Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
May 1, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21922
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Summary
Building capacity and limiting corruption at all levels of Afghan governance are crucial to the
success of a planned transition from U.S.-led NATO forces to Afghan security leadership.
• The capacity of the formal Afghan governing structure has increased significantly
since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but many positions at the local level
are unfilled. Even though the formal governing structure remains weak, President
Hamid Karzai’s Afghan and some U.S. critics assert that he has concentrated
authority in Kabul through vast powers of appointment at all levels—
appointment power given him by the Afghan constitution.
• Addressing these criticism, Karzai has publicly and repeatedly denied assertions
by opposing faction leaders that he wants to stay in office beyond the 2014
expiration of his second term and said in April 2012 that he is considering trying
to move the next presidential election to 2013. Still, international efforts to curb
fraud in two successive elections (for president in 2009 and parliament in 2010)
largely failed and many believe election oversight has improved little since.
• Nepotism and political considerations in hiring are entrenched in Afghan culture
and limit development of a competent bureaucracy, as does widespread illiteracy.
Karzai has accepted U.S. help to build emerging anti-corruption institutions, but
these same institutions have sometimes caused a Karzai backlash when they have
targeted his allies or relatives.
There is concern among many observers that U.S. efforts to help build Afghan governance,
democracy, civil society, and rule of law could founder as the United States and its partners seek
to wind down their involvement in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Some argue that the informal
power structure is a more important factor in governance than the formal power structure and will
compensate for a diminution in the power of Kabul. Karzai has turned the informal power
structure to his advantage by relying on the loyalty of several close, ethnic Pashtun allies while
both engaging and dividing the minority ethnic and political faction leaders that generally oppose
him. Some non-Pashtun faction leaders oppose Karzai on the grounds that he is too willing to
make concessions to insurgent leaders in search of a settlement. There are fears that a
reintegration of the Taliban into Afghan politics will further set back progress in human rights and
the rights of women, and boost ethnic Pashtuns at the expense of the other minorities.
Broader issues of human rights often vary depending on the security environment in particular
regions, although some trends prevail nationwide. The State Department and outside human
rights reports on Afghanistan attribute many of the human rights abuses in Afghanistan to overall
lack of security and to traditional conservative attitudes still prevalent. Women have made
substantial gains in government and the private sector since the fall of the Taliban, but many
organizations report substantial backsliding, particularly in areas where the insurgency operates.
Traditional attitudes also contribute to the judicial and political system’s continued toleration of
child marriages, imprisonment of women who flee domestic violence, judgments against converts
from Islam to Christianity, and curbs on the sale of alcohol and Western-oriented programming in
the Afghan media. See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report R40747, United Nations Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan: Background and Policy Issues, by Rhoda Margesson; and CRS Report
R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and
Kenneth Katzman.
Congressional Research Service
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Contents
Overview: Historic Patterns of Afghan Authority and Politics........................................................ 1
Relations Among Ethnicities and Communities........................................................................ 2
The Pashtuns ....................................................................................................................... 3
The Tajiks............................................................................................................................ 3
The Hazaras......................................................................................................................... 3
The Uzbeks.......................................................................................................................... 3
Relative Lack of Attraction to Formal Political Parties............................................................. 4
Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape............................................................................. 5
Establishment of the Afghan Government Structure: Tending Toward Centralization ............. 5
Bonn Agreement.................................................................................................................. 5
Permanent Constitution/Presidential System and Powers................................................... 6
National Assembly (Parliament) Formed: Structure and Powers........................................ 7
Rivalries Within and Outside Governing Institutions................................................................ 8
Karzai’s Presidential Leadership, His Close Advisers, and Staff ........................................ 9
Karzai’s Allies in the National Assembly.......................................................................... 10
The Opposition: The “Northern Alliance,” Dr. Abdullah, and Karzai Opponents in
the Lower House of Parliament...................................................................................... 13
Other Power Brokers, “Warlords,” and Local Faction Leaders ........................................ 15
Emerging Power Centers: Civil Society and “Independent” Activists.............................. 20
Ethnic and Factional Cooperation in the Security Sector.................................................. 21
Elections in 2009 and 2010 Widened Political Schisms.......................................................... 21
2009 Presidential Election................................................................................................. 22
September 18, 2010, Parliamentary Elections................................................................... 26
Implications for the United States of the Afghan Elections Disputes ............................... 32
Next Presidential Elections: Karzai Says He Will Yield Power........................................ 33
Afghan Governing Capacity and Performance.............................................................................. 34
Expanding Central Government Capacity............................................................................... 35
The Afghan Civil Service.................................................................................................. 35
The Afghan Budget Process .............................................................................................. 36
Expanding Local (Subnational) Governance........................................................................... 37
The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)............................................ 37
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils ................................................................. 38
District-Level Governance ................................................................................................ 39
Municipal and Village Level Authority............................................................................. 39
U.S. Local Governance Advisory Capacity....................................................................... 40
Reforming Afghan Governance: Curbing Corruption ............................................................. 41
High Level Corruption, Nepotism, and Cronyism ............................................................ 41
Lower-Level Corruption.................................................................................................... 41
Administration Views and Policy on Corruption .............................................................. 41
Anti-Corruption Initiatives................................................................................................ 42
Kabul Bank Scandal and Continuing Difficulties ............................................................. 46
Rule of Law Efforts ................................................................................................................. 48
Promoting Human Rights and Civil Society ........................................................................... 49
Institution-Building: The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
(AIHRC)......................................................................................................................... 50
Religion: Influence of National Ulema Council................................................................ 50
Congressional Research Service
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Riots over Quran Burnings: 2011 and 2012 ...................................................................... 51
Media and Freedom of Expression/Social Freedoms........................................................ 51
Harsh Punishments............................................................................................................ 52
Religious Freedom ............................................................................................................ 53
Human Trafficking ............................................................................................................ 54
Advancement of Women ................................................................................................... 54
Democracy, Human Rights, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues.......................... 58
Effects of a Settlement with the Taliban.................................................................................. 58
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Afghan Ethnicities ............................................................................................. 62
Tables
Table 1. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations .............................................................................. 60
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 62
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 62
Congressional Research Service
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Overview: Historic Patterns of Afghan Authority
and Politics
Through differing regimes of widely varying ideologies, Afghanistan’s governing structure has
historically consisted of weak central government unwilling or unable to enforce significant
financial or administrative mandates on all of Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic communities or on the
80% of Afghans who live in rural areas. Many communities are separated by mountains and wide
expanses that can take days to reach. The tensions between the central government and the
outlying areas have often mirrored the struggles between urban, educated “modernizers” and the
rural, lesser-educated traditionalists who adhere to strict Islamic customs. The Taliban
government (1996-2001) opposed modernization.
At the national level, Afghanistan had few, if any, Western-style democratic institutions prior to
the international intervention that took place after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United
States. Under the constitution of 1964, King Zahir Shah was to be a constitutional monarch, and
an elected lower house and appointed upper house were set up. The parliament during that era
never reached the expectation of becoming a significant check on the king’s power, although the
period from 1964 until the seizure of power by Mohammad Daoud in a 1973 military coup was
considered a flowering of Afghan democracy. The last lower house elections during that period
were held in 1969. The parliament was suspended outright following the April 1978 Communist
seizure of power. The elected institutions and the 2004 adoption of a constitution were part of a
post-Taliban transition roadmap established by a United Nations-sponsored agreement of major
Afghan factions signed in Bonn, Germany, on December 5, 2001 (“Bonn Agreement”),1 after the
Taliban had fallen. Karzai is the first directly elected Afghan president.
Since the fall of the Taliban, there has also been the growth of civil society, populated largely by
educated Afghans, many of whom returned to Afghanistan from exile when the Taliban fell.
Organizations and groups centered on various issues, including women’s rights, law and justice,
media freedoms, economics and business issues, the environment, and others, have proliferated.
U.S. and partner policy has been to try to empower these groups as a check on government power
and as a guarantor that Afghan democracy will become entrenched.
These newly emerging interest groups have still not been able to displace—or even necessarily
substantially influence—the informal power structure of ethnic, regional, tribal, clan, village, and
district structures that exercise authority at all levels. At the local level, these structures governed
and secured Afghanistan until the late 1970s but were weakened by decades of subsequent war
and Taliban rule. Some traditional local authority figures fled or were killed; others were
displaced by mujahedin commanders, militia leaders, Taliban militants, and others. The local
power brokers who displaced some of the tribal structures are far less popular and are widely
accused of selectively applying Afghan law and of using their authority to enrich themselves.
Some of the traditional tribal councils, which are widely respected but highly conservative in
orientation, remained intact. Some of them continue to exercise their writ rather than accept the
authority of the central government or even local government appointees. Still other community
authorities prefer to accommodate local insurgents, whom they often see as wayward but
reconcilable members of the community, rather than help the government secure their areas.
1 For text, see http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm.
Congressional Research Service
1
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
The informal power structure has decision-making bodies and processes that do not approximate
Western-style democracy but yet have participatory and representative elements. Meetings called
shuras, or jirgas (consultative councils),2 often composed of designated notables, are key
mechanisms for making or endorsing authoritative decisions or dispensing justice. Some of these
mechanisms are practiced by Taliban insurgents in areas under their control or influence. On the
other hand, some see the traditional patterns as competing with and detracting from the
development of the post-Taliban formal power structure—a structure that, with Western guidance,
has generally tried to meet international standards of democratic governance and human rights
practices.
At the national level, one traditional mechanism has carried over into the post-Taliban governing
structure. The convening of a loya jirga, an assembly consisting of about 1,500 delegates from all
over Afghanistan, has been used on several occasions. Under the constitution, decisions of a loya
jirga supersede decisions made under any other process, including cabinet meetings or even
elections. In the post-Taliban period, loya jirgas have been convened to endorse Karzai’s
leadership, to adopt a constitution, and to discuss a long-term defense relationship with the United
States. A special loya jirga, called a peace jirga, was held on June 2-4, 2010, to review
government plans to offer incentives for insurgent fighters to end their armed struggle and rejoin
society. Another loya jirga was held during November 16-19, 2011; it endorsed proposed Afghan
government conditions on a potential strategic partnership agreement between Afghanistan and
the United States. However, the constitution specifies who should be delegates at a constitutional
loya jirga, and in the absence of elected district councils (whose members are mandated to be
included), all of Afghanistan’s post-Taliban loya jirgas have been traditional loya jirgas.
Relations Among Ethnicities and Communities
Even though post-Taliban Afghanistan is modernizing politically and economically, patterns of
political affiliation by family, clan, tribe, village, ethnicity, region, and comradeship in past battles
often supersede relationships based on ideology or views. These patterns have been evident in
every Afghan election since the fall of the Taliban. Most candidates, including Karzai, have
pursued campaign strategies designed primarily to assemble blocs of ethnic and geographic votes,
although some have also sought to advance specific new programs and ideas. The traditional
patterns have been even more pronounced in province-based campaigns such as those for the
provincial councils and the parliament. In these cases, electorates (the eligible voters of a specific
province) are small and candidates can easily exploit clan and familial relationships.
While Afghans continue to follow traditional patterns of affiliation, there has been a sense among
Afghans that their country now welcomes members of all political and ethnic groups and factions.
There have been very few incidents of ethnic-based violence since the fall of the Taliban, but
jealousies over relative economic and political positions of the different ethnic communities have
sporadically manifested as clashes or political disputes.
2 Shura is the term used by non-Pashtuns to characterize the traditional assembly concept. Jirga is the Pashtun term.
The Afghan constitution provides for a constitutional loya jirga as the highest decisionmaking body, and specifies the
institutions that must be represented at the jirga. If a constitutional jirga cannot be held or is blocked, a traditional jirga
can be convened by the President to discuss major issues, although its ability to render binding decisions on proposals
is unclear.
Congressional Research Service
2
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
The Pashtuns
Ethnic Pashtuns (pronounced POSH-toons, sometimes referred to as Pathans—pah-TAHNS), as
the largest single ethnicity, have historically asserted a “right to rule.” Pashtuns are about 42% of
the population and, with few exceptions, have governed Afghanistan. The sentiment of the “right
to rule” is particularly strong among Pashtuns of the Durrani tribal confederation, which
predominates in the south and is a rival to the Ghilzai confederation, which predominates in the
east and has historically had close ties to Pakistan.
Karzai is a Durrani Pashtun. His cabinet and inner advisory circle has come to be progressively
dominated by Pashtuns, both Ghilzai and Durrani, which has largely minimized the advisory
input of the other communities. However, Karzai is credited by some observers for consulting
with other communities, particularly the Tajiks, before issuing decrees or reaching decisions. The
Taliban government was and its insurgency is composed almost completely of Pashtuns. A table
on major Pashtun clans is provided below (see Table 1), as is a map showing the distribution of
Afghan ethnicities (see Figure 1).
The Tajiks
On a few occasions, non-Pashtuns have ruled—one recent example was the 1992-1996
presidency of the mujahedin government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik (who was assassinated
on September 20, 2011). Tajiks are the second-most numerous community, composing an
estimated 25% of the population, and are the core of the “Northern Alliance” grouping that is
opposed to but often works amicably with Karzai. The Tajiks and the Northern Alliance are
discussed extensively later in this paper.
The Hazaras
Many Pashtuns are said to be increasingly resentful of the Hazara Shiite minority (about 10% of
the population) that is advancing economically and politically through education; the Hazaras
have historically been looked down upon by the Pashtuns, who have tended to employ Hazaras as
domestic workers and other lower and lower middle class occupations. These jealousies could
have been a factor in the December 6, 2011, bombings of Hazaras in three cities, killing 60, while
they were visiting their mosques to celebrate the Shiite holy day of Ashura. A Pakistan-based
militant group, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, claimed responsibility—possibly in an effort to stir up
sectarian conflict in Afghanistan. Afghan Shiite officials said such tactics would not work, as
there is no inclination toward sectarian conflict in Afghanistan.
The Uzbeks
Uzbeks, like the Hazaras, are about 10%. The Uzbek community is Sunni Muslim and speaks a
language akin to Turkish, as well as Dari. The most well-known Uzbek leader in Afghanistan is
Abdul Rashid Dostam, who was allied with Soviet occupation forces but later defected and
helped bring down the Communist regime in Afghanistan in April 1992. Because of their alliance
with the Soviet Union during the occupation period, many Uzbeks in Afghanistan are leftwing
and highly secular.
Congressional Research Service
3
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Relative Lack of Attraction to Formal Political Parties
One major issue that connects post-Taliban and pre-Taliban Afghanistan is that there is little
overarching glue that holds Afghan factions together. The concept of nation is widely held, but
not as strongly as are traditional patterns of affiliation. There is a popular aversion to formal
“parties” as historically tools of neighboring powers—a perception stemming from the war
against the Soviet Union when seven mujahedin parties were funded by and considered tools of
outside parties. Some of these mujahedin parties remain, such as the mostly Pashtun Hizb-e-Islam
and the mostly Tajik Jamiat Islami, as discussed below. However, most of the mujahedin era
parties have evolved into alternate or broader coalitions. Hizb-e-Islam is a notable exception to
that trend, and it does generally still compete in elections as a distinct party. Prior to September
2009, when a new political party’s law was adopted, there were 110 registered political parties.
However, a September 2009 law required the parties to reregister, and only five completed the
process by the time of the September 18, 2010, parliamentary election.
Partly because parties are viewed with suspicion, President Hamid Karzai has not formed his own
party, but many of his supporters in the National Assembly (parliament) belong to a moderate
faction of Hizb-e-Islam that is committed to working within the political system. The grouping
was reduced somewhat by the results of the September 18, 2010, parliamentary elections. The
putative leader of this group is Minister of Economy Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal. A militant faction
of Hizb-e-Islam is loyal to pro-Taliban insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar; it is called Hizb-e-
Islam Gulbuddin (HIG).
Other large parties that do exist, for example the Junbush Melli of Abdul Rashid Dostam, tend to
be identified with specific ethnic (in his case, Uzbeks) or sectarian factions, rather than
overarching themes. A major party is Jamiat Islami (Islamic Society), a party that grouped Tajik
leaders during the anti-Soviet war, although many Tajik leaders still identify with the broader
anti-Taliban “Northern Alliance,” and more recently broader groupings discussed later, such as
the United Front and the Hope and Change Movement. However, these parties do not advertise
themselves as “ethnic” parties per se, because Article 35 of the Afghan constitution bans parties
based on ethnicity or religious sect.
It was hoped that post-Taliban Afghanistan would produce a substantial number of secular, pan-
ethnic democratic parties. Some large such parties have formed, particularly the Hope and
Change party of Dr. Abdullah, discussed further below. Another secular, pan-ethnic party, the
Truth and Justice Party, was formed by ex-Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar and other
allies in October 2011, also discussed further below. Smaller secular parties include the
Afghanistan Labour and Development Party, the National Solidarity Party of Afghanistan’s
Youth, the Republican Party, and the National Congress Party of Afghanistan led by Abdul Latif
Pedram. Some parties are left wing, such as the National United Party of Afghanistan, led by
former parliamentarian Nur ul-Haq Ulumi. However, some believe that all the smaller, idea-based
parties remain weak because the Single, Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system—in which each
voter casts a ballot for only one candidate—favors candidates running as independents rather than
as members of parties. Moreover, Western-style parties are generally identified by specific
ideologies, ideas, or ideals, while most Afghans, as discussed above, retain their traditional
affiliations. As a result, many of the parties that have been formed since the fall of the Taliban
have centered around personalities rather than broad idea-driven platforms.
Congressional Research Service
4
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape
U.S. policy since 2001 has been to help expand the capacity of formal Afghan governing
institutions, most of which were nearly non-existent during Taliban rule. No parliament was
functioning during that time, and Afghanistan was run by a small, Qandahar based group around
Mullah Mohammad Umar, who remained there. Those government offices that were functioning
were minimally staffed, and virtually none had modern equipment, according to observers in
Kabul. There were virtually no checks or balances on Mullah Omar’s decision to host Osama bin
Laden in Afghanistan during that time. Since 2007, but with particular focus during the Obama
Administration, U.S. policy has been to not only try to expand Afghan governing capacity and the
ability of the government to deliver services—at the central and local levels—but to push for its
reform, transparency, and oversight. However, the formal governing structure continues to
compete, often unsuccessfully, with the traditional power structures discussed above.
Establishment of the Afghan Government Structure: Tending
Toward Centralization
The 2001 ouster of the Taliban government paved the way for the success of a long-stalled U.N.
effort to form a broad-based Afghan government and for the international community to help
Afghanistan build legitimate governing institutions. In the formation of the first post-Taliban
transition government, the United Nations was viewed as a credible mediator by all sides largely
because of its role in ending the Soviet occupation. During the 1990s, a succession of U.N.
mediators adopted many of former King Zahir Shah’s proposals for a government to be selected
by a traditional assembly, or loya jirga. However, U.N.-mediated cease-fires between warring
factions did not hold. Non-U.N. initiatives made little progress, particularly the “Six Plus Two”
multilateral contact group, which began meeting in 1997 (the United States, Russia, and the six
states bordering Afghanistan: Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan).
Other failed efforts included a “Geneva group” (Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United States)
formed in 2000; an Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) contact group; and prominent
Afghan exile efforts, including discussion groups launched by Hamid Karzai and his clan, former
mujahedin commander Abd al-Haq, and Zahir Shah (“Rome process”). The sections below
discuss the formation of the post-Taliban governing structure of Afghanistan.
Bonn Agreement
Immediately after the September 11 attacks, former U.N. mediator Lakhdar Brahimi was brought
back (he had resigned in frustration in October 1999). U.N. Security Council Resolution 1378
(November 14, 2001) called for a “central” role for the United Nations in establishing a
transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote
stability and aid delivery. After the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the United Nations invited
major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern Alliance and that of the former King—but
not the Taliban—to an international conference in Bonn, Germany.
On December 5, 2001, the factions signed the “Bonn Agreement.”3 It was endorsed by U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001). The agreement was reportedly forged
3 Text of Bonn agreement at http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/files/petersberg.htm.
Congressional Research Service
5
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
with substantial Iranian diplomatic help because Iran had supported the military efforts of the
Northern Alliance faction and had leverage to persuade temporary caretaker Rabbani and the
Northern Alliance to cede the top leadership to Hamid Karzai as leader of an interim
administration. Other provisions of the agreement:
• authorized an international peace keeping force to maintain security in Kabul,
and Northern Alliance forces were directed to withdraw from the capital. Security
Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001, and renewed yearly thereafter)
gave formal Security Council authorization for the international peacekeeping
force (International Security Assistance Force, ISAF);
• referred to the need to cooperate with the international community on counter
narcotics, crime, and terrorism; and
• applied the constitution of 1964 until a permanent constitution could be drafted.4
On December 5, 2011, there was an international conference on Afghanistan in Bonn, marking
the 10th anniversary since the 2001 Bonn Conference. The meeting, in part, evaluated governance
progress in Afghanistan since the original convention.
Permanent Constitution/Presidential System and Powers
A June 2002 “emergency” loya jirga put a representative imprimatur on the transition; it was
attended by 1,550 delegates (including about 200 women). Subsequently, a 35-member
constitutional commission drafted the constitution, unveiling it in November 2003. It was debated
by 502 delegates, selected in U.N.-run caucuses, at a “constitutional loya jirga (CLJ)” during
December 13, 2003-January 4, 2004. The CLJ, chaired by prominent Islamic scholar and former
interim Afghan leader Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, ended with approval of the constitution with only
minor changes.
The constitution set up a presidential system, with an elected president having relatively broad
powers and a separately elected National Assembly (parliament). Opposing too great a
centralization of power (which would favor Pashtuns), the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance
failed in its effort to set up a prime ministership in which the elected parliament would select a
prime minister—who would serve in addition to the president. The faction did achieve some
limitation to presidential powers by assigning major authorities to the parliament, as discussed
below. The Northern Alliance assumed that, in a prime ministerial system, the post of elected
President would be held by a Pashtun but, in a tradition of power sharing, the prime minister post
would be held by a Tajik or other ethnic minority. The constitution and election system (a two
round election if no majority is achieved in the first round) strongly favor the likelihood that an
ethnic Pashtun will be president of Afghanistan.
The president serves a five-year term, with a two-term limit (Article 62). There are two vice
presidents. The president has broad powers. Under article 64, he has the power to appoint all
“high-ranking officials,” which has been interpreted by Karzai to include not only cabinet
ministers but also members of the Supreme Court, judges, provincial governors and district
4 The last pre-Karzai loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a constitution.
Najibullah convened a loya jirga in 1987 to approve pro-Moscow policies, but that gathering was widely viewed by
Afghans as illegitimate.
Congressional Research Service
6
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
governors, local security chiefs, and members of supposedly independent commissions such as
the Independent Election Commission and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
(AIHRC). However, these appointments are constitutionally subject to confirmation by the
National Assembly. The president also is commander-in-chief of the Afghan armed forces. In an
outcome still debated, at the CLJ, the opposition did not achieve the right of elected provincial
and district councils to choose their governors.
The constitution made former King Zahir Shah honorary “Father of the Nation,” a title that is not
heritable. Zahir Shah died on July 23, 2007.5 It (Article 58) also set up the Afghanistan
Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) to refer cases of human rights violations to
“the legal authorities.” (See further below on this commission.)
Karzai Elected in First Post-Taliban Presidential Elections in 2004
Security conditions precluded the holding of the first post-Taliban elections simultaneously. The
first election, for president, was held on October 9, 2004, missing a June constitutional deadline.
Turnout was about 80%. On November 3, 2004, Karzai was declared winner (55.4% of the vote)
over his 17 challengers on the first round, avoiding a runoff. He was sworn in to office in
December 2004, about one year before the swearing in of an elected National Assembly; he ruled
by decree during that one year period.
National Assembly (Parliament) Formed: Structure and Powers
Parliamentary and provincial council elections were intended for April-May 2005 but were
delayed until September 18, 2005. The elections were based on a “Single Non-Transferable Vote”
System; candidates stood as individuals, not part of a party list. Voting was for one candidate
only, although the number of representatives varied by province, ranging from 2 (Panjshir
Province) to 33 (Kabul Province). Herat has 17; Nangahar, 14; Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni, 11
seats each. Because of the difficulty in confirming voter registration rolls and determining district
boundaries, elections for the 364 district councils, each of which will likely have contentious
boundaries because they will inevitably separate tribes and clans, have not been held to date.
The National Assembly, established as a result of the September 2005 elections, has been the key
formal institution for non-Pashtuns and political independents to express political opposition to
and to exert influence on Karzai. The Assembly has been set up by the constitution as a relatively
powerful body that can, to some extent, check the powers of the president, although the Northern
Alliance and other Karzai critics say it has insufficient power to brake presidential authority. One
of its first tasks was to review, and either endorse, amend, or void, the decrees Karzai had issued
in the one year he was President and no National Assembly was operating.
The Assembly consists of a 249 all-elected lower house (Wolesi Jirga, House of the People) and a
selected 102 seat upper house (Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders). The upper house is selected as
follows: one-third, or 34 seats, appointed by the president (for a five-year term); one-third
appointed by the elected provincial councils (four-year term), and one-third appointed by elected
district councils (for a three-year term). Of the president’s appointments, half (17) are mandated
to be women. In the absence of elected district councils, two-thirds of the body is selected by the
5 Text of constitution at http://arabic.cnn.com/afghanistan/ConstitutionAfghanistan.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
7
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
provincial councils for four year terms. The lower house is mandated to be at least 28% female
(68 persons)—an average of two for each of the 34 provinces.
The lower house has the power to vote no-confidence against ministers (Article 92)—based on a
proposal by 10% of the lower house membership, or 25 parliamentarians. Both the upper and
lower houses are required to pass laws. Under Article 98 of the constitution, the national budget is
taken up by the Meshrano Jirga first and then passed to the Wolesi Jirga for its consideration.
Both houses of parliament, whose budgets are controlled by the Ministry of Finance, are staffed
by about 275 Afghans, reporting to a “secretariat.” There are 18 oversight committees, a research
unit, and a library. USAID has helped the Afghanistan National Assembly build its capabilities
with a parliamentary assistance program for Afghanistan.
After the National Assembly was inaugurated on December 19, 2005, it immediately
demonstrated institutional strength. In March 2006, it achieved a vote to require Karzai’s cabinet
to be approved individually, rather than en bloc, increasing opposition leverage. However, Karzai
rallied his support and all but 5 of the 25 nominees were confirmed. In May 2006, the opposition
within the Assembly compelled Karzai to change the nine-member Supreme Court, the highest
judicial body, including ousting 74-year-old Islamic conservative Fazl Hadi Shinwari as chief
justice. The proximate justification for the ouster was Shinwari’s age, which was beyond the
official retirement age of 65. (Shinwari later went on to head the Ulema Council, Afghanistan’s
highest religious body, before his death in 2011.)
The process of confirming Karzai’s second-term cabinet—in which many of Karzai’s nominees
were voted down in several nomination rounds during 2010—demonstrates that the Assembly is
an increasingly strong institution that is pressing for honest, competent governance. These
principles are advocated most insistently, although not exclusively, by the younger, more
technocratic independent bloc in the lower house. The Assembly repeatedly voted down Karzai
nominees following the contentious outcome of the 2009 presidential election, as discussed
below.
Rivalries Within and Outside Governing Institutions
As discussed above, many intersecting trends—including ethnicity, tribal affiliation, geography,
economic interests, and ideologies—determine politics in Afghanistan. These splits manifest
within as well as outside Afghan governing institutions, including the National Assembly.
Although they largely accept that a Pashtun is most likely to hold the top slot in the Afghan
government, non-Pashtuns insist on being and are represented at high levels of the central
government. Ethnic minorities have demanded, and have achieved, a large measure of control
over how government programs are implemented in their geographic regions. Although Karzai
has the power to appoint provincial and district governors, in practice he has not appointed
governors of a different ethnicity than the majority of residents of particular provinces and
districts. One notable exception is the governor of Herat, Daud Shah Saba, appointed in 2011; he
is a Pashtun in an overwhelmingly Tajik province. The Independent Directorate of Local
Governance (IDLG, which recommends to the presidential palace local appointments) often
consults notables of a province on local appointments.
Congressional Research Service
8
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Karzai’s Presidential Leadership, His Close Advisers, and Staff
As president, Karzai is advised by what some observers believe is a narrow spectrum of Pashtuns
in the cabinet and in his presidential office. Some of them are former members of the moderate
wing of the Islamist party Hezb-e-Islam. Among his top aides are his chief of staff, former
Minister of Information and Culture Abdul Karim Kurram, who was appointed in April 2011. The
chief of staff serves as key gatekeeper of access to Karzai. He replaced Mohammad Umar
Daudzai, an Islamic conservative who fought during the anti-Soviet war in more radical Hezb-e-
Islam faction Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and was said to be a skeptic of Western/U.S. influence over
Afghan decision making. On October 23, 2010, The New York Times asserted that he was the
presidential office’s liaison with Iran for accepting the approximately $2 million per year in
Iranian assistance that is provided as cash. Karzai acknowledged this financial arrangement.
Daudzai was appointed Ambassador to Pakistan in April 2011. Another top palace aide is
minister-counselor Tajj Ayubi. A top communications aide, Waheed Omar, resigned in August
2011, possibly because of the influence of Hizb-e-Islam supporters on Karzai; he was replaced on
an acting basis by Siamak Herawi.
Some of Karzai’s top advisers are well-educated and Westernized. For example, Karzai trusts
such professionals as French-educated physician—now foreign minister—Zalmay Rassoul and
former Foreign Minister and now National Security Adviser Rangin Spanta. Both are Pashtuns.
Spanta, who served in the government during the Soviet occupation era, was foreign minister
during March 2006-February 2010, and is said to retain some leftwing views. The National
Security Council, headed by Spanta, is located in the presidential palace complex and heavily
populated by ethnic Pashtuns. Two other trusted NSC officials (both Pashtuns) are first deputy
NSC Adviser Ibrahim Spinzada (a Karzai brother-in-law), and Shaida Mohammad Abdali, the
second deputy NSC adviser.
Karzai also surrounds himself with Pashtun tribal and faction leaders from southern Afghanistan,
such as Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh, the former governor of Helmand (until 2005). These
personalities reflect Karzai’s attempts to exert direct control over his home province of Qandahar
and the neighboring large province of Helmand.
An administrative unit that has attracted increasing international attention as a potential center of
more organized policymaking is the Office of Administrative Affairs (OAA), referred to by some
as the General Administrative Office or the Cabinet Secretariat. However, some experts say that,
particularly under its current head, a Hazara Shiite named Sadiq Mudabir, it is primarily
administrative, and without any policy coordination role. It is a holdover from the Communist
era, and contains many longtime bureaucrats. During the 1990s it may have had as many as 1,800
personnel, but has been trimmed during the Karzai era to about 700 staff members. The
operations of the unit are funded primarily by the United Kingdom, but U.S. military and civilian
officials have been assigned to provide advice and assistance to the office as well.
Some observers assert that the apparatus around Karzai require improved focus and organization.
One idea that surfaced in 2009, and which some Afghans still raise, is to prod Karzai to create a
new position akin to a “chief administration officer” who can break through administrative
bottlenecks. Several potential officials reportedly negotiated with Karzai about playing that role,
including one of Karzai’s 2009 election challengers, Ashaf Ghani. Ghani was not given this role
but he has since advised Karzai on government reform and institution building after reconciling
with him following the 2009 presidential election. Ghani has been part of Karzai’s advisory team
for all recent major international conferences on Afghanistan, including the December 5, 2011,
Congressional Research Service
9
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Bonn Conference, and he is also in charge of managing the transition from the United States and
NATO to Afghan lead.
Karzai’s Allies in the National Assembly
In addition to his allies in the presidential palace and the government writ large, Karzai has about
60-70 core supporters, mostly but not exclusively Pashtuns, in the Wolesi Jirga. Karzai and his
aides hoped to but failed to increase the president’s support base in the September 18, 2010,
elections, but instead the results caused Karzai’s base to shrink by about 20 deputies as compared
to his support in the 2006-2011 lower house. Of his lower house supporters, about half are former
members of the conservative Pashtun-based Hizb-e-Islam party (the same party as that headed by
insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar). Others in Karzai’s camp in the lower house are followers
of Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, a prominent Pashtun Islamic conservative mujahedin era party
leader.6 As a result, Karzai was unable to engineer the selection of Sayyaf to become lower house
speaker in 2011, displacing Yunus Qanooni (Tajik). Neither Sayyaf nor Qanooni was unable to
obtain enough votes to become speaker, instead losing to a compromise candidate, Abdul Raouf
Ibrahimi, an Uzbek who is perceived as weak.
Several of Karzai’s supporters in parliament are from Qandahar, Karzai’s home province, and
from Helmand province. For example, one pro-Karzai Pashtun who was reelected in the 2010
elections is former militia leader Hazrat Ali (Nangarhar Province), who led the Afghan
component of the failed assault on Osama bin Laden’s purported redoubt at Tora Bora in
December 2001. On the other hand, the 2010 elections resulted in the loss in parliament of Karzai
cousin Jamil Karzai, and Pacha Khan Zadran (Paktia) who, by some accounts, helped Osama bin
Laden escape Tora Bora. A key Karzai brother, discussed further below, is Ahmad Wali Karzai
(chair of the Qandahar provincial council), who was assassinated on July 12, 2011.
Karzai Support Significant in the Upper House
Karzai has relatively fewer critics in the 102-seat Meshrano Jirga (House of Elder, upper house),
partly because of his bloc of 34 appointments (one-third of that body). In 2005, he engineered the
appointment of an ally as speaker: Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, a noted Islamic scholar and former
mujahedin party leader (Afghanistan National Liberation Front, ANLF), who headed the post-
Communist mujahedin government for one month (May 1992). Mojadeddi resigned in February
2010 and was replaced by another Karzai ally, then deputy speaker Fazl Hadi Muslim Yaar.
Because it is composed of more elderly, established, notable Afghans who are traditionalist in
their political outlook, the Meshrano Jirga has tended to be more Islamist conservative than the
lower house, advocating a legal system that accords with Islamic law, and restrictions on press
and Westernized media broadcasts. As an example of the upper house’s greater support for
Karzai, it voted on April 3, 2010, not to act on the election decree that the lower house had
rejected on March 31, 2010, meaning that the decree applied to the September 18 parliamentary
election.
Karzai also has used his bloc of appointments to the upper house to co-opt potential antagonists
or reward his friends. In 2006, he appointed Northern Alliance military leader Muhammad Fahim
6 Sayyaf led the Ittihad Islami (Islamic Union) mujahedin party during the war against the Soviet occupation.
Congressional Research Service
10
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
to the upper body, perhaps to compensate for his removal as defense minister, although he
resigned after a few months and later joined the UF. (He was Karzai’s primary running mate in
the 2009 elections and is now first vice president.) In 2006, Karzai also named a key ally, former
Helmand Governor Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh, to the body.
Karzai was scheduled to make his 34 new upper house appointments (five year terms) prior to the
January 26, 2011, seating of the new parliament. However, Karzai delayed naming his choices
while the 2010 election remained in dispute. Because two thirds of the body serve four-year
terms—and the provincial councils that were elected in 2009 were able to appoint their 68
members of the upper house—the body continued to operate even though Karzai had not
submitted his 34 appointments. On January 27, 2011, the body reaffirmed Muslim Yaar as upper
house speaker. On February 19, 2011, Karzai made his 34 selections, reappointing 18 incumbents
and appointing 16 new members to the body. In line with the constitution, 17 of Karzai’s
appointments are women.
Congressional Research Service
11
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Hamid Karzai, born December 24, 1957, was selected to lead Afghanistan at the Bonn Conference because he was a
prominent Pashtun leader who had been involved in Taliban-era political talks among exiled Afghans and was viewed
as a compromiser rather than a “strongman.” However, some observers consider his compromises as Afghanistan’s
leader a sign of weakness and criticize him for indulging members of his clan and other allies with appointments. His
term expires in 2014 and he is constitutionally barred from running again; he told parliamentarians in August 2011
that he would abide by the constitutional requirement to step down at that time.
From Karz village in Qandahar Province, Karzai has led the powerful Popolzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns since 1999,
when his father was assassinated, allegedly by Taliban agents, in Quetta, Pakistan. Karzai’s grandfather was head of the
consultative National Council during King Zahir Shah’s reign. He attended university in India and supported the
mujahdin party of Sibghatul ah Mojadeddi (still a very close al y) during the anti-Soviet war. He was deputy foreign
minister in the mujahidin government of Rabbani during 1992-1995, but he left the government and supported the
Taliban as a Pashtun alternative to Rabbani. He broke with the Taliban as its excesses unfolded and forged alliances
with other anti-Taliban factions, including the Northern Alliance. Karzai entered Afghanistan after the September 11
attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the Taliban, supported by U.S. Special Forces. He became central to U.S.
efforts after Pashtun commander Abdul Haq entered Afghanistan in October 2001 without U.S. support and was
captured and hung by the Taliban. Karzai was slightly injured by an errant U.S. bomb in late 2001.
With heavy protection, Karzai has survived several assassination attempts since taking office, including rocket fire or
gunfire at or near his appearances. His wife, Dr. Zenat Karzai, is a gynecologist by profession. They have a son,
Mirwais, born in 2008. Karzai has consistently denied al egations by unnamed U.S. and other officials that he is taking
mood altering medications.
His half brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, was the most powerful political figure in Qandahar Province until his
assassination on July 12, 2011. He was key to President Karzai’s information network in Qandahar. Ahmad Wali was
widely accused of involvement in or tolerating narcotics trafficking, but reportedly also was a paid informant for the
CIA; some of his property has been used by U.S. Special Forces. Earlier, Ahmad Wali was the apparent target of at
least two bombings in Qandahar in 2009. Karzai’s other brothers have lived in the United States, including Qayyum
Karzai, who won a parliament seat in the September 2005 election but resigned in October 2008 for health reasons.
Another brother, Mahmoud Karzai, is reportedly under U.S. Justice Department investigation for al eged corruption.
He has wide business interests in Qandahar and Kabul, including auto dealerships, a coal mine, a cement factory,
apartment houses, and a stake in Kabul Bank, which nearly col apsed in September 2010. Other Karzai relatives have
profited extensively from international contracts, including a $2.2 billion U.S. “Host Nation Trucking” contract. The
United States banned contracts to one such firm, Watan Risk Management, as of January 6, 2011; the firm is co-
owned by two Karzai relatives (Ahmad and Rashid Popal).
U.S.-Karzai Relations
During 2010, Obama Administration criticism of the shortcomings of the Karzai government, particularly its
corruption, caused substantial frictions in U.S.-Karzai relations. Karzai’s frustrations at what he sees as U.S. and
international pressure on him emerge periodically. On April 1, 2010, and April 4, 2010. Karzai expressed frustration
with what he saw as international meddling in the August 20, 2009, presidential election and, more generally,
subordination to the decisions of international donors. The April 4, 2010, comments suggested that Western
meddling in Afghanistan was fueling support for the Taliban as a legitimate resistance to foreign occupation7 and nearly
derailed the May 10-14, 2010, Karzai visit to Washington, DC. In October 2011, a setback occurred over a Karzai
statement that Afghanistan would side with Pakistan in the event of a war between Pakistan and the United States.
Since then, Karzai has continued to criticize U.S. military night raids, airstrikes, control of detention policies, and U.S.
negotiations with Taliban representatives that bypass the Afghan government. At each downturn in the relationship,
top Administration officials have sought to restore the relationship by reassuring Karzai of U.S. support and of
attention to his concerns.8 On some occasions, U.S. officials have said many of his concerns and criticisms of U.S.
operations in Afghanistan are justified. Karzai’s relations with the U.S. Embassy in Kabul have improved since the
arrival of Ambassador Ryan Crocker (confirmed on June 29, 2011).
Source: CRS.
7 An exact English translation of his April 4 comments, in which he purportedly said that even he might consider
joining the Taliban if U.S. pressure on him continues, is not available.
8 Dreazen, Yochi, and Sarah Lynch. “U.S. Seeks to Repair Karzai Tie.” Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
12
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
The Opposition: The “Northern Alliance,” Dr. Abdullah, and Karzai
Opponents in the Lower House of Parliament
Broadly, the political opposition to Karzai (putting aside Taliban and other insurgents) consists
mainly of ethnic minorities (Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara) who fought the Taliban in a politico-
military coalition called the “Northern Alliance.” Tajik leaders formed the core of the Northern
Alliance, and the Tajiks were centered around the legendary Tajik mujahedin commander Ahmad
Shah Masoud. Members of the Northern Alliance are generally defined by their association with
him. Some refer to all Tajik members of the Alliance as “Panjshiris” because many of them are,
like Masoud, from the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul. (Masoud, who became legendary for
preventing Soviet occupation forces from conquering the Panjshir Valley, was killed by Al Qaeda
supporters two days before the September 11 attacks on the United States, possibly in conjunction
with that plot.)
Many of these Tajik leaders belonged to the Jamiat Islami (Islamic Society) political party, whose
leader was Burhanuddin Rabbani (assassinated September 20, 2011, as discussed throughout). As
such, Rabbani was technically Masoud’s political leader although Masoud was generally
perceived as having a larger following than Rabbani, who was from Badakshan Province (not the
Panjshir Valley). Rabbani served as president during the mujahedin government (1992-96), and
served briefly again as Afghanistan’s leader during November-December 2001, before Karzai was
inaugurated as interim leader.
Since the constitution was adopted in 2004, leaders of the Northern Alliance have long advocated
amending it to give more power to parliament and to empower the elected provincial councils
(instead of the president) to select governors and mayors. Such steps would ensure maximum
autonomy from Kabul for non-Pashtun areas, and serve as a check and balance on Pashtun
dominance of the central government. The leaders of these factions tend to be vehemently anti-
Pakistan, which they see as supporting Taliban and other insurgent groups to broaden their
influence in future Afghan governments. In the 112th Congress, legislation introduced October 5,
2011 by Rep. Dana Rohrabacher appears to support the Northern Alliance view of decentralized
governance by urging that it be U.S. policy to support a decentralized, federal political system
that “shifts more power to regions, provinces, and districts and away from a corrupt
presidency…” and support constitutional reform that provides for election of mayors, police
chiefs, and governors.
On the other hand, the Northern Alliance figures and their allies have differences among
themselves that has rendered them relatively ineffective as an opposition to Karzai. Many
“opposition” figures have often joined Karzai’s government in exchange for autonomy or a share
of business interests. Examples include Vice President Muhammad Fahim and Balkh Governor
Atta Mohammad Noor. Other Northern Alliance figures have worked with him on certain
issues—a prominent example was former President Rabbani. He agreed in October 2010 to
assume the chairmanship of the 70 member “High Peace Council—the body that is leading
Karzai’s effort to reconcile with insurgent leaders. Rabbani’s September 20, 2011, assassination
by an alleged Taliban operative widened the rift between Karzai and the Northern Alliance
adherents who believe that Karzai’s outreach to the Taliban has proved naïve and
counterproductive. Some suspect the core concern is that reconciliation will bring additional
Pashtuns into government, increasing the Pashtun dominance of government, or that the Taliban
will be given control of areas that are at least partly inhabited by members of non-Pashtun
minorities. Still, the Karzai strategy of giving high-level appointments to his critics has, to date,
proved successful in keeping his opposition divided and off balance.
Congressional Research Service
13
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
The Opposition Movements Led by Dr. Abdullah
Although Rabbani was the elder statesman of the Northern Alliance, he was largely displaced in
recent years by the overall “leader of the opposition”—former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah
Abdullah. Abdullah is about 51 years old; his mother is Tajik and father is Pashtun but his identity
as the foreign envoy of Ahmad Shah Masoud causes him to be identified politically as a Tajik. He
was dismissed from his Foreign Minister post by Karzai in a March 2006 cabinet reshuffle and he
now heads a private foundation named after Ahmad Shah Masoud.
Dr. Abdullah emerged as Afghanistan’s opposition leader after his unsuccessful challenge against
Karzai for president in the August 2009 election in which widespread fraud was demonstrated. He
is not in parliament but he works to promote his agenda through public statements, in direct
meetings with Karzai, and through allies in the lower house, as discussed below. He visited
Washington, DC, one week after Karzai’s May 10-14, 2010, visit, criticizing Karzai’s governance
at various think tanks and in a meeting with the State Department. He visited Washington, DC,
again in April 2011 and held several meetings with the Obama Administration, while using
several think-tank appearances to criticize Afghan governance under Karzai.
The pro-Abdullah/anti-Karzai bloc in parliament has gone through several iterations. During
2007-2009, the bloc called itself the United Front (UF), although some accounts refer to it as the
“National Front” or “United National Front.” It was formed in April 2007 by then Wolesi Jirga
speaker Yunus Qanooni (former adviser to Ahmad Shah Masoud and Northern Alliance stalwart;
he was Karzai’s main challenger in the 2004 presidential election) and the late former Afghan
President Burhanuddin Rabbani. The United Front included some Pashtuns, such as Soviet-
occupation era security figures Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi and Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, head of the
National United Party. Ulumi was not reelected to parliament in 2010.
The United Front bloc underwent changes during 2009-2010 as Abdullah emerged as a national
opposition figure, and Rabbani and other Northern Alliance figures reached accommodations with
Karzai. In late May 2010, Abdullah created a formal, national democratic opposition party called
the “Hope and Change Movement.” Running in the September 18, 2010, elections under that
name, Abdullah supporters sought to increase their numbers in the new Assembly and hold a
commanding position that would enable them to block Karzai initiatives or achieve passage of its
own alternative proposals. The 2010 elections results suggest this objective was not achieved, and
the number of Abdullah supporters is roughly the same as it was in the previous Assembly—
about 60 supporters. This is also a bloc similar in size to Karzai’s core support base. On
December 22, 2011, ten political parties launched the “National Coalition of Afghanistan, under
the leadership of Dr. Abdullah.
New Opposition Groupings Form
Some Tajik and other figures outside the Assembly are, if not challenging Abdullah for opposition
leadership, at least emerging as strong voices. The issue that may be galvanizing them is the
concept of a peace agreement with the Taliban. In June 2011, several key Northern Alliance
leaders joined with former Vice President Ahmad Zia Masoud (Ahmad Shah Masoud’s brother) to
announce a new opposition group—the National Front of Afghanistan—centered around this
issue. Even before this new opposition was formed, Ahmad Zia Masoud, as well as ousted
intelligence leader Amrollah Saleh (see below) were increasingly outspoken against a potential
settlement with the Taliban. Dr. Abdullah is perceived as sympathetic to this new alliance, but he
apparently did not play a key public role in forming it.
Congressional Research Service
14
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
On November 4, 2011, a new party, the Truth and Justice Party, launched itself as a self-
proclaimed reformist party consisting of leaders of all of Afghanistan’s various ethnicities. Unlike
the coalition led by Dr. Abdullah, this party is in favor of reconciliation with the Taliban. Major
figures behind it include Karzai’s previous Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar, who was
dismissed by Karzai in 2010, as well as Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam and Afghanistan
Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) chairwoman Sima Simar, an ethnic Hazara.
Taliban era deputy justice minister Jalaluddin Shinwari joined the party as well.
Other Power Brokers, “Warlords,” and Local Faction Leaders
An informal power structure exists outside the institutions established after the ousting of the
Taliban regime. Karzai has been compelled to work with this informal power structure of well-
funded, locally popular, and sometimes well-armed faction leaders, while simultaneously working
with formal institutions such as the National Assembly. Some faction leaders operate in both
spheres—holding official positions through constitutional processes while also exercising
influence their home provinces—beyond these formal roles. Some are Northern Alliance figures
and others are Pashtun faction leaders. Some of these faction leaders—most of whom the United
States and its partners regularly deal with and have good working relations with—cause
resentment among some sectors of the population and complicate U.S. stabilization strategy. A
number of them are alleged to own or have equity in security or other Afghan firms that have won
business from various U.S. and other donor agencies and fuel allegations of nepotism and other
forms of corruption.
Still others argue that U.S. policy since 2007 has further empowered local faction leaders or even
created new factions and militias that never existed before. A variety of expedient local security
initiatives undertaken since 2007, including the Afghan Public Protection Program, its successor
the Afghan Local Police Program, Village Stability Operations, and the Critical Infrastructure
Police, have created new security organs that sometimes operate without full control by central
security organs. These programs are said by critics to have revived the militia concept that was
being dismantled by the international community during 2001-2006. Partly because of
accusations against these irregular forces created by the United States/NATO, in December 2011
Karzai said Afghanistan would dismantle one of them: the Critical Infrastructure Police, which
was created by the Germany-led Regional Command North and was mostly composed of non-
Pashtun minorities. No Afghan government action was taken against the other forces mentioned,
which are mostly Pashtun. Some Afghans (particularly the Northern Alliance) believe that the
international community’s original strategy of dismantling local power structures in favor of a
monopoly of central government control over armed force has caused the security deterioration
noted since 2006.
Some assert that the Obama Administration’s criticism of Karzai has caused him to become ever
more reliant on factional power brokers. Karzai’s position is that confronting faction leaders
outright would likely cause their followers—who usually belong to ethnic or regional
minorities—to go into armed rebellion. Even before the Obama Administration came into office,
Karzai argued that keeping the faction leaders on the government side is needed in order to keep
the focus on fighting “unrepentant” Taliban insurgents (who are almost all ethnic Pashtuns).
In February 2007, both houses of parliament passed a law (officially titled the National
Reconciliation, General Amnesty, and National Stability Law) giving amnesty to faction leaders
and others who committed abuses during Afghanistan’s past wars. Karzai sent back to parliament
an altered draft to give victims the right to seek justice for any abuses. Even though the revised
Congressional Research Service
15
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
draft contained that amendment, Karzai did not sign the final version in May 2007, leaving the
status unclear. However, in December 2009, the Afghan government published the law in the
official gazette (a process known as “gazetting”), giving it the force of law. The following
sections analyze some of the main faction leaders.
Vice President Muhammad Fahim
Karzai’s choice of Northern Alliance figure Muhammad Fahim as his first vice presidential
running mate in the August 2009 elections might have been a manifestation of Karzai’s growing
reliance on faction leaders, as well as his drive to divide the Northern Alliance. Fahim is a Tajik
from the Panjshir Valley region who was named military chief of the Northern Alliance/UF
faction after Ahmad Shah Masoud’s death. The Fahim choice was criticized by human rights and
other groups because of Fahim’s long identity as a mujahedin commander/militia faction leader. A
New York Times story of August 27, 2009, said that the Bush Administration continued to deal
with Fahim when he was defense minister (2001-2004) despite reports that he was involved in
facilitating narcotics trafficking in northern Afghanistan. Other allegations suggest he has
engineered property confiscations and other benefits to feed his and his faction’s business
interests. During 2002-2007, he reportedly withheld turning over some heavy weapons to U.N.
disarmament officials who have been trying to reduce the influence of local strongmen such as
Fahim. Obama Administration officials have not announced any limitations on dealings with
Fahim now that he is vice president. In August 2010, Fahim underwent treatment in Germany for
a heart ailment. In January 2011, he began performing his duties again.
Fahim’s brother, Abdul Hussain Fahim, was a beneficiary of concessionary loans from Kabul
Bank, a major bank that has faced major losses due to its lending practices and may need to be
recapitalized (see below). The Fahim brother is also reportedly partnered with Mahmoud Karzai
on coal mining and cement manufacturing ventures.
Abdul Rashid Dostam: Uzbeks of Northern Afghanistan
Some observers have cited Karzai’s handling of prominent Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam as
evidence of political weakness. Dostam, generally aligned with the Northern Alliance, commands
numerous partisans in his redoubt in northern Afghanistan (Jowzjan, Faryab, Balkh, and Sar-I-Pol
provinces), where he was, during the Soviet and Taliban years, widely accused of human rights
abuses of political opponents. To try to separate him from his armed followers, in 2005 Karzai
appointed him to the post of chief of staff of the armed forces. On February 4, 2008, Afghan
police surrounded Dostam’s villa in Kabul in response to reports that he attacked an ethnic
Turkmen rival, but Karzai did not order his arrest for fear of stirring unrest among Dostam’s
followers. To try to resolve the issue without stirring unrest, in December 2008 Karzai
purportedly reached an agreement with Dostam under which he resigned as chief of staff and
went into exile in Turkey in exchange for the dropping of any case against him.9
Dostam returned to Afghanistan on August 16, 2009, and subsequently held a large pro-Karzai
election rally in his home city of Shebergan. Part of his intent in supporting Karzai was to
potentially oust a strong rival figure in the north, Balkh Province Governor Atta Mohammad
Noor, see below. Noor is a Tajik but, under a 2005 compromise with Karzai, is in control of a
9 CRS e-mail conversation with a then National Security aide to President Karzai, December 2008.
Congressional Research Service
16
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
province that is inhabited by many Uzbeks—a source of irritation for Dostam and other Uzbeks.
Dostam’s support apparently helped Karzai carry several provinces in the north in the 2009
election, including Jowzjan, Sar-i-Pol, and Faryab. In January 2010, he was restored to his
previous, primarily honorary, position of chief of staff of the armed forces. Although he was not
nominated by Karzai to the post-election cabinet, two members of his “Junbush Melli” (National
Front) party were—although they were voted down by the National Assembly because the
Assembly insisted on competent officials rather than party loyalists in the new cabinet. Dostam’s
failure to secure posts for his allies could account for his decision to join the new opposition
grouping formed in June 2011, discussed above. He continues to alternate his time between
Afghanistan and Turkey; he is said to be suffering from health problems.
Dostam’s reputation is further clouded by his actions during the U.S.-backed war against the
Taliban. On July 11, 2009, the New York Times reported that allegations that Dostam had caused
the death of several hundred Taliban prisoners during the major combat phase of OEF (late 2001)
were not investigated by the Bush Administration. In responding to assertions that there was no
investigation of the “Dasht-e-Laili” massacre because Dostam was a U.S. ally,10 President Obama
said any allegations of violations of laws of war need to be investigated. Dostam responded to
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (which carried the story) that only 200 Taliban prisoners died
and primarily because of combat and disease, not intentional actions of his forces.
Atta Mohammad Noor: Balkh Province
Atta Mohammad Noor, another figure generally considered part of the Northern Alliance, has
been the governor of Balkh Province, whose capital is the vibrant city of Mazar-e-Sharif, since
2005. Mazar-e-Sharif is one of the four cities to be transitioned to Afghan security leadership in
June 2011. It is unique in that 60% of the residents of the city have access to electricity 24 hours
per day, a far higher percentage than most other cities in Afghanistan, and higher even than
Kabul. He is an ethnic Tajik and former mujahedin commander who openly endorsed Dr.
Abdullah in the 2009 presidential election. However, Karzai has kept Noor in place because he
has kept the province secure, allowing Mazar-e-Sharif to become a major trading hub, and
because displacing him could cause ethnic unrest. Observers say that Noor exemplifies the local
potentate, brokering local security and business arrangements that enrich Noor and his allies
while ensuring stability and prosperity.11 Some reports say that he commands two private militias
in the province that, in at least two districts (Chimtal and Charbolak), outnumber official Afghan
police, and which prompt complaints of abuses (land seizures) by the province’s Pashtuns.
Isma’il Khan: Western Afghanistan/Herat
Another Northern Alliance strongman that Karzai has sought to simultaneously engage and
weaken is prominent Tajik political leader and former Herat Governor Ismail Khan. Herat is one
of the four cities that was transitioned to Afghan security leadership in July 2011. In 2006, Karzai
appointed him minister of energy and water, taking him away from his political base in the west.
However, Khan remains influential in the west, and maintaining ties to Khan helped Karzai win
Tajik votes in Herat Province that might otherwise have gone to Dr. Abdullah. Certified results
showed Karzai winning that province, indicating that the deal with Khan was helpful to Karzai.
10 This is the name of the area where the Taliban prisoners purportedly died and were buried in a mass grave.
11 Gall, Carlotta, “In Afghanistan’s North, Ex-Warlord Offers Security.” New York Times, May 17, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
17
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Still, Khan is said to have several opponents in Herat, and a bombing there on September 26,
2009, narrowly missed his car. U.S. officials purportedly preferred that Khan not be in the cabinet
because of his record as a local potentate, although some U.S. officials credit him with
cooperating with the privatization of the power sector of Afghanistan. Karzai renominated Khan
in his ministry post on December 19, 2009, causing purported disappointment by
parliamentarians and western donor countries who want Khan and other faction leaders
weakened. His renomination was voted down by the National Assembly but he remains in an
acting capacity. Additional questions about Khan were raised in November 2010 when Afghan
television broadcast audio files purporting to contain Khan insisting that election officials alter
the results of the September 18, 2010, parliamentary elections.12 Khan is on the High Peace
Council that is the main body overseeing the reconciliation process with Taliban leaders.
Sher Mohammad Akhundzadeh and “Koka:” Southern
Afghanistan/Helmand Province
Karzai’s relationship with a Pashtun strongman, Sher Mohammad Akhundzadeh, demonstrates
the dilemmas facing Karzai in governing Afghanistan. Akhunzadeh was a close associate of
Karzai when they were in exile in Quetta, Pakistan, during Taliban rule. Karzai appointed him
governor of Helmand after the fall of the Taliban, but in 2005, Britain demanded he be removed
for his abuses and reputed facilitation of drug trafficking, as a condition of Britain taking security
control of Helmand. Karzai reportedly has sought to reappoint Akhundzadeh, who Karzai
believes was more successful against militants in Helmand using his local militiamen than Britain
has been with its more than 9,500 troops there. Akhunzadeh said in a November 2009 interview
that many of his followers joined the Taliban insurgency after Britain insisted on his ouster.
However, Britain and the United States have strongly urged Karzai to keep the existing governor,
Ghulab Mangal, who has won wide praise for his successes establishing effective governance in
Helmand (discussed further under “Expanding Local (Subnational) Governance”) and for
reducing poppy cultivation there. Akhunzadeh attempted to deliver large numbers of votes for
Karzai in Helmand, although turnout in that province was very light partly due to Taliban
intimidation of voters.
An Akhunzadeh ally, Abdul Wali Khan (nicknamed “Koka”), was similarly removed by British
pressure in 2006 as police chief of Musa Qala district of Helmand. However, Koka was reinstated
in 2008 when that district was retaken from Taliban control. The Afghan government insisted on
his reinstatement and his militia followers subsequently became the core of the 220-person police
force in the district. Koka is mentioned in a congressional report as accepting payments from
security contractors who are working under the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) “Host
National Trucking” contract that secures U.S. equipment convoys. Koka allegedly agrees to
secure the convoys in exchange for the payments.13
12 Partlow, Joshua, “Audio Files Raise New Questions About Afghan Elections.” Washington Post, November 11,
2010.
13 House of Representatives. Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform. “Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan.” Report
of the Majority Staff, June 2010.
Congressional Research Service
18
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Ahmad Wali Karzai: Southern Afghanistan/Qandahar Province and
Implications of His July 12, 2011, Assassination
Governing Qandahar, a province of about 2 million, of whom about half live in Qandahar city, is
a sensitive issue in Kabul because of President Karzai’s active political interest in his home
province. Qandahar governance is particularly crucial to ongoing U.S. military-led operations to
increase security in surrounding districts, giving the July 12, 2011, assassination of Karzai’s half
brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, crucial significance. The assassin was allegedly a close aide and
bodyguard who pulled him aside to talk and then fielded a concealed weapon to shoot him at
point blank range. The assassin was killed by other bodyguards.
In Qandahar, Ahmad Wali Karzai was chair of the provincial council, a post with relatively
limited formal power, but he was always more powerful than any appointed governor of
Qandahar. President Karzai frequently rotated the governors of Qandahar to ensure that none of
them will impinge on Ahmad Wali’s authority. Perceiving him as the key power broker in the
province, many constituents and interest groups met him each day, requesting his interventions on
their behalf. Numerous press stories have asserted that he protected narcotics trafficking in the
province, and some press stories say he was also a paid informant and facilitator for CIA and
Special Operations Forces in the province.14 Some Afghans explained Ahmad Wali Karzai’s
activities as an effort to ensure that his constituents in Qandahar have financial means to sustain
themselves, even if through narcotics trade, before there are viable alternative sources of
livelihood. Observers report that President Karzai repeatedly rebuffed U.S. and other suggestions
to convince his brother to step down as provincial council chairman, and U.S. officials reportedly
had ceased making those suggestions as of August 2010. Before his death, some observers say
Ahmad Wali had been taking U.S. and other advice and was bringing rivals and various tribes
into the decisionmaking process, to the point where many tribal figures had sought to persuade
President Karzai to appoint him as governor.
Qandahar, and President Karzai’s influence there, suffered an additional blow on July 27, 2011,
when the appointed mayor of Qandahar city, Ghulam Haider Hamidi, was assassinated. Hamidi
was an Afghan American accountant by training and, like Ahmad Wali Karzai, received mixed
reviews depending on whether the observer benefitted or was harmed by his decisions.
Before Ahmad Wali’s assassination, U.S. officials had been trying to bolster the clout of the
appointed Qandahar governor, Tooryalai Wesa, to the point where petitioners seek his help on
their problems. The United States and its partners have sought to do so by funding and supporting
Wesa’s efforts to equitably distribute development funds and build local governing structures out
of the tribal councils he has been holding. U.S. officials reportedly sought to prevent Ahmad Wali
from interfering in that.15 Karzai had appointed Wesa—a Canadian-Afghan academic—in
December 2008, perhaps hoping that his ties to Canada would convince Canada to continue its
mission in Qandahar beyond 2011. If that was partly the intent of Wesa’s appointment, it did not
succeed. However, Qandahar’s police chief, Colonel Abdul Razziq, is perceived as having
substantial weight, as well as a reputation for corruption. He was appointed to that post in March
2011 when his predecessor was killed in an insurgent attack.
14 Filkins, Dexter, Mark Mazetti and James Risen, “Brother of Afghan Leader Is Said to be on C.I.A. Payroll,” New
York Times, October 28, 2009.
15 Partlow, Joshua, “U.S. Seeks to Bolster Kandahar Governor, Upend Power Balance,” Washington Post, April 29,
2010.
Congressional Research Service
19
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
The death of Ahmad Wali Karzai might serve to empower Governor Wesa over the long term.
Some observers still fear eventual conflict to fill the void left by Ahmad Wali. The United States
is concerned that progress achieved in stabilizing Qandahar and other southern provinces since
2009 could be jeopardized at a time when U.S forces are beginning to draw down. Karzai’s quick
installation of another relative, Shah Wali Karzai, as titular head of the Popolzai clan and informal
Qandahar power broker after Ahmad Wali’s death did not completely calm the perception of a
leadership vacuum. Observers say Shah Wali lacks the acumen and clout of Ahmad Wali.
Ghul Agha Shirzai: Eastern Afghanistan/Nangarhar
A key gubernatorial appointment has been Ghul Agha Shirzai as governor of Nangarhar. He is a
Pashtun from the powerful Barakzai clan based in Qandahar Province, previously serving as
governor of that province, where he reportedly continued to exercise influence in competition
with Ahmad Wali Karzai. Ahmad Wali Karzai’s death on July 12, 2011, could prompt Sherzai and
his allies to assert themselves in the province, possibly by trying to convince Karzai to make him
Qandahar governor again.
In Nangarhar, Sherzai is generally as an interloper. But, much as has Noor in Balkh, Shirzai has
exercised effective leadership, particularly in curbing poppy cultivation there. At the same time,
Shirzai is also widely accused of arbitrary action against political or other opponents, and he
reportedly does not remit all the customs duties collected at the Khyber Pass/Torkham crossing to
the central government. He purportedly uses the funds for the benefit of the province, not trusting
that funds remitted to Kabul would be spent in the province. As noted above, Shirzai had
considered running against Karzai in 2009 but then opted not to run as part of a reported “deal”
that yielded unspecified political and other benefits for Shirzai.
Emerging Power Centers: Civil Society and “Independent” Activists
Another interest group has emerged since the fall of the Taliban, which is a product of
Afghanistan’s increasing modernity. This interest group centers around civil society activists and
“independents” in the National Assembly and other institutions. The independents in and outside
the Assembly are generally intellectuals, businessmen, and women’s activists who have become
more prominent and outspoken since the ousting of the Taliban regime. Although articulate and,
to some extent, backed by some democracy-oriented international NGOs, these civil society
leaders have struggled against traditional faction leaders to exert influence over policy.
Of the independents that were present in the 2005-2010 parliament, one, the 45-year-old Malalai
Joya (Farah Province), was a leading critic of war-era faction leaders. In May 2007 the lower
house voted to suspend her for this criticism for the duration of her term and she did not seek
reelection in 2010. Others in this independent camp have included Ms. Fauzia Gailani (Herat
Province, not returned to parliament); Ms. Shukria Barekzai, chairwoman of the lower house
Defense Committee during 2011; and Mr. Ramazan Bashardost, a former Karzai minister who
champions parliamentary powers and has established a “complaints tent” near the parliament
building to highlight and combat official corruption. (He ran for president in the 2009 elections
on an anti-corruption platform and drew an unexpectedly large amount of votes.) Bashardost was
returned to parliament in the September 2010 election. U.S.-based International Republican
Institute (IRI) has helped train the independents; the National Democratic Institute (NDI) has
assisted the more established factions.
Congressional Research Service
20
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Some other leading independents are present in the 2011-2015 lower house. They include Rafiq
Shahir from Herat, a well-known civil-society activist; Dr. Saleh Seljuki; and Ahmad Behzad (all
from Herat). Other independents reelected include Shakiba Hashemi and Khalid Pashtun, both
from Qandahar. Ms. Fawzia Koofi, a one time a deputy lower house speaker and declared
presidential candidate for 2014, also remains in the Assembly and an outspoken leader on Afghan
women’s rights.
Ethnic and Factional Cooperation in the Security Sector
The security organs are considered an arena where Pashtuns, Tajiks, and others, of all factional
affiliations, have worked together relatively well. The National Directorate for Security (NDS, the
intelligence directorate) was headed by a non-Pashtun (Amrollah Saleh, a Tajik) during 2006-
2010, although he was dismissed on June 6, 2010, by Karzai for disagreements over whether and
how to engage insurgent leaders in political settlement negotiations. He was replaced by a
Pashtun, Rehmat Nabil, who had no previous intelligence experience but is perceived as more
consultative than was Saleh. Still, he inherited a service dominated by Tajiks (although some left
when Saleh was ousted) and by a mix of personnel that served during the Soviet occupation era
(the service was then called Khad), and in the mujahedin government of 1992-1996. During
2002-2007, the Central Intelligence Agency reportedly paid for all of the NDS budget.16
Perhaps to preserve the tradition of ethnic balance in the security sector of government, the chief
of staff of the Afghan National Army, Bismillah Khan Mohmmadi (a Tajik), was named interior
minister on June 26, 2010. He replaced Mohammad Hanif Atmar, a Pashtun, who was fired the
same day and on roughly the same grounds as Saleh (see above for Atmar’s role in an opposition
party formed in November 2011). By all accounts, Khan is widely respected, even among
Pashtuns. The security ministries tend to have key deputies who are of a different ethnicity than
the minister or top official.
Some observers take a different view, asserting that Tajiks continue to control many of the
command ranks of the Afghan security institutions, giving Pashtuns only a veneer of control of
these organizations. U.S. commanders in Afghanistan say the composition of the national security
forces—primarily the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police—has been brought
broadly into line with the population. However, Pashtuns from the south (Durranis) remain
underrepresented, in part because of the fears that insurgents might target their relatives if they
join the security forces. Many of the Pashtuns in the security forces are from the Jalalabad area
and are Ghilzai Pashtun tribal confederation that is prevalent there and elsewhere in the east.
Elections in 2009 and 2010 Widened Political Schisms
Elections are widely considered a key harbinger of the durability and extent of Afghanistan’s
political development—and a metric to judge the legitimacy and popularity of the Afghan partner
in the U.S. mission. The 2009 presidential and provincial elections were the first post-Taliban
elections run by the Afghan government itself in the form of the Afghanistan Independent
Electoral Commission. Donors, including the United States, invested almost $500 million in 2009
16 Filkins, Dexter, and Mark Mazzetti. “Key Karzai Aide in Graft Inquiry is Linked to C.I.A.” New York Times, August
26, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
21
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
to improve the capacity of the Afghan government to conduct the elections.17 Both it and the
September 2010 National Assembly elections were flawed, as discussed below, and widened
differences between Karzai and his opponents.
2009 Presidential Election
The 2009 election was plagued, from the start, by assertions of a lack of credibility of the
Independent Elections Commission. Its commissioners, including then-Chairman Azizullah
Ludin, were selected by, and many were politically close to, Karzai. As a check and balance to
ensure electoral credibility, there was also a U.N.-appointed Elections Complaints Commission
(ECC) that reviewed fraud complaints. Under the 2005 election law, there were three ECC seats
for foreign nationals, appointed by the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General/head
of U.N. Assistance Mission–Afghanistan, UNAMA. The two Afghans on the ECC governing
council18 were appointed by the Supreme Court and Afghanistan Independent Human Rights
Commission, respectively.
Disputes first erupted over the election date. On February 3, 2009, Afghanistan’s Independent
Election Commission (IEC) set August 20, 2009, as the election date (a change from a date
mandated by Article 61 of the Constitution as April 21, 2009, in order to allow at least 30 days
before Karzai’s term expired on May 22, 2009). The IEC decision on the latter date cited Article
33 of the Constitution as mandating universal accessibility to the voting—and saying that the
April 21 date was precluded by difficulties in registering voters, printing ballots, training staff,
advertising the elections, and the dependence on international donor funding, in addition to the
security questions.19 His opponents’ (led by Dr. Abdullah) insisted that Karzai’s presidency ended
May 22, 2009, and that a caretaker government should run Afghanistan until elections. The IEC
reaffirmed on March 4, 2009, that the election would be held on August 20, 2009. Karzai argued
that the Constitution does not provide for any transfer of power other than in case of election or
death of a president. The Afghan Supreme Court backed that decision on March 28, 2009, and the
Obama Administration publicly backed these rulings.
Election Modalities and Processes
Despite the political dispute between Karzai and his opponents, enthusiasm among the public
appeared high in the run-up to the election. Registration, which updated 2005 voter rolls, was
conducted during October 2008 - March 2009. About 4.5 million new voters registered, and about
17 million total Afghans were registered. However, there were widespread reports of registration
fraud (possibly half of all new registrants), with some voters registering on behalf of women who
do not, by custom, show up at registration sites, and others selling registration cards.
Presidential candidates filed to run during April 24 - May 8, 2009. A total of 44 registered to run
for president, of which three were disqualified for various reasons, leaving a field of 41 (later
reduced to 32 after several dropped out). In the provincial elections, 3,200 persons competed for
420 seats nationwide. Although about 80% of the provincial council candidates ran as
17 Report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), September 9, 2010.
18 ECC website, http://www.ecc.org.af/en/.
19 Statement of the Independent Election Commission Secretariat, February 3, 2009, provided to CRS by a Karzai
national security aide.
Congressional Research Service
22
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
independents, some of Afghanistan’s parties, including Hezb-i-Islam, fielded multiple candidates
in several different provinces. The provincial elections component of the election received little
attention, in part because the role of these councils is unclear. About 200 women competed for the
124 seats reserved for women (29%) on the provincial councils, although in two provinces
(Qandahar and Uruzgan) there were fewer women candidates than reserved seats. In Kabul
Province, 524 candidates competed for the 29 seats of the council.
The European Union, supported by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) sent a few hundred observers, and the International Republican Institute and National
Democratic Institute sent observers as well. About 8,000 Afghans assisted the observation
missions, according to the U.N. Nations Development Program.
Security was a major issue for all the international actors supporting the Afghan elections process,
amid open Taliban threats against Afghans who vote. In the first round, about 7,000 polling
centers were to be established (with each center having multiple polling places, totaling about
29,000), but, of those, about 800 were deemed too unsafe to open, most of them in restive
Helmand and Qandahar provinces. A total of about 6,200 polling centers opened on election day.
The total cost of the Afghan elections in 2009 were about $300 million. Other international
donors contributing funds to close the gap left by the U.S. contribution of about $175 million.
The Political Contest and Campaign
The presidential competition took shape in May 2009. In the election-related deal-making,20
Karzai obtained an agreement from Fahim to run as his first vice presidential running mate. In
doing so, Karzai showed the UF opposition grouping to be split. Karzai, Fahim, and incumbent
second Vice President Karim Khalili (a Hazara) registered their ticket on May 4, 2009, just before
Karzai left to visit the United States. Karzai convinced several prominent Pashtuns not to run,
including Ghul Agha Shirzai, a member of the powerful Barakzai clan; and Anwar al-Haq Ahady,
the former finance minister and Central Bank governor. Anti-Karzai Pashtuns failed to coalesce
around one challenger, such as Former Interior Minister Ali Jalali and former Finance Minister
(2002-2004) and then Karzai critic Ashraf Ghani. Ghani decided to run without Jalali or
prominent representation from other ethnicities in his vice presidential slots.
The UF had difficulty forging a united challenge to Karzai. Dr. Abdullah registered to run with
UF backing. His running mates were Dr. Cheragh Ali Cheragh, a Hazara who did poorly in the
2004 election, and a little known Pashtun, Homayoun Wasefi.
The Campaign
Karzai went into the election as a clear favorite, but the key question was whether he would win
in the first round (more than 50% of the vote). IRI and other pre-election polls showed him with
about 45% support and Dr. Abdullah his nearest competitor at about 25%. During the campaign,
Karzai railed against civilian casualties resulting from U.S./NATO operations and pledged to hold
a loya jirga, including Taliban figures, to try to reach a settlement with the insurgency. Atlhough
20 Some of the information in this section obtained in CRS interviews with a Karzai national security aide, December
2008.
Congressional Research Service
23
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Karzai was criticized for a campaign that relied on reaching out to traditional leaders, he did
participate in at least one publicly broadcast debate (August 16, 2009, on state-run Radio
Television-Afghanistan, RTA) with two of his rivals (Abdullah did not participate). Dr. Abdullah
campaigned extensively in his key base in the north and west, which are populated mainly by
Tajiks, but he did campaign in some Pashtun-dominated areas. Both Karzai and Abdullah held
large rallies in Kabul and elsewhere.
Ghani polled at about 6% just before the election, according to surveys. Ghani appeared
frequently in U.S. and Afghan media broadcasts criticizing Karzai for failing to establish
democratic and effective institutions, but he had spent much time in the United States and Europe
and many average Afghans viewed him as out of touch. Ghani tried to make extensive use of the
Internet for advertising and fundraising, even though most Afghans do not even have access to
electricity, and he was advised by James Carville.21
A candidate who polled unexpectedly well was 56-year-old anti-corruption parliamentarian
Ramazan Bashardost, an ethnic Hazara. He ran a low-budget campaign with low-paid personnel
and volunteers, but attracted a lot of media and was able to appeal to reform-minded Afghans
outside his core Hazara base. According to the preliminary results, Bashardost carried several
Hazara provinces, including Ghazni and Dai Kondi, but Mohaqiq’s backing apparently helped
Karzai carry the Hazara heartland of Bamiyan province.
The Election Results
Taliban intimidation and voter apathy appear to have suppressed the total turnout to about 5.8
million votes cast, or about a 35% turnout, far lower than expected. Twenty-seven Afghans,
mostly security forces personnel, were killed in election-day violence. Turnout was said by
observers and U.S. and other military personnel based there to have been very low in Helmand
Province, despite the fact that Helmand was the focus of a U.S. military-led offensive. Some
observers said that turnout among women nationwide was primarily because there were not
sufficient numbers of female poll workers recruited by the IEC to make women feel comfortable
enough to vote. In general, however, election observers reported that poll workers were generally
attentive and well trained, and the voting process appeared orderly. In normally secure Kabul,
turnout was said to be far lighter than in the 2004 presidential election—turnout might have been
dampened by a suicide bombing on August 15, 2009, outside NATO/ISAF military headquarters
there. In addition, several dozen provincial council candidates, and some workers on the
presidential campaigns, were killed in election-related violence. A convoy carrying Fahim (Karzai
vice presidential running mate, see below) was bombed, although Fahim was unharmed.
Clouding the election substantially were the widespread fraud allegations coming from all sides.
Dr. Abdullah held several news conferences after the election, purporting to show evidence of
systematic election fraud by the Karzai camp. Karzai’s camp made similar allegations against
Abdullah as applied to his presumed strongholds in northern Afghanistan. The ECC, in
statements, stated its belief that there was substantial fraud likely committed, and mostly by
Karzai supporters. However, the low turnout in the presumed Karzai strongholds in southern
Afghanistan led Karzai and many Pashtuns to question the election’s fairness as well, on the
grounds that Pashtuns were intimidated from voting in greater proportions than were others.
21 Mulrine, Anna, “Afghan Presidential Candidate Takes a Page From Obama’s Playbook,” U.S. News and World
Report, June 25, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
24
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
The IEC released vote results slowly. Preliminary results were to be announced by September 3.
However, the final, uncertified total was released on September 16, 2009. It showed Karzai at
54.6% and Dr. Abdullah at 27.7%. Bashardost and Ghani received single-digit vote counts (9%
and 3% respectively), with trace amounts for the remainder of the field.
Vote Certified/Runoff Mandated
The constitution required that a second-round runoff, if needed, be held two weeks after the
results of the first round are certified. Following the release of the vote count, the complaints
evaluation period began which, upon completed, would yield a “certified” vote result. On
September 8, 2009, the ECC ordered a recount of 10% of polling stations (accounting for as many
as 25% total votes) as part of its investigations of fraud. Polling stations were considered
“suspect” if the total number of votes exceeded 600, which was the maximum number allotted to
each polling station; or where any candidate received 95% or more of the total valid votes cast at
that station (assuming more than 100 votes were cast there). Perhaps reflecting political
sensitivities, the recount consisted of a sampling of actual votes.22
On October 20, 2009, the ECC determined, based on its investigation, that about 1 million Karzai
votes, and about 200,000 Abdullah votes, were considered fraudulent and were deducted from
their totals. The final, certified, results of the first round were as follows: Karzai—49.67%
(according to the IEC; with a slightly lower total of about 48% according to the ECC
determination); Abdullah—30.59%; Bashardost—10.46%; Ghani—2.94%, Yasini—1.03%, and
lower figures for the remaining field.23
During October 16-20, 2009, U.S. and international officials, including visiting Senator John
Kerry, met repeatedly with Karzai to attempt to persuade him to acknowledge that his legitimate
vote total did not exceed the 50%+ threshold to claim a first-round victory. On October 21, 2009,
the IEC accepted the ECC findings and Karzai conceded the need for a runoff election. A date
was set as November 7, 2009. Abdullah initially accepted. In an attempt to produce a fair second
round, UNAMA, which provided advice and assistance to the IEC, requested that about 200
district-level election commissioners be replaced and that there be fewer polling stations—about
5,800, compared to 6,200 previously—to eliminate polling stations where very few votes were
expected to be cast.
After a runoff was declared, no major faction leader switched support of either candidate. Prior to
the ECC vote certification, Dr. Abdullah told CRS at a meeting in Kabul on October 15, 2009,
that he might be willing to negotiate with Karzai on a “Joint Program” of reforms—such as direct
election of provincial governors—to avoid a runoff. However, some said the constitution does not
provide for a negotiated settlement and that the runoff must proceed. Others said that a deal
between the two, in which Abdullah dropped his candidacy, could have led the third-place
finisher, Bashardost, to assert that he must face Karzai in a runoff. Still others say the issue could
have necessitated resolution by Afghanistan’s Supreme Court.
The various pre-runoff scenarios were mooted on November 1, 2009, when Dr. Abdullah refused
to participate in the runoff on the grounds that the problems that plagued the first round were
unresolved. Some believe Abdullah pulled out because of his calculation that he would not
22 “Afghan Panel to Use Sampling in Recount,” USA Today, September 22, 2009.
23 See IEC website for final certified tallies, http://www.iec.org.af/results.
Congressional Research Service
25
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
prevail in the second round. On November 2, 2009, the IEC issued a statement saying that, by
consensus, the body had determined that Karzai, being the only candidate remaining in a two-
person runoff, should be declared the winner. The Obama Administration accepted the outcome as
“within Afghanistan’s constitution,” on the grounds that the fraud had been investigated. On that
basis, the United States, as well as U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon (visiting Kabul), and
several governments, congratulated Karzai on the victory. Secretary of State Clinton praised Dr.
Abdullah for his relatively moderate speech announcing his pullout. However, the marred
elections process was a major factor in a September-November 2009 high-level U.S. strategy
reevaluation because of the centrality of a credible, legitimate partner Afghan government to U.S.
strategy.24
As noted above, the election for the provincial council members were not certified until
December 29, 2009. The council members took office in February 2011.
September 18, 2010, Parliamentary Elections
The split over the conduct of the presidential elections widened in the run-up to the September
18, 2010, parliamentary elections. Mechanisms to prevent fraud were not fully implemented and
the results continue to be disputed as of July 2011, largely paralyzing the institutional functioning
of the Assembly and its role as a check and balance on the Karzai government. As a result, the
political structure of Afghanistan has continued to fragment, even as the government assumers
greater responsibility in the context of a transition to Afghan security leadership beginning in July
2011. The July 20, 2010, Kabul conference final communiqué included an Afghan government
pledge to initiate, within six months, a strategy for long-term electoral reform.
Election Timing
On January 2, 2010, the IEC had initially set National Assembly elections for May 22, 2010. The
IEC view was that this date was in line with a constitutional requirement for a new election to be
held well prior to the expiry of the current Assembly’s term. However, U.S., ECC, UNAMA, and
officials of donor countries argued that Afghanistan’s flawed institutions would not be able to
hold free and fair elections under this timetable. Among the difficulties noted were that the IEC
lacks sufficient staff, given that some were fired after the 2009 election; that the IEC lacks funds
to hold the election under that timetable; that the U.S. military buildup will be consumed with
securing still restive areas at election time; and that the ECC’s term expired at the end of January
2010. A functioning ECC was needed to evaluate complaints against registered parliamentary
candidates because there are provisions in the election law to invalidate the candidacies of those
who have previously violated Afghan law or committed human rights abuses.
The international community pressed for a delay of all of these elections until August 2010 or,
according to some donors, mid-2011.25 Bowing to funding and the wide range of other
considerations mentioned, on January 24, 2010, the IEC announced that the parliamentary
elections would be postponed until September 18, 2010. Other experts said that the security
24 Fidler, Stephen and John W. Miller, “U.S. Allies Await Afghan Review,” Wall Street Journal, September 25, 2009.
25 Trofimov, Yaroslav, “West Urges Afghanistan to Delay Election,” Wall Street Journal, December 11, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
26
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
issues, and the lack of faith in Afghanistan’s election institutions, necessitated further
postponement.26
About $120 million was budgeted by the IEC for the parliamentary elections, of which at least
$50 million came from donor countries, giving donors leverage over when the election might take
place. The remaining $70 million was funds left over from the 2009 elections. Donors had held
back the needed funds, possibly in an effort to pressure the IEC to demonstrate that it is
correcting the flaws identified in the various “after-action” reports on the 2009 election. With the
compromises and Karzai announcements below, those funds were released as of April 2010.
Election Decree/Reform
With the dispute between the Karzai government and international donors continuing over how to
ensure a free and fair election, in February 2010 Karzai signed an election decree that would
supersede the 2005 election law and govern the 2010 parliamentary election.27 The Afghan
government argued that the decree supersedes the constitutional clause that any new election law
not be adopted less than one year prior to the election to which that law will apply.
Substantively, some of the provisions of the election decree—particularly the proposal to make
the ECC an all-Afghan body—caused alarm in the international community. Another
controversial element was the registration requirements of a financial deposit (equivalent of about
$650), and that candidates obtain signatures of at least 1,000 voters. On March 14, 2010, after
discussions with outgoing UNAMA head Kai Eide, Karzai reportedly agreed to cede to UNAMA
two “international seats” on the ECC, rather than to insist that all five ECC members be Afghans.
Still, the majority of the ECC seats were Afghans.
The election decree became an issue for Karzai opponents and others in the National Assembly
who seek to assert parliamentary authority. On March 31, the Wolesi Jirga voted to reject the
election decree. However, on April 3, 2010, the Meshrano Jirga decided not to act on the election
decree, meaning that it was not rejected by the Assembly as a whole and governed the September
18, 2010, National Assembly elections. Karzai upheld his pledge to implement the March 2010
compromise with then UNAMA head Eide by allowing UNAMA to appoint two ECC members
and to implement a requirement that at least one non-Afghan ECC member concur in decisions.
Among other steps to correct the mistakes of the 2009 election, the Afghan Interior Ministry
planned instituted a national identity card system to curb voter registration fraud. However,
observers say that registration fraud still occurred. On April 17, 2010, Karzai appointed a new
IEC head, Fazel Ahmed Manawi, a Tajik, who drew praise from many factions (including
“opposition leader” Dr. Abdullah, who is half Tajik and identifies with that ethnicity) for
impartiality. The IEC also barred 6,000 poll workers who served in the 2009 election from
working the 2010 election.
26 Rondeaux, Candace, “Why Afghanistan’s September Elections Ought to Be Postponed.” Washington Post, July 11,
2010.
27 Partlow, Joshua, “Afghanistan’s Government Seeks More Control Over Elections,” Washington Post, February 15,
2010.
Congressional Research Service
27
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Preparations and the Vote
Preparations for the September 18 election proceeded without major disruption, according to the
IEC. Candidates registered during April 20-May 6, 2010. A list of candidates was circulated on
May 13, 2010, including 2,477 candidates for the 249 seats.28 These figures included 226
candidates who registered but whose documentation was not totally in order; and appeal restored
about 180 of them. On May 30, 2010, in a preliminary ruling, 85 candidates others were
disqualified as members of illegal armed groups. However, appeals and negotiations restored all
but 36 in this latter category. A final list of candidates, after all appeals and decisions on the
various disqualifications, was issued June 22. The final list included 2,577 candidates, including
406 women. Sixty-two candidates were invalidated by the ECC, mostly because they did not
resign their government positions, as required.
Voter registration was conducted June 12-August 12. According to the IEC, over 375,000 new
voters were registered, and the number of eligible voters was about 11.3 million. Campaigning
began June 23. Many candidates, particularly those who are women, said that security difficulties
have prevented them from conducting active campaigning. At least three candidates and 13
candidate supporters were killed by insurgent violence.
On August 24, 2010, the IEC announced that the Afghan security forces say they would only be
able to secure 5,897 of the planned 6,835 polling centers. To prevent so-called “ghost polling
stations” (stations open but where no voters can go, thus allowing for ballot-stuffing), the 938
stations considered not secure were not opened. The IEC announcement stated that further
security evaluation could lead to the closing of still more stations and, on election day, a total of
5,355 centers opened (304 of those slated to open did not, and for 157 centers there was no
information available). In part to compensate, the IEC opened extra polling stations in centers in
secure areas near to those that were closed.
On election day, about 5.6 million votes were cast out of about 17 million eligible voters. Turnout
was therefore about 33%. A major issue suppressing turnout was security. At first, it appeared as
though election-day violence was lower than in the 2009 presidential election. However, on
September 24, NATO/ISAF announced that there were about 380 total attacks, about 100 more
than in 2009. However, voting was generally orderly and the attacks did not derail the election.
Parliamentary Election Outcome
Preliminary results were announced on October 20, 2010, and final, IEC-certified results were to
be announced by October 30, 2010, but were delayed until November 24, 2010, due to
investigation of fraud complaints. While the information below illustrates that there was
substantial fraud, the IEC and ECC have been widely praised by the international community for
their handling of the fraud allegations.
Of the 5.6 million votes cast, the ECC invalidated 1.3 million (about 25%) after investigations of
fraud complaints. The ECC prioritized complaints filed as follows: 2,142 as possibly affecting the
election, 1,056 as unable to affect the result, and 600 where there will be no investigation. Causes
28 The seat allocation per province is the same as it was in the 2005 parliamentary election—33 seats up for election in
Kabul; 17 in Herat province; 14 in Nangarhar, 11 each in Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni; 9 in Badakhshan, Konduz, and
Faryab, 8 in Helmand, and 2 to 6 in the remaining provinces. Ten are reserved for Kuchis (nomads).
Congressional Research Service
28
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
for invalidation most often included ballot boxes in which all votes were for one candidate. About
1,100 election workers were questioned by ECC personnel, and 413 candidates were referred by
the ECC to the Attorney General for having allegedly committed election fraud.
The results, as certified by the IEC, resulted in substantial controversy within Afghanistan and led
to a political crisis. The certified results were as follows.
• About 60% of the lower house (148 out of 249) winners were new members.
• As noted above, Karzai’s number of core supporters was reduced from about 90
to 60-70. This was in part because the number of Pashtuns elected was 94, down
from 120 in the outgoing lower house. Several pro-Karzai candidates lost in
Qandahar Province, and because many Pashtuns did not vote due to security
reasons, in mixed Ghazni Province. The low Pashtun turnout in Ghazni caused
Hazara candidates to win all 11 seats from the province, instead of 6 Pashtuns
and 5 Hazaras in the outgoing lower house; this was a big factor in the reduction
of the number of Pashtuns who won election. Several prominent pro-Karzai
deputies were defeated, including Jamil Karzai, Pacha Khan Zadran, Mahmud
Khan Suleimankhel (Paktika Province), and Muin Mirastyal (Konduz Province).
• The lower house is more diverse politically than the outgoing one, and less
predictable in its votes. The Hazara strength has no clear impact because many
Hazaras support Karzai, although their increased political strength has caused
ethnic tensions with the Pashtuns. Other Hazaras oppose Karzai as a
representative of the political strength of the Pashtuns.
• Some observers note that some local militia commanders won election, adding to
or replacing similar figures in past parliaments: the newly elected include
Amanullah Guzar (Kabul) who may have been behind May 2006 rioting in Kabul
against NGO offices; and Haji Abdul Zahir (Nangarhar), a member of the well-
known “Eastern Shura” once headed by the assassinated Hajji Abdul Qadir and
one-time Kabul Governor Hajji Din Mohammad. Other “mujahedin-era figures
were reelected, including Iqbal Safi (Kapisa), Zalmai Mujaddedi (Badakhshan),
Fukkuri Beheshti (Bamiyan), and Shahzada Shahed (Kunar).
• Two ex-Taliban figures, Mullah Salam Rocketi, and Musa Wardak, were
defeated.
• A date of the inauguration of the new parliament was set for January 20, 2011, at
which time, under Afghan law, President Karzai would formally open the session.
Special Tribunal, Related Political Crisis, and Resolution
The certified results triggered a major political crisis, caused primarily by Pashtuns who felt they
lost the election due to fraud. The issue brought the operations of the National Assembly to a
virtual halt, with Karzai ruling by decree, with seven cabinet posts and a few Supreme Court seats
remaining unfilled by permanent appointees, and, as discussed above, with certified election
winners in the Assembly threatening to impeach him in July 2011.
Immediately after the election results were certified, Karzai took steps to address Pashtun
grievances, but with its own interest in increasing the number of Pashtuns elected, in December
2010 the Karzai government (office of the Attorney General) indicted all seven IEC
Congressional Research Service
29
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
commissioners as well as the three Afghan members of the ECC. The deputy Attorney General
that same month urged election results to be voided and the Afghan Supreme Court to order a
recount. There were weekly demonstrations against the fraud by about 300 candidates who felt
deprived of victory, under a banner called the “Union of Afghan Wolesi Jirga Candidates 2010,”
led by defeated Ghazni candidate Daud Sultanzoy.
On December 28, 2010, at the instruction of the Supreme Court, Karzai issued a decree
empowering a five-member tribunal to review fraud complaints. This deepened the crisis
considerably. Many Afghans, including an independent watchdog group, “Free and Fair Election
Foundation,” maintained that the tribunal had no legal authority under the constitution to review
the election. The IEC and EC, backed by UNAMA and the international community, insisted that
the certified results stand, asserting they are the only bodies under Afghan electoral law that have
legitimate jurisdiction over election results. Still, on January 19, 2011, the day before the
parliament was to convene, the tribunal leader, Judge Sediqullah Haqiq, announced it would need
another month to evaluate the fraud allegations. On that basis, following the recommendation, the
Karzai government postponed the inauguration of the new parliament by one month.
Defying Karzai and the special tribunal, about 213 of the certified winners met at the
Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul on January 20, 2011, and reportedly decided to take their seats on
Sunday, January 23, 2011, without Karzai’s formal inauguration. Elected deputies at the meeting
said they would try to convene at the parliament building but would meet elsewhere, if blocked.
They elected an interim speaker, Hajji Mohammad Sarwar Osmani, from Farah Province. This
would have rendered unclear the legal status of a self-convened parliament.
During January 20-25, 2011, with the lower house threatening to convene on its own, a
compromise was found. Karzai agreed to inaugurate the lower house on January 26, 2011; that
event took place. However, the ongoing fraud investigation by the special tribunal remained
active, despite insistence by declared winners to terminate it. As noted, after its inauguration, the
lower house elected a compromise candidate, Abdul Raouf Ibrahimi, from the Uzbek community,
as speaker. This fell short of Karzai’s goal of engineering selection of Sayyaf but accomplished
his aim of denying Qanooni reselection to that post. The upper house was completed as of
February 19, 2011, when Karzai made his 34 appointments.
The special tribunal process continued to investigate and to recount votes in several provinces.
The crisis became acute on June 23, 2011, when the special tribunal ruled that 62 defeated
candidates be reinstated. The National Assembly—containing the 62 persons who would lose
their seats if the tribunal’s order were followed—subsequently passed a no-confidence vote
against Attorney General Aloko. On August 10, 2011, Karzai appeared to defuse the eight month-
long crisis; he issued a decree declaring that special court does not have jurisdiction to change
election results, and that such changes are the role of the IEC. Subsequently, on August 21, 2011,
the IEC implemented elements of a compromise urged by UNAMA by ruling that nine winners
had won their seats through fraud and must be removed. This decision, with IEC chairman
Manawi acknowledged was partly due to politics, removed fewer than the 17 that UNAMA had
urged but more than the 5 the IEC reportedly thought would defuse the crisis. The nine
disqualifications seemed to many observers to be few enough to calm the dispute and allow
governance to move forward, but the lower house subsequently voted to refuse any seat
alterations at all. Some of the nine newly declared winners were sworn in on September 4, 2011,
and the nine whose victories were overturned were barred from entering the parliament building.
However, in protest of the decision, about 70 parliamentarians refused to convene and the
Assembly was unable to obtain a quorum to act on legislation or government nominees, including
Congressional Research Service
30
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Supreme Court vacancies. The boycotting parliamentarians ended their protest on October 8,
2011, paving the way for the National Assembly to resume full function.
2009 and 2010 Elections Alter Karzai-Assembly Relations
The exposure of widespread fraud in the 2009 and 2010 elections appeared to alienate Karzai
from the National Assembly. In the confirmation process of his post-2009 election cabinet,
National Assembly members, particularly the well-educated independents, objected to many of
his nominees as “unknowns,” as having minimal qualifications, or as loyal to faction leaders who
backed Karzai in the 2009 election. Karzai’s original list of 24 ministerial nominees (presented
December 19) was generally praised by the United States for retaining the highly praised
economic team (and most of that team was confirmed). However, overall, only 7 of the first 24
nominees were confirmed (January 2, 2010), and only 7 of the 17 replacement nominees were
confirmed (January 16, 2010), after which the Assembly went into winter recess. Although then
UNAMA head Kai Eide called the vetoing of many nominees a “setback” to Afghan governance,
Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell said on January 6, 2010, that the vetoing by parliament
reflected a “healthy give and take” among Afghanistan’s branches of government. Another five
(out of seven nominees) were confirmed on June 28, 2010, although one was a replacement for
the ousted Interior Minister Atmar.
The differences over cabinet selections continued after the resolution in 2011 of the Assembly
elections, although perhaps with less intensity, suggesting Karzai and the Assembly have sought
to put aside differences and focus on governing. Major developments in the cabinet selection
process included the following:
• The main security ministers—Defense Minister Abdal Rahim Wardak and
Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar—were renominated by Karzai and
confirmed on January 2, 2010. (Atmar was later dismissed, see above.)
• Three key economic/civilian sector officials who work very closely with USAID
and U.S. Embassy Kabul—Finance Minister Omar Zakhiwal, Agriculture
Minister Mohammad Rahimi, and Education Minister Ghulam Faruq Wardak—
were renominated and also were confirmed on January 2, 2010. The highly
praised Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (Ehsan Zia), who runs
the widely praised National Solidarity Program, was not renominated, and his
replacement Wais Barmak, (a Northern Alliance figure) was voted down. The
second replacement, Jarullah Mansoori, was confirmed on January 16, 2010.
• The U.S.-praised Commerce Minister Wahidollah Sharani was selected to move
over to take control of the Mines Ministry; he was confirmed on January 2, 2010.
• From the clan of former moderate mujahedin party leader Pir Gaylani, his son-in-
law Anwar al Haq Al Ahady was eventually confirmed as Commere Minister.
However, Hamid Gaylani (Pir Gaylani’s son) was voted down for Minister of
Border and Tribal Affairs.
• Northern Alliance power broker from Herat Ismail Khan was voted down in 2010
but remained as Minister of Energy and Water in an acting capacity. He was
confirmed in March 2012. U.S. officials and many Afghans see him as a faction
leader with no technical expertise.
Congressional Research Service
31
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
• Karzai initially did not nominate a permanent foreign minister, leaving Spanta in
place as a caretaker. However, in the second nomination round, Karzai selected
his close ally Zalmay Rassoul, who has been national security adviser since 2004,
to the post. Rassoul was confirmed on January 16, 2010. Spanta is head of the
National Security Council.
• Minister of Women’s Affairs Ghazanfar was renominated to remain the only
female minister, but was voted down on January 2, 2010. In the cabinet
renominations, Karzai named three women—Suraiya Dalil to Public Health,
Pelwasha Hassan to Women’s Affairs, and Amina Afzali (minister of youth in an
earlier Karzai cabinet) to Labor and Social Affairs. Of those, only Afzali was
confirmed on January 16, 2010. Ghazanfar and Dalil headed those ministries in
an acting capacity until being confirmed in March 2012.
• Of the other nominees confirmed on January 16, 2010, at least one has previously
served in high positions. The Assembly confirmed that day: Zarar Moqbel (who
previously was interior minister) as Counternarcotics Minister; Economy
Minister Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, who heads a moderate faction of the Hizb-e-
Islam party of pro-Taliban insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar; Mohammad
Yousaf Niazi, minister of Hajj and Waqf (religious endowments) affairs; and
Habibullah Ghalib, Minister of Justice.
• On June 28, 2010, Karzai obtained parliamentary approval for five positions out
of seven nominees, including Bismillah Khan as Interior Minister; Al Ahady (see
above); and former Qandahar Governor Asadullah Khalid as Minister of Border
and Tribal affairs. Voted down were two Hazara Shiites: Sarwar Danesh as
Minister of Higher Education, and former IEC chief Daud Ali Najafi as Minister
of Transportation. Their rejection caused Hazara members in the Assembly to
demonstrate their disapproval of the vote, and Karzai called for Hazaras to be
approved in the future to ensure all-ethnic participation in government. Both
headed those ministries in an acting capacity until March 12, 2012, when Najafi
was confirmed and a replacement for Danesh—Obaidullah Obaid—was
confirmed.
• The March 12, 2012, National Assembly confirmation of most of those ministers
who were serving in an acting capacity—including the controversial Ismail
Khan—as well as some new nominees suggested the Assembly was moving to
put past disputes with Karzai behind and instill clear authority in all ministries.
On the other hand, suggesting disputes linger, the lower house voted down the
2012-2013 budget in March 2012.
Implications for the United States of the Afghan Elections Disputes
U.S. officials express clear U.S. neutrality in all Afghan elections. However, U.S. officials
remained concerned that the 2009 and 2010 elections, and subsequent political crisis, were
complicating the July 2011 start of the transition to Afghan security leadership, which began in
seven areas (three provinces and four cities). According to President Obama on June 22, 2011, as
part of the transition, 10,000 U.S. troops will leave Afghanistan (of the 99,000 that are there) by
the end of 2011, and an additional 23,000 by September 2012. The election fraud and disputes
have purportedly affected the perceptions of the Afghan people about the legitimacy of the
Afghan government and its ability to take the lead on security by the end of 2014, according to
current plans. The August 10, 2011, Karzai decree may serve to alleviate some of these concerns.
Congressional Research Service
32
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Afghans close to Karzai believe that the U.S. posture on the Afghan elections strained relations
between the two countries. In the 2009 presidential election, Karzai reportedly believed the
United States was hoping strong candidates might emerge to replace him. The United States
repeatedly stated its neutrality in all Afghan elections, and Ambassador Timothy Carney headed
the 2009 U.S. election support effort at U.S. Embassy Kabul, tasked to ensure that the United
States was even-handed.
Next Presidential Elections: Karzai Says He Will Yield Power
Under the constitution, the next presidential elections are to be held by the end of 2014. There is
no clear frontrunner to succeed Karzai, although a number of candidates receive attention from
observers, particularly those who ran before or considered doing so. Among them are Dr.
Abdullah, Ghul Agha Sherzai (see above), Ashraf Ghani, former Interior Minister Ali Jalali (a
Pashtun), Yunus Qanooni, Ahmad Zia Masoud, Ramazan Bashardost, Amrollah Saleh, and others.
Most of these figures are mentioned elsewhere in this report. Parliamentarian Fawzia Koofi,
mentioned above, has stated in editorials since late 2011 that she will run, although her gender as
well as her Tajik ethnicity would lead most observers to conclude she is not favored to win.
Some Karzai critics have claimed he plans to alter the constitution to allow himself to run for a
third time, or possibly engineer a loya jirga to ask him to stay in office after 2014. At a June 15,
2011, Senate Appropriations Committee hearing, then Secretary of Defense Gates said Karzai had
abandoned any such thinking and would leave office in 2014. Some U.S. officials sought to
persuade Karzai to make a more public and definitive declaration to that effect. On August 12,
2011, the palace issued a statement that Karzai had told a group of parliamentarians that he would
end his presidency after his second term and had begun to search for a potential successor to
endorse.
Election Timing, Other Ongoing Electoral Issues
In April 2012, Karzai acknowledged that he had begun discussing with aides the possibility of
advancing the election to some time in 2013. The public explanation for raising this possibility is
that international troops will be leaving by the end of 2014, and more foreign troops will be
available to secure the election in 2013 than in 2014. However, some might argue that moving the
election up gives well-known Karzai associates a political advantage over lesser known figures.
Electoral mechanisms continue to function. IEC Chairman Manawi continues until early 2013, as
does the term of IEC commissioner Abdul Pashaye. On December 19, 2011, Karzai swore in five
new commissioners he appointed, a move that renewed criticism of mechanisms and laws that
allow the President to appoint election officials. That same month the IEC signed a two-year
assistance program by UNDP called ELECT II (Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow).
Congressional Research Service
33
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Afghan Governing Capacity and Performance29
In two major Afghanistan policy addresses—March 27, 2009, and December 1, 2009—President
Obama stressed that more needed to be done to promote the legitimacy and effectiveness of the
Afghan government at both the Kabul and local levels. In the latter statement, he said: “The days
of providing a blank check [to the Afghan government] are over.” The President did not raise the
issue of governance directly in his June 22, 2011, announcement of an initial U.S. troop
drawdown from Afghanistan, but the implication of his speech is that the Afghan government will
be expected, as the drawdowns proceed during 2011-2014, to assume full responsibility for more
of its own functions, not limited to security but including revenue generation, oversight, service
delivery, and provision of justice. Some believe that Afghanistan will revert to a terrorist haven
unless effective governance is well established before the transition to Afghan leadership is
completed by 2014.
As to the progress of Afghan governance, a November 2011 report by the Office of Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Marc Grossman assesses:
We have seen progress in the capacity of Afghan institutions to provide services, however
the low baseline of Afghan capacity means significant work remains. We recognize that a
long-term commitment to governance in areas such as civil service and public administration
reform is needed for transition to succeed…At the same time, key independent governance
institutions are emerging as checks on executive power and independent arbiters of the
political system.
Many of the shortcomings in this and other reports are attributed to all the political disputes,
alleged corruption, and the lack of workers trained or skilled in governmental affairs that are
discussed in this paper.
Partner organizations often emphasize governance to an even greater degree than does the United
States. Then-head of the U.N. Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) Kai Eide said in a
departing news conference on March 4, 2010, that improving governance and political processes
are “indispensable” for resolving the conflict in Afghanistan, and that U.S. and partner efforts
have focused too much on military approaches. Eide was succeeded by Staffan de Mistura in
March 2010, who in turn has been succeeded by Jan Kubis as of December 2011. Their
substantive positions on the issue are similar to those of Eide.
The Obama Administration has developed about 45 different metrics to assess progress in
building Afghan governance and security, as it was required to do (by September 23, 2009) under
P.L. 111-32, an FY2009 supplemental appropriation.30 UNAMA also evaluates Afghan
governance according to numerous metrics. Afghan progress according to these metrics is
presented in reports of the Secretary-General to the U.N. General Assembly, such as the report
released March 5, 2012 (U.N. document number: A/66/728-S/2012/133)
29 Some information in this section is from the State Department report on human rights in Afghanistan for 2009,
March 11, 2010; for text, see http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/sca/136084.htm and the International Religious
Freedom Report, released October 26, 2009, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127362.htm.
30 “Evaluating Progress in Afghanistan-Pakistan” Foreign Policy website, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/
09/16/evaluating_progress_in_afghanistan_pakistan.
Congressional Research Service
34
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Expanding Central Government Capacity
As discussed above, the international community has had mixed success in shifting authority in
Afghanistan from traditional leaders and relationships to transparent and effective state
institutions. Afghan ministries have greatly increasing their staffs and technological capabilities
(many ministry offices now have modern computers and communications, for example). Afghan-
led governmental reform and institution-building programs under way, all with U.S. and other
donor assistance, include: training additional civil servants, instituting merit-based performance
criteria, basing hiring on qualifications rather than kinship and ethnicity, and weeding out
widespread governmental corruption. However, the government still faces a relatively small
recruitment pool of workers with sufficient skills and many are reluctant to serve in the provincial
offices of the central government ministries, particularly in provinces where there is still
substantial violence. U.S. mentors and advisers serve in virtually all the Afghan ministries,
although that assistance has been interrupted at least temporarily as of February 24, 2012, because
of the anti-U.S. riots resulting from the errant U.S. discarding and burning of detainee Qurans at
Bagram Airfield.
Afghanistan has also tried to address the problem of international donors luring away Afghan
talent with higher salaries, by pledging at the July 20, 2010, Kabul conference to reach an
understanding with donors, within six months, on a harmonized salary scale for donor-funded
salaries of Afghan government personnel. It is not clear whether that objective was met.
The Afghan Civil Service
The low level of Afghan bureaucratic capacity is being addressed in a number of ways, but
slowly. There are about 500,000 Afghan government employees, although the majority of them
are in the security forces. A large proportion of the remainder work as teachers. On several
occasions, the United States has funded jobs fairs that have recruited some new civil servants.
To increase the proficiency of government, during late 2010-early 2011, the government instituted
merit-based appointments for senior positions, such as deputy provincial governors and district
governors, and converted those positions to civil servants rather than political appointees.
However, that effort stalled in April–September 2011, according to the October 2011 DOD report,
because Karzai has not yet approved merit-based selectees for 14 deputy governor positions. If
approved, more than three quarters of all of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces would have merit based
deputy governors.
The key institution that is deciding on merit based appointments, standardizing job descriptions,
salaries, bonuses, and benefits is the Afghan Independent Administrative Reform and Civil
Service Commission (IARCSC). The Commission has thus far redefined more than 80,000 civil
servant job descriptions. The Afghan cabinet drafted a revised civil service law to institute merit-
based hiring and give the IARCSC a legal underpinning; it was ratified by the National Assembly
in late 2011 and replaced a less-specific September 2005 civil service law.
Under a USAID program called the Civilian Technical Assistance Plan, the United States is
providing technical assistance to Afghan ministries and to the IARCSC. From January 2010 until
January 2011, the USAID, under a February 2010 memorandum of understanding, gave $85
million to programs run by the commission to support the training and development of Afghan
civil servants. One of the commission’s subordinate organizations is the Afghan Civil Service
Institute, which trained over 16,000 bureaucrats during 2010-2011, according to the DOD 1230
Congressional Research Service
35
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
report, and which has instituted an internship program for 1,000 interns in national civil service
jobs and 2,000 interns in provincial and district offices. On-going training for civil servants is
provided by an arm of the Civil Service Institute called the National Training Directorate (NTD).
According to the November 2011 report from the office of the Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Amb. Marc Grossman, USAID programs are helping employees of the
state-owned Afghan power company (DABS) to manage Afghanistan’s power grid and bill its
customers. USAID programs have also trained 250 Ministry of Mines personnel in geology to try
to help develop Afghanistan’s extractive industries sector.
Many Afghan civil service personnel undergo training in India, building on growing relations
between Afghanistan and India. Japan and Singapore also are training Afghan civil servants on
good governance, anti-corruption, and civil aviation. Singapore and Germany will, in 2011,
jointly provide technical assistance in the field of civil aviation. Some of these programs are
conducted in partnership with the German Federal Foreign Office and the Asia Foundation.
The Afghan Budget Process
The international efforts to build up the central government are reflected in the Afghan budget
process. The Afghan government controls its own funds as well as those of directly supplied
donor funds. The Afghan budget year follows the solar year, which begins on March 21 of each
year, which also corresponds to the Persian New Year (“Nowruz”). In early February 2011, the
National Assembly adopted a 2011 national budget (March 2011-March 2012) in line with its
responsibilities. However, the lack of a quorum in the Assembly in mid- to late-2011 slowed
consideration of a budget for 2012 (March 2012-March 2013) and the lower house voted down
the 2012 budget in March 2012.
The Afghan budget is a “unitary” (centralized) system. Once a budget is adopted by the full
National Assembly (first the upper house and then the lower house, and then signed by Karzai),
the funds are allocated to central government ministries and other central government entities.
Elected provincial councils, appointed provincial governors, and district governors formulate
their local budget requirements and therefore help shape the national budget process, but the
localities do not control their own budgets. These local organs do approve the disbursement of
funds by the central entities (called mustofiats, accounting offices in each of Afghanistan’s 34
provinces). All revenue is collected by central government entities which implement the local
programs but, according to experts, contributes to the widespread observation that local officials
sometimes seek to retain or divert locally collected revenues. There are several pilot programs in
place, including the Provincial Budget Pilot Program (PBPP) to improve budgetary planning
integration between the national and provincial levels. As of April 2012, four ministries and the
IDLG say they have made sound progress on this program and several other ministries are to be
included in it in 2012-2013.
Donor Involvement in the Afghan Budget
Because of the paucity of funds taken in by the Afghan government—about $1.7 billion in
2011—a GAO study issued September 2011 found that during 2006-2010, about 90% of total
Afghan government expenditures (operating budget and development budget) was provided by
Congressional Research Service
36
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
international donors. Of that amount, the United States provide 62% and other donors provided
28% of total expenditures.31 Donor funds covered 57% of the Afghan government operating
budget, which is about $2.2 billion. Afghan officials stated in material circulated at the December
5, 2011, Bonn Conference that it will need at least $10 billion in donated funds per year from
2014 (the end of the security transition) until 2025.
Although still wary of misuse, the United States has been slowly accommodating Afghan
demands that aid be channeled through the Afghan government. More than 40% of U.S. aid was
channeled through the Afghan government during FY2011. This is close to the target figure of
50% that was endorsed at the July 20, 2010, Kabul conference, and up from 21% in FY2009,
according to a June 8, 2011, staff report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Evaluating
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan). Increased percentages are predicated on U.S.
assessments of the ability of individual ministries to accurately and transparently administer
donated funds. Currently, according to that Foreign Relations Committee staff report, 14 Afghan
ministries have received USAID and State Department funds, and these ministries have received
over $300 million in direct U.S. funding as of June 2011.
Karzai has repeatedly said that the low level of direct funding has stunted the growth of Afghan
government capacity. Many international development experts concur that only through direct
funding will the Afghan government be able to develop the capacity and eventually the
transparency to govern and deliver services effectively.
Expanding Local (Subnational) Governance
As U.S. concerns about corruption in the central government increased after 2007, U.S. and allied
policy has increasingly emphasized building local, or “subnational” governance. This accords
with U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, which is to build institutions that can govern and secure areas
cleared by U.S. and NATO forces and preventing Taliban reinfiltration. The U.S. shift in
emphasis complements that of the Afghan government, which asserts that it has itself long sought
to promote local governance in Afghanistan’s political and economic development.
U.S. and partner country officials say that local governance is slowly improving and expanding,
particularly in areas secured by the 2010 U.S. “troop surge,” and only with the help of substantial
donor funds and programming. U.S. officials say that Afghans are increasingly forming local
councils and building ties to appointed local leaders in these cleared and secured areas. However,
the April 2012 DOD report on Afghanistan stability (p.71) says subnational bodies “remain
unable to provide many basic government services.” This could be, in part, a result of attempts by
Kabul to centralize decision making—the localities have their own governing bodies but the
central government ministries in the provincial capitals of each province—not the subnational
bodies—actually implement national programs. Local officials often disagree with the Kabul
ministry representatives on priorities or on implementation mechanisms.
The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)
In terms of local governance institution-building, a key institution was empowered in August
2007 when Karzai placed the selection process for local leaders (provincial governors and down)
31 Government Accountability Office. “Afghanistan’s Donor Dependence.” September 20, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
37
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
in a new Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)—and out of the Interior
Ministry. The IDLG was headed until early 2011 by Jelani Popal, a member of Karzai’s Popolzai
tribe and a close Karzai ally. Some international officials say that Popal packed local agencies
with Karzai supporters, where they were able to arrange votes for Karzai in the August 2009
presidential elections. He was replaced by Abdul Khaliq Farahi, a former diplomat who was
kidnapped in Peshawar, Pakistan, and held for nearly three years (2008-2011) allegedly by
militants linked to Al Qaeda.
In terms of donor programming, the IDLG is the implementing partner of the U.N. Development
Program in the Afghanistan Subnational Governance Program II (ASGP-II). It was funded with
$83.6 million from the European Community, Italy, Switzerland, and Britain. Its main
achievement has been to fund national technical assistance for the IDLG.
The IDLG is an implementing partner for the District Delivery Program (DDP), now operating in
32 of the 364 districts of Afghanistan. It is a program created to improve government presence
and service delivery at the district level, and is funded by the United States, Britain, Denmark,
and France. U.S. funding for the program was suspended in July 2011 pending accountability of
expenditures and a request for the IDLG and Ministry of Finance to satisfy several conditions,
and has not reactivated to date.32
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils
Many believe that, even more than institutional expansion, the key to effective local governance
is the appointment of competent and incorruptible governors in all 34 Afghan provinces. U.N.,
U.S., and other international studies and reports all point to the beneficial effects (reduction in
narcotics trafficking, economic growth, lower violence) of some of the strong Afghan civilian
appointments at the provincial level. Provincial governors are still political appointees selected
mostly for loyalty to Karzai although, as noted above, progress is being made in implementing a
merit-based appointment system for deputy provincial governors and district governors.
A key example of a successful gubernatorial appointment is the March 2008 appointment of
Gulab Mangal as Helmand governor. He is from Laghman Province (eastern Afghanistan) and
drew immediate skepticism from the local tribes and power-brokers of the south who repeatedly
have urged Karzai to replace him. But, he has drawn wide praise from the United States and the
international community for taking effective action to convince farmers to grow crops other than
poppy. His leadership accounts for the reduction of cultivation in Helmand that have been noted
since 2009. Mangal has played a key role in convening tribal shuras and educating local leaders
on the benefits of the U.S.-led offensive to remove Taliban insurgents from Marjah town and
install new authorities there. A key Mangal ally, who has reportedly helped bring substantial
stability to the Nawa district, is Abdul Manaf.
Other governors, such as Ghul Agha Shirzai and Atta Mohammad Noor (discussed above) are
considered effective, but have been criticized for exercising excessive independence of central
authority. Many of the other governors are considered weak, ineffective, or corrupt. Beyond the
governors, there are widespread concerns about governing capacity at the local level because so
many of the posted positions have gone unfilled in many provinces, particularly those that are
restive.
32 DOD report on Afghanistan stability, April 2012, p.73.
Congressional Research Service
38
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Provincial Councils
One problem noted by governance experts is that the role of the elected provincial councils is
unclear. The elections for the provincial councils in all 34 provinces were held on August 20,
2009, concurrent with the presidential elections. The previous provincial council elections were
held concurrent with the parliamentary elections in September 2005. In most provinces, the
provincial councils do not act as true local legislatures and are considered weak compared to the
power and influence of the provincial governors.
Perhaps the most significant role the provincial councils play is in choosing the upper house of
the National Assembly (Meshrano Jirga). In the absence of district councils (no elections held or
scheduled), the provincial councils elected in 2009 have chosen two-thirds (68 seats) of the 102-
seat body. Karzai appointed the remaining 34 seats in February 2011.
District-Level Governance
The April 2012 DOD report on Afghan stability says that there was “measured progress” over the
past six months in developing effective district governance. District governors are appointed by
the president, at the recommendation of the IDLG. However, only a small proportion (about 5%-
10%) of all district governors have been appointed through the merit-based appointment system
in which qualifications are assessed by the IARCSC (see above). In some districts of Helmand
that had fallen under virtual Taliban control until the July 2009 U.S.-led offensives in the
province, there were no district governors in place at all. Some of the district governors, including
in Nawa and Now Zad district, returned after the U.S.-led expulsion of Taliban militants.
The difficulty plaguing the expansion of district governance, in addition to security issues, is lack
of resources. Only slightly more than half of all district governors (there are 364 districts) have
any staff or vehicles.
District Councils
Another problem in establishing district level governance has been the fact that no elections for
district councils have been held due to boundary and logistical difficulties. In his November 19,
2009, inaugural speech, Karzai said the goal of the government is to hold these elections along
with the 2010 parliamentary elections. However, that was not accomplished and no date for these
elections has been set. As a result, there is no one authoritative district-level representative body,
but rather a collection of groupings established by donor programs. According to the April 2012
DOD report on Afghan stability, the Afghan government has agreed in principle to a roadmap
leading to a single district level body, a roadmap to be endorsed by September 2012, although not
necessarily implying district elections could be held by then.
Municipal and Village Level Authority
As are district governors, mayors of large municipalities are appointed. There are about 42
mayors nationwide, many with deputy mayors. Karzai pledged in his November 2009 inaugural
that “mayoral” elections would be held “for the purpose of better city management.” However, no
municipal elections have been held and none is scheduled.
Congressional Research Service
39
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
As noted throughout, there has traditionally been village-level governance by groups of tribal
elders and other notables. That structure remains, particularly in secure areas, while village
councils have been absent or only sporadically active in areas where there is combat. As noted
above, a U.S. official in southern Afghanistan Henry Ensher said in January 2011 that councils
have been formed in areas where security has been established by the 2010 U.S. “troop surge.”
The IDLG and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), with advice from
India and other donors, also are empowering localities to decide on development priorities. The
MRRD has formed about 30,000 Community Development Councils (CDCs) nationwide to help
suggest priorities, and these bodies are eventually to all be elected.
U.S. Local Governance Advisory Capacity
As a consequence of the March 2009 Obama Administration review, to help build local governing
capacity, the Administration recruited about 500 U.S. civilian personnel from the State
Department, USAID, the Department of Agriculture, and several other agencies—and many
additional civilians from partner countries joined them—to advise Afghan ministries, and
provincial and district administrations. That effort raised the number of U.S. civilians in
Afghanistan to about 975 by early 2010 and to 1,330 by August 2011. Of these, nearly 400 are
serving outside Kabul, up from 67 in early 2009.
Although many U.S. civilian officials now work outside Kabul, there are about 1,200 employees
at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. To accommodate the swelling ranks, in early November 2010 a
$511 million contract was let to Caddell Construction to expand it, and two contracts of $20
million each were let to construct U.S. consulates in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. Those consulates
are in operation.
As noted above, the accidental discarding and burning of Qurans at Bagram Airfield in late
February 2012 set off Afghan anti-U.S. protests. On February 24, 2012, the top U.S. and NATO
commander in Afghanistan, General John Allen, pulled all NATO advisers out of Afghan
ministries because two U.S. military advisers were assassinated at the Interior Ministry by a
Ministry employee the previous day. These advisers subsequently returned.
Senior Civilian Representative Program
The Administration also has instituted appointments of “Senior Civilian Representatives”
(SCR),33 who are counterparts to the military commanders of each NATO/ISAF regional
command (there are currently five of them). Each Senior Civilian Representative has 10-30
personnel on his/her team. For example, the SCR for Regional Command South is based at
Qandahar airfield and interacts closely with the military command of the southern sector. The
SCR for Regional Command East (RC-E) is based at Bagram Airfield.
33 For more information, see U.S. Department of Defense. “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in
Afghanistan,” April 2011; http://www.defense.gov/news/1230_1231Report.pdf, pp. 19-20.
Congressional Research Service
40
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Reforming Afghan Governance: Curbing Corruption34
Partly because many Afghans view the central government as “predatory,” many Afghans and
international donors have lost faith in Karzai’s leadership. NATO estimates that about $2.5 billion
in total bribes are paid by Afghans each year.
High Level Corruption, Nepotism, and Cronyism
At the upper levels of government, some observers have asserted that Karzai deliberately tolerates
officials who are allegedly involved in the narcotics trade and other illicit activity, and supports
their receipt of lucrative contracts from donor countries, in exchange for their support. Karzai’s
brother, Mahmoud, as discussed above, has apparently grown wealthy through real estate and
auto sales ventures in Qandahar and Kabul, purportedly by fostering the impression he can
influence his brother. In October 2010 it was reported that a Justice Department investigation of
Mahmoud Karzai’s dealings (he holds dual U.S.-Afghan citizenship) had begun, and reported
grand jury consideration of charges (racketeering, tax evasion) against him began in mid-
February 2011. Several other high officials, despite very low official government salaries, have
acquired ornate properties in west Kabul since 2002, according to Afghan observers. This raises
the further question of the inadequacy of and possible corruption within Afghanistan’s land titling
system. Other observers who have served in Afghanistan say that Karzai has appointed some
provincial governors to “reward them” and that these appointments have gone on to “prey”
economically on the populations of that province.
Lower-Level Corruption
Observers who follow the issue say that most of the governmental corruption takes place in the
course of performing mundane governmental functions, such as government processing of official
documents (e.g., passports, drivers’ licenses), in which processing services routinely require
bribes in exchange for action.35 Other forms of corruption include Afghan security officials’
selling U.S./internationally provided vehicles, fuel, and equipment to supplement their salaries. In
other cases, local police or border officials may siphon off customs revenues or demand extra
payments to help guard the U.S. or other militaries’ equipment shipments. Other examples
security commanders’ placing “ghost employees” on official payrolls in order to pocket their
salaries. Corruption is fed, in part, by the fact that government workers receive very low salaries
(about $200 per month, as compared to the pay of typical contractors in Afghanistan that might
pay as much as $6,500 per month). Many observers say there is a cultural dimension to the
corruption—that it is expected that those Afghans who have achieved government positions will
reward their relatives and friends with favors, appointments, and contracts.
Administration Views and Policy on Corruption
As noted throughout, there is a consensus within the Administration on the wide scope of the
corruption in Afghan government and the deleterious effect the corruption has on winning the
34 For more information, particularly on Rule of Law programs, see CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of
Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman.
35 Filkins, Dexter, “Bribes Corrode Afghan’s Trust in Government,” New York Times, January 2, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
41
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Afghan population over to the government side. The Administration wrestled throughout 2010
with the degree to which to press an anti-corruption agenda with the Karzai government, but, in
early 2011, the Administration reportedly decided to prioritize reducing low-level corruption
instead of investigations of high-level allies of Karzai.36 The latter investigations have sometimes
come into conflict with other U.S. objectives by causing a Karzai backlash. In addition, such
investigations may complicate efforts to obtain the cooperation of Afghans who can help stabilize
areas of the country. Some of these Afghans are said to be paid by the CIA for information and
other support, and the National Security Council reportedly issued guidance to U.S. agencies to
review this issue.37
Yet, U.S. officials believe that anti-corruption efforts must be pursued because corruption is
contributing to a souring of Western publics on the mission as well as causing some Afghans to
embrace Taliban insurgents. General Petraeus, the former top U.S. and NATO commander in
Afghanistan, said he made anti-corruption a top priority to support his counter-insurgency
strategy. A key deputy, General H.R. McMaster, formed several DOD task forces to focus on anti-
corruption (Shafafiyat, Task Force Spotlight, and Task Force 2010) from a U.S. military/counter-
insurgency perspective. These task forces, in part, review U.S. contracting strategies so as to
enhance Afghan capacity and reduce the potential for corruption. Some observers assert that anti-
corruption efforts are more appropriately an issue to be handled by U.S. civilian officials, not the
U.S. military. The Shafafiyat task force announced in February 2012 that has thus far caused the
restitution of $11.1 million, $25.4 million in fines, and $3.4 million in seizures from allegedly
fraudulent contractors, and has debarred or suspended more than 125 American, Afghan, and
international workers for alleged fraud.38
Anti-Corruption Initiatives
Obama Administration officials have credited Karzai with allowing the United States and other
donors to help develop oversight bodies to curb corruption. However, the credit is tempered by
congressional and some Administration criticism of slow implementation and allegations that he
continues to shield his closest allies from investigation or prosecution. These criticisms were
amplified in an April 30, 2012, report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR). At the July 20, 2010, Kabul conference—following onto the January
28, 2010, London conference—the Afghan government finalized a National Anti-Corruption
Strategy (“Azimi report”) and committed to enacting 37 laws to curb corruption. As of November
2011, none of these laws has been enacted, according to the October 2011 DOD report, although
that is due at least in part to the election dispute-related lack of legislative work by the National
Assembly for most of 2011. The Afghan cabinet has drafted new anti-corruption and auditing
laws, and there has been some implementation of some anti-corruption steps by Karzai, using his
executive authority (decree).
• Assets Declarations and Verifications. During December 15-17, 2009, Karzai
held a conference in Kabul to combat corruption. It debated, among other ideas,
requiring deputy ministers and others to declare their assets, not just those at the
ministerial level. That requirement was imposed. Karzai himself earlier declared
36 Strobel, Warren and Marisa Taylor. “U.S. Won’t Pursue Karzai Allies in Anti-Corruption Campaign.” McClatchy
Newspapers, January 6, 2011.
37 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “A Subtler Takc to Fight Afghan Corruption.” Washington Post, September 13, 2010.
38 John Ryan. “Task Force Rooting Out Corruption in Afghanistan.” Army Times, February 20, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
42
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
his assets on March 27, 2009. On June 26, 2010, Karzai urged anti-corruption
officials to monitor the incomes of government officials and their families,
including his, to ensure their monies are earned legally. The July 20, 2010, Kabul
conference communiqué39 included an Afghan pledge to verify and publish these
declarations annually, beginning in 2010. According to a U.N. report of March 9,
2011, 1,995 senior Afghan officials had declared their assets. However, the
SIGAR report of April 30, 2012, said that the government’s progress for
verification of the declarations continues to “fall short of U.S. expectations.”
• A Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee to evaluate the government’s
performance in combatting corruption was mandated by the Kabul conference
communiqué to be established within three months of the conference (by October
2010). According to the June 23, 2011, U.N. report, the committee, supported by
UNDP, was inaugurated on May 11, 2011. It was established by decree and is
composed of three Karzai nominees and three international nominees.
• Establishment of High Office of Oversight. In August 2008 Karzai, with reported
Bush Administration prodding, set up the “High Office of Oversight for the
Implementation of Anti-Corruption Strategy” (commonly referred to as the High
Office of Oversight, HOO) with the power to identify and refer corruption cases
to state prosecutors, and to catalogue the overseas assets of Afghan officials. On
March 18, 2010, Karzai, as promised during the January 28, 2010, international
meeting on Afghanistan in London, issued a decree giving the High Office direct
power to investigate corruption cases rather than just refer them to other offices.
However, the SIGAR reported on April 30, 2012, that the HOO’s core functions
either deteriorated or were ineffective during the first quarter of 2012. USAID is
providing the HOO $30 million total during FY2011-FY2013 to build capacity at
the central and provincial level, according to USAID officials. USAID pays for
salaries of 6 HOO senior staff and provides some information technology
systems as well.
• Establishment of Additional Investigative Bodies: Major Crimes Task Force and
Sensitive Investigations Unit. Since 2008, several additional investigative bodies
have been established under Ministry of Interior authority. The most prominent is
the “Major Crimes Task Force,” tasked with investigating public corruption,
organized crime, and kidnapping. A headquarters for the MCTF was inaugurated
on February 25, 2010, and it has been funded and mentored by the FBI, the DEA,
the U.S. Marshal Service, Britain’s Serious Crimes Organized Crime Agency, the
Australian Federal Police, EUPOL (European police training unit in
Afghanistan), and the U.S.-led training mission for Afghan forces. The MCTF
has 169 investigators, according to U.S. officials.
A related body is the Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU), run by several dozen
Afghan police officers, vetted and trained by the DEA.40 This body led the arrest
in August 2010 of a Karzai NSC aide, Mohammad Zia Salehi, on charges of
soliciting a bribe from the New Ansari Money Exchange in exchange for ending
a money-laundering investigation of the firm. The middle-of-the-night arrest
39 Communiqué text at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/world/asia/21kabultext.html.
40 Nordland, Ron and Mark Mazzetti. “Graft Dispute in Afghanistan Is Test for U.S.” New York Times, August 24,
2010.
Congressional Research Service
43
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
prompted Karzai, by his own acknowledgment on August 22, 2010, to obtain
Salehi’s release and to say he would establish a commission to place the MCTF
and SIU under more thorough Afghan government control. Following U.S.
criticism that Karzai is protecting his aides (Salehi reportedly was involved in
bringing Taliban figures to Afghanistan for conflict settlement talks), Karzai
pledged to visiting Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry on
August 20, 2010, that the MCTF and SIU would be allowed to perform their
work without political interference. In November 2010, the Attorney General’s
office said it had ended the prosecution of Salehi.
• Anti-Corruption Unit,” and an “Anti-Corruption Tribunal.” These investigative
and prosecution bodies were established by decree in 2009. Eleven judges have
been appointed to the tribunal. The tribunal, under the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, tries cases referred by an Anti-Corruption Unit of the Afghan
Attorney General’s office. However, of the approximately 2,000 cases
investigated by the Anti-Corruption Unit, only 28 officials have been convicted
as of October 2011. One of the cases that was shut down due to high-level
opposition to any prosecution is Kapisa Province Governor Ghulam Qawis Abu
Bakr. The Department of Justice suspended its training program for the Anti-
Corruption Unit in early 2012 because of the unit’s “lack of seriousness,”
according to the SIGAR report of April 30, 2012. One of the laws pledged during
the July 20, 2010, Kabul conference would be enacted (by July 20, 2011)
included a law to empower the Anti-Corruption Tribunal and the Major Crimes
Task Force. That has been held up, in part, by the lack of a quorum in the
National Assembly for most of 2011.
• Implementation: Prosecutions and Investigations of High-Level Officials. The
Afghanistan Attorney General’s office has investigated at least 20 senior officials,
including two sitting members of the cabinet. However, most of these
investigations resulted in little or no action because those under investigation are
protected by Karzai or other powerful figures. The April 30, 2012, SIGAR report
said there had been no progress by the Attorney General in undertaking new
prosecutions in early 2012. Some of those investigated previously included
Minister of Mining Wahidollah Sharani and his father, who is a cabinet-rank
adviser to Karzai on religious affairs; Commerce Minister Amin Farhang (for
allegedly submitting inflated invoices for reimbursement); former Minister of
Mines Mohammad Ibrahim Adel, (who reportedly accepted a $30 million bribe to
award a key mining project in Lowgar Province to China);41 and former Minister
of the Hajj Mohammad Siddiq Chakari (for accepting bribes to steer Hajj-related
travel business to certain foreign tourist agencies. Chakari was able to flee
Afghanistan to Britain). Then deputy Kabul mayor Wahibuddin Sadat was
arrested at Kabul airport in December 2009 for alleged misuse of authority.
• EITI. Relatedly, Afghanistan has signed up as a candidate to the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) which is intended to ensure that
contracting for Afghanistan’s mineral resources is free of corruption. Afghanistan
hopes to become fully EITI compliant by April 2012. The World Bank gave
41 Partlow, Joshua, “Afghanistan Investigating 5 Current and Former Cabinet Members,” Washington Post, November
24, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
44
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Afghanistan a three year grant of $52 million to manage its natural resources
effectively.
• Salary Levels. The government has tried to raise salaries, particularly of security
forces, in order to reduce their inclination to solicit bribes. In November 2009,
the Afghan government announced an increase in police salaries (from $180 per
month to $240 per month). The Interior Minister, Bismillah Khan, is credited by
DOD with instituting transparency and accountability in promotions and
assignments.
• Bulk Cash Transfers Out of Afghanistan. At the July 2010 Kabul conference, the
government pledged to adopt regulations and implement within one year policies
to govern the bulk transfers of cash outside the country. This was intended to
grapple with issues raised by reports, discussed below, of officials taking large
amounts of cash out of Afghanistan (an estimated $3 billion - $4.5 billion per
year taken out). U.S. officials say that large movements of cash are inevitable in
Afghanistan because only about 5% of the population use banks and 90% use
informal cash transfers (“hawala” system). The late Ambassador Holbrooke
testified on July 28, 2010 (cited earlier), that the Afghan Central Bank has begun
trying to control hawala transfers; 475 hawalas have been licensed, to date,
whereas none was licensed as recently as 2009. In June 2010, U.S. and Afghan
officials announced establishment of a joint task force to monitor the flow of
money out of Afghanistan, including monitoring the flow of cash out of Kabul
International Airport. On August 21, 2010, it was reported that Afghan and U.S.
authorities would implement a plan to install U.S.-made currency counters at
Kabul airport to track how officials had obtained their cash (and ensure it did not
come from donor aid funds).42 During 2011, the United States tripled the number
of Homeland Security personnel devoted to training Afghan customs and border
employees to curb bulk transfers and smuggling. On March 19, 2012, Central
Bank Governor Noorullah Delawari said the Bank had imposed a $20,000 per
person limit on cash transfers out of the country.
• Auditing Capabilities. The SIGAR has previously assessed that the mandate of
Afghanistan’s Control and Audit Office is too narrow and lacks the independence
needed to serve as an effective watch over the use of Afghan government funds.43
At the Kabul conference, the government pledged to submit to parliament an
Audit Law within six months, to strengthen the independence of the Control and
Audit Office, and to authorize more auditing by the Ministry of Finance. The
government drafted an audit law but, according to the April 30, 2012, SIGAR
report, the National Assembly’s legislative committee rejected the draft law in
early 2012.
• Legal Review. The Kabul conference communiqué committed the government to
establish a legal review committee, within six months, to review Afghan laws for
compliance with the U.N. Convention Against Corruption. Afghanistan ratified
the convention in August 2008.
42 Miller, Greg and Joshua Partlow. “Afghans, U.S. Aim to Plug Cash Drain.” Washington Post, August 21, 2010.
43 Madhani, Aamer. “U.S. Reviews Afghan Watchdog Authority.” USA Today, May 12, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
45
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
• Local Anti-Corruption Bodies. Some Afghans have taken it upon themselves to
oppose corruption at the local level. Volunteer local inspectors, sponsored
originally by Integrity Watch Afghanistan, are reported to monitor and report on
the quality of donor-funded, contractor implemented construction projects.
However, these local “watchdog” groups do not have an official mandate, and
therefore their authority and ability to rectify inadequacies are limited.
Kabul Bank Scandal and Continuing Difficulties
The near-collapse of Kabul Bank is a prime example of how well-connected Afghans have
avoided regulations and other restrictions in order to garner personal profit. Mahmoud Karzai is a
major (7%+) shareholder in the large Kabul Bank, which is used to pay Afghan civil servants and
police, and he reportedly received large loans from the bank to buy his position in it. Another big
shareholder is Abdul Hussain Fahim, mentioned above, the brother of First Vice President Fahim
and partner of Mahmoud Karzai on other ventures. The insider relationships were exposed in
August and September 2010 when Kabul Bank reported large losses ($500 million initially
reported, according to the Afghan Central Bank) primarily from shareholder investments in Dubai
properties, prompting President Karzai to appoint a Central Bank official to run the Kabul Bank.
However, the government moves did not prevent large numbers of depositors from moving their
money out of it. With the United States and other donors refusing to recapitalize the bank, the
Afghan government said on November 27, 2010, that it had injected “far less” than $500 million
into the Bank to keep it solvent. The United States offered to finance an audit of Afghan banks,
including Kabul Bank, but the Finance Ministry said on November 27, 2010, it would hire its
own auditor—a move that suggested to some that high Afghan officials seek to avoid sharing the
results with international donors.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) suspended its credit program for the Afghan government
in November 2010 because of the scandal and demanded the entire Afghan banking industry
undergo an outside forensic audit and that those responsible be held accountable. That caused the
holding up of $70 million World Bank/Afghan Reconstruction Fund (ARTF) in donor funds due
to be paid June 11, 2011. Other donors suspended as much as $1.8 billion because of the IMF
suspension.
Amid Afghan confirmation that the questionable loans of the bank total over $925 million
(including interest due), the IMF—as a condition of resuming its credit program—subsequently
pushed for the bank to be sold. Afghan officials initially refused to sell the bank on the grounds
that doing so would cause a renewed run on the bank. However, the Central Bank agreed to
separate the bank’s performing from non-performing assets and then dissolve or restructure the
bank.44 A version of the plan, which was subject to approval by an Afghan government
committee, was formally approved and announced on April 21, 2011. The section of the bank
holding non-performing assets (“bad bank”) is focusing on recouping the bad loans.
The political fallout also produced some resolution. On January 15, 2011, the office of Afghan
Attorney General Ishaq Aloko announced an investigation into what led to the near-collapse of
the bank and the principals involved. The investigating commission briefed reporters on its
findings on May 30, 2011, placing much of the blame on lax controls by the Central Bank and its
governor, Abdul Qadir Fitrat. The government commission also largely absolved Mahmoud
44 Ernesto Londono. “Afghan Officials Opt to Dissolve Bank Draped in Scandal.” Washington Post, March 27, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
46
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Karzai of any wrongdoing, saying he had paid off his loans, and naming other key figures, such
as Dostam, as taking out $100,000 in unsecured loans. The following day, Central Bank governor
Fitrat disputed the commission’s conclusions. He had previously told parliament that Mahmoud
Karzai owed $22 million. In part because of his feuding with the beneficiaries of the Kabul Bank
lending, Fitrat fled Afghanistan for the United States and announced his resignation on June 27,
2011. Karzai reportedly subsequently barred U.S. advisers from the Central Bank. On December
11, 2011, Karzai called for the United States to extradite Fitrat to Afghanistan and blamed U.S.
officials for knowing of the Bank’s problems at an early stage but failing to alert Afghan
authorities.
The “good bank” (part of the bank with deposits and which still functions) was financed by a
Central Bank loan of $825 million. The Afghan Finance Ministry has promised to pay back the
loan with recovered assets and tax revenues. On October 16, 2011, the National Assembly voted
on a supplemental budget that enabled the Finance Ministry to reimburse the Central Bank loan
over eight years. However, Assembly rejection of the 2012 budget in March 2012 held up an $80
million annual increment for this purpose. Of the estimated $925 million in losses, about $300
million of the losses are judged by the Afghans as untraceable because of a lack of
documentation. As of the end of 2011, only about $78 million had been recovered, although the
recovery effort continues.45 Central Bank governor Noorullah Delawari said in April 2012 that the
country plans to sell Kabul Bank in June 2012.
Until late June 2011, no one had been prosecuted for the Bank’s difficulties. However, on June
30, 2011, the government announced the arrest of two former Kabul Bank executives, Sherkhan
Farnood and Khalilullah Frouzi, who allegedly allowed the concessionary loans to the high-level
Afghans and their relatives. However, as of late 2011, the two were no longer detained and are
frequently cited at various public establishments (restaurants) in Kabul; observers say they are
unlikely to face prosecution.46 On August 1, 2011, the Attorney General’s office sent the names of
about 15 people allegedly responsible for the scandal to Afghan courts for trial. To address
criticism of the lack of prosecutions to date, on April 3, 2012, Karzai ordered a special prosecutor
appointed and a special tribunal created to try those involved in the scandal.
The investigations, the recovery of some lost funds, and the start of a forensic audit of the bank,
suggested Afghanistan was moving to meet the IMF conditions for the restart of its credit
program. On October 6, 2011, the IMF issued a statement that it would restore its credit program
because of the investigations and because of the Afghan efforts to recover some of the Bank’s
funds. In November 2011, the IMF resumed its program by approving a $133 million loan to
Afghanistan. That moved restored the flow of some previously blocked donor funds, including
U.S. contributions to the World Bank-run Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF).
The IMF also wants a timetable for another bank found by the Central Bank to be vulnerable to
collapse, Azizi Bank, to shore up its finances. Another Afghan entity suspected of corruption is
the New Ansari Money Exchange, a large money-trading operation. On February 18, 2011, the
Treasury Department designated the New Ansari, and persons affiliated with it, as major money
laundering entities under the “Kingpin Act,” a designation that bans U.S. transactions with the
45 Afghanistan Plans to Sell Scandal-Scarred Kabul Bank in June. Bloomberg.com, April 11, 2012.
46 Matthew Rosenberg and Graham Bowley. “Intractable Afghan Graft Hampering U.S. Strategy.” New York Times,
March 8, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
47
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
designees. The Treasury Department accused the New Ansari and affiliates of serving as a vehicle
for narcotics trafficking organizations.
Moves to Penalize Lack of Progress on Corruption
Several of the required U.S. “metrics” of progress, cited above, involve Afghan progress against
corruption. A FY2009 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 111-32) mandated the withholding of
10% of about $90 million in State Department counter-narcotics funding subject to a certification
that the Afghan government is acting against officials who are corrupt or committing gross human
rights violations. In the 111th Congress, in June 2010, the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of
the House Appropriations Committee deferred consideration of some of the nearly $4 billion in
civilian aid to Afghanistan requested for FY2011, pending the outcome of a committee
investigation of the issue. The subcommittee’s action came amid reports that as much as $3
billion in funds have been allegedly embezzled by Afghan officials over the past several years.47
In part on the basis of the findings of the House Appropriations Committee investigation, the
Senate Appropriations Committee’s FY2011 omnibus appropriation marked up in December 2010
required Administration certifications of progress against corruption as a condition of providing
aid to Afghanistan. Some of this conditionality was included in the FY2011 continuing
appropriations (P.L. 112-10). Aid conditionality based on Afghan performance against corruption,
on incorporation of women in the reconciliation process, and on reports on progress on the Kabul
Bank scandal, are included in the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 112-74). No U.S.
funding for Afghanistan has been permanently withheld because of this or any other legislative
certification requirement.
Rule of Law Efforts
U.S. efforts to curb corruption go hand-in-hand with efforts to promote rule of law. As of July
2010, the U.S. Embassy has an Ambassador rank official heading a “Rule of Law Directorate.”
U.S. funding supports training and mentoring for Afghan justice officials, direct assistance to the
Afghan government to expand efforts on judicial security, legal aid and public defense, gender
justice and awareness, and expansion of justice in the provinces. According to the SRAP report of
November 2011, USAID’s “Rule of Law Stabilization Program” has trained 670 Afghan judges,
over half the total in the country. The program also had expanded the Afghan Supreme Court’s
training program for new judges, and supports linkage between the traditional justice sector and
the formal justice system.
At the July 20, 2010, Kabul conference, the Afghan government committed to:
• Enact its draft Criminal Procedure Code into law within six months. This is one
of the 37 laws pledged at the Kabul Conference would be enacted. This has not
been accomplished, to date.
• Improve legal aid services within the next 12 months. A December 10, 2010,
U.N. report says that the Ministry of Justice has opened legal aid offices in some
provinces.
47 Rosenberg, Matthew. “Corruption Suspected in Airlift of Billions in Cash From Kabul.” Wall Street Journal, June
28, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
48
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
• Strengthen judicial capabilities to facilitate the return of illegally seized lands.
Separate from the Kabul conference issues, USAID has provided $56 million
during FY2005-2009 to facilitate property registration. An additional $140
million is being provided from FY2010-2014 to inform citizens of land processes
and procedures, and to establish a legal and regulatory framework for land
administration.
• Align strategy toward the informal justice sector (discussed below) with the
National Justice Sector Strategy.
Despite the international focus on the formal justice sector, some estimates say that 80% of cases
are decided in the informal justice system. Many Afghans view the formal sector as riddled with
corruption and unfairness, and continue to use local, informal mechanisms (shuras, jirgas) to
adjudicate disputes—particularly with cases involving local property, familial or local disputes, or
personal status issues In the informal sector, Afghans can usually expect traditional practices of
dispute resolution to prevail, including the traditional Pashtun code of conduct known as
Pashtunwali. Some of these customs, including traditional forms of apology (“nanawati” and
“shamana”) and compensation for wrongs done, are discussed at http://www.khyber.org/articles/
2004/JirgaRestorativeJustice.shtml.
However, the informal justice system is dominated almost exclusively by males. For example,
some disputes are resolved by families’ offering to make young girls available to marry older men
from the family that is the counter-party to the dispute, resulting in numerous forced marriages
and child marriages. This practice is known as baad.
Some informal justice shuras take place in Taliban-controlled territory, and some Afghans may
prefer Taliban-run shuras when doing so means they will be judged by members of their own
tribe or tribal confederation.
One concern is how deeply the international community should become involved in the informal
justice sector. U.S. programs have focused primarily on the formal justice system, but there has
been increasing attention to the informal system because its use is so prevalent. USAID has
implemented a pilot program to assist local shuras in four districts to establish a system to
transmit their judicial rulings, in writing, to the district government. The rule of law issue is
discussed in substantially greater depth in CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law
and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman.
Promoting Human Rights and Civil Society48
None of the Obama Administration strategy reviews in 2009 or 2010 specifically changed U.S.
policy on Afghanistan’s human rights practices. U.S. policy has been to build capacity in human
rights institutions in Afghanistan and to promote civil society and political participation. As far as
policy effectiveness, the State Department judgment is that the country’s human rights record
remains plagued by numerous human rights problems, according to the department’s report for
2010 (issued April 8, 2011). However, as do previous years’ State Department reports, the report
for 2010 attributes these deficiencies to the overall lack of security, loose control over the actions
48 Information in this section is primarily from Department of State. 2010 Human Rights Report: Afghanistan, April 8,
2011; http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/sca/154477.htm.
Congressional Research Service
49
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
of Afghan security forces, and to the actions of local faction leaders and insurgents. A Human
Rights Watch statement issued on the eve of the December 5, 2011, Bonn Conference was highly
critical, saying that “Ten years later [after the first Bonn Conference setting a transition from the
Taliban era’, many basic rights are still ignored or downplayed. While there have been
improvements, the rights situation is still dominated by poor governance, lack of rule of law,
impunity for militias and police, laws and policies that harm women, and conflict-related abuses.”
On the other hand, there has been a significant proliferation of organizations that demand
transparency about human rights deficiencies. This trend has produced the addressing of key
problems by government and is helping entrench a commitment to democracy. The December 5,
2011, Bonn Conference was preceded by meetings (December 2-3, 2011, in Bonn) of Afghan
civil society activists, intended to help assess the progress of Afghan governance and highlight
the role of civil society in governance. It is partly the influence of these organizations that caused
Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (intelligence directorate but with arrest powers),
which has widely been accused of detainee abuse and torture, to establish in late 2011 a “human
rights unit” to investigate these allegations. Prominent examples of Afghan NGO’s that monitor
and agitate for improved human rights practices include the Afghanistan Human Rights and
Democracy Organization, and the Research Institute for Women, Peace and Security.
Institution-Building: The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights
Commission (AIHRC)
One of the institutional human rights developments since the fall of the Taliban has been the
establishment of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). It is headed
by a woman, Sima Simar, a Hazara Shiite from Ghazni Province. It acts as an oversight body over
alleged human rights abuses but its members are appointed by the government and some believe
it is not as aggressive or independent as some had hoped. However, its members are appointed by
the President and, as an indication of government interference, in December 2011, Karzai
dismissed its deputy chairman Ahmad Nader Nadery for his outspoken writings alleging abuses
by traditional allies of Karzai. Nadery heads another civil society watchdog organization, the Free
and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan, which was highly critical of Karzai and his allies
for the 2009 and 2010 election fraud.
The July 20, 2010, Kabul conference communiqué contained a pledge by the Afghan government
to begin discussions with the AIHRC, within six months, to stabilize its budgetary status. It
pledged to provide $1 million per year, but has provided only half that amount. A December 10,
2010, U.N. Secretary General report says the Afghan cabinet has approved inserting a line item in
the annual Afghan budget for the AIHRC, but the March 5, 2012, report of the Secretary General
said the National Assembly has not regularized the AIHRC status within the national budget
framework. USAID has given the AIHRC about $10 million per year since the fall of the Taliban.
Religion: Influence of National Ulema Council
Counterbalancing the influence of post-Taliban modern institutions such as the AIHRC are
traditional bodies such as the National Ulema Council. The Council consists of the 150 most
respected and widely followed clerics throughout Afghanistan, but it represents a network of
about 3,000 clerics nationwide. It has increasingly taken conservative positions more generally,
thereby limiting free expression and social freedoms. The council had been headed by the highly
Congressional Research Service
50
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
conservative former Supreme Court Chief Justice Fazl Hadi Shinwari, who died in India of a
brain hemorrhage in February 2011.
In August 2010, 350 clerics linked to the Council voted to demand that Islamic law (Sharia) be
implemented (including such punishments as stoning, amputations, and lashings) in order to
better prevent crime. If the government were inclined to adopt that recommendation, it is likely
that doing so would require amending the Afghan constitution, which does not implement Sharia.
The Council’s March 2, 2012, backing Sharia interpretations of the rights of women is discussed
below in the section on women’s rights.
The government (Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs) is also involved in regulating religious
practices. Of Afghanistan’s approximately 125,000 mosques, 6,000 are registered and funded by
the government. Clerics in these mosques are paid about $100 per month and, in return, are
expected to promote the government line. In April 2012, the Ministry decreed that it would fire
government-funded clerics who refuse to heed warnings and preach violence or incitement.
Riots over Quran Burnings: 2011 and 2012
As an illustration of Afghanistan’s Islamic conservatism, riots have broken out in two successive
years over what some Afghans perceived as U.S. disrespect of Islam. On April 2, 2011, hundreds
of Afghans rioted in the normally quiet (and non-Pashtun) city of Mazar-e-Sharif to protest the
burning of a Quran by a Florida pastor a few weeks earlier. The rioters, who had been instigated
by the sermons of three mullahs (Islamic preachers) at the city’s signature Blue Mosque, stormed
the U.N. compound in the city and killed at least 12 people, including 7 U.N workers. Over the
next several days, similar, but less violent, demonstrations took place in Qandahar and other
Afghan cities until sentiment calmed. Earlier, in September 2010, some National Ulema Council
figures organized protests against plans by the Florida pastor to burn Qurans, although that
burning was not conducted following international and U.S. criticism of the pastor.
A more serious eruption occurred in late February 2012 over the mistaken U.S. discarding of
Qurans used by detainees at Bagram Airfield. Riots and protests occurred in several cities,
including the normally peaceful and pro-U.S. north, and several U.S. military personnel were
killed by Afghan security forces carrying out their own retaliations. The events caused tensions
between Afghan forces and their U.S. mentors, and potentially complicate the U.S. effort to
accelerate the transition to Afghan security before the end of 2014. The public reaction to the
Quran burning was more intense than it was following the March 11, 2012, killing of 16 Afghans
allegedly by a U.S. soldier, Robert Bales, who is in U.S. military custody. Still, the scope of the
ultimate Afghan reaction to that incident might depend on his legal fate.
Media and Freedom of Expression/Social Freedoms
Afghanistan’s conservative traditions have caused some backsliding in recent years on media
freedoms, which were hailed during 2002-2008 as a major benefit of the U.S. effort in
Afghanistan. In those years, numerous television channels and newspapers and other media forms
were established, giving Afghanistan one of the freest press in the region. Media has expanded to
the point where the government has taken steps in 2012 to launch a communications satellite to
help with broadcast speed and breadth of dissemination.
Congressional Research Service
51
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
However, a press law was passed in September 2008 that gave independence to the official media
outlets but also contained a number of content restrictions and required that new newspapers and
electronic media be licensed by the government. According to the State Department report on
human rights for 2010, there have been intimidation of journalists who criticize the central
government or local leaders, and some news organizations and newspapers have occasionally
been closed for incorrect or derogatory reporting on high officials. USAID programs have trained
investigative journalists to do more reporting on official corruption and other issues. The United
States has provided funding and advice to an Afghan Government Media Information Center that
the Afghan government uses to communicate with the public. However, possibly as part of an
effort to transition more tasks to the Afghans, or possibly as a sign of frustration with Karzai
criticism of some U.S. military operations, U.S. advisers were pulled from the Center in late
December 2011.
Separately, Islamic conservatives (in and outside government, such as the Ulema Council,
parliamentarian Sayyaf, and Shiite cleric Ayatollah Asif Mohseni), have sometimes asserted
control over media content. This has been an attempt to curb the popularity of such post-Taliban
networks as Tolo Television. With the council’s backing, in April 2008 the Ministry of
Information and Culture banned five Indian-produced soap operas on Tolo Television on the
grounds that they are too risqué, although the programs were restored in August 2008 under a
compromise that also brought in some Islamic-oriented programs from Turkey. Tolo has also
aired programs with women performers—presentations that raise eyebrows among religious
conservatives—and about official corruption.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s “Radio Azadi” service for Afghanistan has distributed 20,000
solar powered radios to poor (and usually illiterate) Afghans to improve their access to
information. In general, the government does not restrict access to the Internet, but it does ban
access to pornographic web sites.
Regarding broader social freedoms, as another example of the growing power of the Islamist
conservatives, alcohol is increasingly difficult to obtain in restaurants and stores, although it is
not banned for sale to non-Muslims. There were reports in April 2010 that Afghan police had
raided some restaurants and prevented them from selling alcoholic beverages at all. On the other
hand, some point to the fact that rock bands have appeared publicly in high profile shows in 2011
as evidence of increasing modernity.
Harsh Punishments
In October 2007, Afghanistan resumed enforcing the death penalty after a four-year moratorium,
executing 15 criminals. In August 2010, the issue of stoning to death as a punishment arose when
Taliban insurgents ordered a young couple who had eloped stoned to death in a Taliban-controlled
area of Konduz Province. Although the punishment was not meted out by the government, it was
reported that many residents of the couple’s village supported the punishment.
In early September 2011, press reports asserted that ISAF had suspended prison transfers to some
Afghan facilities because of alleged torture by Afghan prison authorities. Afghanistan’s Interior
Ministry and National Directorate of Security denied the allegations, which included assertions
that prisoners were being beaten with rubber hoses or given electric shocks.
Congressional Research Service
52
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Religious Freedom
The July-December 2010 International Religious Freedom report (released September 13, 2011)49
says that respect for religious freedom declined throughout the reporting period, particularly for
Christian groups and individuals. Members of minority religions, including Christians, Sikhs,
Hindus, and Baha’i’s, often face discrimination; the Supreme Court declared the Baha’i faith to
be a form of blasphemy in May 2007. Northeastern provinces have a substantial population of
Islamailis, a Shiite Muslim sect often called “Seveners” (believers in the Seventh Imam as the
true Imam). Many Ismailis follow the Agha Khan IV (Prince Qarim al-Husseini), who chairs the
large Agha Khan Foundation that has invested heavily in Afghanistan.
One major case that drew international criticism was a January 2008 death sentence, imposed in a
quick trial, against 23-year-old journalist Sayed Kambaksh for allegedly distributing material
critical of Islam. On October 21, 2008, a Kabul appeals court changed his sentence to 20 years in
prison, a judgment upheld by another court in March 2009. He was pardoned by Karzai and
released on September 7, 2009.
A positive development is that Afghanistan’s Shiite minority, mostly from the Hazara tribes of
central Afghanistan (Bamiyan and Dai Kundi provinces) can celebrate their holidays openly, a
development unknown before the fall of the Taliban. Some Afghan Shiites follow Iran’s clerical
leaders politically, but Afghan Shiites tend to be less religious and more socially open than their
co-religionists in Iran. The Hazaras are also advancing themselves socially and politically through
education in such fields as information technology.50 The former Minister of Justice, Sarwar
Danesh, is a Hazara Shiite, the first of that community to hold that post. He studied in Qom, Iran,
a center of Shiite theology. (Danesh was voted down by the parliament for reappointment on
January 2, 2010, and again on June 28 when nominated for Minister of Higher Education.) The
justice minister who was approved on January 16, 2010, Habibullah Ghalib, is part of Dr.
Abdullah’s faction, but not a Shiite Muslim. Ghaleb previously (2006) was not approved by the
Wolesi Jirga for a spot on the Supreme Court. There was unrest among some Shiite leaders in late
May 2009 when they learned that the Afghan government had dumped 2,000 Iranian-supplied
religious texts into a river when an Afghan official complained that the books insulted the Sunni
majority.
Several conversion cases have earned international attention. An Afghan man, Abd al-Rahman,
who had converted to Christianity 16 years ago while working for a Christian aid group in
Pakistan, was imprisoned and faced a potential death penalty trial for apostasy—his refusal to
convert back to Islam. Facing international pressure, Karzai prevailed on Kabul court authorities
to release him (March 29, 2006). His release came the same day the House passed H.Res. 736
calling on protections for Afghan converts. In May 2010, the Afghan government suspended the
operations of two Christian-affiliated international relief groups claiming the groups were
attempting to promote Christianity among Afghans—an assertion denied by the groups (Church
World Service and Norwegian Church Aid). Another case arose in May 2010, when an amputee,
Said Musa, was imprisoned for converting to Christianity from Islam, an offense under Afghan
law that leaves it open for Afghan courts to apply a death sentence under Islamic law (Shariah).
The arrest came days after the local Noorin TV station broadcast a show on Afghan Christians
49 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168240.htm.
50 Oppel, Richard Jr. and Abdul Waheed Wafa, “Hazara Minority Hustles to Head of the Class in Afghanistan,” New
York Times, January 4, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
53
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
engaging in their rituals. Following diplomatic engagement by governments and human rights
groups, Musa was quietly released from prison on February 24, 2011, and reportedly went to
Italy, where he is seeking asylum.
Human Trafficking
Afghanistan was again placed in Tier 2: Watch List in the State Department report on human
trafficking issued on June 27, 2011 (Trafficking in Persons Report for 2011). The placement was
the same as it was in the report for 2010 (June 17, 2010) and a downgrade from the Tier 2
placement of the 2009 report. The Afghan government is assessed in the 2011 report as not
complying with minimum standards for eliminating trafficking, but making significant efforts to
do so. However, the government did not increase its efforts to curb trafficking over the previous
year. The State Department report says that women from China, some countries in Africa, Iran,
and some countries in Central Asia are being trafficked into Afghanistan for sexual exploitation,
although, according to the report, trafficking within Afghanistan is more prevalent than
trafficking across its borders. The report asserts that some families knowingly sell their children
for forced prostitution, including for bacha baazi, a practice in which wealthy men use groups of
young boys for social and sexual entertainment. The United States has spent about $500,000 to
eliminate human trafficking in Afghanistan since FY2001.
Advancement of Women
Women and women’s groups are a large component of the burgeoning of civil society in post-
Taliban Afghanistan. Freedoms for women have greatly expanded since the fall of the Taliban
with their elections to the parliament and their service at many levels of government. The Afghan
government pursues a policy of promoting equality for women under its National Action Plan for
Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA).
Among the most notable accomplishments, women are performing jobs that were rarely held by
women even before the Taliban came to power in 1996, including in the new police force. There
are over 200 female judges and 447 female journalists working nationwide but, in a sign of
difficulty in changing attitudes, the most senior Afghan woman in the police force was
assassinated in Qandahar in September 2008. The first Afghan female pilots arrived for training
in the United States in July 2011. Press reports say Afghan women are increasingly learning how
to drive. Under the new government, the wearing of the full body covering called the burqa is no
longer obligatory, and fewer women are wearing it than was the case a few years ago. In
November 2010, the government opened a USAID-funded women-only park in Kabul called
“Women’s Garden” where women can go, without male escort, and undertake fitness and job
training activities.
A major institutional development has been the formation of a Ministry of Women’s Affairs
dedicated to improving women’s rights, although numerous accounts say the ministry’s influence
is limited in part because of the relative ineffectiveness of minister Husn Banu Ghazanfar. It
promotes the involvement of women in business ventures, and it plays a key role in trying to
protect women from domestic abuse by running a growing number of women’s shelters across
Afghanistan. However, the Afghan government, in January 2011, launched a plan to regulate the
11 shelters by placing them under government control. This has raised concerns that the
government might seek to limit the access to the shelters by some women and in some areas.
Congressional Research Service
54
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
One of the most prominent civil society groups operating in post-Taliban Afghanistan is the
Afghanistan Women’s Network. It has at least 3,000 members and its leaders say that 75 non-
governmental organizations work under its auspices. In addition, the Afghanistan Independent
Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and a private group, Afghanistan Human Rights and
Democracy Organization, focus extensively on rights for Afghan women.
Some groups, such as Human Rights Watch, as well as the State Department human rights report
for recent years, report backsliding on women’s rights. 51 Numerous abuses, such as denial of
educational and employment opportunities, continue primarily because of Afghanistan’s
conservative traditions. This is particularly prevalent in rural areas, and less so in larger urban
areas.
• More than 70% of marriages in Afghanistan are forced, despite laws banning the
practice, and a majority of brides are younger than the legal marriage age of 16.
• The practice of baad, remains prevalent, in which women are given away to
marry someone from another clan to settle a dispute.
• There is no law specifically banning sexual harassment, and women are routinely
jailed for running away from home [and presumably abusive marriages]. Under
the penal code, a man convicted of “honor killing” (of a wife who commits
adultery) cannot be sentenced to more than two years in prison. One case
receiving substantial attention in December 2011 has involved a woman who was
jailed for having a child outside wedlock even though the child was a product of
rape. In order to save face for herself and her family, the woman is contemplating
marrying the rapist.
Many Afghan women are concerned that the efforts by Karzai and the international community to
persuade insurgents to end their fight and rejoin the political process (“reintegration and
reconciliation” process) could result in backsliding on women’s rights. Most insurgents are highly
conservative Islamists who oppose the advancement of women that has occurred. They are
perceived as likely to demand some reversals of that trend if they are allowed, as part of any deal,
to control territory, assume high-level government positions, or achieve changes to the Afghan
constitution. Karzai has said that these concessions are not envisioned, but skepticism remains,
and some Afghan officials close to Karzai do not rule out the possibility of amending the
constitution to accommodate some Taliban demands. Women have been a target of attacks by
Taliban supporters, including attacks on girls’ schools and athletic facilities.
Major Legal Developments
Some Afghan laws passed over the past few years have affected women, both positively and
negatively. The Afghan government tried to accommodate Shiite leaders’ demands in 2009 by
enacting (passage by the National Assembly and signature by Karzai in March 2009) a “Shiite
Personal Status Law,” at the request of Shiite leaders. The law was intended to provide a legal
framework for members of the Shiite minority in family law issues. However, the issue turned
controversial when international human rights groups and governments—and Afghan women in a
demonstration in Kabul—complained about provisions that would appear to sanction marital rape
51 “We Have the Promises of the World: Women’s Rights in Afghanistan,” Human Rights Watch, December 2009,
http://www.wluml.org/sites/wluml.org/files/hrw_report_2009.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
55
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
and which would allow males to control the ability of females in their family to go outside the
home. President Obama publicly called these provisions “abhorrent.” In early April 2009, taking
into account the outcry, Karzai sent the law back to the Justice Ministry for review, saying it
would be altered if it were found to conflict with the Afghan constitution. The offending clauses
were substantially revised by the Justice Ministry in July 2009, requiring that wives “perform
housework,” but also apparently giving the husband the right to deny a wife food if she refuses
sex. The revised law was passed by the National Assembly in late July 2009, signed by Karzai,
and published in the official gazette on July 27, 2009, although it remains unsatisfactory to many
human rights and women’s rights groups.
On August 6, 2009, perhaps in an effort to address some of the criticisms of the Shiite law, Karzai
issued, as a decree, the “Elimination of Violence Against Women” (EVAW) law. Minister of
Women’s Affairs Ghazanfar told CRS in October 2009 that the bill was long contemplated and
not related to the Shiite status law.52 It was enacted by the National Assembly as a law as of
December 2010; it had been held up by the Assembly for final passage because some Islamic
conservatives, such as Sayyaf (cited above), reportedly object to the provisions of the law
criminalizing child marriages. A U.N. report on human rights in Afghanistan, released January 18,
2012 (A/HRC/19/47), says the EVAW law implementation has been weakened by some Supreme
Court rulings and other Afghan legal decisions.
The optimism that greeted the EVAW law was further reduced on March 2, 2012, when the
Ulema Council issued a pronouncement saying women should be forced to wear the veil and be
forbidden from traveling without a male chaperone. The pronouncement did reiterate support for
the rights of women to inherit and own property, and to choose their marital partners. On March
6, 2012, Karzai endorsed the Ulema Council statement.
Women in Key Positions
Despite conservative attitudes, women have moved into prominent positions in all areas of
Afghan governance, although with periodic setbacks. Three female ministers were in the 2004-
2006 cabinet: former presidential candidate Masooda Jalal (Ministry of Women’s Affairs), Sediqa
Balkhi (Ministry for Martyrs and the Disabled), and Amina Afzali (Ministry of Youth). Karzai
named three women to cabinet posts on January 9, 2010, including Afzali (to Labor and Social
Affairs). Of the three, however, only Afzali was confirmed on January 16, 2009; the other two
were opposed by Islamic conservatives but one was later confirmed, as discussed earlier.
Afghanistan has one female ambassador. In the December 16, 2009, nomination list, Karzai
proposed a woman to head a new Ministry of Literacy, but parliament did not vote on this
nomination because it had not yet acted to approve formation of the ministry. In March 2005,
Karzai appointed a former minister of women’s affairs, Habiba Sohrabi, as governor of Bamiyan
province, inhabited mostly by Hazaras.
One woman (Masooda Jalal) ran in the 2004 presidential election, and two ran for president in the
August 20, 2009, election. In the latter, each received less than one-half of 1%. As noted above,
parliamentarian Fawzia Koofi already has declared she will run in 2014, and there are likely to be
additional female candidates.
52 CRS meeting with the Minister of Women’s Affairs, October 13, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
56
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
In the National Assembly, the constitution reserves for women at least 17 of the 102 seats in the
upper house and 68 of the 249 seats in the lower house of parliament. There were 23 serving in
the outgoing upper house, 6 more than Karzai’s mandated bloc of 17 female appointees. There
were 68 women in the previous lower house (when the quota was 62), meaning 6 were elected
without the quota. The number elected in the September 18, 2010, election is 69, one more than
the quota. (For the election, about 400 women ran—about 16% of all candidates.) The target ratio
is ensured by reserving an average of two seats per province (34 provinces) for women—the top
two female vote getters per province. (Kabul province reserves 9 female seats.) In the National
Assembly, a woman, Shukria Barekzai, was chair of the Defense Committee of the elected lower
house during 2011. Some NGOs and other groups believe that the women elected by the quota
system are not viewed as equally legitimate parliamentarians.
About 300 women were delegates to the 1,600-person “peace jirga” that was held during June 2-
4, 2010, which endorsed an Afghan plan to reintegrate insurgents who want to end their fight. The
High Peace Council to oversee the reconciliation process, which met for the first time on October
10, 2010, has 9 women out of 70 members, although these women report that their views are not
taken into account to any significant extent in the Council. At U.S. and other country urging, at
least one woman will be part of the official Afghan delegation to the major international
conference on Afghanistan in Bonn on December 5, 2011. The female participant will be selected
at a meeting of civil society activists in Bonn, a day before the major conference begins.
U.S. and International Posture on Women’s Rights
U.S. officials say that its policy is to promote women’s rights in Afghanistan rigorously. The
Administration has and is following its “Strategy for Assistance to Women in Afghanistan, 2010-
2013.”53 U.S. officials said aid allocations are geared toward that strategy. Specific earmarks for
use of U.S. funds for women’s and girls’ programs in Afghanistan are contained in recent annual
appropriations, and these earmarks have grown steadily. The United States provided $159 million
to programs for Afghan women in FY2009, slightly more than the $150 million earmarked, and
about $225 million for FY2010, more than the $175 earmarked.54 For FY2010, assistance was
provided in the following “pillars” of the U.S. Strategy: health ($87 million); education ($31
million); economy, work, and poverty ($54.6 million); legal protection and human rights ($12
million); and leadership and political participation ($43 million). Amounts were similar for
FY2011. U.S. funding has been used, in part, to help finance over 830,000 microloans to women
during 2004-2011, and they have used these funds to establish 175,000 small businesses,
according to the SRAP report released November 2011.
These strategy pillars, and specific programs funded by them, are discussed in annual State
Department reports on U.S. aid to women and girls. However, an audit issued in July 2010 by the
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction found that the State Department and
USAID did not provide complete and consistent information about the reported activities in
which women and girls were intended beneficiaries.
The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (AFSA, P.L. 107-327) authorized $15 million per
year (FY2003-FY2006) for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. Those monies are donated to the
53 A draft of this strategy document was provided to CRS by the State Department, April 21, 2011.
54 For prior years, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman, in the section on aid to Afghanistan, year by year.
Congressional Research Service
57
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Ministry from Economic Support Funds (ESF) accounts controlled by USAID. S. 229, the
Afghan Women Empowerment Act of 2009, introduced in the 111th Congress, would authorize
$45 million per year in FY2010-FY2012 for grants to Afghan women, for the ministry of
Women’s Affairs ($5 million), and for the AIHRC ($10 million).
Democracy, Human Rights, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues
U.S. funding for democracy, governance, and rule of law programs has grown, in line with the
Obama Administration strategy for Afghanistan. During FY2002-FY2011, a total of about $5.0
billion was spent on democracy, governance, rule of law and human rights, and elections support.
Of these, by far the largest category is “good governance,” which, in large part, is used to build
the financial and management oversight capability of the central government. Good governance
funding accounts for about $1 billion of the $1.388 billion spent on all democracy and
governance funding for FY2011. Rule of law and human rights funding accounts for about $250
million in FY2011, and $1.18 billion for FY2002-2011, of which some funds come from the
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account and the remainder is largely
Economic Support Funds. The remaining FY2011 funds for this overall purpose were: $80
million for civil society building and $50 million for political competition and consensus
building.
The following was funded for FY2012 in P.L. 112-74 (Consolidated Appropriation)
• $1.076 billion for overall democracy and human rights-related funding including
• $789.1 million for good governance;
• $256.6 million for rule of law and human rights ($227 million of which are
INCLE funds);
• $17.3 million for political competition and consensus building; and
• $13.7 million for civil society.
For tables on U.S. aid to Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban
Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
Effects of a Settlement with the Taliban
A major U.S. and Afghan initiative—to reach a conflict-ending settlement with the Taliban—is
likely to affect all of the issues discussed in this paper: Afghan politics, future elections, the
performance of the government along all its metrics, and the human rights situation. Many in the
international community, including within the Obama Administration, initially withheld
endorsement of the concept, fearing it might result in the incorporation into the Afghan political
system of insurgent leaders who retain ties to Al Qaeda and will roll back freedoms instituted
since 2011. The minority communities in the north, women, intellectuals, and others remain
skeptical that their freedoms can be preserved if there is a political settlement with the Taliban.
These groups fear that the Taliban could be given major ministries, seats in parliament, or even
tacit control over territory as part of any deal. Secretary Clinton said in India on July 20, 2011,
that any settlement must not result in and undoing of “the progress that has been made [by
women and ethnic minorities] in the past decade.” To respond to those fears, Afghan and U.S.
officials say that the outcome of a settlement would require the Taliban to drop at least some of its
Congressional Research Service
58
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
demands that (1) foreign troops leave Afghanistan; (2) a new “Islamic” constitution be adopted;
and (3) Islamic law be imposed.
Following the 2010 U.S. shift to supporting a settlement, the July 20, 2010, Kabul Conference
endorsed establishment of an Afghan High Peace Council to build Afghan consensus on the issue.
That Council was established on September 5, 2010, and its 70 members met for the first time
under the leadership of Burhanuddin Rabbani on October 10, 2010. Rabbani was appointed
because of Karzai’s perception that he could bring along skeptical Northern Alliance/Tajik/other
minority figures to support reconciliation. These minority figures, as noted above, fear that
reconciliation with the Taliban will strengthen Pashtun control of government to the detriment of
the non-Pashtun minorities. Rabbani earned substantial respect among all factions for his diligent
work in this role; for example he led High Peace Council visits to Pakistan and other regional
countries, and established provincial representative offices of the Council in at least 27 provinces.
On the other hand, some of the nine women on the Council say their views have been routinely
dismissed. On April 14, 2012, the High Peace Council members voted Rabbani’s son, Salahuddin,
as his replacement.
Prior to the Rabbani killing, U.S., Taliban, and Afghan representatives had proliferated. On April
7, 2011, the Afghan head of the reintegration process, Mohammad Stanekzai (who is also the
secretary of the High Peace Council and was seriously wounded in the Rabbani attack) said that
the Afghan government was in talks with Taliban representatives. The issue garnered further
attention in May 2011 amid reports that U.S. officials had met at least three times in 2011 with
Tayeb Agha, a figure believed close to Mullah Umar. In late June 2011, those meetings were
confirmed both by Karzai and then-Secretary of Defense Gates, who said the talks had been led
by the State Department and have been facilitated by Germany and Qatar.
Rabbani’s assassination set back the reconciliation process because the Northern Alliance and
other reconciliation skeptics asserted that the action demonstrates that the Taliban does not want
reconciliation and that counting on its prospects is naïve. Karzai, seeking to mollify that base of
opinion, echoed that criticism of Pakistan and Pakistan’s Afghan militant contacts. An opportunity
for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and others to pursue the issue was missed when Pakistan boycotted the
December 5, 2011, Bonn Conference over a November 26, 2011, security incident in which U.S.
forces killed 24 Pakistani border troops.
In December 2011, as tensions over these issues abated, U.S. officials resumed the process,
including pursuing the opening of a Taliban political office in Qatar to facilitate talks. That idea
was briefly disrupted by Afghan opposition to Qatar’s role; Afghanistan called its Ambassador to
Qatar back for consultations in December 2011 when Afghanistan learned that Qatar was about to
allow a Taliban office to open. That action suggested that Karzai wants a high degree of control
over any settlement talks, and it came amid reports that U.S. officials had been meeting Taliban
figures more frequently than was previously believed. The United States also revealed it was
considering a Taliban request for a “confidence-building measure” in the form of transferring
captives from the Guantanamo detention facility to a form of house arrest in Qatar. Such a
transfer would require U.S. congressional notification. The transfer reportedly has stalled as of
late April 2012 over Qatar’s failure to fully assure the United States that the detainees would be
able to escape custody. The figures include some, such as Mullah Mohammad Fazl who were
major figures in the Taliban regime (Fazl was deputy Defense Minister). H.Res. 529 expresses
opposition to their release. The United States also demanded a public Taliban statement severing
its ties to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups, possibly as a prelude to a limited battlefield
ceasefire.
Congressional Research Service
59
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Some movement became apparent in early 2012—in January 2012, Karzai dropped his objections
to the Qatar office, and members of the High Peace Council confirmed on February 16, 2012, that
the Afghan government was also involved in talks with some Taliban figures. On February 24,
2012, following a trilateral Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan summit, Pakistani leaders for the first time
publicly encouraged Taliban leaders to negotiate a settlement to the conflict. Still, some U.S.
officials say that all sides were not close to serious negotiations on the core issues of any political
settlement. And, the process suffered another set back following the March 11, 2012, killing of 16
Afghan civilians allegedly by a U.S. soldier. After that incident, the Taliban, as well as Hizb-ei-
Islam of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar called off their participation in settlement talks. An April 15,
2012, attack by militants on several locations in Kabul and other provinces again soured the
Afghan government on talks. On May 1, 2012, President Obama, in a speech in Afghanistan,
acknowledged that the United States has undertaken talks with the Taliban. As of May 1, 2012,
contacts are widely reported to have resumed informally after the suspensions discussed above.
Table 1. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations
Clan/Tribal
Confederations
Location Example
Durrani
Mainly southern Afghanistan:
Qandahar, Helmand, Zabol, Uruzgan,
Nimruz
Popalzai
Qandahar
Hamid Karzai, president of Afghanistan; Jelani Popal,
former head of the Independent Directorate of
(Zirak branch
Local Governance; Mul ah Bradar, the top aide to
of Durrani
Mullah Umar, captured in Pakistan in Feb. 2010.
Pashtun)
Two-thirds of Qandahar’s provincial government
posts held by Zirak Durrani Pashtuns
Alikozai
Qandahar
Mullah Naqibullah (deceased, former anti-Taliban
faction leader in Qandahar)
Barakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Ghul Agha Shirzai (Governor, Nangarhar Province)
Achakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Abdul Razziq, Police Chief, Qandahar Province
Alozai
Helmand (Musa Qala district)
Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh (former Helmand
governor); Hajji Zahir, former governor of Marjah
Noorzai
Qandahar
Noorzai brothers, briefly in charge of Qandahar
after the fall of the Taliban in November 2001
Ghilzai
Eastern Afghanistan: Paktia, Paktika,
Khost, Nangarhar, Kunar
Ahmadzai
Mohammed Najibullah (pres. 1986-1992); Ashraf
Ghani, Karzai adviser, Finance Minister 2002-2004
Hotak
Mullah Umar, but hails from Uruzgan, which is
dominated by Durranis
Taraki
Nur Mohammed Taraki (leader 1978-1979)
Kharoti
Hafizullah Amin (leader September-
December1979); Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, founder of
Hezb-e-Islami (Gulbuddin), former mujahedin party
leader now anti-Karzai insurgent.
Zadran
Paktia, Khost
Pacha Khan Zadran; Insurgent leader Jalaluddin
Haqqani
Kodai
Congressional Research Service
60
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Clan/Tribal
Confederations Location
Example
Mangal
Paktia, Khost
Ghulab Mangal (Governor of Helmand Province)
Orkazai
Shinwari
Nangarhar province
Fasl Ahmed Shinwari, former Supreme Court Chief
Justice
Mandezai
Sangu Khel
Sipah
Wardak
Wardak Province
Abdul Rahim Wardak (Defense Minister)
(Pashtu-speaking
non-Pashtun)
Afridis
Tirah, Khyber Pass, Kohat
Zaka khel
Jawaki
Adam khel
Malikdin, etc
Yusufzais
Khursan, Swat, Kabul
Akozais
Malizais
Loezais
Khattaks
Kohat, Peshawar, Bangash
Akorai
Terai
Mohmands
Near Khazan, Peshawar
Baizai
Alimzai
Uthmanzais
Khawazais
Wazirs
Mainly in Waziristan
Darwesh khel
Bannu
Source: This table was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information Research Specialist, CRS.
Congressional Research Service
61
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Figure 1. Map of Afghan Ethnicities
Source: 2003 National Geographic Society, http://www.afghan-network.net/maps/Afghanistan-Map.pdf. Adapted
by Amber Wilhelm, CRS.
Notes: This map is intended to be illustrative of the approximate demographic distribution by region of
Afghanistan. CRS has no way to confirm exact population distributions.
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
Acknowledgments
The table of major Pashtun tribes was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information Research
Specialist, CRS.
Congressional Research Service
62