were considered “pro-government.” Therefore, the Shura Council
was not a bastion of opposition to the government. In a nod to the increased Shiite strength as a
result of the elections, the government appointed a Shiite (Jawad al-Araidh) as one of the four
deputy prime ministers and another (who is close to Wifaq) as a minister of state for foreign
affairs. Three other Shiites remained in the cabinet.
Heightened political tensions continued in between national elections. In December 2008, the
government made numerous arrests of Shiite demonstrators and accused some of being part of a
foreign-inspired “plot” to destabilize Bahrain. Some were accused of undergoing guerrilla or
terrorist training in Syria. On January 26, 2009, the government arrested three leading Shiite
activists, including Al Haq leaders Alsingace and Mushaima. They were tried during February-
March 2009 but, along with other Shiite activists, were pardoned and released in April 2009.
Alsingace has visited the United States several times to highlight the human rights situation in
Bahrain. As noted below, both have been jailed in connection with the 2011 uprising.)
The 2010 National Assembly and Municipal Election: Prelude to the Uprising
The resentments over the 2006 election, and the still unfulfilled demand of Bahrain’s Shiites for
greater political power and an end to economic discrimination, carried over to the 2010 election.
The election was held on October 23, 2010, with a second round runoff for some districts on
October 30. There were only a limited number of international observers, primarily from various
international human rights organizations. Two Bahraini human rights watchdog groups, the
Bahrain Human Rights Society and the Bahrain Transparency Society, reached agreement to
jointly monitor the 2010 elections. Municipal elections were held concurrently.
The electorate was about 300,000 persons, voting in 40 districts spread throughout 5
governorates. As was the case in the 2006 elections, Shiite oppositionists accused the government
of drawing district boundaries so as to prevent the election of a Shiite majority. Registration of
candidates took place during September 12-16, 2010. About 200 people registered to run, of
whom 7 were women. However, one woman withdrew after registering, leaving a field of six
female candidates. Of the six, only one was formally endorsed by a political society. Munira
Fakhro, a prominent Shiite woman who was exiled prior to the political reform process begun by
King Hamad, was endorsed by Waad. In 2006, she narrowly lost to a Sunni Islamist of Minbar. At
least four candidates in districts where there was no opposition were declared winners by
September 28, 2010. One of them was a Wifaq member.
Wifaq fielded candidates, but candidates linked to Al Haq again boycotted. In the run-up to the
election, on September 4, 2010, 23 Shiite leaders were arrested on charges of attempting a violent
overthrow of the government. They were among about 160 Shiites arrested in August and
September, under a 2006 anti-terrorism law that gives the government broad arrest and
prosecution powers. Among those arrested was Dr. Alsingace (see above), on August 13, 2010,
upon his return from abroad. A prominent Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Hussein Mirza al-Najati, said to
be close to the most senior Iraqi Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, had his Bahrain citizenship revoked on
September 20, 2010.
Some observers asserted that the government crackdown would drive Bahraini Shiites to
politically support boycotting harder-line movements, such as Al Haq, and in so doing suppress
the election turnout among Shiites. The crackdown did not prompt Wifaq to reverse its decision to
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compete. The crackdown might have helped the government’s election strategy but it also led to
stepped up demonstrations by Shiite youth in Shiite neighborhoods. The tensions are also widely
blamed for resulting in a bombing that damaged four police cars on September 15, 2010. The
tensions over the election almost certainly were a catalyst for the major unrest that has occurred
in February 2011, discussed further below.
2010 Election Results
Despite the pre-election tensions, the election was held without major reports of violence.
Turnout was about 67% between the two rounds. The results, some unexpected, included:
• The increase of Wifaq’s representation to 18 seats, although still not a majority.
• Unexpected losses by Sunni Islamist factions, reducing their total to 5 seats from
15. Minbar and Asala each saw dramatic reductions in their seats from 2006:
Minbar decreased to 2 seats (from 7) and Asala decreased to 3 seats (from 8).
Most of the seats were picked up by Sunni independents, who won 17 seats, up
from 9 in the 2006-2010 parliament. Waad won no seats. These results appeared
to represent a rejection of Islamist ideology, and even all ideological candidates,
in favor of pragmatists who would address Bahrain’s economic difficulties.
• The same one woman won who had won in 2006.
• In the municipal elections conducted concurrently, one woman was elected in the
second round—the first woman to be elected to a municipal council.
In advance of the December 14, 2010, start of the parliamentary term, the king named the 2010-
2014 Shura Council. Thirty of the 40 serving Council members were reappointed, leaving only 10
newly appointed members. A total of 19 Shiites were appointed, including the speaker, Ali bin
Salih al-Salih, who was reappointed. The Council has four women, substantially fewer than the
2006-2010 Council that had nine women. Among the four, one is Jewish (Nancy Khadouri), out
of a Jewish population in Bahrain of about 40 persons, and one is Christian (Hala Qarrisah).
Bahrain has an estimated 1,000 Christians.
Table 1. Comparative Composition of National Assembly
Post-By-Election

2006
2010
(October 2011)
Council of Representatives (COR)
Wifaq (Shiite Islamist)
17
18
0
Shi te Independent
0
0
8
Sunni Independent (mostly
secular) in COR
8
17
27
Moderate Sunni Islamist
(Minbar, Muslim
Brotherhood) 7 2 2
Conservative Sunni
Islamist (Asala, Salafi)
8
3
3
COR Sect Composition
23 Sunni, 17 Shiite
22 Sunni, 18 Shiite
32 Sunni, 8 Shiite
Women in COR
1
1
4
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Post-By-Election

2006
2010
(October 2011)
Shura Council (Upper House, appointed)
Sectarian, Religious
Composition Upper
20 Shi te, 19 Sunni, 1
19 Shi te, 19 Sunni, 1
House (Shura Council)
Christian
Christian, 1 Jew
Same as before
Number of Women
9
4
same

2011 Uprising: Origin, Developments, and Prognosis
King Hamad’s 10-year effort to satisfy Shiite aspirations was demonstrated to have failed when a
major uprising began on February 14, 2011, in the wake of the success of the uprising in Egypt
against President Hosni Mubarak. After a few days of protests and relatively minor confrontations
with the mostly Bahraini Sunni and expatriate Sunni security forces, the mostly Shiite
demonstrators converged on the interior of a major traffic circle, “Pearl Roundabout,” named
after a statue that depicted Bahrain’s pearl-diving past. The uprising took place after King Hamad
had authorized that year’s iteration of an annual $2,700 payment to citizens.
The initial demands of the protesters centered on altering the constitution to expand the powers of
the COR; ending gerrymandering that prevents Shiites from winning a majority in the COR;
providing more jobs and economic opportunities; and, among some protesters, replacing hard-line
Prime Minister Khalifa. These moves would, to the mostly Shiite demonstrators, end the sense
that they are “second class citizens” or “not trusted” as Bahraini citizens. On February 15, 2011,
King Hamad spoke to the nation and announced the formation of a committee to investigate the
use of force against protestors, which had killed two until that time.
The unrest took on new dimensions in the early morning of February 17, 2011, when security
forces surrounded the thousands of demonstrators in Pearl Roundabout, many of whom were
asleep, and used rubber bullets and tear gas to remove them from the location. At least four
demonstrators were killed; others died subsequently. The government asserted it had warned of
the impending move, an account disputed by the protesters. At a news conference later on
February 17, 2011, Foreign Minister Khalid Al Khalifa claimed that the Pearl Roundabout was
cleared to avoid a “sectarian abyss”—all-out civil conflict between the Shiites and Sunnis.
Despite heavy security patrols, additional protests took place on February 18, 2011, and security
forces apparently shot several demonstrators. Wifaq pulled all 18 of its deputies out of the COR
immediately thereafter. Britain closed its embassy and banned arms exports to Bahrain.
Government Tactics Change, As Do Protester Demands7
In part at the reported urging of the United States, the government changed tactics on February
19, 2011, pulling security forces back from confronting protesters. That day, demonstrators re-
entered Pearl Roundabout and held large demonstrations at or around that location subsequently.

7 The events of the uprising, and the government’s political and security reaction, are examined in substantial detail in
the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report released November 23, 2011. Text of the report is
at http://files.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf
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A February 22, 2011, demonstration was said to be perhaps the largest in Bahrain’s history,
although some accounts say that a demonstration three days later, which spanned miles of
downtown roads, was even larger. The February 22 demonstration followed by one day a large
counter-demonstration by mostly Sunni supporters of the government.
At the same time, the government, with Crown Prince Salman leading the effort, invited the
representatives of the protesters to begin a formal dialogue. That effort was supported by a
gesture by King Hamad on February 22, 2011, to release or pardon 308 Bahrainis, including Al
Haq leader Hassan Mushaima, paving the way for him to return from exile a few days later.
According to the government, these persons were tried not for political views, per se, but rather
for committing or advocating violence. On February 26, 2011, King Hamad dropped two Al
Khalifa family members from cabinet posts that influence job opportunities and living conditions.
Crown Prince Salman’s “Seven Principles” Reform Plan
On March 13, 2011, Crown Prince Salman articulated “seven principles” that would guide a
national dialogue, including a “parliament with full authority;” a “government that meets the will
of the people;” fair voting districts; and several other measures.8 The articulation of the seven
principles, coupled with the other moves, gave Wifaq and other moderate oppositionists hope that
many of their demands could be met through dialogue. However, the protesters did not leave
Pearl Roundabout and long-standing splits in the opposition were exposed, such as that between
Wifaq and the more hardline Al Haq. Anger at the government’s use of force appeared to shift
many demonstrators closer to Al Haq, which demanded resignation of the monarchy. Six smaller
hardline Shiite political societies reportedly joined Al Haq in insisting on maximalist demands.9
The regime’s offer of dialogue was not taken up consistently or systematically by Wifaq and other
moderate groups, and only informal meetings took place in search of a political solution.10
The Saudi-led Intervention and Crackdown
With no systematic dialogue begun, protests escalated and began to spark Sunni-Shiite clashes
which some Bahrainis believed were evolving into outright sectarian conflict at the mass level.
On March 13, 2011, despite the Crown Prince’s articulation of his “seven points,” protesters
blockaded the financial district of the capital, Manama, prompting governmental fears that the
unrest could choke this major economic sector. Security forces appeared overwhelmed.
Later that same day, Bahrain requested that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), of which it is a
member, send additional security forces to protect key sites. In response to the request, on March
14, 2011, a GCC force (from the GCC joint Peninsula Shield unit) spearheaded by a reported
1,200 Saudi forces (in 20 tanks and in other armored vehicles) and 600 UAE police crossed into
Bahrain and took up positions at key locations in and around Manama. Kuwait sent naval forces
to help Bahrain secure its maritime borders. On March 15, 2011, King Hamad declared (Royal
Decree Number 18) a three-month state of emergency. Bahrain’s security forces, freed up by the
GCC deployment, cleared demonstrators from Pearl Roundabout and demolished the Pearl

8 BICI report, op. cit., p. 165.
9 “Bahrain Hard-Liners Call for Royal Family to Go.” Cable News Network website, March 9, 2011.
10 BICI report, p. 165-66.
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Monument on March 18, 2011.11 Some additional protester deaths were reported in this renewed
crackdown. In conjunction, seven hardline Shiite leaders were re-arrested, including Al Haq’s
Mushaima. The remaining Shiite ministers in the cabinet, many of the Shiites in the Shura
Council, and many Shiites in other senior posts in the judiciary, suspended their work in
government or resigned outright. The Saudi intervention did not, as some feared, prompt a wider
conflict by prompting Iranian intervention on the side of the Shiite protesters.
Staunch Saudi Support for the Bahrain Regime
Well before intervening in Bahrain, the GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia, had begun to fear
that the Bahrain unrest could spread to other GCC states. It was also feared that Iran might be
able to exploit the situation. None of the other GCC states has a Shiite majority (like Bahrain),
but most of them, including Saudi Arabia, have substantial Shiite minorities. The Saudi position
has been that no Shiite takeover in Bahrain would be permitted, and the Saudi government is seen
as backing hardline, anti-compromise officials in the Bahrain government. Perhaps to reinforce
this position, on May 14, 2012, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain announced they would enter into a
close political, economic, and military union—an action clearly intended to signal to Bahrain’s
Shiite opposition that the Bahrain government has unconditional Saudi backing. At a meeting that
day, the other GCC states deferred a decision on broadening that union to the GCC as a whole.
Earlier, shortly after the Bahrain crisis began, the GCC states had pledged aid (some reports
mention $20 billion) to help Bahrain (and Oman, which also faced unrest) try to defuse unrest
through job creation.
Post-GCC Intervention Situation/End of State of Emergency
Most public protests in downtown Manama ceased subsequent to the GCC intervention, but the
government continued its crackdown. At that time, over 1,500 people, mostly Shiites, had been
dismissed from their jobs, and 30 Bahraini protesters had died, although opposition figures were
much higher. Some sources say the government had bulldozed about 30 Shiite mosques as a
measure to prevent Shiites from gathering.
In early April 2011, the government closed the pro-opposition newspaper Al Wasat; it editor-in-
chief, Mansour al-Jamri, went on trial on May 18, 2011, for inciting violence. A well-known
human rights activist, Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR) founder Abdul Hadi al-
Khawaja, was arrested April 9, 2011, and his daughter, Maryam, a prominent activist,
subsequently undertook a hunger strike. On April 15, 2011, the government announced that Wifaq
and another Shiite political society, the Islamic Action Association (see above) were being
investigated for harming national unity and could potentially be disbanded. On May 2, 2011, two
Wifaq officials who had resigned from the COR because of the unrest, Matar Matar and Jawad
Fairuz, were arrested. On May 8, 2011, 14 oppositionists, including Mushaima and Alsingace,
went on trial before a state security court; 7 others went on trial in absentia. On June 23, 2011,
Mushaima, Alsingace, and six other hardline Shiite leaders were sentenced to life in prison.12 On
May 31, 2011, an activist considered a main leader of the opposition, the current head of the

11 Some accounts differ on the involvement of the Peninsula Shield force, with some observers arguing that members of
the force participated directly in suppressing protests, and others accepting the Bahrain/GCC view that the GCC force
guarded key locations and infrastructure.
12 Erika Solomon. “Bahrain Sentences 8 Activists to Life Terms.” Washington Post, June 23, 2011.
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BCHR, Nabeel Rajab, was summoned before the military court prosecuting alleged agitators. (On
February 19, 2012, Matar was acquitted of all charges; Nabeel Rajab was arrested February 15,
2012, for further anti-government activities, released, and then re-arrested April 1, 2012. Earlier,
he was injured by security forces during a protest in January 2012.)
Perceiving the regime had gained the upper hand, the king announced in early May 2011 that the
state of emergency would end on June 1, 2011, two weeks earlier than scheduled. The
government held to that schedule; the GCC forces that deployed to Bahrain, including the
Kuwaiti naval force, reportedly began to depart in late June 2011. The departures were reportedly
completed, although some reports suggest some elements of the force might remain. King Hamad
spoke to the population on May 31, 2011, to mark the end of the emergency, offering
unconditional dialogue with the opposition beginning July 1, 2011.
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) Formed, National
Dialogue Held
On June 29, 2011, as a further gesture toward the opposition, the king named a five-person
“Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry,” (BICI) headed by highly regarded international
legal expert Dr. Cherif Bassiouni, to investigate the government’s response to the unrest that
began in February, and to file its report by October 30, 2011. It held a public forum on July 24,
but came under criticism from Shiite opposition figures who interpreted certain Bassiouni
statements as a bias in favor of exonerating top government officials.
The naming of the BICI set the stage for the “National Dialogue” on political and economic
reform to begin on July 2, 2011, under the chairmanship of speaker of the COR Dhahrani. About
300 delegates participated, of which the Shiite opposition broadly comprised 40-50 delegates, of
which five belonged to Wifaq.13 Wifaq’s decision to participate was prompted by the
government’s release, a few days prior of about 150 of those who had been imprisoned for the
unrest.
Over several weeks, the dialogue addressed political, economic, social, and human rights issues;
each had 15 sub-themes and each sub-theme had 90 topics. Senior Bahraini officials said the
intent of the dialogue was to outline a vision of Bahrain rather than necessarily reach agreement
on specific steps. Still, the continuing detention of many oppositionists hung over the meetings.
Prospects further diminished on July 18, 2011, when Wifaq, which had always asserted that it
would pull out of the talks if and when it became clear that its proposals for a constitutional
monarchy would not be met, withdrew entirely. Others took note of the fact that the crown prince,
the principal champion of dialogue within the upper ranks of the regime, did not chair the
meetings, suggesting he was eclipsed by hard line figures allied with the prime minister.
The dialogue concluded in late July 2011 after reaching consensus on a few recommendations,
which were endorsed by the government on July 29, 2011. The core of the recommendations,
which the government claimed adopted many of the “seven points” articulated by the crown
prince in March 2011, were:
• an elected parliament (lower house) with expanded powers, including the power
to confirm or reject a nominated cabinet; the power to confirm or veto the

13 Mohamed Hasni. “Bahrain Opens Dialogue Buoyed by Shiite Attendance.” Agence France Presse, July 2, 2011.
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government’s four year work plan; the right to discuss any agenda item; and the
power for the full COR to question ministers on their performance or plans. In
addition, the chairman of the National Committee that presides over the National
Assembly should be derived from among the elected COR, not the Shura
Council.
• a government “reflecting the will of the people.”
• “fairly” demarcated electoral boundaries.
• reworking of laws on naturalization and citizenship.
• combating financial and administrative corruption.
• efforts to reduce sectarian divisions.
• There were reportedly 82 economic recommendations, including new
mechanisms to provide food subsidies to only the most needy citizens.
In part as a gesture of reconciliation after the Dialogue concluded, on August 8, 2011, the
government released the two jailed Wifaq COR deputies Matar and Fairuz, along with several
other jailed activists. In a speech on August 28, 2011, near the conclusion of the holy month of
Ramadan, King Hamad announced the pardoning of some protesters, and the reinstatement of
some of the approximately 2,700 of those who had been fired for alleged participation in unrest.
Dialogue Implementation By Constitutional Amendment, and Other Possible
Compromises and Outcomes
The government subsequently appointed a committee to implement the national dialogue
consensus recommendations, headed by deputy Prime Minister Muhammad Mubarak Al Khalifa.
He and other officials conducted rounds of meetings with both houses of the National Assembly
and with government ministries to begin implementation. The government began drafting
amendments to the Bahraini constitution to implement the consensus recommendations. The
proposed amendments were announced by the king on January 16, 2012, including provisions to
implement the recommendations of the National Dialogue on enhancing the powers of the COR:
• Limitations on the power of the king to appoint the members of the Shura
Council, and a requirement that he consult the heads of the two chambers of the
National Assembly before dissolving the COR.
• The ability of either chamber of the National Assembly to draft legislation or
constitutional amendments.
• The overall chair of the National Assembly will be the speaker of the COR, not
the appointed Shura Council.
• The ability of the COR to veto the government’s four year work plan—
essentially an ability to veto the nomination of the entire cabinet—without the
concurrence of the Shura Council. This is an expansion of previous powers to
vote no confidence against individual ministers.
The opposition immediately rejected the constitutional amendments as insufficient, because they
do not fulfill the core of the crown prince’s seven points for a parliament with “full authority,” nor
did the amendments meet the demands contained in the “Manama Document,” adopted on
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October 12, 2011, by several opposition parties, led by Wifaq and Waad. The document called for
a fully elected one-chamber parliament with legislative powers, the direct selection of the prime
minister by the largest coalition in the elected legislature, and the running of elections by an
independent election commission. The opposition viewed the pledge of “fairly demarcated”
election boundaries as vague, and likely to enable the government to continue to gerrymander
districts to ensure a Sunni majority in the lower house. Despite the opposition criticism, the
constitutional amendments were adopted by the National Assembly and ratified by the king on
May 3, 2012.
September 24-October 1 Special Election
Following the conclusion of the National Dialogue—but before the issuing of the BICI report on
the government handling of the unrest—there was a special election to fill the seats vacated by
the 18 Wifaq COR deputies that had resigned at the outset of the unrest. The elections were
scheduled for September 24, 2011, with a second round to be held on October 1, if needed.
However, the legitimacy of the special elections was clouded by the announcement by Wifaq on
August 14, 2011, that it would boycott the elections. That position was based on Wifaq’s decision
that the national dialogue’s reform recommendations were not sufficiently extensive. Several anti-
government demonstrations took place in the run-up to the elections and on the days of the
election, mostly in Shiite neighborhoods.
In advance of the elections, four winners were declared (including one woman) because they
were running unopposed. In both rounds of voting, turnout was assessed as very low, at about
20%, although the government put out official turnout figures of close to 50%. After the first
round on September 24, five additional seats were decided. The October 1 runoff decided the
remaining nine seats. As shown in Table 1, of the 18 seats decided in the special election, 10 were
won by Sunnis, largely because of the Wifaq boycott and low turnout. This suggests that most
Shiites viewed the special election as illegitimate, but the net result is that Sunnis now
overwhelmingly dominate the COR, with 32 seats to only 8 Shiite seats. The special election
resulted in the addition of three women COR deputies.
BICI Report on Handling of the Unrest: Reaction and Implementation
The next major benchmark in the crisis was the release of the BICI report. It was initially due by
October 30 but, because of the large number of interviews required by the BICI, was delayed
until November 23, 2011. Although the focus of the BICI mission was the handling of the
unrest—and not on competing ideas for political reform—the release was viewed by both the
government and the opposition as pivotal. The 500+ page report provided some support for the
narratives of both sides in the crisis, and recommendations, including:14
• There was “systematic” and “deliberate” use of excessive force, including torture
and forced confessions, against protesters.
• The opposition articulated additional demands as the uprising progressed.
• The government did not provide evidence to the BICI that established a link
between the unrest in Bahrain and the government of Iran. (p. 378)

14 http://files.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf
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• The BICI did not find evidence of human rights abuses committed by the GCC
forces that deployed at the request of Bahrain’s government. (p. 378)
• The BICI’s recommendations (pp. 411-415) are generally confined to measures
that would prevent future violence against peaceful protesters, and to investigate
the abuses committed and compensate victims. In keeping with the BICI’s
mandate, the recommendations do not address the political structure of Bahrain.
BICI Report Reactions/Implementation by a National Commission
Apparently recognizing that it would be judged by the international community on its response to
the report, King Hamad issued a statement the day of the report’s release, accepting its criticisms
of the government and promising implementation of its recommendations. Wifaq cheered those
parts of the report that support its accounts but criticized it as failing to state that abuse of
protesters were deliberate government policy and refused to participate in cooperation with the
government on specific implementation steps. The bulk of the opposition, including Wifaq,
expressed skepticism that the recommendations would be fully implemented.
Government implementation of at least some of the recommendations began after the report was
released. On November 26, 2011, King Hamad issued a royal order to establish a 19-member
National Commission to oversee implementation of the recommendations, chaired by Shura
Council speaker Ali al-Salih (a Shiite). The king also announced that the “National Human Rights
Institution,” appointed in 2010, would be fully independent of the government. According to the
government, specific steps to implement the BICI recommendations have included:
• Referral of all cases of security personnel who committed major abuses to the
Public Prosecutor, for subsequent prosecution.
• Abolition of the military court system and transfer of all cases to ordinary courts.
• Establishment of new procedures to record interrogations of detainees.
• Stripping the National Security Agency of law enforcement powers and limiting
it to purely intelligence gathering.
• Creation by the minister of labor of a tripartite commission to address reinstating
fired workers, and public sector employees dismissed for exercising their rights
of speech have been reinstated.
• Drafting a code of conduct for the police, based on international best practices.
The government hired former Miami police chief John Timoney and former
British police chief John Yates to teach Bahraini police tactics and techniques
that conform to international standards of human rights practices.
• Establishment of a compensation fund for the victims of torture.
• The rebuilding of some of the demolished religious sites has begun.
• Contradicting the government’s assertion that it is implementing all
recommendations, BICI chair Bassiouni said the government had not acted on the
recommendation that senior officials who might have ordered the use of
excessive force had not been prosecuted, to date.
On March 20, 2012, the National Commission overseeing implementation of the BICI
recommendations issued its final report. The report generally supported the government’s
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assertions of its implementation steps to that date.15 In the cover letter to its report, the National
Commission states that “the reader will see that in less than 100 days this Commission has
worked hard with the Government to reform the justice, human rights, policing, security services
and media sectors in a way that accords with best international practice.”
Late 2011-Mid 2012 Unrest
The implementation of many of the BICI recommendations has failed to calm unrest. Activists
say many activists remain in detention, and many workers have not been rehired. One, Abdul
Hadi Al-Khawaji, remains in prison and was reportedly near death from a hunger strike, although
he ended that strike in late May 2012. The government has not acted on suggestions it release him
to go to Denmark, where he also holds citizenship. The government again arrested Nabeel Rajab
on May 6, 2012, on charges of illegal gathering. As discussed above, he has been repeatedly
arrested since the unrest began.
On September 29, 2011, 20 medical personnel were sentenced by a military court to jail time
ranging from 5 to 15 years, a sentence harshly criticized by human rights activists worldwide.
The government said the sentences were not for helping protesters medically at Salmaniya
Medical Complex, but for inciting sectarian hatred, possession of illegal weapons, and forcibly
occupying a public building. Following international criticism, on October 5, 2011, the
government announced they would be retried in a civilian court. On June 14, 2012, an appeals
court upheld the conviction of nine of them and sentenced them to between one month to five
years in prison; the convictions of nine others were overturned. Of the five sentenced, four were
determined to have served their sentences during previous detentions and would not have to
return to prison. U.S. State Department official Michael Posner, visiting Bahrain at the time, said
the United States was “deeply disappointed” by the convictions.
Since mid-December 2011, protesters have attempted to occupy the large Budaiya highway or
conduct other demonstrations, leading to clashes with police and a few protester deaths. On
December 24, 2011, security forces fired at Wifaq headquarters after it challenged a ban on its
weekly protests. Security forces confronted protesters who tried to march to Pearl Roundabout to
mark the February 14, 2012, first anniversary of the uprising. Suggesting that the government’s
efforts to portray Bahrain as having returned to “normal” can be questioned, one of the largest
demonstrations to date was held on March 9, 2012. It marked the anniversary of the GCC
intervention, and was held in part to derail the holding of the Formula One auto race in Bahrain,
scheduled for April 22, 2012, which the government advertised as a hallmark of “normalization”
of the situation in Bahrain. Demonstrations took place in the days leading up to and including the
race, but the event was held, although spectator turnout was low.
As an indication of the increasingly violent nature of the unrest, on April 9, 2012, an improvised
explosive device killed seven police (who were all Sunnis). The next day, Sunni citizens
ransacked a supermarket owned by a Shiite business group (Jawad Group). U.N. and White
House statements in subsequent days condemned the police bombing as well as continued use of

15 The full text of the National Commission’s March 20, 2012, report is at http://www.biciactions.bh/wps/portal/BICI/
!ut/p/c5/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3gLAxNHQ093A3f3AEcjA88AQ09DFwtDYwMzY_1wkA48Kgwh8
v6OHp7u7iB5c0tLoLyrhatzkKmxgYkxRN4AB3A00PfzyM9N1S_Izg6ycFRUBACcUdSf/dl3/d3/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS9
ZQnZ3LzZfT0FISUdHRzBHT0Q5OTBJUFAzR0RLNDIwVTU!/?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/
EGOV+English+Library/BICI/Actions+Taken
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excessive force and use of tear gas against protesters. Protests have been taking place primarily in
Shiite villages since.
Continuing Ideas for Political Compromise
Aside from the Crown Prince’s seven points, the national dialogue recommendations, the
constitutional amendments, and the Manama Document, other ideas for interim political
compromises have repeatedly failed to come to fruition. A widely discussed interim compromise
has been the replacement of Prime Minister Khalifa Al Khalifa, who is widely despised by the
opposition, with Wifaq leader Shaykh Ali Salman or another moderate opposition figure. The
government has not agreed to this step even though, throughout the crisis, some Bahrain
government supporters have said that the dismissal of Prime Minister Khalifa was likely.16
Another interim compromise, not adopted to date, could include a broad reshuffling of the cabinet
to give Shiites many more ministerial posts and control of key economic ministries. Wifaq already
holds the majority of seats on several elected municipal councils, although these bodies do not
have national legislative authority. U.S. officials say there is likely to be some cabinet reshuffling
later in 2012, but it is not clear how extensive it will be.
Others continue to put hope in dialogue using the various plans discussed above, including the
Crown Prince’s seven points and the Manama Document. Some observers say that family
hardliners including the Royal Court Minister may have come to a tentative agreement on a
compromise plan in March 2012, but it was apparently viewed by other hardliners as too
conciliatory and was withdrawn. Compromise has been made more difficult by the apparent
political eclipse of the crown prince, who favors dialogue and negotiation.
Others blame the opposition, saying the GCC intervention and continuing crackdown may have
hardened Shiite demands to the point where an agreement is difficult. Harder line Shiite groups
believe that no compromise is possible with the regime still in power, and that increased protests
and actions intended to collapse the economy will force the government to fall. Complicating
prospects for a deal is the observation that many Shiites are gravitating to harder line, anti-
compromise factions.
Still, and amid reports in June 2012 that the two sides are exploring the possibility of resuming
dialogue, the United States and some allies are continuing to push dialogue. U.S. officials have
sought to begin some “Track 2” meetings that might float ideas for a compromise. A British
national, Jonathan Powell, formerly chief of staff to then Prime Minister Tony Blair, reportedly is
working with Wefaq on compromise ideas. The Bahrain government has rejected an idea pushed
by U.S. officials to accept the appointment of a high-level international facilitator or mediator
who might narrow the differences between the parties.
The overthrow of the government and the ascension of a Shiite-led regime is possible, although
the GCC determination to prevent this makes this outcome less likely, at least in the short term.
Still, some observers fear that, in the absence of an imminent solution, the uprising might evolve
into an insurgency with use of violent attacks on security forces, government buildings, and other
targets. Feeding such fears was the regime’s discovery, on June 14, 2012 of bomb-making
materials in several locations.

16 Author conversations with representatives of and observers close to the regime. April 2011.
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U.S. Posture on the Uprising
The Administration has not called for the Al Khalifa to yield to a political transition. The
Administration asserts that there is no justification for doing so because Bahrain’s use of force
has been dramatically less severe than that used by Muammar Qadhafi in Libya and Bashar al-
Assad in Syria, and that the Bahrain government has a long record of reform. The Administration
asserts that it has been consistently highly critical of Bahrain’s use of force against protesters and
its continued imprisonment of dissidents, and has tried to broker a political settlement.
Critics of the Administration say the U.S. response has been colored by the vital U.S. security
interests in Bahrain rather than an impartial commitment to promoting the human rights of the
mostly Shiite demonstrators. Critics add that the Administration is concerned that a fall of the Al
Khalifa regime and ascension of a Shiite-led government could increase Iran’s influence and lead
to an unwanted loss of the U.S. use of Bahrain’s military facilities. It is perhaps the critical
perception of the U.S. stance that has caused some Bahraini Shiites to increasingly denounce U.S.
policy and burn or defile the U.S. flag during demonstrations, according to press reports in June
2012.17
To support its assertions of its commitment to promoting human rights in Bahrain, the
Administration notes that, early in the uprising, Administration officials directly warned their
Bahraini counterparts against using force against the protesters, opposed the GCC intervention,
and called on all parties to take up the offer by the crown prince for a broad political dialogue on
reform.18 After the GCC intervention, the United States increased its criticism, expressing the
view that the crackdown would further inflame unrest over the long term, rather than achieve
quiescence and stability. On March 19, 2011, Secretary Clinton reiterated the U.S. support for the
crown prince’s offer of dialogue, and said:
Bahrain obviously has the sovereign right to invited GCC forces into its territory under its
defense and security agreements…. [The United States has] made clear that security alone
cannot resolve the challenges facing Bahrain. As I said earlier this week, violence is not and
cannot be the answer. A political process is. We have raised our concerns about the current
measures directly with Bahraini officials and will continue to do so.
On April 30, 2011, according to the White House, President Obama spoke by phone to King
Hamad and reportedly stated that Bahrain’s stability depends on respect for the universal rights of
the people of Bahrain, and a process of meaningful reform. At a May 5, 2011, House Foreign
Affairs Committee hearing, State Department officials testified that the United States is “deeply
concerned” by the “campaign of retribution” against the political opposition, adding that “security
operations will not resolve the challenges Bahrain faces.”
President Obama’s May 19, 2011, speech on the uprisings in the Middle East said the prospects
for success of a Bahrain government dialogue with the opposition were compromised by the
jailing of opposition figures. This U.S. position was restated in separate June 7, 2011, meetings
between the Crown Prince and Secretary Clinton and President Obama. According to a White

17 Kareem Fahim. “As Hopes for Reform Fade in Bahrain, Protesters Turn Anger on the United States.” New York
Times, June 24, 2012.
18 Secretary of State Clinton Comments on the Situation in the Middle East. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
GbucMZUg3Gc.
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House statement, President Obama stressed to him that those Bahraini forces or officials
responsible for human rights abuses should be held “accountable.”
The criticism continued in the course of the U.N. General Assembly meetings in New York in
September 2011; in his September 21, 2011, speech to the body, President Obama said:
In Bahrain, steps have been taken toward reform and accountability. We’re pleased with that,
but more is required. America is a close friend of Bahrain, and we will continue to call on the
government and the main opposition bloc—the Wifaq—to pursue a meaningful dialogue that
brings peaceful change that is responsive to the people. We believe the patriotism that binds
Bahrainis together must be more powerful than the sectarian forces that would tear them
apart. It will be hard, but it is possible.
The same day, Ambassador-nominee to Bahrain, Thomas Krajeski, testified in confirmation
hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, saying the government “overreacted” to
the unrest. He also praised the government’s long record of reform and accommodation of some
Shiite demands.
Many experts awaited the Administration reaction to the BICI report as a harbinger of the
direction of U.S. policy toward Bahrain. The U.S. reaction reiterated the U.S. stance since the
crisis began, gaving support to the views of both the government and the opposition. Secretary of
State Clinton said the day of the release that the United States is:
deeply concerned about the abuses identified in the report … and believe[s] that the BICI
report offers a historic opportunity for all Bahrainis to participate in a healing process that
will address long-standing grievances and move the nation onto a path of genuine, sustained,
reform.
During December 15, 2011, less than a month after the BICI report, Assistant Secretary of State
(Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor) Michael Posner made his third visit to Bahrain
since the unrest began. Suggesting that the Administration sees the government of Bahrain as
attempting to implement the BICI recommendations, he repeated past criticisms but also
“condemned” the use of violence by demonstrators “which the government has an obligation to
stop.” He made another visit on February 9, 2012, praising implementation of the BICI
recommendations but also saying more needs to be done, such as the refusal of the government to
drop some pending criminal charges against detainees incarcerated for political expression. The
White House statement of April 11, 2012, on recent violence and use of force against protesters
was noted above.
During early May 2012, Crown Prince Salman visited Washington, DC, and met with Secretary
of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Panetta, and Vice President Biden. As discussed further
below, a resumption of some U.S. arms sales to Bahrain was announced on May 11, 2012, which
represented an Administration effort to strengthen the reformist Crown Prince politically,
although U.S. officials say that objective was not achieved. Posner visited again in June 2012,
criticizing the upholding of some of the convictions of medical personnel discussed above. The
Crown Prince is reported to be planning another visit in late June or early July 2012, reflecting
the degree to which the Administration is trying to promote him as key to a political solution.
Although the Obama Administration has continued military and anti-terrorism assistance and
some arms sales to Bahrain, some U.S. aid and sales are on hold or are at reduced levels from
what was expected before the unrest began. For example, $25 million in military aid (Foreign
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Military Financing, FMF) was requested for Bahrain for FY2012 (figures determined just before
the uprising began), but only $10 million is being provided. The FY2013 budget presented on
February 13, 2012, asks the same $10 million in FMF for FY2013.
Pre-2011 U.S. Posture on Bahraini Democracy and Human Rights
Well before the 2011 unrest began, successive U.S. Administrations have been accused by human
rights groups and Bahraini Shiites of downplaying abuses against Bahraini Shiites. Critics point
to Secretary of State Clinton’s comments in Bahrain on December 3, 2010, referring to the
October 2010 elections, saying: “I am impressed by the commitment that the government has to
the democratic path that Bahrain is walking on. It takes time; we know that from our own
experience.”19
On the other hand, for many years prior to the 2011 unrest, the United States sought to accelerate
political reform in Bahrain and to empower its political societies through several programs. The
primary vehicle has been the “Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI),” which began funding
programs in Bahrain in 2003. MEPI funds have been used to help Bahrain build an independent
judiciary, to strengthen the COR, to empower women, to conduct media training, and to promote
legal reform. MEPI funds have also been used to fund AFL-CIO projects with Bahraini labor
organizations, and to help Bahrain implement the U.S.-Bahrain FTA. In May 2006 Bahrain
revoked the visa for the resident program director of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and
did not allow the office to reopen. NDI was conducting programs to enhance parliamentary
capabilities through a local NGO. In February 2010, the MEPI office of State Department signed
a memorandum of understanding with Bahrain to promote entrepreneurship there and promote
opportunities for trade with U.S. small businesses. According to the State Department’s
International Religious Freedom report for July-December 2010 (September 13, 2011), “the U.S.
government discusses religious freedom with the [Bahraini] government as part of its overall
policy to promote human rights.”
Other Human Rights Issues
The human rights issues in Bahrain are directly tied to the schism between the Sunni-led regime
and the Shiite majority, as noted in the State Department reports on human rights and religious
freedom in Bahrain. Beyond that issue, State Department reports, such as the human rights report
for 2011 (released May 24, 2012, but covering only the 2011 calendar year), note problems for
non-Muslims and for opponents of the government. Bahrain allows freedom of worship for
Christians, Jews, and Hindus although the constitution declares Islam the official religion.
There are several Bahraini human rights groups, mainly advocates for Shiite rights and causes. As
noted above, two of the most prominent such groups are the Bahrain Human Rights Society and
the Bahrain Transparency Society. Another is the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, founded by
Abdul Hadi al-Khawaja, mentioned above.
On June 28, 2012, twenty eight countries issued a joint declaration, during U.N. Human Rights
Council debate, condemning human rights abuses by the Bahrain government. The United States,
Britain, and eight other EU countries did not support the initiative.

19 Department of State. “Remarks With Foreign Minister Al Khalifa After Their Meeting.” December 3, 2010.
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Women’s Rights
Bahrain has tended to be relatively progressive as far as law and regulations. However, as is the
case with its neighbors, Bahrain’s practices and customs tend to limit women’s rights. Women can
drive, own and inherit property, and initiate divorce cases, although religious courts may refuse a
woman’s divorce request. Some prominent women are campaigning for a codified family law that
would enhance and secure women’s rights, running into opposition from Bahraini clerics who are
against granting more rights for women. The campaign for the law is backed by King Hamad’s
wife, Shaykha Sabeeka, and the Supreme Council for Women, which is one association that
promotes women’s rights in Bahrain. Others include the Bahrain Women’s Union, the Bahrain
Women’s Association, and the Young Ladies Association.
To try to showcase its progressiveness, the government has promoted several women to high
positions. The number of women in both chambers of the National Assembly is provided in Table
1, above. Since 2005, there have been two female ministers—Minister of Human Rights and
Social Development Fatima bint Ahmad al-Balushi and Minister of Information and Culture Mai
bint Muhammad Al Khalifa. A previous female minister of health, Nada Haffadh, resigned in
October 2007 following allegations of corruption in her ministry by conservatives who oppose
women occupying high-ranking positions. Two other women, including the president of the
University of Bahrain, have ministerial rank. Ms. Huda Azar Nunu, an attorney and formerly the
only Jew in the Shura Council, is ambassador to the United States.
Religious Freedom
On freedoms for religions other than Islam, the July-December 2010 (released September 13,
2011), State Department report on international religious freedom, in the section on Bahrain, says
that respect for religious freedom exhibited “no change” since the prior report. Most of the report
focuses on Sunni-Shiite differences, which are discussed as political issues above. According to
the report, non-Muslims have been able to practice their religion privately without government
interference, and to maintain places of worship. However, the government requires licenses for
churches to operate, and has in the past threatened to shutter un-licensed churches serving Indian
expatriates. The Baha’i faith, declared blasphemous in Iran and Afghanistan, has been
discriminated against in Bahrain, although recent State Department human rights reports say that
the Baha’i community now gathers and operates openly. According to the State Department
human rights report for 2011, there are 37 Jews in Bahrain, and no reports of anti-Semitic acts
during the reporting period.
Labor Rights
On labor issues, Bahrain has been credited with significant labor reforms, including a 2002 law
granting workers, including noncitizens, the right to form and join unions. The law holds that the
right to strike is a legitimate means for workers to defend their rights and interests, but their right
is restricted in practice, including a prohibition on strikes in the oil and gas, education, and health
sectors. There are about 50 trade unions in Bahrain, but all unions must join the General
Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (GFBTU). As a sign of the degree to which the GFBTU is
dominated by oppositionists, during the height of unrest in 2011, the GFBTU called at least two
general strikes to protest excessive force by security forces. In apparent retaliation by the
government and employers, during March-May 2011, employers dismissed almost 2,500 workers
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from the private sector, and almost 2,000 from the public sector, including 25% of the country’s
union leadership.
Human Trafficking
On human trafficking, the State Department “Trafficking in Persons Report” for 2011, released
June 19, 2012, places Bahrain in “Tier 2: Watch List”—a downgrade from the simple Tier 2
placement of the previous year. The downgrade was based on the government’s failure to produce
results in reducing human trafficking during 2011-2012, despite commitments and pledges to
proactively address the issue. The placement represents a setback from the 2010 “Trafficking in
Persons Report” (June 14, 2010), when the “Watch List” designation was dropped. The 2009
report (June 16, 2009) assessed Bahrain as “Tier 2: Watch List,” with explanatory language
similar to that of the 2008 report.
Executions and Torture
Another issue that has been widely discussed in the context of the uprising, but which predated
the 2011 unrest, is that of executions and torture. Human Rights Watch and other groups long
asserted that Bahrain had been going against the international trend of ending executions. In
November 2009, Bahrain’s Court of Cassation upheld the sentencing to death by firing squad of a
citizen of Bangladesh. That sentenced was imposed for a 2005 murder. From 1977 until 2006,
there were no executions in Bahrain.
Allegations of torture against Shiite opposition figures have been widespread. In February 2010,
more than one year before the uprising began, Human Rights Watch issued a study alleging
systematic use by Bahraini security forces of torture.20 Witnesses at the May 13, 2011, hearing of
the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission asserted that torture was being used regularly on
those arrested in the post-GCC intervention crackdown. The Administration did not send a
witness to testify at that hearing. The State Department human rights report for 2011 said there
were numerous reports of torture and other cruel punishments during the state of emergency in
2011.
U.S.-Bahrain Security and Foreign Policy Relations21
In large part to keep powerful neighbors in check, Bahrain has long linked its security to the
United States, and U.S. efforts to address threats in Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan have benefitted
from access to Bahraini facilities. In recognition of the relationship, in March 2002, President
Bush (Presidential Determination 2002-10) designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally
(MNNA),” a designation that qualifies Bahrain to purchase the same U.S. arms that NATO allies
can purchase. Bahrain-U.S. relations have been somewhat strained by the unrest, but U.S.
officials say that U.S. defense cooperation has not suffered significantly, and that this issue
remains relatively separate from the U.S.-Bahrain discussions on the unrest. Still, the Bahrain
government is said to be slightly less forthcoming with in-kind support to the U.S. military

20 Human Rights Watch. “Bahrain: Torture Redux.” February 2010.
21 Information in this section obtained from a variety of press reports, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(DSCA).
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presence in Bahrain as it was before the unrest began. And, U.S. officials add that there are few, if
any, security cooperation initiatives that the United States can use as leverage to obtain Bahrain
government flexibility on the unrest issue. The opposition says that U.S.-Bahrain defense
relations are not at risk should the Shiite opposition achieve greater influence in Bahrain; Wifaq
leader Shaykh Salman has said in interviews that he supports continuing the security relationship
with the United States.
A U.S. Embassy in Manama, Bahrain’s capital, opened in September 1971 in conjunction with
Bahrain’s independence. At that time, the threat level in the Persian Gulf was perceived as
relatively low. Since then, defense issues have become a central feature of U.S.-Bahrain relations.
Iran’s nuclear program is considered a growing threat to the Persian Gulf states, not only Bahrain.
There is also the issue of terrorism and piracy in the Gulf. Iraq no longer poses a strategic threat
to the GCC states following the U.S.-led ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003.
U.S. Navy Headquarters in Bahrain
The cornerstone of U.S.-Bahrain defense relations is U.S. access to Bahrain’s naval facilities.
February 2008 marked the 60th anniversary of a U.S. naval command presence in Bahrain;
MIDEASTFOR (U.S. Middle East Force), its successor, NAVCENT (naval component of U.S.
Central Command), as well as the Fifth Fleet (reconstituted in June 1995) are headquartered
there, at a sprawling facility called “Naval Support Activity-Bahrain.” The facility now covers
over 100 acres, and about 5,000 U.S. personnel, mostly Navy, are deployed in Bahrain.22
Some smaller U.S. ships (e.g., minesweepers) are homeported there, but the Fifth Fleet consists
mostly of U.S.-homeported ships that are sent to the region on six- to seven-month deployments.
Ships operating in the Fifth Fleet at any given time typically include a carrier strike group, an
amphibious ready group, and some additional surface combatants, and operate in both the Persian
Gulf and Indian Ocean/Northern Arabian Sea. In mid-March 2012, the U.S. Navy announced it is
doubling its minesweepers in the Gulf to eight, and sending additional mine-hunting helicopters,
as tensions escalated over Iran’s nuclear program and its threatened reaction to new sanctions.
To further develop the naval facility (sometimes referred to as “Bahrain Island”), and other
military facilities, the U.S. military is implementing a planned $580 million military construction
program in Bahrain. Construction began in May 2010 to allow larger ships to dock at the naval
facility; the project is expected to be completed, in several phases, by 2015. A January 2008 lease
agreement between the United States and Bahrain allowed for the expansion by making available
the decommissioned Mina (port) Salman. U.S. officials say they are requesting further expansions
of the facility, as of June 2012.
The bulk of the construction program is to expand the naval facility, but $45 million of the funds
is to be used to expand an apron at Shaykh Isa Air Base, where a variety of U.S. aircraft are
stationed, including F-16s, F-18s, and P-3 surveillance aircraft, and $19 million is to be used for a
Special Operations Forces facility. Recent appropriations and requests to fund the construction
include $54 million for FY2008 (Division 1 of P.L. 110-161); no funds for FY2009; $41.5 million
for FY2010 (P.L. 111-117); $258 million for FY2011 (P.L. 112-10); and $100 million was
requested for FY2012 for two projects of nearly equal size. A Senate version of H.R. 2055 had cut

22 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/after-iraq-pullout-us-serves-a-reminder-to-iran/
2011/10/24/gIQAU7dGCM_blog.html.
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the entire FY2012 request, possibly because of the unrest and the uncertainty created by it, and
the cuts were contained in the final version that was enacted as the FY2012 Consolidated
Appropriation (P.L. 112-74).
Some say that the United States should begin examining alternate facilities in the Gulf region in
the expectation that continued Bahraini hosting of the U.S. naval headquarters has become
unstable. On July 22, 2011, the U.S. Navy in Bahrain issued a statement refuting a British press
report that the Navy is planning to relocate the facility. Should there be a decision to take that
step, likely alternatives would include UAE or Qatar, although neither has expressed a position on
whether it would be willing to host such an expanded facility. U.S. officials say other Gulf state
facilities, such as Jebel Ali in UAE, do not provide large U.S. ships with the ease of docking
access that Bahrain does, and that many of the alternative possibilities inconveniently share
docking and other facilities with large commercial operations.
Bilateral Defense Pact
Bahrain was part of the U.S.-led allied coalition that ousted Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, hosting
17,500 troops and 250 combat aircraft at Shaykh Isa Air Base (mentioned above). Expanding on
the agreement under which Bahrain hosted U.S. naval headquarters, Bahrain and the United
States signed a 10-year defense pact on October 28, 1991, seven months after the ousting of Iraqi
troops from Kuwait. The pact was renewed in October 2001, and was presumably to be up for
renewal in October 2011. However, press and expert accounts in August 2011 indicate that, a few
months after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, the Bush Administration may
have extended the pact a further five years, to 2016. The U.S. Defense Department has not
publicly confirmed these stories, although one U.S. official, on background, said the pact was
previously extended beyond October 2011.23 The pact not only provides the United States access
to Bahrain’s air bases and to pre-position strategic materiel (mostly U.S. Air Force munitions),
but also requires consultations with Bahrain if its security is threatened, and it expanded exercises
and U.S. training of Bahraini forces.24
Cooperation With U.S. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
Following the liberation of Kuwait in February 1991, there were about 1,300 U.S. military
personnel in Bahrain during the 1990s to contain Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and Bahraini pilots flew
strikes over Iraq during the war; Iraq fired nine Scud missiles at Bahrain during the war, of which
three hit facilities there. Bahrain hosted the regional headquarters for U.N. weapons inspections in
Iraq during 1991-1998, and the U.S.-led Multinational Interdiction Force (MIF) that enforced a
U.N. embargo on Iraq during 1991-2003. Since the early 1990s, the United States has reportedly
stationed two Patriot anti-missile batteries there.25

23 “U.S.-Bahrain Defense Pact Renewed.” Agence France Presse, August 5, 2011.
24 Details of the U.S.-Bahrain defense agreement are classified. Some provisions are discussed in Sami Hajjar, U.S.
Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute), March
2002, p. 27.
25 Walter Pincus. “Bahrain Government’s Ties With the United States Run Deep.” Washington Post, February 22,
2011.
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Post-September 11 and Post-Saddam Cooperation
The naval headquarters, mentioned earlier, has been used to coordinate the operations of over 20
U.S. warships performing support missions for U.S. and allied naval operations related to the U.S.
military operations in Iraq (2003-2011) and Afghanistan (2001-present). These ships are part of
Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 and 152 that seek to interdict the movement of terrorists, arms,
or weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related technology and narcotics across the Arabian Sea.
These task forces also seek to counter piracy in the Arabian Sea. In March 2008, Bahrain took a
turn in a rotation to command CTF-152, and it commanded again in December 2010. Bahrain
commanded an anti-piracy task force in Gulf/Arabian Sea waters in October 2010. These
operations are offshoots of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, which ousted the
Taliban after the September 11 attacks. Bahrain allowed the United States to fly combat missions
from its bases (Shaykh Isa Air Base) in both OEF and the war to oust Saddam Hussein in March-
April 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF). During both OEF and OIF, Bahrain publicly
deployed its U.S.-supplied frigate warship (the Subha) to help protect U.S. ships, and it sent
ground and air assets to Kuwait in support of OIF. Bahrain hosted about 4,000 U.S. military
personnel during major combat of OEF (October 2001-May 2003).
Bahrain and UAE have been the only Gulf states to deploy their own forces to provide aid to
Afghanistan. In January 2009, Bahrain sent 100 police officers to Afghanistan on a two-year tour
to help U.S./NATO-led stabilization operations there. Their tour was extended until the end of the
NATO mission at the end of 2014.
Bahrain’s participation in OIF came despite domestic opposition in Bahrain to that war. Because
of its limited income, Bahrain has not contributed funds to Iraq reconstruction, but it attended the
“Expanded Neighbors of Iraq” regional conference process which last met in Kuwait on April 22,
2008. That process was suspended in late 2008 as Iraq stabilized and the United States began the
process of withdrawal, complete on December 18, 2011. On October 16, 2008, Bahrain’s first
post-Saddam ambassador to Iraq (Saleh Ali al-Maliki) presented his credentials in Baghdad, in
line with King Hamad’s pledge to President Bush in March 2008. However, relations have
become tense to the extent that Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government and its newly empowered
Shiite clerical establishment is perceived as sympathetic to Bahrain’s opposition. On March 9,
2012, Iraqi Shiites rallied in support of Bahrain’s Shiites on the same day as Bahrain’s opposition
mounted a major demonstration, discussed above. King Hamad did not attend the March 27-29
Arab League summit in Baghdad; Kuwait’s Amir Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah was the only GCC
leader to attend. The other GCC states, including Bahrain, sent lower level delegations.
U.S. Arms Transfers and Military Aid
To assist Bahrain’s ability to cooperate with the United States on regional security issues,
Congress and successive Administrations, citing Bahrain’s limited income, have supported
military assistance to Bahrain’s small force. The unrest has caused the Administration to put on
hold sales to Bahrain of any equipment that can be used against protesters, while continuing to
provide equipment that can only help Bahrain defend itself from external threats or support U.S.
operations in the region.
The main recipient of U.S. military assistance has always been the relatively small Bahrain
Defense Force (BDF), which has less than 10,000 active duty personnel (including 1,200 National
Guard). The BDF and the police are run by Sunni Bahrainis, but are said to supplement their
ranks with unknown percentages of paid Sunni Muslim recruits from neighboring countries,
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including Pakistan, Yemen, Jordan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Until 1998, Bahrain’s internal security
services were run by a former British colonial police officer, Ian Henderson, who had a reputation
among Shiites for using repressive measures. The current director of the internal security service
is Shaykh Khalifa bin Abdullah Al Khalifa, considered a hardliner in the royal family.
FMF (and funds provided under “Section 1206” of the National Defense Authorization Act of
2006, P.L. 109-163) is provided to Bahrain to help it maintain U.S.-origin weapons, to enhance
inter-operability with U.S. forces, to augment Bahrain’s air defenses, to support and upgrade the
avionics of its F-16 fleet, and to improve counter-terrorism capabilities. As an example, the
United States has supplied Bahrain with a coastal radar system that reportedly provides Bahrain
and the U.S. Navy a 360-degree field of vision around Bahrain.26 Some funds have been used to
build up Bahrain’s Special Operations forces. The Defense Department estimates that, in part due
to U.S. assistance, as of FY2008, about 45% of Bahrain’s forces are fully capable of integrating
into a U.S.-led coalition. The FY2012 request, made at the start of the unrest, asked for $25
million in FMF; as shown in Table 3 below, only $10 million is likely to be provided for FY2012,
due in large part to the Administration’s intent to retain leverage against Bahrain to compel it
make reforms. The same lower amount, $10 million, is requested for FY2013.
Bahrain is eligible to receive grant “excess defense articles” (EDA). The United States transferred
the FFG-7 “Perry class” frigate Subha (see above) as EDA in July 1997. In the State
Department’s FY2012 budget request, the Administration supported providing another frigate (an
“extended deck frigate”) to Bahrain as EDA because the Subha is approaching the end of its
service life. The Administration said on May 11, 2012, that it continues to support that transfer,
which is planned for 2014, subject to passage of authorizing legislation.27 In 1996, the United
States gave Bahrain a no-cost five-year lease on 60 M60A3 tanks; title subsequently passed to
Bahrain. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) was suspended for Bahrain in FY1994 but restarted
in appreciation of Bahrain’s support in OEF and OIF.
As noted in Table 3, small amounts of International Military Education and Training funds
(IMET) are provided to Bahrain to inculcate principles of civilian control of the military,
democracy, and interoperability with U.S. forces. Approximately 250 Bahraini military students
attend U.S. military schools each year, either through the IMET program or (57% of them), using
FMF funds, in connection with the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program.
Purchases With National Funds
Bahrain agreed to purchase $91 million worth of U.S. arms through the Foreign Military Sales
program in FY2010—a figure that far exceeds the funds it receives from FMF. Bahrain’s total
government budget is about $6 billion per year. In 1998, Bahrain purchased 10 U.S.-made F-16Cs
from new production, worth about $390 million. In 1999, the United States sold Bahrain 26
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) to arm the F-16s, although some
Members were concerned that the AMRAAM sale could promote an arms race in the Gulf.
Section 581 of the FY1990 foreign operations appropriation act (P.L. 101-167) made Bahrain the
only Gulf state eligible to receive the STINGER shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile, and the
United States has sold Bahrain about 70 Stingers since 1990. (This authorization has been

26 “Bahrain Government’s Ties With the United States Run Deep.” Op. cit.
27 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/05/189810.htm
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repeated in subsequent legislation.) To allay congressional concerns about possible U.S.
promotion of missile proliferation in the region, an August 2000 sale of 30 Army Tactical Missile
Systems (ATACMs, a system of short-range ballistic missiles fired from a multiple rocket
launcher) included an agreement for joint U.S.-Bahraini control of the weapon. (A notification of
a possible sale to Bahrain of 30 ATACM missiles and associated equipment, valued at about $70
million, was sent to Congress on November 4, 2010. Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor for
the missiles.) A sale of up to 180 “Javelin” anti-armor missiles and 60 launch units, worth up to
$42 million; 9 UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters worth up to $252 million; and 6 Bell search and
recovery helicopters, valued at about $160 million, was notified August 3, 2007. An additional 25
AMRAAMs (Raytheon Missile Systems Corp.) and associated equipment, valued at about $74
million, was notified for sale to Bahrain on July 28, 2009.
Bahrain has not purchased any major U.S. missile defense systems, probably because of its
limited funds. That prevents Bahrain from becoming a major factor in the U.S. effort to assemble
a Gulf-wide, integrated missile defense network. That effort was discussed extensively in two
State Department visits to the region—on March 31, 2012, Secretary Clinton attended the first
ministerial meeting of the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia,
which focused on the integrated Gulf missile defense plan. Subsequently, deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Frank Rose spoke in Abu Dhabi on April 12, 2012,28 on the missile defense
issue.
September 2011 Humvee and TOW Sale
One sale, notified on September 14, 2011, is increasingly controversial because it was announced
seven months after the unrest began, and has been agreed to despite U.S. criticism of Bahrain’s
crackdown. It is for a proposed sale of 44 “Humvee” (M115A1B2) armored vehicles and several
hundred TOW missiles of various models, of which 50 are to be “bunker busters.” Along with
associated equipment and support, the proposed sale is worth an estimated $53 million.
Although not considered large in dollar terms, or of particularly sophisticated equipment, the sale
incurred opposition from several human rights groups and from the Bahraini opposition who
assert that the sale represents U.S. downplaying of the abuses committed by the Bahraini
government in the course of the unrest. Human rights groups and Bahraini opposition figures say
the regime could use the Humvees, in particular, in their efforts to crack down on protests. When
the sale was announced, State Department officials said the sale would not violate the intent of
the “Leahy amendment”—a provision of foreign aid and defense appropriations laws that forbids
U.S. sales of equipment to security units that have committed human rights abuses.29
Two joint resolutions were introduced in the 112th Congress to block the sale: S.J.Res. 28,
introduced by Senator Ron Wyden, and H.J.Res. 80, introduced by Representative James
McGovern. Both joint resolutions would prohibit the sale unless the Administration certifies that
Bahrain is rectifying the alleged abuses connected to its suppression of the uprising in 2011. To
block a proposed arms sale would require passage of a joint resolution to do so, and with a veto-
proof majority, because President Obama could veto a joint resolution of disapproval in order to
complete the sale. The House bill attracted 14 co-sponsors, the Senate bill two co-sponsors. On
October 19, 2011, even though the sale had passed the period of congressional review, and

28 U.S. Department of State Daily Digest Bulletin, April 12, 2012.
29 James Lobe. “Bahrain: U.S. Congress Urged to Reject Arms Sales.” IPS News Service, September 29, 2011.
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apparently addressing the criticism and legislative initiatives, the Administration told Congress it
would delay the sale until it could review the BICI report to be released November 23. Still, the
State Department spokesperson stated on January 27, 2012, that “we are maintaining a pause on
most security assistance to Bahrain pending further progress on reform.” At the same briefing, the
department said it was releasing to Bahrain previously notified and cleared spare parts and
maintenance—worth a reported $1 million—needed for Bahrain’s external defense and support of
Fifth Fleet operations. None of the items can be used against protesters, according to the State
Department statement.30
Some of the most recent sales are in accordance with the State Department’s “Gulf Security
Dialogue,” begun in 2006 to counter Iran, and under which a total of about $20 billion worth of
U.S. weapons might be sold to the Gulf monarchy states. Only a small portion of that total sales
volume is reportedly slated for Bahrain. Much of the initiative involves missile defense
integration, and it is primarily Bahrain’s wealthier neighbors, such as UAE, that are buying
advanced U.S. missile defense equipment.
May 11, 2012, Announcement of Possible Future Sales31
As discussed above, on May 11, 2012, in conjunction with a visit to Washington, DC, by
Bahrain’s Crown Prince Salman, the Administration announced that, despite continuing concerns
about Bahrain’s handling of the unrest, it would open up Bahrain to the purchase of additional
U.S. arms for the BDF, Bahrain’s Coast Guard, and Bahrain’s National Guard. The
Administration stated that weaponry that could be sold is not typically used in crowd control or
riot control, and that the TOW and Humvee sale discussed, as well as any sales of equipment that
could be used against protesters (tear gas and rifles, for example), would remain on hold. The
Administration did not release a complete list of weapons categories that might be sold, but it
gave a few examples as follows:
• The Perry-class frigate, as EDA, discussed above;
• Harbor security boats for the Bahrain Coast Guard, as EDA;
• An upgrade to the engines on Bahrain’s U.S.-made F-16s; and
• Additional AMRAAM’s (see above), according to press reports quoting U.S.
officials knowledgeable about the decision.32
Some Members of Congress publicly criticized the May 11, 2012, decision as yielding U.S.
leverage on the government to enact more substantial reforms. Some said they might seek
legislation to block the proposed sales.33

30 Department of State. Taken Question: Bahrain’s Security Assistance. January 27, 2012.
31 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/05/189810.htm

32 Nicole Gaouette. “U.S. Resumes Bahrain Arms Sales Citing Security Interests.” Bloomberg News, May 11, 2012.
33 Sara Sorcher. “Arms Sales to Bahrain Anger Senators.” National Journal Daily, May 14, 2012.
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Anti-Terrorism Cooperation
Bahrain’s cooperation in post-September 11 regional security operations was discussed above. As
far as terrorists operating inside Bahrain itself, the State Department’s report on international
terrorism for 2010 (released August 18, 2011) again credits Bahrain for having “worked to
actively counter terrorist finance,” as well as for enhanced border control capabilities, for a
realignment of institutional responsibilities that resulted in greater capacity and interagency
cooperation, and for successfully prosecuting a number of cases under its 2006 counterterrorism
law. The report for 2010 dropped the criticism of the previous year’s report that Bahrain had not
overcome legal constraints that have sometimes hampered its ability to detain and prosecute
suspected terrorists.
Bahrain also continues to host the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force
(MENA/FATF) secretariat and its Central Bank, Financial Information Unit (within the Central
Bank), and local banks cooperate with U.S. efforts against terrorism financing and money
laundering. As noted by the State Department in the FY2012 budget justification, some of the
U.S. assistance to Bahrain (NADR funds) are used to provide training to its counter-terrorism
institutions and to augment the ability of Bahraini forces to protect U.S. diplomatic and military
facilities in Bahrain. The Bahraini Ministry of Interior is the lead agency that receives this support
and, according to the FY2012 budget justification, the Administration is “reviewing” the use of
this aid to ensure that none was used “against protestors” in the 2011 unrest.
Relations with and Cooperation Against Iran
As noted previously, Bahrain focuses its foreign policy intently on Iran, which the government
believes is able to influence Bahrain’s domestic politics to a greater degree than has any other
regional power. Bahrain’s government perceives Iran as willing and able to support Shiite groups
against Bahrain’s Sunni-dominated government.
The issue of alleged Iranian involvement in the 2011-2012 unrest has risen to the surface of the
debate in Bahrain and the United States. Ambassador Krajeski testified on September 21, 2011,
that the United States “saw no evidence of Iranian instigation” of the unrest, but that the United
States is concerned “about Iranian exploitation” of it. U.S. officials reportedly believe that Iran
has urged hardline Bahraini Shiite factions not to compromise.34 On April 14, 2011, U.S. officials,
speaking on background, told journalists that there was some information to indicate that Iran
might have transferred small amounts of weapons to Bahraini oppositionists.35
The BICI findings appeared to absolve Iran of direct involvement in the 2011 unrest, although the
report blames Iran’s media for incitement of the situation in Bahrain. Bahraini leaders have not
directly contradicted the report’s findings on these points but they clearly believe that Iran’s role
has been more extensive than that cited by the BICI report. On March 21, 2011, King Hamad
indirectly accused Iran of involvement in the unrest by saying a “foreign plot” had been foiled by
the GCC assistance and on April 17, 2011, the Bahraini government sent a letter to U.N.
Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon formally alleging that the pro-Iranian Shiite faction Hezbollah is

34 http://www.stripes.com/gates-protracted-bahrain-negotiations-allowing-greater-iran-influence-1.137532.
35 Adam Entous and Matthew Rosenberg. “U.S. Says Iran Helps Crackdown in Syria.” Wall Street Journal, April 14,
2011.
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seeking to destabilize Bahrain with “logistical help” from unnamed countries (but clearly
referring to Iran). The two countries withdrew their ambassadors in mid-March 2011. In an event
that gave the Bahraini government some justification for its criticism, on May 16, 2011, Iranian
warships began an effort to transport 150 pro-Bahrain opposition Iranian Shiites to Bahrain, but
turned back the following day for fear of provoking a clash with GCC ships. This event came two
days after Iran’s foreign minister praised a speech by King Hamad that appeared intended to
lower tensions with Iran by “offering friendship” to Tehran.
Well before the 2011 unrest, Bahrain’s fears about Iran had been infused by lingering suspicions,
sometimes fed by Iranian actions, that Iran never accepted the results of the 1970 U.N. survey
giving Bahrain independence rather than integration with Iran. Those findings were endorsed by
U.N. Security Council Resolution 278, which was ratified by Iran’s parliament. After these
official determinations, Bahrain had considered the issue closed, after over a century of Persian
contestation of Bahraini sovereignty. Those contests included an effort by Reza Shah Pahlavi of
Iran in the 1930s to deny Bahrain the right to grant oil concessions to the United States and
Britain. In December 1981, and then again in June 1996—a time when Iran was actively seeking
to export its Islamic revolution—Bahrain publicly accused Iran of trying to organize a coup by
pro-Iranian Bahraini Shiites (the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, IFLB). The group’s
successor is the Bahrain Islamic Action Society, which is outlawed.
In recent years, Bahrain’s leadership—and other countries in the region—have reacted strongly
against statements by Iranian editorialists and advisers to Iranian leaders appearing to reassert
Iran’s claim. One such example was a July 2007 Iranian newspaper article reasserting the Iranian
claim to Bahrain. However, that article, along with the Bahraini crown prince’s November 3,
2007, comment that Iran is developing a nuclear weapon (Iran claims it is developing only
civilian nuclear power), did not mar the visit of Iranian President Ahmadinejad on November 17,
2007. In March 2009 by former Iranian parliament speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, now an advisor
to Iran’s Supreme Leader, again referring to Bahrain as Iran’s 14th province. Iran’s Foreign
Ministry immediately tried to limit any diplomatic damage by asserting respect for Bahrain’s
sovereignty and independence, but some Arab governments sharply criticized the Nateq Nuri
comments. Morocco broke relations with Iran as a response.
In connection with its own concerns about Iran, Bahrain has supported the U.S. position that Iran
is not fully cooperating with U.N. Security Council requirements to suspend enrichment of
uranium. In the joint news conference with Secretary Clinton on December 3, 2010, referenced
earlier, the foreign minister restated Bahrain’s support for Iran’s right to nuclear power for
peaceful uses, but that “when it comes to taking that [nuclear] power, to developing it into a cycle
for weapon grade, that is something that we can never accept, and we can never live with in this
region.”36 On April 10, 2012, Bahrain supported a UAE condemnation of a visit to Abu Musa
island by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; in 1992 Iran seized full control of the island,
which previously had been shared between Iran and the UAE under a 1971 agreement.
At the same time, so as not to provide Iran a pretext to pressure Bahrain, Bahrain’s leaders have
sometimes tried to silence voices in Bahrain that publicly attack Iran. An example is the one-day
suspension in 2009 of the newspaper Akhbar al Khaleej (Gulf News) for running an editorial by a
Bahrain Shura Council member who criticized Iranian leaders. Bahrain regularly supports the

36 Department of State. Transcript of Remarks by Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Al Khalifa. December 3,
2010.
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invitation of high-ranking Iranian officials to the annual International Institute for Security
Studies (IISS) conference in Bahrain called the “Manama Dialogue,” held every December. At
times, there have been expectations that U.S. officials might meet with Iranian officials at the
margins of the conference, although such meetings have not taken place in practice.
Bahrain-Iran Gas Development Deal and Other Economic Ties
Another way in which Bahrain stays engaged with Iran is through discussions of major energy
projects with Iran and by conducting normal trade and banking ties with it. The 2007
Ahmadinejad visit resulted in a preliminary agreement for Bahrain to buy 1.2 billion cubic feet
per day (for 25 years) of Iranian gas via an undersea pipeline to be built. The deal would have
involved a $4 billion investment by Bahrain to develop Phases 15 and 16 of Iran’s South Pars gas
field, which presumably would be the source of the gas that Bahrain would import. The March
2009 comments of Nateq Nuri, discussed above, led to the suspension of this deal. On October
21, 2009, Bahrain’s Minister of Oil and Gas Abd al-Husayn Mirza said talks on the deal would
“resume soon.” There is a widespread assumption that the unrest has clouded the prospects for the
deal, but Bahraini officials said in June 2011 that it had not been cancelled outright.
There are no indications that Iran-Bahrain general commerce has been affected by the 2011
unrest. Energy market observers say that Bahrain energy firms are still supplying gasoline to Iran.
No U.N. Security Council Resolution bars such sales, but a U.S. law signed on July 1, 2010—the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-
195)—provides for sanctions against foreign firms that sell more than $1 million worth of
gasoline to Iran. Some energy firms in the Gulf, including in Kuwait, reportedly have become
reticent to continue supplying gasoline to Iran because of the U.S. action, but Bahrain is not
known to have publicly disavowed further gasoline sales to Iran.37 No sanctions have been
imposed on any Bahraini gas traders under CISADA.
In March 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice sanctioned Future Bank, headquartered in
Bahrain, because it is controlled and partially owned by Iran’s Bank Melli. The sanctions, under
Executive Order 13382 (anti-proliferation), prevent U.S. citizens from participating in
transactions with Future Bank and require the freezing of any U.S.-based bank assets. The Bank
remains in operation.
Other Foreign Policy Issues
Bahrain has close relations with the other GCC states, in particular Saudi Arabia, as evidenced by
its turn to Saudi Arabia to help it deal with the 2011 unrest. Virtually all the GCC states have
political structures similar to that of Bahrain, and several have substantial Shiite minorities
(although not majorities, as Bahrain does). Saudi Arabia’s Shiites (about 10% of the population)
are located mostly in the eastern provinces, across a causeway constructed in 1986 that connects
the two countries. This linkage partly explains Saudi concerns about the unrest shaking the royal
family in Bahrain.
The Saudi commitment to Bahrain’s government largely explains its push, at the December 2011
GCC summit and then a separate May 14, 2012, GCC leadership meeting, to turn the GCC into a

37 CRS conversations with foreign diplomats, including some from the Gulf. July–September 2010.
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political union (“Riyadh Declaration”). Doing so would further commit all the GCC states to
ensuring that Shiites do not come to power in Bahrain. The Saudi and Bahraini leaderships went
into the May 14, 2012, meeting proposing a Bahrain-Saudi union that would be expanded to all
six GCC states. However, opposition from Kuwait, Oman, and UAE caused the Saudis and
Bahrainis to shelve the concept of any union, even between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, at least
temporarily.
Because of historic ties between their two royal families, Kuwait has sometimes been touted as a
potential mediator in the Bahraini political crisis. Both royal families hail from the Anizah tribe
that settled in Bahrain and some of whom went onto what is now Kuwait. Kuwaiti Shiites in
Kuwait’s parliament have argued against Kuwait’s siding firmly with the Al Khalifa regime.
However, the Kuwaiti government did, as noted with its naval deployments, join the GCC
position on the side of the government. Kuwait’s prime minister visited Bahrain on July 5, 2011.
On other regional issues, unlike Qatar and UAE, Bahrain did not play a significant role in
assisting the Libyan opposition to the rule of Colonel Muammar Al Qadhafi. Had Bahrain
intervened in Libya, doing so could have been viewed as a contradiction—supporting a
revolutionary movement in another Arab state while arguing that its domestic opposition’s
grievances lacked legitimacy.
As to Syria, the GCC sees Syria as Iran’s main Middle Eastern ally and seeks the ouster of
President Bashar Al Assad. In August 2011, Bahrain joined the other GCC countries in
withdrawing their Ambassadors to Syria. In November, the GCC voted with other Arab League
states to suspend Syria’s membership in the body. In April 2012, the GCC states also proposed
giving the Syrian opposition $100 million in funding that it can use to buy weaponry, although
most of that funding reportedly is being provided by the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.
Some of those states are said to be providing weapons as well. As part of the GCC, Bahrain also
joined the GCC efforts, which yielded success in November 2011, to persuade Yemen’s President
Ali Abdullah Saleh to cede power to a transition process. He left Yemen in January 2012.
Qatar Territorial Disputes38
The United States cooperates closely with both Qatar and Bahrain, which is why the Bahrain-
Qatar territorial dispute was closely watched by U.S. policymakers. The resolution of the dispute
has partly removed these tensions as an issue for U.S. Gulf policy. Qatar, like Bahrain, is a GCC
monarchy; however, their relations have been sometimes acrimonious because of territorial
disputes with roots in the 18th century, when the ruling families of both countries controlled parts
of the Arabian peninsula. Qatar-Bahrain relations have improved since an International Court of
Justice ruled on March 16, 2001, on the disputes. The ICJ ruled in favor of Qatar on some of the
issues, and in favor of Bahrain on others, but the central dispute—over the Hawar Islands—was
decided in favor of Bahrain. Qatar expressed disappointment over the ruling but said it accepted it
as binding, and the two have since muted mutual criticism and cooperated on major regional
issues. The territorial disputes were referred to the ICJ by Qatar in 1991 after clashes in 1986 in
which Qatar landed military personnel on a man-made reef (Fasht al-Dibal) that was in dispute,
and took some Bahrainis prisoner. Saudi mediation in the 1986-1991 period proved fruitless. That
reef was awarded to Qatar in the ICJ ruling. However, the ICJ ruled against Bahrain’s claim to the

38 See The Estimate. Dossier: The Bahrain-Qatar Border Dispute: The World Court Decision, Part 1 and Part 2. March
23, 2001, and April 6, 2001.
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town of Zubara on the Qatari mainland, where some members of the Al Khalifa family were long
buried. Two smaller islands, Janan and Hadd Janan, were ruled not part of the Hawar Islands
group and were awarded to Qatar.
Arab-Israeli Issues
On the Arab-Israeli dispute, Bahrain has not been as significant a mediator or broker as have its
larger neighbors in the Gulf or broader Middle East. Bahrain has not taken a leading role in recent
efforts to reconcile Hamas and Fatah to rebuild Palestinian unity, for example. On the other hand,
Bahrain is not inactive on the issue: On July 16, 2009, Crown Prince Salman authored an op-ed
calling on the Arab states to do more to communicate directly with the Israeli people on their
ideas for peaceful resolution of the dispute.39 Following on that idea, on October 1, 2009, the
foreign minister called for direct talks with Israel. In the previously cited December 3, 2010, joint
press conference with the foreign minister, Secretary of State Clinton expressed appreciation for
Bahrain’s support of Palestinian Authority leaders who are trying to build viable institutions and
rule of law in the Palestinian territories. However, like most Arab states, Bahrain is supporting the
efforts of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to obtain U.N. recognition for a State
of Palestine, despite U.S. opposition to doing so prior to a Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement.
Earlier, Bahrain participated in the 1990-1996 multilateral Arab-Israeli talks, and it hosted a
session on the environment (October 1994). Bahrain did not follow Oman and Qatar in
exchanging trade offices with Israel. In September 1994, all GCC states ceased enforcing
secondary and tertiary boycotts of Israel while retaining the ban on direct trade (primary boycott).
In conjunction with the U.S.-Bahrain FTA, Bahrain dropped the primary boycott and closed
boycott-related offices in Bahrain.
Still, the Arab-Israeli dispute always has the potential to become a political issue within Bahrain.
Islamist hard-liners in Bahrain have accused the government of trying to “normalize” relations
with Israel, citing the government’s sending a delegate to the November 27, 2007, summit on
Middle East peace in Annapolis, the foreign minister’s meeting with Israeli officials at U.N.
meetings in September 2007, and its October 2009 proposal of a “regional organization” that
would group Iran, Turkey, Israel, and the Arab states. That proposal has not been implemented to
date. In late October 2009, the elected COR passed a bill making it a crime (punishable by up to
five years in jail) for Bahrainis to travel to Israel or hold talks with Israelis. The bill, which has
not proceeded to become law (concurrence by the upper house, and acceptance by the king),
apparently was a reaction to a visit by Bahraini officials to Israel in July 2009. The visit was to
obtain the release of five Bahrainis taken prisoner by Israel when it seized a ship bound with
goods for Gaza, which is controlled by Hamas. In June 2010, Sunni and Shiite Islamists in
Bahrain held a demonstration to denounced the Israeli seizure of a ship in a flotilla intended to
run the Israeli blockade of the Hamas-run Gaza Strip.
Economic Issues
Like the other Gulf states, Bahrain was affected by the international financial crisis of 2008-2009,
but perhaps to a lesser extent than the wealthier states of Kuwait, UAE, and Saudi Arabia.

39 “Arabs Need to Talk to the Israelis.” The Washington Post. July 16, 2009.
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Bahrain did not experience the construction and real estate “bubble” to the degree that this
occurred in, for example, UAE. It is also apparently being affected by the 2011 unrest; in May
2011 Moody’s, a bond rating agency, downgraded the quality of Bahrain’s bonds, thereby costing
the government more to borrow funds.
Bahrain has little cushion to deal with economic downturns. It has the lowest oil and gas reserves
of the Gulf monarchy states, estimated respectively at 210 million barrels of oil and 5.3 trillion
cubic feet of gas. Some economic statistics are presented in Table 2. Without the ample oil or gas
resources of its neighbors, Bahrain has diversified its economy by emphasizing banking and
financial services (about 25.5% of GDP). At current rates of production (35,000 barrels per day of
crude oil), Bahrain’s onshore oil reserves will be exhausted in 15 years, but Saudi Arabia shares
equally with Bahrain the 300,000 barrels per day produced from the offshore Abu Safa field. The
United States buys virtually no oil from Bahrain; the major U.S. import from it is aluminum.
Aluminum and other manufacturing sectors in Bahrain account for the existence in Bahrain of a
vibrant middle and working class among its citizens. However, these classes are largely
composed of Shiites, and this has made many Shiites envious of the “ownership class” of Sunni
Muslims. On the other hand, many Shiites own businesses and have done well economically.
To encourage reform and signal U.S. appreciation, the United States and Bahrain signed an FTA
on September 14, 2004. Implementing legislation was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169).
However, in light of the unrest, the AFL-CIO has urged the United States to void the FTA on the
grounds that Bahrain is preventing free association of workers and abridging their rights.
In 2011, the United States exported $1.21 billion worth of goods to Bahrain, about the same
amount as in 2010. The United States imported $518 million in goods from that country,
substantially more than the $420 million imported in 2010. In 2005, total bilateral trade was about
$780 million, suggesting that trade has expanded significantly following the FTA.
Table 2. Some Basic Facts About Bahrain
Population
About 1.25 million, of which about 1 million are citizens
Religions
81% Muslim, 9% Christian, 10% other
GDP (purchasing power parity)
$30.8 billion (2011)
Budget
$7.93 billion revenues, $8.3 billion expenditures (2011)
Inflation Rate
0.3% (2011)
Unemployment Rate
15%
GDP Real Growth Rate
1.5% in 2011, less than half the 4.1% of 2010
Size of Bahrain Defense Forces (BDF)
About 13,000, plus about 1,200 National Guard. Some personnel
are expatriates, including other Arab and Pakistani.
Source: CIA, The World Factbook.
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Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Bahrain
($ in millions)
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12
FY13
(request)
FMF
90.0 24.6 18.847
15.593
14.998
3.968 8.0 19.0 15.46 10.0
10.0
IMET
0.448 0.600 0.649 0.651 0.616 0.622 .661 .670 .435 .700
.725
NADR
1.489
2.761
.776
0.744
.500
1.10
1.5
.500 .45
“Section 5.3
24.54
4.3
16.2

1206”
Notes: IMET = International Military Education and Training Funds, used mainly to enhance BDF military
professionalism and promote U.S. values. NADR = Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining and Related
Programs, used to sustain Bahrain’s counterterrorism capabilities and interdict terrorists. Section 1206 are DOD
funds used to train and equip Bahrain’s special forces, its coastal surveillance and patrol capabilities, and to
develop its counter terrorism assessment capabilities. (Named for a section of the FY2006 Defense
Authorization Act, P.L. 109-163.) FY2008 funds derived from FY2008 supplemental (P.L. 110-252), and the
Consolidated appropriation (P.L. 110-329). FY2009 funds included funding from FY2008 supplemental (P.L. 110-
252) as wel as regular appropriation (P.L. 111-8). FY2010 funds are from Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 111-
117). FY2011 funds are appropriated by P.L. 112-10, Continuing Appropriations for FY2011.
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Figure 1. Bahrain

Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ba.html.

Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612

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