Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
June 19, 2012
Congressional Research Service
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Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations
Summary
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ruled by the Al Saud family since its founding in 1932, wields
significant global political and economic influence as the birthplace of the Islamic faith and by
virtue of its large oil reserves. Close U.S.-Saudi official relations have survived a series of
challenges since the 1940s, and, in recent years, shared concerns over Al Qaeda-inspired
terrorism and Iranian regional ambitions have provided a renewed logic for continued strategic
cooperation. The ongoing political upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa is changing the
dynamics of long-running reform debates in the kingdom. The full effect of these events on the
kingdom and on U.S.-Saudi relations has yet to be determined. Official U.S. concerns about
human rights and religious freedom in the kingdom persist, and some Members of Congress have
expressed skepticism about Saudi leaders’ commitment to combating religious extremism and
sharing U.S. policy priorities in the Middle East and South Asia. However, Bush and Obama
Administration officials have referred to the Saudi government as an important regional partner in
recent years, and U.S. arms sales and related training programs have continued with
congressional oversight. In October 2010, Congress was notified of proposed sales to Saudi
Arabia of dozens of F-15 fighter aircraft, helicopters, and related equipment and services, with a
potential value of $60 billion. Contracts to implement those sales are now being signed.
At home, Saudi leaders are weighing a litany of economic and political reform demands from
competing, energized groups of citizen activists. The prevailing atmosphere of regional unrest
and increased international scrutiny of domestic political developments further complicates
matters. Groups representing liberal, moderate, and conservative trends have submitted advisory
petitions to King Abdullah bin Abdelaziz, and many recent reform statements refer to and echo
past requests submitted to the king and his predecessor, the late King Fahd. Initiatives to organize
nationwide protests have been met with some popular criticism and official rejection, while local
protests over discrete issues occur sporadically. Some observers fear that public confrontations
with unpredictable consequences may result from the apparent incompatibility of a ban on all
demonstrations and the enthusiasm of different activist groups, including Shiite citizens of the
Eastern Province, government employees, students, and relatives of prisoners and terrorism
suspects. The Obama Administration has endorsed Saudi citizens’ rights to free assembly and free
expression. Saudi leaders reject foreign intervention in the country’s internal affairs.
Since taking power in 2005, King Abdullah has created greater public space for domestic social
reform debates and has promoted the concept of a strong national identity among Saudis in the
face of a determined domestic terrorism campaign. He also has codified royal succession
procedures, begun restructuring the justice system, and taken clear steps to exert stronger
government control over religious authorities. Robust oil export revenues have strengthened the
kingdom’s economic position and provide Saudi leaders with significant financial resources to
meet domestic investment needs and provide social benefits. In this context, the United States and
Saudi Arabia continue to grapple with a core challenge identified by the 9/11 Commission in its
final report: defining a broader bilateral relationship that “leaders on both sides are prepared to
publicly defend.” Current U.S. policy seeks to coordinate with Saudi leaders on regional issues
and help them respond to domestic economic and security challenges. It remains to be seen
whether U.S. initiatives and, more importantly, Saudi leaders’ own reform efforts will enable the
kingdom to meet the energy, education, employment, and security needs that its citizens face.
Shared challenges have long defined U.S.-Saudi relations, but questions about political,
economic, and social reform may become more pressing in light of the calls for political change
that are now swirling around the kingdom.
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Contents
Assessment ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Recent Developments ...................................................................................................................... 3
Arms Sales Move Forward as Training Programs Continue ..................................................... 3
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Saudi Arabia................................................................................... 5
U.S.-Saudi Trade ....................................................................................................................... 6
Succession Issues and Recent Leadership Changes .................................................................. 6
December Cabinet Reshuffle, Domestic Policy Priorities, Fiscal Picture................................. 7
Oil Policy and Critical Infrastructure Protection....................................................................... 8
Protests and Eastern Province Unrest........................................................................................ 9
Reform and Women’s Issues ................................................................................................... 10
Saudi Regional Policy ............................................................................................................. 11
Iran .................................................................................................................................... 11
Syria .................................................................................................................................. 12
Bahrain .............................................................................................................................. 12
Yemen................................................................................................................................ 13
Israel and the Palestinians ................................................................................................. 13
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Saudi Arabia......................................................................................................... 2
Figure 2. Crown Prince and Minister of Defense Salman bin Abdelaziz ........................................ 7
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 14
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Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations
Assessment
September 2011 marked the passage of 10 years from a nadir in U.S.-Saudi relations resulting
from the participation of many Saudi nationals in the planning and execution of the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. Since 2001, elements of both continuity and
change have characterized U.S.-Saudi relations. Security cooperation continues to anchor official
U.S.-Saudi relations as it has for decades, bolstered by new major arms sales, continued security
training arrangements, enhanced counterterrorism cooperation, and shared concerns about
potential threats posed by Iran and Al Qaeda. New joint efforts to build stronger economic,
educational, and interpersonal ties are intended to broaden the basis of the bilateral relationship
and help meet the economic demands and aspirations of the kingdom’s young population.
To date, the Obama Administration, like its predecessors, has engaged the Saudi government as a
strategic partner in efforts to promote regional security and global economic stability. Current
U.S. policy initiatives seek to help Saudi leaders, under the leadership of King Abdullah bin
Abdelaziz, address key domestic economic and security challenges. It remains to be seen whether
these U.S. initiatives and, more importantly, Saudi leaders’ own choices will enable the kingdom
to meet the energy, education, employment, and security needs that its citizens face as they look
to the future. These efforts may take on new importance in the years ahead, since significant
shifts in the political and economic landscape of the Middle East have focused international
attention on Saudi domestic policy issues and reinvigorated debates among Saudis. Sensitive
issues such as political reform, unemployment, education, human rights, corruption, religious
freedom and extremism are likely to remain high on the U.S.-Saudi policy agenda, even as the
kingdom’s increasing regional and global clout adds new dimensions to the diplomatic
relationship.
The Administration believes that Saudi Arabia remains stable, and credits King Abdullah’s
government with taking a relatively more responsive and transparent approach to citizens’
concerns than his predecessors. Nevertheless, decision making in the kingdom reflects consensus
among a closed elite. The government seeks to manage demands for improved economic
opportunities and social conditions while security forces monitor and tightly limit political
activity. The large scale of new social spending programs announced by the government to
respond to popular demands during 2011 suggests that the kingdom’s domestic policy challenges
are considerable in scope.
In the coming years, Saudi leaders are likely to continue to face complex questions about political
consent, economic performance, and social reform while managing leadership transitions
expected to transfer power from the sons of the kingdom’s founder, King Abdelaziz, to his
grandchildren. The recent deaths of long-serving Defense Minister and Crown Prince Sultan bin
Abdelaziz and long-serving Interior Minister and Crown Prince Nayef bin Abdelaziz have invited
increased attention to transition issues. King Abdullah and the Al Saud appear to have managed
recent leadership transition decisions smoothly, and an Allegiance Council made up of senior
family members has been established to make transition decisions after King Abdullah’s reign
ends. The Council is untested, but there are no clear indications that the royal family is poised to
revert to the pattern of competition that characterized intra-family relations in the mid-20th
century. Rather, the monarchy’s ability to successfully manage relationships with competing
interest groups in the kingdom is likely to determine the country’s stability in the coming years,
with direct implications for U.S. national security and economic interests.
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Figure 1. Map of Saudi Arabia
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (March 2008)
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Saudi Arabia in Brief
Population (July 2010): 25,731,776 (includes 5,576,076 non-nationals, 38% of national population is 14 years old or
younger)
Population growth rate: 1.55%
Area: 1,960,582 sq.km. (756,985 sq.mi.); just over one-fifth the size of the United States
Ethnic groups: (native Saudis only) Arab 90%; Afro-Asian 10%
Religion: (native Saudis only) Sunni 85-95%, Shi te 5-15%
Literacy (2003): 78.8% (male 84.7%, female 70.8%)
GDP (purchasing power parity, 2010): $622.5 billion; growth rate: 3.8%
External public debt (2010 est.): $82.9 billion
Inflation (2010 est.): 5.7%
Unemployment (2010): 10.8% (Saudi males); some estimates range up to 25%
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF); U.S. Department of Commerce; CIA, The World Factbook; Economist
Intelligence Unit; and Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA).
Recent Developments
Arms Sales Move Forward as Training Programs Continue
In late December 2011, the Obama Administration publicly announced that Saudi Arabia had
agreed to terms to proceed with a $29 billion sale of advanced F-15 fighter aircraft to the
kingdom after months of delay and speculation. On March 9, 2012, the Pentagon announced that
Boeing had been selected for a $11.4 billion contract to supply 84 new F-15s along with related
systems and weaponry as part of the sale. Congress was notified of the proposed sale in October
2010, and Saudi Arabia received the formal letter of offer and approval for consideration in April
2011. Informed observers attributed the delay in the announcement to a combination of Saudi
domestic and foreign policy considerations. These include the illness and subsequent death of
long-serving Defense Minister Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdelaziz Al Saud (see below), and
Saudi reevaluation of the proposal in light of the unrest in the region, the U.S. response, and
political change in Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen. The sale will perpetuate the reliance of the Royal
Saudi Air Force (the elite military service in the country) on material and training support
provided by the United States military and U.S. defense contractors.
Progress was also made in 2011 toward completion of other large outstanding sales, including 24
Apache helicopters valued at $2.7 billion, and 12 MD-530 aircraft and 12 Apache and 24
Blackhawk helicopters at an approximate combined value of $5 billion. The sales will guide the
immediate future of the United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) in Saudi Arabia and
the Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program (PM-SANG), which have been active
in the kingdom under special bilateral agreements since the 1950s and 1970s, respectively. Saudi
purchases fund these programs. The sales, particularly the long-term F-15 program, are seen by
decision makers on both sides as a symbolic commitment to sustained cooperation during a
period likely to include generational change in the kingdom’s aging leadership. As of June 2012,
no legislation or amendments seeking to block or alter the arms sales had been introduced in the
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112th Congress.1 Public debates occurred in Finland and Germany during 2011 concerning
proposed arms sales to Saudi Arabia.
Summary of Recent Fighter Aircraft and Helicopter Sales to Saudi Arabia2
Sale of 84 F-15SA fighter aircraft - Transmittal No. 10-43 (October 20, 2010)
•
Sale includes 84 new F-15SA aircraft with related systems and armaments for the Royal Saudi Air Force.
•
Includes upgrade to 70 F-15S fighter aircraft already in RSAF inventory to F-15SA configuration.
•
Includes provision of training facility in United States and upgrades to existing Saudi military facilities.
•
The estimated potential cost, if all options are exercised, is $29.4 billion.
Proposed sale of AH-64D APACHE, UH-60M BLACKHAWK, AH-6i Light Attack, and MD-530F Light
Turbine Helicopters - Transmittal No. 10-44 (October 20, 2010)
•
Sale would include 36 AH-64D Block III APACHE Helicopters, 72 UH-60M BLACKHAWK Helicopters, 36 AH-
6i Light Attack Helicopters, 12 MD-530F Light Turbine Helicopters, and related systems and armaments for the
Saudi Arabian National Guard.
•
Includes training, support, and U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support
services. Implementation would require “the assignment of approximately 900 contractor representatives and 30
U.S. Government personnel on a full time basis in Saudi Arabia for a period of 15 years.”
•
The estimated potential cost, if all options are exercised, is $25.6 billion.
Proposed sale of AH-64D Longbow Helicopters, Engines and Night Vision Sensors - Transmittal No.
10-45 (October 20, 2010)
•
Sale would include 24 AH-64D Block III APACHE Longbow Helicopters, T700-GE-701D engines, night vision
sensors and helmets, Hellfire missiles, and related systems for the Royal Saudi Land Forces. Also includes training
and support services.
•
The proposed sale “may require the assignment of an additional 35 U.S. Government and 130 contractor
representatives to Saudi Arabia.”
•
The estimated potential cost, if all options are exercised, is $3.3 billion.
Proposed sale of AH-64D Longbow Helicopters, Engines and Night Vision Sensors - Transmittal No.
10-46 (October 20, 2010)
•
Sale would include 10 AH-64D Block III APACHE Longbow Helicopters, T700-GE-701D engines, night vision
sensors and helmets, Hellfire missiles, and related systems for the Saudi Arabian Royal Guard. Also includes
training and support services.
•
The proposed sale “may require the assignment of an additional 35 U.S. Government and 150 contractor
representatives to Saudi Arabia.”
•
The estimated potential cost, if all options are exercised, is $2.2 billion.
1 In the 111th Congress, some Members expressed concerns about the sales and received responses from the Obama
Administration in a variety of channels. H.J.Res. 104 sought to prohibit the proposed sales pursuant to procedures
provided for in the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), although the bill was not considered within the 30-day period
outlined in the AECA.
2 For further information on the proposed sales see Defense Security Cooperation Agency notification transmittal press
releases available at http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/36b_index.htm.
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Analysis of the current regional military balance presents a mixed picture. Saudi Arabia’s
importance to the global economy and the country’s geography suggest the need for a strong
national defense posture and deployable military forces capable of combined operations.
Nevertheless, the profile of existing Saudi forces and the absence of an immediate, direct external
threat from an enemy with advanced military capabilities raise questions among some observers
about Saudi Arabia’s need for specific technologies or weapons systems. Administration officials
believe that the proposed improvement of Saudi Arabia’s conventional military capabilities,
particularly its fighter aircraft capabilities, will strengthen the kingdom’s deterrent position vis-à-
vis Iran, whose conventional air force is limited but whose unconventional warfare capabilities
could threaten the kingdom. References to potential threats to Saudi security from Iran have
persisted since the 1979 Iranian revolution, and have moved back into focus since the overthrow
of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq removed what Saudi and U.S. military officials considered—
after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990—the other primary conventional military threat to
Saudi security. In April 2010, the U.S. Department of Defense reported to Congress that
Iran maintains very sizeable military forces, but they would be relatively ineffective against a
direct assault by well trained, sophisticated military such as that of the United States or its
allies. At present, Iran’s forces are sufficient to deter or defend against conventional threats
from Iran’s weaker neighbors, such as post-war Iraq, the GCC, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan,
but lack the air power and logistical ability to project power much beyond Iran’s borders or
to confront regional powers such as Turkey or Israel.
At present, U.S. and Saudi officials also cite the residual effects of continuing instability in Iraq,
Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and Pakistan as serious external threats to Saudi national security,
while the threat of terrorism and the security of key energy infrastructure remain the principal
domestic security concerns. Administration officials continue to refer to these threats in relation
to the proposed sales but have not publicly commented in detail about how the proposed aircraft
and helicopter sales would help Saudi Arabia address specific transnational and domestic security
challenges.
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Saudi Arabia
The Obama Administration is seeking $10,000 in International Military Education and Training
assistance funding for Saudi Arabia in its FY2013 budget request. This nominal amount makes
Saudi Arabia eligible for a substantial but undisclosed discount3 on the millions of dollars of
training it purchases through the Foreign Military Sales program. The Administration argues that
the discount supports continued Saudi participation in U.S. training programs and this
participation supports the maintenance of important military-to-military relationships and
improves Saudi defense capabilities. In recent years, Congress has enacted prohibitions on IMET
and other foreign assistance to Saudi Arabia, and the Bush and Obama Administrations
subsequently issued national security waivers enabling the assistance to continue. Saudi officials
have been privately critical of the congressional prohibitions and prefer to avoid contentious
public debate over U.S. foreign assistance, arms sales, and security cooperation.
3 The conference report for H.R. 3288 (H.Rept. 111-366) required the Administration to report to Congress within 180
days (by June 14, 2010) on the net savings this eligibility provides to Saudi Arabia and other IMET recipients.
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U.S.-Saudi Trade
Saudi Arabia remained the largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East in 2011. According to
the U.S. International Trade Administration, Saudi exports to the United States were $47.5 billion
(up from $31.4 billion in 2010 but below the 2008 figure of $54.8 billion) and U.S. exports to
Saudi Arabia are estimated at $13.8 billion (up from $11.6 billion in 2010). Comparable 2011
figures for Israel, the second-largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East, were more than $23
billion in exports to the United States and $13.9 billion in imports from the United States. To a
considerable extent, the high value of U.S.-Saudi trade is dictated by U.S. imports of
hydrocarbons from Saudi Arabia and U.S. exports of weapons, machinery, and vehicles to Saudi
Arabia. Fluctuations in the volume and value of U.S.-Saudi oil trade account for declines in the
value of Saudi exports to the United States in recent years.
Succession Issues and Recent Leadership Changes
A complex interplay between seniority, competency, and intra-familial politics complicates efforts
by outsiders to accurately predict the timing and direction of Saudi leadership transitions.
Nevertheless, understanding the potential implications of transition scenarios is becoming
increasingly important as Saudi Arabia enters a period of serial leadership change brought on by
the advanced age of the senior members of the ruling Al Saud family. In October 2011, Crown
Prince Sultan bin Abdelaziz, who had served as Minister for Defense and Aviation since the
1960s, died after a long illness for which he received treatment in the United States. The passing
of Prince Sultan prompted the elevation of his full brother Prince Nayef, the long-serving
Minister of Interior and Second Deputy Prime Minister, to the position of Crown Prince and
presumed heir. A family Allegiance Council established by King Abdullah endorsed the king’s
elevation of Prince Nayef to Crown Prince, although outspoken reform advocate Prince Talal bin
Abdelaziz resigned from the Council in apparent protest.4
Crown Prince Nayef travelled to Cleveland for unspecified medical tests in March 2012, and,
after a brief return to the kingdom, he departed again in June to Switzerland, where he died on
June 16. In the wake of the deaths of his two half-brothers,5 the king named Prince Salman bin
Abdelaziz, the long-time governor of Riyadh, first as Minister of Defense and now as Crown
Prince and Deputy Prime Minister.
Other changes have been made to the leadership of the important Interior and Defense ministries.
The king elevated long-serving Deputy Interior Minister Prince Ahmed bin Abdelaziz to the
leadership of the Ministry. In 2011, the king separated the civil aviation portfolio from the
Ministry of Defense and dismissed Deputy Minister of Defense Prince Abdelrahman bin
Abdelaziz.6 The king elevated late Prince Sultan’s son Prince Khalid bin Sultan to the position of
Deputy Defense Minister to replace his uncle.7
4 King Abdullah retains authority to appoint his successor, while the Allegiance Council he established will decide on
the new king and crown prince after his death. Prince Nayef and Prince Salman have older brothers among the other
living sons of the kingdom’s founder, and while the elevation of a younger son over an older figure may be privately
disputed it is not unprecedented.
5 Prince Salman and the late Princes Sultan and Nayef were full brothers.
6 Prince Abdelrahman is Prince Salman’s elder full brother.
7 Prince Khalid bin Sultan served as a military commander and a key liaison with U.S. forces in the 1991 effort to
(continued...)
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Prince Khalid bin Sultan and several of his
prominent cousins in the third generation of
Figure 2. Crown Prince and Minister of
the ruling branch of the Al Saud family—the
Defense Salman bin Abdelaziz
grandsons of the kingdom’s founder Ibn
Saud—are assuming increasing leadership
roles in the kingdom. The king appointed his
son Prince Abdelaziz bin Abdullah as Deputy
Foreign Minister in July 2011 and his son
Prince Miteb bin Abdullah as Commander of
the U.S.-trained and -equipped Saudi National
Guard in late 2010. Other prominent figures
among the next generation of Saudi princes
include Assistant Minister of Interior for
Security Affairs Prince Mohammed bin
Nayef, National Security Council chief and
former Saudi Ambassador to the United States
Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Governor of Mecca
Province Prince Khaled al Faisal, Governor of
the Eastern Province Prince Mohammed bin
Fahd, Governor of Najran Province Prince
Meshaal bin Abdullah, Deputy Minister of
Petroleum Prince Abdelaziz bin Salman, and
Source: Arab News (Jeddah).
investor and Kingdom Holding Company
Chairman Prince Alwaleed bin Talal.
December Cabinet Reshuffle, Domestic Policy Priorities,
Fiscal Picture
Late 2011 also saw a long-expected cabinet reshuffle that included some important economic
portfolios intended to facilitate the job creation and economic reform agenda endorsed by the
king. Several of the new cabinet appointees, including Minister for Commerce and Industry
Tawfiq Al Rabiah, Minister for Hajj Bandar Al Hajjar, and Minister of Economy and Planning
Muhammad Al Jasser earned degrees in the United States. On the domestic policy front, the Saudi
royal family continues to monopolize major decisions concerning responses to longstanding
social and economic problems, including those related to education, employment, and housing.
On top of record budgets laid out for both 2011 and 2012, the king launched a major additional
spending program in early 2011 to mitigate economic tensions that some feared could fuel
stronger calls from citizens for political change. Key components of this $130 billion initiative
include plans to build 500,000 new housing units, expand benefits and salaries for state
employees, and create a temporary unemployment support program. The new plans mirrored
Saudi efforts to respond to a series of massive floods that killed over 100 individuals in Jeddah,
the main commercial and population hub in western Saudi Arabia. Floods in 2009 and 2011
produced considerable criticism of government investment in civil infrastructure and a lack of
effective, transparent public management.
(...continued)
defend Saudi Arabia and expel Iraqi invasion forces from Kuwait.
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Overall, Saudi state coffers are well positioned to support these programs for the short term based
on years of higher-than-expected oil prices (for example, 2011 revenue was double the official
budget projection). The $184 billion budget for 2012 is based on an assumed oil export price of
below $80 per barrel, while market prices have exceeded that level all of this year. In spite of
these recent trends, some experts on the kingdom’s economy have recently projected that the
Saudi government is set to run consistent budget deficits from 2014 onward. Additionally, the
volume of oil consumed domestically may exceed oil exports by 2030 if domestic energy
consumption patterns do not change (see below).
Oil Policy and Critical Infrastructure Protection
Saudi Arabia has completed a multiyear investment program that increased its oil production
capacity to a potential 12.5 million barrels per day (MBD). In March 2012, Saudi Oil Minister Ali
Naimi called the recent global oil price spike unjustified and indicated that the kingdom would
move to bring more of its spare production capacity online.8 As of late May 2012, Saudi Arabia
was producing close to 10 mbd and exporting 7.5 mbd. According to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration, as of June 8, 2012, Saudi Arabia was the second-largest source of U.S crude oil
imports, about 1.5 million bpd of 9.1 million bpd gross U.S. imports, behind only Canada.9
As indicated above, some experts on Saudi Arabia’s economy have forecast that rising domestic
consumption of oil and natural gas in the kingdom may limit future export capacity and revenue,
as well as the kingdom’s ability to retain the sizeable spare production capacity expected by
global markets.10 According to the Middle East Economic Digest, domestic electricity demand in
Saudi Arabia is projected to nearly double by 2020. Some analysts have suggested that Saudi
leaders could avoid the risks posed by this scenario by adopting “tough policy reforms in areas
such as domestic pricing of energy and taxation, an aggressive commitment to alternative energy
sources, especially solar and nuclear power, and increasing the Kingdom’s share of global oil
production.”11 Energy price increases and taxation are viewed as sensitive given the lack of
popular representation in the kingdom’s political system.
In addition, the U.S. government has embraced new Saudi efforts to invest in renewable energy
technologies (as it did periodically in the 1970s and 1980s), and the potential for nuclear energy
cooperation between the kingdom and the United States has been discussed, although the
likelihood of a proposed bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement moving forward during 2012
remains uncertain.12 The kingdom launched the King Abdullah City for Nuclear and Renewable
8 Guy Chazan, “Naimi calls high oil prices ‘unjustified,’” Financial Times (UK), March 20, 2012.
9 Based on EIA data – “Weekly Imports & Exports” and “Weekly Preliminary Crude Imports by Country of Origin –
Four Week Average,” June 19, 2012.
10 Glada Lahn and Paul Stevens, Burning Oil to Keep Cool: The Hidden Energy Crisis in Saudi Arabia, Chatham
House (UK), December 2011.
11 Brad Bourland and Paul Gemble, “Saudi Arabia’s coming oil and fiscal challenge,” Jadwa Investments (Riyadh),
July 2011.
12 Saudi Arabia signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the United States
in 2008 in which it signaled its intent to forego domestic uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing in favor of
procuring nuclear fuel from market sources. It is unclear whether Saudi authorities remain committed to forgoing
enrichment and reprocessing technologies nearly three years after the original memorandum with the United States was
signed.
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Energy in April 2010, to oversee the country’s planned development of nuclear energy production
and meet rising domestic consumption needs.
U.S. efforts to support Saudi critical infrastructure protection continue under the auspices of a
bilateral agreement signed in May 2008. A Joint Commission on Critical Infrastructure and
Border Security Protection serves as the bilateral coordination mechanism for State Department,
Energy Department, and Defense Department engagement with Saudi counterparts. Initial joint
security assessments have been completed, and U.S. advisory support is being provided on a
contract basis via the Office of the Program Manager-Facilities Security Force (OPM-FSF) to the
Saudi Ministry of Interior as it implements an initial five year development plan for the new
Facilities Security Force.
Protests and Eastern Province Unrest
Efforts by some Saudis to organize nationwide demonstrations on March 11, 2011, failed in the
face of strong government opposition, particularly a mass deployment of security forces.
However, small gatherings of activists and public action by reform advocates and women’s rights
activists have continued sporadically. Certain gatherings, sit-ins, and protests have focused on
security detainees in Saudi prisons and have been led by family members and colleagues of those
detained, including female relatives. These gatherings have proven controversial insofar as some
supporters of the detained are directly challenging the security and justice authorities with
protests and public action. Organizations like Human Rights Watch report that political reform
activists are among those being unjustly detained on security charges. Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula released statements in 2011 criticizing the Saudi government for its treatment of female
family members protesting the detention of their spouses and relatives on terrorism charges.
In March 2012, student demonstrations at King Khalid University in the southwestern province of
Asir drew media attention to the sensitive question of the education conditions and employment
prospects of Saudi Arabia’s large youth population. King Abdullah has indicated that one of his
top priorities is improving education as an investment in the kingdom’s future, and these efforts
have taken on new relevance in light of the youth-led uprisings that have swept across the region
since early 2011. The demonstrations reportedly resulted in injuries to over 50 female students
who were protesting conditions on the women’s campus. Prince Faisal bin Khalid bin Abdelaziz
Al Saud, the governor of Asir province, personally warned against further demonstrations, toured
the campus and met with a select group of students, while many students and local observers
remained critical of conditions and the government’s handling of the situation.
Clashes and unrest have been more frequent in areas of the majority Shia Eastern Province,
bringing Saudi domestic security concerns and foreign policy suspicions together in a potentially
volatile mix. Since late 2010, dozens of civilians and police have been injured and several
civilians have been killed in a series of protests, crowd control confrontations, and arrest raids in
predominantly Shia towns and villages such as Awamiya and Qatif. These towns are located near
important oil infrastructure. According to some human rights groups, more than 380 people have
been arrested since the start of 2011 and as of January 2012, roughly 60 remained in custody.
Some Saudi religious and security officials have implied that individuals responsible for using
force against security officers are acting on orders from abroad, a thinly veiled reference to
assumed Iranian interference.
In January 2012, the Interior Ministry issued warrants for 23 Shia activists wanted for questioning
in relation to confrontations and protests. In February, the Saudi Ministry of Interior said in an
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announcement that “it is the state’s right to confront those that confront it first ... and the Saudi
Arabian security forces will confront such situations ... with determination and force and with an
iron fist.” Shia activists deny any relationship with a foreign agenda and continue to speak out
against what they see as discrimination at home and unwarranted Saudi intervention on the side
of the Sunni government to suppress mostly Shia unrest in neighboring Bahrain. Reports of
celebrations of the death of Crown Prince Nayef in Shia towns have added to sectarian tensions.
Reform and Women’s Issues
Since January 2011, upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa has reinvigorated preexisting
debates on social and political reform in the kingdom. Some Saudis have embraced the current of
change and activism, even as unrest in Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, Yemen and Libya has created
concern about the security consequences of political confrontation. In spite of the new regional
political atmosphere, the dynamics of Saudi reform debates remain consistent overall, even as
pressure may be rising for and against domestic change in different issue areas. Saudi citizens
continue to present leaders with a range of views from across the liberal and conservative
spectrum on most social and economic issues.
In many cases, Saudis’ views conflict and often appear mutually exclusive. For example, while
many Saudis welcomed the king’s announcement concerning the participation of women in the
next session of the advisory Shura Council and in the 2015 municipal elections, some leading
official religious clerics denied having been consulted and stated that they oppose the decision. It
remains unclear whether the kingdom’s gender guardianship system, which requires women to
document the consent of a male relative for most public actions, will apply to the candidacy and
voting procedures for 2015. The confluence of social and economic challenges is illustrated by
ongoing debates about the employment of women in the retail sector, where their work may
involve contact with male customers and coworkers. This is opposed by religious conservatives.
As noted above, female students have shown a willingness to demonstrate and express demands.
Women also staged protests by driving cars in defiance of restrictions in May and June 2011,
prompting words of public support from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Similar protests
planned for June 2012 were delayed following Crown Prince Nayef’s death, and women’s
driving-rights activists have prepared a petition to King Abdullah. Saudi officials have repeatedly
insisted that they reject outside interference in their domestic affairs and reform debates.
The Saudi royal family’s rationale for remaining reluctant to generally embrace populist uprisings
abroad and calls for constitutional democracy at home is self-evidently driven by its concerns
about preserving power. The government’s attempts to enforce a ban on public demonstrations
and gatherings is likely to continue to produce episodes of tension and confrontation. As Saudi
youth continue to see demonstrations and public expressions of dissent now common in several
other Arab countries, the traditional logic of deference to authority and private consultation that
has long governed political relations in the kingdom may begin to fray. Reform debates and Saudi
responses to public political expression may highlight instances in which the kingdom’s leaders
and the United States are on opposing sides of key political and social questions, such as the
rights of individuals to free expression and free assembly.
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Saudi Regional Policy
The trend of political upheaval that has prevailed in the Middle East since 2011 poses foreign as
well as domestic policy challenges for Saudi Arabia’s authoritarian monarchy. Saudi leaders have
been forced to adjust some of their basic foreign policy assumptions and approaches to new
regional realities created by leadership change in Egypt; protests in Bahrain; instability in Yemen;
the collapse of the pro-Saudi Lebanese government of Saad al Hariri; and an ongoing cycle of
protests and violent repression in Syria. Saudis are reassessing their persistent concerns about
terrorism and Iranian regional policy in light of these developments. In early 2011, some expert
observers argued that Saudi Arabia had responded to regional change by taking a distinctly
“counterrevolutionary” posture. In support of their arguments, these observers pointed to Saudi
support for the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces in Egypt and the deployment of Saudi
military forces to support Bahrain’s Sunni monarchy as they confronted predominantly Shia
protestors.13
Other observers argue that Saudi support for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiatives on
Libya and Yemen, and Saudi officials’ calls for armed support for the Syrian opposition,
demonstrate the willingness and ability of Saudi leaders to take a case-by case approach to
managing, if not fully embracing, change. Some Saudi actions and stances, particularly with
respect to Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen, also reflect sectarian and strategic competition with Iran for
regional influence that, as discussed below, builds upon reported ongoing competition elsewhere
in the region, notably Iraq and Lebanon. King Abdullah’s suggestion of a union of the GCC
countries may reflect all of these motives, presenting a bulwark against Iran and bolstering other
monarchies with Riyadh’s support.14
Iran
Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran are two important centers of gravity in the Gulf and
their strategic and sectarian rivalry has been a defining factor in developments in the region for
decades. Saudi officials often express concern about Iranian efforts to assert more power in the
Gulf region and broader Middle East, while Iranian officials question Saudi relations with the
United States and view the conservative Sunni ideology of Saudis as inherently hostile to Iran’s
Shia population and religious leadership. In spite of their differences and mutual suspicions,
Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal bin Abdelaziz has publicly left open the prospect of GCC
dialogue with Iran in recent years, although that prospect was weakened by the revelation in late
2011 of the alleged Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to Washington. In December
2011, Crown Prince Nayef and Intelligence Director Prince Muqrin bin Abdelaziz met with
Iranian Intelligence Minister Haidar Moslehi, presumably to discuss the allegations and regional
security issues. In the months since, there have not been notable indications of any positive
13 These contending views and perspectives are summarized in a collected volume of essays available from the Project
on Middle East Political Science entitled Arab Uprisings: The Saudi Counter-Revolution, August 9, 2011.
14 In his opening remarks at the recent GCC heads of state summit in Riyadh, King Abdullah cited shared security
threats as a reason for the GCC to “move from a phase of cooperation to a phase of union within a single entity.” Saudi
Arabia has begun to discuss details of a proposed Gulf union with other GCC countries, although public reactions
suggest that enthusiasm for the idea outside of Riyadh is lacking. The U.S. government is weighing options for
bolstering security cooperation and coordination in the Gulf in the wake of the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq amid
continuing and possibly increasing tensions with Iran. In March 2012, the United States and the GCC inaugurated the
U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, which is designed to provide a formal, regularized venue for discussion of
regional security, counterterrorism, military partnership, and economic issues.
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change in the relationship. Competing Saudi and Iranian policies toward Syria, Saudi suspicion of
Iran’s nuclear program, and unrest among Arab Shiites in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia contribute to
an atmosphere of tension and mutual distrust, with security implications for the region and the
United States.
Syria
Syria and Saudi Arabia have had strained relations in recent years, particularly following the
assassination of the pro-Saudi former Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafiq Hariri during the Syrian
occupation in 2005. The Saudi government has been a vocal critic of the Asad government’s use
of force against Syrian civilians since early 2011, and Saudi officials are widely assumed to favor
the arming of Syrian opposition fighters. Some reports now suggest that arms and funding from
unidentified third parties are now reaching some Syrian opposition groups. No public
confirmation exists that definitively links Saudi Arabia or other Arab Gulf countries to such
assistance. The U.S. government has continued to deny any involvement in weapons transfers and
call on all sides, including rebels that may be receiving arms from U.S. allies to commit to a
ceasefire. Saudi officials welcomed the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolutions
2042 and 2043 on Syria, and have been critical of the Syrian government’s continued use of force
and the perceived failure of the Special Envoy Kofi Annan’s peace plan.
Saudi policy toward Syria is shaped by Saudi Arabia’s rivalry with Iran for regional influence.
Some Saudis view the short term outcome of Syrian crisis in zero sum terms, while others may be
concerned that conflict or political change in Syria has the potential to destabilize Lebanon or
Jordan or to empower Syrian Islamists. Saudi authorities have taken steps in recent weeks to limit
fundraising activities by private Saudi citizens seeking to support the Syrian opposition. While
the Saudi government may choose to offer similar official support, it remains wary of
independent initiatives by its citizens that may empower extremists at home or abroad.
Bahrain
Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Bahrain in 2011 demonstrated the depth of its concern
about the continuity of the Al Khalifah monarchy there, which many Saudi officials view as a
bulwark against Iranian influence among the majority Shiite population of Bahrain and Saudi
Arabia’s Eastern Province. While sectarian concerns appear to be an important motivating factor
in Saudi policy toward Bahrain, Saudi leaders also have an obvious desire to prevent a popular
uprising from successfully targeting and overthrowing a family monarchy in a neighboring
country. The United States generally shares Saudi concerns about the stability of Bahrain and the
security of the Gulf region, but some Obama Administration officials and some Members of
Congress likely differ with the Saudi government’s forceful backing of elements of the Bahraini
ruling family who are opposed to reform. For U.S. policy makers, Bahrain presents a series of
complex dilemmas that link parallel desires to promote human rights and accountable
government, maintain strategic relationships and military access, and preserve fruitful diplomatic
and security partnerships with longstanding governments. U.S. comments and action with regard
to Bahrain may be regarded by Saudi officials as indicators of U.S. commitment to maintaining
relationships that have long prioritized government-to-government cooperation over people-to-
people ties and human rights and democracy.
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Yemen
In recent years, Saudi Arabia has been drawn more closely into the affairs of its problematic
southern neighbor, as Yemen’s government has struggled to defeat northern Al Houthi rebels amid
continuing attacks from a resurgent Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. A Saudi military
campaign against Al Houthi fighters along the border in 2009 exposed several weaknesses in
U.S.-trained and supplied Saudi military forces, and the unrest in Yemen in 2011 raised the
prospect of chaos that could directly destabilize the kingdom. In response, Saudi officials
intervened forcefully to direct Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to accept the terms of a GCC-
negotiated transition agreement. Whether the agreement will be implemented as planned remains
unclear. Saudi authorities pledged $3.25 billion in support to Yemen at the May 2012 Friends of
Yemen conference in Riyadh. Details on the planned delivery and spending of the pledged funds
are not yet available.
Instability in Yemen and the presence there of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are of
mutual concern to the United States and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has long sought to shape
political and security conditions in Yemen as a means of preventing discrete threats from
emerging on the kingdom’s southern flank. Many Yemenis view Saudi involvement in Yemen—
particularly Saudi patronage relationships with various Yemeni tribal groups—as an attempt to
perpetuate divisions in Yemeni society and prevent a unified Yemen from threatening Saudi
interests. At present, there appears to be significant U.S.-Saudi intelligence cooperation with
regard to the AQAP threat. Unverified press reports suggest that Saudi intelligence services are
using double agents to collect information and sabotage AQAP operations. AQAP’s leadership
and many of its senior operatives are Saudis who fled to Yemen after the failure of the 2003-2008
Al Qaeda campaign in the kingdom.
U.S. support for elements of the Yemeni military and counterterrorism services has resumed
following a suspension that coincided with the 2011 uprising that led to the resignation of long-
serving president Ali Abdullah Saleh. U.S. efforts seek to target senior AQAP personnel while
bolstering the ability of Yemeni forces to retake territory in southern Yemen seized by an AQAP-
affiliate militia known as Ansar al Shariah. While recent events suggest significant changes have
occurred in Yemen, the core dilemmas facing the United States look very much the same as they
have since Yemeni unification in the early 1990s. Saudi Arabia and the United States share an
interest in eliminating transnational terrorist threats in Yemen, but may differ on their preferred
ends and means with regard to the question of Yemen’s long term stability and development.
Israel and the Palestinians
Many Saudi citizens and officials hold and express the view that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is
the central policy problem in the Middle East region. Saudis often argue that the United States
should support a solution to the conflict that adequately addresses various Palestinian and Arab
concerns. The government of Saudi Arabia supports Palestinian national aspirations, strongly
endorses Muslim claims in the Old City of Jerusalem, and has frequently criticized Israeli
settlement building in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Since the 1940s, Saudi-U.S. relations have
been challenged repeatedly by stark differences of opinion over the Israeli-Palestinian question,
with leaders on each side questioning the other’s devotion to achieving a just peace and
willingness to abide by stated policy commitments.
Unlike several other Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia has not established open trade or liaison
channels for communication with Israel. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia generally has supported U.S.
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policy since the early 1990s by endorsing Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements; by joining with
neighboring Gulf states in 1994 in terminating enforcement of the so-called secondary and
tertiary (indirect) boycotts of Israel;15 and by adopting a more proactive approach to Arab-Israeli
peacemaking and diplomacy. Saudi Arabia maintains the primary (direct) boycott.
In March 2002, then-Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abd al Aziz proposed a peace initiative calling
for normalization of Arab relations with Israel following the conclusion of a comprehensive
Israeli-Palestinian peace accord and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The 2002 initiative
paralleled and built upon the August 1981 eight-point plan proposed by then-Crown Prince Fahd
bin Abd al Aziz and subsequently endorsed by the Arab League. Continuing violence and political
developments precluded further consideration of the 2002 Saudi proposal for several years.
On March 28-29, 2007, the heads of state of most of the Arab League countries met in Riyadh
and reconfirmed their support for King Abdullah’s peace proposal, as adopted by the Arab League
in 2002. At the time, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal warned that if Israel rejects the
Arab Peace Initiative, “they will be putting their future not in the hands of the peacemakers but in
the hands of the lords of war.”16 In response to Israel’s 2009 military campaign against Hamas in
the Gaza Strip, Saudi leaders sought to balance their commitment to conditional offers of peace
and recognition to Israel with the demands of regional rivals and some Saudi citizens, clerics, and
officials for a more confrontational approach to Israel.
By all accounts, King Abdullah remains committed to the terms of the peace initiative he put
forward under the auspices of the Arab League in 2002, which calls for normalization of Arab
relations with Israel following the conclusion of a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace accord
and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Saudi Arabia supports the international recognition of
a Palestinian state and full Palestinian membership at the United Nations. A December 2011
Saudi cabinet statement “called on the international community to take a firm and united stand
toward the Palestinian people’s winning of their freedom, independence and their legitimate
rights; to end the injustice they suffer, and to firmly pressure Israel to abandon the logic of force,
opt for the choice of peace, and recognize the Palestinian people’s right to establish their
independent state with Al Quds [Jerusalem] as its capital in accordance with the resolutions of
international legitimacy and international law.”17
Author Contact Information
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
15 See below.
16 David Blair, “Accept Peace Plan or Face War, Israel Told,” Daily Telegraph (UK), March 28, 2007.
17 Saudi Press Agency, “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques Chairs Cabinet Session,” December 5, 2011.
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