Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
May 3, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL30588
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Summary
The Obama Administration and several of its partner countries are seeking to reduce U.S. military
involvement in Afghanistan without jeopardizing existing gains. In a May 1, 2012, visit to
Afghanistan, President Obama said the United States and its partners are within reach of the
fundamental goal of defeating Al Qaeda, and he signed a strategic partnership agreement that will
keep small amounts of U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014 as advisors and trainers. During
2011-2014, the United States and its partners are gradually transferring overall security
responsibility to Afghan security forces. U.S. forces, which peaked at about 99,000 in June 2011,
are being reduced to about 68,000 by September 2012, and President Obama said that “reductions
will continue at a steady pace” from then until the completion of the transition to Afghan lead at
the end of 2014. A key to the transition is to place Afghan forces in the security lead, with U.S.
military involvement changing from combat to a training and advising role, by mid-2013.
The Administration view is that, no matter the U.S. and allied drawdown schedule, security gains
could be at risk from weak Afghan governance and insurgent safe haven in Pakistan. This latter
factor is widely noted as a potential threat to Afghan stability well after the 2014 transition.
Afghan governance is perceived as particularly weak and corrupt, despite the holding of regular
elections since 2004 and the establishment of several overlapping anti-corruption institutions.
As the transition proceeds, there is increasing emphasis on negotiating a settlement to the conflict.
That process has proceeded sporadically since 2010, and has not, by all accounts, advanced to a
discussion of specific proposals to settle the conflict, although there have been discussions of a
ceasefire. Afghanistan’s minorities and women’s groups worry about a potential settlement,
fearing it might produce compromises with the Taliban that erode human rights and ethnic power-
sharing.
To promote long-term growth and prevent a severe economic downturn as international donors
scale back their involvement in Afghanistan, U.S. officials also hope to draw on Afghanistan’s
vast mineral and agricultural resources. Several major privately funded mining, agricultural, and
even energy development programs have begun in the past few years, with more in various stages
of consideration. U.S. officials also look to greater Afghanistan integration into regional trade and
investment patterns—as part of a “New Silk Road (NSR)” economic strategy—to help
compensate for the anticipated reduction in foreign economic involvement in Afghanistan.
Even if these economic efforts succeed, Afghanistan will likely remain dependent on foreign aid
indefinitely. Through the end of FY2011, the United States has provided over $67 billion in
assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $39 billion has been to
equip and train Afghan forces. During FY2001-FY2011, the Afghan intervention has cost about
$443 billion, including all costs. For FY2012, about $16 billion in aid (including train and equip)
is to be provided, in addition to about $90 billion for U.S. military operations there, and $9.2
billion in aid is requested for FY2013. In apparent recognition that Afghanistan will remain
dependent on foreign aid for at least a decade after the 2014 transition, the strategic partnership
agreement signed May 1 provides for Administration efforts to provide unspecified amounts of
aid to Afghanistan until 2024. See CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.
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Contents
Background...................................................................................................................................... 1
From Early History to the 19th Century ..................................................................................... 1
Early 20th Century and Cold War Era ........................................................................................ 1
Soviet Invasion and Occupation Period..................................................................................... 2
The Seven Major “Mujahedin” Parties and Their Activities............................................... 3
Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal........................................................................ 3
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban................................................................ 4
Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001)...................................................................... 5
U.S. Policy Toward the Taliban During Its Rule/Bin Laden Presence................................ 5
The “Northern Alliance” Congeals...................................................................................... 6
Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 ................................................................................................. 7
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom ................................................... 7
Post-Taliban Governance-Building Efforts ............................................................................... 9
U.S. and International Civilian Policy Structure............................................................... 11
Security Policy, 2011-2014 “Transition, and Beyond” .................................................................. 13
Who Is “The Enemy”? Taliban, Haqqani, Al Qaeda, and Others............................................ 13
Groups: The Taliban (“Quetta Shura Taliban”) ................................................................. 13
Al Qaeda/Bin Laden.......................................................................................................... 14
Hikmatyar Faction............................................................................................................. 15
Haqqani Faction ................................................................................................................ 15
Pakistani Groups ............................................................................................................... 17
Insurgent Tactics................................................................................................................ 17
Insurgent Financing: Narcotics Trafficking and Other Methods....................................... 18
The U.S.-Led Military Effort: 2001-2008 ............................................................................... 19
Perception of “Victory,” Followed by Setback and Deterioration..................................... 19
Obama Administration Surge .................................................................................................. 20
Review and December 1, 2009, Surge and Transition Announcement ............................. 21
July 2011 “Deadline” Becomes “Transition” By the End of 2014.................................... 21
Surge Implementation and Results.................................................................................... 22
Transition and Drawdown ....................................................................................................... 24
Unwinding of the Surge Announced June 22, 2011 .......................................................... 24
Mission Changes with Drawdown: Faster Transition to Afghan Combat Lead................ 25
Legislatively Mandated Accelerated Drawdown?............................................................. 26
Beyond 2014: Long-Term Commitment/Strategic Partnership Agreement/Alternatives ........ 26
Strategic Partnership Agreement ....................................................................................... 27
Threats to Long-Term U.S. Presence: Civilian Casualties and Quran-Mishandling
Protests ........................................................................................................................... 29
Alternatives for the Post-Transition Period....................................................................... 30
Transition Pillar: Building Afghan Forces and Establishing Rule of Law .............................. 31
Current and Post-2014 Size of the Force........................................................................... 32
ANSF Funding .................................................................................................................. 32
Training Overview ............................................................................................................ 33
The Afghan National Army (ANA)................................................................................... 34
Afghan Air Force............................................................................................................... 35
Afghan National Police (ANP) ......................................................................................... 35
Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector................................................................................. 39
Policy Component: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) ................................................ 39
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Karzai Criticism of PRTs................................................................................................... 40
Cooperation With Allies/Managing the 2014 Exit................................................................... 40
Major Contingent Developments During the U.S. “Surge” .............................................. 42
Security/Political Initiatives To Facilitate the Transition ........................................................ 43
“Reintegration” and “Reconciliation” With Insurgents..................................................... 43
Regional Dimension ...................................................................................................................... 47
Pakistan/Pakistan-Afghanistan Border .................................................................................... 50
Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations ........................................................................................ 51
Iran........................................................................................................................................... 52
Iran’s Development Aid for Afghanistan........................................................................... 53
Iranian Assistance to Afghan Militants and to Pro-Iranian Groups and Regions.............. 53
Bilateral Government-to-Government Relations .............................................................. 54
India......................................................................................................................................... 55
India’s Development Activities in Afghanistan................................................................. 55
Russia, Central Asian States, and China.................................................................................. 56
Russia/Northern Distribution Network ............................................................................. 56
Central Asian States .......................................................................................................... 57
China ................................................................................................................................. 59
Persian Gulf States................................................................................................................... 59
UAE Involvement ............................................................................................................. 60
Qatar.................................................................................................................................. 60
Keys to Afghanistan’s Post-War Future: U.S. and International Aid and
Economic Development.............................................................................................................. 61
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan................................................................................................ 61
Aid Oversight .................................................................................................................... 62
Aid Authorization: Afghanistan Freedom Support Act ..................................................... 62
Direct Support to the Afghan Government........................................................................ 63
Sustaining Aid Beyond the Transition............................................................................... 65
Development in Key Sectors ................................................................................................... 66
Education........................................................................................................................... 66
Health ................................................................................................................................ 67
Roads................................................................................................................................. 67
Bridges .............................................................................................................................. 67
Railways............................................................................................................................ 67
Electricity .......................................................................................................................... 68
Agriculture ........................................................................................................................ 69
Telecommunications.......................................................................................................... 70
Airlines.............................................................................................................................. 70
Mining and Gems .............................................................................................................. 70
Oil, Gas, and Related Pipelines......................................................................................... 71
Trade Promotion/Reconstruction Opportunity Zones.............................................................. 72
Residual Issues from Past Conflicts............................................................................................... 86
Stinger Retrieval...................................................................................................................... 86
Mine Eradication ..................................................................................................................... 86

Figures
Figure A-1. Map of Afghanistan.................................................................................................... 89
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Figure A-2. Map of Afghan Ethnicities ......................................................................................... 90

Tables
Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process.......................................................................... 10
Table 2. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) ....................................................... 12
Table 3.Summary of Current U.S. Strategy and Implementation .................................................. 22
Table 4. Operation Enduring Freedom Partner Forces .................................................................. 31
Table 5. Background on NATO/ISAF Formation and U.N. Mandate............................................ 42
Table 6. Major Security-Related Indicators ................................................................................... 47
Table 7. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for
Operations in and Supply Lines to Afghanistan ......................................................................... 49
Table 8. Major Reporting Requirements........................................................................................ 65
Table 9. Comparative Social and Economic Statistics................................................................... 74
Table 10. Major Non-U.S. Pledges for Afghanistan 2002-2011 .................................................... 75
Table 11. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998......................................................... 76
Table 12. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2001......................................................... 77
Table 13. Post-Taliban U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan ................................................................. 78
Table 14. Total Obligations for Major Programs: FY2001-FY2010.............................................. 80
Table 15.NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations ................................................................................. 83
Table 16.Provincial Reconstruction Teams.................................................................................... 84
Table 17.Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan .......................................................................... 85

Appendixes
Appendix. U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted ....................................................................... 87

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 90

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Background
Afghanistan has a history of a high degree of decentralization, and resistance to foreign invasion
and occupation. Some have termed it the “graveyard of empires.”
From Early History to the 19th Century
Alexander the Great conquered what is now Afghanistan in three years (330 B.C.E. to 327
B.C.E), although at significant cost and with significant difficulty, and requiring, among other
steps, marriage to a resident of the conquered territory. For example, he was unable to fully pacify
Bactria, an ancient region spanning what is now northern Afghanistan and parts of the
neighboring Central Asian states. (A collection of valuable Bactrian gold was hidden from the
Taliban when it was in power and emerged from the Taliban period unscathed.) From the third to
the eighth century, A.D., Buddhism was the dominant religion in Afghanistan. At the end of the
seventh century, Islam spread in Afghanistan when Arab invaders from the Umayyad Dynasty
defeated the Persian empire of the Sassanians. In the 10th century, Muslim rulers called Samanids,
from Bukhara (in what is now Uzbekistan), extended their influence into Afghanistan, and the
complete conversion of Afghanistan to Islam occurred during the rule of the Gaznavids in the 11th
century. They ruled over the first vast Islamic empire based in what is now Ghazni province of
Afghanistan.
In 1504, Babur, a descendent of the conquerors Tamarlane and Genghis Khan, took control of
Kabul and then moved on to India, establishing the Mughal Empire. (Babur is buried in the Babur
Gardens complex in Kabul, which has been refurbished with the help of the Agha Khan
Foundation.) Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, Afghanistan was fought over by the Mughal
Empire and the Safavid Dynasty of Persia (now Iran), with the Safavids mostly controlling Herat
and western Afghanistan, and the Mughals controlling Kabul and the east. A monarchy ruled by
ethnic Pashtuns was founded in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, who was a senior officer in the
army of Nadir Shah, ruler of Persia, when Nadir Shah was assassinated and Persian control over
Afghanistan weakened.
A strong ruler, Dost Muhammad Khan, emerged in Kabul in 1826 and created concerns among
Britain that the Afghans were threatening Britain’s control of India; that fear led to a British
decision in 1838 to intervene in Afghanistan, setting off the first Anglo-Afghan War (1838-1842).
Nearly all of the 4,500-person British force was killed in that war, which ended with a final
British stand at Gandamack. The second Anglo-Afghan War took place during 1878-1880.
Early 20th Century and Cold War Era
King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan (Third
Anglo-Afghan War) shortly after taking power and won complete independence from Britain as
recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular
modernizer presiding over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated. He was
succeeded by King Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), and then by King Mohammad Zahir
Shah. Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973) is remembered fondly by many older Afghans for
promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and promoting
freedoms for women, including dropping a requirement that they cover their face and hair. In part,
the countryside was secured during the King’s time by local tribal militias called arbokai.
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However, possibly believing that he could limit Soviet support for Communist factions in
Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also built ties to the Soviet government by entering into a significant
political and arms purchase relationship with the Soviet Union. The Soviets built large
infrastructure projects in Afghanistan during Zahir Shah’s time, such as the north-south Salang
Pass/Tunnel and Bagram airfield.
This period was the height of the Cold War, and the United States sought to prevent Afghanistan
from falling into the Soviet orbit. As Vice President, Richard Nixon visited Afghanistan in 1953,
and President Eisenhower visited in 1959. President Kennedy hosted King Zahir Shah in 1963.
The United States tried to use aid to counter Soviet influence, providing agricultural and other
development assistance. Among the major U.S.-funded projects were large USAID-led irrigation
and hydroelectric dam efforts in Helmand Province, including Kajaki Dam (see below).
Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s, during the Nixon Administration, when the
diametrically opposed Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While
receiving medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad
Daoud, a military leader who established a dictatorship with strong state involvement in the
economy. Daoud was overthrown and killed1 in April 1978, during the Carter Administration, by
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA, Communist party) military officers under the
direction of two PDPA (Khalq faction) leaders, Hafizullah Amin and Nur Mohammad Taraki, in
what is called the Saur (April) Revolution. Taraki became president, but he was displaced in
September 1979 by Amin. Both leaders drew their strength from rural ethnic Pashtuns and tried to
impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part by redistributing land and bringing
more women into government. The attempt at rapid modernization sparked rebellion by Islamic
parties opposed to such moves.
Soviet Invasion and Occupation Period
The Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent further gains by
the Islamic militias, known as the mujahedin (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets
replaced Amin with another PDPA leader perceived as pliable, Babrak Karmal (Parcham faction
of the PDPA), who was part of the 1978 PDPA takeover but was exiled by Taraki and Amin.
Soviet occupation forces numbered about 120,000. They were assisted by Democratic Republic
of Afghanistan (DRA) military forces of about 25,000-40,000, supplemented by about 20,000
paramilitary and tribal militia forces, including the PDPA-dominated organization called the
Sarandoy. The combined Soviet and Afghan forces were never able to pacify the outlying areas of
the country. DRA forces were consistently plagued by desertions and its effectiveness on behalf
of the Soviets was limited. The mujahedin benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided
through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in cooperation with Pakistan’s Inter-Service
Intelligence directorate (ISI).

1 Daoud’s grave was discovered outside Kabul in early 2008. He was reburied in an official ceremony in Kabul in
March 2009.
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The Seven Major “Mujahedin” Parties and Their Activities
The mujahedin were also relatively well organized and coordinated by seven major parties that in
early 1989 formed a Peshawar-based “Afghan Interim Government” (AIG). The seven party
leaders and their parties—sometimes referred to as the “Peshawar 7”—were Mohammad Nabi
Mohammadi (Islamic Revolutionary Movement of Afghanistan); Sibghatullah Mojaddedi
(Afghan National Liberation Front); Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (Hezb-i-Islam—Gulbuddin, Islamic
Party of Gulbuddin); Burhanuddin Rabbani (Jamiat Islami, Islamic Society); Yunus Khalis (Hezb-
i-Islam); Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf (Ittihad Islami, Islamic Union for the Liberation of
Afghanistan); and Pir Gaylani (National Islamic Front). Mohammadi and Khalis have died in
recent years of natural causes, and Rabbani was killed in a September 20, 2011, assassination.
The others are still active in Afghan politics and governance or, in the case of Hikmatyar, fighting
the Afghan government.
The mujahedin weaponry included U.S.-supplied portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems
called “Stingers,” which proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The United States
decided in 1985 to provide these weapons to the mujahedin after substantial debate within the
Reagan Administration and some in Congress over whether they could be used effectively and
whether doing so would harm broader U.S.-Soviet relations. The mujahedin also hid and stored
weaponry in a large network of natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan.
However, some warned that a post-Soviet power structure in Afghanistan could be adverse to
U.S. interests because much of the covert aid was being channeled to the Islamist groups
including those of Hikmatyar and Sayyaf.
Partly because of the effectiveness of the Stinger in shooting down Soviet helicopters and fixed
wing aircraft, the Soviet Union’s losses mounted—about 13,400 Soviet soldiers were killed in the
war, according to Soviet figures—turning Soviet domestic opinion against the war. In 1986, after
the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced Karmal with the director of
Afghan intelligence, Najibullah Ahmedzai (known by his first name). Najibullah was a Ghilzai
Pashtun, and was from the Parcham faction of the PDPA. Some Afghans say that some aspects of
his governing style were admirable, particularly his appointment of a prime minister (Sultan Ali
Keshtmand and others) to handle administrative duties and distribute power.
Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal
On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva Accords) requiring
it to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by February 15, 1989, leaving in place the weak
Najibullah government. A warming of relations moved the United States and Soviet Union to try
for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict, a trend accelerated by the 1991 collapse of the
Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow’s capacity for supporting communist regimes in the Third
World. On September 13, 1991, Moscow and Washington agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid
to the Afghan combatants.
The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and covert military
assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from 1980 until the end of the
Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid program grew from about $20 million
per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per year during FY1986-FY1990.2 The Soviet pullout

2 For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from $300 million the previous year
(continued...)
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decreased the perceived strategic value of Afghanistan, causing a reduction in subsequent covert
funding. As indicated in Table 11, U.S. assistance to Afghanistan remained at relatively low
levels from the time of the Soviet withdrawal, validating the views of many that the United States
largely considered its role in Afghanistan “completed” when Soviets troops left, and there was
little support for a major U.S. effort to rebuild the country. The United States closed its embassy
in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its pullout, and it remained so until
the fall of the Taliban in 2001.
With Soviet backing withdrawn, Najibullah rallied Afghan forces and successfully beat back the
first post-Soviet withdrawal mujahedin offensives. Although Najibullah defied expectations that
his government would immediately collapse after a Soviet withdrawal, military defections
continued and his position weakened in subsequent years. On March 18, 1992, Najibullah
publicly agreed to step down once an interim government was formed. That announcement set off
a wave of rebellions primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders in northern Afghanistan—
particularly Abdul Rashid Dostam, who joined prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah
Masud of the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. Masud had
earned a reputation as a brilliant strategist by preventing the Soviets from occupying his power
base in the Panjshir Valley of northeastern Afghanistan. Najibullah fell, and the mujahedin regime
began April 18, 1992.3
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban
The fall of Najibullah exposed the differences among the mujahedin parties. The leader of one of
the smaller parties (Afghan National Liberation Front), Islamic scholar Sibghatullah Mojadeddi,
was president during April-May 1992. Under an agreement among the major parties, Rabbani
became president in June 1992 with agreement that he would serve until December 1994. He
refused to step down at that time, saying that political authority would disintegrate without a clear
successor. That decision was strongly opposed by other mujahedin leaders, including Gulbuddin
Hikmatyar, a Pashtun, and leader of the Islamist conservative Hizb-e-Islam Gulbuddin mujahedin
party. Hikmatyar and several allied factions began fighting to dislodge Rabbani. Rabbani reached
an agreement for Hikmatyar to serve as Prime Minister, if Hikmatyar would cease the shelling
Kabul that had destroyed much of the western part of the city. However, because of Hikmatyar’s
distrust of Rabbani, he never formally assumed a working prime ministerial role in Kabul.
In 1993-1994, Afghan Islamic clerics and students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin, formed the
Taliban movement. Many were former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with conflict
among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries
(“madrassas”) mainly of the “Deobandi” school of Islam.4 Some say this interpretation of Islam is
similar to the “Wahhabism” that is practiced in Saudi Arabia. Taliban practices were also
consonant with conservative Pashtun tribal traditions. The Taliban’s leader, Mullah Muhammad
Umar, had been a fighter in Khalis’s Hezb-i-Islam party during the anti-Soviet war—Khalis’ party

(...continued)
to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half of the fiscal year. See “Country Fact Sheet:
Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377.
3 After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul until the Taliban
movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them.
4 The Deobandi school began in 1867 in a seminary in Uttar Pradesh, in British-controlled India, that was set up to train
Islamic clerics and to counter the British educational model.
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was generally considered moderate Islamist during the anti-Soviet war, but Khalis and his faction
turned against the United States in the mid-1990s. Many of his fighters, such as Mullah Umar,
followed Khalis’ lead. Umar had lost an eye in the anti-Soviet war.
The Taliban viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt and anti-Pashtun, and the four years of
civil war (1992-1996) created popular support for the Taliban as able to deliver stability. With the
help of defections, the Taliban peacefully took control of the southern city of Qandahar in
November 1994. By February 1995, it was approaching Kabul, after which an 18-month
stalemate ensued. In September 1995, the Taliban captured Herat province, bordering Iran, and
imprisoned its governor, Ismail Khan, ally of Rabbani and Masud, who later escaped and took
refuge in Iran. In September 1996, new Taliban victories near Kabul led to the withdrawal of
Rabbani and Masud to the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul with most of their heavy weapons; the
Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996. Taliban gunmen subsequently entered a
U.N. facility in Kabul to seize Najibullah, his brother, and aides, and then hanged them.
Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001)
The Taliban regime was led by Mullah Muhammad Umar, as noted. Umar held the title of Head
of State and “Commander of the Faithful,” remaining in the Taliban power base in Qandahar and
almost never appearing in public, although he did occasionally receive high-level foreign
officials. Al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden relocated from Sudan to Afghanistan, where he had
been a recruiter of Arab fighters during the anti-Soviet war, in May 1996. He at first was located
in territory in Nangarhar province controlled by Hezb-i-Islam of Yunus Khalis (Mullah Umar’s
party leader) but then had free reign in Afghanistan as the Taliban captured nearly all the territory
in Afghanistan. Umar reportedly forged a political and personal bond with Bin Laden and refused
U.S. demands to extradite him. Like Umar, most of the senior figures in the Taliban regime were
Ghilzai Pashtuns, which predominate in eastern Afghanistan. They are rivals of the Durrani
Pashtuns, who are predominant in the south.
The Taliban lost international and domestic support as it imposed strict adherence to Islamic
customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including executions. The
Taliban authorized its “Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice,” headed
by Maulvi Qalamuddin, to use physical punishments to enforce strict Islamic practices, including
bans on television, Western music, and dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or
working outside the home, except in health care, and it publicly executed some women for
adultery. In what many consider its most extreme action, and which some say was urged by Bin
Laden, in March 2001 the Taliban blew up two large Buddha statues carved into hills above
Bamiyan city, considering them idols.
U.S. Policy Toward the Taliban During Its Rule/Bin Laden Presence
The Clinton Administration opened talks with the Taliban after it captured Qandahar in 1994, and
engaged the movement after it took power. However, the Administration was unable to moderate
its policies and relations worsened throughout the Taliban period of rule. The United States
withheld recognition of Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally
recognizing no faction as the government. The United Nations continued to seat representatives
of the Rabbani government, not the Taliban. The State Department ordered the Afghan embassy
in Washington, DC, closed in August 1997. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1193 (August 28,
1998) and 1214 (December 8, 1998) urged the Taliban to end discrimination against women.
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Women’s rights groups urged the Clinton Administration not to recognize the Taliban
government. In May 1999, the Senate-passed S.Res. 68 called on the President not to recognize
an Afghan government that oppresses women.
The Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda’s leadership gradually became the Clinton Administration’s
overriding agenda item with Afghanistan. In April 1998, then-U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations Bill Richardson (along with Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and NSC senior
official Bruce Riedel) visited Afghanistan, but the Taliban refused to hand over Bin Laden. They
did not meet Mullah Umar. After the August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda bombings of U.S. embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton Administration began to strongly pressure the Taliban to
extradite him, imposing U.S. sanctions on Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and achieving adoption
of some U.N. sanctions as well. On August 20, 1998, as a response to the Africa embassy
bombings, the United States fired cruise missiles at alleged Al Qaeda training camps in eastern
Afghanistan, but Bin Laden was not hit.5 Some observers assert that the Administration missed
several other opportunities to strike him, including a purported sighting of him by an unarmed
Predator drone at the Tarnak Farm camp in Afghanistan in the fall of 2000.6 Clinton
Administration officials said that domestic and international support for ousting the Taliban
militarily was lacking.
The “Northern Alliance” Congeals
The Taliban’s policies caused different Afghan factions to ally with the Tajik core of the anti-
Taliban opposition—the ousted President Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Masud, and their ally in the
Herat area, Ismail Khan. Joining the Tajik factions in the broader “Northern Alliance” were
Uzbek, Hazara Shiite, and even some Pashtun Islamist factions discussed below. Virtually all the
figures mentioned remain key players in politics in Afghanistan, sometimes allied with and at
other times adversaries of President Hamid Karzai. (For more information on many of these
figures, see CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government
Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.)
Uzbeks/General Dostam. One major faction was the Uzbek militia (the
Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) of General Abdul
Rashid Dostam. Frequently referred to by some Afghans as one of the “warlords”
who gained power during the anti-Soviet war, Dostam first joined those seeking
to oust Rabbani during his 1992-1996 presidency, but later joined him and the
other Northern Alliance factions opposed to the Taliban.
Hazara Shiites. Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims, are
prominent in Bamiyan, Dai Kundi, and Ghazni provinces (central Afghanistan)
and are always fearful of, and subject to some extent to, repression by Pashtuns
and other larger ethnic factions. The Hazaras have tended to serve in working
class and domestic household jobs, although more recently they have been
prominent in technology jobs in Kabul, raising their economic status. They are
also increasingly cohesive politically, leading to gains in the September 2010
parliamentary elections. During the various Afghan wars, the main Hazara Shiite

5 A pharmaceutical plant in Sudan (Al Shifa) believe to be producing chemical weapons for Al Qaeda also was struck
that day, although U.S. reviews later corroborated Sudan’s assertions that the plant was strictly civilian in nature.
6 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4540958.
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militia was Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, composed of eight different groups).
Hizb-e-Wahdat suffered a major setback in 1995 when the Taliban captured and
killed its leader Abdul Ali Mazari. One of Karzai’s vice president’s Karim
Khalili, is a Hazara. Another prominent Hazara faction leader, Mohammad
Mohaqeq, is a Karzai critic.
Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf. Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, now a leading Islamic
conservative in parliament, headed a Pashtun-dominated hardline Islamist
mujahedin faction (Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, Ittihad
Islami
) during the anti-Soviet war. Even though he is an Islamist conservative,
Sayyaf viewed the Taliban as selling out Afghanistan to Al Qaeda and he joined
the Northern Alliance.
Policy Pre-September 11, 2001
Throughout 2001, but prior to the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration policy differed little
from Clinton Administration policy—applying economic and political pressure on the Taliban
while retaining some dialogue with it, and refraining from militarily assisting the Northern
Alliance. The September 11 Commission report said that, in the months prior to the September 11
attacks, Administration officials leaned toward such a step. The report added that some officials
wanted, in addition, to assist ethnic Pashtuns who were opposed to the Taliban. Other covert
options were reportedly under consideration as well.7 In accordance with U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State Department ordered the Taliban representative office
in New York closed, although Taliban representative Abdul Hakim Mujahid continued to operate
informally.8 In March 2001, Administration officials received a Taliban envoy to discuss bilateral
issues. In one significant departure from Clinton Administration policy, the Bush Administration
stepped up engagement with Pakistan to try to reduce its support for the Taliban. At that time,
there were widespread but unconfirmed allegations by U.S. experts that Pakistani advisers were
helping the Taliban in their fight against the Northern Alliance.
Even though the Northern Alliance was supplied with Iranian, Russian, and Indian financial and
military support—all of whom had different motives for that support—the Northern Alliance
nonetheless continued to lose ground to the Taliban after it lost Kabul in 1996. By the time of the
September 11 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75% of the country, including almost all
provincial capitals. The Alliance suffered a major setback on September 9, 2001 (two days before,
and possibly an integral part of, the September 11 attacks), when Ahmad Shah Masud was
assassinated by Al Qaeda operatives posing as journalists. He was succeeded by his intelligence
chief, Muhammad Fahim,9 a veteran figure but one who lacked Masud’s undisputed authority.
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom
After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the
Taliban when it refused a final U.S. offer to extradite Bin Laden in order to avoid military action.
President Bush articulated a policy that equated those who harbor terrorists to terrorists

7 Drogin, Bob. “U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11.” Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2002.
8 Mujahid has reconciled with the current Afghan government, and serves as one of the deputy leaders of the
70-member High Council on political reconciliation.
9 Some Afghan sources refer to him by the name “Fahim Khan,” or “Marshal Fahim.”
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themselves, and judged that a friendly regime in Kabul was needed to enable U.S. forces to
search for Al Qaeda personnel there. The Administration sought and obtained U.N. backing: U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1368 of September 12, 2001, said that the Council “expresses its
readiness to take all necessary steps to respond (implying force) to the September 11 attacks.”
This was widely interpreted as a U.N. authorization for military action in response to the attacks,
but it did not explicitly authorize Operation Enduring Freedom to oust the Taliban. Nor did the
Resolution specifically reference Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which allows for responses to
threats to international peace and security.
In Congress, S.J.Res. 23 (passed 98-0 in the Senate and with no objections in the House, P.L.
107-40, signed September 18, 2011), was somewhat more explicit than the U.N. Resolution,
authorizing10 “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons.”
Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on October 7, 2001. It
consisted primarily of U.S. air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, facilitated by the
cooperation between reported small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S. special operations forces and
Central Intelligence Agency operatives. The purpose of these operations was to help the Northern
Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces by providing information to direct U.S. air strikes
against Taliban positions. In part, the U.S. forces and operatives worked with such Northern
Alliance contacts as Fahim and Amrollah Saleh, who during November 2001-June 2010 served as
Afghanistan’s intelligence director, to weaken Taliban defenses on the Shomali plain north of
Kabul (and just south of Bagram Airfield, which marked the forward position of the Northern
Alliance during Taliban rule). Some U.S. combat units (about 1,300 Marines) moved into
Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban around Qandahar at the height of the fighting (October-
December 2001), but there were few pitched battles between U.S. and Taliban soldiers.
The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif on November 9, 2001, to forces
led by Dostam.11 Northern Alliance (mainly the Tajik faction) forces—the commanders of which
had initially promised then-Secretary of State Colin Powell that they would not enter Kabul—
entered the capital on November 12, 2001, to popular jubilation. The Taliban subsequently lost
the south and east to U.S.-supported Pashtun leaders, including Hamid Karzai. The end of the
Taliban regime is generally dated as December 9, 2001, when the Taliban surrendered Qandahar
and Mullah Umar fled the city, leaving it under Pashtun tribal law.
Subsequently, U.S. and Afghan forces conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley
south of Gardez (Paktia Province) during March 2-19, 2002, against 800 Al Qaeda and Taliban
fighters. In March 2003, about 1,000 U.S. troops raided suspected Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters in
villages around Qandahar (Operation Valiant Strike). On May 1, 2003, then-Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld announced an end to “major combat.”

10 Another law (P.L. 107-148) established a “Radio Free Afghanistan” under RFE/RL, providing $17 million in funding
for it for FY2002.
11 In the process, Dostam captured Taliban fighters and imprisoned them in freight containers, causing many to
suffocate. They were buried in a mass grave at Dasht-e-Laili.
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Post-Taliban Governance-Building Efforts12
The Bush Administration argued that leaving the region after the 1989 Soviet pullout allowed
Afghanistan to degenerate into chaos, and it decided to try to build a relatively strong Afghan
central government and economy, both of which were devastated by decades of war. The effort,
which many outside experts described as “nation-building,” was supported by the United Nations,
international institutions, and U.S. partners in several post-Taliban international meetings.
The Obama Administration’s strategy review in late 2009 narrowed official U.S. goals to
preventing terrorism safe haven in Afghanistan. However, the elements of Obama Administration
strategy during 2009-2011 continued, and in some cases expanded, the nation-building programs
put in place by the Bush Administration.13 No matter how expansively the U.S. mission has been
defined, building the capacity of and reforming Afghan governance have been consistently and
widely judged to be key to the success of U.S. policy. This has been stated explicitly in each
Obama Administration policy review, strategy statement, and report on progress in Afghanistan,
as well as all major international conferences on Afghanistan, including the major conference in
Bonn on December 5, 2011. That was held at the 10th anniversary of the Bonn Agreement that
began the post-Taliban political transition.
The conclusion of virtually every Administration and outside assessment—including the Defense
Department reports on Afghan stability that are produced every six months—has been that
Afghan governmental capacity, effectiveness, and transparency is increasing but only slowly, and
with periodic setbacks. U.S. assessments say that the deficiencies in governance could jeopardize
stability after the 2014 transition, but many observers believe the international community had
unrealistic expectations of what could be achieved in Afghanistan and that the government will
muddle through over the long term. A major factor that most assessments of Afghan governance
highlight is the still-rampant corruption and cronyism in government and elite circles, which
hampers the effectiveness of transparent and trusted government and private economic
institutions and processes. All of the major measures of Afghan governance, such as the
government’s capacity, effectiveness, and competence, as well as elections, corruption, and
human rights issues, are assessed extensively in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics,
Elections, and Government Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman. Table 1 depicts, in brief, the
process and events that led to the formation of the post-Taliban government of Afghanistan.



12 Governance issues are analyzed in detail in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government
Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.
13 Text of the released summary is at http://documents.nytimes.com/the-obama-administrations-overview-on-
afghanistan-and-pakistan.
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Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process
Interim
Formed by Bonn Agreement. Headed by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, but key security
Administration
positions dominated by mostly minority “Northern Alliance.” Karzai reaffirmed as leader
by June 2002 “emergency loya jirga.” (A jirga is a traditional Afghan assembly.)
Constitution
Approved by January 2004 “Constitutional Loya Jirga” (CLJ). Set up strong presidency, a
rebuke to Northern Alliance that wanted prime ministership to balance presidential
power, but gave parliament significant powers to compensate. Gives men and women
equal rights under the law, allows for political parties as long as they are not “un-Islamic;”
al ows for court rulings according to Hanafi (Sunni) Islam (Chapter 7, Article 15). Set out
electoral roadmap for simultaneous (if possible) presidential, provincial, and district
elections by June 2004. Named ex-King Zahir Shah to non-hereditary position of “Father
of the Nation;” he died July 23, 2007.
Presidential Election
Elections for president and two vice presidents, for five-year term, held October 9, 2004.
Turnout was 80% of 10.5 million registered. Karzai and running mates (Ahmad Zia Masud,
a Tajik and brother of legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud, who was
assassinated by Al Qaeda two days before the Sept. 11 attacks, and Karim Khalili, a
Hazara) elected with 55% against 16 opponents. Second highest vote getter, Northern
Alliance figure (and Education Minister) Yunus Qanooni (16%). One female ran. Funded
with $90 million from donors, including $40 million from U.S. (FY2004, P.L. 108-106).
First Parliamentary
Elections held September 18, 2005, on “Single Non-Transferable Vote” System; candidates
Elections
stood as individuals, not in party list. Parliament consists of a 249 elected lower house
(Wolesi Jirga, House of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper house (Meshrano Jirga,
House of Elders). 2,815 candidates for Wolesi Jirga, including 347 women. Turnout was
57% (6.8 million voters) of 12.5 million registered. Upper house is appointed by Karzai (34
seats, half of which are to be women), and by the provincial councils (68 seats). When
district councils are elected, they will appoint 34 of the seats. Funded by $160 million in
international aid, including $45 mil ion from U.S. (FY2005 supplemental, P.L. 109-13).
First Provincial
Provincial elections held September 18, 2005, simultaneous with parliamentary elections.
Elections/
Exact powers vague, but now taking lead in deciding local reconstruction Provincial
District Elections
council sizes range from 9 to the 29 seats on the Kabul provincial council. Total seats are
420, of which 121 held by women. l3,185 candidates, including 279 women. District
elections not held due to complexity and potential tensions of drawing district boundaries.
Second
Presidential and provincial elections were held August 20, 2009, but required a runoff
Presidential/Provincial because no candidate received over 50% in certified results issued October 20. Second
Elections
round not held because Dr. Abdullah pulled out of runoff. Election costs: $300 million.
Parliamentary
Original y set for May 22, 2010; held September 18, 2010. Results disputed, but agreement
Elections
reached for Karzai inaugurate new lower house on January 26, 2011, six days after original
date. 70 women elected, two more than quota. Speaker selected on February 27, Abdul
Raouf Ibrahimi, an ethnic Uzbek. Special tribunal set up to investigate results and on June
23 ruled that 62 results be altered, prompting a backlash from those who might be
deprived of seats and threats of impeaching Karzai. Crisis eased on August 11, 2011, when
Karzai disbanded special tribunal and announced that only the election bodies have
standing to overturn results. Independent Election Commission announced August 21 that
nine lower house winners would be unseated for fraud. They were sworn in September 4;
but a broad lower house boycott renderied it non-functional until October 9, when
boycott ended. For the upper house, 68 seats council are appointed to four-year terms by
the elected provincial councils in each of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, and remain in office.
Karzai made his 34 appointments on February 19, 2011. The speaker of that body is
Muslim Yaar (a Pashtun).
Third Presidential
To be held in 2014, but Karzai said in April 2014 he is discussing moving the election to
Election
2013 because international forces will still be there in sufficient numbers to protect the
vote. Karzai has repeatedly said he will not seek to alter the constitution to allow him to
run again, but there is no clear front runner to succeed him. Several former candidates,
and others who considered running before but did not, are reportedly considering a run.
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U.S. and International Civilian Policy Structure
Building the capacity of the Afghan government, and helping it develop economically, is
primarily, although not exclusively, the purview of U.S. and international civilian officials and
institutions. In line with the prioritization of Afghanistan policy, in February 2009, the
Administration set up the position of appointed “Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan” (SRAP), occupied first by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, reporting to Secretary of
State Clinton. Holbrooke died on December 13, 2010, but his team at the State Department, led as
of February 2011 by Ambassador Marc Grossman, remains largely intact, consisting mainly of
members detailed from several different agencies.
At the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Ambassador Ryan Crocker replaced Karl Eikenberry on July 25,
2011. There is a “deputy Ambassador” and separate Ambassador rank officials to manage U.S.
economic assistance issues and to oversee Embassy operations. Another official of Ambassador
rank coordinates U.S. rule of law programs. Under various programs, U.S. civilian and coalition
military personnel are assigned to various Afghan ministries in advisory capacities.

The U.S. Embassy has progressively expanded its personnel and facilities to accommodate the
additional civilian hires and Foreign Service officers who have been posted to Afghanistan since
2009 as mentors and advisers to the Afghan government. U.S. officials say there are more than
1,130 U.S. civilian officials in Afghanistan, as of late 2011, up from only about 400 in early 2009.
Of these at least 400 serve outside Kabul to help build governance at the provincial and district
levels. That is up from 67 outside Kabul in 2009.
On February 7, 2010, in an effort to improve civilian coordination between the United States, its
foreign partners, and the Afghan government, a NATO “Senior Civilian Representative” in
Afghanistan, UK Ambassador Mark Sedwill, took office. This official works not only with U.S.
military officials but with representatives of the embassies of partner countries and with a special
U.N. Assistance Mission-Afghanistan (UNAMA, see Table 2). In April 2011 Sedwill was
replaced by the former British Ambassador to Iran, Sir Simon Gass. The contribution of the
United Nations to enhancing governance and coordinating donors is discussed below.
Afghan Ambassador to the United States Sayed Tayib Jawad served as Ambassador from 2004
until his recall in August 2010. Then deputy Foreign Minister Eklil Hakimi replaced him on
February 23, 2011.
Consulates in Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat
The tables at the end of this report include U.S. funding for State Department and USAID
operations, including Embassy construction and running the “Embassy air wing,” a fleet of twin-
engine turboprops that ferry U.S. officials and contractors around Afghanistan. In a significant
development attempting to signal normalization of certain areas of Afghanistan, in early 2010 the
United States formally inaugurated U.S. consulates in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. In November
2010 contracts were announced for expansion of the U.S. Embassy ($511 million) and to
construct the two consulates ($20 million for each facility). As discussed below, both cities were
in the first tranche of areas to be transitioned to Afghan control.
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Table 2. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
The United Nations is extensively involved in Afghan governance and national building, primarily in factional conflict
resolution and coordination of development assistance. The coordinator of U.N. efforts is the U.N. Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). It was headed during March 2010-December 2011 by Swedish diplomat Staffan de-
Mistura, replacing Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide. Mistura formerly played a similar role in Iraq. Slovakian diplomat Jan
Kubis replaced him in January 2012.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1806 of March 20, 2008, expanded UNAMA’s authority to strengthen cooperation
between the international peacekeeping force (ISAF, see below) and the Afghan government. In concert with the
Obama Administration’s emphasis on Afghan policy, UNAMA is to open offices in as many of Afghanistan’s 34
provinces as financial y and logistical y permissible. The mandate of UNAMA, was renewed for another year on March
22, 2011, by Resolution 1974. As did Resolution 1917 the previous year, Resolution 1974 largely restated UNAMA’s
coordinating role with other high-level representatives in Afghanistan and election support role, while referring to
UNAMA’s role in facilitating the coming transition to Afghan leadership. As part of the expansion of its mandate,
UNAMA is playing a role in reintegration of surrendering insurgent fighters that is receiving increased emphasis. It is
doing so through a “Salaam (Peace) Support Group,” working with Afghanistan’s High Peace Council that is
promoting reconciliation and reintegration. UNAMA has always been involved in local dispute resolution and
disarmament of local militias, but its donor coordination has never materialized because of the large numbers and size
of donor-run projects in Afghanistan. Under a March 2010 compromise with Karzai, it nominates two international
members of the five person Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), one fewer than the three it selected under the
prior election law.
UNAMA is also playing a growing role in engaging regional actors in Afghan stability. It was a co-convener of the
January 28, 2010, and July 20, 2010, London and Kabul Conferences, respectively. Along with Turkey, UNAMA chairs
a “Regional Working Group” to enlist regional support for Afghan integration.
On donor coordination, UNAMA is co-chair of the joint Afghan-international community coordination body cal ed
the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), and is helping implement the five-year development strategy
outlined in a “London Compact,” (now called the Afghanistan Compact) adopted at the January 31-February 1, 2006,
London conference on Afghanistan. The priorities developed in that document comport with Afghanistan’s own
“National Strategy for Development,” presented on June 12, 2008, in Paris.
The difficulties in coordinating U.N. with U.S. and NATO efforts were evident in a 2007 proposal to create a new
position of “super envoy” that would represent the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO in Afghanistan.
The concept advanced and in January 2008, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon tentatively appointed British
diplomat Paddy Ashdown as the “super envoy.” Karzai rejected the appointment over concerns about the scope of
authority of such an envoy and the issue was dropped. The NATO senior civilian representative. post, discussed
above, appears to represent a step in the direction of improved donor coordination in Afghanistan and streamlining of
the foreign representative structure there.
For more information on UNAMA, see CRS Report R40747, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan:
Background and Policy Issues
, by Rhoda Margesson.

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Security Policy, 2011-2014 “Transition,
and Beyond”14

The formal Obama Administration policy goal is to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a
safe haven for global terrorism, but the U.S. criteria for judging achievement of that goal have
generally included the degree to which the Afghan government and security force can defend
itself, govern effectively, and develop economically. The U.S. security mission is in the process of
changing from a combat leadership to a mentoring and “overwatch” role. Still, from 2011 until
the completion of the security transition in 2014, the basic pillars of U.S. and NATO security
strategy that have been in place since 2001 remain intact.
Who Is “The Enemy”? Taliban, Haqqani, Al Qaeda, and Others
Security in Afghanistan has been challenged by a confluence of related and, to varying degrees,
cooperating armed groups whose tactics continue to evolve based on experiences from previous
fighting.15 There has not been agreement about the relative strength of insurgents in all of the
areas where they operate. The top commander in Afghanistan, General John Allen, told journalists
in October 2011 that the numbers of insurgents may be far fewer than the 25,000 previously
assessed.
Groups: The Taliban (“Quetta Shura Taliban”)
The core of the insurgency remains the Taliban movement loyal, for the most part, to Mullah
Umar, who led the Taliban regime during 1996-2001. He and many of his top advisers reportedly
operate from Pakistan, probably the city of Quetta but possibly also Karachi, thus accounting for
the term usually applied to Umar and his aides: “Quetta Shura Taliban” (QST). Still, the exact
level of Mullah Umar’s control over insurgent ranks is unclear, and little precise information
exists on Mullah Umar’s remaining inner circle. In recent years, he has lost some of this top aides
to U.S.-led military action, including Mullah Dadullah and Mullah Usmani.
Umar has been making appointments to replenish the QST leadership ranks. When his top deputy,
Mullah Bradar, was arrested in Pakistan in February 2011, Umar replaced him with younger and
reputedly hardline, anti-compromise leaders Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir, a U.S. detainee in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba until 2007; and Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor, a logistics expert.16 The
Taliban has several official spokespersons at large, including Qari Yusuf Ahmadi and Zabiullah
Mujahid, and it operates a clandestine radio station, “Voice of Shariat” and publishes videos.
Some believe that Umar and his inner circle blame their past association with Al Qaeda for their
loss of power. Others believe the Taliban is unlikely to completely sever its ties to Al Qaeda and
other terrorist groups, but the death of Al Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden on May 1, 2011, has
perhaps strengthened the arguments of those in the movement advocating distance from Al

14 Much of the information in this section is taken from U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), “Report on Progress
Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” April 2012.
15 http://www.defense.gov/news/1230_1231Report.pdf.
16 Ibid.; Moreau, Ron. “New Leaders for the Taliban.” Newsweek, January 24, 2011.
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Qaeda. U.S. officials argue that the security successes since 2011 are causing some Taliban
leaders to at least consider the concept of a political settlement, and in the process causing a
reported split in its ranks over the issue. Suggesting he may be leaning toward those urging
compromise, Mullah Umar released a statement on the 10th anniversary of the September 11
attacks on the United States (September 11, 2011) acknowledging there have been some talks,
although only over prisoner exchanges. His subsequent statement marking a Muslim holiday on
November 10, 2011, admonished Taliban commanders to avoid causing civilian casualties.
Al Qaeda/Bin Laden
U.S. officials have long considered Al Qaeda to have been largely expelled from Afghanistan
itself. U.S. commanders have, for several years, characterized any Al Qaeda militants in
Afghanistan as facilitators of militant incursions into Afghanistan rather than active fighters in the
Afghan insurgency. That view was expressed by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper
in his annual worldwide threat assessment testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee on
January 31, 2012. Then-Director of Central Intelligence (now Secretary of Defense) Leon Panetta
said on June 27, 2010, that Al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan itself might number 50-100—a range
since reiterated by other officials.17 Some of the Al Qaeda fighters are believed to belong to Al
Qaeda affiliates such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).
Until the death of Bin Laden on May 1, 2011, there had been frustration within the U.S.
government that Al Qaeda’s top leadership had eluded U.S. efforts to capture them. In December
2001, in the course of the post-September 11 major combat effort, U.S. Special Operations Forces
and CIA operatives reportedly narrowed Osama Bin Laden’s location to the Tora Bora mountains
in Nangarhar Province (30 miles west of the Khyber Pass), but the Afghan militia fighters who
were the bulk of the fighting force did not prevent his escape into Pakistan. Some U.S. military
and intelligence officers (such as Gary Berntsen and Dalton Fury, who have written books on the
battle) have questioned the U.S. decision to rely mainly on Afghan forces in this engagement.
U.S. efforts to find Al Qaeda leaders now reportedly focus on his close ally Ayman al-Zawahiri,
who is also presumed to be on the Pakistani side of the border and who was named new leader of
Al Qaeda in June 2011. CNN reported October 18, 2010, that assessments from the U.S.-led
coalition said Zawahiri (and Bin Laden) was likely in a settled area near the border with
Afghanistan, and not living in a very remote uninhabited area. A U.S. strike reportedly missed
Zawahiri by a few hours in the village of Damadola, Pakistan, in January 2006.18 Many observers
say that Zawahiri is not well liked within Al Qaeda, while other accounts say he has successfully
held the group together since bin Laden’s death and is refocusing on taking advantage of the Arab
uprisings that began in early 2011.
Other senior Al Qaeda leaders are either in or are allowed to transit or reside in Iran. Among them
are Al Qaeda’s former spokesman, Kuwait-born Sulayman Abu Ghaith, as well as Sayf al Adl.
The United States has no diplomatic relations with Iran and has called on Iran to arrest and
submit any Al Qaeda operatives to international authorities for trial.

17 Text of the Panetta interview with ABC News is at http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=11025299.
18 Gall, Carlotta and Ismail Khan. “U.S. Drone Attack Missed Zawahiri by Hours.” New York Times, November 10,
2006.
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U.S. efforts have killed numerous senior operatives other than Bin Laden. A January 2008 strike
near Damadola killed Abu Laith al-Libi, who purportedly masterminded, among other operations,
the bombing at Bagram Air Base in February 2007 during then Vice President Cheney’s visit. In
August 2008, an airstrike was confirmed to have killed Al Qaeda chemical weapons expert Abu
Khabab al-Masri, and two senior operatives allegedly involved in the 1998 embassy bombings in
Africa reportedly were killed by an unmanned aerial vehicle (Predator) strike in January 2009.
Following the killing of Bin Laden, another top Al Qaeda leader, Ilyas Kashmiri, was reportedly
killed by an armed drone strike in June 2011. Such aerial-based strikes have become more
frequent under President Obama, indicating that the Administration sees the tactic as effective in
preventing attacks.
Hikmatyar Faction
Another significant insurgent leader is former mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who
leads Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). He has been allied with Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents
although his faction has sometimes competed with and clashed with Taliban elements. As noted
above, Hikmatyar was one of the main U.S.-backed mujahedin leaders during the Soviet
occupation era but he turned against his colleagues after the Communist government fell in 1992.
He was ultimately displaced by the Taliban as the main opposition to the 1992-1996 Rabbani
government. Hikmatyar’s faction received extensive U.S. support against the Soviet Union, but it
is now active against U.S. and Afghan forces in its main areas of operations—Kunar, Nuristan,
Kapisa, and Nangarhar provinces, north and east of Kabul. On February 19, 2003, the U.S.
government formally designated Hikmatyar as a “specially designated global terrorist,” under the
authority of Executive Order 13224, subjecting it to financial and other U.S. sanctions. The group
is not designated as a “foreign terrorist organization” (FTO).
Several of Karzai’s key allies in the National Assembly are members of a moderate wing of
Hikmatyar’s party, Hizb-e-Islam, and Hikmatyar is widely considered amenable to a
reconciliation deal with Kabul. In January 2010, Hikmatyar outlined specific conditions for
reconciliation, including elections under a neutral caretaker government following a U.S.
withdrawal. On March 22, 2010, both the Afghan government and Hikmatyar representatives
confirmed talks in Kabul, including meetings with Karzai, and Karzai subsequently
acknowledged additional meetings with group representatives. Some close to Hikmatyar attended
the consultative peace loya jirga on June 2-4, 2010, which discussed the reconciliation issue.
Haqqani Faction19
Another militant faction, cited by U.S. officials as perhaps the most potent threat to Afghan
security, is the “Haqqani Network.” It is led overall by Jalaludin Haqqani, but he is aging and his
sons Siraj (or Sirajjudin) and Badruddin exercise operational control. As a mujahedin commander
during the U.S.-backed war against the Soviet Union, Jalaludin Haqqani was a U.S. ally. He
subsequently joined the Taliban regime (1996-2001), serving as its Minister of Tribal Affairs.
Since 2001, he has staunchly opposed the Karzai government and his faction is believed closer to
Al Qaeda than to the Taliban in part because one of the elder Haqqani’s wives is purportedly
Arab. Press reports indicate that the few Al Qaeda fighters that are in Afghanistan are mostly

19 A profile of the faction and its activities is provided in: Joshua Partlow. “In Afghan War, Haqqani Group Is
‘Resilient’ Foe.” Washington Post, May 30, 2011.
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embedded with Haqqani fighters. On the other hand, the faction is believed primarily interested in
earning illicit monies and in controlling parts of Khost Province than in imposing an extreme
Islamic ideology throughout Afghanistan. As discussed below, the faction is increasingly targeting
key locations in Kabul and elsewhere.
Suggesting it may act as a tool of Pakistani interests, the Haqqani network has primarily targeted
Indian interests. It claimed responsibility for two attacks on India’s embassy in Kabul (July 2008
and October 2009), and reportedly was involved, possibly with other groups, on the December
2009 attack on a CIA base in Khost that killed seven CIA officers. U.S. officials attribute the June
28, 2011, attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul and a September 10, 2011, truck bombing
in Wardak Province (which injured 77 U.S. soldiers) to the group. U.S. officials say the attacks on
the U.S. Embassy and ISAF headquarters in Kabul on September 13, 2011, were the work of the
faction as well.
That the faction is tolerated or protected in the North Waziristan area of Pakistan and also its
purported ties to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) has caused sharp U.S.
criticism of Pakistan. The most widely cited criticism was by then Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman
Mullen, following the September 2011 attacks on the U.S. Embassy. Admiral Mullen testified
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 22, 2011, that the Haqqani network
acts “as a veritable arm” of the ISI. Other senior officials reiterated the thrust of that criticism,
although with caveats. The ISI is believed to see the Haqqanis as a potential ally in any Afghan
political structure that might be produced by a political settlement in Afghanistan.
In addition to pressing Pakistan to deny the group safe haven, U.S. officials say they are
increasingly pressuring the Haqqani network with military action in Afghanistan and air strikes
on the Pakistani side of the border, as well as with direct ground action, such as a raid in late July
2011 that reportedly killed over 80 Haqqani network militants. One other Haqqani brother,
Mohammad, was reportedly killed by a U.S. unmanned vehicle strike in late February 2010.
However, the faction, which may have about 3,000 active fighters and operatives, is viewed as
resilient and able to tap a seemingly infinite pool of recruits.
The faction has generally been considered least amenable to a political settlement with the
Afghan government. Siraj Haqqani said after the September 13, 2011, attacks on the U.S.
Embassy that the faction might, at some point, participate in settlement talks. It has also been
reported that U.S. officials—as part of their drive to facilitate a political settlement of the
Afghanistan conflict—met with Haqqani representatives over the summer of 2011, in meetings in
UAE facilitated by the ISI.20
The faction’s calculations could be affected by how the United States characterizes the group. In
July 2010, then-top U.S. commander in Afghanistan General David Petraeus advocated that the
Haqqani network be named as an FTO under the Immigration and Naturalization Act—a signal to
Pakistan that it should not continue to support the Haqqani network.21 Secretary of State Clinton
stated shortly after the September 13, 2011, attack on the U.S. Embassy that such a designation is
being prepared by the Administration. No such designation has been made, to date, probably in
part to incent Pakistan to crack down on the group, which it has apparently not done to date.

20 Matthew Rosenberg. “U.S. Secretly Met Afghan Militants.” Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2011.
21 Jane Perlez, Eric Schmitt, and Carlotta Gall, “Pakistan Is Said to Pursue Foothold in Afghanistan,” New York Times,
June 24, 2010.
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However, a number of Haqqani leaders have been sanctioned as Specially Designated Global
Terrorists (SDGT) under Executive Order 13224, most recently in November 2011. An FTO
designation could make it difficult to conduct further contacts with the faction. S. 1959, which
passed the Senate on December 17, 2011, requires an Administration report on whether the group
meets the criteria for FTO designation and, if not, explanation of why not.
Pakistani Groups
The Taliban of Afghanistan are increasingly linked politically and operationally to Pakistani
Taliban militants. The Pakistani groups might see a Taliban recapture of Afghanistan’s
government as helpful to the prospects for these groups inside Pakistan or in their Kashmir
struggle. A major Pakistani group, the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP), is
primarily seeking to challenge the government of Pakistan, but they facilitate the transiting into
Afghanistan of Afghan Taliban and support the Afghan Taliban goals of recapturing Afghanistan.
The TTP may also be seeking to target the United States, an assessment based on a failed
bombing in New York City in May 2010. The State Department designated the TTP as an FTO
under the Immigration and Naturalization Act on September 2, 2010, allegedly for having close
connections to Al Qaeda. Its current leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, was named as terrorism
supporting entities that day. (He succeeded Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed in a U.S. drone
strike in August 2009.) There were unconfirmed reports that Hakimullah Mehsud may have been
killed in a U.S. armed drone strike in early January 2012.
Another Pakistani group said to be increasingly active inside Afghanistan is Laskhar-e-Tayyiba
(LET, or Army of the Righteous). LET is an Islamist militant group that has previously been
focused on operations against Indian control of Kashmir.
Insurgent Tactics
As far as tactics, prior to 2011, U.S. commanders worried most about insurgent use of improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), including roadside bombs. In January 2010, President Karzai issued a
decree banning importation of fertilizer chemicals (ammonium nitrate) commonly used for the
roadside bombs, but there reportedly is informal circumvention of the ban for certain civilian
uses, and the material reportedly still comes into Afghanistan from at least two major production
plants in Pakistan. U.S. commanders have said they have verified some use of surface-to-air
missiles,22 although it does not appear that sophisticated missiles were involved in the apparent
shootdown of a U.S. Chinook helicopter in which about 30 U.S. soldiers (mostly special forces)
were killed on August 6, 2011.
During 2011 and thus far in 2012, insurgents have made increasing use of infiltrators within the
Afghan security forces, persons impersonating Afghan security personnel, or recruits to their
ranks from among the security forces. There is debate as to whether some of the Afghan security
force attacks on U.S. and other coalition personnel in 2012, particularly those that occurred
following some of the errant U.S. abuses in 2012 (such as the February Quran burnings, discussed
below), were Taliban-inspired or self-inspired by vengeful members of the Afghan force. Afghan
officials have tried to increase monitoring over the sale of military-style clothing that might be
used for such attacks. Other insurgents have made increased use of bombs hidden in turbans,

22 Major General John Campbell, commander of RC-E, July 28, 2010, press briefing.
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which have, until October 2011, generally not been searched out of respect for Afghan religious
traditions. Such a bomb killed former President Rabbani on September 20, 2011, as noted above.
Insurgent Financing: Narcotics Trafficking and Other Methods
All of the insurgent groups in Afghanistan benefit, at least in part, from narcotics trafficking.
However, the adverse effects are not limited to funding insurgents; the trafficking also
undermines rule of law within government ranks. At the same time, narcotics trafficking is an
area on which there has been progress in recent years, although some question whether progress
is sustainable. The trafficking is said to generate an estimated $70 million-$100 million per year
for insurgents. A UNODC report of September 2011 reversed, to some extent, the relatively
positive trend in reporting on this issue, noting that 17 provinces out of 34 provinces in
Afghanistan) fall into the “poppy free” category—down from 20 provinces in the previous year’s
UNODC report. The value of the opium roughly doubled in 2011 to $1.4 billion, largely because
of a sharp rise in the price of opium crops.23
The Obama Administration approach focuses on promoting legitimate agricultural alternatives to
poppy growing in line with Afghan government preferences. In July 2009, the United States
ended its prior focus on eradication of poppy fields on the grounds that this practice was driving
Afghans into the arms of the Taliban as protectors of their ability to earn a living. The de-
emphasis on eradication also put aside the long-standing differences with Karzai over whether to
conduct aerial spraying of fields. Congress apparently has sided with Karzai’s view; successive
annual appropriations laws since FY2008 have prohibited U.S. counter-narcotics funding from
being used for aerial spraying on Afghanistan poppy fields without Afghan concurrence. Some
U.S. programs, such as “Good Performance Initiative” (GPI) funds, give an incentive to
provinces to actively work against cultivation. In 2011, 22 of 34 provinces received awards
totaling a combined $19.2 million.
The U.S. military flies Afghan and U.S. counter-narcotics agents (Drug Enforcement Agency,
DEA) on missions and identifying targets; it also evacuates casualties from counter-drug
operations and assists an Afghan helicopter squadron to move Afghan counter-narcotics forces
around the country. To help break up narcotics trafficking networks, the DEA presence in
Afghanistan is has expanded from 13 agents in 2008 to over 80 as of early 2012.
The Obama Administration has placed additional focus on the other sources of Taliban funding,
including continued donations from wealthy residents of the Persian Gulf. It established a
multinational task force to combat Taliban financing generally, not limited to narcotics, and U.S.
officials are emphasizing with Persian Gulf counterparts the need for cooperation.
The Bush and Obama Administrations have exercised waiver provisions to required certifications
of full Afghan cooperation needed to provide more than congressionally stipulated amounts of
U.S. economic assistance to Afghanistan. Although successive appropriations have required
certification of Afghan cooperation on counter-narcotics, no funds for Afghanistan have been held
up on these grounds. Narcotics trafficking control was perhaps the one issue on which the Taliban
regime satisfied much of the international community. However, cultivation flourished in
provinces under Northern Alliance control, such as Badakhshan.

23 UNDOC, http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Executive_Summary_2011_web.pdf
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The U.S.-Led Military Effort: 2001-2008
To combat the insurgency, the United States is in partnership with 49 other countries and the
Afghan government and security forces. There are about 90,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan as of
May 2012, down from 99,000 in mid-2011, the height of the U.S. presence. The vast majority
operate under NATO/ISAF command, but about 9,000 remain part of the post-September 11 anti-
terrorism mission Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Lieutenant General John Allen took over
the command in Afghanistan on July 18, 2011, succeeding General David Petraeus. Serving under
the top U.S. and NATO/ISAF commander is an “Intermediate Joint Command” focused primarily
on day-to-day operations; it is headed since July 2011 by Lieutenant General Curtis Scaparrotti.
Prior to the U.S. surge in 2009, most U.S. forces were in eastern Afghanistan, leading Regional
Command East (RC-E) of the NATO/ISAF operation. The most restive provinces in RC-E are
Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Kunar, and Nuristan. Helmand, Qandahar, Uruzgan, Zabol, Nimruz, and
Dai Kundi provinces constituted a “Regional Command South (RC-S),” a command formally
transferred to NATO/ISAF responsibility on July 31, 2006. The growing U.S. troop strength in
RC-S in 2009 and 2010—a product of the fact that most of the 2009-2010 U.S. “surge” was
focused on the south—prompted a May 2010 NATO decision to bifurcate RC-S, with the United
States leading at first leading a “southwest” subdivision for Helmand and Nimruz. U.S.
commanders now lead both RC-S and RC-SW. About 4,000 U.S. forces are under German
command in RC-North, headquartered in Konduz. Turkey commands ISAF forces in the capital,
Kabul, and on October 7, 2011, Turkey agreed to continue in that role for another year. Afghan
forces are in overall lead in the capital, however.
Perception of “Victory,” Followed by Setback and Deterioration
During 2001 to mid-2006, U.S. forces and Afghan troops fought relatively low levels of insurgent
violence with focused combat operations against Taliban concentrations in the south and east. For
example, the United States and partner forces conducted “Operation Mountain Viper” (August
2003); “Operation Avalanche” (December 2003); “Operation Mountain Storm” (March-July
2004); “Operation Lightning Freedom” (December 2004-February 2005); and “Operation Pil”
(Elephant, October 2005).
By late 2005, U.S. and partner commanders appeared to believe that the combat, coupled with
political and economic development, had virtually ended any insurgency. Anticipating further
stabilization, NATO/ISAF assumed lead responsibility for security in all of Afghanistan during
2005-2006. Contrary to that view, violence increased significantly in mid-2006, particularly in the
east and the south, where ethnic Pashtuns predominate. Reasons for the deterioration include
popular unrest over Afghan government corruption; the absence of governance or security forces
in many rural areas; the safe haven enjoyed by militants in Pakistan; the reticence of some NATO
contributors to actively combat insurgents; a popular backlash against civilian casualties caused
by military operations; and unrealized expectations of economic development.
NATO counter-offensives during 2006-2008, focused on the Pashtun-dominated areas, cleared
key districts but did not prevent subsequent reinfiltration because Afghan governance was not
established in cleared areas. NATO/ISAF also tried preemptive combat and increased
development work, without durable success. As a result, growing concern took hold within the
Bush Administration, reflected in such statements as a September 2008 comment by then Joint
Chiefs of Staff chairman Admiral Mike Mullen that “I’m not sure we’re winning” in Afghanistan.
Several major incidents supported that assessment, including (1) expanding Taliban operations in
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provinces where it had not previously been active, particularly Lowgar, Wardak, and Kapisa,
close to Kabul; (2) high-profile attacks in Kabul, such as the January 14, 2008, attack on the
Serena Hotel in Kabul and the July 7, 2008, suicide bombing at the Indian Embassy in Kabul,
killing more than 50; (3) the April 27, 2008, assassination attempt on Karzai during a military
parade celebrating the ouster of the Soviet Union; and (4) a June 12, 2008, Sarposa prison break
in Qandahar, in which several hundred Taliban captives were freed.
Start of the Buildup
To try to arrest deterioration, the United States and its partners decided to increase force levels by
partly fulfilling a mid-2008 request by General David McKiernan for 30,000 additional U.S.
troops. The decision whether to fulfill the entire request was deferred to the next Administration.
U.S. troop levels started 2006 at 30,000; climbed slightly to 32,000 by December 2008; and
reached 39,000 by April 2009 (shortly after President Obama took office). Partner forces were
increased significantly as well, by about 6,000 during this time, to a total of 39,000 at the end of
2009 (rough parity between U.S. and non-U.S. forces). Many of the U.S. forces deployed in 2008
and 2009 were Marines that deployed to Helmand, large parts of which had fallen out of
coalition/Afghan control.
In September 2008, the U.S. military and NATO each began strategy reviews. The primary U.S.
review was headed by Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, the Bush Administration’s senior adviser
on Iraq and Afghanistan (who is in the Obama NSC with responsibility for Afghanistan). These
reviews were briefed to the incoming Obama Administration.
Obama Administration Surge
The Obama Administration maintained that Afghanistan needed to be given a higher priority than
it was during the Bush Administration, but that the U.S. mission in Afghanistan not be indefinite.
The new Administration integrated the reviews under way at the end of the Bush Administration’s
into an overarching 60-day inter-agency “strategy review,” chaired by South Asia expert Bruce
Riedel and co-chaired by then SRAP Holbrooke and then-Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Michele Flournoy.
Following its initial review, President Obama announced a “comprehensive” strategy on March
27, 2009.24 In conjunction, he announced the deployment of an additional 21,000 U.S. forces.
Despite approving most of General McKiernan’s request for 30,000 additional forces, the
Administration decided that U.S. military leadership in Afghanistan was insufficiently innovative.
On May 11, 2009, then-Secretary of Defense Gates announced that General McKiernan would be
replaced by General Stanley McChrystal, considered an innovative commander as head of U.S.
Special Operations forces from 2003 to 2008. He assumed the command on June 15, 2009.
After assuming command on June 15, 2009, General McChrystal assessed the security situation
and suggested a strategy in a report of August 30, 2009:25

24 “White Paper,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf.
25 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.
“Commander’s Initial Assessment.” August 30, 2009, available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?.
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• That the goal of the U.S. military should be to protect the population rather than
to focus on searching out and combating Taliban concentrations. Indicators of
success such as ease of road travel, participation in local shuras, and normal life
for families are more significant than counts of enemy fighters killed.
• That there is potential for “mission failure” unless a fully resourced,
comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy is pursued and reverses Taliban
momentum within 12-18 months. About 44,000 additional U.S. combat troops
(beyond those approved by the Obama Administration strategy review in March
2009) would be needed to have the greatest chance for his strategy’s success.
Review and December 1, 2009, Surge and Transition Announcement
The McChrystal assessment set off debate within the Administration and another policy review.
Some senior U.S. officials, such as then-Secretary of Defense Gates, were concerned that adding
many more U.S. forces could create among the Afghan people a sense of “occupation” that could
prove counter-productive. The high-level review included at least nine high-level meetings,
chaired by President Obama, and reportedly concluded on November 19, 2009. The President
announced the following decisions at West Point military academy on December 1, 2009:26
• That 30,000 additional U.S. forces (a “surge”) would be sent (bringing U.S.
levels close to 100,000) to “reverse the Taliban’s momentum” and strengthen the
capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government.
• That there would be a transition, beginning in July 2011, to Afghan leadership of
the stabilization effort and a corresponding beginning of a drawdown of U.S.
force levels. The July 2011 “deadline” caused significant controversy, as
discussed below.
McChrystal Replaced by Petraeus
On June 23, 2010, President Obama accepted the resignation of General McChrystal after
summoning him to Washington, DC, to discuss the comments by him and his staff to a reporter
for Rolling Stone magazine that disparaged several civilian figures involved in Afghanistan
policy. He named General Petraeus as General McChrystal’s successor. In a June 23, 2010,
statement, President Obama attributed the change purely to the Rolling Stone comments, and
stated that Afghanistan policy would not change. General Petraeus was confirmed by the Senate
on June 30, 2010, and assumed command on July 4, 2010.
July 2011 “Deadline” Becomes “Transition” By the End of 2014
The Obama Administration emphasis on transition to Afghan security leadership beginning in
July 2011 was perhaps the most widely debated aspect of policy. The Administration explained
the time frame as a means of indicating to the Afghan government that the Afghan government
must assume greater responsibility for the mission. However, the 2011 deadline was interpreted
by some Administration critics—and by some Afghan and regional leaders—as laying the

26 President Obama speech, op. cit. Testimony of Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and Admiral Mullen before the
Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. December 2, 2009.
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groundwork for a rapid winding down of U.S. involvement.27 Perhaps to address perceived
criticism of such a deadline, on August 31, 2010, the President asserted that the pace and scope of
any drawdown would be subject to conditions on the ground.
The debate over the July 2011 drawdown date abated substantially following the November 19-
20, 2010, NATO summit in Lisbon. At that meeting, it was agreed that the transition to Afghan
leadership would begin in 2011 and would be completed by the end of 2014.
Table 3.Summary of Current U.S. Strategy and Implementation
The major outlines of Obama Administration strategy have taken shape as outlined below.
Goals: to prevent terrorist networks in the region from using Afghanistan as a base to launch international terrorist
attacks.
Strategy Definition: to build Afghan security and governing institutions and transition full responsibility to them by the
end of 2014.
Surge and then Drawdown: U.S. force levels reached a high of 99,000 in mid-2011. A U.S. drawdown of 33,000 is to be
completed by September 2012, with the remaining drawdown plan until 2014 to be determined at a NATO meeting
in Chicago in May 2012. Transition to Afghan combat lead by mid-2013.
Long-Term Involvement. A strategic partnership agreement, signed in Kabul on May 1, 2012, pledges U.S. security and
economic assistance to Afghanistan until 2024.
Reintegration and Reconciliation: to support Afghan efforts to reach a settlement with insurgent leaders and provide
financial and social incentives to persuade insurgents to lay down their arms.
Pakistan: to engage Pakistan and enlist its increased cooperation against militant groups, such as the Haqqani network,
that have a measure of safe haven in Pakistan.
International Dimension: to integrate Afghanistan into existing and new international diplomatic and economic
structures, and to better coordinate all “stakeholders” in the Afghanistan issue (NATO, Afghanistan’s neighbors,
other countries in Afghanistan’s region, the United Nations, and other donors). A major conference was held in Bonn
on December 5, 2011, the 10th anniversary of the original Bonn Conference on Afghanistan.
Partner Participation: to encourage partner forces to remain in Afghanistan until the completion of the transition.
Economic Development: To build a self-sustaining economy that can withstand and, by 2024, compensate for the likely
decrease in international donor aid that accompanies the transition and post-transition period.
Metrics: to measure progress along clear metrics. P.L. 111-32 (FY2009 supplemental appropriation) requires that the
President submit to Congress, 90 days after enactment (by September 23, 2009), metrics by which to assess progress,
and a report on that progress every 180 days thereafter. The Administration’s approximately 50 metrics28 and
reports are submitted regularly, the latest of which was issued in April 2011.

Surge Implementation and Results
The pace and scope of the transition to Afghan security leadership is intended to depend on
assessments of how well U.S. policy is working. Prior to the surge, the Karzai government was

27 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.
Commander’s Initial Assessment.” August 30, 2009, available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf. White House. Remarks by the President In Address to the Nation on the
Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. December 1, 2009; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “Differing Views of New
Afghanistan Strategy.” Washington Post, December 26, 2009.
28 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/16/evaluating_progress_in_afghanistan_pakistan.
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estimated to control about 30% of the country, while insurgents controlled 4% (13 out of 364
districts). Insurgents “influenced” or “operated in” another 30% (Afghan Interior Ministry
estimates in August 2009). Tribes and local groups with varying degrees of loyalty to the central
government control the remainder. Some outside groups report higher percentages of insurgent
control or influence.29 The Taliban had named “shadow governors” in 33 out of 34 of
Afghanistan’s provinces, although many provinces in northern Afghanistan were assessed as
having minimal Taliban presence.
Recent assessments of the security situation have been relatively positive. On January 24, 2012,
ISAF released a summary statement of its accomplishments in 2011, calling it a “remarkably
successful year” that has caused insurgents to have “largely lost control of [the south] and [to]
rely on IED’s as their primary method of attack.”30 By mid-2012, Afghan forces will be in the
lead in areas covering more than 75% of the population.31 The April 2012 DOD report on Afghan
stability and security, covering October 1, 2011-March 31, 2012, says that ISAF and its Afghan
partners “have continued to build on and expand this progress.” The report noted a 16% decline
in enemy-initiated attacks over a comparable period in 2010-2011.
Less optimistic assessments of the surge are based on observations that the insurgents continue to
be able to operate in normally quiet provinces, including cities in the first group to be
transitioned, such as Herat. Moreover, observers note an apparent increase in major attacks in
Kabul, which is generally considered secure: on June 28, 2011, insurgents stormed the historic
Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul, prompting a several hour gun battle with Afghan authorities
backed by NATO-led forces. On August 19, 2011, insurgents attacked the compound of the
British Council in Kabul, on the anniversary of Afghanistan’s formal independence from Britain
in 1919. The September 13, 2011, rocket and gunfire attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and
ISAF headquarters prompted even more significant questions about U.S. and Afghan successes,
although some U.S. officials used the attack as an indication that insurgent groups are altering
their tactics in response to being largely defeated in their strongholds in eastern and southern
Afghanistan (discussed below). On April 15, 2012, about 35 insurgents attacked several locations
in downtown Kabul, as well as conducted attacks in a few other provinces. And, as noted earlier,
some U.S. commanders say that Afghan governance is lagging to the point where the Afghans
may not be able to hold U.S./NATO gains on their own. Gains are also threatened by the
continuing safe haven that insurgents enjoy in Pakistan, a point emphasized in the April 2012
DOD report mentioned above.
Some worry that the gains in Qandahar are particularly fragile. The Qandahar stabilization effort
suffered a significant setback on July 12, 2011, when a trusted aide killed President Karzai’s half-
brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, chair of the provincial council.32 Just 15 days later the mayor of
Qandahar city, Ghulam Haider Hamidi, was killed. Governor Tooryalai Wesa, a low key
technocrat who has tried to balance the flow of U.S. and international funds to the various tribes
and clans in the province, lacks Ahmad Wali Karzai’s influence in the province. On the other

29 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/world/asia/12afghan.html?_r=1.
30 Lawrence Bartlett, “NATO Hails 2011 Successes in Afghanistan.” Agence France Presse, January 24, 2012.
31 U.S. Department of State. Hillary Rodham Clinton Remarks with Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, NATO
Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, April 18, 2012.
32 Partlow, Joshua. “U.S. Seeks to Bolster Kandahar Governor, Upend Power Balance.” Washington Post, April 29,
2010.
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hand, he and other leaders of the province (including Shah Wali Karzai) have eased some of the
grudges and jealousies of Ahmad Wali’s often arbitrary exercise of influence.
Transition and Drawdown
Despite doubts about the durability of progress to date, the results of the surge were considered
sufficient to permit the transition to Afghan security leadership to begin, as planned, in July 2011.
The first tranche of locations to be transitioned was announced by Karzai on March 22, 2011. In
each area of transition, the process of completing the transition to Afghan responsibility is to take
about 12-18 months, according to U.S. commanders. The first tranche was:
• Three provinces: Kabul (except Sarobi district, which is still restive), Panjshir,
and Bamiyan. The latter two are considered highly stable. In Kabul, Afghan
forces have already been in the lead for at least one year. The formal transition
process began with Bamiyan on July 17.
• Four cities: Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Lashkar Gah, and Mehtarlam. The former two
cities are widely considered stable. The latter two are in restive areas, Helmand
and Laghman provinces, respectively, and the announcement of transition in
these cities surprised many observers.
Unwinding of the Surge Announced June 22, 2011
As preparations got under way to begin the transition, then top commander General Petraeus
recommended a gradual drawdown in which the overwhelming majority of the surge forces
would be in combat through the end of 2012. They also had wanted to redeploy some troops to
RC-E, where there had not been as intensive an effort since 2010 as in RC-S or RC-SW. In
considering those recommendations, President Obama took into account the assessment that the
killing of Osama Bin Laden represented a key accomplishment of the core U.S. mission, and
financial needs to reduce the size of the U.S. budget deficit. Asserting that key goals of the surge
had been accomplished, President Obama announced on June 22, 2011, that:
• 10,000 U.S. forces would be withdrawn by the end of 2011. That drawdown has
been accomplished, and U.S. force levels in Afghanistan are about 90,000.
• 23,000 forces (the remainder of the surge forces) would be withdrawn by
September 2012. This will bring U.S. force levels to about 68,000.
• a decision on a drawdown plan for the remaining ISAF forces, from 2012 until
the 2014 transition completion, would be decided at the NATO meeting in
Chicago on May 20-21, 2012. With some indecision about a further drawdown
roadmap, the NATO meeting is likely instead to focus on the size of the Afghan
security forces and U.S. partner commitments to fund and train them after 2014.
General Petraeus and Admiral Mullen, in their testimonies on June 23, 2011, acknowledged that
the President’s decision represented an “aggressive” drawdown but both said that they could still
carry out U.S. policy with it. In a press interview, then Secretary Gates indicated that U.S.
strategy would progressively evolve to more of “overwatch” and counter-terrorism but that, for
the near term, the current counter-insurgency approach could still be pursued in some areas of
Afghanistan, particularly the still restive east.
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Transition Continues: Second Tranche
Subsequent to the drawdown announcement, ISAF and the Afghan government began planning
the second of the seven tranches of areas to be transitioned to Afghan security lead. The scond
tranche was announced on November 27, 2011, as follows:
• Complete provinces: Balkh, Dai Kundi, Takhar, Samangan, Nimruz, and those
areas of Kabul province not transitioned already (Sarobi district). Most of these
provinces are considered relatively stable.
• Large/significant cities: Jalalabad (capital of Nangarhar), Gachcharan (capital of
Ghowr), Shebergan (capital of Jowzjan), Faizabad (capital of Badakshan), Midan
Shahr (capital of Wardak), and Qali Now (capital of Badghis). Most of these
cities are in relatively secure provinces, except for Wardak and Nangarhar.
• Districts of several other provinces in this and the preceding transition phase,
including Nawa, Nad Ali, and Marjah of restive Helmand province; six districts
of Badakhshan; Abkamari district of Badghis; all districts of Herat except for
Shindand; three districts of Laghman; three districts of Nangarhar (outside
Jalalabad city); all districts of Parwan except Shiwari and Siahgherd; all districts
of Sar-i-Pol except Sayyad and the part of Behsud city that is in that province;
and Jalrez and the center of Behsud city in Wardak province.
The transition in these locations began on December 1, 2011 (in Parwan), and almost all areas
began the transition by March 31, 2012. The April 2012 DOD report on Afghan stability says the
third tranche of transition locations remains under discussion as of the end of March 2012.
Mission Changes with Drawdown: Faster Transition to Afghan Combat Lead
After the drawdown began—and the first 10,000 U.S. forces were taken out by December 2011—
some U.S. commanders, including top commander General Allen, revealed a slight mission
change. According to their comments in November and December 2011, some U.S. mentoring
and advisory forces would be sent to Afghanistan in 2012 in an effort to transfer more combat
burden to the Afghan forces, and thereby allow more U.S. regular combat forces to withdraw than
was previously forecast. Secretary of Defense Panetta gave additional weight to these statements
with comments, as he proceeded to a NATO meeting in Brussels on February 2, 2012, that
“hopefully, by the mid to latter part of 2013, we’ll be able to make a transition from a combat role
to a training, advise, and assist role.” On March 15, 2012, during a press conference with visiting
British Prime Minister David Cameron, President Obama affirmed this shift in emphasis, and the
mid-2013 time frame for it.
General Allen, in congressional testimony before the House and the Senate Armed Services
Committees (March 20 and 22, 2012, respectively) said he would not make any recommendations
on further drawdowns until after the surge recovery is complete in September 2012. Reports
purporting to reflect General Allen’s thinking suggested he wanted to keep the 68,000 U.S. troop
levels in Afghanistan until nearly the late 2014 transition timeframe. However, in his speech from
Afghanistan on May 1, 2012, President Obama appeared to resolve any debate by saying that:
After that [September 2012 deadline to reduce to 68,000 troops], reductions will continue at
a steady pace, with more and more of our troops coming home.
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Further contributing to a sense that the United States is looking to reduce the military
commitment to Afghanistan, press reports in late February 2012 said that the Defense Department
is considering downgrading the current U.S. military command, led by a four-star Army general,
to a three-star Special Operations command, perhaps prior to the 2014 end of the transition
period.
Legislatively Mandated Accelerated Drawdown?
In Congress, some have expressed support for efforts or plans to wind down the U.S. involvement
in Afghanistan far more rapidly than those outlined by the Administration. That effort appears to
have gained momentum in the aftermath of the death of Osama Bin Laden on May 1, 2011. In the
111th Congress, H.Con.Res. 248, a resolution introduced by Representative Kucinich to require
removal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan not later than December 31, 2010, was defeated in the
House by a vote of 65 to 356 on March 10, 2010. Other legislation, requiring the Administration
to develop (by January 1, 2011) plans to wind down the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan
failed 18-80, May 27, 2010) in a Senate vote during consideration of a FY2010 supplemental
appropriation (H.R. 4899). On July 1, 2010, the House voted 162-260 to reject a plan in that bill
to require the Administration to submit, by April 4, 2011, a plan and timetable to redeploy from
Afghanistan. Earlier, in House consideration of a FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act
(H.R. 2647), a similar provision failed on June 25, 2009, by a vote of 138-278.
In the 112th Congress, on May 26, 2011, an amendment to the defense authorization bill (H.R.
1540) that would have required a plan to accelerate the transition to Afghan-lead security failed
narrowly by a vote of 204-215. The bill, without the amendment, was passed by both chambers in
December 2011. The amendment contained the main elements of the “Afghanistan Exit and
Accountability Act” (H.R. 1735), which was introduced after the death of Bin Laden. A day
earlier (May 25, 2011), an amendment that would require U.S. troops to withdraw and leave in
place only U.S. counter-terrorism operations failed 123-294. Among other bills, H.R. 651 requires
an agreement with Afghanistan under which U.S. forces redeploy from Afghanistan within one
year of entry into that agreement, and H.Con.Res. 28, H.R. 780, and H.Con.Res. 248 require a
withdrawal. The latter bill failed by a vote of 356 to 65 on March 10, 2011.
Beyond 2014: Long-Term Commitment/Strategic
Partnership Agreement/Alternatives

President Obama and other senior U.S. officials have consistently sought to reassure the Afghans
by saying that 2014 is not a date certain for a complete U.S. pullout, but rather for a transition to
Afghan leadership. The top U.S. commander, General John Allen, made clear in interviews in late
December 2011—and in his March 2012 congressional testimony mentioned above—that U.S.
forces (no numbers specified) would likely remain even after the 2014 transition, and possibly for
several years thereafter. Many experts assess the likely numbers at about 20,000 troops, for
overwatch and training of the ANSF,33 although proposals offered by experts range from about
10,000 to 30,000.

33 General Allen interview with Scott Pelley, CBS 60 Minutes. Broadcast October 15, 2011.
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The mission performed by the force would resemble the concept of a counter-terrorism focused
mission favored by Vice President Joseph Biden during the 2009 strategy debates. According to
the concept, U.S. troops, many of which could be Special Operations forces, would advise the
Afghan forces and conduct or direct some combat against high value targets. U.S. commanders
say that some of the most effective current U.S. operations consist of Special Operations forces
tracking and killing selected key mid-level insurgent commanders, even though such operations
were not intended to be the centerpiece of current U.S. strategy. Some of these operations
reportedly involve Afghan commandos trained by U.S. Special Forces.
Many experts believe that this strategy would be sufficient to prevent a collapse of Afghan forces
or the Afghan government, even if the Taliban remains as active as it is today. Others believe this
strategy would likely lead to Taliban gains in the south and east, although likely not gains that
would cause U.S. policy to be considered a failure. Critics of this approach express the view that
Al Qaeda would regain a safe haven again in Afghanistan if there are insufficient numbers of U.S.
forces there.34
Strategic Partnership Agreement
U.S. troops that remain after 2014 would do so under the auspices of a strategic partnership
agreement—an agreement intended to signal that the United States is committed to Afghan
stability and development for many years after the transition is complete. Formal negotiations on
the agreement began in February 2011, pursuant to President Obama’s statement, at a May 12,
2010, press conference with visiting President Karzai, that the United States and Afghanistan
would renew and expand an existing, five-year-old strategic partnership. Unlike the Iraq case, few
major Afghan figures have called for an outright end to U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan
after 2014, although tensions in the partnership over various issues have increased over the past
year, and particularly after the February-March 2012 Quran burning and Afghan civilian killings
discussed below.
The negotiations were repeatedly plagued by two disagreements in particular—Afghan insistence
on control over detention centers and a halt to or control over nighttime raids on insurgents by
U.S. forces. The detainee issue was resolved on March 10, 2012, with a U.S. agreement to
accelerate the transfer of imprisoned insurgents to Afghan control, to occur over six months. The
United States reportedly still has a veto over which, if any, can be released, and 50 non-Afghans
will remain in U.S. custody. In early April 2012, the two sides reached agreement to give Afghans
more control over night raids, including requiring an Afghan court warrant to hold any raid
captives for more than 48 hours. The resolution of these two issues allowed for the initialing of
the agreement in early April and the formal signing by President Obama and President Karzai in
Afghanistan on May 1, 2012.
The strategic partnership agreement represents a broad outline of the post-2014 relationship, with
details to be filled in subsequently. It has a duration of 10 years. The major provisions include the
following:35
• A commitment to continued U.S.-Afghan cooperation to secure Afghanistan. It is
not specifically stated, although it is strongly implied, that U.S. troops will

34 Ibid.
35 The text is at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf
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remain in Afghanistan after 2014. No numbers are discussed in the document. By
all accounts, as discussed above, the mission will be to train and mentor Afghan
forces, and to help defeat high value targets (counter-terrorism). This latter
mission will most likely be performed by Special Operations Forces.
• The United States will seek funds (appropriations) to provide training and arms
to the Afghan security forces. The agreement does not stipulate which systems
are to be provided. The Afghans are said to have overly ambitious plans to buy
major U.S. combat systems, such as F-16s, that the Afghans cannot likely sustain
without significant long-term assistance.
• The United States will designate Afghanistan as a “Major Non-NATO Ally,” a
designation reserved for close U.S. allies and which would expedite the arms sale
process for Afghanistan.
• The legal status of U.S. forces will be spelled out in a formal Status of Forces
Agreement (“Bilateral Security Agreement” is the term used in the agreement) to
be negotiated, and which might extend beyond 2014. U.S. forces currently
operate in Afghanistan under “diplomatic notes” between the United States and
the interim government of Afghanistan—primarily one that was exchanged in
November 2002. The notes give the United States legal jurisdiction over U.S.
personnel serving in Afghanistan. A draft SOFA reportedly has been under
discussion between the United States and Afghanistan since 2007.
• There will be no “permanent” U.S. bases or the use of Afghan facilities for use
against neighboring countries, but would apparently allow long-term U.S. use of
Afghan facilities.
• The Administration will request economic aid for Afghanistan for the duration of
the agreement (2014-2024), but no amounts are specified. The Afghan
government reportedly wanted a $2 billion per year commitment written into the
agreement but the United States told Afghanistan that amounts can only be
determined through the appropriations process.
In October 2011, even with negotiations still stalled, Karzai called a loya jirga to endorse the
concept of the pact as well as his insistence on Afghan control over detentions and approval
authority for U.S.-led night raids. A November 16-19, 2011, traditional loya jirga (the jirga was
conducted not in accordance with the constitution and its views are therefore non-binding),
consisting of about 2,030 delegates, gave Karzai the approvals he sought, both for the pact itself
and his suggested conditions. It is not clear whether the final agreement will be submitted to the
Afghan National Assembly for formal ratification.
The strategic partnership was first established on May 23, 2005, when Karzai and President Bush
issued a “joint declaration”36 providing for U.S. forces to have access to Afghan military
facilities, in order to prosecute “the war against international terror and the struggle against
violent extremism.” The joint statement did not give Karzai enhanced control over facilities used
by U.S. forces, over U.S. operations, or over prisoners taken during operations. Some of the
bases, both in and near Afghanistan, that support combat in Afghanistan, include those in Table 7.
Karzai’s signing of the partnership had been blessed by 1,000 Afghan representatives on May 8,

36 See http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/afghanistan/WH/20050523-2.pdf.
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2005, at a consultative jirga in Kabul. That jirga supported an indefinite presence of international
forces to maintain security but urged Karzai to delay a firm decision to request such a presence.
Karzai stated on March 22, 2011, that he would likely call another loya jirga to evaluate the
renewed and expanded partnership, if it is agreed with the United States. A FY2009 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 111-32) and the FY2010, FY2011, and FY2012 National Defense
Authorization Acts (P.L. 111-84, P.L. 111-383, and H.R. 1540, respectively) prohibit the U.S.
establishment of permanent bases in Afghanistan.
Threats to Long-Term U.S. Presence: Civilian Casualties and
Quran-Mishandling Protests

As noted above, Afghan officials seek in any long-term pact to limit the U.S. ability to cause
civilian casualties and to conduct certain operations that cause political backlash against the
United States and the Afghan government. U.S. commanders agree, to a large extent, with the
Afghan concerns, but seek to balance civilian casualties against the need to accomplish
operational objectives. The Afghan position has evolved out of several major incidents, including
one near Herat on August 22, 2008, in which a NATO bomb killed up to 90 civilians, as well as
an incident in September 2009 in Konduz in which Germany’s contingent called in an airstrike on
Taliban fighters who captured two fuel trucks, killing several civilians as well as Taliban fighters.
However, ISAF-caused civilian casualties continue and usually lead to recriminations from
President Karzai, including a veiled threat from Karzai in May 2011 that continued civilian
casualties would cause Afghans to view international forces as occupiers. He made similar
comments in June 2011, causing then-U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry to rebuke
him indirectly but publicly.
If there is a decision to retain international forces in Afghanistan beyond 2014, the attitudes of the
Afghan population might become a factor. The insurgent forces had always used the presence of
foreign forces on Afghan soil as a rallying and recruiting point, but the vast bulk of Afghans have,
in surveys, generally appreciated the need for foreign forces to secure Afghanistan. Yet, there are
growing signs that the public welcome of foreign forces might be eroding. On April 1, 2011,
crowds of Afghans in the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif demonstrated against the March 2011
burning of a Quran by a Florida pastor. The demonstration turned violent, with protesters
storming the U.N. compound in the city and killing 12, including 7 U.N. staff. Demonstrations in
other Afghan cities followed, including anti-U.S. slogans and posters echoing the Taliban’s anti-
U.S., anti-Western rhetoric.
A wave of demonstrations and attacks followed reports that U.S. soldiers had mistakenly burned
several Qurans on February 20, 2012, after removing them from Bagram Airfield detention center
on suspicion that books were being used by insurgents to plot while in detention. During February
20-March 7, 2012, six U.S. personnel were killed by Afghan security personnel taking revenge
for the action, and possibly inspired or directed by the Taliban. The reaction was less pronounced
to the alleged killing of 16 Afghans by a U.S. soldier, Sergeant Robert Bates, who has been
arrested and flown back to the United States for trial. A U.S.-Afghan investigation of the incident
is under way.
The demonstrations and attacks raise questions as to whether the Afghan public has begun to see
international forces as occupiers, and appeared to illustrate that a long-term presence of large
numbers of international forces might be opposed broadly within Afghanistan.
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Alternatives for the Post-Transition Period
As the end of the planned transition approaches in 2014, there is growing discussion of alternative
strategies and policies that will stabilize Afghanistan after that time.
Make Concessions to the Taliban/De-Facto Partition
Some experts, such as former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill and members of a
working group sponsored by the Century Foundation (including former negotiator Lakhdar
Brahimi and former high-ranking State Department official Thomas Pickering), believe that the
United States and its partners have to work with Pakistan and other neighboring states to reach a
political settlement, even if such a settlement might be favorable to the Taliban. These experts
believe that the Afghan government will not be able to secure itself by 2014 and that the Taliban
would make steady gains if U.S. troop levels fall to the 20,000 level widely envisioned.
Some proposals by these experts involve allowing the Taliban to control large parts of the south
and east, where the insurgency is most active, and to work with the Northern Alliance to keep
other parts of Afghanistan relatively peaceful. These plans are referred to by experts as partition
or de-facto partition plans, although those terms are usually used by experts who believe these
plans amount to a managed U.S. defeat.
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Table 4. Operation Enduring Freedom Partner Forces
Operation Enduring Freedom continues as a separate combat track, led by the United States but joined by at least 12
partners. The caveat issue is less of a factor with OEF, since OEF is known as a combat-intensive mission conducted
in large part by special forces contingents of contributing nations. The overwhelming majority of non-U.S. forces are
under the NATO/ISAF mission. Prior to NATO assumption of command in October 2006, 19 coalition countries—
primarily Britain, France, Canada, and Italy—contributed approximately 4,000 combat troops to OEF-Afghanistan.
Most were subsequently rebadged to ISAF. However, several foreign contingents, composed mainly of special
operations forces, including forces from the UAE, are still part of OEF-Afghanistan. This includes about 500 British
special forces, some German special forces, and other special forces units. In early 2010, U.S. Special Forces operating
in Afghanistan were brought under direct command of the top U.S. command in Afghanistan.
Under OEF, Japan provided naval refueling capabilities in the Arabian sea, but the mission was suspended in October
2007 fol owing a parliamentary change of majority there in July 2007. The mission was revived in January 2008 when
the new government forced through parliament a bill to allow the mission to resume. It was renewed again, over
substantial parliamentary opposition, in December 2008, but the opposition party won September 2009 elections in
Japan and reportedly has decided on an alternative to continuing the refueling mission—by increasing its financial
contributions to economic development in Afghanistan. That led to an October 2009 pledge by Japan—already the
third largest individual country donor to Afghanistan, providing about $1.9 billion in civilian reconstruction aid since
the fall of the Taliban—to provide another $5 billion over five years. It has been requested to be a major financial
donor of an Afghan army expansion, and, in March 2009, it pledged to pay the costs of the Afghan National Police for
six months.
As part of OEF outside Afghanistan, the United States leads a multi-national naval anti-terrorist, anti-smuggling, anti-
proliferation interdiction mission in the Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea, headquartered in Bahrain. That mission was
expanded after the fall of Saddam Hussein to include protecting Iraqi oil platforms in the Gulf.

Transition Pillar: Building Afghan Forces and Establishing Rule of
Law

Key to the transition to Afghan lead is the effectiveness of the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF), consisting primarily of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police
(ANP). The ANSF have expanded considerably since 2002, and Obama Administration strategy
has thus far emphasized improving it through partnering and more intense mentoring and
training—about 90% of ANSF units are partnered with international forces. During 2011-2014,
U.S. and allied strategy is to focus on putting the ANSF into the lead on progressively more and
more difficult operations. As of May 2012, the ANSF is in the lead in 40% of all combat
missions, and, by the end of 2012, it will have security lead over more than 50% of the Afghan
population.
There are still widespread doubts about their ability to take the lead on security throughout the
country. Some of the deficiency throughout the ANSF is due to illiteracy, which is estimated at
about 90%. That prompted NTM-A to increasingly focus on providing literacy training, which is
also seen as a large driver of recruits who want the literacy education. The April 2012 DOD
report says there were 112,000 Afghan soldiers and police undergoing literacy training as of
March 2012. The NATO factsheet mentioned above says that 68% of the ANSF have at least first
grade literacy, up from only 14% in 2009.
Another concern is loyalty and ideology within the ANSF. Incidents of ANSF attacks on coalition
personnel have increased since early 2011 and created increased tensions between the Afghans
and their mentors. This complicates the transition in cases in which there is less interaction
between Afghan forces and their U.S.-led mentors.
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Current and Post-2014 Size of the Force
On January 21, 2010, the joint U.N.-Afghan “Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board” (JCMB)
agreed that, by October 2011, the ANA would expand to 171,600 and the ANP to about 134,000,
for a total ANSF of 305,600. Both forces reached that level by late September 2011. In August
2011, a larger target size of 352,000 (195,000 ANA and 157,000 ANP) was set, to be reached by
November 2012. As of March 31, 2012, they number about 345,000 (195,000 ANA and 150,000
ANP). They are expected to reach this target somewhat ahead of schedule, probably by July or
August of 2012. This new target level is slightly smaller than a General Petraeus recommendation
of 378,000, which was not adopted because of the concerns about the Afghan ability to sustain so
large a force.
As planning for the post-2014 period has proceeded in the run-up to the May 20-21, 2012, NATO
summit in Chicago, which will focus on long-term financial and military sustainment of the
ANSF, there appears to be a consensus to reduce the total ANSF to about 230,000 by 2017. This
lower figure is primarily, according to many officials, to reduce the cost of sustaining it to about
$4 billion per year. Sustaining the 352,000 force would cost an estimated $6 billion per year, a
figure that some donors balked at as too expensive. In a visit to the United States in April 2012,
Defense Minister Wardak indicated the reduced size would depend on the situation on the ground
after 2014, and he stressed that funding an Afghan force is far less expensive than funding
international forces to ensure Afghanistan’s security. About 1,500 women serve in the ANSF, of
which about 1,300 are police.
ANSF Funding
The issue of sustaining the ANSF after 2014 is likely to be a major issue at the May 2012 NATO
summit in Chicago because the Afghan security sector is funded almost entirely through
international donations. The time frame for Afghan financial self-sufficiency for its security is far
in the future. As noted elsewhere, the Afghan government will take in less than $2 billion in total
revenue in 2011. In December 2009, Karzai asserted that the Afghan government could not likely
fund its own security forces until 2024, and no Afghan or other official has shortened that time
frame since.
In 2011, NTM-A had a budget of $10 billion, almost all of which is U.S. funded, including $3
billion for infrastructure; $3 billion for equipment; $1 billion for training; and $3 billion for
“sustainment” (food and salaries for the Afghan forces, and related costs). The United States will
spend about $11.2 billion on the ANSF in FY2012. A reduction to $5.75 billion is requested for
FY2013. Recent appropriations for the ANA and ANP are contained in the tables at the end of this
report, which also contain breakdowns for Commanders Emergency Response Program funds, or
CERP, which is used for projects that build goodwill and presumably reduce the threat to use
forces. CERP has also been used for what could be considered development projects, a point of
contention among some observers. As noted in the tables, as of FY2005, the security forces
funding has been DOD funds, not State Department funds (Foreign Military Financing, FMF).
The United States has sought contributions to fund the ANSF in the post-2014 period. Planning
for a $4.1 billion ANSF budget during 2017-2024 (based on the 230,000 member force), the
United States has sought contributions from allies of about $1.3 billion. U.S. officials are
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planning for $500 million per year to be provided by the Afghan government, and about $2.3
billion would be provided by the United States.37
NATO Trust Fund for the ANA
In 2007 ISAF set up a trust fund for donor contributions to fund the transportation of equipment
donated to and the training of the ANA; the mandate was expanded in 2009 to include
sustainment costs. In November 2010 a further expansion was agreed on to support literacy
training for the ANA. As of March 31, 2012, donor contributions and pledges to the ANA Trust
Fund total about $550 million. U.S. funding for the ANA is provided separately, not through this
fund.
Law and Order Trust Fund for the ANP
There is also a separate “Law and Order Trust Fund” (LOTF) for Afghanistan, run by the U.N.
Development Program, which is used to pay the salaries of the ANP and other police-related
functions. From 2002-2011, donors contributed $1.5 illion to the Fund, of which the United States
contributed about $914 million, according to the April 2012 DOD report (p. 45). Japan’s 2009
pledge to pay the expenses of the Afghan police for at least six months (about $125 million for
each six month period) is implemented through the LOTF.
Other Bilateral Donations
The DOD reports discuss other bilateral donations to the ANSF, both in funds and in arms and
equipment donations. There is a “NATO Equipment Donation Program,” through which donor
countries supply the ANSF with equipment. Since 2002, about $2.9 billion in assistance to the
ANSF has come from these sources. As an example, in October 2011, Croatia and Slovenia
donated a total of over 20,000 AK-47 assault rifles to the ANP. Australia contributed $40 million
to relocate the ANA’s 205th Corps, and South Korea contributed $30 million for medical and
communications equipment.
There is also a NATO-Russia Council Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund. Launched in March
2011, this fund provides maintenance and repair capacity to the Afghan Air Force helicopter fleet,
much of which is Russian-made.
Training Overview
U.S. forces, along with partner countries and contractors, train the ANSF and will likely continue
to do so after 2014. In February 2010, the U.S.-run “Combined Security Transition Command-
Afghanistan” (CSTC-A) that ran the training was subordinated to the broader NATO Training
Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A). CSTC-A’s mission was reoriented to building the capacity of
the Afghan Defense and Interior Ministries, and to provide resources to the ANSF.
A core element of NATO’s training efforts are its mentoring teams—known as Operational
Mentoring Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams

37 Karen DeYoung. “U.S. Seeks More Money From Donors for Afghan Force.” Washington Post, March 28, 2012.
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(POMLTs). The OMLTs and POMLTs are responsible for training and mentoring deployed ANSF
units. OMLTs, which operate with the Afghan National Army (ANA), consist of 11-28 personnel
from one or several countries. POMLTs, which teach and mentor the Afghan National Police
(ANP), are composed of 15-20 personnel each. Of the approximately 150 OMLTs, 77 are
comprised of U.S. trainers. U.S. trainers comprise 279 of the approximately 330 POMLTs. The
total number of required trainers (U.S. and partner) for the ANSF has been 4,750, but it is not
known whether this structure will be preserved after the 2014 completion of the transition. This
issue is likely to be discussed at the May 20-21, 2012, NATO summit in Chicago.
Working with NTM-A is a separate France-led 300-person European Gendarmerie Force (EGF)
has been established to train Afghan forces in the provinces. The European Union is providing a
190-member “EUPOL” training effort, and 60 other experts to help train the ANP.
The Afghan National Army (ANA)
The Afghan National Army has been built “from scratch” since 2002—it is not a direct
continuation of the national army that existed from the 1880s until the Taliban era. That national
army all but disintegrated during the 1992-1996 mujahedin civil war and the 1996-2001 Taliban
period. However, some Afghan officers who served prior to the Taliban have joined the ANA.
U.S. and allied officers say that the ANA is becoming a major force in stabilizing the country and
a national symbol. The ANA is able to lead a growing percentage of all combat operations. ANA
battalions, or “Kandaks,” are the main unit of the Afghan force. According to the April 2012
DOD report on Afghan stability, there has been a major increase over the past six months in the
number of Kandaks able to operate as “Independent with Advisors.” Only one Kandak had that
rating in September 2011, and 13 do now. The commando forces of the ANA, trained by U.S.
Special Operations Forces, and numbering about 5,300, are considered well-trained and are
taking the lead in some operations against high-value targets.
Still, there is substantial skepticism within the U.S. defense establishment that it can assume full
security responsibility by 2014. It suffers from at least a 20% desertion rate and some accounts
say that a typical ANA unit is only at about 50% of its authorized strength at any given time and
there are significant shortages in about 40% of equipment items. The high desertion rate
complicates U.S.-led efforts to steadily grow the force. Some recruits take long trips to their home
towns to remit funds to their families, and often then return to the ANA after a long absence.
Others, according to U.S. observers, often refuse to serve far from their home towns. The FY2005
foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) required that ANA recruits be vetted for terrorism,
human rights violations, and drug trafficking.
To assist its performance, the United States is attempting to better equip the ANA. Approximately
$2.7 billion worth of vehicles, weapons, equipment, and aircraft were provided during August
2011-March 2012. The United States is also helping the ANSF build up an indigenous weapons
production capability. However, in line with U.S. efforts to cut costs for the ANSF, the Defense
Department reportedly plans to shift in FY2013 from providing new equipment to maintaining
existing equipment, including Russian-supplied helicopters.
The United States has built five ANA bases: Herat (Corps 207), Gardez (Corps 203), Qandahar
(Corps 205), Mazar-e-Sharif (Corps 209), and Kabul (Division HQ, Corps 201, Air Corps).
Coalition officers conduct heavy weapons training for a heavy brigade as part of the “Kabul
Corps,” based in Pol-e-Charki, east of Kabul.
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ANA Ethnic and Factional Considerations
At the time the United States first began establishing the ANA, Northern Alliance figures who
were then in key security positions weighted recruitment for the national army toward its Tajik
ethnic base. Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment or left the ANA program. The
naming of a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as Defense Minister in December 2004 reduced
desertions among Pashtuns (he remains in that position). U.S. officials in Afghanistan say this
problem was further alleviated with better pay and more close involvement by U.S. forces, and
that the force is ethnically integrated in each unit and representative. With about 41% Pashtuns,
34% Tajiks, 12% Hazaras, and 8% Uzbeks, the force is roughly in line with the broad
demographics of the country. However, U.S. commanders say that those Pashtuns who are in the
force are disproportionately eastern Pashtuns (from the Ghilzai tribal confederations) rather than
southern Pashtuns (mostly Durrani tribal confederations). Defense Minister Wardak said in
February 2011 that a greater proportion of southern Pashtuns are being recruited to redress that
imbalance somewhat, and the October 2011 DOD report says a re-evaluation in 2011 shows that
there are more southern Pashtuns in the force than previously thought. The chief of staff was
General Bismillah Khan, a Tajik who was a Northern Alliance commander, although as of June
2010 he is Interior Minister.
Afghan Air Force
Equipment, maintenance, and logistical difficulties continue to plague the Afghan Air Force, and
it remains mostly a support force for ground operations rather than a combat-oriented force.
However, the Afghan Air Force has been able to make ANA units nearly self-sufficient in airlift.
The force is a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed prior to the Soviet invasion, and
is expanding gradually after its equipment was virtually eliminated in the 2001-2002 U.S. combat
against the Taliban regime. It now has about over 5,240 personnel, including 400 pilots, of a
target size of about 8,000 by 2016. It has about 86 aircraft including gunship, attack, and transport
helicopters—of a planned fleet of 145 aircraft. Afghan pilots are based at Bagram air base. There
are five female Afghan Air Force personnel; four arrived in the United States in July 2011 for
training as military helicopter pilots.
Afghanistan also is seeking the return of 26 aircraft, including some MiG-2s that were flown to
safety in Pakistan and Uzbekistan during the past conflicts in Afghanistan. U.S. plans do not
include supply of fixed-wing combat aircraft such as F-16s, which Afghanistan wants, according
to U.S. military officials. There is a concern that Afghanistan will not soon have the capability to
sustain operations of an aircraft as sophisticated as the F-16. In 2010, Russia and Germany
supplied MI-8 helicopters to the Afghan Air Force. The Brazilian firm Embraer was under a DOD
contract ($355 million) to provide 20 Super Tucano turboprop aircraft to the Afghan Air Force,
although the work fell behind schedule and DOD may rebid all or part of the contract.
Afghan National Police (ANP)
U.S. and Afghan officials believe that building up a credible and capable national police force is
at least as important to combating the insurgency as building the ANA. The DOD reports on
Afghanistan, cited earlier, contains substantial detail on U.S.-led efforts to continue what it says
are “significant strides [that] have been made in professionalizing the ANP.” Outside assessments
are widely disparaging, asserting that there is rampant corruption to the point where citizens
mistrust and fear the ANP. Among other criticisms are a desertion rate far higher than that of the
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ANA; substantial illiteracy; involvement in local factional or ethnic disputes because the ANP
works in the communities its personnel come from; and widespread use of drugs. It is this view
that has led to consideration of stepped up efforts to promote local security solutions such as
those discussed above.
Bismillah Khan, the Interior Minister, was highly respected as ANA chief of staff and has taken
steps to try to improve the ANP, including through unannounced visits to stations around the
country. He has also instituted salary increases and objective standards for promotions and
assignments. Still, some Pashtuns might resent his Tajik ethnicity, and some criticized him for
direct involvement in combating the September 13, 2011, attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul
and confusing the lines of authority and reducing the effect of the Afghan counterattack. His
reform efforts build on those taken in March 2010, by then-Interior Minister Atmar when he
signed a “strategic guidance” document for the ANP, which prioritizes eliminating corruption
within the ANP and winning public confidence. About 1,300 ANP are women, demonstrating
some commitment to gender integration of the force.
Other U.S. commanders credit a November 2009 raise in police salaries (nearly doubled to about
$240 per month for service in high combat areas)—and the streamlining and improvement of the
payments system for the ANP—with reducing the solicitation of bribes by the ANP. The raise also
stimulated an eightfold increase in the number of Afghans seeking to be recruited. Others note the
success, thus far, of efforts to pay police directly (and avoid skimming by commanders) through
cell phone-based banking relationships (E-Paisa, run by Roshan cell network).
The United States has worked to correct longstanding equipment deficiencies. The ANP is
increasingly being provided with heavy weapons and now have about 5,000 armored vehicles
countrywide. Still, most police units lack adequate ammunition and vehicles. In some cases,
equipment requisitioned by their commanders is being sold and the funds pocketed by the police
officers. These activities contributed to the failure of a 2006 “auxiliary police” effort that
attempted to rapidly field large numbers of new ANP officers.
The U.S. police training effort was first led by State Department/INL, but DOD took over the lead
in police training in April 2005. Some U.S. officials believe that the United States and its partners
still have not centered on a clearly effective police training strategy. A number of programs, such
as the auxiliary police program attempted during 2005 was discarded as ineffective, and replaced
during 2007-2011 with a program called “focused district development.” In that program, a
district police force was taken out and retrained, its duties temporarily performed by more highly
trained police (Afghan National Civil Order Police, or ANCOP, which number about 9,400
nationwide), and then reinserted after the training is complete. However, the ANCOP officers are
currently being used mostly to staff new checkpoints that are better securing the most restive
districts. Police training includes instruction in human rights principles and democratic policing
concepts, and the State Department human rights report on Afghanistan, referenced above, says
the government and observers are increasingly monitoring the police force to prevent abuses.
Supplements to the National Police: Afghan Local Police (ALP) and Other Local
Forces

The failure of several police training efforts led to efforts, beginning in 2008, to develop local
forces to protect their communities. Until mid-2008, U.S. military commanders opposed assisting
local militias anywhere in Afghanistan for fear of creating rivals to the central government and of
re-creating militias that commit abuses and administer arbitrary justice. However, the urgent
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security needs in Afghanistan caused reconsideration and, during his command, General Petraeus
expanded local security experiments, based on successful experiences in Iraq and after designing
mechanisms to reassure Karzai that any local security organs would be firmly under Afghan
government (mainly Ministry of Interior) control. Among these initiatives are:
Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police (ALP). The Village Stability
Operations concept began in February 2010 in Arghandab district of Qandahar
Province. U.S. Special Operations Forces organized about 25 villagers into an
armed neighborhood watch group, and the program was credited by U.S.
commanders as bringing normal life back to the district. The pilot program was
expanded and formalized into a joint Afghan-U.S. Special Operations effort in
which 12 person teams from these forces live in communities to help improve
governance, security, and development.
• An outgrowth of the Village Stability Operations is the Afghan Local Police
program in which the U.S. Special Operations Forces conducting the Village
Stability Operations set up and train local security organs of about 300 members
each. These local units are under the control of district police chiefs and each
fighter is vetted by a local shura as well as Afghan intelligence. As of March
2012, there are a total of about 12,660 ALP operating in 58 different districts.
There are three ALP centers in Helmand province. A total of 99 districts have
been approved for the program, each with about 300 fighters, which would bring
the target size of the program to about 30,000. However, the ALP program, and
associated and preceding such programs discussed below, were heavily criticized
in a September 12, 2011, Human Rights Watch report citing wide-scale human
rights abuses (killings, rapes, arbitrary detentions, and land grabs) committed by
the recruits. The report triggered a U.S. military investigation which substantiated
many of the report’s findings, although not the most serious of the allegations.38
• The ALP initiative was also an adaptation of another program, begun in 2008,
termed the “Afghan Provincial Protection Program” (APPP, commonly called
“AP3”), funded with DOD (CERP) funds. The APPP got under way in Wardak
Province (Jalrez district) in early 2009 and 100 local security personnel
“graduated” in May 2009. It was subsequently expanded to 1,200 personnel. U.S.
commanders said no U.S. weapons were supplied to the militias, but the Afghan
government provided weapons (Kalashnikov rifles) to the recruits, possibly using
U.S. funds. Participants in the program are given $200 per month. General
Petraeus showcased Wardak in August 2010 as an example of the success of the
APPP and similar efforts. The National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84)
called for a report on the program within 120 days of the October 28, 2009,
enactment.
Afghan Public Protection Force. A new force is being developed by the Ministry
of Interior, in partnership with ISAF and U.S. Embassy Kabul. The Afghan
Public Protection Force is intended to be a guard force of about 14,000 personnel
which will help guard diplomatic and development sites. The force was
developed to implement Karzai’s demands in 2010 that private security
contractor forces be disbanded and their functions performed by official Afghan

38 Ernesto Londono. “U.S. Cites Local Afghan Police Abuses.” Washington Post, December 16, 2011. The Human
Rights Watch report is entitled “Just Don’t Call It a Militia.” http://www.hrw.org, September 12, 2011.
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government forces by March 20, 2012. That deadline was extended because of
the slow pace of standing up the new protection force, and some development
organizations continue to use locally hired guard forces.
The local security experiments to date resemble but technically are not arbokai, which are private
tribal militias. Some believe that the arbokai concept should be revived as a means of securing
Afghanistan, as the arbokai did during the reign of Zahir Shah and in prior pre-Communist eras.
Reports persist that some tribal groupings have formed arbokai without specific authorization.
The local security programs discussed above appear to reverse the 2002-2007 efforts to disarm
local sources of armed force. And, as noted in the April 2012 DOD report on Afghan stability,
there have sometimes been clashes and disputes between ALP and ANSF units, particularly in
cases where the units are of different ethnicities. These are the types of problems that prompted
the earlier efforts to disarm rather than establish local militia forces, as discussed below.
DDR. The main program, run by UNAMA, was called the “DDR” program—Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration—and it formally concluded on June 30, 2006. The program
got off to a slow start because the Afghan Defense Ministry did not reduce the percentage of
Tajiks in senior positions by a July 1, 2003, target date, dampening Pashtun recruitment. In
September 2003, Karzai replaced 22 senior Tajiks in the Defense Ministry officials with Pashtuns,
Uzbeks, and Hazaras, enabling DDR to proceed. The major donor for the program was Japan,
which contributed about $140 million. Figures for collected weapons are in and U.S. spending on
the programs are in the U.S. aid tables later in the report.
The DDR program was initially expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters, although that figure was
later reduced. (Figures for accomplishment of the DDR and DIAG programs are contained in
Table 6.) Of those demobilized, 55,800 former fighters have exercised reintegration options
provided by the program: starting small businesses, farming, and other options. U.N. officials say
at least 25% of these found long-term, sustainable jobs. Some studies criticized the DDR program
for failing to prevent a certain amount of rearmament of militiamen or stockpiling of weapons
and for the rehiring of some militiamen.39 Part of the DDR program was the collection and
cantonment of militia weapons, but generally only poor-quality weapons were collected. As one
example, Fahim, still the main military leader of the Northern Alliance faction, continues to turn
heavy weapons over to U.N. and Afghan forces (including four Scud missiles), although the U.N.
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) says that large quantities of weapons remain in the
Panjshir Valley.
Despite the earlier demobilization, which affected many of the northern minorities, there are
indications that some faction leaders may be seeking to revive disbanded militias. The minorities
may fear increased Taliban influence as a result of the Karzai reconciliation efforts, and the
minorities want to be sure they could combat any Taliban abuses that might result if the Taliban
achieves a share of power.
DIAG. Since June 11, 2005, the disarmament effort has emphasized another program called
“DIAG”—Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups. It is run by the Afghan Disarmament and
Reintegration Commission, headed by Vice President Khalili. Under the DIAG, no payments are
available to fighters, and the program depends on persuasion rather than use of force against the

39 For an analysis of the DDR program, see Christian Dennys. Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament?, June
6, 2005, http://www.jca.apc.org/~jann/Documents/Disarmament%20demobilization%20rearmament.pdf.
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illegal groups. DIAG has not been as well funded as was DDR: it has received $11 million in
operating funds. As an incentive for compliance, Japan and other donors have made available
$35 million for development projects where illegal groups have disbanded. These incentives were
intended to accomplish the disarmament of a pool of as many as 150,000 members of 1,800
different “illegal armed groups”: militiamen that were not part of recognized local forces (Afghan
Military Forces, AMF) and were never on the rolls of the Defense Ministry. These goals were not
met by the December 2007 target date in part because armed groups in the south say they need to
remain armed against the Taliban, but UNAMA reports that 100 out of 140 districts planned for
DIAG are now considered “DIAG compliant.” (U.N. Secretary General Report, March 9, 2011).
Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector
Many experts believe that an effective justice sector is vital to Afghan governance. Some of the
criticisms and allegations of corruption at all levels of the Afghan bureaucracy have been
discussed throughout this report. U.S. justice sector programs generally focus on promoting rule
of law and building capacity of the judicial system, including police training and court
construction. The rule of law issue is covered in detail in CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S.
Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance
, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman.
Policy Component: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
U.S. and partner officials have generally praised the effectiveness of “Provincial Reconstruction
Teams” (PRTs)—enclaves of U.S. or partner forces and civilian officials that provide safe havens
for international aid workers to help with reconstruction and to extend the writ of the Kabul
government—in accelerating reconstruction and assisting stabilization efforts. The PRTs, the
concept for which was announced in December 2002, perform activities ranging from resolving
local disputes to coordinating local reconstruction projects, although most U.S.-run PRTs and
most PRTs in combat-heavy areas focus on counter-insurgency. Many of the additional U.S.
civilian officials deployed to Afghanistan during 2009 and 2010 are based at PRTs, which have
facilities, vehicles, and security. Some aid agencies say they have felt more secure since the PRT
program began,40 but several relief groups do not want to associate with military forces because
doing so might taint their perceived neutrality. Others, such as Oxfam International, argue that the
PRTs are delaying the time when the Afghan government has the skills and resources to secure
and develop Afghanistan on its own. It is likely that the PRTs in Afghanistan will either be phased
out or transitioned to purely civilian leadership and roles as the transition unfolds.
The list of PRTs in operation, including lead country, is shown in Table 16. Virtually all the PRTs
are now under the ISAF mission. Each PRT operated by the United States has U.S. forces; DOD
civil affairs officers; representatives of USAID, State Department, and other agencies; and
Afghan government (Interior Ministry) personnel. Most PRTs, including those run by partner
forces, have personnel to train Afghan security forces. USAID officers assigned to the PRTs
administer PRT reconstruction projects.

40 Kraul, Chris. “U.S. Aid Effort Wins Over Skeptics in Afghanistan.” Los Angeles Times, April 11, 2003.
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Karzai Criticism of PRTs
As far as use of PRTs to jump-start development, USAID observers say there is little Afghan
input, either into development project decision making or as contractors for facility and other
construction. That lack of input has fed criticism by Karzai, most recently at his February 6, 2011,
speech at a security conference in Munich, that the PRTs should be abolished and all aid funds
channeled through the Afghan government. USAID spending on PRT projects is in the table on
USAID spending in Afghanistan at the end of this report.
To address the criticism, some donor countries have enhanced the civilian component of the PRTs
and change their image from military institutions. There has been long been consideration to turn
over the lead in the U.S.-run PRTs to civilians rather than military personnel, presumably State
Department or USAID officials. That was first attempted in 2006 with the establishment of a
civilian-led U.S.-run PRT in the Panjshir Valley. As noted, in March 2009, the Netherlands
converted its PRT to civilian lead, although that alteration ceased after the assumption of U.S. and
Australian PRT command in July 2010. As of November 2009, the “civilianization” of the PRT
concept has evolved further with the decision to refer to PRTs as Interagency Provincial Affairs
(IPA) offices or branches. In this new concept—a local parallel to the Senior Civilian
Representatives now assigned to each regional command—State Department officers enjoy
enhanced decision-making status at each PRT.
Cooperation With Allies/Managing the 2014 Exit
Partner forces have been key to the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. Since 2006, the vast bulk of all
U.S. troops in Afghanistan have served under the umbrella of the NATO-led “International
Security Assistance Force” (ISAF). ISAF consists of all 26 NATO members states plus partner
countries—a total of 50 countries including the United States. However, as the transition to
Afghan security leadership began in July 2011, U.S. officials have been attempting to prevent a
“rush to the exits” in which partner forces pull out before their areas of responsibility are ready
for transition. U.S. officials want partner drawdowns to occur at roughly the same rate and
proportion as the U.S. drawdown occurs—thus far achieved.
Virtually all the European governments have long been under pressure from their publics and
parliaments to end or reduce their military involvement in Afghanistan. Several key contingents
had (1) already ended their combat missions (the Netherlands), (2) announced firm ends to those
missions (Canada ended its combat mission in late July 2011, but will furnish 950 trainers for the
ANSF), or (3) set notional times to depart before the 2014 completion of the transition. Partner
forces that continue to bear the brunt of combat in Afghanistan include Britain, Canada, Poland,
France, Denmark, Romania, and Australia.
Some partner countries have already announced planned drawdowns, leading to the completion of
their missions before the end of 2014. Other drawdown schedules from 2012 to 2014 are likely to
be announced at the May 20-21, 2012, NATO summit meeting in Chicago. There are no firm
indications, to date, of which countries would maintain forces in Afghanistan beyond the 2014
transition. However, some experts believe that close U.S. allies will keep some forces in
Afghanistan in order to show support for U.S. policy after 2014.
• France announced in late 2011 that it would cut about 1,000 forces by the end of
2012. However, in February 2012, following an incident in which an Afghan
soldier killed four French soldiers, France announced it would wind down its
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mission in Afghanistan by the end of 2013, one year earlier than the 2014
transition date.
• Britain announced it would withdraw about 900 of its force by the end of 2012,
and the remainder of the contingent would be out by the end of 2014. However,
in February 2012, Britain reaffirmed it would remain in Afghanistan at least
through the end of 2014 transition completion.
• Italy and Germany have also indicated an intent to try to wind down their
involvement in Afghanistan before the end of 2014.
• Denmark said it will withdraw 120 troops by the end of 2012, but will increase
development aid and ANSF training contributions.
• Poland said in March 2012 that it would not withdraw forces before the end of
2014.
• Belgium said it will remove 300 personnel from Kabul International Airport by
the end of 2012.
• Turkey said it will redeploy 200-300 personnel from the Kabul sector by the end
of 2013.
• Australia plans to end its mission in Afghanistan before the 2014 completion of
the transition, and it began to transition its mission to Afghan forces in Uruzgan
Province in April 2012.
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Table 5. Background on NATO/ISAF Formation and U.N. Mandate
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created by the Bonn Agreement and U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001, a Chapter 7 resolution),41 initially limited to Kabul. In October 2003, after
Germany agreed to contribute 450 military personnel to expand ISAF into the city of Konduz, ISAF contributors
endorsed expanding its presence to several other cities, contingent on formal U.N. approval—which came on
October 14, 2003, in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1510. In August 2003, NATO took over command of ISAF—
previously the ISAF command rotated among donor forces including Turkey and Britain.
NATO/ISAF’s responsibilities broadened significantly in 2004 with NATO/ISAF’s assumption of security responsibility
for northern and western Afghanistan (Stage 1, Regional Command North, in 2004 and Stage 2, Regional Command
West, in 2005, respectively). The transition process continued on July 31, 2006, with the formal handover of the
security mission in southern Afghanistan to NATO/ISAF control. As part of this “Stage 3,” a British/Canadian/Dutch-
led “Regional Command South” (RC-S) was formed. Britain is the lead force in Helmand; Canada is lead in Qandahar,
and the Netherlands was lead in Uruzgan until its departure in July 2010; the three rotated the command of RC-S.
“Stage 4,” the assumption of NATO/ISAF command of peacekeeping in 14 provinces of eastern Afghanistan (and thus
all of Afghanistan), was completed on October 5, 2006. As part of the completion of the NATO/ISAF takeover, the
United States put about half the U.S. troops then operating in Afghanistan under NATO/ISAF in “Regional Command
East” (RC-E).
The ISAF mission was renewed (until October 13, 2012) by U.N. Security Council Resolution 2011 (October 12,
2011), which reiterated previous resolutions’ support for the Operation Enduring Freedom mission. Tables at the end
of this report list contributing forces, areas of operations, and their Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

Major Contingent Developments During the U.S. “Surge”
U.S. partners note that they have repeatedly answered U.S. calls to support the mission. In concert
with the beginning of the U.S. surge in early 2009, additional pledges came through at the April
3-4, 2009, NATO summit, and other force pledges were announced in conjunction with the
January 28, 2010, conference on Afghanistan in London. Among major pledges (troops and major
aid funds) that supported the U.S. surge:
• November 10, 2009: Ahead of President Obama’s visit to Asia, Japan announced
a pledge of $5 billion over the next five years for Afghanistan civilian
development, although it suspended its naval refueling mission. Japan has been
covering about half of the $250 million yearly salary costs of the ANP.
• July 2009: South Korea announced it would increase its aid contribution to
Afghanistan by about $20 million, in part to expand the hospital capabilities at
Bagram Air Base. In July 2010, it returned about 150 engineers to Afghanistan
for development missions, protected by 300 South Korean forces, to Parwan
Province.42

41 Its mandate was extended until October 13, 2006, by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1623 (September 13, 2005);
and until October 13, 2007, by Resolution 1707 (September 12, 2006).
42 Until December 2007, 200 South Korean forces at Bagram Air Base, mainly combat engineers, were part of
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF); they left in December 2007 in fulfillment of a decision by the South Korean
government the previous year. However, many observers believe South Korea did not further extend its mission beyond
that, possibly as part of an agreement in August 2007 under which Taliban militants released 21 kidnapped South
Korean church group visitors. Two were killed during their captivity. The Taliban kidnappers did not get the demanded
release of 23 Taliban prisoners held by the Afghan government.
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• December 2009-January 2010 (London conference): A total of about 9,000 forces
were pledged (including retaining 2,000 sent for the August 2009 election who
were due to rotate out). Several countries pledged police trainers.
• July 2010: Malaysia became a new contributor to the Afghanistan effort,
furnishing 40 military medics.
• March 2011: Germany said it would add 300 forces to operate surveillance
systems, although this decision was related to its refusal to participate in military
action against Libya rather than to an Afghanistan-specific requirement.
• May 2011: Kazakhstan became the first Central Asian state to announce a troop
contribution, pledging four noncombat troops to the mission.
• The April 2012 DOD report on Afghan stability says that Georgia, Montenegro,
and Mongolia are adding forces to their contingents in 2012.
National “Caveats” on Combat Operations
One of the most thorny issues has been the U.S. effort to persuade other NATO countries to adopt
flexible rules of engagement that allow all contributing forces to perform combat missions.
NATO and other partner forces have not, as they pledged at the NATO summit in April 2008,
removed the so-called “national caveats” on their troops’ operations that Lieutenant General
McChrystal says limits operational flexibility. For example, some nations refuse to conduct night-
time combat. Others have refused to carry Afghan personnel on their helicopters. Others do not
fight after snowfall. These caveats were troubling to NATO members with forces in heavy combat
zones; such countries feel they are bearing the brunt of the fighting.
Security/Political Initiatives To Facilitate the Transition
Despite the assessments of progress, the U.S. view is that ending the conflict on favorable terms
requires convincing insurgent leaders that a negotiated settlement should be pursued.
“Reintegration” and “Reconciliation” With Insurgents43
Even before his term as top commander in Afghanistan, General Petraeus had said that the way
conflicts like the one in Afghanistan end is through a political settlement. The issue of
reintegrating insurgent fighters into society, and reconciling with insurgent leaders, is receiving
increasing high-level attention. Both are Afghan-led processes but they have concerned some in
the international community and Afghanistan because of the potential for compromises with
insurgents that may produce backsliding on human rights. Most insurgents are highly
conservative Islamists who agreed with the limitations in women’s rights that characterized
Taliban rule. Many leaders of ethnic minorities are also skeptical of the effort because they fear
that it might further Pashtun political strength within Afghanistan, and enhance the influence of
Pakistan in Afghan politics. The United States and the Karzai government agree that any
settlement requires that fighters and insurgent leaders agree, as an outcome,44 to (1) cease

43 This issue is discussed in substantial detail in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman
44 The concept that this stipulations could be an “outcome” of negotiations was advanced by Secretary of State Clinton
(continued...)
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fighting, (2) accept the Afghan constitution, and (3) sever any ties to Al Qaeda or other terrorist
groups.
Reintegration/”Peace Jirga”
Before the more recent emphasis on reconciliation, the concept of providing incentives to
persuade insurgents to surrender and reenter their communities received most of the U.S.
attention. The elements included in a reintegration plan drafted by the Afghan government and
adopted by a “peace loya jirga” during June 2-4, 2010,45 included providing surrendering fighters
with jobs, amnesty, protection, and an opportunity to be part of the security architecture for their
communities. Later in June 2010, President Karzai issued a decree to implement the plan, which
involves outreach by Afghan local leaders to tribes and others who can convince insurgents to lay
down their arms. The Afghan plan received formal international backing at the July 20, 2010,
Kabul Conference. Britain, Japan, and several other countries, including the United States, have
announced a total of about $235 million in donations to a new fund to support the reintegration
process, of which $134 million has been received.46 The U.S. contribution is about $100 million
(CERP funds), of which $50 million was formally pledged in April 2011.47
Despite the international funding for the effort, the Afghan-led reintegration process has moved
forward slowly. As of April 2012, over 4,000 fighters have reintegrated, according to Defense
Minister Wardak, and another 1,800 are entering the process. However, those reintegrated are still
mostly from the north and west, although with perhaps some increasing participation from
militants in the more violent south and east. Some observers say there have been cases in which
reintegrated fighters have committed Taliban-style human rights abuses against women and
others, suggesting that the reintegration process might have unintended consequences.
Previous efforts similarly met mixed success. A “Program for Strengthening Peace and
Reconciliation” (referred to in Afghanistan by its Pashto acronym “PTS”) operated during 2003-
2008, headed by then Meshrano Jirga speaker Sibghatullah Mojadeddi and Vice President Karim
Khalili, and overseen by Karzai’s National Security Council. The program persuaded 9,000
Taliban figures and commanders to renounce violence and join the political process.
Reconciliation With Taliban Figures/Rabbani Assassination Setback
The separate but related Afghan-led initiative is to conduct negotiations with senior insurgent
leaders. Many in the international community, including within the Obama Administration,
initially withheld endorsement of reconciliation, fearing it might result in the incorporation into
the Afghan political system of insurgent leaders who retain ties to Al Qaeda and commit severe
human rights abuses. According to Afghan and U.S. officials, any settlement would require—as
an outcome—that the Taliban drop at least some of its demands that (1) foreign troops leave

(...continued)
at the first annual Richard C. Holbrooke Memorial Address. February 18, 2011.
45 Afghanistan National Security Council. “Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program.” April 2010.
46 United Nations. Report of the Secretary General: “The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International
Peace and Security.” March 9, 2011.
47 The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84) authorized the use of CERP funds to win local
support, to “reintegrate” Taliban fighters.
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Afghanistan; (2) a new “Islamic” constitution be adopted; and (3) Islamic law is imposed.
However, those are viewed as opening positions; the Afghan government, for its part, may have
softened its position on changes to the Afghan constitution as part of a settlement. Secretary
Clinton said in India on July 20, 2011, that any settlement must not result in and undoing of “the
progress that has been made [by women and ethnic minorities] in the past decade.”
Following the 2010 U.S. shift on the issue, the July 20, 2010, Kabul Conference endorsed
establishment of an Afghan High Peace Council to build Afghan consensus on the issue. That
Council was established on September 5, 2010, and its 70 members met for the first time under
the leadership of Tajik leader Burhanuddin Rabbani on October 10, 2010. Rabbani was appointed
because of Karzai’s perception that he could bring along skeptical Northern Alliance/Tajik/other
minority figures to support reconciliation. He earned substantial respect among all factions for his
diligent work in this role; for example he led High Peace Council visits to Pakistan and other
regional countries, and established provincial representative offices of the Council in at least 27
provinces. On the other hand, some of the nine women on the Council say their views have been
routinely dismissed. In April 2012, the Council elected Rabbani’s son, Salahuddin, to head the
Council.
Prior to the Rabbani killing, U.S., Taliban, and Afghan representatives had proliferated. On April
7, 2011, the Afghan head of the reintegration process, Mohammad Stanekzai (who is also the
secretary of the High Peace Council and was seriously wounded in the Rabbani attack) said that
the Afghan government was in talks with Taliban representatives. The issue garnered further
attention in May 2011 amid reports that U.S. officials had met at least three times in 2011 with
Tayeb Agha, a figure believed close to Mullah Umar. In late June 2011, those meetings were
confirmed both by Karzai and then-Secretary of Defense Gates, who said the talks had been led
by the State Department and have been facilitated by Germany and Qatar.
Rabbani’s assassination set back the reconciliation process because the Northern Alliance and
other reconciliation skeptics asserted that the action demonstrates that the Taliban does not want
reconciliation and that counting on its prospects is naïve. Karzai, seeking to mollify that base of
opinion, echoed that criticism of Pakistan and Pakistan’s Afghan militant contacts. An opportunity
for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and others to pursue the issue was missed when Pakistan boycotted the
December 5, 2011, Bonn Conference over a November 26, 2011, security incident in which U.S.
forces killed 24 Pakistani border troops.
In December 2011, as tensions over these issues abated, U.S. officials resumed the process,
including pursuing the opening of a Taliban political office in Qatar to facilitate talks. That idea
was briefly disrupted by Afghan opposition to Qatar’s role; Afghanistan called its Ambassador to
Qatar back for consultations in December 2011 when Afghanistan learned that Qatar was about to
allow a Taliban office to open. That action suggested that Karzai wants a high degree of control
over any settlement talks, and it came amid reports that U.S. officials had been meeting Taliban
figures more frequently than was previously believed. The United States also revealed it was
considering a Taliban request for a “confidence-building measure” in the form of transferring
captives from the Guantanamo detention facility to a form of house arrest in Qatar. Such a
transfer would require U.S. congressional notification. The transfer reportedly has stalled as of
late April 2012 over Qatar’s failure to fully assure the United States that the detainees would not
be able to escape custody. The figures include some, such as Mullah Mohammad Fazl who were
major figures in the Taliban regime (Fazl was deputy Defense Minister). H.Res. 529 expresses
opposition to their release. The United States also demanded a public Taliban statement severing
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its ties to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups, possibly as a prelude to a limited battlefield
ceasefire.
Some movement became apparent in early 2012—in January 2012, Karzai dropped his objections
to the Qatar office, and members of the High Peace Council confirmed on February 16, 2012, that
the Afghan government was also involved in talks with some Taliban figures. On February 24,
2012, following a trilateral Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan summit, Pakistani leaders for the first time
publicly encouraged Taliban leaders to negotiate a settlement to the conflict. Still, some U.S.
officials say that all sides were not close to serious negotiations on the core issues of any political
settlement. And, the process suffered another setback following the March 11, 2012, killing of 16
Afghan civilians allegedly by a U.S. soldier. After that incident, the Taliban, as well as Hizb-ei-
Islam of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, called off their participation in settlement talks. An April 15,
2012, attack by militants on several locations in Kabul and other provinces again soured the
Afghan government on talks. On May 1, 2012, President Obama, in a speech in Afghanistan,
acknowledged that the United States has undertaken talks with the Taliban. As of May 1, 2012,
contacts are widely reported to have resumed informally after the suspensions discussed above.
The contacts discussed above came after a “false start,” in which one purported senior Taliban
interlocutor was revealed as an imposter. Earlier, Mullah Bradar, who is close to Mullah Umar,
was said by the Afghan side to have been engaged in talks with the Afghan government prior to
his arrest by Pakistan in February 2010. Karzai reportedly believes that Pakistan arrested Bradar
in order to be able to influence the course of any Afghan government-Taliban settlement. The
Taliban as a movement was not invited to the June 2-4, 2010, consultative peace jirga, but some
Taliban sympathizers reportedly were there.
Previous talks have taken place primarily in Saudi Arabia and UAE. Press reports said that
Afghan officials, including Karzai’s brother, Qayyum; Arsala Rahmani, a former Taliban official
now in parliament; and the former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul Salam Zaeef, who
purportedly is in touch with Umar’s inner circle. These same Taliban representatives may be
involved in the ongoing talks referred to above.
Removing Taliban Figures From U.N. Sanctions Lists. The consultative peace jirga, in its final
declaration, supported Karzai’s call for the removal of the names of some Taliban figures from
U.N. lists of terrorists, lists established pursuant to Resolution 1267 and Resolution 1333
(October 15, 1999, and December 19, 2000, both pre-September 11 sanctions against the Taliban
and Al Qaeda) and Resolution 1390 (January 16, 2002). Press reports before the July 20, 2010,
Kabul Conference said the Afghan government has submitted a list of 50 Taliban figures it wants
taken off this list (which includes about 140 Taliban-related persons or entities) as a confidence-
building measure. The Conference called on Afghanistan to engage with the U.N. Security
Council to provide evidence to justify such de-listings, and U.N., U.S., and other international
officials said they would support considering de-listings on a case-by-case basis. On January 26,
2010, Russia, previously a hold-out against such a process, dropped opposition to removing five
Taliban-era figures from these sanctions lists, including Taliban-era foreign minister Wakil
Mutawwakil, who ran in 2005 parliamentary elections. Also removed was Abdul Hakim Monib,
who has served Karzai as governor of Uruzgan, Abdul Hakim Mujahid, who was Taliban
representative in the United States, and three others. Mujahid now is one of three deputy chairs of
the High Peace Council. “Mullah Rocketi,” not on the sanctions list, is a former Taliban
commander who ran for president in the August 2009 elections.
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On June 17, 2011, in concert with U.S. confirmations of talks with Taliban figures, the U.N.
Security Council adopted Resolution 1988 and 1989. The resolutions drew a separation between
the Taliban and Al Qaeda with regard to the sanctions. However, a decision on whether to remove
the 50 Taliban figures from the list, as suggested by Afghanistan, was deferred. On July 21, 2011,
14 Taliban figures were removed from the “1267” sanctions list; among them were four members
of the High Peace Council (including Arsala Rahmani, mentioned above).
Table 6. Major Security-Related Indicators
Force Current
Level
Total Foreign Forces
About 130,000: About 90,000 U.S. and 40,000 non-U.S. partner forces. (U.S. total was:
in Afghanistan
25,000 in 2005; 16,000 in 2003; 5,000 in 2002. ISAF totals were: 12,000 in 2005; and 6,000 in
2003.) U.S. forces deployed at 88 bases in Afghanistan.
U.S. Casualties in
1,835 killed, of which 1,520 by hostile action. Additional 103 U.S. deaths in other OEF
Afghanistan
theaters. 150 U.S. killed from October 2001-January 2003. 500+ killed in 2010.
NATO/ISAF Sectors RC-South: 35,000 (U.K. lead). RC-Southwest: 27,000 (U.S. lead); RC-East: 32,000 (U.S. lead);
RC-North: 11,000 (German lead); RC-West: 6,000 (Italy lead) RC-Kabul: 5,000 (Turkey).
Afghan National
About 195,000 as of May 2012, achieving the 195,000 target size that was planned by
Army (ANA)
November 2012. 5,300 are commando forces, trained by U.S. Special Forces. ANA private
paid about $200 per month; generals about $750 per month.
Afghan National
About 150,000 as of May 2012, with goal of 157,000 by November 2012. 21,000 are Border
Police (ANP)
Police; 3,800+ counter-narcotics police; 14,400 Civil Order Police (ANCOP).
ANSF Salaries
About $800 million per year, paid by donor countries bilaterally or via trust funds
Number of Al Qaeda “Less than 100 or so,” according to General Petraeus in April 2011. Also, small numbers of
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
Number of Taliban
Up to 25,000 (U.S. military and Afghan estimates in mid-2011), although General Allen
fighters
believes numbers are much lower. Plus about 3,000 Haqqani faction and 1,000 Hikmatyar.
Reintegrations
Over 4,000 fighters reintegrated since 2010 with about another 1,800 awaiting processing
Afghan casualties
United Nations said on February 4, 2012, that 3,000 civilians were killed in 2011, an 8%
increase over 2011. The majority were killed by insurgent groups. See CRS Report R41084,
Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians, by Susan G. Chesser.
Sources: CRS; testimony and public statements by DOD officials.

Regional Dimension
The transition to Afghan security leadership has led some regional powers to plan to secure their
interests in Afghanistan in a post-NATO/ISAF Afghanistan. As part of its transition strategy, the
Obama Administration is promoting Afghanistan’s integration into regional security and
economic organizations and patterns. In so doing, the Administration is hoping to deter
Afghanistan’s neighbors from using Afghanistan to secure their own interests. The Administration
obtained pledges from Afghanistan’s neighbors to that concept at a region-led international
meeting in Istanbul on November 2, 2011, resulting in the “Istanbul Declaration” and the
December 5, 2011, Bonn Conference on Afghanistan (the 10th anniversary of the Bonn
Conference that formed the post-Taliban political and security architecture for Afghanistan). That
meeting was attended by high-level representatives from 85 countries and 15 international
organizations. Although the final declaration of the conference affirmed that vision, Pakistan
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decided not to send high-level representation to the conference because of a November 26, 2011,
security incident with the United States, reducing the conference’s focus on regional integration.
The Administration is emphasizing development of a Central Asia-South Asia trading hub—part
of a “New Silk Road” (NSR)—in an effort to keep Afghanistan stable and economically vibrant
as donors wind down their involvement.
Prior to the recent efforts, Afghanistan has been slowly integrated into regional security and
economic organizations. In November 2005, Afghanistan joined the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and Afghanistan seeks observer status in the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), a security coordination body that includes Russia, China, and
several Central Asian states. Russia supports observers status for Afghanistan and has proposed
that the SCO should be a priority forum to coordinate regional contributions to Afghanistan. U.S.
officials have also sought to enlist both regional and greater international support for Afghanistan
through the still-expanding 50-nation “International Contact Group,” which held its latest meeting
in Jeddah on March 3, 2011.
Several regional summit meeting series have been established involving Afghanistan, including
• Summit meetings between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkey; and between Iran,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The latest Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan meeting took
place in Islamabad on February 16-17, 2012. The previous such meeting occurred
in Tehran on June 25, 2011. The fifth of the Turkey-led meetings occurred on
December 24, 2010, and resulted in a decision for joint military exercises in
March 2011 between Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
• Turkey and UNAMA co-chair a “Regional Working Group” initiative, which
organized the major meeting on Afghanistan in Istanbul on November 2, 2011.
UNAMA also leads a “Kabul Silk Road” initiative, to promote regional
cooperation on Afghanistan.
• Russia has assembled two “quadrilateral summits,” the latest of which was on
August 18, 2010, among Pakistan, Russia, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, and
focused on counter-narcotics and anti-smuggling.
• Another regional collaborative effort is the Regional Economic Cooperation
Conference on Afghanistan, which was launched in 2005. It held its fifth meeting
in Tajikistan on March 26-27, 2012.
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Table 7. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for
Operations in and Supply Lines to Afghanistan
Facility
Use
Bagram Air
50 miles north of Kabul, the operational hub of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and base for CJTF-
Base
82. At least 2,000 U.S. military personnel are based there. Handles many of the 150+ U.S.
aircraft (including helicopters) in country. Hospital constructed, one of the first permanent
structures there. FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provided about $52 million for various
projects to upgrade facilities at Bagram, including a control tower and an operations center, and
the FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provided $20 million for military
construction there. NATO also using the base and sharing operational costs. Bagram can be
accessed directly by U.S. military flights following April 2010 agreement by Kazakhstan to allow
overflights of U.S. lethal equipment.
Qandahar Air
Just outside Qandahar, the hub of military operations in the south. Turned over from U.S. to
Field
NATO/ISAF control in late 2006 in conjunction with NATO assumption of peacekeeping
responsibilities. Enhanced (along with other facilities in the south) at cost of $1.3 billion to
accommodate influx of U.S. combat forces in the south.
Shindand Air
In Farah province, about 20 miles from Iran border. Used by U.S. forces and combat aircraft
Base
since October 2004, after the dismissal of Herat governor Ismail Khan, who controlled it.
Peter Ganci
Used by 1,200 U.S. military personnel as wel as refueling and cargo aircraft for shipments into
Base: Manas,
Afghanistan. Leadership of Kyrgyzstan changed in April 2005 in an uprising against President
Kyrgyzstan
Askar Akayev and again in April 2010 against Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Previous Kyrgyz governments
demanded the U.S. vacate the base but in both cases, (July 2006 and July 2009) agreement to
use the base was extended in exchange for large increase in U.S. payments for its use (to $60
million per year in the latter case). Interim government formed in April 2010 first threatened
then retracted eviction of U.S. from the base. Defense Secretary Panetta visited in March 2012
to launch talks on extending U.S. use of the facility beyond 2014.
Incirlik Air
About 2,100 U.S. military personnel there; U.S. aircraft supply U.S. forces in Iraq and
Base, Turkey
Afghanistan. U.S. use repeatedly extended for one year intervals by Turkey.
Al Dhafra, UAE Air base used by about 1,800 U.S. military personnel, to supply U.S. forces and related
transport into Iraq and Afghanistan. Could see increasing use if Manas closes.
Al Udeid Air
Largest air facility used by U.S. in region. About 5,000 U.S. personnel in Qatar. Houses central
Base, Qatar
air operations coordination center for U.S. missions in Iraq and Afghanistan; also houses
CENTCOM forward headquarters. Could see increased use if Manas closes.
Naval Support
U.S. naval command headquarters for OEF anti-smuggling, anti-terrorism, and anti-proliferation
Facility, Bahrain
naval search missions, and Iraq-related naval operations (oil platform protection) in the Persian
Gulf and Arabian Sea. About 5,100 U.S. military personnel there.
Karsi-Khanabad Not used by U.S. since September 2005 fol owing U.S.-Uzbek dispute over May 2005 Uzbek
Air Base,
crackdown on unrest in Andijon. Once housed about 1,750 U.S. military personnel (900 Air
Uzbekistan
Force, 400 Army, and 450 civilian) supplying Afghanistan. U.S. relations with Uzbekistan have
improved since 2009, but there is still no U.S. use of the air base. Uzbekistan allowed German
use of the base temporarily in March 2008. Some U.S. shipments began in February 2009
through Navoi airfield in central Uzbekistan, and U.S. signed agreement with Uzbekistan on
April 4, 2009, al owing nonlethal supplies for the Afghanistan war. Goods are shipped to Latvia
and Georgia, some transits Russia by rail, then to Uzbekistan.
Tajikistan
Some use of air bases and other facilities by coalition partners, including France, and emergency
use by U.S. India also uses bases under separate agreement. New supply lines to Afghanistan
established in February 2009 (“northern route”) make some use of Tajikistan.
Pakistan
As discussed below, most U.S. supplies have flowed through Pakistan, but progressively
increased use is being made through the Northern Distribution Network. Heavy equipment
docks in Karachi and is escorted by security contractors to the Khyber Pass crossing.
Russia
Allows non-lethal equipment to transit Russia by rail. In March 2012, expressed willingness to
allow use of an airfield to move goods to Afghanistan. Still does not allow lethal aid to transit.
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Pakistan/Pakistan-Afghanistan Border48
The Afghanistan neighbor that is considered most crucial to Afghanistan’s future is Pakistan, and
Pakistan’s actions on the Afghanistan issue are of increasing concern to U.S. policymakers.
Virtually all Obama Administration policy statements on Afghanistan emphasize the linkage
between militant safe haven in Pakistan and the difficulty stabilizing Afghanistan, and the April
2012 DOD report on Afghanistan’s stability identifies this safe haven as among the largest threat
to Afghan stability after 2014. Pakistan is determined to retain influence over Afghanistan—a
position heavily colored by fears of historic rival India. Pakistan appears insistent that
Afghanistan, at the very least, not align with rival India, and, at best, provide Pakistan strategic
depth against India. Pakistan says India is using its Embassy and four consulates in Afghanistan
(Pakistan says India has nine consulates) to train and recruit anti-Pakistan insurgents, and is using
its reconstruction funds to build influence there.
After the May 1, 2011, U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbotabad, Pakistan, U.S.-
Pakistan relations deteriorated throughout 2011 and still have not fully recovered. U.S. concerns
that Pakistan might be playing the role of adversary in Afghanistan sharpened significantly in the
wake of the September 13, 2011, attack on U.S. Embassy Kabul, allegedly by the Haqqani
network, as discussed above in the section on the Haqqani faction. Relations worsened further
after a November 26, 2011, incident in which a U.S. airstrike killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in an
incident still under investigation by the U.S. military. Pakistan responded by closing border
crossings, suspending participation in the border coordination centers (see below), and boycotting
the December 5 Bonn Conference. Suspicions were further inflamed on December 6, 2011, when
a Pakistan-based group, Lashkar-i-Janghvi, claimed responsibility for two suicide bombings
against Afghan Hazara Shiites celebrating a Shiite holiday, killing 80. Although U.S. officials say
that military cooperation on Afghanistan has slowly resumed, Pakistan did not give SRAP
Grossman a visa to visit Pakistan for reconciliation consultations in January 2012 and it has not
reopened the border crossings as of early May 2012.
The 2011 U.S.-Pakistan recriminations contrast with the first several years after the September
11, 2001, attacks; Pakistani cooperation against Al Qaeda had been considered by U.S. officials to
be relatively consistent and effective. During 2001-2006, the Bush Administration praised then
President Pervez Musharraf for Pakistani accomplishments against Al Qaeda, including the arrest
of over 700 Al Qaeda figures since the September 11 attacks.49 After the attacks, Pakistan
provided the United States with access to Pakistani airspace, some ports, and some airfields for
OEF. Others say Musharraf acted against Al Qaeda only when it threatened him directly; for
example, after the December 2003 assassination attempts against him.
In April 2008, in an extension of the work of the Tripartite Commission (Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and ISAF, in which military leaders of these entities meet on both sides of the border), the three
countries agreed to set up five “border coordination centers” (BCCs) which include networks of
radar nodes to give liaison officers a common view of the border area. These centers build on an
agreement in May 2007 to share intelligence on extremists’ movements. Four have been

48 For extensive analysis of U.S. policy toward Pakistan, and U.S. assistance to Pakistan in conjunction with its
activities against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
49 Among those captured by Pakistan are top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah (captured April 2002); alleged September
11 plotter Ramzi bin Al Shibh (September 11, 2002); top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March 2003);
and a top planner, Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005).
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established to date, including one near the Torkham Gate at the Khyber Pass, but all four are on
the Afghan side of the border. Pakistan has not fulfilled its May 2009 pledge to establish one on
the Pakistani side of the border.
Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations
The U.S. mission in Afghanistan also depends on healthy, consistent, and operationally significant
cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan-Pakistan relations have
tended to fluctuate. Many Afghans fondly remember Pakistan’s role as the hub for U.S. backing
of the mujahedin that forced the Soviet withdrawal in 1988-1989, but, later, most Afghan leaders
came to resent Pakistan as the most public defender of the Taliban movement when it was in
power. (Pakistan was one of only three countries to formally recognize it as the legitimate
government; Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the others.)
After the end of the rule of military leader and President Pervez Musharraf in 2008, there was
improvement in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. Karzai attended the September 9, 2008,
inauguration of civilian President Asif Zardari. Zardari visited Kabul on January 9, 2009, where
he and Karzai signed a joint declaration against terrorism that affects both countries. (A
September 2010 meeting between them reaffirmed this declaration.) Afghan and Pakistani
ministers jointly visited Washington, DC, during February 23-27, 2009, to participate in the first
Obama Administration strategic review, and Karzai and Zardari conducted a joint visit to
Washington, DC, in May 2009.
In the aftermath of Afghan recriminations against Pakistan for the presence of Bin Laden, Karzai
had what were widely described as productive meetings in Islamabad during June 10-11, 2011,
including the announcement of implementation of the new transit trade agreement discussed
below. The summit paved the way for a U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan meeting on June 28, 2011,
attended by SRAP Grossman, although the meeting was clouded somewhat by Afghan allegations
that several hundred rockets had been fired into Afghanistan from Pakistan in prior days—
allegations that have continued since. The September 2011 attacks on the U.S. Embassy and the
killing of former President Rabbani worsened relations significantly (as discussed above in the
section on reconciliation with the Taliban). Pakistan’s worst fears about Indian influence in
Afghanistan were inflamed when Karzai, on October 5, 2011, and perhaps as a reaction to the
Haqqani attacks in Kabul, flew to India to sign a significant trade and security pact (see below).
While the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship has not fully recovered, Karzai and Zardari
expressed broad agreement, including on the issue of Afghan reconciliation, at the February 16-
17, 2012, Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan summit in Islamabad.
Regarding the long-term relationship, Pakistan wants the government of Afghanistan to pledge to
abide by the “Durand Line,” a border agreement reached between Britain (signed by Sir Henry
Mortimer Durand) and then Afghan leader Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893, separating
Afghanistan from what was then British-controlled India (later Pakistan after the 1947 partition).
The border is recognized by the United Nations, but Afghanistan continues to indicate that the
border was drawn unfairly to separate Pashtun tribes and should be renegotiated. As of October
2002, about 1.75 million Afghan refugees have returned from Pakistan since the Taliban fell, but
as many as 3 million might still remain in Pakistan.
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Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA)
Pakistan has also sought to control Afghanistan’s trade, particularly with India, leading to U.S.
efforts to persuade Pakistan to forge a “transit trade” agreement with Afghanistan. That effort
bore success with the signature of a trade agreement between the two on July 18, 2010, allowing
for an easier flow of Afghan products, which are mostly agricultural products that depend on
rapid transit. On June 12, 2011, in the context of a Karzai visit to Islamabad, both countries began
full implementation of the agreement. It is expected to greatly expand the $2 billion in trade per
year the two countries were doing prior to the agreement. The agreement represented a success
for the Canada-sponsored “Dubai Process” of talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan on
modernizing border crossings, new roads, and a comprehensive border management strategy to
meet IMF benchmarks. A drawback to the agreement is that Afghan trucks, under the agreement,
are not permitted to take back cargo from India after dropping off goods there. The Afghanistan-
Pakistan trade agreement followed agreements to send more Afghan graduate students to study in
Pakistan, and a June 2010 Afghan agreement to send small numbers of ANA officers to undergo
training in Pakistan.50
Iran
Iran perceives its key national interests in Afghanistan as denying the United States a base from
which to pressure or attack Iran. Secondarily, Iran seeks to exert its traditional influence over
western Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the Persian empire, to protect
Afghanistan’s Shiite and other Persian-speaking minorities. There are mixed views on how
influential Iran is in Afghanistan; most experts appear to see Iran as a relatively marginal player,
particularly compared to Pakistan.
The Obama Administration initially saw Iran as potentially helpful to its strategy for Afghanistan;
the late SRAP Holbrooke was an advocate of cooperation with Iran on Afghanistan issues. Early
in the Administration, Secretary of State Clinton made a point of announcing that Iran would be
invited to the U.N.-led meeting on Afghanistan at the Hague on March 31, 2009. At the meeting,
the late SRAP Holbrooke briefly met the Iranian leader of his delegation to the meeting, and
handed him a letter on several outstanding human rights cases involving Iranian-Americans. At
the meeting, Iran pledged cooperation on combating Afghan narcotics and in helping economic
development in Afghanistan—both policies Iran is pursuing to a large degree.
Still, suggesting that the concept of cooperation with Iran on Afghanistan still resonates with
some U.S. officials and outside experts, Iran’s attendance of the October 18, 2010, International
Contact Group meeting in Rome, including a briefing by then top commander in Afghanistan
General Petraeus. Earlier, the United States and Iran took similar positions at a U.N. meeting in
Geneva in February 2010 that discussed drug trafficking across the Afghan border. Iran did not
attend the January 28, 2010, international meeting in London, but it did attend the July 28, 2010,
international meeting in Kabul (both discussed above). As a member of the OIC, an Iranian
representative attended the March 3, 2011, Contact Group meeting at OIC headquarters in
Jeddah. Iran attended the region-led international meeting in Istanbul on November 2, 2011, and
the December 5, 2011, Bonn Conference.

50 Partlow, Joshua. “Afghans Build Up Ties With Pakistan.” Washington Post, July 21, 2010.
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Iran’s Development Aid for Afghanistan
Iran’s economic aid to Afghanistan supports international efforts to develop Afghanistan. Iran has
pledged about $1 billion in aid to Afghanistan, of which about $500 million has been provided to
date. The funds have been used mostly to build roads and bridges in western Afghanistan. In
cooperation with India, Iran has been building roads that would connect western Afghanistan to
Iran’s port of Chahbahar, and provide Afghan and other goods an easier outlet to the Persian Gulf.
Iran also has provided credits to the Afghan private sector and helped develop power transmission
lines in the provinces bordering Iran.
Iranian Assistance to Afghan Militants and to Pro-Iranian Groups and Regions
Even though Iran aids Afghanistan’s development, it also is allegedly arming militants there. Iran
may be arming groups in Afghanistan to try to pressure U.S. forces that use Afghanistan’s
Shindand air base,51 which Iran fears the United States might use to attack or conduct surveillance
against Iran. Or, Iran’s policy might be to gain broader leverage against the United States by
demonstrating that Iran is in position to cause U.S. combat deaths in Afghanistan.
The State Department report on international terrorism for 2010, released August 18, 2011, said
the Qods Force of the Revolutionary Guard of Iran continues to provide training to the Taliban on
small unit tactics, small arms, explosives, and indirect weapons fire, and that it ships arms to
militants in Qandahar. This phrasing implies that Iran is arming Pashtun Taliban militants in the
core of the combat zone in Afghanistan. Weapons provided, according to the State Department
report, include mortars, 107mm rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, and plastic explosives. On
March 9, 2011, NATO said it had seized 48 Iranian-made rockets in Nimruz Province, bound for
Afghan militants; the 122mm rockets, have a range (13 miles) greater than those previously
provided by Iran. On August 3, 2010, the Treasury Department, acting under Executive Order
13224, named two Qods Force officers as terrorism supporting entities (freezing assets in the
United States, if any). They are Hossein Musavi, Commander of the Qods Force Ansar Corps,
which is the key Qods unit involved in Afghanistan; and Hasan Mortezavi, who is a Qods officer
responsible for providing funds and materiel to the Taliban, according to the Treasury
Department.52
Assistance to Ethnic and Religious Factions in Afghanistan
Others are puzzled by Iran’s support of Taliban fighters who are Pashtun, because Iran has
traditionally supported Persian-speaking non-Pashtun factions in Afghanistan, many of whom
have been oppressed by the Pashtuns. Some of Iran’s funding has been intended to support pro-
Iranian groups in the west as well as Hazara Shiites in Kabul and in the Hazara heartland of
Bamiyan, Ghazni, and Dai Kundi, in part by providing scholarships and funding for technical
institutes. Iran has used some of its funds to construct mosques in Herat, pro-Iranian theological
seminaries in Shiite districts of Kabul, and Shiite institutions in Hazara-dominated areas. Iran also
offers scholarships to Afghans to study in Iranian universities, and there are consistent allegations
that Iran has funded Afghan provincial council and parliamentary candidates who are perceived

51 Rashid, Ahmed. “Afghan Neighbors Show Signs of Aiding in Nation’s Stability.” Wall Street Journal, October 18,
2004.
52 Treasury Department. Fact Sheet: U.S. Treasury Department Targets Iran’s Support for Terrorism. August 3, 2010.
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as pro-Tehran.53 These efforts have helped Iran retain close ties with Afghanistan’s leading Shiite
cleric, Ayatollah Mohammad Mohseni.
Bilateral Government-to-Government Relations
Iran’s interest in a broad relationship with Karzai has not, to date, been affected by Iran’s
continued support for Taliban and other militants in Afghanistan. Karzai has, at times, called Iran
a “friend” of Afghanistan; in March 2010 he met with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
on two occasions, possibly to signal to the United States that he might realign with regional actors
if the United States continues to criticize his leadership. One of the meetings was just after the
departure of visiting Defense Secretary Gates. Previously, Karzai received Ahmadinejad in Kabul
in August 2007, and he visited Tehran at the end of May 2009 as part of the tripartite diplomatic
process between Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. During a visit to the United States in May 2009,
Karzai said he had told both the United States and Iran that Afghanistan must not become an
arena for the broader competition and disputes between the United States and Iran.54 The latest
Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran summit meeting was held in Tehran during June 24-25, 2011. It came a
few days after a visit to Afghanistan by Iran’s Defense Minister, Ahmad Vahidi, to sign a bilateral
border security agreement.
A controversy arose in late October 2010 when Karzai acknowledged accepting about $2 million
per year in cash payments from Iran, via his Chief of Staff Mohammad Daudzai. On the other
hand, in December 2010, Iran suddenly ceased shipping fuel into Afghanistan, causing some spot
dislocations in Afghanistan, including in Kabul. The move could have been related to reported
shortages of gasoline inside Iran, which are a result of U.S. sanctions imposed on sales of
gasoline to Iran in July 2010.
Many Afghans look fondly on Iran for helping them try to oust the Taliban regime when it was in
power. Iran saw the Taliban regime, which ruled during 1996-2001, as a threat to its interests in
Afghanistan, especially after Taliban forces captured Herat in September 1995. Iran subsequently
drew even closer to the ethnic minority-dominated Northern Alliance than previously, providing
its groups with fuel, funds, and ammunition.55 In September 1998, Iranian and Taliban forces
nearly came into direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of its diplomats were killed in the
course of the Taliban’s offensive in northern Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the border and
threatened military action, but the crisis cooled without a major clash, possibly out of fear that
Pakistan would intervene on behalf of the Taliban. Iran offered search and rescue assistance in
Afghanistan during the U.S.-led war to topple the Taliban, and it also allowed U.S. humanitarian
aid to the Afghan people to transit Iran. Iran helped construct Afghanistan’s first post-Taliban
government, in cooperation with the United States—at the December 2001 “Bonn Conference.”
In February 2002, Iran expelled Karzai-opponent Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, but it did not arrest him.
At other times, Afghanistan and Iran have had disputes over Iran’s efforts to expel Afghan
refugees. There are 1 million registered Afghan refugees in Iran, and about 1.4 million Afghan
migrants (non-refugees) living there. A crisis erupted in May 2007 when Iran expelled about
50,000 into Afghanistan. About 300,000 Afghan refugees have returned from Iran since the
Taliban fell.

53 King, Laura. “In Western Afghan City, Iran Makes Itself Felt.” Los Angeles Times, November 14, 2010.
54 Comments by President Karzai at the Brookings Institution. May 5, 2009.
55 Steele, Jonathon. “America Includes Iran in Talks on Ending War in Afghanistan.” Washington Times, December 15,
1997.
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India
The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are almost the exact reverse of those of
Pakistan. India’s goals are to deny Pakistan “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, to deny Pakistan the
ability to block India from trade and other connections to Central Asia and beyond, and to prevent
militants in Afghanistan from attacking Indian targets in Afghanistan. India saw the Afghan
Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda during 1996-2001 as a major threat to India itself because of Al
Qaeda’s association with radical Islamic organizations in Pakistan, such as LET (Laskhar-e-
Tayyiba, or Army of the Righteous), one of the groups that was formed in Pakistan to challenge
India’s control of part of the disputed territories of Jammu and Kashmir. Some of these groups
have committed major acts of terrorism in India, including the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in
November 2008 and in July 2011. Pakistan accuses India of using nine consulates in Afghanistan
to spread Indian influence in Afghanistan. According to Afghan officials, India has four
consulates (in the major cities of Qandahar, Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Herat) and no security
presence in Afghanistan, to date.
Some believe India has been concerned that any negotiated settlement of the Afghanistan conflict
will give Pakistan preponderant influence in Afghanistan, and India, which supported the
Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the mid-1990s, has been stepping up its contacts with
those factions to discuss possible contingencies in the event of an Afghan settlement deal. Still,
possibly at U.S. urging, in May 2011, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, during a visit to
Afghanistan, publicly expressed India’s support for the reconciliation process. He also announced
during that visit a new India-Afghanistan “Strategic Partnership,” which demonstrated India’s
support for U.S. efforts to better integrate Afghanistan into regional political, economic, and
security structures. On October 5, 2011, shortly after the Rabbani assassination and Afghan
recriminations against Pakistan, Karzai visited Delhi to sign the pact. The pact affirmed
Pakistan’s worst fears because it gives India, for the first time, a formal role as one of the
guarantors of Afghan stability. In addition, the pact provides for expanded political and cultural
ties. Indian experts noted that no Indian troops or security forces would necessarily deploy to
Afghanistan as a consequence of the pact, although the pact would mean increased cooperation
on counter-terrorism operations and possibly Indian training of the ANSF. The United States
views India’s role in Afghanistan as constructive, although U.S. officials have often cautioned
against an Indian role in Afghan security so as not to inflame Pakistan’s sentiments. The signature
of the Afghan-Indian pact might represent a softening of that U.S. position in light of the U.S.-
Pakistan rift discussed above. Tajikistan, which also supported the mostly Tajik Northern Alliance
against the Taliban when it was in power, allows India to use one of its air bases.
Even had the strategic pact not been signed, it is unlikely Afghanistan will ever distance itself
from India. Many of the families of Afghan leaders have lived in India at one time or another and,
as noted above, Karzai studied there.
India’s Development Activities in Afghanistan
India is the fifth-largest single country donor to Afghan reconstruction, funding projects worth
over $1.5 billion, with an additional $500 million announced during the Singh visit to Kabul in
May 2011. Indian officials assert that all their projects are focused on civilian, not military,
development and are in line with the development priorities set by the Afghan government. India,
along with the Asian Development Bank, financed a $300 million project, mentioned above, to
bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. It has also renovated the well-known Habibia
High School in Kabul and committed to a $67 million renovation of Darulaman Palace as the
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permanent house for Afghanistan’s parliament. India and Afghanistan finalized the construction
plans for that building in early 2012. At a cost of about $85 million, India financed the
construction of a road to the Iranian border in remote Nimruz province, linking landlocked
Afghanistan to Iran’s Chahbahar port on the Arabian Sea. India is currently constructing the 42
megawatt hydroelectric Selwa Dam in Herat Province at a cost of about $77 million, expected to
be completed in late 2012. This will increase electricity availability in the province. In December
2011, an Indian firm, the Steel Authority of India, Ltd. (SAIL) was declared winning bidder on
three of four blocs of the Hajji Gak iron ore project in Bamiyan Province. This led to assessments
that India is also an economic beneficiary of international intervention in Afghanistan, without
taking the risk of involving India militarily there.
India is also helping Afghanistan’s Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) with its
efforts to build local governance organizations, and it provides 1,000 scholarships per year for
Afghans to undergo higher education in India. Some Afghans want to enlist even more Indian
assistance in training Afghan bureaucrats in accounting, forensic accounting, oversight, and other
disciplines that will promote transparency in Afghan governance.
Russia, Central Asian States, and China
Some neighboring and nearby states take an active interest not only in Afghan stability, but in the
U.S. military posture that supports U.S. operations in Afghanistan. The region to the north of
Afghanistan is a growing factor in U.S. efforts to rely less on supply routes through Pakistan,
particularly as U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated and the border crossings (for U.S.
equipment) from Pakistan to Afghanistan remained closed as of March 2012.
Russia/Northern Distribution Network
Russia wants to reemerge as a great power and to contain U.S. power in Central Asia, including
Afghanistan. At the same time, by supporting the “Northern Distribution Network” supply route
for NATO forces in Afghanistan, Russia supports U.S. and NATO efforts to combat militants in
the region who have sometimes posed a threat to Russia itself. Its hosting of the “quadrilateral
summits” mentioned above, could represent stepped up efforts by Russia to exert influence on the
Afghanistan issue. Previously, Russia had kept a low profile in the country because it still feels
humiliated by its withdrawal in 1989 and senses some Afghan resentment of the Soviet
occupation. Since 2002, Russia has only been providing small amounts of humanitarian aid to
Afghanistan.
In line with Russian official comments in June 2010 that more economic and social assistance is
needed for Afghanistan, Russia is investing $1 billion in Afghanistan to develop its electricity
capacity and build out other infrastructure. Included in those investments are implementation of
an agreement, reached during a Karzai visit to Moscow on January 22, 2011, for Russia to resume
long dormant Soviet occupation-era projects such as expanding the Salang Tunnel connecting the
Panjshir Valley to Kabul, hydroelectric facilities in Kabul and Baghlan provinces, a customs
terminal, and a university in Kabul.
During the 1990s, after its 1989 withdrawal and the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia
supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban with some military equipment and technical
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assistance in order to blunt Islamic militancy emanating from Afghanistan.56 Although Russia
supported the U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan out of fear of Islamic
(mainly Chechen) radicals, Russia continues to seek to reduce the U.S. military presence in
Central Asia. Russian fears of Islamic activism emanating from Afghanistan may have ebbed
since 2002 when Russia killed a Chechen of Arab origin known as “Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-
Khattab), who led a militant pro-Al Qaeda Chechen faction. The Taliban government was the
only one in the world to recognize Chechnya’s independence, and some Chechen fighters fighting
alongside Taliban/Al Qaeda forces have been captured or killed.
Northern Distribution Network and Other Aid to Afghan Security
Russian cooperation is crucial to the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. In February 2009, Russia paved
the way for the expansion of the Northern Distribution Network supply route into Afghanistan by
allowing the resumption of shipment of non-lethal equipment into Afghanistan through Russia
(following a suspension in 2008 caused by differences over the Russia-Georgia conflict). There
are discussions with Russia over possibly allowing some lethal equipment to transit as well and
for use of a Russian air base as a hub in the supply chain. About half of all ground cargo for U.S.
forces in Afghanistan now flow through the Northern Distribution Network, and the United States
is emphasizing this network as relations with Pakistan remain strained.
Russia has also responded to NATO requests to provide helicopters and spare parts to the Afghan
forces (which still make heavy use of Russian-made Hind helicopters) as well as fuel. In April
2011, there was agreement to establish a “Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund.” Russia has also
delivered 24 helicopters to Afghan forces, financed by the United States. Russia reportedly has
pledged to train Afghan security forces.
In November 2010, in its most significant intervention in Afghanistan since its occupation,
Russian officers reportedly joined U.S. and Afghan forces attempting to interdict narcotics
trafficking in Afghanistan. However, the move prompted a complaint by President Karzai because
he was not consulted about the inclusion of the Russians.
Central Asian States
These states are crucial to the U.S. transition in Afghanistan, as discussed in a Senate Foreign
Relations Committee staff report released December 19, 2011, entitled “Central Asia and the
Transition in Afghanistan.” As shown in Table 7, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and
Kazakhstan are pivotal actors in U.S. efforts to expand the Northern Distribution Network supply
route as an alternative to reliance on routes through Pakistan. These states are also becoming
crucial to the New Silk Road (NSR) strategy that seeks to help Afghanistan become a trade
crossroads between South and Central Asia—a strategy that could net Kabul substantial customs
duties and other economic benefits. The possible revival of a long-standing plan to establish
Afghanistan as a transit hub for Central Asian natural gas (TAPI pipeline) is discussed later in this
report under “Development in Key Sectors.” Turkmenistan is key to this natural gas project but,
perhaps to avoid offending Pakistan or other actors, it takes a position of “positive neutrality” on
Afghanistan and does not allow its territory to be part of the Northern Distribution Network. No
U.S. forces have been based in Turkmenistan.

56 Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” New York Times, July 27, 1998.
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On security cooperation, Tajikistan allows access primarily to French combat aircraft, and
Kazakhstan has allowed use of facilities in case of emergency. In May 2011, Kazakhstan became
the first Central Asian state to pledge forces to Afghanistan (four non-combat troops). Earlier, in
April 2010, Kazakhstan agreed to allow U.S. over flights of lethal military equipment to
Afghanistan, allowing the United States to use polar routes to fly materiel directly from the
United States to Bagram Airfield.
In 1996, several of the Central Asian states banded together with Russia and China into a regional
grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss the Taliban threat. It includes
China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Reflecting Russian and
Chinese efforts to limit U.S. influence in the region, the group has issued statements, most
recently in August 2007, that security should be handled by the countries in the Central Asia
region. A meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss Afghanistan was held in
Moscow on March 25, 2009, and was observed by a U.S. official, as well as by Iran.
Uzbekistan, a sponsor of Afghan faction leader Abdul Rashid Dostam, an ethnic Uzbek, allowed
use of Karshi-Khanabad air base by OEF forces from October 2001 until a rift emerged in May
2005 over Uzbekistan’s crackdown against riots in Andijon. Uzbekistan’s March 2008 agreement
with Germany for it to use Karshi-Khanabad air base temporarily, for the first time since the rift
with the United States, suggested potential for U.S.-Uzbek cooperation on Afghanistan and other
issues to be rebuilt. Renewed U.S. discussions with Uzbekistan apparently bore some fruit with
the Uzbek decision in February 2009 to allow the use of Navoi airfield for shipment of
U.S./NATO goods into Afghanistan. As a rift with Pakistan widened in September 2011, the
United States launched new overtures to Uzbekistan, including a call from President Obama to
Uzbek President Islam Karimov congratulating him on 20 years of independence from
Russia/Soviet Union. Subsequently, the Administration opened formal negotiations with
Uzbekistan to enlist its cooperation with further expansion of the Northern Distribution Network.
An increasing amount of trade is flowing from Afghanistan to and through the Central Asian
states. As noted below, railway lines are being built to Uzbekistan. The Panj bridge, built largely
with U.S. funds, has become a major thoroughfare for goods to move between Afghanistan and
Tajikistan. Kazakhstan is funding a $50 million program to develop Afghan professionals.
During Taliban rule, Russian and Central Asian leaders were alarmed that radical Islamic
movements were receiving safe haven in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, in particular, has long asserted
that the group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), allegedly responsible for four
simultaneous February 1999 bombings in Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is
linked to Al Qaeda.57 One of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed while
commanding Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in Konduz in November 2001. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
do not directly border Afghanistan, but IMU guerrillas transited Kyrgyzstan during incursions
into Uzbekistan in the late 1990s.
Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan chose to seek close
relations with the Taliban leadership when it was in power, possibly viewing engagement as a
more effective means of preventing spillover of radical Islamic activity from Afghanistan. It saw
Taliban control as facilitating construction of the natural gas pipeline, discussed above, that was

57 The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in September 2000.
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under consideration during Taliban rule. The September 11 events stoked Turkmenistan’s fears of
the Taliban and its Al Qaeda guests and the country publicly supported the U.S.-led war.
China58
China’s involvement in Afghanistan policy appears to be growing, primarily to secure access to
Afghan minerals and resources but perhaps also to help its ally, Pakistan, avoid encirclement by
India. Like Pakistan, China has been a rival of India. China also is concerned about the potential
for Islamic militancy in Afghanistan to inflame Islamist sentiment among China’s Uighur
community in China. A major organizer of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China has a
small border with a sparsely inhabited sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan Corridor,”
and it is building border access routes and supply depots to facilitate China’s access to
Afghanistan through the corridor.
Chinese delegations continue to assess the potential for new investments in such sectors as
mining and energy,59 and the cornerstone is the development of the Aynak copper mine south of
Kabul. In early 2012, China National Petroleum Co. was awarded the rights to develop oil
deposits in the Amu Darya basin. Since 2002, China has pledged about $255 million in economic
aid to Afghanistan, about 75% of which has been provided to date.
China has taken a small role in securing Afghanistan. Having established significant strategic and
economic interests in post-Taliban Afghanistan, there were indications in 2009 that China was
considering contributing some People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces, possibly in a non-combat
role, to help secure Afghanistan. A communiqué from the Obama visit to China in November
2009 implied a possible larger role for China to help stabilize Afghanistan. No Chinese forces
have been deployed to Afghanistan, but it has trained some ANSF personnel at a People’s Armed
Police facility in China since 2006. It also has offered training for ANSF officers at People’s
Liberation Army training colleges and universities.
During the Taliban era, in December 2000, sensing China’s increasing concern about Taliban
policies, a Chinese official delegation met with Mullah Umar. However, China did not
enthusiastically support U.S. military action against the Taliban, possibly because China was
wary of a U.S. military buildup nearby.
Persian Gulf States
The Gulf states are considered a key part of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan. As noted, the late
Ambassador Holbrooke focused substantial U.S. attention—and formed a multilateral task
force—to try to curb continuing Gulf resident donations to the Taliban in Afghanistan. He
maintained that these donations are a larger source of Taliban funding than is the narcotics trade.
The Gulf states have also been a source of development funds and for influence with some
Afghan clerics and factions.

58 For more information, see CRS Report RL33001, U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy,
by Shirley A. Kan.
59 CRS conversations with Chinese officials in Beijing. August 2007.
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Saudi Arabia has a role to play in Afghanistan in part because, during the Soviet occupation,
Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of dollars to the Afghan resistance, primarily
Hikmatyar and Sayyaf. Drawing on its reputed intelligence ties to Afghanistan during that era,
Saudi Arabia worked with Taliban leaders to persuade them to suppress anti-Saudi activities by Al
Qaeda. Some press reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed, but did
not agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to decide Bin Laden’s fate.
A majority of Saudi citizens practice the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam similar to that of the
Taliban, and Saudi Arabia was one of three countries to formally recognize the Taliban
government. The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to Iran, but Iranian-
Saudi relations improved after 1997 and balancing Iranian power ebbed as a factor in Saudi
policy toward Afghanistan.
Saudi Arabia has played a role as a go-between for negotiations between the Karzai government
and “moderate” Taliban figures. This role was recognized at the London conference on January
28, 2010, in which President Karzai stated in his opening speech that he sees a role for Saudi
Arabia in helping stabilize Afghanistan. As noted, some reports say that a political settlement
might involve Mullah Umar going into exile in Saudi Arabia. This may explain why Karzai has
preferred to hold any talks with the Taliban in Saudi Arabia rather than Qatar.
According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively, if not publicly, with OEF. It
broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September 2001 and quietly permitted the
United States to use a Saudi base for command of U.S. air operations over Afghanistan, but it did
not permit U.S. airstrikes from it.
UAE Involvement
The United Arab Emirates, the third country that recognized the Taliban regime, is emerging as
another major donor to Afghanistan. It contributes about 300 troops to OEF and ISAF security
missions in southern Afghanistan, including Helmand province. Some are military medical
personnel who run small clinics and health programs for Afghans in the provinces where they
operate.
The UAE has donated at least $135 million to Afghanistan since 2002, according to the Afghan
Finance Ministry. Projects funded include housing in Qandahar, roads in Kabul, a hospital in
Zabol province, and a university in Khost. At the same time, the UAE property market has been
an outlet for investment by Afghan leaders who may have acquired their funds through soft loans
from the scandal-plagued Kabul Bank or through corruption connected to donor contracts or other
businesses.
Qatar
Until 2011, Qatar was not regarded as a significant player on the Afghanistan issue. It had not
recognized the Taliban regime when it was in power, and was said to have little influence with
Taliban figures interested in reconciliation. However, since late 2011, Qatar has increased its
profile as host of a planned Taliban political office discussed above. The United States views
Qatar as less influenced by Pakistan than is Saudi Arabia, and this might explain why the United
States has pushed for Qatar to be the accepted host of a Taliban political office.
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Keys to Afghanistan’s Post-War Future:
U.S. and International Aid and
Economic Development

Experts have long believed that accelerating economic development would do more to improve
the security situation than other policy components, and that economic development is widely
considered pivotal to Afghanistan’s ability to shape its future after the bulk of international forces
depart and donors presumably wind down their financial as well as military involvement. Donor
aid currently accounts for more than 95% of Afghanistan’s GDP, and replacements for donated
funds of that magnitude are hard to identify. The crucial role of economic factors in the success of
the transition and in post-2014 Afghanistan is discussed in an Administration report released in
December 2011, called the “U.S. Economic Strategy for Afghanistan.”60
Adding to the complexity of strategy development is the analysis that some economic sectors in
Afghanistan have been developed largely with private investment, including by wealthy or well-
connected Afghans who have founded companies. Therefore, it is often difficult to determine the
effects on Afghanistan’s economy of aid, as compared to the effects of investment, trade, and
other variables. As noted above, as part of the U.S. strategy, in July 2011 Secretary of State
Clinton and other U.S. officials articulated a post-transition vision of greater Afghan economic
integration in the region and its role in a “New Silk Road” trading system which would
presumably accelerate Afghan private sector growth and customs revenue receipts.
Hindering Afghanistan is that its economy and society are still fragile after decades of warfare
that left about 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans, and about 1 million Afghan children
who were born and raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. More than 3.5 million Afghan
refugees have since returned, although a comparable number remain outside Afghanistan. The
U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) supervises Afghan repatriation and Afghan
refugee camps in Pakistan. As discussed, the literacy rate is very low and Afghanistan has a small,
although growing, pool of skilled labor, middle managers, accountants, and information
professionals.
There are debates over virtually all aspects of international aid to Afghanistan, including amounts,
mechanisms for providing it, the lack of coordination among donors, and how aid is distributed
within Afghanistan. For example, some of the more stable provinces, such as Bamiyan and Balkh,
complain that most of the U.S. and international aid—an estimated 80%—is flowing mostly to
the restive provinces in an effort to quiet them, and ignoring the needs of poor Afghans in
peaceful areas. Later in this report are tables showing U.S. appropriations of assistance to
Afghanistan, and Table 14 lists U.S. spending on all sectors for FY2001-FY2010.
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan
During the 1990s, the United States became the largest single provider of assistance to the Afghan
people. During Taliban rule, no U.S. aid went directly to that government; monies were provided

60 The report, produced by the National Security Staff, was released December 2, 2011. It was mandated by the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011 (Section 1535 of P.L. 111-383).
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through relief organizations. Between 1985 and 1994, the United States had a cross-border aid
program for Afghanistan, implemented by USAID personnel based in Pakistan. Citing the
difficulty of administering this program, there was no USAID mission for Afghanistan from the
end of FY1994 until the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan in late 2001.
For all of FY2002-FY2011, the United States provided about $67.4 billion in assistance,
including military “train and equip” for the ANA and ANP (which is about $39.5 billion of these
funds). The figures in the tables, which include aid costs for FY2012 and the request for FY2013,
do not include costs for U.S. combat operations. Those costs amount to/are expected to amount to
about $90 billion in FY2010, $104 billion for FY2011, $93 billion for FY2012, and $79 billion
for FY2013. For further information on combat costs, see CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
, by Amy Belasco.
Aid Oversight
Still heavily dependent on donors, Karzai has sought to reassure the international donor
community by establishing a transparent budget and planning process. Some in Congress want to
increase independent oversight of U.S. aid to Afghanistan; the conference report on the FY2008
defense authorization bill (P.L. 110-181) established a “special inspector general” for Afghanistan
reconstruction, (SIGAR) modeled on a similar outside auditor for Iraq (“Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction,” SIGIR). Funds provided for the SIGAR are in the tables below.
On May 30, 2008, Major General Arnold Fields (Marine, ret.) was named to the position. His
office has filed several reports on Afghan reconstruction, which include discussions of SIGAR
staffing levels and activities, as well as several specific project audits. However, he acknowledged
that criticisms in a July 2010 “peer review” of SIGAR operations by the Inspectors General of
several U.S. agencies were valid, attributing many of the shortcomings to slow pace of fully
funding his office.61 One recent SIGAR report noted deficiencies in the ability of the Afghan
government’s Central Audits Office to monitor how funds are used. Another (January 2011)
assesses the degree of coordination in U.S. programs to help women and girls. Some Members of
Congress criticized the SIGAR for ineffective oversight and called for his replacement; General
Fields (ret) announced his resignation in January 2011. Steve Trent is SIGAR as of September
2011.
Aid Authorization: Afghanistan Freedom Support Act
A key post-Taliban aid authorization bill, S. 2712, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA)
of 2002 (P.L. 107-327, December 4, 2002), as amended, authorized about $3.7 billion in U.S.
civilian aid for FY2003-FY2006. The law, whose authority has now expired, was intended to
create a central source for allocating funds; that aid strategy was not implemented. However,
some of the humanitarian, counter-narcotics, and governance assistance targets authorized by the
act were met or exceeded by appropriations. No Enterprise Funds authorized by the act have been
appropriated. The act authorized the following:
• $60 million in total counter-narcotics assistance ($15 million per year for
FY2003-FY2006);

61 http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/peer_review/Section5.pdf.
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• $30 million in assistance for political development, including national, regional,
and local elections ($10 million per year for FY2003-FY2005);
• $80 million total to benefit women and for Afghan human rights oversight ($15
million per year for FY2003-FY2006 for the Afghan Ministry of Women’s
Affairs, and $5 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 to the Human Rights
Commission of Afghanistan);
• $1.7 billion in humanitarian and development aid ($425 million per year for
FY2003-FY2006);
• $300 million for an Enterprise Fund;
• $550 million in drawdowns of defense articles and services for Afghanistan and
regional militaries. (The original law provided for $300 million in drawdowns.
That was increased by subsequent appropriations laws.)
A subsequent law (P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004), implementing the recommendations of the
9/11 Commission, contained “The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.” The
subtitle mandated the appointment of a U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan and requires
additional Administration reports to Congress.
Afghan Freedom Support Act Reauthorization
In the 110th Congress, H.R. 2446, passed by the House on June 6, 2007 (406-10), would have
reauthorized AFSA through FY2010. A version (S. 3531), with fewer provisions than the House
bill. It was not taken up by the full Senate, possibly over concerns that it might limit
Administration flexibility in allocating aid. H.R. 2446 would have authorized about $1.7 billion
in U.S. economic aid and $320 in military aid (including drawdowns of equipment) per fiscal
year. It also would have authorized a pilot program of crop substitution to encourage legitimate
alternatives to poppy cultivation; and a cut off of U.S. aid to any Afghan province in which the
Administration reports that the leadership of the province is complicit in narcotics trafficking.
AFSA reauthorization was not reintroduced in the 111th Congress.
Direct Support to the Afghan Government
Because of the paucity of funds taken in by the Afghan government—about $1.7 billion in
2011—a GAO study issued September 2011 found that during 2006-2010, about 90% of total
Afghan government expenditures (operating budget and development budget) was provided by
international donors. Of that amount, the United States provide 62% and other donors provided
28% of total expenditures.62 Donor funds covered 57% of the Afghan government operating
budget, which is about $2.2 billion. Afghan officials stated in material circulated at the December
5, 2011, Bonn Conference that it will need at least $10 billion in donated funds per year from
2014 (the end of the security transition) until 2025. Some U.S. funds are provided both directly
and through a U.N.-run multi-donor Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) account, run by
the World Bank. As of early 2011, 31 donors had contributed $4.1 billion to the ARTF, with $2.1
billion for Afghan salaries and over $1.2 billion for priority investments. (DOD “1230 report,”
April 2011, p. 86.) Donors, including the United States, resumed contributing to the ARTF in

62 Government Accountability Office. “Afghanistan’s Donor Dependence.” September 20, 2011.
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November 2011, when the IMF restored its credit program for Afghanistan, which had been
suspended for more than a year because of the Kabul Bank scandal.
Currently, the United States disburses more than 40% of its donated aid funds through the Afghan
government. The Kabul Conference (July 20, 2010) communiqué endorsed a goal of increasing
that to about 50% and for 80% of all funds to align with Afghan government priorities.
National Solidarity Program
Through the ARTF, the United States supports an Afghan government program that promotes
local decision making on development—the “National Solidarity Program” (NSP). The program
provides block grants of about $60,000 per project to local councils to implement their priority
projects, most of which are water projects. The Afghan implementer is the Ministry of Rural
Rehabilitation and Development. It is widely hailed by many institutions as a highly successful,
Afghan-run program, although its contributions to improving local governance are unclear. Still,
it is being implemented in almost every district of Afghanistan. Donors have provided the
program with over $600 million, about 90% of which has been U.S. funding. U.S. funds for the
program are drawn from a broad category of ESF for “good governance.” P.L. 111-32, the
FY2009 supplemental discussed above, earmarked $70 million to defray a large part of a shortfall
in that program. The FY2010 consolidated appropriation (P.L. 111-117) earmarked another $175
million in ESF for the program.
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Table 8. Major Reporting Requirements
Several provisions require Administration reports on numerous aspects of U.S. strategy, assistance, and related issues.

P.L. 108-458, The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments required, through the end of FY2010, an
overarching annual report on U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Other reporting requirements expired, including
required reports (1) on long-term U.S. strategy and progress of reconstruction; (2) on how U.S. assistance is
being used; (3) on U.S. efforts to persuade other countries to participate in Afghan peacekeeping; and (4) a joint
State and DOD report on U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan.

P.L. 110-181 (Section 1230), FY2008 Defense Authorization Act requires a quarterly DOD report on the
security situation in Afghanistan; the first was submitted in June 2008. It was required by that law through
FY2011. Section 1231 required a report on the Afghan National Security Forces through the end of FY2010.
Both reports have been extended until the end of FY2014 by the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act
(H.R. 1540, P.L. 112-81).

Section 1229 of the same law requires the quarterly report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR).

P.L. 111-8 (Omnibus Appropriation, explanatory statement) required a State Department report on the use of
funds to address the needs of Afghan women and girls (submitted by September 30, 2009).

P.L. 111-32, FY2009 Supplemental Appropriation (Section 1116), required a White House report, by the time of
the FY2011 budget submission, on whether Afghanistan and Pakistan are cooperating with U.S. policy sufficiently
to warrant a continuation of Administration policy toward both countries, as wel as efforts by these
governments to curb corruption, their efforts to develop a counter-insurgency strategy, the level of political
consensus in the two countries to confront security chal enges, and U.S. government efforts to achieve these
objectives. The report was released with a date of September 30, 2010.

The same law (Section 1117) required a report, by September 23, 2009, on metrics to be used to assess
progress on Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy. A progress report measured against those metrics is to be
submitted by March 30, 2010, and every six months thereafter, until the end of FY2011.

Section 1228 of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84) required a report, within 120
days, on the Afghan Provincial Protection Program and other local security initiatives. Section 1235 authorized a
DOD-funded study of U.S. force levels needed for eastern and southern Afghanistan, and Section 1226 required
a Comptrol er General report on the U.S. “campaign plan” for the Afghanistan (and Iraq) effort.

Sustaining Aid Beyond the Transition
U.S. and Afghan policymakers are concerned that international assistance will wane after the end
of the transition in 2014. As shown in Table 10, non-U.S. donors, including such institutions as
the EU and the Asian Development Bank, have provided over $29 billion in assistance to
Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban. When combined with U.S. aid, this by far exceeds the
$27.5 billion for reconstruction identified by the IMF as required for 2002-2010. Major pledges
have been made primarily at donor conferences such as Tokyo (2002), Berlin (April 2004), Kabul
(April 2005), London (February 2006), Paris (June 2008), and London (January 2010).
The December 5, 2011, Bonn Conference was not, according to U.S. officials, intended as a
“pledging conference.” However, in advance of that conference the World Bank released a report
warning that an abrupt aid cutoff could lead to fiscal implosion, loss of control over the security
sector, the collapse of political authority, and the possibility of civil war. At the Bonn Conference,
Afghan officials stated that Afghanistan would be dependent on about $10 billion per year of
international economic aid until 2025. Identifying sources of this long-term assistance will be the
focus of an international conference on Afghanistan in Tokyo in July 2012.
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Among multilateral lending institutions, the World Bank is expected to be key to sustaining
Afghanistan long term. In May 2002, the World Bank reopened its office in Afghanistan after 20
years. Its projects have been concentrated in the telecommunications and road and sewage
sectors. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has also been playing a major role in Afghanistan,
including in financing railway construction. Another of its projects in Afghanistan was funding
the paving of a road from Qandahar to the border with Pakistan, and as noted above, it is
contributing to a project to bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. On the eve of the
London conference on January 28, 2010, the IMF and World Bank announced $1.6 billion in
Afghanistan debt relief.
Development in Key Sectors
Efforts to build the legitimate economy are showing some results, by accounts of senior U.S.
officials. Some sectors, discussed below, are being developed primarily (although not
exclusively) with private investment funding. There has been substantial new construction,
particularly in Kabul, including luxury hotels; a $25 million Coca Cola bottling factory (opened
in September 2006); apartment and office buildings; and marriage halls and other structures. The
bottling factory is located near the Bagrami office park (another private initiative), which includes
several other factories. The Serena luxury hotel was built by the Agha Khan foundation, a major
investor in Afghanistan. On the other hand, press reports in March 2012 say that uncertainty
about the post-2014 political and security situation is causing some Afghan businessmen to
relocate outside the country, or to develop external components of their business in case the
situation in Afghanistan deteriorates.
An arm of DOD, called the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, formerly headed by
Deputy Under Secretary Paul Brinkley, facilitated some of the investment. The Task Force has
seen many of its personnel depart because of a provision of the FY2011 Defense Authorization
Act (P.L. 111-383) that required the Task Force be folded into State/USAID-led assistance
structures by the end of FY2011. Others say that private investment could be healthier if not for
the influence exercised over it by various faction leaders and Karzai relatives. The following are
some key sectors and what has been accomplished with U.S. and international donor funds, as
well as with private investment.
Education
Despite the success in enrolling Afghan children in school since the Taliban era (see statistics
above), setbacks have occurred because of Taliban attacks on schools, causing some to close. In
addition, Afghanistan’s university system is said to be woefully underfunded, in part because
Afghans are entitled to free higher education (to the B.A. level) by the Constitution, which means
that demand for the higher education far outstrips Afghan resources. The shortfall is impeding the
development of a large enough pool of skilled workers for the Afghan government. Afghanistan
requires about $35 million to operate its universities and institutes for one year; USAID plans to
spend about $20 million to help fund those activities in FY2012.63

63 Boak, Josh. “Afghan Universities Struggling for Funding.” Washington Post, February 13, 2011.
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Health
The health care sector, as noted by Afghan observers, has made considerable gains in reducing
infant mortality and giving about 65% of the population at least some access to health
professionals. In addition to U.S. assistance to develop the health sector’s capacity, Egypt
operates a 65-person field hospital at Bagram Air Base that instructs Afghan physicians. Jordan
operates a similar facility in Mazar-e-Sharif.
Roads
Road building is considered a U.S. priority and has been USAID’s largest project category there,
taking up about 25% of USAID spending since the fall of the Taliban. Roads are considered key
to enabling Afghan farmers to bring legitimate produce to market in a timely fashion, and former
commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan General Eikenberry (later Ambassador) said “where the
roads end, the Taliban begin.” The major road, the Ring Road, is nearly all repaved, and the 150
miles in the northwest remaining to be repaved is being funded by a $350 million Asian
Development Bank donation. Among other major projects completed are a road from Qandahar to
Tarin Kowt, (Uruzgan province) built by U.S. military personnel, inaugurated in 2005; and a road
linking the Panjshir Valley to Kabul. In several of the most restive provinces, U.S. funds
(sometimes CERP funds) are being used to build roads that link up farming communities to the
market for their products. Other key priorities are completing a Khost-Gardez road, under way
currently, but slowed by security concerns, and a Salang Bypass Road through Bamiyan province.
The Afghan government has committed to developing an East-West road across Afghanistan,
from Herat to Kabul. However, funding only for a few segments (Herat to Chest-e-Sharif, and
Maidany Shar to Bamiyan, and Bamiyan City to Yakowlang in that same province) have been
identified, from Italy and Japan.
Bridges
Afghan officials are said to be optimistic about increased trade with Central Asia now that a new
bridge has opened (October 2007) over the Panj River, connecting Afghanistan and Tajikistan.
The bridge was built with $33 million in (FY2005) U.S. assistance. The bridge is helping what
press reports say is robust reconstruction and economic development in the relatively peaceful
and ethnically homogenous province of Panjshir, the political base of the Northern Alliance.
Railways
Afghanistan is beginning to develop functioning railways—a sector it lacked as a legacy of
security policy during the late 19th century that saw railroads as facilitating invasion of
Afghanistan. Rail is considered increasing crucial to Afghanistan’s ability to develop its mineral
wealth because it is the means by which minerals can be exported to neighboring countries. Three
railway projects are under way. One, from Mazar-i-Sharif to Hairaton, on the border with
Uzbekistan, was completed in March 2011 with $165 million from the Asian Development Bank.
It has become operational as of early 2012. With funding from Japan and China, other rail lines
will extend from Iran to Herat Province, and from the Tajikistan border down to Konduz. The
Afghan government wants India to build a railway as part of its iron mining project discussed
below. The various segments are eventually to link up and parallel the Ring Road that circles
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Afghanistan. The railway will integrate Afghanistan to the former Soviet railway system in
Central Asia, increasing Afghanistan’s economic integration in the region.
Electricity
At least 10% of USAID funds for Afghanistan have been spent on power projects, although that
percentage rose in 2010 and 2011. The Afghanistan Compact states that the goal is for electricity
to reach 65% of households in urban areas and 25% in rural areas by 2010, a goal that has not
been met. However, severe power shortages in Kabul, caused in part by the swelling of Kabul’s
population to about 3 million, up from half a million when the Taliban was in power, are fewer
now than two years ago. Power to the capital has grown due to the Afghan government’s
agreements with several Central Asian neighbors to import electricity, as well as construction of
new substations. Many shops in Kabul are now lit up at night, as observed by numerous visitors
over the past few years, including CRS. On the other hand, there has been some criticism of a 105
Megawatt power generating plants built by USAID at Tarakhil, in north Kabul at a cost of about
$300 million because of the high costs of fuel, the questionable need for the plant given
alternative plants built recently, and the possible inability of the Afghan authorities to maintain
them. As noted above, in January 2011, Russia pledged to resume work on some long dormant
hydroelectric projects in Afghanistan that were suspended when Soviet troops withdrew in 1989.
Kajaki Dam and Qandahar Power Initiative
A major USAID and DOD focus is on power projects in southern Afghanistan. The key long-term
project is to expand the capacity of the Kajaki Dam, located in Helmand Province. Currently, two
turbines are operating—one was always working, and the second was repaired by USAID
contractors. This has doubled electricity production in the south and caused small factories and
other businesses to come to flourish. USAID plans to further expand capacity of the dam by
installing a third turbine (which there is a berth for but which never had a turbine installed.) In an
operation involving 4,000 NATO troops (Operation Ogap Tsuka), components of the third turbine
were successfully delivered to the dam in September 2008. It was expected to be operational in
mid-late 2009 but technical and security problems, such as inability to secure and build roads
leading to the dam, have delayed the project. A $266 million USAID contract was let to Black
and Veatch in December 2010 to complete the installation, and it tried to eliminate the security
bottleneck in mid-2011 by hiring a private security firm to protect the dam, but there still is no
public estimate as to when the third turbine will be completed. During 2004-January 2012,
USAID has spent $72 million on the dam, and it intends to spend $85 million more. Additional
funds, such as that for the Black and Veatch contract, have been spent by DOD.
In the interim, and to the consternation of some who want long-term, sustainable solutions for
Afghanistan rather than short-term palliatives, the U.S. military and USAID began in February
2011 to implement a plan (“Qandahar Power Initiative”) to focus on smaller substations and
generator projects that can bring more electricity to Qandahar and other places in the south
quickly. The initiative has been pursued in order to facilitate the U.S.-military led counter-
insurgency strategy in Qandahar, even though the initiative may not produce sustainable gains
over the longer term. Some of the power provided by additional diesel generators is being used to
supply the Qandahar Industrial Park. For this and other power projects, the Administration
requested legislative authority for an “Infrastructure Fund” to be funded by DOD. That authority
was provided in the FY2011 DOD authorization bill (P.L. 111-383). Actual funding is depicted in
the FY2011 and FY2012 aid tables below. President Karzai said in a CNN interview on June 26,
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2011, that the Afghan government favored emphasizing the longer-term Kajaki Dam project
rather than the interim generator project.
Solar Power
There is also an apparent increasing emphasis on providing electricity to individual homes and
villages through small solar power installations. A contractor to USAID, IRG, is providing small
solar powered-electricity generators to homes in several districts of Afghanistan, alleviating the
need to connect such homes to the national power grid. However, there are technical drawbacks,
including weather-related inconsistency of power supply and the difficulty of powering
appliances that require substantial power. The U.S. broadcasting service to Afghanistan, Radio
Azadi, run by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, has given out 20,000 solar-powered radios
throughout Afghanistan, according to RFE/RL in December 2010.
Agriculture
With about 80% of Afghans living in rural areas, the agriculture sector has always been key to
Afghanistan’s economy and stability. The late Ambassador Holbrooke, including in his January
2010 strategy document, outlined U.S. policy to boost Afghanistan’s agriculture sector not only to
reduce drug production but also as an engine of economic growth. Prior to the turmoil that
engulfed Afghanistan in the late 1970s, Afghanistan was a major exporter of agricultural
products.
USAID has spent about 15% of its Afghanistan funds on agriculture (and “alternative
livelihoods” to poppy cultivation), and this has helped Afghanistan double its legitimate
agricultural output over the past five years. One emerging “success story” is growing Afghan
exports of high-quality pomegranate juice called Anar. Other countries are promoting not only
pomegranates but also saffron rice and other crops that draw buyers outside Afghanistan. Another
emerging success story is Afghanistan’s November 2010 start of exports of raisins to Britain.64
Wheat production was robust in 2009 because of healthy prices for that crop, and Afghanistan is
again self-sufficient in wheat production. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has about 110
personnel in Afghanistan on long-term and priority projects; there are also at least 25 agriculture
experts from USAID in Afghanistan. Their efforts include providing new funds to buy seeds and
agricultural equipment, and to encourage agri-business. In addition, the National Guard from
several states is deploying nine (as of March 2011) “Agribusiness Development Teams” in
several provinces to help Afghan farmers with water management, soil enhancement, crop
cultivation, and improving the development and marketing of their goods.
U.S. strategy has addressed not only crop choice but also trying to construct the entirety of the
infrastructure needed for a healthy legitimate agriculture sector, including road building, security
of the routes to agriculture markets, refrigeration, storage, transit through Pakistan and other
transportation of produce, building legitimate sources of financing, and other aspects of the
industry. U.S. officials in Kabul say that Pakistan’s restrictions on trade between Afghanistan and
India had prevented a rapid expansion of Afghan pomegranate exports to that market, but the
transit trade agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, discussed above, is expected to
alleviate some of these bottlenecks. Dubai is another customer for Afghan pomegranate exports.

64 Lemmon, Gayle Tzemach. “New Hope for Afghan Raisin Farmers.” New York Times, October 9, 2010.
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There is a vibrant timber industry in the northeast provinces. However, the exports are illegal. De-
forestation has been outlawed because of the potential for soil erosion and other economic and
environmental effects.
In terms of specific programming, USAID has a $150 million program for the relatively safe
areas of Afghanistan to continue to develop licit crops. The Incentives Driving Economic
Alternatives for the North, East, and West (IDEA-NEW) program is planned to run through
FY2014. In southern and eastern areas of the country where counterinsurgency operations are
ongoing, USAID’s $474 million Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture
(AVIPA-Plus) program ran through FY2011 and includes initiatives coordinated with U.S.
counterinsurgency operations in Helmand and Qandahar provinces. The program provides
vouchers for wheat seed, fertilizer, and tools, in addition to supporting cash for work programs
and small grants to local cooperatives.
Telecommunications
Several Afghan telecommunications firms have been formed. With startup funds from the Agha
Khan Foundation (the Agha Khan is leader of the Isma’ili community, which is prevalent in
northern Afghanistan), the highly successful Roshan cellphone company was founded. Another
Afghan cellphone firm is Afghan Wireless. The most significant post-Taliban media network is
Tolo Television, owned by Moby Media. U.S. funds are being used to supplement the private
investment; a $4 million U.S. grant, in partnership with the Asia Consultancy Group, is being
used to construct communication towers in Bamiyan and Ghor provinces. The Afghan
government plans to link all major cities by fiber optic cable by mid-2012.
Airlines
The 52-year-old national airline, Ariana, is said to be in significant financial trouble due to
corruption that has affected its safety ratings and left it unable to service a heavy debt load.
However, there are new privately run airlines, such as Safi Air (run by the Safi Group, which has
built a modern mall in Kabul), and Kam Air. Another, Pamir, was ordered closed in 2010 due to
safety concerns.
Mining and Gems
Afghanistan’s mining sector has been largely dormant since the Soviet invasion. Some Afghan
leaders complain that not enough has been done to revive such potentially lucrative industries as
minerals mining, such as of copper and lapis lazuli (a stone used in jewelry). The issue became
more urgent in June 2010 when a DOD development team announced, based on surveys, that
Afghanistan may have untapped minerals worth over $1 trillion.65 Then top commander in
Afghanistan General Petraeus, in an interview with NBC News on August 15, 2010, said the
amount could be in the “trillions.” Although copper and iron are the largest categories by value,
there are believed to also be significant reserves of such minerals as lithium in western
Afghanistan—lithium is crucial to the new batteries being used to power electric automobiles.

65 Risen, James. “U.S. Identifies Mineral Riches in Afghanistan.” New York Times, June 14, 2010.
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Aynak Copper Field. There is substantial activity in this sector, which the Afghan government
estimates will generate $1.4 billion in annual government revenue by 2016, and $2.2 billion per
year by 2020. A major project, signed in November 2007, is with China Metallurgical Group for
the company to invest $3.0 billion to develop Afghanistan’s Aynak copper field in Lowgar
Province. The agreement, viewed as generous to the point where it might not be commercially
profitable for China Metallurgical Group, includes construction of two coal-fired electric power
plants (one of which will supply more electricity to Kabul city); a segment of railway (discussed
above); and a road from the project to Kabul. Work on the mine reportedly has been slowed by
various factors, including the need to clear mines in the area and to excavate ancient artifacts that
the Afghan government seeks to preserve. Actual digging at the mine is expected to begin in mid-
2012. U.S. forces do not directly protect the project, but U.S. forces have set up small bases on
some of the roads leading to the mine project to provide general stability there.
Hajji Gak Iron Ore Project. In September 2011 seven bids were submitted for another large
mining project, the Hajji Gak iron ore mine (which may contain 60 billion tons of iron ore) in
Bamiyan Province. The bids—from Chinese, Indian, and other firms—were evaluated and, in late
2011, the Steel Authority for India Ltd. (SAIL) was awarded the largest share of the project. One
of the four blocs of the project was awarded to Kilo Gold of Canada. The project is expected to
generate $200 million in annual government revenues when fully operational.
On December 14, 2010, with involvement of the DOD Task Force for Business and Stability
Operations, 10 outside investors announced $50 million in investment in a gold mine in Baghlan
Province. There is another gold mine operating in neighboring Takhar Province.
On December 7, 2011, the Ministry of Mines began accepting bids to develop copper and gold
deposits in large parts of the north, northeast, west, and central Afghanistan. Other tenders have
gone out to develop the Namak Sar lithium deposit in Herat Province.
Oil, Gas, and Related Pipelines
Afghanistan has no hydrocarbons energy export industry and a small refining sector that provides
some of Afghanistan’s needs for gasoline or other fuels. Almost all of Afghanistan’s fuel comes
from neighboring states. However, Afghanistan’s prospects in this sector appeared to brighten by
the announcement in March 2006 of an estimated 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic
feet of gas reserves. Experts believe these amounts, if proved, could make Afghanistan relatively
self-sufficient in energy and able to export energy to its neighbors. In a major development, on
December 15, 2010, the Afghan government let a six-month contract to a local firm, Ghazanfar
Neft Gas, to collect and market crude oil from the Angot field in northern Afghanistan (part of a
field that may contain 80 million barrels of oil), initially producing at the low rate of 800 barrels
per day.
The energy sector is expanding with the awarding in early 2012 of development rights to the Amu
Darya basin (northern Afghanistan) oil fields to China National Petroleum Co. Subsequently, a
tender will be offered to develop a larger oil field in Balkh Province (Kasha Kari bloc), estimated
to hold 1.8 billion barrels of oil.
USAID has funded test projects to develop gas resources in northern Afghanistan. Building on
that aid, there is increasing optimism that private investors will fund at least 25% of a $300
million needed investment for a 200 megawatt gas-fired thermal plant in northern Afghanistan.
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The plant would be part of a plan to link Afghanistan’s natural gas field in Shehbergan to the
population center in Mazar-e-Sharif.
TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) Gas Pipeline Project. Another major energy
project remains under consideration. During 1996-1998, the Clinton Administration supported
proposed natural gas and oil pipelines through western Afghanistan as an incentive for the
warring factions to cooperate. A consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal Corporation
proposed a $7.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline that would originate in southern Turkmenistan
and pass through Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible extensions into India.66 The deterioration
in U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 suspended hopes for the pipeline projects, but prospects for
the project improved in the post-Taliban period. In a summit meeting in late May 2002 between
the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the three countries agreed to revive the
project. Sponsors held an inaugural meeting on July 9, 2002, in Turkmenistan, signing a series of
preliminary agreements. On December 12, 2010, in the Turkmenistan capital Ashkabad, the
relevant leaders reaffirmed their intent to complete the project. Disagreements remain over the
proportion of gas supplied to the line by individual countries, and over pricing, but Afghan
officials say the Asian Development Bank has agreed to finance the project, removing what had
been a major hurdle. U.S. officials view this project as a superior alternative to a proposed gas
pipeline from Iran to India, transiting Pakistan.
Trade Promotion/Reconstruction Opportunity Zones
The key to U.S. economic strategy, as exemplified by the New Silk Road strategy, is to encourage
Afghanistan’s trade relationships. The United States is doing so by promoting regional economic
integration, discussed above, as well as through bilateral economic agreements with Afghanistan.
A key to the strategy was accomplished in 2011 when Afghanistan and Pakistan finalized
provisions to implement their 2010 transit trade agreement. To facilitate Afghanistan’s ability to
increase trade, USAID is funding a five year project ($63 million total during 2010-2014) to
simplify the customs clearance process. This includes new import procedures that have reduced
the time needed for imports to clear customs by 45%. On December 13, 2004, the 148 countries
of the World Trade Organization voted to start membership talks with Afghanistan.
Earlier, in September 2004, the United States and Afghanistan signed a bilateral trade and
investment framework agreement (TIFA), and most of Afghanistan’s exports are eligible for duty
free treatment under the enhanced Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program. The
Administration economic strategy report of December 2011 says the Administration is reaching
out to Afghan exporters and U.S. importers of Afghan products to make increased use of the GSP
program. The TIFA is seen as a prelude to a broader and more complex bilateral free trade
agreement, but negotiations on an FTA have not yet begun.
Another initiative supported by the United States is the establishment of joint Afghan-Pakistani
“Reconstruction Opportunity Zones” (ROZs) which would be modeled after “Qualified Industrial
Zones” run by Israel and Jordan in which goods produced in the zones receive duty free treatment
for import into the United States. Bills in the 110th Congress, S. 2776 and H.R. 6387, would have

66 Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of South Korea, Crescent Steel
of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say
Russia’s Gazprom would probably receive a stake in the project. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), October 30, 1997,
p. 3.
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authorized the President to proclaim duty-free treatment for imports from ROZs to be designated
by the President. In the 111th Congress, a version of these bills was introduced (S. 496 and H.R.
1318). President Obama specifically endorsed passage of these bills in his March 2009 strategy
announcement. H.R. 1318 was incorporated into H.R. 1886, a Pakistan aid appropriation that is a
component of the new U.S. strategy for the region, and the bill was passed by the House on June
11, 2009, and then appended to H.R. 2410. However, another version of the Pakistan aid bill, S.
1707, did not authorize ROZs; it was passed and became law (P.L. 111-73).
















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Table 9. Comparative Social and Economic Statistics
Population
28 million +. Kabul population is 3 million, up from 500,000 in Taliban era.
Ethnicities/Religions
Pashtun 42%; Tajik 27%; Uzbek 9%; Hazara 9%; Aimak 4%; Turkmen 3%; Baluch 2%.
Size of Religious
Religions: Sunni (Hanafi school) 80%; Shi te (Hazaras, Qizilbash, and Isma’ilis) 19%; other 1% Christians-
Minorities
estimated 500-8,000 persons; Sikh and Hindu-3,000 persons; Bahai’s-400 (declared blasphemous in May
2007); Jews-1 person; Buddhist- smal numbers, mostly foreigners. No Christian or Jewish schools. One
church.
Literacy Rate
28% of population over 15 years of age. 43% of males; 12.6% of females.
GDP, and GDP Growth
$29.8 billion purchasing power parity (PPP). 109th in the world. Per capita: $1,000 purchasing power parity.
and Unemployment
212th in the world. Growth: about 9% for 2010 and 8% expected for 2011. GDP was about $10 billion (PPP)
Rates
during last year of Taliban rule. Unemployment rate is about 40%.
Children in
7.1 million, of which 40% are girls. Up from 900,000 boys in school during Taliban era. 4,000 schools built (all
School/Schools Built
donors) and 140,000 teachers hired since Taliban era. 17 universities, up from 2 in 2002. 75,000 Afghans in
since 2002
universities in Afghanistan (35% female); 5,000 when Taliban was in power.
Afghans With Access to
65% with basic health services access-compared to 8% during Taliban era. Infant mortality down 22% since
Health Coverage
Taliban to 135 per 1,000 live births. 680 clinics built .
Roads Built
About 2,500 miles paved post-Taliban, including repaving of “Ring Road” (78% complete) that circles the
country. Kabul-Qandahar drive reduced to 6 hours.
Judges/Courts
Over 1,000 judges (incl. 200 women) trained since fal of Taliban.
Banks Operating
17, including branches in some rural areas, but about 90% of the population still use hawalas (informal money
transfer services). No banks existed during Taliban era. Some limited credit card use. Some Afghan police
now paid by cel phone (E-Paisa).
Access to Electricity
15%-20% of the population. Much of its electricity imported from neighboring states.
Government Revenues
About $1.7 billion in 2010; more than double the $720 million 2007. Total Afghan budget is about $4.5 billion
(excl. donor funds)
(including development funds)—shortfal covered by foreign donors, including through Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund.
Financial Reserves/Debt
About $4.4 billion, up from $180 million in 2002. Includes amounts due Central Bank. $8 billion bilateral debt,
plus $500 million multilateral. U.S. forgave $108 million in debt in 2004, and $1.6 billion forgiven by other
creditors in March 2010.
Foreign/Private
About $500 million to $1 billion per year. Four Afghan airlines: Ariana (national) plus at least two privately
Investment
owned: Safi and Kam. Turkish Air and India Air fly to Kabul.
Mining/Minerals
Vast untapped minerals affirmed by U.S. experts (June 2010). Chinese firm mining copper in Lowgar Province,
and contracts to mine iron ore and produce oil in in various stages of consideration and implementation.
Legal Exports/
80% of the population is involved in agriculture. Self-sufficiency in wheat production as of May 2009 (first time
Agriculture
in 30 years). Exports: $400 million+ (2011): fruits, raisins, melons, pomegranate juice (Anar), nuts, carpets,
lapis lazuli gems, marble tile, timber products (Kunar, Nuristan provinces). July 2010 Afghanistan-Pakistan
trade agreement.
Imports
Imports: $3.4 billion (2009): food, energy, capital goods, textiles, autos. Top five trading partners (in
descending order): Pakistan, Russia, Iran, India, United States.
Oil Proven Reserves
3.6 billion barrels of oil, 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas. Current oil production negligible, but USAID funding
project to revive oil and gas facilities in the north.
Cellphones/Tourism
About 6.5 million cellphone subscribers, up from neglibile amounts during Taliban era. Tourism: National
park opened in Bamiyan June 2009. Increasing tourist visits.
Sources: CIA, The World Factbook; various press and U.S. government official testimony.
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Table 10. Major Non-U.S. Pledges for Afghanistan 2002-2011
($ in millions)
Japan

8,150
European Union

2,880
Asian Development Bank

2,270
Britain
2,220
World Bank

2,140
Germany 2,130
India
1,515
Canada
1,255
Iran
1,000
Netherlands
775
Norway 745
Australia 645
Italy
645
Sweden 635
United Nations

445
Denmark 435
France 320
China
255
Spain
220
Turkey 210
Finland 160
Russia
150
Saudi Arabia

140
UAE
135
Switzerland
120
South Korea

115
Czech Republic

105
Total
$24,900

(includes donors of under
(of which $19,700
$100 million, not listed)
disbursed—about 80%)
Source: Afghanistan Ministry of Finance: Development Cooperation Report, 2010; various U.S. government
reports, including Defense Department reports on Afghanistan stability. Figure for Japan includes $5 billion
pledged in 2008 (over five years) to fund Afghan National Police salaries.
Note: Table includes donors of over $100 million only.
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Table 11. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998
($ in millions)
Fiscal
Devel.
Econ. Supp.
P.L. 480 (Title I
Other (Incl. Regional
Year
Assist.
(ESF)
and II)
Military
Refugee Aid)
Total
1978 4.989 —
5.742 0.269
0.789 11.789
1979 3.074 —
7.195 —
0.347 10.616
1980

(Soviet invasion-December 1979)


1981 — —
— —


1982 — —
— —


1983 — —
— —


1984 — —
— —


1985 3.369 —



3.369
1986 — —
8.9 —

8.9
1987
17.8
12.1 2.6 —
— 32.5
1988 22.5 22.5 29.9 —

74.9
1989 22.5 22.5 32.6 —

77.6
1990 35.0 35.0 18.1 —

88.1
1991 30.0 30.0 20.1 —

80.1
1992 25.0 25.0 31.4 —

81.4
1993 10.0 10.0 18.0 —
30.2 68.2
1994 3.4 2.0
9.0 —
27.9 42.3
1995 1.8 —
12.4 —
31.6 45.8
1996 — — 16.1 —
26.4 42.5
1997 — — 18.0 —
31.9a 49.9
1998 — —
3.6 —
49.14b 52.74
Source: Department of State.
a. Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics.
b. Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake relief aid,
100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and $1.54 for
counternarcotics.
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Table 12. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2001
($ in millions)

FY1999 FY2000 FY2001
U.S. Department of
42.0 worth of
68.875 for 165,000
131.1 (300,000
Agriculture (DOA) and
wheat (100,000
metric tons.
metric tons under
USAID Food For Peace
metric tons under
(60,000 tons for
P.L. 480, Title II,
(FFP), via World Food
“416(b)” program.)
May 2000 drought
and 416(b))
Program(WFP)
relief)
State/Bureau of
16.95 for Afghan
14.03 for the same
22.03 for similar
Population, Refugees and
refugees in Pakistan
purposes
purposes
Migration (PRM) via
and Iran, and to
UNHCR and ICRC
assist their
repatriation
State Department/
7.0 to various
6.68 for drought
18.934 for similar
Office of Foreign
NGOs to aid
relief and health,
programs
Disaster Assistance
Afghans inside
water, and
(OFDA)
Afghanistan sanitation programs
State Department/HDP
2.615 3.0
2.8
(Humanitarian Demining
Program)
Aid to Afghan Refugees
5.44 (2.789 for
6.169, of which
5.31 for similar
in Pakistan (through
health, training—
$3.82 went to
purposes
various NGOs)
Afghan females in
similar purposes
Pakistan)
Counter-Narcotics

1.50
USAID/Office of

0.45
(Afghan
Transition Initiatives
women in
Pakistan)
DOD



Foreign Military



Financing
Anti-Terrorism



Economic Support Funds



(E.S.F)
Peacekeeping


Totals
76.6
113.2
182.6
Source: CRS.

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Table 13. Post-Taliban U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan
(appropriations/allocations in $ millions)
2002-2012 2013
Fiscal
Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
2009
2010 2011 2012 Total
Req
ESF
117 239.3 894.8 1,280 473.4 1,210.7 1,399.5 2,048 3,346 1,967.5 1,936.8 14,913.8 1,849.3
DA
18.3 42.5 153.1 169.6 185 166.8 149.4
0.4
0.3
0.0
0.0
885.4
0.0
GHCS
7.5 49.7 33.4 38.0 41.5 100.8 63.1 58.2 92.3 69.9
0.0 554.4 0.0
Refugee
Accounts
160 61.5 63.3 47.1 36 53.8 44.3
77 81.5 65.0 79.3 769.3 0.0
Food Aid
206
74.5
99
96.7
108.3
69.5
220
77
31.6
112.5
0.6
1,096.2
0.0
IDA
197
85.8
11.2 4.2 0 0 17 27 29.6 66.6 40.8 479.3 0.0
INCLE

60 0.0 220.0 709.3 232.7 251.7 307.6
484 589.0 400.0
324 3,578.3
600
NADR
44 34.7 66.9 38.2 18.2 36.6 26.6 48.6 57.7 69.3
65 505.6 54.3
IMET

0.2 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.6 1.4 1.8 1.6 2.0 12.2 1.5
FMF
57 191 413.7 396.8 0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0 1,058.5
0.0
Other
32 23.1 36.3 18.1 0.2 0.1 23.1
9.9
3.8
7.5
0.5 154.6 0.0
DOD—ASSF 0.0
0.0
0.0
995
1,908
7,406.4
2,750
5,607
9,163
11,619.3
11,200
50,648.5
5,749.2
DOD—CERP
0.0 0.0 40.0 136 215 209 488.3 550.7 1,000 470 400 3,439 400
Infrastructure
Fund 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 400 400
800 400
Business
Task
Force 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 150.0 150.0 559.2 179
DOD—Counternarc 0.0 0.0 71.8 224.5 108.1 291.0 192.8 235.1 392.3 376.5 392.6 2,268.5 0.0
DOD—Other
7.5 165 285 540 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 997.5 0.0
DEA Counternarc
0.6
2.9
3.7
16.8
23.7
20.4
40.6
18.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
127.5
0.0
Total U.S. Assistance
908
970
2,393
4,711
3,351
9,818
5,724
9,2585
14,848
15,795
15,070
82,848
9,233
Sources and Notes: Prepared by Curt Tarnoff, Specialist in Foreign Assistance, May 2012. Department of State annual budget presentation documents; and CRS
calculations. Does not include SIGAR or State/USAID operational expenses (over $5 billion since 2002). Food aid includes P.L.480 Title II, Food for Education, Food for
Progress, 416b Food Aid, Emerson Trust, and USAID CCC. “Other”=USAID Other, Office of Transition Initiatives, Treasury Technical Assistance, and Peacekeeping
accounts. ESF=Economic Support Funds; DA=Development Assistance; GHCS=Global Health/Child Survival; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; NADR=Nonproliferation,
Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining, and Related: IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE=International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; ASSF= Afghan Security
Forces Funding; IDA=International Disaster Assistance
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Table 14. Total Obligations for Major Programs: FY2001-FY2010
($ in millions. Source: USAID and CRS calculations)
Security Related Programs (mostly DOD funds)
Afghan National Security Forces (incl. FMF, and DOD ANSFF)
40506
Commander Emergency Response Program (CERP)
3039
Karzai Protection (NADR funds)
440
Counter-Narcotics (INCLE, DOD, DEA)
5227
Other, incl de-mining operations (Halo Trust, other contractors)
146
International Military Education and Training Funds (IMET)
9.8
Other DOD: AFSA defense article drawdown (540), Infrastructure Fund (400),
1547
Business Task Force (150)
Humanitarian-Related Programs
Food Aid (USDA and USAID: P.L. 480 Title 1 and II; Food for Progress, 416(b),
994
Food for Education)
Migration and Refugee aid (including emergency)
690
Debt Relief for Afghan government
11
Disaster Relief (IDA)
406
USAID Development Funding: Economic Support Funds (ESF) and
Total: 15,900+
Development Assistance (DA)
Afghan government budget support
423
Democracy (Including election support)
1775
Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (for National Solidarity Program, etc)
1909
(about 500 for NSP)
Rule of Law and Human Rights (incl. some INCLE funds)
935
Roads
2280
Power/Electricity
1453
Education
782
Health Sector
932
Water
88
Agriculture
1192
PRT projects (development and local governance)
1692
Private Sector Development/Econ. Growth (incl cash-for-work)
1406
Alternative Development/Livelihoods
1186
Embassy Operations, Construction, Aid Oversight
3,721
Other Aid:

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Child Survival and Health
556
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)
26
Treasury Technical Assistance
3.5
USAID (other)
31
Total (including minor amounts not included in table)
73,255
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Table 15.NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations
(as of April 16, 2012)
NATO Countries
Non-NATO Partners
Belgium 522
Albania 290
Bulgaria 605
Armenia 126
Canada 508*
Austria 3
Czech Republic
527
Australia
1550
Denmark 692
Azerbaijan 94
Estonia 153
Bosnia-Herzegovina
59
France 3308
Croatia 320
Germany 4900
Finland
176
Greece 122
Georgia 800
Hungary 337
Ireland
7
Iceland 6
Jordan 0
Italy 3816
Macedonia
177
Latvia 175
Malaysia 46
Lithuania 245
Mongolia 113
Luxemburg 10
Montenegro 39
Netherlands 274
New
Zealand 153
Norway 525
Singapore 39
Poland
2457
South Korea
350
Portugal 133
Sweden 500
Romania 1843
Ukraine
23
Slovakia
331
United Arab Emirates
35
Slovenia 89
Tonga 55
Spain 1481


Turkey 1327


United Kingdom
9500


United States
90000


Total Listed ISAF: 128,961
Source: http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/16%20August%202011%20Placemat.pdf
Note: As noted elsewhere in this report, U.S. force totals in Afghanistan (including those not under
NATO/ISAF) are approximately 98,000. In addition, the NATO/ISAF site states that troop numbers in this table
are based on broad contribution and do not necessarily reflect the exact numbers on the ground at any one
time. Kazakhstan announced in May 2011that it would send 4 non-combat officers to join ISAF. *ISAF figures
now reflect Canada combat troop pullout in July-August 2011; numbers listed are to train the ANSF. Numbers in
the table for the United States may not reflect the start of a U.S. drawdown in July 2011.
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Table 16.Provincial Reconstruction Teams
Location (City)
Province/Command
U.S.-Lead (all under ISAF banner)
1. Gardez
Paktia Province (RC-East, E)
2. Ghazni
Ghazni (RC-E). with Poland.
3. Jalalabad
Nangarhar (RC-E)
4. Khost
Khost (RC-E)
5. Qalat
Zabol (RC-South, S). with Romania.
6. Asadabad
Kunar (RC-E)
7. Sharana
Paktika (RC-E). with Poland.
8. Mehtarlam
Laghman (RC-E)
9. Jabal o-Saraj
Panjshir Province (RC-E), State Department lead
10. Qala Gush
Nuristan (RC-E)
11. Farah
Farah (RC-SW)
Partner Lead (most under ISAF banner)
PRT Location
Province
Lead Force/Other forces
12. Qandahar
Qandahar (RC-S)
Canada (seat of RC-S)
13. Lashkar Gah
Helmand (RC-S)
Britain. with Denmark and Estonia
14. Tarin Kowt
Uruzgan (RC-S)
Australia (and U.S.) (Replaced Netherlands in August 2010)
15. Herat
Herat (RC-W)
Italy (seat of RC-W)
16. Qalah-ye Now
Badghis (RC-W)
Spain
17. Mazar-e-Sharif
Balkh (RC-N)
Sweden
18. Konduz
Konduz (RC-N)
Germany (seat of RC-N)
29. Faizabad
Badakhshan (RC-N)
Germany. with Denmark, Czech Rep.
20. Meymaneh
Faryab (RC-N)
Norway. with Sweden.
21. Chaghcharan
Ghowr (RC-W)
Lithuania. with Denmark, U.S., Iceland
22. Pol-e-Khomri
Baghlan (RC-N)
Hungary
23. Bamiyan
Bamiyan (RC-E)
New Zealand (not NATO/ISAF).
24. Maidan Shahr
Wardak (RC-C)
Turkey
25. Pul-i-Alam
Lowgar (RC-E)
Czech Republic
26. Shebergan
Jowzjan (RC-N)
Turkey
27. Charikar
Parwan (RC-E)
South Korea (Bagram, in Parwan Province, is the base of RC-E)
Note: RC = Regional Command.
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Table 17.Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan
Party/
Ideology/

Leader Leader
Ethnicity Regional
Base
Taliban
Mullah (Islamic cleric) Muhammad Umar (still at large
Ultra-
Throughout
possibly in Afghanistan. Umar, born in Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan
orthodox
south and east.
province, is about 65 years old.
Islamic,
Smal numbers
Pashtun
elsewhere.
Haqqani
Jalaludin Haqqani. Allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda. Said to
Same
as
Paktia, Paktika,
Network
be supported, or at least tolerated, by Pakistani ISI.
above
Khost, Kabul
Islamic Society Yunus Qanooni (speaker of lower house)/Muhammad
Moderate Much of
(leader of
Fahim/Dr. Abdul ah Abdul ah (Foreign Minister 2001-2006).
Islamic,
northern and
“Northern
Ismail Khan, a so-called “warlord,” heads faction of the
mostly Tajik western
Alliance”)
grouping in Herat area. Former party head, Burhanuddi
Afghanistan,
Rabbani, assassinated by Taliban in September 2011.
including Kabul
National
Abdul Rashid Dostam. Was Karzai rival in October 2004
Secular,
left-
Jowzjan, Balkh,
Islamic
presidential election, then his top “security adviser.” As of
leaning,
Faryab, Sar-i-Pol,
Movement of
October 2011, reportedly has joined new opposition
Uzbek
and Samangan
Afghanistan
movement called “Truth and Justice Party.”
provinces.
Hizb-e-
Composed of Shiite Hazara tribes from central Afghanistan.
Shiite,
Bamiyan, Ghazni,
Wahdat
Former members Karim Khalili is vice president, but
Hazara
Dai Kundi
Mohammad Mohaqiq is Karzai rival. General y pro-Iranian.
tribes
province
Was part of Rabbani 1992-1996 government, and fought
unsuccessfully with Taliban over Bamiyan. Still revered by
Hazaras is the former leader of the group, Abdul Ali Mazari,
who was captured and killed by the Taliban in March 1995.
Pashtun
Various regional governors and local leaders in the east and
Moderate Dominant in the
tribal/regional
south; central government led by Hamid Karzai.
Islamic,
south and east
leaders
Pashtun
Hizb-e-Islam
Mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. Was part of
Orthodox Small groups in
Gulbuddin
Soviet-era U.S.-backed “Afghan Interim Government” based
Islamic,
Nangarhar,
(HIG)
in Peshawar, Pakistan. Was nominal “prime minister” in
Pashtun
Nuristan, and
1992-1996 mujahedin government but never actual y took
Kunar provinces
office. Lost power base around Jalalabad to the Taliban in
1994, and fled to Iran before being expelled in 2002. Still
active in operations east of Kabul, but open to ending
militant activity. Leader of a rival Hizb-e-Islam faction, Yunus
Khalis, the mentor of Mullah Umar, died July 2006.
Islamic Union
Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Islamic conservative, leads a pro-
orthodox Paghman
Karzai faction in parliament. Lived many years in and
Islamic,
(west of Kabul)
politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his “Wahhabi”
Pashtun
ideology. During anti-Soviet war, Sayyaf’s faction, with
Hikmatyar, was a principal recipient of U.S. weaponry.
Criticized the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein after
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
Source: CRS.
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Residual Issues from Past Conflicts
A few issues remain unresolved from Afghanistan’s many years of conflict, such as Stinger
retrieval and mine eradication.
Stinger Retrieval
Beginning in late 1985 following internal debate, the Reagan Administration provided about
2,000 man-portable “Stinger” anti-aircraft missiles to the mujahedin for use against Soviet
aircraft. Prior to the ouster of the Taliban, common estimates suggested that 200-300 Stingers
remained at large, although more recent estimates put the number below 100.67 The Stinger issue
resurfaced in conjunction with 2001 U.S. war effort, when U.S. pilots reported that the Taliban
fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft. No hits were reported. The danger of these weapons has
become apparent on several past occasions. Iran bought 16 of the missiles in 1987 and fired one
against U.S. helicopters in the Persian Gulf. India claimed that it was a Stinger supplied to
Islamic rebels in Kashmir by sympathizers in Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter
over Kashmir in May 1999.68 Soviet-made SA-7 “Strella” man-portable launchers, which
allegedly have been used in the past by Al Qaeda, including against an Israeli passenger jet in
Kenya on November 30, 2002, were discovered in Afghanistan by U.S. forces in December 2002.
In 1992, after the fall of the Russian-backed government of Najibullah, the United States
reportedly spent about $10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a premium, from individual
mujahedin commanders. The New York Times reported on July 24, 1993, that the buy back effort
failed because the United States was competing with other buyers, including Iran and North
Korea, and that the CIA would spend about $55 million in FY1994 in a renewed effort. On March
7, 1994, the Washington Post reported that the CIA had recovered only about 50 or 100 at-large
Stingers. In February 2002, the Afghan government found and turned over to the United States
“dozens” of Stingers.69 In January 2005, Afghan intelligence began buying Stingers back, at a
reported cost of $150,000 each.70 Any Stingers that remain in Afghanistan likely pose little threat,
in part because of deteriorating components. No recent uses are reported.
Mine Eradication
Land mines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute one of the principal dangers to the
Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that 5 million to 7 million mines remain scattered
throughout the country, although some estimates are lower. U.N. teams have destroyed one
million mines and are now focusing on de-mining priority-use, residential and commercial
property, including lands around Kabul. Amounts contributed by the United States to the de-
mining effort are shown in the tables above. Most of the funds have gone to HALO Trust, a
British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action Program for Afghanistan. The Afghanistan
Compact adopted in London in February 2006 states that by 2010, the goal should be to reduce
the land area of Afghanistan contaminated by mines by 70%.

67 Saleem, Farrukh. “Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan,” Friday Times. August 17-23, 2001.
68 “U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles—Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999.
69 Fullerton, John. “Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S.” Reuters, February 4, 2002.
70 “Afghanistan Report,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 4, 2005.
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Appendix. U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted
Virtually all U.S. and international sanctions on Afghanistan, some imposed during the Soviet
occupation era and others on the Taliban regime, have now been lifted.
• P.L. 108-458 (December 17, 2004, referencing the 9/11 Commission
recommendations) repealed bans on aid to Afghanistan outright. On October 7,
1992, President George H. W. Bush had issued Presidential Determination 93-3
that Afghanistan is no longer a Marxist-Leninist country, but the determination
was not implemented before he left office. Had it been implemented, the
prohibition on Afghanistan’s receiving Export-Import Bank guarantees,
insurance, or credits for purchases under Section 8 of the 1986 Export-Import
Bank Act, would have been lifted. In addition, Afghanistan would have been able
to receive U.S. assistance because the requirement would have been waived that
Afghanistan apologize for the 1979 killing in Kabul of U.S. Ambassador to
Afghanistan Adolph “Spike” Dubs. (Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and
killed when Afghan police stormed the hideout where he was held.)
• U.N. sanctions on the Taliban imposed by Resolution 1267 (October 15, 1999),
Resolution 1333 (December 19, 2000), and Resolution 1363 (July 30, 2001) have
now been narrowed to penalize only Al Qaeda (by Resolution 1390, January 17,
2002). Resolution 1267 banned flights outside Afghanistan by Ariana, and
directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets. Resolution 1333 prohibited
the provision of arms or military advice to the Taliban (directed against
Pakistan); ordered a reduction of Taliban diplomatic representation abroad; and
banned foreign travel by senior Taliban officials. Resolution 1363 provided for
monitors in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was provided
to the Taliban.
• On January 10, 2003, President Bush signed a proclamation making Afghanistan
a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), eliminating U.S.
tariffs on 5,700 Afghan products. Afghanistan had been denied GSP on May 2,
1980, under Executive Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740).
• On April 24, 1981, controls on U.S. exports to Afghanistan of agricultural
products and phosphates were terminated. Such controls were imposed on June 3,
1980, as part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union for the invasion of
Afghanistan, under the authority of Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405].
• In mid-1992, the George H. W. Bush Administration determined that Afghanistan
no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This opened Afghanistan to the
use of U.S. funds made available for the U.S. share of U.N. organizations that
provide assistance to Afghanistan.
• On March 31, 1993, after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, President Clinton, on
national interest grounds, waived restrictions provided for in Section 481 (h) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 mandating sanctions on Afghanistan,
including bilateral aid cuts and suspensions, including denial of Ex-Im Bank
credits; the casting of negative U.S. votes for multilateral development bank
loans; and a non-allocation of a U.S. sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions
included denial of GSP; additional duties on exports to the United States; and
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curtailment of air transportation with the United States. Waivers were also
granted in 1994 and, after the fall of the Taliban, by President Bush.
• On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to the products
of Afghanistan, reversing the February 18, 1986, proclamation by President
Reagan (Presidential Proclamation 5437) that suspended most-favored nation
(MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287). The Foreign Assistance
Appropriations for FY1986 [Section 552, P.L. 99-190] had authorized the denial
of U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) status for Afghanistan.
• On July 2, 2002, the State Department amended U.S. regulations (22 C.F.R. Part
126) to allow arms sales to the new Afghan government, reversing the June 14,
1996, addition of Afghanistan to the list of countries prohibited from importing
U.S. defense articles and services. Arms sales to Afghanistan had also been
prohibited during 1997-2002 because Afghanistan had been designated under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132) as a state
that is not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.
• On July 2, 2002, President Bush formally revoked the July 4, 1999, declaration
by President Clinton of a national emergency with respect to Taliban because of
its hosting of Bin Laden. The Clinton determination and related Executive Order
13129 had blocked Taliban assets and property in the United States, banned U.S.
trade with Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, and applied these sanctions to
Ariana Afghan Airlines, triggering a blocking of Ariana assets (about $500,000)
in the United States and a ban on U.S. citizens’ flying on the airline. (The ban on
trade with Taliban-controlled territory had essentially ended on January 29, 2002,
when the State Department determination that the Taliban controls no territory
within Afghanistan.)

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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Figure A-1. Map of Afghanistan

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.

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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Figure A-2. Map of Afghan Ethnicities

Source: 2003 National Geographic Society. http://www.afghan-network.net/maps/Afghanistan-Map.pdf. Adapted
by Amber Wilhelm, CRS Graphics.
Notes: This map is intended to be illustrative of the approximate demographic distribution by region of
Afghanistan. CRS has no way to confirm exact population distributions.

Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612

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