Belarus: Background and U.S. Policy Concerns
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
May 1, 2012
Congressional Research Service
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Belarus: Background and U.S. Policy Concerns

Summary
Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko snuffed out Belarus’s modest progress toward
democracy and a free market economy in the early 1990s and created an authoritarian, Soviet-
style regime. Belarus has close historical and cultural ties to Russia. Efforts to establish a political
and economic “union” between the two countries have had substantial public support in Belarus.
Nevertheless, the pace of integration between Belarus and Russia has been fitful. Current Russian
policy toward Belarus appears to be focused on gaining control of Belarus’s economic assets
while reducing the costs of subsidizing the Belarusian economy.
For many years, the United States limited ties to the regime while providing modest support to
pro-democracy organizations in Belarus. The United States and the European Union also imposed
sanctions on Belarusian leaders. In March 2008, Belarus withdrew its ambassador from
Washington and forced the United States to recall its ambassador from Minsk, in response to what
Belarus perceived as a tightening of U.S. sanctions against Belneftekhim, the state-owned
petrochemicals firm. Later in 2008, the United States and European Union suspended some
sanctions in exchange for very modest improvements on human rights issues.
This policy suffered a setback in December 2010, when Belarus held presidential elections that
observers from the OSCE viewed as falling far short of international standards. Moreover, in
response to an election-night demonstration against electoral fraud in a square in central Minsk,
the Lukashenko regime arrested over 700 persons, including most of his opponents in the
election, as well as activists, journalists, and civil society representatives. Some of those detained
were viciously beaten by police. On January 31, 2011, the EU and the United States imposed
enhanced visa and financial sanctions against top Belarusian officials. The United States also
reimposed sanctions against two key subsidiaries of Belneftekhim. They also pledged enhanced
support for Belarusian pro-democracy and civil society groups. Although Lukaskhenko has
released most of the political prisoners, he has continued to imprison at least 10. In response, the
United States and the EU have imposed sanctions against additional prominent Belarusian
officials, and the businessmen and firms associated with them.
Congress has responded to the situation in Belarus with legislation. In January 2012, President
Obama signed the Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act. The legislation reauthorizes the
Belarus Democracy Act of 2004. It updates the provisions of the legislation to include the
fraudulent December 2010 election and the ensuing crackdown. It also updates the report the
Administration is required to file to include assistance provided by other governments or
organizations to assist the Belarusian government’s efforts to control the Internet. The bill says it
is the policy of the United States to call on the International Ice Hockey Federation to suspend its
plan to hold the 2014 International World Ice Hockey championship in Minsk until the
government of Belarus releases all political prisoners. The move would be a serious blow to
Lukashenko personally, as he is known to be an avid hockey fan.
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Belarus: Background and U.S. Policy Concerns

Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Political and Economic Situation..................................................................................................... 1
Economic Situation ................................................................................................................... 2
Relations with Russia ...................................................................................................................... 3
Relations with NATO and the European Union............................................................................... 5
U.S. Policy....................................................................................................................................... 7
Congressional Action............................................................................................................... 10

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 11

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Belarus: Background and U.S. Policy Concerns

Introduction
Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko snuffed out Belarus’s modest progress toward
democracy and a free market economy and created an authoritarian regime shortly after being
elected as president in 1994. His regime is in rhetoric and policies a throwback to the Soviet era.
Those advocating a stronger U.S. role in trying to bring democratic change to Belarus say that the
country is important to the United States because Belarus is an obstacle to the U.S. goal of
making Europe “whole and free.” Another concern is Belarus’s support for pariah regimes,
including through arms sales.
Relations between Belarus and the EU and United States have been particularly poor since
Lukashenko’s brutal repression of the opposition after fraudulent presidential elections in
December 2010. In response, the EU and United States have imposed strengthened sanctions
against key Belarusian leaders, businessmen, and firms. Russia has taken advantage of this
situation to increase its political and economic influence in Belarus.
Political and Economic Situation
Lukashenko was first elected as president of Belarus in 1994 on a populist, anti-corruption
platform. He dominates the Belarusian political scene, controlling the parliament, government,
security services, and judiciary through a large presidential administration and substantial extra-
budgetary resources. He has reduced potential threats from within his regime by frequently
removing or transferring officials at all levels, often claiming they are incompetent or corrupt.
Former regime figures who move into opposition are singled out for particularly harsh
punishment. His tight control over an unreformed economy has prevented the rise of powerful
“oligarchs,” as occurred in Ukraine and Russia. The Lukashenko regime also controls almost all
of the media, which it uses to burnish Lukashenko’s image and attack real and imagined
adversaries. Lukashenko is known for his political unpredictability and for making rambling and
rhetorically colorful public statements.
Opposition groups and leaders in Belarus have so far posed little threat to the Lukashenko regime.
The opposition’s weakness is in part due to the regime’s repression, but divisions over ideology
and the conflicting personal ambitions of its leaders have also been factors. Lukashenko also
appears to have succeeded in convincing some Belarusians, especially in the countryside, that his
leadership has provided them with stable (if very modest) living standards and public order, in
contrast to the vast disparities in wealth and rampant criminality prevalent in neighboring Russia.
The State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights for 2010 said the regime harassed,
arrested, and beat opposition figures. The regime forced the closure of independent media and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dealing with political issues and human rights. The
regime sharply restricted activities of independent trade unions and some religious groups. In
January 2012, a law went into effect that strengthened the government’s ability to control internet
use in Belarus.
Belarus held presidential elections in December 2010. According to monitors from the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the elections failed to meet
international standards for free and fair elections. The observers noted a few positive trends,
including limited but uncensored television airtime for opposition candidates. However, the
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observers also detailed serious shortcomings in the vote. The government used its administrative
resources to support Lukashenko’s candidacy and broadcast media (entirely state-owned) focused
overwhelmingly on positive coverage of Lukashenko. The vote count was conducted in a non-
transparent way, with observers assessing almost half of observed vote counts as “bad or very
bad.” According to the Belarusian Central Election Commission, Lukashenko was reelected with
nearly 80% of the vote. His top opponent, Andrei Sannikau, purportedly won under 3%.
The government responded to an election-night demonstration against electoral fraud in central
Minsk with the arrest (and in several cases vicious beatings) of seven of the nine opposition
candidates as well as the detention of over 700 other persons, including activists, journalists, and
civil society representatives.1 Since early 2011, Lukaskhenko has released most, but not all, of the
political prisoners. Most recently, in early April 2012, Lukashenko released Andrei Sannikau, one
of the main opposition presidential candidates, and Dzmitry Bandarenka, his chief campaign aide.
In order to secure their release, Sannikau and Bandarenka had to request pardons from
Lukashenko and apologize for their alleged misdeeds. According to the EU, 10 political prisoners
remain in custody.
Belarus is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections by September 2012. It is unclear whether the
main opposition parties will participate in the vote, given the near-certainty of electoral fraud by
the Lukashenko regime.
Economic Situation
Belarus’s economy is the most unreformed in Europe, according to most observers. Nevertheless,
until the global economic crisis, Belarus’s economy appeared to be doing quite well, at least on
paper. Belarus’s economy has been buoyed by exports to a growing Russia, and, until recently,
Belarusian refineries have profited from refining cheap Russian crude oil and exporting it to
Western countries. In addition, many experts doubt that Belarusian statistics are entirely accurate.
Growth in industrial production is made possible by subsidies to ailing state firms. This economic
system keeps official unemployment very low. Wage and pension increases are mandated by the
government. Some prices are controlled. Collective farms are also propped up by subsidies,
although private plots held by peasants are more productive.
For much of his reign, Lukashenko’s policies have provided a low but stable standard of living
for many Belarusians and are a key reason for the public support that he has enjoyed, particularly
among older and rurally based Belarusians. State control of most of the economy can also provide
a way of pressuring potential opponents into silence. Most persons in Belarus work at state-
owned enterprises on one-year labor contacts, which the government can decline to renew if an
employee displeases it.
The global economic crisis caused a slowdown in Belarus’s economic growth. In 2008, real Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) increased by a reported 10%, but growth slowed to 0.2% in 2009.
Reported GDP growth surged again in 2010 to 7.6%. Belarus’s foreign exchange reserves
dwindled as the government tried to defend the Belarusian rubel, leading it to request and receive
a $2 billion stabilization loan from Russia. Belarus also agreed to a $2.5 billion loan from the

1 The OSCE election observers’ preliminary report can be found at http://www.osce.org/odihr/documents/74638
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International Monetary Fund in January 2009. The IMF added another $1 billion in July 2009.
Belarus also received loans from the World Bank.
The IMF called for wide-ranging reforms in such areas as price and wage liberalization,
deregulation, privatization, and reducing the size of government. The government simplified the
tax system and cut red tape needed to establish new companies. However, the regime has shown
few signs that it is willing to make more sweeping changes, such as sharply reducing government
control of the economy or breaking up the collective farm system. Perhaps due to a need to raise
funds for government coffers, Belarus sold a few large companies to foreign investors, mostly
from Russia. Western buyers have shown little interest in buying Belarusian firms, given the
unattractive investment climate in the country. In April 2010, Belarus said it would not seek
another IMF loan, perhaps due to a disinclination to undertake structural reforms. Also,
Lukashenko increased government spending ahead of the election, and may not have wanted a
loan that would have been conditioned on reduced spending.
Belarus suffered another economic crisis in early 2011 due to rapidly dwindling foreign exchange
reserves, in part as a result of government overspending prior to the December 2010 election. The
government sought an IMF loan, which was refused due to Belarus’s failure to agree to deeper
economic reforms. Instead, in October 2011, the government allowed the rubel to float freely,
which resulted in an immediate devaluation of the Belarusian currency by more than 50%. This
move, plus loans from Russia and asset sales to Russian firms, has helped to stabilize Belarus’s
external position, at least for now. The devaluation has caused a deterioration of living standards
for many Belarusians, who depend on imports, which are now more expensive, for high-quality
consumer goods. It has also added to Belarus’s problem with hyperinflation. By December 2011,
year-on-year inflation in Belarus was 109%. Real GDP growth slowed to a reported 5.3% in
2011.2
Relations with Russia
Belarus has close historical and cultural ties with Russia. The two countries also have close
economic relations. Belarus is a member of the Eurasian Economic Community (also known as
EurAsEC), also which includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Belarus is also a
member of a customs union within EurAsEC, with Russian and Kazakhstan. These countries have
started the process of creating a single Economic Space, or common market.
Russian policy toward Belarus appears to be focused on gaining control of Belarus’s key
economic assets, while limiting subsidies to the country. After the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Russia’s state-owned natural gas firm Gazprom supplied Belarus with natural gas at Russian
domestic prices, providing a large indirect subsidy to the Lukashenko regime. About 20% of
Russia’s natural gas exports and about half of its oil exports to Europe flow through Belarusian
pipelines.
In 2006, Gazprom pressured Belarus to sell to it half of the Beltransgaz natural gas firm (which
controls the pipelines and other infrastructure on Belarusian territory) and other key Belarusian
energy firms, or face the quadrupling of the price Belarus would pay for Russian natural gas.
Belarus would face a cut-off in supplies, if it did not agree to pay the higher price. Belarus agreed

2 Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report: Belarus, February 2012.
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to sell Gazprom a 50% majority stake in stages between 2007 and 2010. In addition to receiving
cheap natural gas, Belarus has also benefitted from inexpensive and duty-free crude oil supplies
that are processed at Belarusian refineries. Belarus then sold the bulk of these refined products to
EU countries at a hefty profit. In 2007, Russia started reducing this subsidy to the Belarusian
economy, as well. To hedge his bets, Lukashenko has tried to diversify Belarus’s energy supplies
through imports from such countries as Venezuela, Kazakhstan, Iran, and Azerbaijan, as well as
development of coal reserves and a nuclear power plant within Belarus.
Lukashenko has pointed to close military cooperation between Russia and Belarus, and Belarus's
geographical position between NATO and Russia as reasons for Russia to subsidize energy
supplies to Belarus. Belarus is a member of the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO), which Russia hopes to make into a counterweight to NATO influence. In
2009, Belarus announced that it would join the CSTO rapid reaction force. However, Belarus
continues to stress that it will not deploy its forces outside its borders. Russian and Belarusian air
defenses are closely integrated. Russia has supplied Belarus with up-to-date air defense
equipment. A regional task force of Belarusian and Russian ground forces conducts joint military
exercises. There are a small number of Russian troops in Belarus, in part to run a naval radio
station and an early warning radar station.
Normally the Kremlin’s most loyal ally, Lukashenko has shown some independence from
Moscow’s foreign policy. Belarus has refrained from following Russia's lead in recognizing the
Georgian breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent countries, despite
continuing pressure from Moscow to do so. Belarus provided asylum to former Kyrgyzstan
President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, whose April 2010 ouster was supported by Moscow. Lukashenko
has also played host to Georgian President and Kremlin antagonist Mikheil Shaakashvili.
Tensions between Moscow and Minsk increased as a result of attacks on Lukashenko in
government-controlled Russian media in the second half of 2010. However, just days before the
December 2010 presidential election the two sides signed an agreement on oil export duties that
Minsk claimed was worth an estimated $4 billion a year to Belarus. Lukashenko agreed that
Belarus would further integrate its economy with Russia’s in a regional “Single Economic
Space.” In contrast to U.S. and EU condemnation of what was widely perceived as a fraudulent
election and of an ensuing crackdown against the opposition, Russian President Medvedev
congratulated Lukashenko on his “reelection.”
Russia has taken advantage of Minsk’s international isolation since the presidential election and
its foreign exchange shortfall to gain control of key Belarusian economic assets. In June 2011,
Russia, through the Eurasian Economic Community, granted Belarus a $3 billion stabilization
loan. Release of the loan tranches is conditioned on the privatization of Belarusian companies. In
November 2011, Belarus agreed to sell its remaining portion of Beltransgaz to Gazprom, giving
the Russian state-owned company a 100% share. In exchange, Belarus received a substantial
reduction in the price charged by Gazprom for natural gas supplies. Russia has also cut the price
of oil supplies to Belarus. In addition, Belarus has received a $1 billion loan from the Russian
Sberbank and the Eurasian Development Bank. As collateral, Belarus had to put up 35% of the
key Belarusian fertilizer company Belaruskali.
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Relations with NATO and the European Union
Belarus’s relations with NATO are poor. Belarus strongly opposed NATO enlargement to include
neighboring central European countries. Lukashenko continues to claim that NATO represents a
military threat to Belarus. Belarus is a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, but has
not been very active in it.
Belarus-EU ties (and to some extend U.S.-Belarus relations) have followed a familiar pattern—
the Lukashenko regime conducts fraudulent elections and engages in repressive actions against
opposition figures. The EU responds with sanctions against persons responsible for those actions,
but refrains from sanctions against Belarus as a whole. Lukashenko, perhaps seeking international
loans and feeling particularly strong pressure from Russia, liberates political prisoners, while
keeping the fundamentally undemocratic nature of the regime intact. The EU responds by
enhancing contacts with the government. Another cycle of repression ensues, often after the next
fraudulent election, and the cycle repeats itself.
For example, in January and February 2008, Belarus freed political prisoners whose release was
demanded by the United States and the EU. In March, Belarus signed an agreement with the EU
to open an EU Commission delegation in Minsk. The moves contrasted with a sharp deterioration
in relations with the United States at the same time, leading to speculation that Belarus was trying
to split the United States and EU. Lukashenko freed the final three political prisoners in Belarus
in August 2008. However, EU and U.S. efforts to encourage real political reform suffered a
setback when Belarus’s September 2008 parliamentary elections fell far short of OSCE standards,
although the OSCE noted a few “minor” improvements.
Nevertheless, given Russia’s continuing pressure on Belarus’s energy supplies, increasing
Russian investment in Belarus, and the perceived threat posed to Russia’s neighbors by its
military actions in Georgia, the EU expanded its policy of engagement with the Lukashenko
regime. On October 13, 2008, EU foreign ministers agreed to suspend a travel ban on
Lukashenko, as well as most of the other Belarusian leaders banned from travel to the EU, for six
months. The EU extended the travel ban suspension for several additional six-month periods. A
few Belarusian officials remained under travel sanctions, including the head of the Belarusian
Central Electoral Commission, and officials believed implicated in the disappearance of three
opposition figures and a Russian television cameraman in 1999. EU officials and top officials
from EU countries visited Belarus.
In May 2009, the EU invited Belarus to join its Eastern Partnership Initiative, part of the EU’s
European Neighborhood program. The Partnership is aimed at developing a regional approach to
the EU’s relations with the countries lying between the EU and Russia, rather than the bilateral
ties that the EU has at present with these states. The program could lead to greater aid and advice
from the EU to Belarus. Long-term goals of the Partnership include a free trade zone and visa-
free travel to the EU.
After the EU unveiled its new policy, many Belarusian opposition leaders were skeptical of
aspects of the EU’s rapprochement with Lukashenko. They did not oppose in principle the
suspension of sanctions and the Eastern Partnership for Belarus, but stressed that in exchange for
these concessions the EU must insist far more strongly on a specific timetable for real democratic
reforms rather than what they viewed as the merely cosmetic ones offered by the regime. They
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expressed concern that the EU is sacrificing them for geopolitical reasons and perhaps also to
participate in the purchase of Belarus’s economic assets.
Some analysts attributed the EU’s more accommodating stance toward Belarus as a geopolitical
response to the Russian assault on Georgia. EU leaders reportedly fear that a resurgent Russia
could move to completely dominate Belarus unless the EU moves quickly to engage it. On the
other hand, EU countries with a particularly close relationship with Russia, such as Germany,
France, and Italy, are anxious to reassure Moscow that any improvement of EU ties with Belarus
will not come at the expense of Russia’s own special relationship with Minsk. Analysts also
claimed that a new policy of engagement was needed, as the old one of near-isolation had done
nothing to make the country more democratic.
Some countries that have traditionally been more skeptical of Moscow, such as Poland and
Lithuania, also favored the opening to Belarus. As neighbors of Belarus, they wanted to foster
increased economic and other exchanges across their common border. In addition, Poland hoped
engagement will improve the situation of the substantial ethnic Polish minority in Belarus.
However, despite the EU’s new policy, Lukashenko continued his efforts to exert control over
ethnic Polish organizations in Belarus, in particular by harassing the Union of Poles, an
independent organization backed by Warsaw.
For his part, Lukashenko wants to increase EU investment in Belarus. Minsk also hopes to
become a more important and reliable energy transit state for Europe, although this would depend
in large part on Russia, Belarus’s energy supplier. Despite his desire for closer ties with the EU,
Lukashenko has continued to make clear his continued support for very close ties with Moscow.
He has also complained about EU pressure for democratic reforms.
The fraudulent December 19, 2010, elections and their aftermath were a serious setback to EU-
Belarus relations. In November 2010, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle and Polish
Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski visited Minsk and met with President Lukashenko. They
called on Belarus to hold a free and fair presidential election. If it did so, Sikorski said Belarus
could receive about 3 billion Euro in grants and loans from the EU over the next three years.
However, the brutal post-election crackdown caused a dramatic shift in EU policy. Westerwelle
and Sikorski, who had only weeks earlier offered Belarus a 3 billion Euro “carrot,” coauthored
with Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt and Czech Foreign Minster Karel Schwartzenberg a
sharply worded article in the December 23 New York Times entitled “Lukashenko the Loser.”
They said that “continued positive engagement with Mr. Lukashenko at the moment seems to be a
waste of time.” They said Europe “must now deepen our engagement with the democrats of
Belarus and those inside the government who disapprove of the fateful turn their country has
taken.”
On January 31, 2011, European Union foreign ministers agreed to reimplement visa bans against
top Belarusian leaders, which were first imposed in 2004 and 2006 and suspended in 2008. In
addition, they agreed to impose visa bans and asset freezes on those responsible for the fraudulent
December 2010 election and the ensuing crackdown on the opposition and civil society. The
ministers said that the sanctions would be lifted only after the release and “rehabilitation” of those
persons detained on political grounds. The Council added that in addition to this, “further reforms
of the Electoral Code, the freedom of expression and of the media, the freedom of assembly and
association, would pave the way for the lifting of the restrictive measures.” The ministers said the
EU would provide “urgent support to those repressed and detained on political grounds and their
families” and strengthen other aid to civil society, “targeting in particular NGOs and students.”
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The statement said the EU looked forward to opening talks with Belarus for “visa facilitation” to
permit more ordinary Belarusian to visit the EU. In the meantime, the ministers expressed support
for EU member states’ waiver or reduction of visa fees for Belarusians. The EU statement stated
that the EU remains committed to dialogue with the Belarusian authorities and to the Eastern
Partnership program, but that “deepening” EU relations with Belarus “is conditional on progress
towards respect by the Belarusian authorities for the principles of democracy, the rule of law and
human rights.”3
In 2011, it seemed that another cycle in the EU-Belarus relationship would begin as the regime
liberated many of its political prisoners. However, others remained in captivity and additional
arrests and persecution of the opposition took place. In addition, those imprisoned were
reportedly subjected to ill-treatment and torture. In response, the EU has added names to its list of
persons subject to a visa ban and asset freeze on several occasions, most recently in March 2012.
The list contains not only senior Belarusian leaders responsible for repression, but also wealthy
businessmen (often referred to as “oligarchs”) with close connections to the regime. As of late
March 2012, the EU’s sanctions list contained 243 persons. In addition, 32 firms associated with
the regime have had their assets frozen by the EU.
Some analysts have pointed out Lukashenko has found ways to pressure the EU to not push
sanctions too far. For example, press reports claimed that during talks over adding certain
Belarusian oligarchs to the sanctions list in early 2012, Slovenia, Latvia, and other countries were
hesitant to include some names on the list, because of the investments of the oligarchs in their
countries. In addition, Belarusian officials have hinted that, if EU pressure is too intense,
Belarusian border guards could focus more on holding up the transit of EU exports through
Belarus, rather than intercepting asylum-seekers seeking to enter EU territory. Lukashenko has
also barred opposition figures from attending conferences in the EU, in retaliation for visa
sanctions against his officials and supporters. Perhaps for the same reason, the regime has
declined to conclude an agreement with the EU on visa facilitation for ordinary Belarusians.
The EU has allocated a total of 19.3 million Euro ($25.5 million) for aid for civil society and
independent media in Belarus between 2011 and 2013. In March 2012, the EU launched a
dialogue with Belarusian civil society and the opposition on the reforms needed to modernize
Belarus and to improve EU-Belarusian cooperation.
U.S. Policy
The United States recognized independent Belarus on December 25, 1991. U.S. officials hailed
the removal of all nuclear weapons from Belarus in November 1996. However, U.S.-Belarus
relations deteriorated as Lukashenko become increasingly authoritarian. In 1997, a State
Department spokesman announced a policy of “selective engagement” with Belarus on issues of
U.S. national interests and “very limited dealings” on other issues. In addition to U.S. opposition
to Lukashenko’s human rights violations, the United States has criticized Belarus’s relations with
rogue regimes, such as Iran and Venezuela.

3 The EU foreign ministers’ statement can be found at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119038.pdf
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U.S. aid to Belarus has been meager. Aid to Belarus has been reduced over the past few years,
although by a lesser amount than in the cases of many other countries in Europe and Eurasia. The
United States provided $15 million in aid to Belarus in FY2010. According to the FY2013
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, in FY2011, the United States
provided $13.864 million in aid for Belarus. In FY2012, Belarus is expected to receive $11
million in U.S. aid. For FY2013, the Administration has requested $11 million in aid for Belarus.
Over three-quarters of this aid is slated for strengthening democratic political parties, civil
society, and independent media. U.S. aid funds exchange programs and education programs for
Belarusian students. The U.S. assistance program also supports anti-trafficking efforts and the
strengthening of small and medium-sized businesses in Belarus
U.S. officials have noted that implementation of U.S. programs has been made difficult by the
Lukashenko regime. The Bush Administration noted that the regime’s harassment of NGOs,
including by banning foreign aid to NGOs even remotely dealing with politics and jailing
members of NGOs not registered with the authorities, hindered the delivery of U.S. aid. The
Obama Administration has noted that the sharp reduction in the number of U.S. diplomats in
Belarus forced by the Belarusian government makes monitoring and assessing program
performance difficult.
In concert with the EU, the United States has imposed a visa ban against Lukashenko and top
Belarusian officials since 2004 for undermining democratic processes, violating human rights,
and engaging in corruption. In addition, in November 2007 the United States froze the U.S. assets
of the state-owned oil and petrochemicals firm Belneftekhim and prohibited U.S. persons or
businesses from doing business with it. Belneftekhim makes chemical fertilizers and oil products.
It accounts for 35% of Belarus’s exports and over 30% of the country’s industrial output. U.S.
officials said the move was aimed at tightening financial sanctions against a massive
conglomerate under the regime’s control. However, the material impact of the sanctions was not
expected to be great, given the company has only modest assets in the United States, and that the
EU, the main market for Belneftekhim’s products, has not imposed sanctions of its own on the
firm.4
On March 6, 2008, the Administration issued a clarification on the Belneftekhim sanctions that
said that the freezing of Belneftekhim’s assets included the assets of any firms in which
Belneftekhim owns a 50% or greater interest. Belarus interpreted the move as a tightening of the
sanctions. Lukashenko responded by recalling Belarus’s ambassador to the United States on
March 7 and pressing for the removal of the U.S. Ambassador to Belarus, Karen Stewart.
Ambassador Stewart left Minsk on March 12 for consultations in Washington. Belarus reduced
the number of its diplomats in Washington to five persons, and demanded that the United States
do the same. The United States complied with Belarus’s request. The United States has not
appointed a new Ambassador to Belarus.
After this low point in U.S.-Belarusian ties, the United States appeared to attempt to improve
relations, in line with the European Union’s desire to engage Belarus by easing sanctions in
exchange for small steps forward on democratization. In early September 2008, the United States
suspended sanctions for six months on two Belneftekhim entities, while leaving sanctions on
others. The move was a reward for the release of the last Belarusian political prisoners in August

4 Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 29, 2007. Information on the financial sanctions can be found at the U.S. Treasury
Department website, http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/belarus/belarus.shtml.
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and an incentive to hold freer and fairer parliamentary elections on September 28. However, the
overture to Belarus appeared to suffer a setback after Belarus’s 2008 parliamentary elections,
which the State Department said “fell significantly short” of international standards. It said that
the United States would “maintain the dialogue” with the Belarusian government, but that better
elections and a better human rights record would be needed before ties could improve
“significantly.”5 Despite Belarus’s lack of significant progress on democratic reform, the United
States extended the suspension of sanctions on the two Belneftekhim entities for additional six-
month periods through November 2010.
The U.S.-Belarus rapprochement continued in early December 2010, when Secretary of State
Clinton and Belarusian Foreign Minister Sergei Martynov, meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan,
announced that Belarus had agreed to eliminate its supply of highly enriched uranium (HEU) by
the Nuclear Security Summit in March 2012 in Korea. In return, Belarus was to receive an
invitation to that summit, as well as U.S. aid to help Belarus dispose of its HEU. The United
States would continue to provide assistance for security upgrades at the Belarus Joint Institute for
Power and Nuclear Research, where all of the HEU is kept. The United States also offered
unspecified support for Belarus’s desire to build a new civilian nuclear power plant. Finally, the
two sides agreed that “enhanced respect for democracy and human rights in Belarus remains
central to improving bilateral relations.” Belarus’s agreement to give up its HEU may have been
part of an effort to secure better ties with the United States, given the importance with which the
United States views nuclear proliferation.
However, the positive impact of the HEU agreement on U.S.-Belarusian relations was sharply
diminished by the December 19, 2010, presidential election debacle. In a statement released by
the White House press secretary on December 20, the Administration said it
strongly condemns the actions that the Government of Belarus has taken to undermine the
democratic process and use disproportionate force against political activists, civil society
representatives and journalists, and we call for the immediate release of all presidential
candidates and the hundreds of protestors who were detained on December 19 and 20. The
United States cannot accept as legitimate the results of the presidential election announced
by the Belarusian Central Election Commission December 20.
The statement said that “the Belarusian government’s actions are a clear step backwards on issues
central to our relationship with Belarus.”
On January 31, 2011, in a move timed to coincide with a similar EU statement, the United States
announced a package of measures in response to the situation in Belarus. The Administration re-
imposed sanctions against Lakokraska OAO and Polotsk Steklovolokno OAO, the two key
subsidiaries of Belneftekhim against which sanctions had previously been suspended. The
statement also said the United States will “significantly” expand the number of Belarusian
officials (and their families) subject to a visa ban to include those responsible for the fraudulent
December 2010 election and the repression that followed. The United States would also increase
the number of persons and entities subject to asset freezes.
The statement said that the United States would increase its support to Belarusian civil society,
independent media, and democratic political parties. The Administration said that the U.S. will

5 “Belarus: Parliamentary Elections,” State Department press statement, September 29, 2008, from the State
Department website, http://www.state.gov.
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review its policy based on whether Belarus takes certain actions, including “the immediate release
of all detainees and the dropping of all charges associated with the crackdown; a halt to the
harassment of civil society, independent media and the political opposition; and space for the free
expression of political views, the development of a civil society, and freedom of the media.”6
In August 2011, the United States imposed sanctions against four additional Belarusian state-
owned enterprises: the Belshina tire factory; Grodno Azot, which manufactures fertilizer; Grodno
Khimvolokno, a fiber manufacturer; and Naftan, a major oil refinery. All four companies are
deemed to be controlled by Belneftekhim. In response to the U.S. announcement, Belarus
suspended the elimination of its stock of highly enriched uranium, which it had undertaken as part
of the December 2010 agreement with the United States.
The United States is concerned about human trafficking in Belarus. According to the State
Department’s 2011 Trafficking in Persons report, Belarus is a country of origin and transit for
women and children trafficked for sexual exploitation. It is listed as a “Tier 2” Watch List
country. This means that it does not meet minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking,
and has not made significant efforts in the previous year to do so. The report notes decreased law
enforcement activity against trafficking and insignificant progress in efforts to protect victims.
There has been some debate among policy analysts in Belarus, the United States, and Europe
about whether the current sanctions policy against Belarus is effective or even in some respects
counterproductive. Supporters, including some Belarusian opposition leaders, credit them with
being responsible for their liberation from prison. However, some Belarusian opposition figures
also criticize the sanctions for being largely symbolic in character, and being full of loopholes that
permit the regime to continue to do highly lucrative business in the EU and elsewhere. Experts in
the United States and Europe who are concerned about Russian efforts to strengthen its sphere of
influence in the region warn that by isolating Belarus, the EU and United States are playing into
Moscow’s hands, without achieving real gains on democratization.
Congressional Action
In the 11th and 112th Congress, Members of Congress have spoken out strongly against human
rights abuses in Belarus in congressional hearings, floor statements, speeches, and legislation. On
January 13, 2010, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen introduced H.R. 4436. The bill would
require an annual report by the Secretary of State to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Belarus’s arms sales and weapons-related technology
transfers, including to countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism.
On November 16, 2010, Representative Christopher Smith introduced H.Res. 1716, which
sharply condemns Lukashenko as a “dictator,” and calls on Belarus to conduct the presidential
election according to OSCE standards. He says that the United States remains open to
reevaluating ties with Belarus when it makes demonstrable progress in democracy, human rights,
and the rule of law.
On January 26, 2011, Representative Smith introduced H.R. 515, the Belarus Democracy and
Human Rights Act of 2011. On July 6, 2011, the House agreed to the bill by voice vote. The

6 For a text of the statement, see http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/01/155640.htm#
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Senate passed an amended version of H.R. 515 on December 14. The House agreed to the Senate
version by voice vote on December 20. President Obama signed the bill into law on January 3
(P.L. 112-82).
The law reauthorizes the Belarus Democracy Act (BDA) of 2004. It updates the provisions of the
legislation to sharply condemn the fraudulent December 2010 presidential election and the
ensuing crackdown. It expresses support for continuing radio, television, and Internet
broadcasting to Belarus by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the Voice of America, European
Radio for Belarus, and Belsat. The legislation updates the BDA by including the post-December
2010 events in the section of the earlier law that expressed support for U.S. sanctions against
Belarus. These include a prohibition on U.S. financial assistance to the Belarusian government
and expressing the sense of the Congress that the United States should oppose multilateral
financial aid to Belarus. These conditions are to remain in place until the President determines
Belarus meets specific democratic and human rights criteria. The section expresses the sense of
the Congress that the President should coordinate with European countries to take similar
measures against Belarus.
The BDA also required the President to report within 90 days and every year thereafter on the
sale of weapons or weapons-related assistance to regimes supporting terrorism, and on the
personal wealth of Lukashenko and other senior Belarusian leaders. P.L. 112-82 expands that
report to include weapons technology and training, as well as support from foreign governments
or organizations for the surveillance or censorship of the Internet. The law also says it is the
policy of the United States to call on the International Ice Hockey Federation to suspend its plan
to hold the 2014 International World Ice Hockey championship in Minsk until the government of
Belarus releases all political prisoners. The move would be a serious blow to Lukashenko
personally, as he is known to be an avid hockey fan.
On March 17, 2011, the Senate approved S.Res. 105 by unanimous consent. S.Res. 105 sharply
condemned the conduct of the December 2010 presidential vote, applauded the sanctions imposed
by the United States and EU on the Lukashenko regime and their commitment to provide
assistance to civil society in Belarus, and called for the 2014 World Hockey Championship not to
be held in Belarus unless all political prisoners are released.

Author Contact Information

Steven Woehrel

Specialist in European Affairs
swoehrel@crs.loc.gov, 7-2291


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