Mexico’s 2012 Elections
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
June 20, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42548
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Mexico’s 2012 Elections
Summary
Given the close and complex relationship that the United States has with neighboring Mexico, the
results of the July 1, 2012, Mexican elections are of interest to U.S. policy makers. As Mexico
does not allow consecutive reelection for any office, the results of these elections could lead to
significant changes in the country’s political landscape and the Mexican government’s approach
to aspects of its relations with the United States. The top issues being debated in the Mexican
presidential campaign—security, economic policy, and energy sector reform—are of crucial
importance to Mexico’s future and of keen interest to Congress. The policies adopted by the next
Mexican President will likely have implications for U.S.-Mexican security cooperation, North
American economic integration, and U.S. energy security. The legislative elections are equally
crucial, as they will likely determine how easily the next Mexican administration will be able to
advance its agenda through the legislature.
The polls have tightened since mid-May 2012, but analysts are still predicting that the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) will retake the presidency after 12 years of rule by the
conservative National Action Party (PAN). The PRI could also capture a plurality, and perhaps
even a simple majority, in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. Mexico’s security challenges and
continuing poverty have left many Mexicans disappointed with the PAN and nostalgic for the
order and stability they remember under the PRI, despite the party’s past reputation for corruption
and undemocratic practices. Recent scandals involving former PRI governors under investigation
for corruption and money laundering, and a new student movement protesting, among other
things, Mexican media conglomerates’ tendency to favor the PRI, have shaken up the race.
Despite the aforementioned developments, a plurality of voters continue to express support for
PRI candidates for the Chamber of Deputies and PRI presidential candidate Enrique Peña Nieto, a
former governor of the state of Mexico. According to several polls from mid-June, Peña Nieto,
running in a coalition with the Green Ecological Party (PVEM), has a double-digit lead over his
opponents. Roughly 15% to 20% of the electorate remains undecided, however, and constitutes a
bloc of voters large enough potentially to tip the election toward one of the other candidates.
Since late May, Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador, a former mayor of Mexico City representing a
leftist coalition led by the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), has moved into second
place in most polls ahead of Josefina Vázquez Mota, a former Minister of Education standing for
the PAN. Gabriel Quadri, an environmentalist from the small National Alliance Party (PANAL)
aligned with the Mexican teacher’s union, continues to trail far behind in the polls.
This report provides an overview of the parties and candidates competing in the Mexican federal
elections with a focus on the presidential contest, followed by a discussion of key issues in the
campaign that could have implications for U.S.-Mexican relations. It will be updated after the
election results are tallied. For background information on Mexico and U.S.-Mexican relations,
see CRS Report RL32724, Mexico: Issues for Congress, by Clare Ribando Seelke and CRS
Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications, by M.
Angeles Villarreal.
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Mexico’s 2012 Elections
Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background...................................................................................................................................... 1
Election Mechanics.......................................................................................................................... 4
Mexico’s Political Parties ................................................................................................................ 5
Profiles of the Presidential Candidates ............................................................................................ 8
Andrés Manuel López Obrador (PRD/PT/PMC) ...................................................................... 8
Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI/PVEM).............................................................................................. 9
Gabriel Quadri de la Torre (PANAL) ...................................................................................... 10
Josefina Vázquez Mota (PAN) ................................................................................................ 11
Issues.............................................................................................................................................. 12
Security.................................................................................................................................... 12
Economy.................................................................................................................................. 15
Oil Sector Reform.................................................................................................................... 17
Mexico’s Broader Approach to Relations with the United States ........................................... 18
Figures
Figure 1. Mexico’s 2012 Electoral Map .......................................................................................... 6
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 19
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Mexico’s 2012 Elections
Introduction
On July 1, 2012, Mexican voters will head to the polls to elect a president who will serve a six-
year term beginning on December 1, 2012. All 128 seats in the Mexican Senate and 500 seats in
the lower house of congress, known as the Chamber of Deputies, are also up for election.
Senators will serve six-year terms and deputies will serve three-year terms that begin on
September 1, 2012. Elections for local and state offices will take place in 14 states (including the
Federal District that includes Mexico City), six of which will hold gubernatorial elections (see the
map in Figure 1).1 Voters in the Federal District will select a head of government (mayor). Since
Mexico does not permit consecutive reelection for any political office, the results of these
elections could lead to shifts in Mexico’s domestic and foreign policy priorities, which could have
implications for U.S.-Mexican relations. For these reasons, Congress may be interested in
assessing the following questions:
• How do the various candidates intend to improve security conditions in Mexico
while simultaneously maintaining efforts against transnational organized crime?
• What type of economic policies does each candidate endorse and to what extent
do they intend to work with the United States to boost growth and
competitiveness in both countries?
• How do the candidates intend to address Mexico’s declining oil production and
could the solutions they endorse increase opportunities for U.S.-Mexican energy
cooperation?
This report provides background information on Mexico’s 2012 elections and the parties
competing in those elections, profiles of the presidential candidates, and a discussion of some of
the major policy issues being discussed that could affect U.S.-Mexican relations.2
Background
Twelve years after Mexico experienced a historic transition of power from one party to another
after 71 years of rule by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), Mexican voters appear to
favor PRI candidates for the July 1, 2012, presidential and legislative elections. Since before the
campaign officially began on March 30, 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto of the centrist PRI has
maintained a double-digit lead in most polls3 over Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the coalition
led by the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), Josefina Vázquez Mota of the
conservative National Action Party (PAN), and Gabriel Quadri of the National Alliance Party
(PANAL). The legislative elections have followed the same trajectory as the presidential race,
1 Chiapas will hold its gubernatorial election on August 19, 2012.
2 See also: Eric L. Olson, Mexico’s 2012 Elections: Key Issues and Critical Questions Now and Beyond, Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars Mexico Institute, June 2012.
3 One poll published by Grupo Reforma on May 31, 2012, showed López Obrador within four points of Peña Nieto, but
that poll remains an outlier. A Reforma poll published on June 19, 2012, showed Peña Nieto 12 points ahead of López
Obrador (after undecided voters and those who will annul their votes were factored out). Polls that have been published
by Reforma are available at http://gruporeforma-blogs.com/encuestas/. A compilation of recent polls from a variety of
sources is available at http://www.adnpolitico.com/encuestas.
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with a plurality of voters favoring PRI candidates followed by the PRD-led coalition, the PAN,
and then the PANAL.4
Polling conducted after the second and final presidential debate on June 10 showed Peña Nieto
with 37.0% support, López Obrador with 23.5%, Vázquez Mota with 21.4%, Quadri with 3.0%,
and 15.1% of voters undecided.5 López Obrador appears to have benefitted in recent weeks from
the YoSoy132 (I am 132) student protest movement that began in Mexico City and has organized
itself through social media. Although the nascent movement appears to be intended to have some
of the youth voters’ concerns—such as perceived media bias—heard by the candidates, the
movement’s overall impact on the national elections results remains unclear.6 Capturing the
undecided vote, including the youth vote, will be essential for the PAN and PRD presidential
candidates, since Mexican law requires only a plurality of votes in a presidential race and does
not provide for a second round of voting.
The July 1, 2012, elections are occurring at a time when Mexico is facing significant economic
and security challenges and presidential power is being increasingly constrained by a more active
congress and Supreme Court, powerful governors, and a vocal civil society.7 Analysts maintain
that Mexico has experienced modest economic growth punctuated by a severe economic crisis (in
2009) and a growing security crisis under two successive PAN administrations that have
overshadowed some of the policy achievements of those governments.8 As a result, economic and
security issues are top concerns among the Mexican electorate. The major presidential candidates
have all stressed the importance of boosting job creation and improving public security in
Mexico, with many arguing that an effective way to reduce the influence of criminal groups is by
creating jobs. However, voters appear to believe that the PRI may be best equipped to restore
order and restart economic growth, despite some uncertainty about how the party’s return to
power might impact Mexican democracy.9
U.S. analysts and policy makers may be particularly interested in the 2012 Mexican elections
given that their results will impact a key ally with whom the United States shares a nearly 2,000-
mile border and some $450 billion in total annual bilateral trade. Mexico’s Interior Minister has
outlined steps that Mexico’s Federal Elections Institute (IFE) and the federal government, in
collaboration with state officials, are taking to ensure that organized crime-related violence does
not interfere with the electoral process. Those steps include offering protection to any candidate
4 According to Reforma, 44% of Mexican voters effectively favor the PRI-PVEM for the Senate, 26% support the PRD
coalition, 25% favor the PAN, and 5% support PANAL. For the Chamber of Deputes, 43% of voters favor the PRI-
PVEM, 27% support the PRD coalition, 25% the PAN, and 5% the PANAL.
5 Buendía & Laredo, Panorama Electoral, June 18, 2012, available at http://www.buendiaylaredo.com/publicaciones/
217/120615_PANORAMA_ELECTORAL.pdf.
6 The protest movement formed after some of Peña Nieto’s supporters alleged that it was paid outsiders, not students,
who demonstrated against their candidate and forced his early exit from a May 11 event at the private Ibero-American
University. The students rejected that assertion and protested the major TV networks’ apparent backing of the PRI’s
claims. Using You Tube and other social media outlets, the students began bringing together youth from public and
private universities and likeminded outsiders for protests against the perceived media bias in Mexico. While the
movement has not backed a particular party or candidate, many of its supporters have expressed antipathy for the PRI
and Peña Nieto. Damien Cave, “In Protests and Online, a Youth Movement Seeks to Sway Mexico’s Election,” New
York Times, June 11, 2012.
7 Shannon K. O’Neil, “The Old Guard in a New Mexico: How a Stronger Democracy Will Check the PRI,”
ForeignAffairs.com, June 6, 2012.
8 See, for example, Pamela K. Starr, “Mexico’s Big, Inherited Challenges,’” Current History, February 2012.
9 Dave Graham, “Mexico’s Old Rulers Bounce Back as New Start Beckons,” Reuters, June 19, 2012.
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who feels threatened, not just to presidential candidates.10 While journalists, a party activist, and a
candidate for state legislature have been killed recently, analysts do not expect violence to derail
the electoral process.11 Mexico’s electoral institutions have also been reformed so that full
recounts will occur in districts where the top two candidates are separated by less than a
percentage point, as occurred in the 2006 presidential election. This reform aims to guarantee the
veracity of the results quickly so that losing candidates will accept their defeats rather than
protesting the results, as PRD candidate López Obrador did in 2006.12
In addition to concerns about the electoral process in Mexico, U.S. policy makers are focused on
the election results because of their potential impact on the U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship.
U.S.-Mexican relations are affected by the domestic and foreign policy priorities of both
governments. In recent years, the bilateral relationship has shifted from focusing on trade and
migration issues to emphasizing security cooperation, a top priority of President Calderón.
Mexican-U.S. relations have grown closer as a result of the Mérida Initiative,13 a bilateral
counterdrug and anticrime effort first announced in October 2007, but other bilateral issues have
received less attention. The election of a new Mexican president may alter the direction of
bilateral security efforts and could shift the focus of bilateral relations from security to issues
such as economic integration or energy cooperation.
10 Gobierno Federal de México, Secretaría de Gobernación, “El Gobierno Federal Continúa Trabajando para Tener un
Proceso Electoral Ejemplar, Limpio, y Transparente: Poiré,” press release, March 5, 2012; “Analysis-Drug Gang
Menace Overshadows Mexican Election,” Reuters, March 29, 2012.
11 On the recent violence, see Tracy Wilkinson, “Violence Escalates in Mexico; Candidates and Reporters are Targeted
as Elections Approach,” Los Angeles Times, June 15, 2012. Eduardo Guerrero, a Mexican security analyst, says that
local elections are the most at risk of being influenced by organized crime, particularly in Colima, Guerrero, Jalisco,
Morelos, Nuevo León, and San Luis Potosí. See Eduardo Guerrero Gutiérrez, “El Crimen Organizado en las
Elecciones,” Nexos, June 1, 2012.
12 Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) planned to announce results of the July 1, 2006 elections the following
day, but the vote was too close to call. At the end of the preliminary vote count, Calderón held a slight lead over López
Obrador, prompting the PRD candidate to call for a full recount of the votes. López Obrador alleged that there had been
fraud at some polling places and illegal interference in the election by then-President Vicente Fox and conservative
business groups. Mexico’s Federal Electoral Tribunal ordered a recount of 9% of polling places in early August. In a
unanimous decision issued August 28, the Tribunal held that although there were some irregularities, the election was
fair. On September 5, 2006, the Tribunal ruled unanimously that, although then-President Fox’s comments jeopardized
the election, they did not amount to illegal interference in the campaign. The Tribunal also found that commercials paid
for by some business groups at the end of the campaign were illegal, but that the impact of the ads was insufficient to
warrant the annulment of the election. The Tribunal named Felipe Calderón president-elect on September 5, 2006.
López Obrador rejected the September 5th ruling and led a campaign of civil disobedience, including the blockade of
Mexico City’s principal avenue until mid-September, that reportedly cost Mexico City businesses over $500 million in
revenue. See CRS Report RS22462, Mexico’s 2006 Elections.
13 From FY2008-FY2012, Congress appropriated $1.9 billion in Mérida assistance for Mexico, roughly $1 billion of
which had been delivered as of the end of April 2012. Whereas U.S. assistance initially focused on training and
equipping Mexican counterdrug forces, it now places more emphasis on addressing the weak institutions and
underlying societal problems—including corruption and impunity—that have allowed the drug trade to flourish in
Mexico. The updated Mérida strategy, announced in March 2010, focuses on (1) disrupting organized criminal groups,
(2) institutionalizing the rule of law, (3) building a 21st century border, and (4) building strong and resilient
communities. U.S. assistance has shifted from providing expensive equipment to focusing on training and technical
assistance and from only supporting the Mexican federal government to also assisting certain key states with police and
judicial reform, as well as community-based crime prevention programs. For background on the Mérida Initiative, see
CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, by Clare Ribando Seelke
and Kristin M. Finklea.
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Election Mechanics14
Since the mid-1960s, Mexico has undergone several cycles of electoral reforms that have
gradually helped the country build a modern electoral system that is generally well regarded.
Mexico’s federal campaigns and elections are administered by a Federal Electoral Institute (IFE),
an entity created in 1990 under the Ministry of the Interior that became an autonomous agency in
1996. IFE is governed by a nine-member General Council whose members must be approved by
the Chamber of Deputies. Electoral reforms in 1996 also created an Electoral Tribunal (TEPJF)
within the federal judiciary to settle disputes between IFE and political parties, certify the results
of presidential elections and declare their winner, resolve any legal challenges to federal voting
results, and give final rulings on local electoral challenges.15 State and municipal elections are
governed by state-level administrative agencies and electoral courts.
The role that IFE and the Electoral Tribunal play in administering and arbitrating elections has
increased as a result of electoral reforms passed in 2007 that sought to increase equity in
campaigns, but have since been criticized as unnecessarily restrictive.16 The new electoral rules
shortened the length of the presidential campaign to 90 days, outlawed propaganda by the
incumbent government during the campaign, prohibited political parties from purchasing
additional television and radio spots directly17 and from engaging in negative campaigning, and
forbade citizens or private groups from publishing advertisements in favor or against candidates.
Internet ads are not subject to the same restrictions as television, radio, or print advertisements.
IFE’s General Council generally decides what constitutes a breach of these new regulations and
how any violations should be punished. IFE’s decisions can be appealed to the Electoral Tribunal,
which issues final decisions that cannot be appealed. The 2012 campaign, which began on March
30 and ends on June 27, is the first major test of these new regulations. Thus far, the prohibitions
on negative campaigning have been largely ignored, as candidates and parties have launched
aggressive attack ads, particularly on social media websites.18
At the federal level, Mexican elections are conducted as follows:
• The president is elected by a plurality vote in a direct election to serve a six-year
term with no possibility for reelection.
14 For background on Mexico’s 2012 elections, see International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), Elections in
Mexico: July 1 General Elections, Frequently Asked Questions, Washington, DC, March 12, 2012, http://www.ifes.org/
Content/Events/2012/~/media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2012/Elections_in_Mexico_FAQ_2012.pdf.
15 Detailed background information on how IFE and the TEPJF function is available at http://www.ife.org.mx/portal/
site/ifev2/Internacional_English/#2.
16 Leonardo Valdés Zurita, Reforma 2007-2008 Electoral: Análisis Comparativo de la Reforma Electoral
Constitucional y Legal 2007-2008, IFE, November 2008, available at http://www.ife.org.mx/documentos/
Reforma_Electoral/docs/AC_RefElect0708.pdf. Jorge G. Castaneda and Marco A. Morales, “Progress, but to What
End? 2007 Electoral Reform in Mexico,” Harvard International Review, Spring 2008.
17 Instead, IFE now must approve purchases of air time beyond what is allocated in Mexican electoral law: 30 percent
of television and radio spots are distributed equally among the candidates, while 70 percent are allocated according to
each party’s performance in the last federal elections. The PRI performed better than the PAN and the PRD in the 2009
congressional elections, meaning that it has been allocated more air time than the other parties.
18 Randal C. Archibold and Elisabeth Malkin, “A Race Recast by YouTube and Twitter,” New York Times, April 29,
2012.
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• Senators: 96 members are elected by a plurality vote from state-level party lists
with the top vote-getting list obtaining two seats and the second placed list
earning one seat per state, while 32 members are chosen through proportional
representation from nationwide party lists. Parties must receive at least two
percent of the vote to capture a seat through proportional representation. Senators
serve for six-year terms and may be reelected, though not consecutively.
• Deputies: 300 members are elected by a plurality vote in single-member
districts, while 200 members are chosen through proportional representation from
closed party lists in five 40-member districts. Parties must receive at least two
percent of the vote to capture a seat through proportional representation. Deputies
are elected for three-year terms and may be reelected, though not consecutively.
By law, 40% of each party’s congressional list must be composed of female candidates, a
requirement that several of the parties struggled to meet this year.
State and municipal elections are also taking place in 14 states. Those elections include six
gubernatorial contests, five of which will be held on July 1, 2012,19 and the election of the mayor
of the Federal District. Governors’ term lengths vary by state, but cannot exceed six years.
Governors cannot be reelected.
Mexico’s Political Parties
Mexico has three major political parties—the PRI, the PAN, and the PRD—two of which have
formed coalitions with smaller parties for the 2012 federal elections.20 Another small party
formed in 2005 and loosely aligned with Mexico’s powerful teacher’s union, the National
Alliance Party (PANAL), decided to field its own presidential candidate after the PRI broke its
alliance with the party earlier this year. See Figure 1 for a map of the state governorships that are
controlled by each of the three major parties. As seen below, three states—Sinaloa, Puebla, and
Oaxaca—are currently governed by coalitions composed of the PAN, PRD, and other small left-
leaning parties. These “stop the PRI” coalitions were successful in the 2010 state-level contests.
However, they did not field candidates in the 2011 gubernatorial elections or in the 2012
elections.
19 Chiapas is holding a gubernatorial election on August 19, 2012.
20 These characterizations are largely drawn from: Emily Edmonds-Poli and David A. Shirk, Contemporary Mexican
Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), pp. 151-167.
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Figure 1. Mexico’s 2012 Electoral Map
Source: El Universal as adapted by CRS Graphics.
The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) unified the country after the Mexican Revolution
(1910-1920) by organizing the major groups in Mexican society (organized labor, peasants,
professionals) into a corporatist party that governed Mexico from 1929 until 2000. The PRI
became a centrist party that relied on a hierarchical party structure, strong patronage system, and
periodic electoral fraud to maintain its dominance. Through the 1960s, the PRI presided over a
period of strong, state-led economic growth. The PRI’s popularity declined, however, after its
violent repression of student protesters led to the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre, and its financial
mismanagement in the 1970s contributed to an economic crisis in the early 1980s. Dissident PRI
members split with the party in the mid-1980s, eventually creating a progressive party known as
Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) after the PRI embraced neo-liberal (market-friendly)
economic policies and proved unwilling to adopt more democratic internal procedures for
choosing candidates. PRI presidential candidates were often hand-selected by incumbents through
a process known as the “tap of the finger” (el dedazo) rather than through party primaries or
nominating conventions. The PRI was accused of electoral fraud in the 1988 presidential election
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and has been criticized for corruption and for previously allowing organized crime to operate
relatively freely within certain parameters set by the state.21 The PRI recently expelled Tomas
Yarrington, a former governor of Tamaulipas, from the party after U.S. prosecutors alleged in a
civil suit that he bought property in Texas to launder funds for Mexican drug traffickers.22
PRI power has waxed and waned over the course of the past 15 years. The PRI lost control of the
Chamber of Deputies in 1997 and handed over the Mexican presidency to the PAN in 2000. Even
as its power diminished in 2000, the PRI remained the largest party in the Mexican Congress and
retained control over several key governorships. The PRI currently controls 19 of 32
governorships, 25% of the seats in the Senate, and 48% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
The PRI has formed a “Committed to Mexico (Comprometidos por México)” alliance with the
Green Ecological Party (PVEM), a small party focused exclusively on environmental protection.
With the PVEM, the PRI holds a majority in the Chamber. The PRI is particularly dominant in the
north/northeast and in the Yucatán. It competes with the PRD in southern Mexico.
The National Action Party (PAN) is a socially conservative, pro-business party that was formed
in 1939 by Catholic activists,23 professionals, and entrepreneurs who disagreed with the PRI’s
intervention in the economy and its hierarchical and secularist tendencies. From the 1940s
through the mid-1980s, the PAN served as the official opposition to the PRI, but failed to capture
any governorships or large numbers of congressional seats. By the late 1980s, however, the PAN
had begun to build on the support it had developed in local and state elections to capture
governorships in business-friendly northern states and in conservative central western states.
Vicente Fox’s come-from-behind presidential victory in 2000 marked the party’s crowning
achievement, but some have become disillusioned that corruption, impunity, and poverty are still
pervasive in Mexico after 12 years of PAN rule.24 Escalating organized crime-related violence,
some of which has occurred in response to the Calderón Administration’s tough anticrime
policies, has also reportedly weakened support for the PAN.25 The PAN has controlled the
presidency since 2000, governs six states alone and three in coalition with the PRD, and holds
39% of the seats in the Senate and 28% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
The Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) is a center-left party founded by dissident PRI
members in the late 1980s that has formed a “Progressive Movement” coalition with the Workers’
Party (PT) and Citizens’ Movement (PMC), two smaller left-wing parties. The PRD grew out of a
coalition of leftist groups that supported the 1988 presidential bid of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, son
of famed President Lázaro Cárdenas. Its early transition from movement to political party was
hindered by the PRI’s opposition to its existence and its own internal divisions. The PRD has
traditionally been skeptical of neo-liberal economic policies, opposed opening state-owned oil
company Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) to private investment, and called for greater attention to
21 See, for example, Luis Astorga and David A. Shirk, “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in
the U.S.-Mexican Context,” in Shared Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime,
ed. Eric L. Olson, David A. Shirk, and Andrew Selee (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
and the University of San Diego Trans-Border Institute, 2010), p. 34.
22 William Booth, “In Mexico, Case of Ex-Governor and Narcos Reads Like Crime Thriller,” Washington Post, June
14, 2012.
23 Some of those Catholic activists had roots in the Cristero rebellion. Devout Catholics launched the rebellion in 1927
to protest restrictions placed on the Church in the 1917 Constitution and by Mexico’s revolutionary leaders. By the
time the conflict ended in 1929, some 70,000 rebels had died and as many as 500,000 Mexicans had been displaced.
24 See, for example, Pamela K. Starr, “Mexico’s Big Inherited Challenges,” Current History, February 2012.
25 Luis Prados, “Mexico’s Presidential Race Kicks Off with Predictions of a PRI Comeback,” El Páis, April 5, 2012.
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poverty and inequality. The PRD has built its strongest support bases in and around Mexico City,
which it has governed since mayors were first elected in the city in 1997, and in the poor states of
southern Mexico. The PRD came close to the capturing the presidency in 2006 with Andrés
Manuel López Obrador, a popular former mayor of Mexico City, as its standard bearer. The party
lost popular support and became plagued by internal divisions, however, after López Obrador
refused to accept his defeat. Analysts expressed some surprise that the Mexican left coalesced
behind López Obrador’s 2012 presidential candidacy. The PRD governs the Federal District and
three states alone and three states in coalition with the PAN. It holds 18% of the seats in the
Senate and 13% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
The following section provides general information on each of the four presidential candidates (in
alphabetical order) and their campaigns. More detailed information on the candidates’ stances on
particular issues of key concern to the United States—security, trade, energy, and foreign
relations—are analyzed in more detail below under the heading “Issues.”
Profiles of the Presidential Candidates
Andrés Manuel López Obrador (PRD/PT/PMC)
PRD presidential candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador, a native of the southern state of
Tabasco, studied political science and public administration at National Autonomous University
of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México) before returning to Tabasco to work with
the Chontal indigenous community. In the late 1980s, he aligned himself with Cuahtémoc
Cárdenas, founder of the PRD. López Obrador became the PRD party president for Tabasco in
1989, served as national party president (1996-1999), and succeeded Cárdenas as the second
elected mayor of the Federal District encompassing Mexico City (2000-2005), an area with a
population of approximately 8.7 million. Extremely popular as mayor, he was expected to win the
presidency in 2006. He led in the polls until late April 2006, when he lost support due to
comments deemed disrespectful of President Fox and his refusal to take part in presidential
debates. López Obrador and his supporters rejected the Electoral Tribunal’s September 5, 2006
finding that, despite some irregularities, Felipe Calderón won the 2006 presidential elections.
Andrés Manuel López Obrador has sought to moderate his image and his campaign platform to
appeal to a broader cross-section of voters than in 2006, but some analysts believe that his recent
move to the center may be too little, too late.26 In 2006, López Obrador’s campaign slogan was
“for the good of all, the poor first” and focused on poverty reduction, job creation, indigenous
rights, and infrastructure investment. Some of his proposals, such as re-opening North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations to better protect Mexican farmers, alarmed
investors. This year, rather than emphasizing the needs of one group over another, López Obrador
has pledged to help rebuild Mexico into a “republic of love” that is built upon the values honesty
and justice and oriented toward creating jobs and well-being for all. Some of his proposals
include combating corruption and wasteful government spending; creating jobs and educational
opportunities so that youth will not become involved in crime out of economic necessity; and
involving the government, private sector, and social groups in development efforts.27 While
26 Mark Stevenson, “Mexico’s Left in Disarray Ahead of Election,” Associated Press, April 4, 2012.
27 Andrés Manuel López Obrador campaign website, “Fundamentos para una República Amorosa,” press release,
(continued...)
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López Obrador still disputes the 2006 election results, he has apologized for launching disruptive
protests against them and pledged to accept the 2012 election results even if he does not win.
Some analysts, though acknowledging his evolution as a candidate, maintain that López
Obrador’s continued emphasis on state-led economic growth and revolutionary ideals may not
appeal to Mexican voters, an increasingly middle-class and urbane electorate.28
Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI/PVEM)
Enrique Peña Nieto has been active in the PRI in his native state of Mexico since 1984, most
recently serving as governor from 2005-2011. Peña Nieto obtained a law degree from the
Panamerican University (Universidad Panamericana) and an MBA from the Monterrey Institute
of Technology and Higher Education (Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de
Monterrey). An attorney, Peña Nieto began working for the government of the state of Mexico in
1993. Prior to his election as governor, he served as the Secretary of Administration for the state
of Mexico from 2000-2002 and as a state congressman from 2003-2004. Peña Nieto became the
majority leader of his party in the state legislature and speaker of that body.
From 2005-2011, Enrique Peña Nieto served as governor of the state of Mexico, which is home to
roughly 15 million people (13.4% of Mexico’s population) and constitutes 9.4% of Mexico’s
Gross Domestic Product (GDP).29 Peña Nieto’s slogan as governor was a “government that
delivers” and his programs and activities were frequently covered by Televisa as a result of a
lucrative deal to buy air time that his supporters reportedly signed with the national network in
2005.30 In his final state of the state report, Peña Nieto maintained that his government had
created 224,000 jobs, increased investments in infrastructure without taking on additional debt,
and doubled tax revenues in the state.31 The report presented a more mixed record in the area of
public security, revealing that kidnappings had increased while homicides had declined. After
analysts identified inconsistent data in the report, Peña Nieto revised the report’s assertion that the
state’s overall homicide rate had declined by half during his administration, noting that the rate
had remained fairly stable through 2010.32 In July 2011, Peña Nieto’s chosen successor was
elected governor with more than 60% of the vote.
Enrique Peña Nieto is the candidate of the “Committed to Mexico” coalition composed of the PRI
and the PVEM. Peña Nieto’s campaign is pointing to his achievements as governor of the state of
Mexico as evidence that he is an effective leader and administrator, while his opponents have
questioned whether he indeed completed all of the projects that he promised to deliver. The five
(...continued)
December 6, 2011, available at http://www.amlo.org.mx/noticias/comunicados.html?id=88655. Andrés Manuel López
Obrador, “Carta a Joseph Biden,” March 3, 2011, http://www.lopezobrador.org.mx/documentos/carta_joseph.pdf.
28 Stevenson op. cit.
29 Mexican government data as cited in: JP Morgan, Mexico Economic Comment: What to Expect From the Upcoming
General Elections, March 30, 2012.
30 For more information, see Duncan Wood, The Rise of Enrique Peña Nieto and Return of the PRI, Center for
Strategic & International Studies, October 2011.
31 For a summary and analysis of the report, see Laura Islas, “6to Informe: Peña Nieto, los 10 Datos Claves de su
Sexenio,” El Universal Estado de México, September 5, 2011.
32 “Crime in Mexico, the Governor’s Miraculous Achievement,” The Economist, September 22, 2011; Enrique Peña
Nieto, “Homicidios Dolosos en el Estado de México,” La Razón, September 27, 2012, available at
http://www.razon.com.mx/spip.php?article93100.
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national commitments he has outlined in his presidential platform include restoring peace and
liberty (by reducing homicides and kidnappings by 50%), tripling growth in order to create more
and better jobs, reducing poverty and making Mexico more inclusive, providing access to quality
education for all, and restoring Mexico’s leadership position in the world.33 Peña Nieto has
outlined a ten point economic plan for Mexico that includes opening up PEMEX to private
investment and a four-pillar security strategy that emphasizes reducing violence and focusing
enforcement and prevention efforts in the most violent areas.34 As when he was governor, Peña
Nieto’s team is running a media-savvy campaign that has been bolstered by its ties with Mexico’s
leading television networks. Supporters maintain that the Peña Nieto represents a “new PRI” that
is free from the corruption that characterized the party in the past, but critics have questioned how
truly independent he is from old-time PRI power brokers.35 In response to critics and protesters
who have argued that a PRI government would govern undemocratically, Peña Nieto released a
“democracy manifesto” pledging his commitment to govern in a way that protects freedom of
speech and expression, human rights, transparency, and accountability.36
Gabriel Quadri de la Torre (PANAL)
The least well known of the candidates, Gabriel Quadri, a native of Mexico City, is an
environmentalist and researcher who was reportedly surprised when he was approached by
PANAL leaders in February 2012 to serve as their presidential candidate after the PRI ended its
electoral alliance with the party. Despite the unconventional and apparently undemocratic way he
was selected to run for president, some analysts predict that Quadri’s candidacy may help the
PANAL broaden its appeal beyond supporters of Elba Esther Gordillo37 and the national teacher’s
union.38 Quadri obtained a degree in civil engineering from the Iberoamerican University
(Universidad Iberoamericana) and an M.A. in economics from the University of Texas at Austin.
He has served as director of environmental planning for Mexico City (1989-1993), president of
the National Institute for Ecology (1994-1997), and director general of the Business Council for
Sustainable Development in Mexico (1998-2003). Since 2003, he has been associate director of
an environmental consulting firm and of a think tank devoted to sustainable development.
33 CRS translation of information from Enrique Peña Nieto’s campaign website: http://enriquepenanieto.com/
compromisos-nacionales. These broad pillars are fleshed out in a book published by the candidate in 2011 that can be
accessed via the campaign website. Enrique Peña Nieto, México, la Gran Esperanza: un Estado Eficaz para una
Democracia de Resultados, (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 2011). Hereinafter Peña Nieto, 2011.
34 “Mexican Presidential Frontrunner’s 10-Point Plan,” Reuters, October 10, 2011; Enrique Peña Nieto, “11 for 2011:
How Should Mexico Deal with Violence,” Financial Times, January 6, 2011.
35 E. Eduardo Castillo, “Mexico’s Vanquished Ruling Party, Once the ‘Perfect Dictatorship,’ Poised for Comeback,”
Associated Press, March 30, 2012; “Mexico’s Presidential Front-Runner Builds Huge Lead as Fresh Face for old
Ruling Party,” Associated Press, May 2, 2012.
36 For criticism of Peña Nieto and the PRI, see John M. Ackerman, “The PRI Peril in Mexico,” Los Angeles Times,
May 22, 2012. Peña Nieto’s manifesto is available here: http://www.enriquepenanieto.com/dia-a-dia/entrada/por-una-
presidencia-democratica-manifiesto.
37 Elba Esther Gordillo is a powerful politician who heads the PANAL party and the 1.5 million member Mexican
teacher’s union. Gordillo, a former Secretary General of the PRI, was expelled from the party in 2006 after supporting
the candidacy of Felipe Calderón. She has been widely criticized for thwarting efforts at education reform in Mexico
and for corruption, but her ability to mobilize union voters has made her a key power broker in Mexican politics. María
de las Heras, “La Incómoda Alianza Entre Calderón y Gordillo,” El País, July 4, 2011.
38 Arturo Gallardo, “Candidate Lands Presidential Nomination Over Dinner,” San Antonio Express-News, February 26,
2012.
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Quadri has developed a detailed platform that includes 17 priority areas of action. His primary
proposals focus on reforming education, promoting sustainable economic growth, opening up
PEMEX to private investment and reducing the government’s dependence on PEMEX revenues,
and improving citizen security by expanding the federal police and privatizing some prisons.39
Despite the detailed proposals he has put forth and his solid performance in the first of two
presidential debates, held on May 6, 2012, few observers are predicting that Quadri de la Torre’s
long-shot candidacy will garner significant popular support.40
Josefina Vázquez Mota (PAN)
Josefina Vázquez Mota has embraced her status as the first female presidential candidate to
represent a major political party in Mexico. Her slogan, “Josefina: Different,” stresses the
uniqueness of her candidacy, and also seeks to subtly distinguish herself from the current
Calderón government. Born in Mexico City, Vázquez Mota obtained an economics degree from
the Iberoamerican University and completed a program in Executive Business Administration at
the Panamerican Institute for Executive Business Administration (Instituto Panamericano de Alta
Dirección de Empresas). She has worked as a columnist on economic issues for several Mexican
newspapers (Novedades, El Economista, and El Financiero) and served as an advisor to business
associations such as Coparmex (la Confederación Patronal de la República Mexicana). A
longtime PAN party activist, Vázquez Mota was first elected to Congress in 2000 where she
served as the deputy chair of the economic policy committee. Vázquez Mota left Congress in
December 2000 to serve as Minister of Social Development for the Fox Administration,
becoming the first woman to occupy that position. Josefina Vázquez Mota then served as
Mexico’s first female Minister of Education during the first half of the Calderón Administration
(2006-2009) before being reelected to Congress in July 2009. Prior to her presidential bid,
Vázquez Mota had been serving as the leader of the PAN delegation in the Chamber of Deputies.
Vázquez Mota’s campaign started on a high note as she decisively defeated the other candidates
running for the PAN nomination in February 2012, but she has since struggled to gather
momentum due to internal disputes within her party and problems within her own team.41 The
PAN’s decision not to hold internal elections to select its candidate until February put Vázquez
Mota at a disadvantage compared to the two other major party candidates who had been selected
by their parties in November 2011. Despite that, excitement over her historic candidacy and her
apparent ability to relate to Mexican voters led observers to predict that the race would become
much more competitive as the campaign got underway.42 Vázquez Mota is proposing to build an
inclusive government that can form cross-party coalitions within the Mexican Congress to help
the country complete its transformation into a just, competitive, and vibrant multi-party
democracy. She has warned voters not to support candidates who might represent a return to the
authoritarianism or populism of the past because Mexico’s transition has been incomplete, but she
has struggled to hone her own message and to disseminate it to voters.
39 Gabriel Quadri de la Torre’s platform is available here on his campaign website: http://www.nuevaalianza.mx/
plataforma.php.
40 The second and final presidential debate is scheduled to be held on June 10, 2012.
41 Mexico’s Chance at First Female President Slims as Ruling Party Fails to Make Candidate Shine,” Associated Press,
May 3, 2012.
42 Shannon K. O’Neil, “Vázquex Mota and the 2012 Mexican Election,” Foreign Affairs, February 8, 2012.
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Distinguishing Vázquez Mota’s proposals from those of the current Calderón government,
particularly in the security realm, has been particularly difficult.43 Vázquez Mota’s platform
includes 400 concrete actions under four pillars. They include security (including violence
reduction and combating street crimes); well-being (improving the quality of education and
healthcare and expanding access to credit); productivity (boosting growth and competitiveness,
supporting small businesses, diversifying export partners); and taking advantage of Mexico’s
natural assets to build a “better Mexico” that is a regional leader and global player.44
Issues
Security
Increasing violence perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and other criminal
groups is threatening citizen security and some aspects of governance in Mexico. While the illicit
drug trade has been prevalent in Mexico for decades, an increasing number of DTOs are fighting
for control of smuggling routes into the United States and resisting the Mexican government’s
campaign against them. During the Calderón Administration, government enforcement efforts,
many of which have been led by military forces, have taken down some of the leaders of each of
the major DTOs, either through arrests or deaths during operations to detain them.45 At the same
time, the government’s focus on dismantling the leadership of the DTOs appears to have
contributed to brutal succession struggles, shifting alliances among criminal groups, and the
replacement of existing leaders and groups with others that are even more violent. According to
Mexican government estimates, organized-crime related violence resulted in more than 47,500
deaths between December 2006 and September 2011.46 The toll now may now exceed 55,000.
The Mexican government’s efforts to combat organized crime have been hampered by persistent
corruption within the country’s police and judicial institutions. Police reform efforts have
advanced further at the federal level than at the state and municipal level, but even agents in the
newly reconstituted Federal Police (FP) have been accused of corruption and human rights
abuses.47 Many observers have expressed concern that constitutional reforms passed in 200848
aimed at making Mexico’s judicial system more flexible, transparent, and efficient are being
43 “Energy Flat, Attendance Down as Mexico’s Female Presidential Candidate Works on a Comeback,” Associated
Press, April 17, 2012.
44 Josefina Vázquez Mota’s platform is available at http://josefina.mx/mexico_diferente.php.
45 Although they have received less attention, other pillars of the Calderón government’s security strategy have
included increasing the operational and technological capacities of the state, initiating legal and institutional reforms,
strengthening crime prevention and social programs, and bolstering international anticrime and counterdrug
cooperation, particularly with the United States.
46 Mexican government data for 2007-2010 are available at http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/base-de-datos-de-
fallecimientos/, and data for January through September 2011 are available at http://www.pgr.gob.mx/
temas%20relevantes/estadistica/estadisticas.asp.
47 In April 2012, a Ciudad Juárez businessman who had accused 10 FP of extorting, kidnapping, and torturing him was
found murdered in his home.
48 Under the reform, Mexico has until 2016 to replace its trial procedures at the federal and state level, moving from a
closed-door, inquisitorial process based on written arguments to a public trial system with oral arguments and the
presumption of innocence until proven guilty. In addition to oral trials, judicial systems are expected to adopt additional
means of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and other complementary reforms.
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implemented in several states, but have stalled at the federal level.49 Due to reported deficiencies
and corruption within some law enforcement and public prosecutor’s offices, the impunity rate
for murder in Mexico stands at roughly 81%.50
Criticism of the Calderón government’s security strategy has increased as organized crime-related
homicides have risen, but the presidential candidates have thus far backed similar anticrime
approaches, albeit with a greater emphasis on reducing violence and combating street crime (such
as kidnapping and extortion).51 As an example, all of the presidential candidates have pledged to
continue the fight against organized crime and said that maintaining some form of military-led
counterdrug strategy will be necessary, at least in the short term, despite concerns that some
military officers engaged in anticrime efforts have committed human rights abuses.52 While
López Obrador initially pledged to withdraw military troops from anticrime efforts within six
months of taking office, he has since said that he would gradually withdraw troops as federal
police forces are stood up, a position similar to that of President Calderón.53 All of the candidates
have also talked about continuing to increase the size of some sort of federal police force and
Peña Nieto, Quadri, and López Obrador have endorsed the formation of state-level police
commands that would absorb some or all municipal forces. Other proposals backed by all of the
candidates have included improving intelligence-gathering, reducing prison overcrowding,
increasing anti-money laundering efforts, and bolstering prevention efforts. All of the candidates
ostensibly support implementation of the 2008 judicial reforms, with Peña Nieto emphasizing that
the state of Mexico is one of only three states fully operating under the new adversarial, oral
criminal justice system.
49As of April 2012, 15 of 32 Mexican states have passed new criminal procedure codes and ten states have either fully
or partially implemented the reforms. The Mexican Congress has yet to approve a new federal criminal procedure code,
a key element needed to guide both federal and state reform efforts.
50 In other words, about 91% of murderers have not been brought to justice. Mexico Evalúa, Seguridad y Justicia Penal
en los Estados: 25 Indicadores de Nuestra Debilidad Institucional, March 2012, p. 50.
51 In his analysis of the May 6, 2012, presidential debate, Alejandro Hope, a top Mexican security analyst, maintained
that all of the candidates backed the key components of the Calderón government’s security strategy in one form or
another. Alejandro Hope, “Apuntes Sobre el Debate,” May 7, 2012, available at http://www.animalpolitico.com/
blogueros-plata-o-plomo/2012/05/07/apuntes-sobre-el-debate/.
52 Human Rights Watch, Neither Rights nor Security: Killings, Torture, and Disappearances in Mexico’s “War on
Drugs,” November 2011.
53 “Decálogo Íntegro de AMLO Sobre Seguridad Pública,” Red Política—El Universal, April 11, 2012. Hereinafter
Decálogo, 2012.
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In their platforms and public pronouncements,54 the candidates have made the following
proposals:
Andrés Manuel López Obrador
•
Combat poverty, inequality, and a lack of job and
educational opportunities for youth
(PRD/PT/MC)
•
Create a new federal police force, have a unified
police command in the states, and gradually
withdraw the military from the streets
•
Punish corruption and human rights violations by
security forces
•
Convene daily meetings of security cabinet
•
Create an institute to promote citizen participation
in violence prevention efforts
Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI/PVEM)
•
Develop a proactive crime prevention strategy that
focuses on addressing the underlying causes of
crime, such as poverty and unemployment
•
Increase the size of the federal police to 50,000,
create a national gendarme comprised of some
military forces currently engaged in fighting
organized crime that will be under civilian control,
and establish 32 unified state police forces
•
Hasten implementation of judicial reform
•
Focus anticrime efforts and social and economic
programs in the most violent areas of the country
•
Develop a National Strategy to Reduce Violence
that will contain binding commitments for all levels
of government, along with civil society, to
accomplish
Gabriel Quadri (PANAL)
•
Increase the size of the Federal Police tenfold, while
also keeping the military engaged in the fight against
organized crime
•
Establish unified police commands in the states and
dissolve municipal forces
•
Reduce the use of preventive detention in prisons,
separate dangerous inmates from low-level
offenders, and privatize minimum security prisons
•
Make the Attorney General’s Office an autonomous
institution with an independent advisory board
comprised of well-respected citizen experts
54 These security proposals have been summarized in Spanish by the Ethos Foundation at
http://www.arenaelectoral.com. For Vázquez Mota’s strategy, see also http://josefina.mx/mexico_diferente.php, pp. 8-
18. For Enrique Peña Nieto’s strategy, see Anahi Rami and Dave Graham, “Mexico’s Peña Nieto Plans new Police to
Fight Drug Gangs,” Reuters, April 9, 2012; Peña Nieto, 2011, p. 129; and Enrique Peña Nieto, “11 for 2011: How
Should Mexico Deal with Violence,” Financial Times, January 6, 2011. For Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s security
strategy, see Decálogo, 2012, and Andrés Manuel López Obrador, “Carta a Joseph Biden,” March 3, 2011. Gabriel
Quadri’s strategy is drawn from his campaign platform, which is available at http://www.nuevaalianza.mx/
plataforma.php.
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Josefina Vázquez Mota (PAN)
•
Build a federal police force of 150,000 and adopt a
national police model that wil “respect federalism”
and retain high-performing municipal forces, but also
keep the military engaged in anticrime efforts
•
Consolidate the independence of the Attorney
General’s Office (PGR)
•
Adopt and homogenize new federal and state
criminal procedure codes
•
Punish officials convicted of ties to organized crime
with life in prison
•
Establish a national pact and program against crime
and violence focused on education and culture
The candidates have not commented much on the Mérida Initiative directly, but have made
general statements to the effect that they would each continue security cooperation with the
United States if elected, albeit with a different focus than under Calderón. Vázquez Mota
maintains that, in addition to stepping up anti-money laundering efforts, the countries should
develop complementary intelligence, enforcement, and prevention efforts. Peña Nieto gives
higher priority to more intelligence-sharing than larger amounts of U.S. security assistance, but
his four pillar strategy resembles the Mérida Initiative’s four pillars, albeit with an explicit
emphasis on violence prevention and reduction. His advisors have mentioned the importance of
both Mexico and the United States working more closely together to assist Central American
governments struggling to contain violence and insecurity. López Obrador emphasizes
development aid to combat the root causes of crime and violence over security assistance. All the
candidates have said that they would push the United States to do more to honor its domestic
commitments under the Mérida Initiative to combat drug demand, bulk cash smuggling, and
weapons trafficking. López Obrador has also pledged not to allow any U.S. intelligence or law
enforcement operations that would introduce weapons or bulk cash into Mexican territory.
Economy
Over the past 12 years of PAN rule, Mexico has experienced macroeconomic stability and low
inflation and unemployment, but continued to post relatively high rates of poverty and
inequality.55 Analysts credit the Calderón government with deftly handling the 2008-2009 global
financial crisis, improving Mexico’s business climate (through investments in infrastructure and
reducing bureaucratic red tape), and moving forward on some energy and competitiveness
reforms. Still, economic growth has averaged just 1.8% per year under Presidents Fox and
Calderón, and poverty rates have not declined significantly over the last decade.56 Observers have
55 Duncan Wood, “Mexico’s Elections and the Economy—Voters Face a Tough Decision,” Center for Strategic &
International Studies, May 2012.
56 According to the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the percentage of Mexicans
living in poverty fell between 2000 and 2006, but rose again between 2006 and 2008 to include almost 45% of the
population. Recent Mexican government data show that the percentage of Mexicans living in poverty increased again
between 2008 and 2010 to include 46.2% of the population, or roughly 52 million people. See Consejo Nacional de
Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social, Medición de Pobreza 2010, July 29, 2011, http://www.coneval.gob.mx/.
Some analysts dispute those findings, maintaining that Mexico has already built a relatively large middle class. See
Luis de la Calle and Luis Rubio, Mexico: a Middle Class Society: Poor no More, Development Not Yet, (Washington:
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars—Mexico Institute, January 2012).
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expressed disappointment that structural reforms needed to boost growth and competitiveness in
Mexico—fiscal reform to raise tax revenue and reduce dependence on oil revenues, labor reform,
and educational reform—have not been enacted. Increasing insecurity, persistent corruption, and
a weak law enforcement and judicial system still in need of reform may also be limiting foreign
investment in Mexico.57
The presidential candidates have all pledged to boost economic growth and competitiveness in
Mexico in order to create more formal sector jobs and reduce poverty. Josefina Vázquez Mota’s
economic platform aims to build upon the hard-earned financial stability that she says Mexico has
experienced under PAN governments. Vázquez Mota aims to boost growth by increasing labor
market flexibility and labor productivity, opening up to greater competition sectors that have
historically been protected, supporting small and medium-sized businesses and farmers, and using
public-private partnerships to boost investment in key sectors. Throughout the campaign,
Vázquez Mota has variously emphasized her experience as an economist, as a Minister of Social
Development and a Minister of Education, and as a mother to prove that she can relate to—and
help solve—the economic challenges facing average Mexicans. She also stresses the need for
fiscal, energy, and education reform.
Enrique Peña Nieto acknowledges that the PAN has maintained the macroeconomic stability
that began in the mid-1990s during the PRI government of Ernesto Zedillo, but criticizes the past
two administrations for allowing Mexico to fall behind faster-growing countries like Brazil.58 He
identifies several reasons why Mexico’s economic growth has lagged: low productivity,
insufficient access to credit, deficient investment in infrastructure, monopolies, a large and
expanding informal sector, and a continued over-reliance on the U.S. market. To counter these
deficiencies, Peña Nieto advocates a 10-point economic plan that includes, among other
measures: implementing recently-passed legislation to counter monopolistic practices, passing
fiscal reform, opening up the oil sector, making farmers more productive, and doubling
infrastructure investments. Peña Nieto also endorses an active international trade policy aimed at
increasing Mexico’s trade with Asia, South America, and other markets.
Given his background as an environmentalist, it is unsurprising that PANAL candidate Gabriel
Quadri’s economic plan emphasizes sustainable growth and development. Quadri, like the other
candidates, pledges to maintain macroeconomic stability in Mexico, but also stresses the
importance of enacting a “green” fiscal reform. Elements of that reform would include increasing
tax revenues and ending some energy subsidies to allow for increased investments in public
transport, education, and renewable energy; allowing states and municipalities to levy more taxes
to support local priorities; and making public spending more efficient and transparent. Quadri is
also a strong supporter of energy sector reform and reducing government taxes on PEMEX. He
would also replace traditional subsidies to rural farmers with support aimed at promoting their
involvement in environmental conservation and increasing their productivity.
While the other candidates endorse similar reforms aimed at making Mexico’s market-friendly
economy more competitive, Andrés Manual López Obrador identifies neo-liberalism as one of
the primary reasons why social conditions in Mexico have deteriorated. López Obrador blames
the PRI’s adoption of neo-liberal policies in the mid-1980s and the PAN’s maintenance of those
57 Presentation by Ambassador James R. Jones, Chairman & CEO, MannatJones Global Strategies, at the Center for
Strategic & International Studies, May 9, 2012.
58 Peña Nieto, 2011, pp. 57-63.
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policies for Mexico’s sluggish economic growth and anemic job creation rates. Although he has
toned down some of the anti-business rhetoric he voiced in 2006, López Obrador continues to
favor state-centered economic policies to market-based solutions. If elected, he promises to
launch an austerity program and an aggressive anti-corruption drive to free up government
funding for investment in infrastructure projects and social development programs. López
Obrador argues, perhaps more forcefully than any other candidate, that reducing poverty and
inequality will help solve Mexico’s crime problems. López Obrador supports the provision of
energy subsidies and other perks to Mexican producers and protecting the interests of Mexican
producers in international trade negotiations.
Oil Sector Reform
The future of oil and gas production in Mexico is of great importance for Mexico’s economic
well-being and for U.S. energy security, a key congressional interest. Oil continues to be
important for the Mexican economy, representing almost 14% of overall export earnings in
2010.59 The state oil company, PEMEX, contributes more than a third of the federal government’s
budget. Mexico was the third largest supplier of crude oil to the United States in 2011 after
Canada and Saudi Arabia, accounting for about 11.7% of U.S. oil imports.60
Oil production in Mexico has declined significantly since the mid-2000s, with some predicting
that if PEMEX is not reformed, the country could become a net oil importer as soon as 2015.61
There are concerns that Mexico’s proven oil reserves are declining because of insufficient funds
available for maintenance and exploration. In part because of the Mexican government’s heavy
fiscal demands, PEMEX has had financial difficulties, with its debt increasing and the company
registering an annual operating loss since 1998. PEMEX lacks the technology and expertise
needed to perform the deep-water exploration and drilling that is needed to tap into new reserves
or to exploit its extensive shale gas deposits. Energy reforms passed in 2008 allowed PEMEX to
enter into incentive-based service contracts with foreign oil companies, but did not permit
PEMEX to enter into joint ventures in exploration and production or private companies to build
and operate refineries or pipelines in Mexico. In February 2012, the United States and Mexico
signed a transboundary hydrocarbons agreement that clarifies how oil in the “western gap”
portion of the Gulf of Mexico can be developed, including how U.S. companies may implement
certain projects with PEMEX.62
Many U.S. observers are interested in whether the next Mexican Administration will push for
further reforms to increase private involvement in PEMEX. Three of the four presidential
candidates (Peña Nieto, Vázquez Mota, and Quadri) have endorsed further opening up PEMEX to
private investment. All three candidates have suggested that PEMEX might follow the example of
Petrobras in Brazil. In the 1990s, Petrobras increased private involvement in exploration,
production, and refining; implemented reforms to boost its competitiveness; and then gradually
opened itself up to private minority ownership. Enacting further reforms to Article 27 of the
59 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Country Analysis Brief- Mexico, July 2011.
60 U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, via Global Trade Atlas.
61 Duncan Wood, “The Administration of Decline: Mexico’s Looming Oil Crisis,” Law and Business Review of the
Americas, vol. 16, Fall 2010.
62 U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement,” press release,
February 20, 2012.
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Mexican Constitution would likely be required in order to allow private companies to partner
with PEMEX, a task which Peña Nieto’s campaign manager has said would be an immediate
priority for a Peña Nieto administration.63 In contrast to his opponents, Andrés Manuel López
Obrador opposes deepening private involvement in PEMEX. Instead, he has proposed ridding
PEMEX of corruption, boosting investment in exploration, constructing five new refineries, and
lowering crude oil exports so as to fulfill domestic energy needs first.64
Mexico’s Broader Approach to Relations with the United States
Until the early 1980s, Mexico had a closed and statist economy and an independent foreign policy
that was often at odds with the United States. Those policies began to shift, however, under
President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), and changed even more dramatically under President
Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) and President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000). President
Salinas opened Mexico’s economy to trade and investment and negotiated NAFTA, while
President Zedillo enacted electoral reforms to make Mexican politics more competitive and
increased cooperation with the United States on drug control and border issues. The U.S.-
Mexican relationship has continued to grow stronger and more institutionalized during the PAN
Administrations of Vicente Fox (2000-2006) and Felipe Calderón, with security gradually
overtaking trade and immigration as the primary focus of the bilateral relationship. The increasing
importance of the U.S.-Mexican relationship has been evidenced by the fact that recent U.S.
presidents have convened pre-inaugural meetings with their Mexican counterparts.
Some Members of Congress may be concerned that leadership changes that result from the July 1,
2012, Mexican elections could have a significant impact on U.S.-Mexican relations, particularly
if the elections result in a change in the party in power. However, few analysts are predicting that
the elections will result in any seismic shifts in bilateral relations. After meeting with the three
leading presidential candidates in early March 2012, Vice President Joseph Biden predicted that
U.S. cooperation with Mexico would not be significantly altered by the election of any of the
three.65 Of the major candidates, Andrés Manuel López Obrador has proposed the most dramatic
shift away from current policies, but even he has promised to respect NAFTA and continue
combating criminal groups in Mexico, albeit from a prevention and development focus. While
one might expect the most continuity in bilateral relations should the PAN retain the presidency,
Josefina Vázquez Mota has pledged to move away from focusing largely on migration and
security matters to emphasizing education, economic, and cultural cooperation. Enrique Peña
Nieto has sought to reassure U.S. policy makers that a PRI administration would continue to
combat organized crime, while also successfully implementing structural reforms that have
stalled under the PAN. He also supports increased bilateral and trilateral (with Canada) economic
cooperation.66 Given the daunting security crisis and persistent economic and social challenges
that Mexico is facing, it is likely that next president of Mexico will pursue relations with the
United States as a means of overcoming his or her country’s domestic challenges.
63 “Excerpts: Luis Videgaray; ‘We Will Maintain the Fight Against Organized Crime,’” Wall Street Journal, April 27,
2012.
64 Carina García, “Presenta AMLO Plan Energético; Rechaza Privatización de PEMEX,” El Universal, April 10, 2012.
65 Olga R. Rodriguez and Michael Weissenstein, “Biden Meets with Mexican Presidential Candidates,” Associated
Press, March 5, 2012.
66 Lally Weymouth, “Interview with Mexican Presidential Candidate Enrique Peña Nieto,” Washington Post, May 18,
2012.
Congressional Research Service
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Mexico’s 2012 Elections
Author Contact Information
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
cseelke@crs.loc.gov, 7-5229
Congressional Research Service
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