Nuclear Energy Policy
Mark Holt
Specialist in Energy Policy
June 20, 2012
Congressional Research Service
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Nuclear Energy Policy

Summary
Nuclear energy issues facing Congress include power plant safety and regulation, radioactive
waste management, research and development priorities, federal incentives for new commercial
reactors, nuclear weapons proliferation, and security against terrorist attacks.
The earthquake and resulting tsunami that severely damaged Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
power plant on March 11, 2011, raised questions in Congress about the disaster’s possible
implications for nuclear safety regulation, U.S. nuclear energy expansion, and radioactive waste
policy. The tsunami knocked out all electric power at the six-reactor plant, resulting in the
overheating of several reactor cores, loss of cooling in spent fuel storage pools, major hydrogen
explosions, and releases of radioactive material to the environment. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) issued orders to U.S. nuclear plants March 12, 2012, to begin implementing
safety improvements in response to Fukushima.
Significant incentives for new commercial reactors were included in the Energy Policy Act of
2005 (EPACT05, P.L. 109-58), such as tax credits and loan guarantees. Together with volatile
fossil fuel prices and the possibility of greenhouse gas controls, the federal incentives for nuclear
power helped spur renewed interest by utilities and other potential reactor developers. License
applications for as many as 31 new reactors have been announced, and NRC issued licenses for
four reactors at two plant sites in early 2012. However, falling natural gas prices and other
circumstances have made it unlikely that many more of the proposed nuclear projects will move
toward construction in the near term.
DOE’s nuclear energy research and development program includes advanced reactors, fuel cycle
technology and facilities, and infrastructure support. The Obama Administration’s FY2013
funding request totals $770.4 million, which is $88.3 million (10.3%) below the enacted FY2012
funding level. DOE is requesting $65 million for FY2013 to provide technical support for
licensing small modular light water reactors (LWRs), $2 million below the FY2012 funding level.
The House-passed version of the FY2013 Energy and Water appropriations bill (H.R. 5325)
increased nuclear R&D by $89.9 million from FY2012, while the Senate Appropriations
Committee recommended a $20.1 million increase (S. 2465).
Disposal of highly radioactive waste has been one of the most controversial aspects of nuclear
power. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-425), as amended in 1987, required DOE
to conduct a detailed physical characterization of Yucca Mountain in Nevada as a permanent
underground repository for high-level waste. The Obama Administration decided to “terminate
the Yucca Mountain program while developing nuclear waste disposal alternatives,” according to
the DOE FY2010 budget justification. Alternative waste management strategies were evaluated
by the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, which issued its final report to the
Secretary of Energy on January 26, 2012. The report recommended options for temporary
storage, treatment, and permanent disposal of highly radioactive nuclear waste, along with an
evaluation of nuclear waste technologies. It did not recommend specific sites for new nuclear
waste facilities or evaluate the suitability of Yucca Mountain. No funding was provided in
FY2012 or requested for FY2013 to continue NRC licensing of the Yucca Mountain repository,
although the issue is currently the subject of a federal appeals court case. The House-passed
FY2013 Energy and Water bill provided DOE with $25 million to resume Yucca Mountain
licensing, along with $10 million for NRC. The Senate Appropriations Committee authorized a
pilot program to develop one or more voluntary nuclear waste storage sites.
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Contents
Most Recent Developments ............................................................................................................. 1
Nuclear Power Status and Outlook.................................................................................................. 2
Possible New Reactors .............................................................................................................. 5
Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Regulation.................................................................................... 8
Safety......................................................................................................................................... 8
Emergency Planning ......................................................................................................... 11
Domestic Reactor Safety Experience................................................................................ 12
Reactor Safety in the Former Soviet Bloc......................................................................... 14
Licensing and Regulation ........................................................................................................ 14
Reactor Security ...................................................................................................................... 15
Decommissioning.................................................................................................................... 17
Nuclear Accident Liability....................................................................................................... 17
Federal Incentives for New Nuclear Plants ................................................................................... 20
Nuclear Production Tax Credit ................................................................................................ 20
Standby Support ...................................................................................................................... 21
Loan Guarantees...................................................................................................................... 22
Subsidy Costs .................................................................................................................... 23
Congressionally Authorized Ceilings................................................................................ 24
Nuclear Solicitations ......................................................................................................... 25
Global Climate Change ........................................................................................................... 26
Nuclear Power Research and Development................................................................................... 27
Reactor Concepts..................................................................................................................... 28
Small Modular Light Water Reactors ...................................................................................... 29
Fuel Cycle Research and Development................................................................................... 30
Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies .................................................................................. 31
Nuclear Waste Management .......................................................................................................... 32
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation ...................................................................................................... 34
Federal Funding for Nuclear Energy Programs ............................................................................. 35
Legislation in the 112th Congress................................................................................................... 37
H.R. 301 (Forbes).............................................................................................................. 37
H.R. 617 (Matheson)......................................................................................................... 37
H.R. 909 (Nunes) .............................................................................................................. 37
H.R. 1023 (Thornberry) .................................................................................................... 37
H.R. 1242 (Markey) .......................................................................................................... 37
H.R. 1268 (Lowey)............................................................................................................ 37
H.R. 1280 (Ros-Lehtinen)/S. 109 (Ensign)....................................................................... 38
H.R. 1320 (Berman) .......................................................................................................... 38
H.R. 1326 (Fortenberry)/S. 640 (Akaka) .......................................................................... 38
H.R. 1436 (Christopher H. Smith) .................................................................................... 38
H.R. 1694 (Engel) ............................................................................................................. 38
H.R. 1710 (Burgess).......................................................................................................... 38
H.R. 2075 (Engel) ............................................................................................................. 38
H.R. 2133 (Matheson)/S. 1220 (Conrad) .......................................................................... 39
H.R. 2354 (Frelinghuysen)................................................................................................ 39
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H.R. 2367 (Pearce)............................................................................................................ 39
H.R. 3302 (Rooney) .......................................................................................................... 39
H.R. 3308 (Pompeo)/S. 2064 (DeMint) ............................................................................ 39
H.R. 3657 (Terry) .............................................................................................................. 39
H.R. 3822 (Lowey)............................................................................................................ 40
H.R. 5325 (Frelinghuysen)/S. 2465 (Feinstein) ................................................................ 40
H.R. 4301 (Duncan) .......................................................................................................... 40
H.R. 4625 (Joe Wilson)/S. 2176 (Graham) ....................................................................... 40
S. 512 (Bingaman)............................................................................................................. 40
S. 1320 (Murkowski)......................................................................................................... 40
S. 1394 (Webb).................................................................................................................. 41
S. 1510 (Bingaman)........................................................................................................... 41
S. 2031 (Sherrod Brown) .................................................................................................. 41
S. 2146 (Bingaman)........................................................................................................... 41

Tables
Table 1. Announced Nuclear Plant License Applications ................................................................ 7
Table 2. Funding for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ........................................................... 36
Table 3. DOE Funding for Nuclear Activities (Selected Programs) .............................................. 36

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 41

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Most Recent Developments
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on February 9, 2012, approved the first licenses to
build new U.S. commercial nuclear reactors in more than three decades. The combined operating
licenses (COLs) allow Southern Company to construct and operate two new Westinghouse
AP1000 reactors at the Vogtle nuclear power plant in Georgia. On March 30, 2012, NRC
approved COLs for two additional AP1000 reactors at the existing Summer nuclear plant in South
Carolina. Each of the new reactors, scheduled for completion between 2016 and 2019, is expected
to cost from $5 billion to $7 billion.
NRC on March 12, 2012, issued its first nuclear plant safety requirements based on lessons
learned from the March 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan. NRC ordered U.S. nuclear plant
operators to begin implementing safety enhancements related to the loss of power caused by
natural disasters, reactor containment venting, and monitoring the water levels of reactor spent
fuel pools. The Fukushima nuclear plant was hit by an earthquake and tsunami that knocked out
all electric power at the six-reactor plant, resulting in the overheating of the reactor cores in three
of the units and a heightened overheating risk at several spent fuel storage pools at the site. The
overheating of the reactor cores caused major hydrogen explosions and releases of radioactive
material to the environment. Several House and Senate hearings have been held on the accident,
and several bills on nuclear safety have been introduced in the 112th Congress. Proposed bills
would delay all new nuclear licenses and permits until stronger safety standards were in place
(H.R. 1242), expand evacuation planning around U.S. nuclear reactors (H.R. 1268), and initiate
U.S. efforts to strengthen international nuclear safety agreements (S. 640, H.R. 1326).
The Obama Administration requested $770.4 million for nuclear energy research and
development in its FY2013 budget, submitted to Congress February 12, 2012. Including
advanced reactors, fuel cycle technology, infrastructure support, and safeguards and security, the
total nuclear energy request is $88.3 million (10.3%) below the enacted FY2012 funding level.
Funding for safeguards and security in FY2012 was provided under a separate appropriations
account, Other Defense Activities, but it is included under the Nuclear Energy account in the
FY2013 request. The largest proposed reductions for FY2013 are Reactor Concepts (35.9%),
Radiological Facility Management (26.6%), and Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies (12.5%).
The House-passed FY2013 Energy and Water Development appropriations bill would increase
nuclear R&D by $89.9 million from FY2012 (H.Rept. 112-462), while the Senate Appropriations
Committee recommended a $20.1 million increase (S.Rept. 112-164),
Nuclear energy funding for FY2012 was included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012
(P.L. 112-74), approved by Congress December 17, 2011. The funding measure included $67
million to commercialize small modular reactors and $60 million for nuclear waste disposal
research.
The Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, established by the Obama
Administration to recommend a new strategy for nuclear waste management, issued its final
report to the Secretary of Energy on January 26, 2012.1 President Obama has moved to terminate
previous plans to open a national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV. In its final

1 Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, Report to the Secretary of Energy, January 2012,
http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/brc_finalreport_jan2012.pdf.
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report, the Blue Ribbon Commission recommended a “consent-based” approach to siting nuclear
waste facilities and that the roles of local, state, and tribal governments be negotiated for each
potential site. The development of consolidated waste storage and disposal facilities should begin
as soon as possible, the Commission urged. A new waste management organization should be
established to develop the repository, along with associated transportation and storage systems,
according to the Commission. The new organization should have “assured access” to the Nuclear
Waste Fund, which holds fees collected from nuclear power plant operators to pay for waste
disposal. Under existing law, the Nuclear Waste Fund cannot be drawn down without
congressional appropriations. The House appropriations bill would provide DOE with $25 million
for FY2013 to resume Yucca Mountain licensing, along with $10 million for NRC in a floor
amendment (H.R. 5325). The Senate Appropriations Committee on April 26, 2012, authorized a
pilot program to develop one or more voluntary nuclear waste storage sites (S. 2465).
President Obama’s State of the Union Address on January 25, 2011, called for nuclear power to
be included in a national goal of generating 80% of U.S. electricity “from clean energy sources”
by 2035. Along with nuclear power and renewable energy, “clean energy” would include
“efficient” natural gas plants and clean coal technologies, to the extent that they reduced carbon
emissions compared with conventional coal-fired plants. The President’s proposed Clean Energy
Standard could provide a significant boost to U.S. nuclear power expansion, particularly in areas
of the country with relatively limited renewable energy resources. Senator Bingaman, Chairman
of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, introduced legislation to establish a
national clean energy standard March 1, 2012 (S. 2146).
Nuclear Power Status and Outlook
After nearly 30 years in which no new orders had been placed for nuclear power plants in the
United States, a series of license applications that began in 2007 prompted widespread
speculation about a U.S. “nuclear renaissance.” The renewed interest in nuclear power largely
resulted from the improved performance of existing reactors, federal incentives in the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58), the possibility of carbon dioxide controls that could increase
costs at fossil fuel plants, and volatile prices for natural gas—the favored fuel for new power
plants for the past two decades.
Four of the proposed new U.S. reactors received licenses from the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) in early 2012. NRC approved combined construction permit and operating
licenses (COLs) for Southern Company to build and operate two new Westinghouse AP1000
reactors at the Vogtle nuclear power plant in Georgia on February 9, 2012. On March 30, 2012,
NRC approved COLs for two additional AP1000 reactors at the existing Summer nuclear plant in
South Carolina. Substantial site preparation and infrastructure work has already taken place at
both sites, and the owners of both projects announced plans to move to full construction after
receiving their COLs.2

2 Southern Company, “Southern Company Subsidiary Receives Historic License Approval for New Vogtle Units, Full
Construction Set to Begin,” February 9, 2012, http://www.southerncompany.com/news/iframe_pressroom.aspx;
SCANA, “NRC Approves COLs for SCE&G, Santee Cooper Nuclear Units,” March 30, 2012, http://www.scana.com/
en/investor-relations/news-releases/nrc-approves-cols-for-sceg-santee-cooper-nuclear-units.htm.
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However, the future of all other proposed new U.S. reactors is uncertain. High construction cost
estimates—a major reason for earlier reactor cancellations—continue to undermine nuclear power
economics. A more recent obstacle to nuclear power growth has been the development of vast
reserves of domestic natural gas from previously uneconomic shale formations, which has held
gas prices low and reduced concern about future price spikes. Moreover, uncertainty over U.S.
controls on carbon emissions may be further increasing caution by utility companies about future
nuclear projects.
The March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami that severely damaged Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power plant could also affect plans for new U.S. reactors, although U.S. nuclear power
growth was already expected to be modest in the near term. Following the Fukushima accident,
preconstruction work was suspended on two planned reactors at the South Texas Project. Tokyo
Electric Power Company (TEPCO), which owns the Fukushima plant, had planned to invest in
the South Texas Project expansion, but TEPCO’s financial condition plunged after the accident.
New U.S. safety requirements resulting from the Fukushima disaster could raise investor
concerns about higher costs. On the other hand, after the accident the Obama Administration
reiterated its support for nuclear power expansion as part of its clean energy policy.3
The recent applications for new power reactors in the United States followed a long period of
declining nuclear generation growth rates. Until the COLs were issued for the Vogtle and Summer
projects, no nuclear power plants had been ordered in the United States since 1978, and more than
100 reactors had been canceled, including all ordered after 1973. The most recent U.S. nuclear
unit to be completed was the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA’s) Watts Bar 1 reactor, ordered in
1970 and licensed to operate in 1996. But largely because of better operation and capacity
expansion at existing reactors, annual U.S. nuclear generation has risen by about 20% since the
startup of Watts Bar 1.4
The U.S. nuclear power industry currently comprises 104 licensed reactors at 65 plant sites in 31
states and generates about 20% of the nation’s electricity.5 TVA’s board of directors voted August
1, 2007, to resume construction on Watts Bar 2, which had been suspended in 1985; the renewed
construction project was to cost about $2.5 billion and be completed in 2013. However, TVA
announced on April 5, 2012, that completing Watts Bar 2 would cost up to $2 billion more than
expected and take until 2015.6 At TVA’s request, NRC in March 2009 reinstated the construction
authorization for the two-unit Bellefonte (AL) nuclear plant, which had been deferred in 1988 and
canceled in 2006.7 The TVA board voted on August 18, 2011, to complete construction of
Bellefonte 1 after the Watts Bar 2 project is finished. Completing Bellefonte 1 was projected at
that time to cost $4.9 billion, with operation to begin by 2020.8

3 Oral Testimony of Energy Secretary Steven Chu at the House Energy and Commerce Committee – As Prepared for
Delivery, March 16, 2011, http://www.energy.gov/news/10178.htm.
4 Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Monthly, Net Generation by Energy Source, April 2011,
http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/epm_sum.html.
5 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Information Digest 2008-2009, NUREG-1350, Vol. 20, August 2008, p. 32,
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1350/v20/sr1350v20.pdf.
6 Mary Powers, “Credit Agencies See Watts Bar-2 Cost Impact,” Nucleonics Week, April 12, 2012, p. 1.
7 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority (Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Units 1 and
2),” 74 Federal Register 10969, March 13, 2009.
8 Tennessee Valley Authority, “TVA Board Implements Vision,” press release, August 18, 2011, http://www.tva.com/
news/releases/julsep11/board_meeting/index.htm.
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Annual electricity production from U.S. nuclear power plants is much greater than that from oil
and hydropower and other renewable energy sources. Nuclear generation has been overtaken by
natural gas in recent years, and it remains well behind coal, which accounts for about 45% of U.S.
electricity generation.9 Nuclear plants generated more than half the electricity in four states in
2011—Connecticut, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Vermont.10 The 790 billion net kilowatt-
hours of nuclear electricity generated in the United States during 201111 was about the same as
the nation’s entire electrical output in the early 1960s, when the oldest of today’s operating U.S.
commercial reactors were ordered.12
Reasons for the 30-year halt in U.S. nuclear plant orders included high capital costs, public
concern about nuclear safety and waste disposal, and regulatory compliance issues.
High construction costs may pose the most serious obstacle to nuclear power expansion.
Construction costs for reactors completed since the mid-1980s ranged from $2 to $6 billion,
averaging more than $3,900 per kilowatt of electric generating capacity (in 2011 dollars), far
higher than commercial fossil fuel technologies. The nuclear industry predicts that new plant
designs could be built for less than that if many identical plants were built in a series, but current
estimates for new reactors show little if any reduction in cost.13
In contrast, average U.S. nuclear plant operating costs per kilowatt-hour dropped substantially
since 1990, and expensive downtime has been steadily reduced. Licensed U.S. commercial
reactors generated electricity at an average of 89% of their total capacity in 2011, according to the
Energy Information Administration (EIA).14
Seventy-three commercial reactors have received 20-year license extensions from the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), giving them up to a total of 60 years of operation. License
extensions for 13 additional reactors are currently under review, and more are anticipated,
according to NRC.15 The FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-74) provided $25
million for DOE to study further reactor life extension to 80 years, and DOE requested $21.7
million for that program in FY2013.
Existing nuclear power plants appear to hold a strong position in electricity wholesale markets. In
most cases, nuclear utilities have received favorable regulatory treatment of past construction
costs, and average existing nuclear plant operating costs are estimated to be competitive with

9 Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Monthly, Net Generation by Energy Source, February 2012,
http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/epm_sum.html. Net generation excludes electricity used for power plant
operation.
10 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Information Digest, 2011–2012, NUREG-1350, Volume 23, http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1350/v23/sr1350v23-sec-2.pdf.
11 Ibid.
12 All of today’s 104 operating U.S. commercial reactors were ordered from 1963 through 1973; see “Historical Profile
of U.S. Nuclear Power Development,” U.S. Council for Energy Awareness, 1992.
13 For a comparison of generating costs, see CRS Report RL34746, Power Plants: Characteristics and Costs, by Stan
Mark Kaplan.
14 Energy Information Administration, “U.S. Nuclear Generation and Generating Capacity,” http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/
nuclear/page/nuc_generation/gensum.html.
15 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Fact Sheet on Reactor License Renewal, August 8, 2011, http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fs-reactor-license-renewal.html.
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those of fossil fuel technologies.16 Although eight U.S. nuclear reactors were permanently shut
down during the 1990s, none has been closed since 1998.
Possible New Reactors
Electric utilities and other firms have announced plans to apply for COLs for more than 30
reactors (see Table 1).17 (For a discussion of COLs, see the “Licensing and Regulation” section
below.)
As noted above, construction is currently underway on four of the proposed new reactors, at the
Vogtle and Summer sites. COLs are being actively pursued for about 16 additional reactors
(shown in Table 1), whose owners have not committed to actual construction but are keeping the
option available if conditions are more favorable in the future. The experience of the first few
reactors to be constructed is likely to be crucial in determining whether a wave of subsequent
units will move forward as the nuclear industry envisions.
The two new Vogtle reactors are scheduled to go on line in 2016 and 2017,18 while the Summer
units are planned for 2016 and 2019.19 EIA estimates that construction costs of new nuclear
power plants will average $5,335 per kilowatt of capacity, or about $6.1 billion for an AP1000
unit, not including interest costs.20 The two Summer units are expected to cost about $11.6 billion
in 2012 dollars, according to regulatory filings,21 while the two Vogtle units are projected by their
primary owner to cost a total of $13.35 billion.22
Progress Energy’s Levy County project, with two AP1000 units, is scheduled by NRC to receive
a final decision on its COLs in early 2013. As shown in Table 1, the remaining 9 projects that are
actively seeking COLs, with a total of 14 proposed reactors, do not have firm licensing schedules
from NRC. Several of those projects would use designs that also do not have firm NRC review
schedules. As a result, these reactors appear unlikely to be completed before the early 2020s. This
group includes the planned units 3 and 4 at the South Texas Project, where preconstruction work
was suspended after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, as noted above. The joint venture
developing the new South Texas Plant reactors, Nuclear Innovation North America (NINA), will
focus solely on the COL and a DOE loan guarantee.23 Several of these proposed nuclear projects

16 Energy Information Administration, Nuclear Power: 12 percent of America’s Generating Capacity, 20 percent of the
Electricity
, July 17, 2003, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/analysis/nuclearpower.html.
17 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, New Reactors, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors.html.
18 Southern Company, “Smart Power,” http://www.southerncompany.com/smart_energy/smart_power_vogtle-
kemper.html.
19 Shaw Group, “V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, Units 2 and 3,” http://www.shawgrp.com/projects/nuclear/vcsummer.
20 Energy Information Administration, “Updated Capital Cost Estimates for Electricity Generation Plants,” November
2010, http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/beck_plantcosts/index.html.
21 South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, “Petitions for Updates and Revisions to the Capital Cost Schedule and the
Construction Schedule,” before the Public Service Commission of South Carolina, February 29, 2012,
http://www.scana.com/NR/rdonlyres/35AAED95-5226-416A-8DC2-0743BC93B911/0/
2012PetitiontoUpdateCostSchedules.pdf. Total cost based on SCE&G ownership of 55%.
22 Southern Company, “Smart Power,” http://www.southerncompany.com/smart_energy/smart_power_vogtle-
kemper.html. Total cost based on Southern Company’s 45.7% ownership.
23 NRG Energy, “NRG Energy, Inc. Provides Greater Clarity on the South Texas Nuclear Development Project,” press
release, April 19, 2011, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=
UGFyZW50SUQ9OTAwMzB8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMXxUeXBlPTM=&t=1.
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may require additional partners in order to proceed to construction, according to recent company
announcements.24
Several other COL applications have been suspended, withdrawn, or shifted to early site permits
(ESPs) only. Entergy suspended further license review of its planned GE ESBWR reactors at
River Bend, LA, and Grand Gulf, MS, although it still has a previously issued ESP for Grand
Gulf. AmerenUE suspended review of a COL for its proposed new Callaway unit in Missouri, and
Exelon withdrew its COL application for a proposed two-unit plant in Victoria County, TX, but
both are now seeking early site permits instead, laying the groundwork for possible future
licensing.
TVA decided to defer consideration of its COL application for two new Westinghouse AP1000
reactors at its Bellefonte plant in Alabama in favor of completing the first of two unfinished
Babcock & Wilcox reactors at the site. TVA had submitted a COL application for the Bellefonte
AP1000s in October 2007 as part of the NuStart consortium.25
Constellation Energy announced October 9, 2010, that it was abandoning negotiations with DOE
for a loan guarantee for the planned Calvert Cliffs 3 reactor, which Constellation had been
developing as part of its UniStar joint venture with the French national utility EDF.26
Constellation sold its share of UniStar to EDF so that EDF could seek another U.S. partner to
continue the Calvert Cliffs project.27 (For more discussion of Constellation’s decision, see the
“Loan Guarantees” section below.)
NRC anticipates that several more COL and other license applications will be submitted in the
next two years. This includes a TVA plan to submit construction permit applications for six small
modular reactors (SMRs) of about 160 megawatts each at its Clinch River, TN, site.

24 Jeff Beattie, “Southeast Utilities Seek Partners to Hedge Nuclear Bets,” Energy Daily, October 5, 2010, p. 1.
25 Tennessee Valley Authority, “Single Nuclear Unit at the Bellefonte Plant Site,” fact sheet, http://www.tva.gov/
environment/reports/blnp/index.htm.
26 Constellation Energy, “Constellation Energy Releases Statement Regarding U.S. Department of Energy Loan
Guarantee,” press release, October 9, 2010, http://ir.constellation.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=516614.
27 Letter from Michael J. Wallace, Vice Chairman and Chief Operating Officer, Constellation Energy, to Thomas
Piquemal, Group Executive Vice President, Finance, EDF, October 15, 2010, http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/
CEG/1036755503x0x410084/e27369a0-ce85-432f-bfad-e17ddce4f8f2/101510_-_EDF_letter.pdf; Unistar, “EDF and
Constellation Energy Announce Comprehensive Agreement,” press release, October 27, 2010, http://press.edf.com/
press-releases/all-press-releases/2010/edf-and-constellation-energy-announce-comprehensive-agreement-82018.html&
return=42873.
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Table 1. Announced Nuclear Plant License Applications
Announced
Applicant Site
Reactor
Type
Units
Status
COL issued
Southern Vogtle
(GA)
Westinghouse
2
COL application submitted 3/13/08; engineering,
AP1000
procurement, and construction (EPC) contract
signed 4/8/08; ESP and limited construction approved
8/26/09; conditional DOE loan guarantee announced
2/16/10; NRC hearing held 9/27-28/11; COL
approved February 9, 2012
SCE&G Summer
Westinghouse
2
COL submitted 3/31/08; EPC contract signed
(SC)
AP1000
5/27/08; COL approved March 30, 2012
COL scheduled for completion
Progress Energy Levy County
Westinghouse
2
COL submitted 7/30/08; scheduled for completion in
(FL)
AP1000
2013
COL schedule under revision
DTE Energy
Fermi (MI)
GE ESBWR
1
COL submitted 9/18/08
FPL Turkey
Point
Westinghouse
2
COL submitted 6/30/09; preconstruction work being
(FL)
AP1000
conducted
Luminant
Comanche
Mitsubishi US-
2
COL submitted 9/19/08
Power
Peak (TX)
APWR
(formerly TXU)
Duke Energy
Wil iam
Westinghouse
2
COL submitted 12/13/07
States Lee
AP1000
(SC)
Nuclear
South Texas
Toshiba ABWR
2
COL submitted 9/20/07; EPC contract signed with
Innovation
Project
Toshiba 2/12/09; NRG Energy halted further
North America
investment 4/19/11
PPL Bell
Bend
Areva EPR
1
COL submitted 10/10/08
(PA)
Progress Energy Harris (NC)
Westinghouse
2
COL submitted 2/19/08; EPC contract signed 1/5/09
AP1000
UniStar Calvert
Cliffs
Areva EPR
1
COL submitted 7/13/07 (Part 1), 3/13/08 (Part 2);
(MD)
Constel ation withdrew from project 10/8/10
Dominion
North Anna
Mitsubishi US-
1
COL submitted 11/27/07; ESP approved 11/20/07;
APWR
reactor selection announced 5/7/10
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Announced
Applicant Site
Reactor
Type
Units
Status
Licensing suspended
Entergy Grand
Gulf
Not specified
1
COL submitted 2/27/08; licensing suspended 1/9/09;
(MS)
ESP approved 3/27/07
Exelon Victoria
Not specified
2
COL application withdrawn and ESP application
County (TX)
submitted 3/25/10
AmerenUE Calloway Areva EPR
1
COL submitted 7/24/08; license review suspended
(MO)
6/23/09; ESP expected 2012
Entergy
River Bend
Not specified
1
COL submitted 9/25/08; licensing suspended 1/9/09
(LA)

TVA Bellefonte
Westinghouse
2
COL submitted 10/30/07; licensing deferred 9/29/10
AP1000
Unistar Nine
Mile
Areva EPR
1
COL submitted 9/30/08; licensing suspended 12/1/09
Point (NY)
Anticipated license applications
Blue Castle
Utah
Not specified
1
ESP application expected in 2012
TVA Clinch
River
mPower small
6
Construction permit application expected in 2014;
(TN)
modular reactor
operating license application expected in 2017
AmerenUE
Missouri
Westing. SMR
1
COL application expected in 2012
Unnamed
Unspecified
Unspecified
1
COL application expected in 2013
Southern
Unspecified
Unspecified
1
COL application expected in 2013
Total units announced

38
Total currently active COLs
20
Sources: NRC, Nucleonics Week, Nuclear News, Nuclear Energy Institute, company news releases.
Note: Applications are for COLs unless otherwise specified.
Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Regulation
Safety
Worldwide concern about nuclear power plant safety rose sharply after the Fukushima accident,
which is generally considered to be much worse than the March 1979 Three Mile Island accident
in Pennsylvania but not as severe as the April 1986 Chernobyl disaster in the former Soviet
Union. Based on dose rates reported by Japanese authorities, the Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC) estimated that the Fukushima accident subjected the population to a total
radiation dose of 148,000 person-rem through April 5. In comparison, the total dose from Three
Mile Island was estimated at 2,000 person-rem, while Chernobyl was estimated at 25.5 million
person-rem.28 The Fukushima disaster resulted in similar levels of radioactive contamination per

28 Matthew McKinzie and Thomas B. Cochran, Natural Resources Defense Council, “The Collective Effective Dose
Resulting from Radiation Emitted During the First Weeks of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident,” April 10, 2011,
http://docs.nrdc.org/nuclear/files/nuc_11041301a.pdf. A person-rem is the equivalent of one person receiving a
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square meter to that of Chernobyl, but the Fukushima contamination was much less widespread
and affected a smaller number of people.29 (For more background on the Fukushima accident, see
CRS Report R41694, Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, by Mark Holt, Richard J. Campbell, and
Mary Beth Nikitin.)
The Fukushima accident has raised particular policy questions for the United States because,
unlike Chernobyl, the Fukushima reactors are similar to common U.S. designs. Although the
Fukushima accident resulted from a huge tsunami that incapacitated the power plant’s emergency
diesel generators, the accident dramatically illustrated the potential consequences of any natural
catastrophe or other situation that could cause an extended “station blackout” – the loss of
alternating current (AC) power. Safety issues related to station blackout include standards for
backup batteries, which now are required to provide power for 4-8 hours, and additional measures
that may be required to assure backup power. The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)
released a detailed description of the Fukushima accident in November 2011.30
Safety concerns at U.S. reactors were also raised by hydrogen explosions at four of the
Fukushima reactors—resulting from a high-temperature reaction between steam and nuclear fuel
cladding—and the loss of cooling at the Japanese plant’s spent fuel storage pools. Other safety
issues that have been raised in the wake of Fukushima include the vulnerability of U.S. nuclear
plants to earthquakes, floods, and other natural disasters, the availability of iodine pills to prevent
absorption of radioactive iodine released during nuclear accidents, and the adequacy of nuclear
accident emergency planning.
In response to such concerns, NRC on March 23, 2011, established a task force “made up of
current senior managers and former NRC experts” to “conduct both short- and long-term analysis
of the lessons that can be learned from the situation in Japan.”31 The Near-Term Task Force issued
its report July 12, 2011, making recommendations ranging from specific safety improvements to
broad changes in NRC’s overall regulatory approach.32 NRC staff subsequently identified several
of those actions that “can and should be initiated without delay.”33 The NRC Commissioners
largely agreed with the recommendations on October 18, 2011, and instructed the agency’s staff

(...continued)
radiation dose of one rem. For background on radiation doses, see CRS Report R41728, The Japanese Nuclear
Incident: Technical Aspects
, by Jonathan Medalia.
29 French Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire (IRSN), Assessment on the 66th Day of Projected External
Doses for Populations Living in the North-West Fallout Zone of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, Report DRPH/2011-
10, p. 27, http://www.irsn.fr/EN/news/Documents/IRSN-Fukushima-Report-DRPH-23052011.pdf.
30 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Station
, INPO 11-005, November 2011, available from the Nuclear Energy Institute at http://www.nei.org/
resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/safetyandsecurity/reports/special-report-on-the-nuclear-accident-at-the-fukushima-
daiichi-nuclear-power-station.
31 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Nuclear Regulatory Commission Directs Staff on Continuing Agency Response to
Japan Events; Adjust Commission Schedule,” press release, March 23, 2011, http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1108/
ML110821123.pdf.
32 Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, Recommendations for Enhancing
Reactor Safety in the 21st Century
, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, July 12, 2011,
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf.
33 NRC, “Recommended Actions to Be Taken Without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report,” SECY-11-
0124, September 9, 2011.
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to “strive to complete and implement the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident within five
years—by 2016.”34 Tier 1 regulatory actions, which are to get underway immediately, include
Seismic and flood hazard reevaluations and walkdowns. Nuclear plant operators
will be required to evaluate the implications of updated seismic and flooding
models, including all potential flooding sources. Plant operators will be required
to identify and verify the adequacy of flood and seismic protection features at
their sites.
Station blackout regulatory actions. NRC will issue an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking (ANPR) with the goal of requiring that nuclear power
plants be able to cope with the total loss of AC power (station blackout) for at
least eight hours. The eight hour period is intended to give plant personnel
enough time to restore AC power or, if that is not possible, to take actions to
extend the plant’s ability to cope with the loss of AC power to at least 72 hours.
The eight-hour coping time would rely only on permanently installed equipment,
while the 72-hour coping time could rely on off-site, portable equipment. Enough
equipment and personnel would be required to protect all affected reactors at a
multi-unit plant. While new regulations are being prepared, NRC is to order plant
operators to protect emergency equipment from damage from external events and
ensure that enough equipment is available to protect all reactors at a plant site.
Reliable hardened vents for Mark I containments. NRC will order nuclear plants
to install vents for the containments in Mark I reactors (the type at Fukushima).
The vents would be designed to reduce containment pressure while preventing
hydrogen in the containment from leaking into the reactor building, as occurred
at Fukushima.
Spent fuel pool instrumentation. NRC will order nuclear plants to install safety
instrumentation to monitor spent fuel pool conditions, such as water level,
temperature, and radiation levels, from the plant control room.
Strengthening and integrating accident procedures and guidelines. NRC will
order nuclear plants to modify emergency operating procedures to integrate
severe accident management guidelines and extensive damage mitigation
guidelines. The modifications would have to specify clear command-and-control
strategies and establish training qualifications for emergency decisionmakers.
Emergency preparedness regulatory actions. Pending a rulemaking, NRC will
order nuclear plants to ensure adequate emergency preparedness training for
multi-reactor station blackouts and other emergencies.
The NRC staff slightly modified its proposals for top priority actions and divided the remaining
Task Force proposals into two lower tiers, which were determined to require further assessment
and potentially long-term study. Included in the lower-tier actions were requirements for
emergency water supply systems for spent fuel pools, secure power for emergency
communications and data systems, confirmation of seismic and flooding hazards, and
modifications to NRC’s regulatory process.35

34 NRC, “Staff Requirements – SECY-11-0124 – Recommended Actions to Be Taken Without Delay from the Near-
Term Task Force Report,” October 18, 2011, http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1126/ML11269A204.pdf.
35 R.W. Borchardt, NRC Executive Director for Operations, “Prioritization of Recommended Actions to Be Taken in
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On March 12, 2012, NRC issued its first nuclear plant safety requirements based on the lessons
learned from Fukushima. NRC ordered U.S. nuclear plant operators to begin implementing safety
enhancements related to the loss of power caused by natural disasters, reactor containment
venting, and monitoring the water levels of reactor spent fuel pools. Nuclear plant operators were
required to begin implementing the requirements immediately and come into full compliance no
later than the end of 2016.36 NRC also issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking for new
regulatory actions on station blackout March 20, 2012.37
Legislation introduced after the Fukushima accident includes the Nuclear Power Plant Safety Act
of 2011 (H.R. 1242), introduced by Representative Markey on March 29, 2011. It would require
NRC to revise its regulations within 18 months to ensure that nuclear plants could handle major
disruptive events, a loss of off-site power for 14 days, and the loss of diesel generators for 72
hours. Spent fuel would have to be moved from pool to dry-cask storage within a year after it had
cooled sufficiently, and emergency planning would have to include multiple concurrent disasters.
NRC could not issue new licenses or permits until the revised regulations were in place.
Emergency Planning
Following the Three Mile Island accident, which revealed severe weaknesses in preparations for
nuclear plant emergencies, Congress mandated that emergency plans be prepared for all licensed
power reactors (P.L. 96-295, Sec. 109). NRC was required to develop standards for emergency
plans and review the adequacy of each plant-specific plan in consultation with the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
NRC’s emergency planning requirements focus on a “plume exposure pathway emergency
planning zone (EPZ),” encompassing an area within about 10 miles of each nuclear plant. Within
the 10-mile EPZ, a range of responses must be developed to protect the public from radioactive
releases, including evacuation, sheltering, and the distribution of non-radioactive iodine (as
discussed above). The regulations also require a 50-mile “ingestion pathway EPZ,” in which
actions are developed to protect food supplies.38 Nuclear plants are required to conduct
emergency preparedness exercises every two years. The exercises, which are evaluated by FEMA
and NRC, may include local, state, and federal responders and may involve both the plume and
ingestion EPZs.39
The size of the plume exposure EPZ has long been a subject of controversy, particularly after the
9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, in which nuclear plants were believed to have been a
potential target. Attention to the issue was renewed by the Fukushima accident, in which some of
the highest radiation dose rates have been measured beyond 10 miles from the plant.40

(...continued)
Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned,” SECY-11-0137, October 3, 2011.
36 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Actions in Response to the Japan Nuclear Accident,” May 1, 2012,
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan-info.html.
37 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Station Blackout,” Advance notice of proposed rulemaking, Federal Register,
March 20, 2012, p. 16175, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-03-20/pdf/2012-6665.pdf.
38 10 CFR 50.47, Emergency Plans.
39 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Emergency Preparedness & Response,” website, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/
emerg-preparedness.html.
40 Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT), “Readings of Integrated Dose at
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Controversy over the issue intensified after NRC recommended on March 16, 2011, the
evacuation of U.S. citizens within 50 miles of the Fukushima plant. The NRC recommendation
was based on computer models that, using meteorological data and estimates of plant conditions,
found that potential radiation doses 50 miles from the plant could exceed U.S. protective action
guidelines.41 Legislation introduced by Representative Lowey (H.R. 1268) would require
evacuation planning within 50 miles of U.S. nuclear power plants.
In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NRC modified its nuclear plant emergency planning
requirements and began a comprehensive review of emergency planning regulations and
guidance. The NRC staff sent a proposed final rule based on that review to the NRC
Commissioners for approval on April 8, 2011, and the rule took effect December 23, 2011.42
Among the changes included in the rule are new requirements for periodic updates of EPZ
evacuation time estimates, mandatory backups for public alert systems, and protection of
emergency responders during terrorist attacks. The new emergency planning regulations were
prepared before the Fukushima accident, but the NRC staff recommended approval of the
changes without waiting for further changes that might result from the lessons of the Japanese
accident. Emergency planning changes resulting from Fukushima should be implemented later,
the staff recommended.43
Domestic Reactor Safety Experience
Nuclear power safety has been a longstanding issue in the United States. Safety-related
shortcomings have been identified in the construction quality of some plants, plant operation and
maintenance, equipment reliability, emergency planning, and other areas. In one serious case, it
was discovered in March 2002 that leaking boric acid had eaten a large cavity in the top of the
reactor vessel in Ohio’s Davis-Besse nuclear plant. The corrosion left only the vessel’s quarter-
inch-thick stainless steel inner liner to prevent a potentially catastrophic loss of reactor cooling
water. Davis-Besse remained closed for repairs and other safety improvements until NRC allowed
the reactor to restart in March 2004.
NRC’s oversight of the nuclear industry is a subject of contention as well; nuclear utilities often
complain that they are subject to overly rigorous and inflexible regulation, but nuclear critics
charge that NRC frequently relaxes safety standards when compliance may prove difficult or
costly to the industry.
In terms of public health consequences, the safety record of the U.S. nuclear power industry in
comparison with other major commercial energy technologies has been excellent. During more
than 3,500 reactor-years of operation in the United States,44 the only incident at a commercial

(...continued)
Monitoring Post out of 20 Km Zone of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP,” data series, http://www.mext.go.jp/english/incident/
1304275.htm.
41 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “NRC Provides Protective Action Recommendations Based on U.S. Guidelines,”
press release, March 16, 2011, http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1108/ML110800133.pdf.
42 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Enhancements to Emergency Planning Regulations,” Final rule, Federal Register,
November 23, 2011, p. 72560.
43 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Final Rule: Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations,” SECY-11-
0053, April 8, 2011, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2011/2011-0053scy.pdf.
44 Nuclear Energy Institute, “Myths and Facts About Nuclear Energy,” January 2012, p. 12, .http://www.nei.org/
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nuclear power plant that might lead to any deaths or injuries to the public has been the Three Mile
Island accident, in which more than half the reactor core melted.45 A study of 32,000 people living
within five miles of the reactor when the accident occurred found no significant increase in
cancer rates through 1998, although the authors noted that some potential health effects “cannot
be definitively excluded.”46
The relatively small amounts of radioactivity released by nuclear plants during normal operation
are not generally believed to pose significant hazards, although some groups contend that routine
emissions are unacceptably risky. There is substantial scientific uncertainty about the level of risk
posed by low levels of radiation exposure; as with many carcinogens and other hazardous
substances, health effects can be clearly measured only at relatively high exposure levels. In the
case of radiation, the assumed risk of low-level exposure has been extrapolated mostly from
health effects documented among persons exposed to high levels of radiation, particularly
Japanese survivors of nuclear bombing in World War II, medical patients, and nuclear industry
workers.47
NRC announced April 7, 2010, that it had asked the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to
“perform a state-of-the-art study on cancer risk for populations surrounding nuclear power
facilities.” Unlike in previous studies, NAS is to examine cancer diagnosis rates, rather than
cancer deaths, potentially increasing the amount of data. The new study would also use
geographic units smaller than counties to determine how far members of the study group are
located from reactors, to more clearly determine whether there is a correlation between cancer
cases and distance from reactors.48
NRC’s 1986 Safety Goal Policy Statement declared that nuclear power plants should not increase
the risk of accidental or cancer deaths among the nearby population by more than 0.1%.49 Later
NRC guidance established a “subsidiary benchmark” for the probability of accidental core
damage (fuel melting): Core damage frequency should average no more than one in 10,000 per
reactor per year.50 In addition, NRC set a benchmark that reactor containments should be
successful at least 90% of the time in preventing major radioactive releases during a core-damage
accident. Therefore, the benchmark probability of a major release from containment failure

(...continued)
resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/reliableandaffordableenergy/factsheet/myths—facts-about-nuclear-energy-january-
2012.
45 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident,” March 15, 2011,
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html.
46 Evelyn O. Talbott et al., “Long Term Follow-Up of the Residents of the Three Mile Island Accident Area: 1979-
1998,” Environmental Health Perspectives, published online October 30, 2002, at http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/docs/2003/
5662/abstract.html.
47 National Research Council, Committee to Assess the Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing
Radiation, Beir VII: Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation, Report in Brief, http://dels-
old.nas.edu/dels/rpt_briefs/beir_vii_final.pdf.
48 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “NRC Asks National Academy of Sciences to Study Cancer Risk in Populations
Living Near Nuclear Power Facilities,” press release, April 7, 2010, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/
news/2010/10-060.html.
49 NRC, “Safety Goals for the Operations of Nuclear Power Plants,” policy statement, Federal Register, August 21,
1986, p. 30028, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/policy/51fr30028.pdf.
50 NRC Staff Requirements Memorandum on SECY-89-102, “Implementation of the Safety Goals,” Memorandum to
James M. Taylor fro Samuel J. Chilk, June 15, 1990, http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0037/ML003707881.pdf.
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during a core melt accident would average less than one in 100,000 per reactor per year.51 (For the
current U.S. fleet of about 100 reactors, that rate would yield an average of one core-damage
accident every 100 years and a major release every 1,000 years.) On the other hand, some groups
challenge the complex calculations that go into predicting such accident frequencies, contending
that accidents with serious public health consequences may be more frequent.52
Reactor Safety in the Former Soviet Bloc
The Chernobyl accident was by far the worst nuclear power plant accident to have occurred
anywhere in the world. At least 31 persons died quickly from acute radiation exposure or other
injuries, and thousands of additional cancer deaths among the tens of millions of people exposed
to radiation from the accident may occur during the next several decades.
According to a 2006 report by the Chernobyl Forum organized by the International Atomic
Energy Agency, the primary observable health consequence of the accident was a dramatic
increase in childhood thyroid cancer. The Chernobyl Forum estimated that about 4,000 cases of
thyroid cancer have occurred in children who after the accident drank milk contaminated with
high levels of radioactive iodine, which concentrates in the thyroid. Although the Chernobyl
Forum found only 15 deaths from those thyroid cancers, it estimated that about 4,000 other
cancer deaths may have occurred among the 600,000 people with the highest radiation exposures,
plus an estimated 1% increase in cancer deaths among persons with less exposure. The report
estimated that about 77,000 square miles were significantly contaminated by radioactive
cesium.53 Greenpeace issued a report in 2006 estimating that 200,000 deaths in Belarus, Russia,
and Ukraine resulted from the Chernobyl accident between 1990 and 2004.54
Licensing and Regulation
For many years, a top priority of the U.S. nuclear industry was to modify the process for licensing
new nuclear plants. No electric utility would consider ordering a nuclear power plant, according
to the industry, unless licensing became quicker and more predictable, and designs were less
subject to mid-construction safety-related changes required by NRC. The Energy Policy Act of
1992 (P.L. 102-486) largely implemented the industry’s licensing goals.
Nuclear plant licensing under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-703; U.S.C. 2011-2282)
had historically been a two-stage process. NRC first issued a construction permit to build a plant
and then, after construction was finished, an operating license to run it. Each stage of the
licensing process involved adjudicatory proceedings. Environmental impact statements also are
required under the National Environmental Policy Act.

51 U.S. NRC, Regulatory Guide 1.174, “An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed
Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis,” Revision 1, November 2002, http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-collections/reg-guides/power-reactors/rg/01-174.
52 Public Citizen Energy Program, “The Myth of Nuclear Safety,” http://www.citizen.org/cmep/energy_enviro_nuclear/
nuclear_power_plants/reactor_safety/articles.cfm?ID=4454.
53 The Chernobyl Forum: 2003-2005, Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts,
International Atomic Energy Agency, April 2006.
54 Greenpeace. The Chernobyl Catastrophe: Consequences on Human Health, April 2006, p. 10.
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Over the vehement objections of nuclear opponents, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 provided a
clear statutory basis for one-step nuclear licenses. Under the new process, NRC can issue
combined construction permits and operating licenses (COLs) and allow completed plants to
operate without delay if they meet all construction requirements—called “inspections, tests,
analyses, and acceptance criteria,” or ITAAC. NRC would hold preoperational hearings on the
adequacy of plant construction only in specified circumstances.
DOE’s Nuclear Power 2010 program had paid up to half the cost of several COLs and early site
permits to test the revised licensing procedures. However, the COL process cannot be fully tested
until construction of new reactors is completed. At that point, it could be seen whether completed
plants will be able to operate without delays or whether adjudicable disputes over construction
adequacy may arise. Section 638 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05, P.L. 109-58)
authorizes federal payments to the owner of a completed reactor whose operation is held up by
regulatory delays. The nuclear industry is asking Congress to require NRC to use informal
procedures in determining whether ITAAC have been met, eliminate mandatory hearings on
uncontested issues before granting a COL, and make other changes in the licensing process.55
A fundamental concern in the nuclear regulatory debate is the performance of NRC in issuing and
enforcing nuclear safety regulations. The nuclear industry and its supporters have regularly
complained that unnecessarily stringent and inflexibly enforced nuclear safety regulations have
burdened nuclear utilities and their customers with excessive costs. But many environmentalists,
nuclear opponents, and other groups charge NRC with being too close to the nuclear industry, a
situation that they say has resulted in lax oversight of nuclear power plants and routine
exemptions from safety requirements.
Primary responsibility for nuclear safety compliance lies with nuclear plant owners, who are
required to find any problems with their plants and report them to NRC. Compliance is also
monitored directly by NRC, which maintains at least two resident inspectors at each nuclear
power plant. The resident inspectors routinely examine plant systems, observe the performance of
reactor personnel, and prepare regular inspection reports. For serious safety violations, NRC often
dispatches special inspection teams to plant sites.
NRC’s reactor safety program is based on “risk-informed regulation,” in which safety
enforcement is guided by the relative risks identified by detailed individual plant studies. NRC’s
risk-informed reactor oversight system, inaugurated April 2, 2000, relies on a series of
performance indicators to determine the level of scrutiny that each reactor should receive.56
Reactor Security
Nuclear power plants have long been recognized as potential targets of terrorist attacks, and
critics have long questioned the adequacy of requirements for nuclear plant operators to defend
against such attacks. All commercial nuclear power plants licensed by NRC have a series of

55 Nuclear Energy Institute, Legislative Proposal to Help Meet Climate Change Goals by Expanding U.S. Nuclear
Energy Production
, Washington, DC, October 28, 2009, p. 5, http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/
newplants/policybrief/2009-nuclear-policy-initiative.
56 For more information about the NRC reactor oversight process, see http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/
ASSESS/index.html.
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physical barriers against access to vital reactor areas and are required to maintain a trained
security force to protect them.
A key element in protecting nuclear plants is the requirement that simulated terrorist attacks,
monitored by NRC, be carried out to test the ability of the plant operator to defend against them.
The severity of attacks that plant security must prepare for is specified in the “design basis threat”
(DBT).
EPACT05 required NRC to revise the DBT based on an assessment of terrorist threats, the
potential for multiple coordinated attacks, possible suicide attacks, and other criteria. NRC
approved the DBT revision based on those requirements on January 29, 2007. The revised DBT
does not require nuclear power plants to defend against deliberate aircraft attacks. NRC
contended that nuclear facilities were already required to mitigate the effects of large fires and
explosions, no matter what the cause, and that active protection against airborne threats was being
addressed by U.S. military and other agencies.57 After much consideration, NRC voted February
17, 2009, to require all new nuclear power plants to incorporate design features that would ensure
that, in the event of a crash by a large commercial aircraft, the reactor core would remain cooled
or the reactor containment would remain intact, and radioactive releases would not occur from
spent fuel storage pools.58 The rule change was published in the Federal Register June 12, 2009.59
NRC rejected proposals that existing reactors also be required to protect against aircraft crashes,
such as by adding large external steel barriers. However, NRC did impose some additional
requirements related to aircraft crashes on all reactors, both new and existing, after the 9/11
terrorist attacks of 2001. In 2002, as noted above, NRC ordered all nuclear power plants to
develop strategies to mitigate the effects of large fires and explosions that could result from
aircraft crashes or other causes. An NRC regulation on fire mitigation strategies, along with
requirements that reactors establish procedures for responding to specific aircraft threats, was
approved December 17, 2008.60 The fire mitigation rules were published in the Federal Register
March 27, 2009.61
Other ongoing nuclear plant security issues include the vulnerability of spent fuel pools, which
hold highly radioactive nuclear fuel after its removal from the reactor, standards for nuclear plant
security personnel, and nuclear plant emergency planning. NRC’s March 2009 security
regulations addressed some of those concerns and included a number of other security
enhancements.
EPACT05 required NRC to conduct force-on-force security exercises at nuclear power plants
every three years (which was NRC’s previous policy), authorized firearms use by nuclear security

57 NRC Office of Public Affairs, NRC Approves Final Rule Amending Security Requirements, News Release No. 07-
012, January 29, 2007.
58 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Rule—Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for New Nuclear Power Reactors,
Commission Voting Record
, SECY-08-0152, February 17, 2009.
59 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for New Nuclear Power Reactors,” Final Rule,
74 Federal Register 28111, June 12, 2009. This provision is codified at 10 CFR 50.150.
60 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “NRC Approves Final Rule Expanding Security Requirements for Nuclear Power
Plants,” press release, December 17, 2008, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2008/08-227.html.
61 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Power Reactor Security Requirements,” Final Rule, 74 Federal Register 13925,
March 27, 2009.
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personnel (preempting some state restrictions), established federal security coordinators, and
required fingerprinting of nuclear facility workers.
(For background on security issues, see CRS Report RL34331, Nuclear Power Plant Security and
Vulnerabilities
, by Mark Holt and Anthony Andrews.)
Decommissioning
When nuclear power plants reach the end of their useful lives, they must be safely removed from
service, a process called decommissioning. NRC requires nuclear utilities to make regular
contributions to dedicated funds to ensure that money is available to remove radioactive material
and contamination from reactor sites after they are closed.
The first full-sized U.S. commercial reactors to be decommissioned were the Trojan plant in
Oregon, whose decommissioning completion received NRC approval on May 23, 2005, and the
Maine Yankee plant, for which NRC approved most of the site cleanup on October 3, 2005. The
Trojan decommissioning cost $429 million, according to reactor owner Portland General Electric,
and the Maine Yankee decommissioning cost about $500 million.62 Decommissioning of the
Connecticut Yankee plant cost $790 million and was approved by NRC on November 26, 2007.63
NRC approved the cleanup of the decommissioned Rancho Seco reactor site in California on
October 7, 2009.64 The decommissioning of Rancho Seco was estimated to cost $500 million,
excluding future demolition of the cooling towers and other remaining plant structures.65
After nuclear reactors are decommissioned, the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) accumulated during their
operating lives remains stored in pools or dry casks at the plant sites. About 2,800 metric tons of
spent fuel is currently stored at nine closed nuclear power plants. “Until this SNF is removed
from these nine sites, the sites cannot be fully decommissioned and made available for other
purposes,” DOE noted in a 2008 report.66 President Obama’s decision to terminate development
of an underground spent fuel repository at Yucca Mountain, NV, has increased concerns about the
ultimate disposition of spent fuel at decommissioned sites. (For more information, see CRS
Report R42513, U.S. Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, by James D. Werner.)
Nuclear Accident Liability
Liability for damages to the general public from nuclear incidents is addressed by the Price-
Anderson Act (primarily Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2210).
EPACT05 extended the availability of Price-Anderson coverage for new reactors and new DOE
nuclear contracts through the end of 2025. (Existing reactors and contracts were already covered.)

62 Sharp, David, “NRC Signs Off on Maine Yankee’s Decommissioning,” Associated Press, October 3, 2005.
63 E-mail communication from Bob Capstick, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, August 28, 2008.
64 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “NRC Releases Rancho Seco Nuclear Plant for Unconditional Use,” press release,
October 7, 2009, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2009/09-165.html.
65 “20 Years Later, Rancho Seco Ready for Final Shutdown,” Sacramento County Herald, June 9, 2009,
http://m.news10.net/news.jsp?key=190656.
66 DOE Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Report to Congress on the Demonstration of the Interim
Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel from Decommissioned Nuclear Power Reactor Sites, DOE/RW-0596, Washington, DC,
December 2008, p. 1, http://www.energy.gov/media/ES_Interim_Storage_Report_120108.pdf.
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Under Price-Anderson, the owners of commercial reactors must assume all liability for nuclear
damages awarded to the public by the court system, and they must waive most of their legal
defenses following a severe radioactive release (“extraordinary nuclear occurrence”). To pay any
such damages, each licensed reactor with at least 100 megawatts of electric generating capacity
must carry the maximum liability insurance reasonably available, which was raised from $300
million to $375 million on January 1, 2010.67 Any damages exceeding $375 million are to be
assessed equally against all 100-megawatt-and-above power reactors, up to $111.9 million per
reactor. Those assessments—called “retrospective premiums”—would be paid at an annual rate of
no more than $17.5 million per reactor, to limit the potential financial burden on reactor owners
following a major accident. According to NRC, all 104 commercial reactors are currently covered
by the Price-Anderson retrospective premium requirement.68
For each nuclear incident, the Price-Anderson liability system currently would provide up to
$12.6 billion in public compensation. That total includes the $375 million in insurance coverage
carried by the reactor that suffered the incident, plus the $111.9 million in retrospective premiums
from each of the 104 currently covered reactors, totaling $12.0 billion. On top of those payments,
a 5% surcharge may also be imposed, raising the total per-reactor retrospective premium to
$117.5 million and the total available compensation to about $12.6 billion. Under Price-
Anderson, the nuclear industry’s liability for an incident is capped at that amount, which varies
over time depending on the number of covered reactors, the amount of available insurance, and
an inflation adjustment. Payment of any damages above that liability limit would require
congressional approval under special procedures in the act.
EPACT05 increased the limit on per-reactor annual payments to $15 million from the previous
$10 million, and required the annual limit to be adjusted for inflation every five years. As under
previous law, the total retrospective premium limit is adjusted every five years as well. Both the
annual and total limits were most recently adjusted October 29, 2008.69 For the purposes of those
payment limits, a nuclear plant consisting of multiple small reactors (100-300 megawatts, up to a
total of 1,300 megawatts) would be considered a single reactor. Therefore, a power plant with six
120-megawatt small modular reactors would be liable for retrospective premiums of up to $111.9
million, rather than $671.4 million (excluding the 5% surcharge).
The Price-Anderson Act also covers contractors who operate hazardous DOE nuclear facilities.
EPACT05 set the liability limit on DOE contractors at $10 billion per accident, to be adjusted for
inflation every five years. The first adjustment under EPACT, raising the liability limit to $11.961
billion, took effect October 14, 2009.70 The liability limit for DOE contractors previously had
been the same as for commercial reactors, excluding the 5% surcharge, except when the limit for
commercial reactors dropped because of a decline in the number of covered reactors. Price-
Anderson authorizes DOE to indemnify its contractors for the entire amount of their liability, so
that damage payments for nuclear incidents at DOE facilities would ultimately come from the

67 American Nuclear Insurers, “Need for Nuclear Liability Insurance,” January 2010,
http://www.nuclearinsurance.com/library/Nuclear%20Liability%20in%20the%20US.pdf.
68 Reactors smaller than 100 megawatts must purchase an amount of liability coverage determined by NRC but are not
subject to retrospective premiums. Total liability for those reactors is limited to $560 million, with the federal
government indemnifying reactor operators for the difference between that amount and their liability coverage (Atomic
Energy Act Sec. 170 b. and c.).
69 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Inflation Adjustment to the Price-Anderson Act Financial Protection
Regulations,” 73 Federal Register 56451, September 29, 2008.
70 Department of Energy, “Adjusted Indemnification Amount,” 74 Federal Register 52793, October 14, 2009.
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Treasury. However, the law also allows DOE to fine its contractors for safety violations, and
contractor employees and directors can face criminal penalties for “knowingly and willfully”
violating nuclear safety rules.
EPACT05 limited the civil penalties against a nonprofit contractor to the amount of management
fees paid under that contract. Previously, Atomic Energy Act §234A specifically exempted seven
nonprofit DOE contractors and their subcontractors from civil penalties and authorized DOE to
automatically remit any civil penalties imposed on nonprofit educational institutions serving as
DOE contractors. EPACT05 eliminated the civil penalty exemption for future contracts by the
seven listed nonprofit contractors and DOE’s authority to automatically remit penalties on
nonprofit educational institutions.
The Price-Anderson Act’s limits on liability were crucial in establishing the commercial nuclear
power industry in the 1950s. Supporters of the Price-Anderson system contend that it has worked
well since that time in ensuring that nuclear accident victims would have a secure source of
compensation, at little cost to the taxpayer. Extension of the act was widely considered a
prerequisite for new nuclear reactor construction in the United States. Opponents contend that
Price-Anderson inappropriately subsidizes the nuclear power industry by reducing its insurance
costs and protecting it from some of the financial consequences of the most severe conceivable
accidents. The possibility that damages to the public from the Fukushima accident could greatly
exceed the Price-Anderson liability limits has prompted new calls for reexamination of the law.71
The United States is supporting the establishment of an international liability system that, among
other purposes, would cover U.S. nuclear equipment suppliers conducting foreign business. The
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) will not enter into force
until at least five countries with a specified level of installed nuclear capacity have enacted
implementing legislation. Such implementing language was included in the Energy Independence
and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140, section 934), signed by President Bush December 19,
2007. Supporters of the Convention hope that more countries will join now that the United States
has acted. Aside from the United States, three countries have submitted the necessary instruments
of ratification, but the remaining nine countries that so far have signed the convention do not have
the required nuclear capacity for it to take effect. Ratification by a large nuclear energy producer
such as Japan would allow the treaty to take effect, as would ratification by two significant but
smaller producers such as South Korea, Canada, Russia, or Ukraine.
Under the U.S. implementing legislation, the CSC would not change the liability and payment
levels already established by the Price-Anderson Act. Each party to the convention would be
required to establish a nuclear damage compensation system within its borders analogous to
Price-Anderson. For any damages not covered by those national compensation systems, the
convention would establish a supplemental tier of damage compensation to be paid by all parties.
P.L. 110-140 requires the U.S. contribution to the supplemental tier to be paid by suppliers of
nuclear equipment and services, under a formula to be developed by DOE. Supporters of the
convention contend that it will help U.S. exporters of nuclear technology by establishing a
predictable international liability system. For example, U.S. reactor sales to the growing

71 Ellen Vancko, Union of Concerned Scientists, “The Impact of Fukushima on the US Nuclear Power Industry,”
presentation to the Center for Strategic and International Studies Conference on Nuclear Safety and Fukushima, April
7, 2011, https://csis.org/files/attachments/110407_vancko_nuclear_safety_0.pdf.
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economies of China and India would be facilitated by those countries’ participation in the CSC
liability regime.
Federal Incentives for New Nuclear Plants
The nuclear power industry contends that support from the federal government would be needed
for “a major expansion of nuclear energy generation.”72 Significant incentives for building new
nuclear power plants were included in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05, P.L. 109-58),
signed by President Bush on August 8, 2005. These include production tax credits, loan
guarantees, insurance against regulatory delays, and extension of the Price-Anderson Act nuclear
liability system (discussed above in the “Nuclear Accident Liability” section of this report).
Relatively low prices for natural gas—nuclear power’s chief competitor—and rising estimated
nuclear plant construction costs have decreased the likelihood that new reactors would be built
without federal support. Any regulatory delays and increased safety requirements resulting from
the Fukushima accident could also pose an obstacle to nuclear construction plans.
As a result, numerous bills have been introduced in recent years to strengthen or add to the
EPACT05 incentives (see “Legislation in the 112th Congress” at the end of this report). Nuclear
power critics have denounced the federal support programs and proposals as a “bailout” of the
nuclear industry, contending that federal efforts should focus instead on renewable energy and
energy efficiency.73
Nuclear Production Tax Credit
EPACT05 provides a 1.8-cents/kilowatt-hour tax credit for up to 6,000 megawatts of new nuclear
capacity for the first eight years of operation, up to $125 million annually per 1,000 megawatts.
The credit is not adjusted for inflation.
The Treasury Department published interim guidance for the nuclear production tax credit on
May 1, 2006.74 Under the guidance, the 6,000 megawatts of eligible capacity (enough for about
four or five reactors) are to be allocated among reactors that filed license applications by the end
of 2008. If more than 6,000 megawatts of nuclear capacity ultimately qualify for the production
tax credit, then the credit is to be allocated proportionally among any of the qualifying reactors
that begin operating before 2021.
By the end of 2008, license applications had been submitted to NRC for more than 34,000
megawatts of nuclear generating capacity,75 so if all those reactors were built before 2021 they
would receive less than 20% of the maximum tax credit. However, the reactor licensing status

72 Nuclear Energy Institute, “NEI Unveils Package of Policy Initiatives Needed to Achieve Climate Change Goals,”
press release, October 26, 2009, http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/newsreleases/nei-unveils-package-of-policy-
initiatives-needed-to-achieve-climate-change-goals/.
73 Nuclear Information and Resource Service, “Senate Appropriators Lard President Obama’s Stimulus Package with
up to $50 Billion in Nuclear Reactor Pork,” press release, January 30, 2009, http://www.nirs.org/press/01-30-2009/1.
74 Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Internal Revenue Bulletin, No. 2006-18, “Credit for
Production From Advanced Nuclear Facilities,” Notice 2006-40, May 1, 2006, p. 855.
75 Energy Information Administration, Status of Potential New Commercial Nuclear Reactors in the United States,
February 19, 2009.
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shown in Table 1 indicates that only four new units, totaling about 4,600 megawatts of capacity,
are currently licensed for construction and likely to be completed before 2021. Two other units,
totaling about 2,300 megawatts, are scheduled to receive their licenses and could possibly go into
service by 2021.
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has urged Congress to remove the 6,000 megawatt capacity
limit for the production tax credit, index it for inflation, and extend the deadline for plants to
begin operation to the start of 2025. NEI is also proposing that a 30% investment tax credit be
available for new nuclear construction as an alternative to the production credit.76
Standby Support
Because the nuclear industry has often blamed licensing delays for past nuclear reactor
construction cost overruns, EPACT05 authorizes the Secretary of Energy to provide “standby
support,” or regulatory risk insurance, to help pay the cost of regulatory delays at up to six new
commercial nuclear reactors. For the first two reactors that begin construction, the DOE payments
could cover all the eligible delay-related costs, such as additional interest, up to $500 million
each. For the next four reactors, half of the eligible costs could be paid by DOE, with a payment
cap of $250 million per reactor. Delays caused by the failure of a reactor owner to comply with
laws or regulations would not be covered. Project sponsors will be required to pay the “subsidy
cost” of the program, consisting of the estimated present value of likely future government
payments.
DOE published a final rule for the “standby support” program August 11, 2006.77 According to a
DOE description of the final rule,
Events that would be covered by the risk insurance include delays associated with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s reviews of inspections, tests, analyses and acceptance
criteria or other licensing schedule delays as well as certain delays associated with litigation
in federal, state or tribal courts. Insurance coverage is not available for normal business risks
such as employment strikes and weather delays. Covered losses would include principal and
interest on debt and losses resulting from the purchase of replacement power to satisfy
contractual obligations.78
Under the program’s regulations, a project sponsor may enter into a conditional agreement for
standby support before NRC issues a combined operating license. The first six conditional
agreements to meet all the program requirements, including the issuance of a COL and payment
of the estimated subsidy costs, can be converted to standby support contracts. No conditional
agreements have yet been reached, according to DOE, primarily because the subsidy cost
estimates have not been approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).79

76 Nuclear Energy Institute, Legislative Proposal to Help Meet Climate Change Goals by Expanding U.S. Nuclear
Energy Production
, Washington, DC, October 28, 2009, p. 4, http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/
newplants/policybrief/2009-nuclear-policy-initiative.
77 Department of Energy, “Standby Support for Certain Nuclear Plant Delays,” Federal Register, August 11, 2006,
p. 46306.
78 DOE press release, August 4, 2006, http://nuclear.gov/home/08-04-06.html.
79 Meeting with Rebecca F. Smith-Kevern, Director, DOE Office of Light Water Reactor Deployment, October 7,
2009.
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The Nuclear Energy Institute has called for expanding the Standby Support program to $500
million for all six covered reactors, rather than just the first two. In addition, NEI proposed that if
a reactor successfully begins operating without any delay payments, that plant’s Standby Support
coverage, instead of expiring unused, be allowed to “roll over” to the next plant with a
conditional agreement.80
Loan Guarantees
Title XVII of EPACT05 authorizes federal loan guarantees for up to 80% of construction costs for
advanced energy projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions, including new nuclear power
plants. Under such loan guarantee agreements, the federal government would repay all covered
loans if the borrower defaulted. This would reduce the risk to lenders and allow them to provide
financing at low interest rates. The Title XVII loan guarantees are widely considered crucial by
the nuclear industry to obtain financing for new reactors. However, opponents contend that
nuclear loan guarantees would provide an unjustifiable subsidy to a mature industry and shift
investment away from environmentally preferable energy technologies.81
The total amount of Title XVII loan guarantees to be made available for nuclear power has been
the subject of considerable congressional debate. President Obama’s FY2011 budget request
would have nearly tripled the current ceiling on federal loan guarantees for nuclear power plants,
from $18.5 billion to $54.5 billion. A $36 billion increase would increase the number of reactors
that could receive loan guarantees from about three or four to about a dozen, depending on their
size. The Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act for FY2011 (P.L.
112-10) did not provide the requested increase, leaving the nuclear power loan guarantee ceiling
at $18.5 billion. The Administration again requested a $36 billion nuclear loan guarantee increase
for FY2012, but none of the increase was included in the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations
Act. No increase was requested for FY2013.
The Administration announced the first conditional nuclear power plant loan guarantee on
February 16, 2010, totaling $8.33 billion for two proposed new reactors at Georgia’s Vogtle
nuclear plant site. Owners of the Vogtle project have reportedly estimated that the loan guarantee
could reduce their financing costs by as much as $2 billion.82 Other finalists for the first round of
nuclear reactor loan guarantees were Calvert Cliffs 3 in Maryland, South Texas Plant 3 and 4, and
Summer 2 and 3.83 However, as noted earlier, the future of the proposed units at Calvert Cliffs
and the South Texas Plant is currently uncertain, leaving only Summer 2 and 3 as clearly viable
candidates.

80 Nuclear Energy Institute, op. cit.
81 Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, Statement on Nuclear Developments Before the Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, United States Senate
, Natural Resources Defense Council, March 18, 2009,
http://energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=f25ddd10-c1f5-9e2e-528e-
c4321cca4c1b&Witness_ID=9f14a78d-58d0-43fb-bf5b-21426d1d888e.
82 K. Steiner-Dicks, “Weekly Intelligence Brief 7-13 June 2012,” Nuclear Energy Insider, June 13, 2012.
83 Letter from Office of Management and Budget Director Peter R. Orszag to House and Senate leaders, May 21, 2010,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/legislative_letters/Pelosi_05212010.pdf.
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DOE issued final rules for the program October 4, 2007,84 and finalized the first loan guarantee
on September 4, 2009, totaling $535 million to Solyndra Inc. for a photovoltaic panel
manufacturing plant, which subsequently defaulted.85 DOE’s proposed loan guarantee rules,
published May 16, 2007, had been sharply criticized by the nuclear industry for limiting the
guarantees to 90% of a project’s debt. The industry contended that EPACT05 allows all of a
project’s debt to be covered, as long as debt does not exceed 80% of total construction costs. In its
explanation of the proposed rules, DOE expressed concern that guaranteeing 100% of a project’s
debt could reduce lenders’ incentive to perform adequate due diligence and therefore increase
default risks. In the final rule, however, DOE agreed to guarantee up to 100% of a project’s debt,
but in that case the loans had to be issued by the Federal Financing Bank.
Subsidy Costs
Title XVII requires the estimated future government costs resulting from defaults on guaranteed
loans to be covered up-front by appropriations or by payments from project sponsors, such as the
utility planning to build a plant. These “subsidy costs” are calculated as the present value of the
average possible future net costs to the government for each loan guarantee. If those calculations
are accurate, the subsidy cost payments for all the guaranteed projects together should cover the
future costs of the program, including default-related losses. However, the Congressional Budget
Office has predicted that the up-front subsidy cost payments will prove too low by at least 1%
and is scoring bills accordingly.86 For example, appropriations bills that provide loan guarantee
authorizations include an adjustment equal to 1% of the loan guarantee ceiling. (For more
information on loan guarantee subsidy costs, see CRS Report R42152, Loan Guarantees for
Clean Energy Technologies: Goals, Concerns, and Policy Options
, by Phillip Brown.)
DOE loan guarantees for renewable energy and electricity transmission projects under EPACT05
section 1705, added by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5), do
not require subsidy cost payments by project sponsors, because potential losses are covered by
advance appropriations in the act. No such appropriations are currently available for nuclear
power projects, so it is anticipated that nuclear loan guarantee subsidy costs would be paid by the
project sponsors. As a result, the level of the subsidy costs could have a powerful effect on the
viability of nuclear power projects, which are currently expected to cost between $5 billion and
$10 billion per reactor. For example, a 10% subsidy cost for a $7 billion loan guarantee would
require an up-front payment of $700 million.
No subsidy cost amount has yet been established for any nuclear loan guarantee, including the
lead Vogtle project in Georgia. The Administration’s continuing internal deliberations over that
question may reflect its importance and the amount of controversy being generated. Internal DOE
documents released May 23, 2012, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act show that
Southern Company, the lead partner in the Vogtle project, has been offered a subsidy cost of

84 Published October 23, 2007 (72 Federal Register 60116). Revised final rules were published December 4, 2009 (74
Federal Register 63544).
85 Department of Energy, “Vice President Biden Announces Finalized $535 Million Loan Guarantee,” press release,
September 4, 2009, http://www.lgprogram.energy.gov/press/090409.pdf. For details on the default, see CRS Report
R42058, Market Dynamics That May Have Contributed to Solyndra’s Bankruptcy, by Phillip Brown.
86 Congressional Budget Office, S. 1321, Energy Savings Act of 2007, CBO Cost Estimate, Washington, DC, June 11,
2007, pp. 7-9, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/82xx/doc8206/s1321.pdf.
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0.5%-1.5%, subject to other conditions that are still under negotiation. Higher subsidy costs are
being offered to two other partners in the project.87
The nuclear industry contends that historical experience indicates defaults are likely to be
minimal and that nuclear plant subsidy costs should therefore be low.88 However, nuclear power
critics contend that nuclear power plants are likely to experience delays and cost overruns that
could lead to much larger losses under the loan guarantee program. The Center for American
Progress concluded that nuclear subsidy costs “should be at least 10 percent and possibly much
more.”89
Constellation Energy informed DOE on October 8, 2010, that it was withdrawing from loan
guarantee negotiations on Calvert Cliffs 3, blaming “the Office of Management and Budget’s
inability to address significant problems with its methodology for determining the project’s credit
subsidy cost.” Constellation’s letter to DOE said OMB’s “shockingly high” estimate of the
subsidy cost for Calvert Cliffs 3 was 11.6%, or about $880 million. “Such a sum would clearly
destroy the project’s economics (or the economics of any nuclear project for that matter), and was
dramatically out of line with both our own and independent assessments of what the figure should
reasonably be,” the letter stated.90 Although OMB has not released its subsidy cost methodology,
it may consider the default risk for a “merchant plant” such as Calvert Cliffs to be significantly
higher than that of a rate-regulated plant such as Vogtle. A plant under traditional rate regulation
is allowed to pass all prudently incurred costs through to utility ratepayers, while a merchant plant
charges market rates for its power. A merchant plant, therefore, could potentially earn higher
profits than a rate-regulated plant, but it also runs the risk of being unable to cover its debt
payments if market rates for wholesale electric power drop too low or if its costs are higher than
anticipated.
Congressionally Authorized Ceilings
Under the Federal Credit Reform Act (FCRA), federal loan guarantees cannot be provided
without an authorized level in an appropriations act. The Senate-passed version of omnibus
energy legislation in the 110th Congress (H.R. 6) would have explicitly eliminated FCRA’s
applicability to DOE’s planned loan guarantees under EPACT05 (Section 124(b)). That provision
would have given DOE essentially unlimited loan guarantee authority for guarantees whose
subsidy costs were paid by project sponsors, but it was dropped from the final legislation (P.L.
110-140). Similar language was also included in subsequent legislative proposals, such as energy
legislation reported by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources July 16, 2009 (S.
1462).

87 Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, “Secret Documents Highlight Nuclear’s Risk,” press release, May 23, 2012,
http://www.cleanenergy.org/index.php?/Press-Update.html?form_id=8&item_id=299.
88 Statement of Leslie C. Kass, Nuclear Energy Institute, to the Subcommittee on Domestic Policy, House Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform, April 20, 2010, http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/speechesandtestimony/april-
20-2010-kass. DOE is treating final subsidy cost determinations as proprietary, prompting some groups to call for the
amounts to be made public.
89 Richard Caperton, Protecting Taxpayers from a Financial Meltdown, Center for American Progress, Washington,
DC, March 8, 2010, p. 2, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/03/nuclear_financing.html.
90 Letter from Michael J. Wallace, Vice Chairman and Chief Operating Officer, Constellation Energy, to Dan Poneman,
Deputy Secretary of Energy, October 8, 2010, http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/hp/ssi/wpc/
constellationenergy.PDF?sid=ST2010100900005.
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Pursuant to FCRA, the FY2007 continuing resolution (P.L. 110-5) established an initial cap of $4
billion on loan guarantees under the program, without allocating that amount among the various
eligible technologies. The explanatory statement for the FY2008 omnibus funding act (P.L. 110-
161) increased the loan guarantee ceiling to $38.5 billion through FY2009, including $18.5
billion specifically for nuclear power plants and $2 billion for uranium enrichment plants.91
The FY2009 omnibus funding act increased DOE’s total loan guarantee authority for specified
technology categories to $47 billion, in addition to the $4 billion in general authority provided in
FY2007. Of the $47 billion, $18.5 billion continued to be reserved for nuclear power, $18.5
billion was for energy efficiency and renewables, $6 billion was for coal, $2 billion was for
carbon capture and sequestration, and $2 billion was for uranium enrichment. The time limits on
the loan guarantee authority were eliminated. The loan guarantee ceilings remained the same for
FY2010 but were sharply reduced for non-nuclear technologies by the FY2011 Continuing
Appropriations Act. The nuclear power loan guarantee ceiling remains at $18.5 billion.
Nuclear Solicitations
DOE issued a solicitation for up to $20.5 billion in nuclear power and uranium enrichment plant
loan guarantees on June 30, 2008.92 According to the nuclear industry, 10 nuclear power projects
applied for $93.2 billion in loan guarantees, and two uranium enrichment projects asked for $4.8
billion in guarantees, several times the amount available.93 Under the program’s regulations, a
conditional loan guarantee commitment cannot become a binding loan guarantee agreement until
the project receives a COL and all other regulatory requirements are met, as noted above; and the
first COLs were issued in early 2012.
In the uranium enrichment solicitation, DOE in July 2009 informed USEC Inc., which plans to
build a new plant in Ohio, that its technology needed further testing before a loan guarantee could
be issued.94 DOE notified Congress in March 2010 that it would reprogram $2 billion of its
unused FY2007 loan guarantee authority toward uranium enrichment, increasing the uranium
enrichment total to $4 billion. The move would potentially allow guarantees to be provided to
both USEC and the other applicant in the uranium enrichment solicitation, the French firm Areva,
which is planning a plant in Idaho.95 DOE offered a $2 billion conditional loan guarantee to Areva
on May 20, 2010.96
DOE informed USEC in October 2011 that the centrifuge technology for its proposed new
enrichment plant still needed further testing and offered to provide up to $300 million to help
build a demonstration “train” of 720 centrifuges.97 Energy Secretary Steven Chu sent letters to the

91 Congressional Record, December 17, 2007, p. H15585.
92 http://www.lgprogram.energy.gov/keydocs.html.
93 Marvin S. Fertel, Statement for the Record to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, Nuclear
Energy Institute, March 18, 2009, p. 9, http://energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&
Hearing_ID=f25ddd10-c1f5-9e2e-528e-c4321cca4c1b&Witness_ID=4de5e2df-53fe-49ba-906e-9b69d3674e41.
94 Department of Energy, “800 to 1000 New Jobs Coming to Piketon,” press release, July 28, 2009,
http://www.lgprogram.energy.gov/press/072809.pdf.
95 Maureen Conley, “DOE Finds $2 Billion More for SWU Plant Loan Guarantees,” NuclearFuel, April 5, 2010, p. 3.
96 Department of Energy, “DOE Offers Conditional Loan Guarantee for Front End Nuclear Facility in Idaho,” press
release, May 20, 2010, http://www.energy.gov/news/8996.htm.
97 Maureen Conley, “Congress ‘Frustrated’ by Inaction on USEC Loan Guarantee,” NuclearFuel, October 31, 2011,
(continued...)
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House and Senate Appropriations Committees on October 25, 2011, to request an unspecified
funding transfer in FY2012 for the first $150 million of USEC assistance.98 DOE’s FY2013
budget request includes $150 million for the USEC centrifuge demonstration program. The
House provided $100 million in the FY2013 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill
(H.R. 5325, H.Rept. 112-462), while the Senate Appropriations Committee version of the bill
recommended $150 million in transfer authority to fund the project (S. 2465, S.Rept. 112-164).
An authorization of $150 million for the USEC centrifuge demonstration program is included in
the House-passed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (H.R. 4310).
DOE has recently provided other assistance to USEC. DOE agreed on May 15, 2012, to provide
depleted uranium stockpiles (material left over from the enrichment process) to Energy Northwest
for reenrichment at USEC’s plant in Paducah, KY, for use as reactor fuel.99 DOE agreed on March
13, 2012, to acquire low-enriched uranium from USEC in exchange for taking responsibility for
low-value depleted uranium tails that USEC would otherwise have to dispose of, freeing $44
million of USEC’s funds for the centrifuge project.100 DOE announced June 13, 2012, that it
would provide $88 million for the centrifuge demonstration program by taking over responsibility
for disposal of additional depleted uranium from USEC. In return, DOE will take ownership of
the equipment and technology used in the demonstration and lease it to USEC.101
Global Climate Change
Global climate change that may be caused by carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions
is cited by nuclear power supporters as an important reason to develop a new generation of
reactors. Nuclear power plants emit relatively little carbon dioxide, mostly from nuclear fuel
production and auxiliary plant equipment. This “green” nuclear power argument has received
growing attention in think tanks and academia. As stated by the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology in its major study The Future of Nuclear Power: “Our position is that the prospect of
global climate change from greenhouse gas emissions and the adverse consequences that flow
from these emissions is the principal justification for government support of the nuclear energy
option.”102 As discussed above, the Obama Administration is also including nuclear power as part
of its clean energy strategy.

(...continued)
p. 8.
98 Steven Chu, Secretary of Energy, letters to Chairmen and Ranking Members of House and Senate Appropriations
Committees and Subcommittees on Energy and Water Development, October 25, 2011. For more information on the
USEC funding proposal, see CRS Congressional Distribution Memorandum Business Outlook for USEC Inc., by Mark
Holt, available from the author.
99 USEC Inc., “Five-Party Arrangement Extends Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Enrichment Operations,” press
release, May 15, 2012, http://www.usec.com/news/five-party-arrangement-extends-paducah-gaseous-diffusion-plant-
enrichment-operations. The depleted uranium consists of “high assay” tails, which have relatively high levels of fissile
U-235.
100 USEC Inc., “Funding,” web page, http://www.usec.com/american-centrifuge/what-american-centrifuge/plant/
funding.
101 Department of Energy, “Obama Administration Announces Major Step Forward for the American Centrifuge
Plant,” press release, June 13, 2012, http://energy.gov/articles/obama-administration-announces-major-step-forward-
american-centrifuge-plant.
102 Interdisciplinary MIT Study, The Future of Nuclear Power, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003, p. 79.
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However, environmental groups have contended that nuclear power’s potential greenhouse gas
benefits are modest and must be weighed against the technology’s safety risks, its potential for
nuclear weapons proliferation, and the hazards of radioactive waste.103 They also contend that
energy efficiency and renewable energy would be far more productive investments for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions.104
Proposals to reduce carbon dioxide emissions – through taxation, a cap-and-trade system, or other
regulatory controls – could significantly increase the cost of generating electricity with fossil
fuels and improve the competitive position of nuclear power. A federal Clean Energy Standard
that includes nuclear power, as proposed in President Obama’s January 2011 State of the Union
Address and in S. 2146, could provide a similar boost to nuclear energy expansion. Utilities that
have applied for nuclear power plant licenses have often cited the possibility of federal
greenhouse gas controls or other mandates as one of the reasons for pursuing new reactors. (For
more on federal incentives and the economics of nuclear power and other electricity generation
technologies, see CRS Report RL34746, Power Plants: Characteristics and Costs, by Stan Mark
Kaplan.)
Nuclear Power Research and Development
The Obama Administration’s FY2013 funding request for nuclear energy research and
development totaled $770.4 million. Including advanced reactors, fuel cycle technology,
infrastructure support, and safeguards and security, the total nuclear energy request was $88.3
million (10%) below the enacted FY2012 funding level. Funding for safeguards and security at
DOE’s Idaho facilities in FY2012 was provided under a separate appropriations account, Other
Defense Activities, but it was included under the Nuclear Energy account in the FY2013 request.
The largest proposed reductions for FY2013 were Reactor Concepts (36%), Radiological Facility
Management (27%), and Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies (13%).
Nuclear energy funding is included in the Energy and Water Development appropriations bills.
The House passed its version of the Energy and Water bill for FY2013 on June 6, 2012 (H.R.
5325, H.Rept. 112-462). Excluding funding for Idaho safeguards and security, the House bill
provided an increase of $89.9 million for the nuclear energy account, for a total of $765.4 million.
The House bill included $93.4 million for Idaho safeguards and security under the Other Defense
Activities Account. The Senate Appropriations Committee on April 26, 2012, recommended a
$20.1 million increase for nuclear energy, including Idaho safeguards and security and $17.7
million in prior-year balances (S. 2465, S.Rept. 112-164).
Using reorganized budget categories established for FY2011, the Administration’s FY2013
nuclear R&D budget request is consistent with DOE’s Nuclear Energy Research and

103 Gronlund, Lisbeth, David Lochbaum, and Edwin Lyman, Nuclear Power in a Warming World, Union of Concerned
Scientists, December 2007.
104 Travis Madsen, Tony Dutzik, and Bernadette Del Chiaro, et al., Generating Failure: How Building Nuclear Power
Plants Would Set America Back in the Race Against Global Warming
, Environment America Research and Policy
Center, November 2009, http://www.environmentamerica.org/uploads/39/62/3962c378b66c4552624d09cbd8ebba02/
Generating-Failure—Environment-America—Web.pdf.
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Nuclear Energy Policy

Development Roadmap issued in April 2010.105 The Roadmap lays out the following four main
goals for the program:
• Develop technologies and other solutions that can improve the reliability, sustain
the safety, and extend the life of current reactors;
• Develop improvements in the affordability of new reactors to enable nuclear
energy to help meet the Administration’s energy security and climate change
goals;
• Develop sustainable nuclear fuel cycles; and
• Understand and minimize the risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism.
Reactor Concepts
The Reactor Concepts program area includes the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP)
demonstration project and research on other advanced reactors (often referred to as Generation IV
reactors). This area also includes funding for developing advanced small modular reactors
(discussed in the next section) and to enhance the “sustainability” of existing commercial light
water reactors. The total FY2013 funding request for this program was $73.7 million, a reduction
of $41.2 million from FY2012. The House provided an increase of $11.1 million from the
FY2012 level, while the Senate Appropriations Committee’s recommendation was the same as
the request.
Most of the Administration’s proposed reduction in Reactor Concepts would be for NGNP, a
high-temperature gas-cooled reactor demonstration project authorized by the Energy Policy Act
of 2005 (EPACT05, P.L. 109-58). The reactor is intended to produce high-temperature heat that
could be used to generate electricity, help separate hydrogen from water, or be used in other
industrial processes. DOE is requesting $21.2 million for the NGNP project for FY2013, down
from $40 million provided in FY2012. Under EPACT05, the Secretary of Energy was to decide
by the end of FY2011 whether to proceed toward construction of a demonstration plant. Secretary
of Energy Steven Chu informed Congress on October 17, 2011, that DOE would not proceed with
a demonstration plant design “at this time” but would continue research on the technology.106
Potential obstacles facing NGNP include low prices for natural gas, the major competing fuel,
and private-sector unwillingness to share the project’s costs as required by EPACT05.107
According to the DOE budget justification, the NGNP program in FY2013 will focus on fuels for
very high temperature reactors, the graphite used in high-temperature reactor cores, and licensing
issues. The House provided $50 million for NGNP, to allow DOE to continue developing a
licensing framework and continue working with industry on the program. The Senate panel
restricted NGNP activities to ongoing fuel-related research.
Funding for the Advanced Reactor Concepts subprogram would also be reduced sharply by the
Administration request, from $21.9 million in FY2012 to $12.4 million in FY2013. Reactor

105 Department of Energy, Nuclear Energy Research and Development Roadmap, Report to Congress, Washington,
DC, April 2010, http://nuclear.gov/pdfFiles/NuclearEnergy_Roadmap_Final.pdf.
106 Idaho National Laboratory, NGNP Project 2011 Status and Path Forward, INL/EXT-11-23907, December 2011.
107 Yanmei Xie, “Cheap Natural Gas, Cost-Share Disagreement Jeopardize NGNP,” Nucleonics Week, April 28, 2011,
p. 1.
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concepts being developed by this subprogram are generally classified as “Generation IV”
reactors, as opposed to the existing fleet of commercial light water reactors, which are generally
classified as generations II and III. Such advanced reactors “could dramatically improve nuclear
power performance including sustainability, economics, and safety and proliferation resistance,”
according to the FY2013 justification. Nuclear technology development under this program
includes “fast reactors,” using high-energy neutrons, and reactors that would use a variety of heat-
transfer fluids, such as liquid sodium and supercritical carbon dioxide. International research
collaboration in this area would continue under the Generation IV International Forum (GIF). The
House provided an increase of $1.1 million over FY2012, while the Senate Appropriations
Committee approved the Administration’s proposed reduction.
DOE’s FY2013 request for the Light Water Reactor Sustainability subprogram was $21.7 million,
$3.3 million below the FY2012 appropriation. The program conducts research on extending the
life of existing commercial light water reactors beyond 60 years, the maximum operating period
currently licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The program, which is to be cost-
shared with the nuclear industry, is to study the aging of reactor materials and analyze safety
margins of aging plants. Other research under this program is to focus on improving the
efficiency of existing plants, through such measures as increasing plant capacity and upgrading
instrumentation and control systems. Research on longer-life LWR fuel is aimed at eliminating
radioactive leakage from nuclear fuel and increasing its accident tolerance, along with other
“post-Fukushima lessons learned research needs,” according to the budget justification. The
House rejected the Administration’s proposed reduction, while the Senate Appropriations
Committee approved it.
Small Modular Light Water Reactors
Rising cost estimates for large conventional nuclear reactors—widely projected to be $6 billion or
more—have contributed to growing interest in proposals for small modular reactors (SMRs).
Ranging from about 40 to 350 megawatts of electrical capacity, such reactors would be only a
fraction of the size of current commercial reactors. Several modular reactors would be installed
together to make up a power block with a single control room, under most concepts. Current
SMR proposals would use a variety of technologies, including high-temperature gas technology
in the NGNP program and the light water (LWR) technology used by today’s commercial
reactors.
DOE requested $65 million for FY2013 to provide technical support for licensing small modular
LWRs, $2 million below the FY2012 funding level. This program focuses on LWR designs
because they are believed most likely to be deployed in the near term, according to DOE.
Conferees on the FY2012 appropriations bill anticipated a five-year program totaling $452
million. The program is similar to DOE’s support for larger commercial reactor designs under the
Nuclear Power 2010 Program, which ended in FY2010. DOE will provide support for design
certification, standards, and licensing. As with the Nuclear Power 2010 Program, at least half the
costs of the LWR SMR program are to be covered by industry partners, according to DOE. The
program will support two teams of reactor vendors and specific utilities or consortia who are
interested in building the reactors at specific sites, according to the DOE justification. DOE
announced a funding solicitation for the program on March 22, 2012.108 Applications have been

108 Department of Energy, “Obama Administration Announces $450 Million to Design and Commercialize U.S. Small
Modular Nuclear Reactors,” press release, March 22, 2012, http://www.ne.doe.gov/newsroom/2012PRs/
(continued...)
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submitted by four industry consortia, led by Babcock & Wilcox, Holtec, NuScale Power, and
Westinghouse, proposing reactors ranging from 45-225 megawatts.109
The House approved $114 million for the SMR licensing program, $47 million above FY2012.
The House Appropriations Committee report called the increase necessary to keep the program on
track to receive $452 million over five years. The Senate panel provided the same funding as in
the budget request.
An additional $18.5 million for FY2013 was requested by DOE under the Reactor Concepts
program (described in the section above) for SMR advanced concepts R&D—$10.2 million
below the FY2012 funding level. Unlike the SMR licensing support program, which focuses on
conventional LWR technology, the SMR advanced concepts program would conduct research on
technologies that might be deployed in the longer term, according to the budget justification. The
House rejected the Administration’s proposed reduction, while the Senate Appropriations
Committee approved the budget request.
Small modular reactors would go against the overall trend in nuclear power technology toward
ever-larger reactors intended to spread construction costs over a greater output of electricity.
Proponents of small reactors contend that they would be economically viable despite their far
lower electrical output because modules could be assembled in factories and shipped to plant
sites, and because their smaller size would allow for simpler safety systems. In addition, although
modular plants might have similar or higher costs per kilowatt-hour than conventional large
reactors, their ability to be constructed in smaller increments could reduce electric utilities’
financial commitment and risk.
Fuel Cycle Research and Development
The Fuel Cycle Research and Development Program conducts “long-term, science-based”
research on a wide variety of technologies for improving the management of spent nuclear fuel,
according to the DOE budget justification. The total FY2013 funding request for this program is
$175.4 million, $10.8 million below the FY2012 appropriation. The House approved $138.7
million for Fuel Cycle R&D, $36.7 million below the request. The Senate Appropriations
Committee recommended $193.1 million, $17.7 million above the request.
The range of fuel cycle technologies being studied by the program includes direct disposal of
spent fuel (the “once through” cycle) and partial and full recycling, according to the budget
justification. The Fuel Cycle R&D Program “will research and develop a suite of technology
options that will enable future decision-makers to make informed decisions about how best to
manage nuclear waste and used fuel from reactors,” the budget justification says.
Much of the planned research on spent fuel management options will address the near-term
recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, which issued its
final report on January 26, 2012.110 The commission was chartered to develop alternatives to the

(...continued)
nePR032212_print.html.
109 World Nuclear Association, “Small Nuclear Power Reactors,” May 2012, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/
inf33.html.
110 Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, “Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future
(continued...)
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planned Yucca Mountain, NV, spent fuel repository, which President Obama wants to terminate.
The largest subprogram under Fuel Cycle Research and Development is Used Nuclear Fuel
Disposition, with a request of $59.7 million, the same as the FY2012 funding level. Activities in
that area include work toward the development and licensing of standardized spent fuel
containers, studies of potential spent fuel disposal partnerships, and the accelerated
characterization of potential geologic media for waste disposal.
The House report contended that much of the proposed research in the Used Fuel Disposition
Program relates to waste program changes recommended by the Blue Ribbon Commission that
have not been enacted by Congress. As a result, the panel reduced funding for Used Fuel
Disposition to $38 million, $15 million of which would be for storage and transportation work
related to the Yucca Mountain repository. The Senate panel’s $17.7 million increase from the
budget request consists of prior-year funds that would be used for a spent fuel storage pilot
project (see the “Nuclear Waste Management” section for more details).
Other major research areas in the Fuel Cycle R&D Program include the development of advanced
fuels for existing commercial reactors and advanced reactors, improvements in nuclear waste
characteristics, and technology to increase nuclear fuel resources, such as uranium extraction
from seawater.
Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies
The Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies (NEET) program “is designed to conduct research
and development (R&D) in crosscutting technologies that directly support and enable the
development of new and advanced reactor designs and fuel cycle technologies,” according to the
FY2013 DOE budget justification. The DOE funding request for the program was $65.3 million,
$9.4 million below the FY2012 level. The House provided $75 million, nearly the same as in
FY2012, while the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended the same funding as the
request.
DOE’s proposed funding cut would come entirely under the category of Crosscutting Technology
Development, for which $26.2 million was requested, $9.7 million below FY2012. According to
the budget justification, the cuts result from elimination of research on manufacturing methods
and nonproliferation risk assessments. Continuing crosscutting research activities are to include
development of innovative materials, advanced automation and information technologies,
advanced sensors, and improved fuel performance. The Energy Innovation Hub for Modeling and
Simulation, created in FY2010, had a request of $24.6 million, slightly above the FY2012
appropriation. The Modeling and Simulation Hub is creating a computer model of an operating
reactor to allow a better understanding of nuclear technology, with the benefits of such modeling
extending to other energy technologies in the future, according to the budget justification.
DOE requested $14.6 million for the National Scientific User Facility, the same as the FY2012
appropriation, to support partnerships by universities and other research organizations to conduct
experiments “at facilities not normally accessible to these organizations,” according to the

(...continued)
Issues Final Report to Secretary of Energy,” press release, January 26, 2012, http://brc.gov/index.php?q=
announcement/brc-releases-their-final-report.
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justification. Up to five such partnerships are currently anticipated, and the FY2013 funding will
allow up to three new long-term and five “rapid turnaround” projects to be awarded.
Nuclear Waste Management
One of the most controversial aspects of nuclear power is the disposal of radioactive waste, which
can remain hazardous for thousands of years. Each nuclear reactor produces an annual average of
about 20 metric tons of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel, for a nationwide total of about 2,000
metric tons per year. U.S. reactors also generate about 27,000 cubic meters of low-level
radioactive waste per year, including contaminated components and materials resulting from
reactor decommissioning.111
The federal government is responsible for permanent disposal of commercial spent fuel (paid for
with a fee on nuclear power production) and federally generated radioactive waste, while states
have the authority to develop disposal facilities for most commercial low-level waste. Under the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA, 42 U.S.C. 10101, et seq.), spent fuel and other highly
radioactive waste is to be isolated in a deep underground repository, consisting of a large network
of tunnels carved from rock that has remained geologically undisturbed for hundreds of thousands
of years. As amended in 1987, NWPA designated Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the only
candidate site for the national repository. The act required DOE to begin taking waste from
nuclear plant sites by 1998—a deadline that even under the most optimistic scenarios will be
missed by more than 20 years. DOE filed a license application with NRC for the proposed Yucca
Mountain repository in June 2008.
The Obama Administration “has determined that developing the Yucca Mountain repository is not
a workable option and the Nation needs a different solution for nuclear waste disposal,”
according to the DOE FY2011 budget justification. As a result, no funding for Yucca Mountain or
DOE’s Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM), which had run the
program, was requested for FY2011. The Continuing Appropriations Act for FY2011 (P.L. 112-
10) approved the funding termination. The Administration established the Blue Ribbon
Commission on America’s Nuclear Future on March 1, 2010, to develop an alternative waste
management strategy.
DOE filed a motion with NRC to withdraw the Yucca Mountain license application on March 3,
2010. An NRC licensing panel rejected DOE’s withdrawal motion June 29, 2010, on the grounds
that NWPA requires full consideration of the license application by NRC. The full NRC
Commission deadlocked on the issue September 9, 2011, leaving the licensing panel’s decision in
place and prohibiting DOE from withdrawing the Yucca Mountain application. However, the
commission ordered at the same time that the licensing process be halted because of “budgetary
limitations.”112 No funding was provided in FY2012 or requested for FY2013 to continue Yucca

111 DOE, Manifest Information Management System http://mims.apps.em.doe.gov. Average annual utility disposal
from 2002 through 2011. Annual volume ranges from 68,441 cubic meters in 2005 to 5,326 cubic meters in 2009.
112 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “In the Matter of U.S. Department of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository),”
CLI-11-07, September 9, 2011, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/orders/2011/2011-
07cli.pdf.
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Mountain licensing activities, although the issue is currently the subject of a federal appeals court
case.113
The Blue Ribbon Commission issued its final report on January 26, 2012.114 The commission
recommended options for temporary storage, treatment, and permanent disposal of highly
radioactive nuclear waste, along with an evaluation of nuclear waste research and development
programs and the need for legislation. It did not recommend specific sites for new nuclear waste
facilities or evaluate the suitability of Yucca Mountain.
The commission’s proposed “consent-based” approach to the siting of waste facilities called for
the roles of local, state, and tribal governments to be negotiated for each potential site. The
development of consolidated waste storage and disposal facilities should begin as soon as
possible, the commission urged. A new waste management organization should be established to
develop the repository, along with associated transportation and storage systems, according to the
commission. The new organization should have “assured access” to the Nuclear Waste Fund,
which holds fees collected from nuclear power plant operators to pay for waste disposal. Under
NWPA, DOE could not spend those funds without congressional appropriations.

In the FY2013 Energy and Water Development appropriations bill (H.R. 5325), the House
Appropriations Committee sharply criticized the Administration’s nuclear waste policy and
provided $25 million for DOE to resume work on the Yucca Mountain repository license. An
amendment on the House floor provided an additional $10 million to NRC for Yucca Mountain
licensing (H.Amdt. 1188). The Senate Appropriations Committee provided no funds for Yucca
Mountain but included language (§312, S. 2465) authorizing a pilot program to demonstrate one
or more consolidated interim storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel and high level waste. Any
proposed storage site would require the consent of the affected state governor, local government
of jurisdiction, affected Indian tribes, and Congress. The Senate panel directed DOE to use $2
million of its program direction funding for the pilot program, along with $17.7 million in
unobligated prior-year appropriations from the Nuclear Waste Fund.
Funding for the nuclear waste program in the past has been provided under two appropriations
accounts. The Administration’s last request for funding, in FY2010, was divided evenly between
an appropriation from the Nuclear Waste Fund, which holds fees paid by nuclear utilities, and the
Defense Nuclear Waste Disposal account, which pays for disposal of high-level waste from the
nuclear weapons program. The Senate Appropriations Committee report for that year called for
the Secretary of Energy to suspend fee collections, “given the Administration’s decision to
terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program while developing disposal alternatives,” but the
language was dropped in conference. Energy Secretary Steven Chu in October 2009 rejected
requests from the nuclear industry and state utility regulators to suspend the fee, saying the
revenues were still necessary, and nuclear utilities and regulators filed lawsuits to stop the fee in
April 2010.115 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed with the

113 U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, USCA Case #11-1271, Yucca Mountain Reply
Brief of Petitioners Mandamus Action, February 13, 2012, http://www.naruc.org/policy.cfm?c=filings.
114 Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, Report to the Secretary of Energy, January 2012,
http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/brc_finalreport_jan2012.pdf.
115 National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, “State Regulators Go to Court with DOE over Nuclear
Waste Fees,” news release, April 2, 2010, http://www.naruc.org/News/default.cfm?pr=193; Nuclear Energy Institute,
“NEI, Electric Utilities File Suit to Suspend Collection of Fees for Reactor Fuel Management,” news release, April 5,
2010, http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/newsreleases/nei-electric-utilities-file-suit-to-suspend-collection-of-fee-for-
(continued...)
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plaintiffs on June 1, 2012, and ordered DOE to prepare a new justification for continuing to
collect the fees.116
The Yucca Mountain project faced regulatory uncertainty even before the Obama
Administration’s move to shut it down. A ruling on July 9, 2004, by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit overturned a key aspect of the Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA’s) regulations for the planned repository.117 The three-judge panel ruled that EPA’s
10,000-year compliance period was too short, but it rejected several other challenges to the rules.
EPA published new standards on October 15, 2008, that would allow radiation exposure from the
repository to increase after 10,000 years.118 The State of Nevada has filed a federal Appeals Court
challenge to the EPA standards. (For more information on the EPA standards, see CRS Report
RL34698, EPA’s Final Health and Safety Standard for Yucca Mountain, by Bonnie C. Gitlin.)
NWPA required DOE to begin taking waste from nuclear plant sites by January 31, 1998. Nuclear
utilities, upset over DOE’s failure to meet that deadline, have won two federal court decisions
upholding the department’s obligation to meet the deadline and to compensate utilities for any
resulting damages. Utilities have also won several cases in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.
DOE estimates that liability payments would eventually total $20.8 billion if DOE were to begin
removing waste from reactor sites by 2020, the previous target for opening Yucca Mountain.119
(For more information, see CRS Report R40996, Contract Liability Arising from the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982
, by Todd Garvey CRS Report R40202, Nuclear Waste
Disposal: Alternatives to Yucca Mountain
, by Mark Holt, CRS Report RL33461, Civilian Nuclear
Waste Disposal
, by Mark Holt, and CRS Report R42513, U.S. Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, by
James D. Werner.)
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
Renewed interest in nuclear power throughout the world has led to increased concern about
nuclear weapons proliferation, because technology for making nuclear fuel can also be used to
produce nuclear weapons material. Of particular concern are uranium enrichment, a process to
separate and concentrate the fissile isotope uranium-235, and nuclear spent fuel reprocessing,
which can produce weapons-useable plutonium.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts a safeguards program that is intended
to prevent civilian nuclear fuel facilities from being used for weapons purposes, but not all
potential weapons proliferators belong to the system, and there are ongoing questions about its
effectiveness. Several proposals have been developed to guarantee nations without fuel cycle

(...continued)
reactor-fuel-management.
116 U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners v. U.S. Department of Energy
, No. 11-1066, decided June 1, 2012, http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/
internet/opinions.nsf/4B11622F4FF75FEC85257A100050A681/$file/11-1066-1376508.pdf.
117 U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Nuclear Energy Institute v. Environmental Protection
Agency
, No. 01-1258, July 9, 2004.
118 Environmental Protection Agency, “Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca
Mountain, Nevada,” 73 Federal Register 61256, October 15, 2008.
119 BRC Final Report, op. cit., p. 80.
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facilities a supply of nuclear fuel in exchange for commitments to forgo enrichment and
reprocessing, which was one of the original goals of the Bush Administration’s Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership, now called the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation.120
Several situations have arisen throughout the world in which ostensibly commercial uranium
enrichment and reprocessing technologies have been subverted for military purposes. In 2003 and
2004, it became evident that Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan had sold sensitive technology
and equipment related to uranium enrichment to states such as Libya, Iran, and North Korea.
Although Pakistan’s leaders maintain they did not acquiesce in or abet Khan’s activities, Pakistan
remains outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG). Iran has been a direct recipient of Pakistani enrichment technology.
IAEA’s Board of Governors found in 2005 that Iran’s breach of its safeguards obligations
constituted noncompliance with its safeguards agreement, and referred the case to the U.N.
Security Council in February 2006. Despite repeated calls by the U.N. Security Council for Iran
to halt enrichment and reprocessing-related activities, and imposition of sanctions, Iran continues
to develop enrichment capability at Natanz and at a site near Qom disclosed in September 2009.
Iran insists on its inalienable right to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, pursuant to
Article IV of the NPT. Interpretations of this right have varied over time. Former IAEA Director
General Mohamed ElBaradei did not dispute this inalienable right and, by and large, neither have
U.S. government officials. However, the case of Iran raises perhaps the most critical question in
this decade for strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime: How can access to sensitive
fuel cycle activities (which could be used to produce fissile material for weapons) be
circumscribed without further alienating non-nuclear weapon states in the NPT?
Leaders of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime have suggested ways of reining in
the diffusion of such inherently dual-use technology, primarily through the creation of incentives
not to enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel. The international community is in the process of
evaluating those proposals and may decide upon a mix of approaches. At the same time, there is
debate on how to improve the IAEA safeguards system and its means of detecting diversion of
nuclear material to a weapons program in the face of expanded nuclear power facilities
worldwide.
(For more information, see CRS Report RL34234, Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy
Implications of Expanding Global Access to Nuclear Power
, coordinated by Mary Beth Nikitin;
and CRS Report R41216, 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference: Key Issues
and Implications
, coordinated by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin.)
Federal Funding for Nuclear Energy Programs
The following tables summarize current funding for DOE nuclear energy programs and NRC.
The sources for the funding figures are Administration budget requests and committee reports on
the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Acts, which fund DOE and NRC. The House
passed its version of the FY2013 Energy and Water Development appropriations bill on June 6,

120 The organization approved a new mission statement with the name change at its June 2010 meeting in Ghana. See
http://www.gneppartnership.org.
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2012 (H.R. 5325, H.Rept. 112-462). The Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version
on April 26, 2012 (S. 2465, S.Rept. 112-164).
Table 2. Funding for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(budget authority in millions of current dollars)
FY2013
FY2013
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
Sen.

Approp.
Approp.
Approp.
Request
House
Comm.
Reactor Safety
806.8a 804.1a 800.1a 809.9
809.9
—b
Nuclear Materials and
220.2 229.4 227.1 232.3 228.9 —
Waste
Yucca Mountain Licensing
29.0
10.0
0
0
10.0

Inspector
General
10.9
10.1
10.9 11.0 11.0 11.9
Total NRC budget
1,066.9 1,052.3 1,038.1 1,053.2 1,059.8 1,054.1
authority
—Offsetting fees
-912.2
-914.2
-909.5 -927.7 -921.7 -924.7
Net
appropriation
154.7
138.1
128.6 128.5 138.1 129.4
a. Subcategories from NRC budget request.
b. Subcategories not specified.
Table 3. DOE Funding for Nuclear Activities (Selected Programs)
(budget authority in millions of current dollars)
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
FY2013
FY2013

Approp.
Approp.
Approp.
Request
House
Senate
University programs
5.0
0
5.0
0
5.0
0
Reactor Concepts

168.5
115.5
73.7
126.7
73.7
Smal Modular Reactor Licensing


67.0
65.0
114.0
65.0
Fuel Cycle R&D
136.0
187.6
187.4
175.4
138.7
193.2
Nuclear Energy Enabling
— 51.4 74.9
65.3 75.0 65.3
Technologies
International Nuclear Energy
— 3.0 3.0
3.0 3.0 3.0
Cooperation
Radiological Facilities Management
72.0
51.7
69.9
51.0
51.0
66.0
Idaho Facilities Management
173.0 183.6 155.0 152.0 162.0 152.0
Program
Direction
73.0 86.3 91.0 90.0 90.0 92.0
Total, Nuclear Energya
786.6 732.1 765.4 770.4 765.4 785.4
Civilian Nuclear Waste
Disposalb
196.8 0
0 0 25.0
0
a. Excludes funding provided under other accounts.
b. Funded by a 1-mill-per-kilowatt-hour fee on nuclear power, plus appropriations for defense waste disposal
and homeland security.
Congressional Research Service
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Nuclear Energy Policy

Legislation in the 112th Congress
H.R. 301 (Forbes)
New Manhattan Project for Energy Independence. Establishes program to develop new energy-
related technologies, including treatment of nuclear waste. Introduced January 18, 2011; referred
to Committee on Science and Technology.
H.R. 617 (Matheson)
Radioactive Import Deterrence Act. Restricts imports of radioactive waste. Introduced February
10, 2011; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.
H.R. 909 (Nunes)
Roadmap for America’s Energy Future. Includes provisions to triple the number of U.S. nuclear
power plants, encourage recycling of spent nuclear fuel, develop nuclear waste disposal capacity,
remove statutory limits on waste disposal at the proposed Yucca Mountain repository, establish a
nuclear fuel supply reserve, and require NRC to establish expedited procedures for issuing new
reactor combined construction and operating licenses. Introduced March 3, 2011; referred to
multiple committees.
H.R. 1023 (Thornberry)
No More Excuses Energy Act of 2011. Includes provisions to prohibit NRC from considering
nuclear waste storage when licensing new nuclear facilities, and to establish a tax credit for
obtaining nuclear component manufacturing certification. Introduced March 10, 2011; referred to
multiple committees.
H.R. 1242 (Markey)
Nuclear Power Plant Safety Act of 2011. Requires NRC to revise its regulation within 18 months
to ensure that nuclear plants could handle major disruptive events, a loss of off-site power for 14
days, and the loss of diesel generators for 72 hours. Spent fuel would have to be moved from pool
to dry-cask storage within a year after it had cooled sufficiently, and emergency planning would
have to include multiple concurrent disasters. NRC could not issue new licenses or permits until
the revised regulations were in place. Introduced March 29, 2011; referred to Committee on
Energy and Commerce.
H.R. 1268 (Lowey)
Nuclear Power Licensing Reform Act of 2011. Requires evacuation planning within 50 miles of
U.S. nuclear power plants and that reactor license renewals be subject to the same standards that
would apply to new reactors. Introduced April 7, 2011; referred the Committee on Energy and
Commerce.
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Nuclear Energy Policy

H.R. 1280 (Ros-Lehtinen)/S. 109 (Ensign)
Requires congressional approval of agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation with foreign
countries. House bill introduced March 31, 2011; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Senate bill introduced January 25, 2011; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations.
H.R. 1320 (Berman)
Nuclear Nonproliferation and Cooperation Act of 2011. Requires additional nonproliferation
conditions for new peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements. Introduced April 1, 2011; referred to
Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 1326 (Fortenberry)/S. 640 (Akaka)
Furthering International Nuclear Safety Act of 2011. Requires U.S. delegation to the Convention
on Nuclear Safety to encourage member countries to use metrics in assessing safety
improvements and publicly post national safety reports, and that U.S. agencies submit a strategic
plan for international nuclear safety cooperation. Senate bill introduced March 17, 2011; referred
to Committee on Foreign Relations. House bill introduced April 1, 2011; referred to Committee
on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 1436 (Christopher H. Smith)
Requires nuclear power facilities to notify NRC and state and local governments within 24 hours
of an unplanned release of radionuclides above allowable limits. Introduced April 7, 2011;
referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.
H.R. 1694 (Engel)
Nuclear Disaster Preparedness Act. Requires the President to issue guidance for federal response
to nuclear disasters, covering specific topics listed in the bill. Introduced May 3, 2011; referred to
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
H.R. 1710 (Burgess)
Nuclear Used Fuel Prize Act of 2011. Authorizes the Secretary of Energy to establish monetary
prizes for advancements in used nuclear fuel management technology. Introduced May 4, 2011;
referred to Committees on Science, Space, and Technology and Ways and Means.
H.R. 2075 (Engel)
Dry Cask Storage Act. Requires spent nuclear fuel to be moved from storage pools to dry casks
within one year after it has sufficiently cooled. Owners of spent fuel could reduce their payments
to the Nuclear Waste Fund to offset extra dry cask storage costs resulting from the act. Introduced
June 1, 2011; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Congressional Research Service
38

Nuclear Energy Policy

H.R. 2133 (Matheson)/S. 1220 (Conrad)
Fulfilling U.S. Energy Leadership (FUEL) Act. Among other provisions, authorizes nuclear fuel
cycle research and development, including waste treatment processes and advanced waste forms.
Requires the Secretary of Energy to consider recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission
on America’s Nuclear Future in implementing the authorized program and to submit a report to
Congress comparing the Secretary’s proposed long-term nuclear waste management solutions
with the proposed Yucca Mountain repository. House bill introduced June 3, 2011; referred to
multiple committees. Senate bill introduced June 16, 2011; referred to Committee on Finance.
H.R. 2354 (Frelinghuysen)
Energy and Water Development Appropriations for FY2012. Provides funding for NRC and DOE
nuclear energy programs. Introduced and reported as an original measure by the House
Appropriations Committee June 24, 2011 (H.Rept. 112-118). Passed House July 15, 2011, by vote
of 219-196. Reported by Senate Appropriations Committee September 7, 2011 (S.Rept. 112-75).
Considered on Senate floor November 16, 2011. Enacted as part of Consolidated Appropriations
Act for FY2012 (P.L. 112-74), December 23, 2011.
H.R. 2367 (Pearce)
Government Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Extension Act of 2011. Would authorize disposal of
government-owned non-defense transuranic waste in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), in
addition to currently authorized defense waste. Introduced June 24, 2011, referred to Committees
on Energy and Commerce and Armed Services.
H.R. 3302 (Rooney)
Restore America Act of 2011. Among other provisions, would encourage tripling of U.S. nuclear
power capacity, require licensing proceedings to continue for the proposed Yucca Mountain waste
repository, remove statutory capacity limits on the repository, prohibit the President from
blocking or hindering nuclear spent fuel recycling, establish a nuclear fuel reserve, and establish
expedited reactor licensing procedures. Introduced November 1, 2011; referred to multiple
committees.
H.R. 3308 (Pompeo)/S. 2064 (DeMint)
Energy Freedom and Economic Prosperity Act. Among other provisions, would terminate
production tax credit for electricity generated by advanced nuclear plants. House bill introduced
November 2, 2011; referred to Committees on Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce.
Senate bill introduced February 6, 2012; placed on the Senate legislative calendar.
H.R. 3657 (Terry)
Nuclear Emergency Re-establishment of Obligations Act. Establishes criteria and procedures for
the exercise of emergency authority by the NRC Chairman. Introduced December 13, 2011;
referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.
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Nuclear Energy Policy

H.R. 3822 (Lowey)
Requires NRC to distribute safety-related fines collected from nuclear facilities to the counties in
which the facilities are located to maintain radiological emergency preparedness plans.
Introduced January 24, 2012; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.
H.R. 5325 (Frelinghuysen)/S. 2465 (Feinstein)
Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2013. Includes
funding for DOE nuclear energy programs and NRC. House bill introduced and reported as an
original measure by the Appropriations Committee on May 2, 2012, and passed House June 6,
2012, by vote of 255-165 (H.Rept. 112-462). Senate bill introduced and reported as an original
measure by the Appropriations Committee April 26, 2012 (S.Rept. 112-164).
H.R. 4301 (Duncan)
Includes a requirement that NRC reach a determination on DOE’s license application for the
Yucca Mountain repository and removes existing statutory limits on the amount of waste that can
be placed into the repository. Introduced March 29, 2012; referred to multiple committees.
H.R. 4625 (Joe Wilson)/S. 2176 (Graham)
Yucca Utilization to Control Contamination Act/Nuclear Waste Fund Relief and Rebate Act.
Requires that payments into the Nuclear Waste Fund be returned to utilities unless the President
certifies that Yucca Mountain is the selected site for a nuclear waste repository; that defense
nuclear waste be transported to Yucca Mountain beginning in 2017; and that statutory
requirements for disposal of nuclear waste be sufficient grounds for NRC to determine that waste
from new or relicensed reactors will be disposed of in a timely manner. House bill introduced
April 25, 2012; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce. Senate bill introduced March 8,
2012; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
S. 512 (Bingaman)
Nuclear Power 2021 Act. Authorizes a cost-shared program between DOE and the nuclear
industry to develop and license standard designs by 2021 for two reactors below 300 megawatts
of electric generating capacity, including at least one no larger than 50 megawatts. Introduced
March 8, 2011; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
S. 1320 (Murkowski)
Nuclear Fuel Storage Improvement Act of 2011. Authorizes the Secretary of Energy to provide
payments to units of local government that, with the approval of the state governor, volunteer to
host a “privately owned and operated temporary used fuel storage facility.” Introduced June 30,
2011; referred to Committee on Environment and Public Works.
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Nuclear Energy Policy

S. 1394 (Webb)
Allows a Commissioner of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to continue to serve on the
Commission if a successor is not appointed and confirmed in a timely manner. Introduced July
20, 2011; referred to Committee on Environment and Public Works.
S. 1510 (Bingaman)
Clean Energy Financing Act of 2011. Establishes Clean Energy Deployment Administration to
provide financial assistance to commercial projects using clean energy technology, including
nuclear power. Introduced and reported as an original measure by the Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources August 30, 2011 (S.Rept. 112-47).
S. 2031 (Sherrod Brown)
Authorizes $150 million to demonstrate USEC centrifuge technology. Introduced December 17,
2011; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
S. 2146 (Bingaman)
Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012. Establishes minimum U.S. annual percentages of clean
energy use, including nuclear power, starting at 24% in 2015 and rising to 84% in 2035.
Introduced March 1, 2012; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Committee
hearing held May 17, 2012.

Author Contact Information

Mark Holt

Specialist in Energy Policy
mholt@crs.loc.gov, 7-1704

Congressional Research Service
41