In Brief:
Next Steps in the War in Afghanistan?
Issues for Congress
Catherine Dale
Specialist in International Security
June 15, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42137
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
In Brief: Next Steps in the War in Afghanistan? Issues for Congress
n May 1, 2012, President Obama gave a speech from Bagram Air Field in which he laid
out U.S. government approaches for “winding down” the war in Afghanistan.1 While a
O number of observers have challenged the logical plausibility of a unilateral decision to
“wind down” a war, the Administration’s commitment to decreasing U.S. involvement in the war
in Afghanistan is clear.
As of mid-2012, many observers point to a coalescing vision of the way forward—shared by the
governments of the United States, Afghanistan, and other international partners—that includes
bringing the current campaign to a close by the end of 2014, and pursuing a political settlement
among the parties in conflict, while extending U.S. and other international commitments to
Afghanistan beyond 2014. In evaluating this emerging vision, some observers emphasize that the
overall level of ambition has been lowered, while others stress that the timeline for international
engagement has been extended. For the U.S. government, the broad strategic issues at stake in the
war in Afghanistan continue to include:
• What fundamental national security interests does the United States have in
Afghanistan and the region?
• What minimum conditions—political, economic, security—would need to
pertain in Afghanistan in order for those U.S. interests to be protected?
• How appropriate are current and projected future U.S. approaches, until and after
2014, for helping Afghans establish those conditions?
• When and to what extent are Afghans likely to be able to sustain those conditions
with relatively limited support from the international community?
• Ultimately, how important is this overall effort—given its likely timeline, risks,
and costs—compared to other U.S. government priorities?
At this apparent turning point in both strategic thinking and activity on the ground, this short
report considers issues that may be of interest to Congress as it considers the strength and
duration of further U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, to 2014 and beyond.2
Background
Since assuming office, the Obama Administration has articulated two consistent core goals for the
war—to defeat al-Qaeda and to prevent future safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Less
clear to many observers is exactly what it would take to prevent future safe havens.3
1 Remarks by President Obama in Address to the Nation from Afghanistan, May 1, 2012, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/01/remarks-president-address-nation-afghanistan.
2 For further analysis related to Afghanistan, see additional CRS reports by Amy Belasco, Susan Chesser, Catherine
Dale, Kenneth Katzman, Alan Kronstadt, Rhoda Margesson, Moshe Schwartz, Curt Tarnoff, Liana Wyler.
3 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Washington,
DC, March 27, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-
Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/. The war in Afghanistan began in late 2001 with a U.S.-led coalition military
operation designed to remove Afghanistan’s Taliban-led regime and to prevent future terrorist safe havens, in the wake
of the terrorist attacks launched by al Qaeda from Afghanistan on September 11, 2001.
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In Brief: Next Steps in the War in Afghanistan? Issues for Congress
Much of the rationale behind current U.S. government civilian and military efforts in Afghanistan
dates back to 2009, when General Stanley McChrystal took command of NATO’s International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and was tasked to conduct an initial strategic assessment. That
assessment, and the subsequent ISAF campaign design, were based on the Administration’s two
core goals as well as on the novel prospect of more troops, more civilian expertise, more
resources, more highest-level leadership attention, and relatively unlimited time.4
Subsequently, four major sets of constraints were imposed on the effort:
• In December 2009, in a major policy speech at West Point, President Obama
announced both that a troop surge would take place, and that those troops would
begin to draw down in July 2011.5
• In November 2010, at the NATO Lisbon Summit, the Afghan government and the
NATO Allies, including the United States, agreed on a formal “Transition”
process, in which responsibility for security would transition to the Afghan
government. This process would begin in early 2011 and would be completed by
the end of 2014.6
• In June 2011, President Obama announced parameters for drawing down the
surge forces. From the surge peak of about 100,000 U.S. troops, the U.S. troop
commitment to Afghanistan would draw down by 10,000 troops by the end of
2011, and by a further 23,000 by the end of September 2012, reaching a total of
68,000 by that date. Afterwards, the pace of further drawdowns would be
“steady” and at some point the mission would change “from combat to support.”7
• In May 2012, at the NATO Chicago Summit, the Afghan government and NATO
Allies confirmed that the ISAF mission would be completed by the end of 2014,
that Afghans would assume lead responsibility for security throughout
Afghanistan by mid-2013, and that at that milestone international forces would
shift to playing a primarily supporting role.8
At the same time, the timeline for the commitment of the international community to Afghanistan
has been extended well past 2014—out to 2024, covering the 10-year period of “Transformation”
designed to follow Transition. At the NATO Chicago Summit, participants affirmed that the
partnership with Afghanistan would continue beyond the conclusion of the current campaign. And
the recently finalized U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA)—a statement of
4 General Stanley McChrystal, COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, August 30, 2009, available in redacted form from the
Washington Post, at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf.
The author was part of that assessment team.
5 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, West Point, NY, December 1, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan.
6 NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration, Lisbon, Portugal, November 20, 2010, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease.
7 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, Washington, DC, June 22,
2011, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/22/remarks-president-way-forward-
afghanistan.
8 Chicago Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North
Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease.
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In Brief: Next Steps in the War in Afghanistan? Issues for Congress
mutual commitment in multiple arenas—is scheduled to remain in force throughout the
Transformation period.9
Some practitioners and observers, pointing to the series of tightening constraints, note that the
overall campaign remains based on the same two core goals but must now meet them with less
time and fewer resources. For some, that raises a basic question: to what extent, if any, do recent
additional constraints on time and resources introduce greater risk—in terms of cost, time,
casualties, or ability to accomplish the mission? Others suggest that any such risks may be
mitigated to some extent by the longer timeline for international commitment, depending on what
forms that commitment takes.
Current Debates
For some observers, the U.S. debates about the way forward in Afghanistan are apparently over—
a strategic direction has been adopted and the only remaining questions concern execution. Others
suggest otherwise, noting that rarely is an adopted policy framework completely immutable, and
pointing to an array of choices within the current policy framework concerning the extent of
further U.S commitment and the forms it might take.
Troop Levels and the Campaign
For many observers, whether supporters or critics of the effort, U.S. troop levels are the starting
point of the debates—the most powerful, visible marker of the extent of U.S. commitment and an
indication of how far the fight has progressed. A number of observers have argued for
“accelerating” the pace of U.S. troop drawdowns from Afghanistan, while others, including some
commanders on the ground, have supported keeping as many troops in theater as possible through
the 2013 fighting season, as well as a residual troop presence after 2014.
Over the past year, basic policy parameters for future U.S. troop levels have become clearer. In
his May 2012 speech at Bagram, President Obama confirmed that after the return to the pre-surge
level of 68,000 troops by September 2012, further drawdowns would continue at a steady pace.
While the precise timing of those further drawdowns has not yet been announced, ISAF
Commander General Allen has stated that after the “surge recovery” is completed, he will assess
conditions and then provide the President with recommendations regarding further drawdowns.
Beyond 2014, the President has added, some U.S. troops may remain in Afghanistan—pending
the outcome of U.S.-Afghan negotiations designed to achieve a Bilateral Security Agreement
(BSA)—to pursue “two narrow security missions”, counter-terrorism and training the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF).10
9 Ibid., and Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan, May 2, 2012, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-
afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf.
10 See Remarks by President Obama in Address to the Nation from Afghanistan, May 1, 2012, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/01/remarks-president-address-nation-afghanistan; and DoD News
Briefing with General John Allen from the Pentagon, May 23, 2012, available at http://www.deffense/gov/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5040. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on March 22,
2012, Gen Allen stated that 68,000 is a “good going-in number” for thinking about U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan.
NATO, for its part, has announced the intention to establish a new “training, advising and assistance mission” in
(continued...)
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In Brief: Next Steps in the War in Afghanistan? Issues for Congress
For those for whom the primary imperative is to bring the troops home, the conditions on the
ground in Afghanistan may be largely irrelevant. But for those concerned with outcomes in
Afghanistan, it may be helpful to consider the troop numbers debate in terms of both remaining
requirements and the contributions of all non-U.S. forces in Afghanistan—including the extent of
coalition contributions, and the capacity and capabilities of the ANSF.
Campaign-driven requirements have evolved somewhat in recent years:
• In 2009, the McChrystal assessment introduced geographic prioritization of effort
across the entire Afghan theater. The campaign named southern Afghanistan,
including the Taliban’s traditional homeland in Kandahar province, and its
breadbasket next door in Helmand province, the “main effort.” Parts of eastern
Afghanistan, where insurgents, particularly the Haqqani network, enjoyed
sanctuaries and transit routes out to safe havens in Pakistan, were the collective
second priority. The designation of the south as the main effort—designed in part
to send a signal of resolve to the Taliban—also had practical implications in
terms of the allocation of forces, the availability of intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and Afghan and coalition leadership time and
attention.11
• Three years later, commanders on the ground point to significant progress against
the Taliban in the south but argue that it’s not over there yet—a substantial
Afghan army and police force, backed up by coalition forces, will be required in
order to consolidate the gains achieved. ISAF has been reluctant to formally shift
the campaign’s main effort to the east, given both the strategic significance of
Kandahar and the implications that would carry for the availability of personnel
and resources in the south.
• Meanwhile, the security challenges in eastern Afghanistan have grown, if
anything, increasingly complex. Afghan and coalition forces operating in eastern
Afghanistan have given top priority to protecting Kabul and securing the
provinces immediately south of it, down Highway 1 toward Kandahar. That was
in part a response to increased targeting of Kabul by the Haqqani network, who
were reportedly pressured by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to do so.
But the relatively limited availability of forces has meant relatively deliberate
progress. Key supporting efforts for the combined force in eastern Afghanistan
include continuing to disrupt Haqqani movement and sanctuaries in their
traditional tribal homeland, further to the east, and also securing the long border
with Pakistan—a particular challenge in part because of all the Afghan security
forces, the Afghan Border Police have benefited the least from close unit-to-unit
partnership with coalition forces. Further, ISAF officials have observed,
(...continued)
Afghanistan, after the conclusion of the ISAF mission at the end of 2014. See Chicago Summit Declaration on
Afghanistan issued by the Heads of State and Government of Afghanistan and Nations contributing to the NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), May 21, 2012, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
official_texts_87595.htm.
11 General Stanley McChrystal, COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, note 2, supra; and interviews with ISAF officials
2009, 2010, 2011.
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sometimes with bewilderment, the strong and growing focus of senior Afghan
security officials on relatively remote Nuristan and upper Kunar provinces.12
Another important component of the requirement for U.S. troops concerns the contributions likely
to be provided over time by other security forces. Key troop contributors to ISAF have signaled
their intent to drawdown or withdraw altogether, and the ISAF mission as a whole is scheduled to
conclude by the end of 2014.13 The ANSF—which will in any case bear the long-term
responsibility—are scheduled to grow to a target endstrength of 352,000, including both army
and police, by October 2012. Participants at the NATO Chicago Summit broadly agreed on a
subsequent “gradual managed force reduction…to a sustainable level”, with a working target of
228,500.14
Real future contributions of the ANSF are likely to depend not only on total endstrength, but also
on their operational effectiveness and the institutional abilities of the Afghan system to manage
and supply them; on the force mix (including high-end forces, regular army, police, border police)
within the total endstrength; on contributions from auxiliary entities such as the Afghan Local
Police (ALP), community-based forces vetted by local traditional leaders and under the formal
authority of the Ministry of Interior; and on key decisions about force employment including
where to focus and where to assume risk.
Questions that might help inform the debates about the next steps for U.S. troop levels include:
• How much must the level of insurgent threat in Afghanistan be reduced, to help
ensure that Afghan forces can contend successfully with the residual challenge
with minimal international assistance? To what extent is the participation of U.S.
forces in combined operations now with Afghan partners still necessary to reduce
that threat sufficiently?
• What other purposes does a U.S. force presence need to serve, if any, toward
meeting U.S. core goals—for example, serving as a deterrent to those who would
challenge Afghanistan’s sovereignty, or providing leverage for U.S. efforts to
help shape a broader political settlement process aimed at ending the war?
• To what extent if any must the objectives of the combined campaign be scaled
back given the constraints on the scope and duration of future U.S. troop
presence?
• How should differences be reconciled when Afghan and U.S. campaign priorities
diverge?
• How good do Afghan forces need to be, to contend effectively with a residual
insurgent threat? What total ANSF endstrength, and what force mix, will that
12 Interviews with ISAF officials, 2011; and Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability
in Afghanistan,” April 2012, available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_27_12.pdf.
13 For example, it is the French stated intent to withdraw all of its forces by the end of 2012, and the United Kingdom
has announced that as a first step it will withdraw 500 of its 9,500 troops in 2012. See Carol Matlock, “France
Confirms Afghanistan Troop Withdrawal Plan, AFP Reports,” Bloomberg, June 9, 2012; and Nick Hopkins, “500
Troops To Be Withdrawn from Afghanistan, Says Defence Secretary,” The Guardian, April 26, 2012.
14 Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan issued by the Heads of State and Government of Afghanistan and
Nations contributing to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), May 21, 2012, available at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm.
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require over time? How much risk, and of what kinds, do incremental reductions
in future ANSF endstrength introduce?
• To what extent is a continued U.S. force presence after 2014—and with what
force mix, and for how long—necessary to help bolster ANSF ability?
• To what extent if any does Afghan reliance on the ALP—typically deeply rooted
in local communities, but not trained to the level of regular forces, and regarded
skeptically by regular security force leaders as lacking national-level loyalties—
contribute to or alternatively threaten Afghanistan’s future stability?
Transition and Change of Mission
All major stakeholders have agreed that central to the way forward in Afghanistan is shifting
increasing responsibility for security to Afghan forces. That shift is codified at the strategic level
in the formal process of Transition, and it is often discussed, at the operational level, in terms of a
“change of mission” for U.S. and other international forces. The two concepts are linked but not
isomorphic, and they are often poorly understood, in part because the premises of Transition have
changed over time and because the role of coalition forces on the ground is constantly evolving.
The greatest danger, some observers suggest, may be logically conflating formal shifts with actual
improvements in the competence of Afghan forces.
The concept of transition has evolved since its launch several years ago:
• President Karzai introduced the terms and timeline of the debate, in his
November 2009 presidential inaugural address and in his opening remark to the
January 2010 London Conference. He argued that within five years—by the end
of 2014—Afghan would “take the lead in ensuring security and stability across
the country.”15
• At the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO and Afghanistan
codified the Transition process, by which lead responsibility for security would
transition from coalition forces to Afghans, place by place across the country in a
series of tranches; and Afghans would exercise full responsibility for security
across the country by the end of 2014. Decisions to begin the transition process
were to be “conditions-based”, drawing not only on security conditions and the
abilities of the ANSF in a given location, but also on the extent of competent
governance.
• By the NATO Chicago Summit in May 2012, an approach driven more by
timelines than conditions had emerged.16 The governments of Afghanistan and
15 See President Karzai, Inauguration Speech, November 19, 2009; and President Karzai, Opening Remarks, London
Conference, January 28, 2010.
16 Most observers agree that there are substantial differences in conditions among the Transition tranches announced so
far. Tranche 1, announced in March 2011, included benign locales such as Panjshir and Bamiyan provinces, which had
barely if at all suffered from malign external influence. Tranche 2, announced in November 2011, included former hot
spots in the campaign’s main effort in the south, including Marja, Nawa and Nad-e Ali districts of Helmand province,
where sustained combined operations over time had significantly degraded the insurgency. Tranche 3, announced in
May 2012, included 122 districts as well as all remaining provincial capitals—covering a wide array of security and
governance conditions. Remaining territory includes, significantly, much of the area along Afghanistan’s eastern border
with Pakistan. See NATO Backgrounder, “Transition to Afghan Lead: Inteqal,” available at http://www.nato.int/
(continued...)
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troop-contributing nations agreed on a new “milestone”—that all parts of
Afghanistan would begin the process of transition, and thus that Afghans would
be in the lead everywhere, by mid-2013.17 Many observers agree that while such
an approach may have utility in terms of encouraging Afghans to do more, or in
terms of communicating progress to external audiences, a timeline-driven
approach loses its utility as a measure of progress.
When U.S. military commanders on the ground talk about transition—which Gen Allen has called
“the linchpin of our strategy”18—they generally mean not the policy decisions per se but rather
the growing capabilities of their Afghan counterparts, and the corresponding evolution of the role
of their own forces. The concept of shifting “from combat to support” has engendered some
confusion by suggesting a flip-of-the-switch change on a date certain. In fact, the relationship
between Afghan and coalition forces has evolved continually and markedly over time:
• One of the central tenets of the 2009 McChrystal review was the need for
enhanced “unit partnering,” in which like Afghan and coalition units live, train,
plan, and execute together, 24/7. The premise is that partnering jumpstarts a
partner force’s capabilities, including leadership, by “showing” not just “telling.”
In this construct, coalition units are bolstering their partners’ capabilities while
participating directly in combined operations targeting the insurgencies.19
• As unit partnering matured, particularly with the Afghan National Army,
coalition forces leaned forward into the next phase—drawing back, doing less
themselves, and encouraging Afghans to make Afghan systems work. Key
questions from ISAF commanders to their own subordinates included: What
essential things does your Afghan partner unit still have a hard time with? What
is your plan to help them get there? How much time will that take? In contrast to
a blanket “mission change” declaration, such de facto transition has taken place
unit-by-unit, and location-by-location.20 Senior officials have stressed that even
as U.S. forces step back they will remain “combat-capable.”21
• Meanwhile, 2012 has witnessed the introduction to theater of Security Force
Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAATs)—small teams that embed with much larger
(...continued)
nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20120516_media_backgrounder_transition_en.pdf.
17 Yet some rhetorical confusion persists about what that 2013 milestone signifies. President Obama stated that it would
signal ANSF lead “for combat operations”; Gen Allen stated that ANSF would move into the lead for “counter-
insurgency”; while formal NATO rhetoric, broadly reinforcing Gen Allen’s statement, indicates that Afghans will
assume the lead for security writ large. See Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan issued by the Heads of State
and Government of Afghanistan and Nations contributing to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF), May 21, 2012, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm; Remarks by
President Obama in Address to the Nation from Afghanistan, May 1, 2012, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2012/05/01/remarks-president-address-nation-afghanistan; and DoD News Briefing with Gen John
Allen from the Pentagon, May 23, 2012, available at http://www.deffense/gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=
5040.
18 DoD News Briefing with Gen John Allen from the Pentagon, May 23, 2012, available at http://www.deffense/gov/
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5040.
19 General Stanley McChrystal, COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, and interviews with ISAF officials, 2009 and 2010.
20 Interviews with ISAF officials, 2011 and 2012.
21 DoD News Briefing with Gen John Allen from the Pentagon, May 23, 2012, available at http://www.deffense/gov/
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5040.
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Afghan units to provide advisory support and some connectivity to the larger
coalition force. Commanders underscore that the shift from unit partnership to
advisory teams should not necessarily be consecutive—what makes better sense
is to gradually decrease the roles played by coalition force partner units, to
introduce advisory teams, to “let Afghan units fail” to some extent, but to
maintain a sufficient coalition combat force presence during that process to “pick
up the pieces” or prevent catastrophic failure if necessary.22
An even deeper change in the mission of U.S. forces in Afghanistan is contemplated after 2014.
The signed SPA commits the U.S. and Afghan governments to begin negotiations on a Bilateral
Security Agreement (BSA), to be completed within one year, to govern any future U.S. force
presence; and it suggests that future roles might include combating al Qaeda and affiliates and
training the ANSF.23
Questions that might help inform the debates about transition and change of mission include:
• Under an advisory construct, what is the proper division of labor over time
between coalition units and advisory teams?
• To what extent does an increased emphasis on developing ANSF counterparts
come at the expense of continuing to reduce the threats insurgents pose to
stability in Afghanistan? Or can increasingly capable ANSF backed up by
coalition forces make roughly similar progress?
• As the ANSF assume greater responsibilities, is it acceptable—or even desirable,
as a spur toward learning—for them to “fail” in some ways?
• How appropriate—and clearly understood—are U.S. and coalition standards for
knowing when to step in?
• What effects, exactly, might a post-2014 U.S. military presence in Afghanistan be
designed to achieve?
Economy
Afghanistan’s ability to sustain itself after reductions in contributions by the international
community was long the little-discussed “elephant in the room” in strategic-level debates,
perhaps because the challenge seemed so daunting. More recently, however, the Afghan
Government and the international community have worked more concertedly on realistic
economic development plans.
That intensified focus was catalyzed in part by one of the largest looming challenges—sustaining
the ANSF. In that arena, the NATO Chicago Summit unveiled a compromise way forward: ANSF
endstrength will be sustained at its peak level of 352,000 troops until approximately 2017, then
reduced to approximately 228,500 troops; the international community will initially contribute the
22 Interviews with U.S. official, 2011 and 2012.
23 Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan, May 2, 2012, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-
afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf.
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lion’s share of the estimated $4.1 billion annual bill to sustain the force; and the Afghan
Government will increasingly assume financial responsibility.24
New economic approaches, at both strategic and operational levels, moderate earlier aspirations
and attempt to map plans against a timeline:
• At the strategic level, key documents associated with the so-called Kabul Process
stress bringing international assistance on-budget and aligning activities by
Afghan priorities. They emphasize focusing on prioritized Afghan systems—
infrastructure, transportation, financial mechanisms, the judicial sector, and
human capital—and making them work.25
• At the operational level, practitioners refer to a “paradigm shift” in both the
theory and practice of U.S. civilian and military assistance efforts. The new
operational-level thinking is based on the same basic tenet—making Afghan
systems work—with a practical focus on doing less and spending less money
directly while providing technical assistance. Many practitioners and observers
argue that a shift in economic approaches is long overdue, since years of
relatively indiscriminate spending led to an array of unproductive or
counterproductive results. These, it is argued, have included an inability to track
money spent; the flow of assistance funds out of the country; the distortion of
labor markets; investment in systems or components that Afghans did not want or
could not sustain; and the empowerment of “thugs.”26
Questions that might help inform the debates about the next steps for Afghanistan’s economy
include:
• What kind of a system can the likely future Afghan economy—barring
exogenous shocks to the system—realistically be expected to support?
• What legal constructs and accountability mechanisms would have to be in place,
and what other minimum conditions met, in order for Afghanistan to realize its
maximum potential—given its mineral resources and potential agricultural
productivity—as a fiscally self-sufficient state?
24 Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan issued by the Heads of State and Government of Afghanistan and
Nations contributing to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), May 21, 2012, available at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm.
25 See Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Towards a Self-Sustaining Afghanistan: An Economic
Transition Strategy, November 29, 2011; and Afghanistan and the International Community: From Transition to the
Transformation Decade, Conference Conclusions, the International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, December 5,
2011, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/afghanistan/docs/2011_11_conclusions_bonn_en.pdf. For more explicitly U.S.
Government perspective, see National Security Staff, U.S. Economic Strategy for Afghanistan, December 2, 2011,
crafted in response to the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, P.L. 111-383, January
7, 2011, Section 1535; and Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States of America and the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, May 2, 2012, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf.
26 Interviews with U.S. Embassy Kabul and ISAF officials, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012. The November 2010 Bonn
concluding document also stressed the shift from service delivery to capacity-building, see Afghanistan and the
International Community: From Transition to the Transformation Decade, Conference Conclusions, the International
Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, December 5, 2011, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/afghanistan/docs/
2011_11_conclusions_bonn_en.pdf.
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• As the balance of U.S. support shifts from providing things—a role that has
given the U.S. government a prominent seat at the table—to providing advice,
will the U.S. government be able to maintain sufficient leverage—for example, to
encourage accountability and to help shape a political settlement process?
• Given that most observers agree that it will take time for Afghans to develop the
ability to generate, collect, and spend revenues, and that international assistance
is likely to diminish significantly in the near-term, what are the risks to Afghan
stability in the near-term? To what extent and in what ways might the
international community help mitigate these risks?
• While recent commitments from the U.S. Government and NATO extend the
timeline of “commitment” out to 2024, how realistic is that longer timeline for
Afghans to build a largely self-sustaining economy? What minimum conditions
would that require, and what is it possible to achieve by the end of the period of
transformation in 2024?
• Professions of commitment notwithstanding, how much assistance are members
of the international community likely to provide to Afghanistan through 2024,
given the significant financial pressures and competing demands that they are
likely to face?
• In a very practical sense, to what extent will the significant reduction in the U.S.
troop presence over time affect the ability of U.S. Government civilians to
support Afghan development efforts in a still-somewhat-unsettled security
environment? What useful lessons might be drawn from the somewhat analogous
so-called “transition” in Iraq, including the validity of the planning assumptions
applied in that case?27
• To what extent does the proposed dramatic reduction in ANSF total
endstrength—designed in part to significantly reduce pressure on the future
Afghan budget—introduce additional risk? To what extent will a smaller total
force be able to protect Afghan interests, and U.S. interests in the region? How
can Afghanistan best mitigate the risks, financial and otherwise, of demobilizing
thousands of young men with well-developed weapons skills but few other
economic prospects?
Governance
An array of triggers—including the 2010 Kabul Bank crisis, doubts about Afghanistan’s political
future after its 2014 presidential elections, and a heightened sense that the leverage of the
international community may diminish with troop drawdowns and decreased assistance—has
pushed the Afghanistan debates to recognize the importance of “good governance” to
Afghanistan’s future stability but also to weigh “how much is enough.” Many observers point to
an apparent lowering of expectations in this arena on the part of the international community.
• The 2009 McChrystal assessment argued boldly that governance should be on par
with security as a focus of the campaign. The basic theory was that the primary
27 Many observers have suggested that the use of the term “transition” in Iraq was often misunderstood as suggesting an
assumption by the Department of State of all the roles previously played by DoD.
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In Brief: Next Steps in the War in Afghanistan? Issues for Congress
arbiter of lasting stability in Afghanistan is the Afghan people—the extent to
which they accept the system and are able to hold it accountable. Accountability
measures—of which, after decades of upheaval, Afghanistan enjoyed few—
might include everything from formal elections, to the traditional voice of
inclusive local councils, to a vibrant media, to a robust civil society. If the people
viewed government officials as looking out for themselves and not for the people,
they would be more likely to reject the system and to refuse to participate in it.
So, the theory ran, the international community—while it enjoyed significant
leverage—should help the Afghan people foster accountable governance.28
• Subsequently, some of the international community’s efforts to support good
governance matured and bore fruit. At sub-national levels of governance, the
international community, prompted by complaints by Afghan local communities,
worked with Afghan ministries to bring about the removal—not just the
“recycling” to other posts—of some particularly pernicious district-level
officials.29
• At higher levels of authority within the Afghan system, the challenges proved
more intractable. Some international practitioners long argued for seeking the
removal from office of Afghan powerbrokers—such as Brigadier General Razziq,
the Acting Provincial Chief of Police in Kandahar, and Governor Sherzai of
Nangarhar province—who were perceived by some to be working for themselves
rather than for all the Afghan people in their respective areas. Yet it was a more
pragmatic, laissez-faire approach toward governance that gained traction:
“shaping” the incentive structure for some powerbrokers and encouraging them
to behave more, rather than less, constructively. Broadly in this vein, some
practitioners contended that the international community, with its limited
language skills and cultural awareness, could hardly be savvy enough to
understand all the subtleties of Afghan relationship networks and power
structures. Others argued that de facto Afghan authority structures, including
powerbrokers who naturally command attention when they walk into the room
and can “get things done,” might be a sufficient basis for stability in the Afghan
context.30
• The most recent strategic guidance reflects the growing view that fostering good
governance is really hard and takes time. Key documents still call for countering
corruption, but with a subtle shift: countering corruption is now overwhelmingly
an Afghan responsibility, while the very circumscribed role of the international
community is to foster specific Afghan capabilities. That change in approach is
echoed in accounts from many U.S. Government civilian practitioners on the
ground, who increasingly describe their roles in terms of building capacity rather
than fostering accountability.31
28 General Stanley McChrystal, COMISAF’s Initial Assessment.
29 Interviews with ISAF officials, 2009, 2010, 2011.
30 Interviews with U.S. Embassy Kabul and ISAF officials, 2011 and 2012.
31 Participants in the NATO Chicago Summit reminded the Afghan Government of its commitment “to a democratic
society, based on the rule of law and good governance, including progress in the fight against corruption.…” The U.S.-
Afghan SPA describes a division of labor in which the Afghan Government will improve governance by increasing
responsiveness and transparency, including efficiency and accountability at all levels, to better meet the Afghan
people’s needs, while the U.S. will focus on capacity-building. Interviews with ISAF officials, 2011 and 2012, and see
(continued...)
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In Brief: Next Steps in the War in Afghanistan? Issues for Congress
Questions that might help inform the debates about the next steps in Afghan governance include:
• What kind of durable stability can be achieved in a system based in part on self-
interested powerbrokers largely unconstrained by accountability mechanisms?
How might such an arrangement be expected to affect U.S. interests, if at all, in
the longer-run?
• How do Afghans envisage “accountability” and the mechanisms necessary to
make it work? What might the U.S. government do to support their vision?
• What forms of leverage, to encourage greater accountability, might the U.S.
Government theoretically still be able to exercise, between now and 2014, and
after 2014?
• To what extent do alternative voices in Afghanistan—including civil society, the
private sector, the media, and traditional local authority structures—have the
potential to provide a system of checks and balances by which the Afghan people
can hold government accountable? To what extent are any such accountability
measures likely to be able to exert influence to shape the 2014 presidential
elections, or a reconciliation process designed to bring the war to an end?
Pakistan
Successful counter-insurgency generally relies on “smothering” an insurgency within a closed
environment. Pakistan—Afghanistan’s permanent neighbor—has long posed a conundrum for the
campaign in Afghanistan by offering safe havens to Afghan insurgent leaders and fighters. The
access those havens provide to recruiting, financing, training, and leadership direction grossly
complicates the campaign in Afghanistan, making it far more difficult to deprive the insurgencies
of the “oxygen” lifelines they need.
The challenge these safe havens pose to the campaign has not abated over time:
• The 2009 McChrystal assessment deemed Pakistan a serious concern. Campaign
planning at that time assumed that Pakistan would take some action against
Afghan insurgent safe havens. Commanders considered that without such action,
the risk to the campaign in Afghanistan would be substantial.32
• Then for several years, cooperative initiatives flourished. These included border
coordination meetings at the tactical level, combined trilateral planning
(including both Pakistanis and Afghans) at the operational level, and coordinated
operations on either side of the border designed to leave insurgents with nowhere
to go. Commanders reported the strengthening of personal relationships through
(...continued)
Chicago Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North
Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease; and Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United
States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, May 2, 2012, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf.
32 General Stanley McChrystal, COMISAF’s Initial Assessment.
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In Brief: Next Steps in the War in Afghanistan? Issues for Congress
these activities. Yet Pakistani forces apparently remained unwilling, or incapable,
or both, of taking action against Afghan insurgent safe havens.33
• In 2011, two developments shattered any accumulated mutual confidence. The
U.S. action against Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on May 2, 2011,
was viewed by some in Pakistan as an egregious violation of Pakistani
sovereignty, but also left many in the U.S. with the view that bin Laden could not
have found sanctuary for so long without some official Pakistani knowledge or
support. The November 2011 cross-border in which, due to apparent
miscommunications, U.S. fires killed Pakistani troops in Mohmand agency, led to
some measure of Pakistani outrage.34
• As of mid-2012, U.S. officials cautiously report that efforts, such as
consultations, have resumed, aimed at rebuilding mil-to-mil relationships with
Pakistan. Goals include the resumption of tactical-level border coordination,
including institutionalizing more effective communications to prevent repetitions
of the November 2011 event; and the future conduct of coordinated operations on
both sides of the border. Yet U.S. commanders suggest that their planning
assumptions have changed considerably, compared to three years earlier—little to
no Pakistani action against Afghan insurgent safe havens is expected. That
means, they explain, greater requirements for Afghans to provide a bulwark
against incursions, measured in terms of the strength of Afghan forces, the
competence of the border regime, and the refusal of local Afghan communities to
tolerate an insurgent presence in their midst. One more specific implication,
commanders add, is the need to array the ANSF differently, with a greater focus
on eastern Afghanistan, from the border to Kabul, than might otherwise have
been planned.35
Questions that might help inform the debates about the implications of persistent safe havens in
Pakistan include:
• What results can realistically be expected in the near- to medium-term from U.S.
and Afghan mil-to-mil engagement with Pakistani forces?
• To what extent might alternative approaches, such as U.S. drone strikes, be relied
on to reduce the threat from Afghan insurgent safe havens inside Pakistan? How
do the effects of a de-capitation drone strike compare to those of clearing and
holding operations? What other risks if any do such strikes introduce?
• To what extent does current U.S. strategic thinking assume that a political
settlement of the war in Afghanistan—a “deal”—would result in the permanent
closure of safe havens? If circumstances in Pakistan do not change, what would
33 Interviews with U.S., Afghan, Pakistani officials, 2009, 2010, 2011.
34 Investigation into the Incident in Vicinity of the Salala Checkpoint on the Night of 25-26 Nov 2011, redacted, a
report by Brig Gen Stephen A. Clark, U.S. Central Command, December 26, 2011, available at
http://www.centcom.mil/images/stories/Crossborder/report%20exsum%20further%20redacted.pdf.
35 Interviews with ISAF officials, 2011 and 2012. And see Gen Allen, Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on
Afghanistan, transcript, March 22, 2012; and DoD News Briefing with LTG Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander,
International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, June 11, 2012, available at http://www.defense.gov/
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5059.
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prevent some current or future insurgent leaders from making use of the same
safe havens?
• To what extent does the persistence of safe havens in Pakistan increase the
requirements for Afghan resilience? What forms would that resilience have to
take, to ensure that Afghan—and U.S.—interests are protected? What risks might
any additional requirements pose to other aspects of the campaign, by reducing
available resources?
How Does This End?
Many observers suggest that, particularly in the wake of the NATO Chicago Summit, an
unprecedentedly clear “way forward” has emerged for in Afghanistan, including major
components of the effort as well as a longer and more realistic timeline for international
engagement. Yet some suggest that these major components are still not linked together in a
single coherent strategic roadmap, one that begins with a vision of endstate that protects U.S.
interests, includes the minimum essential conditions necessary to realize that endstate, articulates
a strategic logic that connects the major components of the effort, and juxtaposes that roadmap
against a clear timeline.
In particular, some suggest, grave conceptual confusion persists about how the war itself ends. In
some circles, and in particular at the operational and tactical levels, it appears that the “theory of
victory” for the war in Afghanistan, the logic that links current approaches to a desired endstate,
is the gradual accretion of gains in Afghan civilian and security capability, together with an
incrementally diminished insurgency. In other circles, primary emphasis is placed on achieving a
negotiated settlement among the parties in conflict. The U.S. Government has clearly indicated its
support for an Afghan-led process of reconciliation of former insurgent leaders.36 Both of those
logics, in turn, would seem to challenge the notion that the U.S. Government can unilaterally
“wind down” the war.
Questions that might help inform the debates about how the war in Afghanistan ends include:
• How well do the major components of the effort—the campaign on the ground,
and political settlement efforts including a reconciliation process, as well as
economic and regional approaches—fit together and inform each other, in a
single roadmap, against a timeline? What assumptions does that roadmap make?
What risks does it allow?
36 U.S. policy originally named three criteria—renunciation of al Qaeda, rejection of violence, and acceptance of the
Afghan Constitution—as preconditions for participation in a reconciliation process, but was later revised, naming those
criteria necessary “outcomes” of reconciliation, thereby lowering the bar to the start of talk. See “Clinton Backs Talks
with Moderate Taliban,” CNN, March 31, 2009, based on her remarks at a conference at The Hague aimed at
international support for stabilizing Afghanistan; and, announcing the shift, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton,
Remarks at the Launch of the Asia Society’s Series of Richard C. Holbrooke Memorial Addresses, New York, NY,
February 18, 2011, available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156815.htm. The SPA echoes that position,
see Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan, May 2, 2012, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-
afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf.
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• As part of that comprehensive roadmap, what roles should the U.S. government
play? What roles are more appropriately played by other actors, first of all
Afghans, and also including other members of the international community?
• What are the respective roles of the campaign on the ground, and of political
settlement efforts, in bringing the war in Afghanistan to a close? Does the
campaign create conditions that may produce a political settlement? Does a well-
crafted reconciliation bring the campaign on the ground to a close? Is either, or
are both, essential?
• How inclusive must a settlement process be in order to help ensure the durability
of any agreement achieved, and to counter-balance natural hedging behavior
under the patronage of various power-brokers in the face of deep uncertainty
about the future and decades of grim experience in the past? How important is
the active participation in a national settlement process—not just the post facto
buy-in—of key groups such as civil society, the media, and the private sector, as
well as traditional authority structures? How if at all should the U.S. Government
help foster such inclusiveness?
• To what extent if any does persistent corruption pose a challenge to the campaign
on the ground or to an effective settlement process? What if the Afghan people
do not view any of their apparent political choices as viable?
• Given the full panoply of U.S. national security interests and broader concerns,
what should be the relative priority of Afghanistan, between now and 2014, and
after 2014, for the U.S. government?
Author Contact Information
Catherine Dale
Specialist in International Security
cdale@crs.loc.gov, 7-8983
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