Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
April 19, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21968
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Summary
Relations among major political factions have worsened substantially since late 2011, threatening
Iraq’s stability and the perception of the achievements of the long U.S. intervention in Iraq. Sunni
Arabs, always fearful that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki would seek unchallenged power for
Shiite factions allied with him, accuse him of an outright power grab as he seeks to purge the
highest-ranking Sunni Arabs from government and to cripple attempts by Sunni-inhabited
provinces to achieve greater autonomy. Iraq’s Kurds have also become increasingly distrustful of
Maliki over territorial, political, and economic issues, and have begun to similarly accuse him of
authoritarian practices. The political crisis threatens to undo the relatively peaceful political
competition and formation of cross-sectarian alliances that had emerged since 2007 after several
years of sectarian conflict. Some Sunni insurgent groups apparently seek to undermine Maliki by
conducting high-profile attacks intended to reignite sectarian conflict.
The political rift has stalled the movement on national oil laws that had occurred during August-
November 2011. The political crisis has also renewed outside criticism that Iraq’s factions lack
focus on governance, or on improving key services, such as electricity.
The splits and dysfunctions within Iraq’s government that have widened since mid-December
2011 have called into question the legacy of U.S. involvement. In line with the letter of the
November 2008 bilateral U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, President Obama announced on October
21, 2011, that U.S. negotiations with Iraqi leaders failed to extend the agreement to allow for the
presence of any U.S. forces after 2011. The U.S. proposal to retain troops was based on lingering
U.S. doubts over the ability of Iraqi leaders and security forces to preserve the earlier gains.
However, as U.S. troops withdrew (completing the withdrawal on December 18, 2011),
Administration officials asserted publicly that Iraq’s governing and security capacity is sufficient
to continue to build a stable and democratic Iraq without a major U.S. military presence. Iraq’s
security forces number over 650,000 members, increasingly well armed and well trained—
observations the Administration says justifies selling Iraq such sophisticated equipment as U.S. F-
16 aircraft.
The view of the Administration is that the United States is able to engage Iraq extensively without
U.S. troops there, in order to help consolidate security, political, and economic progress and to
help Iraq resist Iranian influence. The Administration states that U.S. training for Iraq’s security
forces is continuing, using programs for Iraq similar to those with other countries in which there
is no U.S. troop presence. About 16,000 U.S. personnel, including contractors, remain in Iraq
under State Department authority to exert U.S. influence. Perhaps because Iraqi leaders are
increasingly emerging from U.S. tutelage, the State Department said in February 2012 that it is
considering a significant reduction in U.S. personnel in Iraq.
Some experts argue that, even though the U.S. civilian presence in Iraq remains large and active,
Iraq is realigning itself in the region. Some see it moving closer to Iran, and they cite Iraq’s
reluctance to call for Iran’s ally, Bashar Al Assad of Syria, to yield power amid major unrest.
Others see Iraq trying to reestablish its historic role as a major player in the Arab world, and to do
so Iraq has been trying to assuage fears of Sunni Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
Iraq took a large step toward returning to the Arab fold by hosting an Arab League summit on
March 27-29, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Contents
Overview of the Post-Saddam Political Transition.......................................................................... 1
Initial Transition and Construction of the Political System....................................................... 1
January 30, 2005, Elections for an Interim Government..................................................... 1
Permanent Constitution....................................................................................................... 2
December 15, 2005, Elections............................................................................................. 3
2006-2011: Sectarian Conflict and U.S.-Assisted Reconciliation ................................................... 4
Benchmarks and a Troop Surge................................................................................................. 4
The Strengthening of Maliki and the Iraqi Government: 2008-2009 ........................................ 5
Attempts to Decentralize Governance: Provincial Powers Law and
January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections ............................................................................ 5
The March 7, 2010, Elections: Shiites Fracture and Sunnis Cohere ......................................... 7
Election Law Dispute and Final Provisions ........................................................................ 8
Election Parameters............................................................................................................. 9
Flashpoint: De-Baathification and Disqualification of Some Prominent Sunnis.............. 10
Election and Results.......................................................................................................... 11
Post-Election Government ................................................................................................ 12
Agreement on a New Government Reached (“Irbil Agreement”)..................................... 13
2010-2014 Government Formed ....................................................................................... 13
Unresolved Schisms and Post-U.S. Withdrawal Political Collapse............................................... 14
Centralization of Power Disputes/Security Ministry Appointments........................................ 15
Security Ministerial Appointments.................................................................................... 15
National Council for Strategic Policies Dispute................................................................ 16
Broader Sunni Community Grievances and Reactions ........................................................... 16
Sunni Moves to Form Separate Regions ........................................................................... 16
Sons of Iraq Fighters ......................................................................................................... 16
Sunni Insurgent Violence/Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I)........................................................... 17
KRG-Central Government Disputes/Combined Security Mechanism .................................... 18
Territorial Issues/“Disputed Internal Boundaries” ............................................................ 18
KRG Oil Exports/Oil Laws ............................................................................................... 20
Intra-Kurdish Divisions..................................................................................................... 21
The Sadr Faction’s Continuing Ambition and Agitation ......................................................... 21
Post-U.S. Withdrawal Political Crisis...................................................................................... 22
The Crisis Abates?............................................................................................................. 23
Effect of the Crisis on Upcoming Elections...................................................................... 24
Related Governance Issues ............................................................................................................ 24
National Oil Laws and Other Pending Laws/Budget .............................................................. 25
2011 Arab Spring-Related Demonstrations ............................................................................. 25
Protest-Prompted Governmental Reforms ........................................................................ 26
General Human Rights Issues.................................................................................................. 26
Trafficking in Persons ....................................................................................................... 27
Media and Free Expression............................................................................................... 27
Labor Rights...................................................................................................................... 27
Religious Freedom/Situation of the Christian Religious Minority.................................... 28
Women’s Rights ................................................................................................................ 29
Corruption ......................................................................................................................... 29
Mass Graves ...................................................................................................................... 29
Congressional Research Service
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Regional Dimension ...................................................................................................................... 29
Iran........................................................................................................................................... 30
Iranian Opposition: People’s Mojahedin/Camp Ashraf and PJAK ................................... 31
Syria......................................................................................................................................... 31
Turkey...................................................................................................................................... 32
Gulf States ............................................................................................................................... 32
U.S. Military Withdrawal and Post-2011 Policy............................................................................ 33
Question of Whether U.S. Forces Would Remain Beyond 2011............................................. 33
U.S. Efforts to Convince Iraq to Request A Continued U.S. Military Presence................ 34
President Obama Announces Decision on Full Withdrawal.............................................. 35
Structure of the Post-Troop Security Relationship............................................................ 35
The Bilateral Relationship and State Department As Lead Agency in Iraq ...................... 36
Tables
Table 1. Major Coalitions for 2010 National Elections ................................................................... 8
Table 2. March 2010 COR Election: Final, Certified Results by Province ................................... 39
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Iraq: FY2003-FY2013 ....................................................................... 40
Table 4. Recent Democracy Assistance to Iraq.............................................................................. 41
Table 5. January 31, 2009, Provincial Election Results (Major Slates)......................................... 42
Table 6. Election Results (January and December 2005) .............................................................. 43
Table 7. Assessments of the Benchmarks ...................................................................................... 44
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 46
Congressional Research Service
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Overview of the Post-Saddam Political Transition
During the 2003-2011 presence of U.S. forces, Iraq completed a formal political transition from
the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein to a plural political system in which varying sects and
ideological and political factions compete in elections. A series of elections began in 2005, after a
one-year occupation period and a subsequent seven-month interim period of Iraqi self-
governance. There has been a consensus among Iraqi elites since 2005 to give each community a
share of power and prestige to promote cooperation and unity. Still, disputes over the relative
claim of each community on power and economic resources permeated almost every issue in Iraq
and were never fully resolved. The constant infighting among the major factions over their
perceived share of power and resources has interfered with the basic functions of governing and
produced popular frustration over a failure of government to deliver services.
Initial Transition and Construction of the Political System
After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003, the United States set up an occupation
structure, reportedly based on concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor major factions
and not produce democracy. In May 2003, President Bush, reportedly seeking strong leadership in
Iraq, named Ambassador L. Paul Bremer to head a “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA),
which was recognized by the United Nations as an occupation authority. Bremer discontinued a
tentative political transition process and instead appointed (July 13, 2003) a non-sovereign Iraqi
advisory body, the 25-member “Iraq Governing Council” (IGC). During that year, U.S. and Iraqi
negotiators, advised by a wide range of international officials and experts, drafted a “Transitional
Administrative Law” (TAL, interim constitution), which became effective on March 4, 2004.1
After about one year of occupation, the United States, following a major debate between the CPA
and various Iraqi factions over the modalities and rapidity of a resumption of Iraqi sovereignty,
handed sovereignty to an appointed Iraqi interim government on June 28, 2004. That date was
two days ahead of the TAL-specified date of June 30, 2004, for the handing over of Iraqi
sovereignty and the end of the occupation period, which also laid out the elections roadmap
discussed below. The interim government was headed by a prime minister, Iyad al-Allawi, leader
of the Iraq National Accord, a secular, non-sectarian faction but whose supporters are mostly
Sunni Arabs. Allawi is a Shiite Muslim but many INA leaders were Sunnis, and some of them
were formerly members of the Baath Party. The president was Sunni tribalist Ghazi al-Yawar.
January 30, 2005, Elections for an Interim Government
Iraqi leaders who rose to prominence after the fall of Saddam Hussein had always assumed that a
series of elections would determine the composition of Iraq’s new power structure. The beginning
of the elections process was set for 2005 to produce a transitional parliament that would supervise
writing a new constitution, a public referendum on a new constitution, and then the election of a
full term government under that constitution.
In accordance with the dates specified in the TAL, the first post-Saddam election was held on
January 30, 2005. The voting was for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly (which formed an
1 Text, in English, is at: http://www.constitution.org/cons/iraq/TAL.html
Congressional Research Service
1
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
executive), four-year-term provincial councils in all 18 provinces, and a Kurdistan regional
assembly (111 seats). The election for the transitional Assembly was conducted according to the
“proportional representation/closed list” election system, in which voters chose among “political
entities” (a party, a coalition of parties, or persons). A total of 111 entities were on the national
ballot, of which 9 were multi-party coalitions.
Still restive over their displacement from power in the 2003 U.S. invasion, Sunni Arabs (20% of
the overall population) boycotted, winning only 17 Assembly seats, and only 1 seat on the 51-seat
Baghdad provincial council. That council was dominated (28 seats) by representatives of the
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), then led by Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim. (In August 2003,
when Abd al-Aziz’s brother, Mohammad Baqr al-Hakim, was assassinated in a bombing outside a
Najaf mosque, Abd al-Aziz succeeded his brother as ISCI leader. After Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim’s
death from lung cancer in August 2009, his son Ammar, born in 1971, succeeded him.)
Radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, whose armed faction (the militia operated under the name
Mahdi Army) was then at odds with U.S. forces, also boycotted, leaving his faction poorly
represented on provincial councils in the Shiite south and in Baghdad. The resulting transitional
government placed Shiites and Kurds in the highest positions—Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK) leader Jalal Talabani was president and Da’wa (Shiite party) leader Ibrahim al-Jafari was
prime minister. Sunnis were Assembly speaker, deputy president, a deputy prime minister, and six
ministers, including defense.
Permanent Constitution2
The elected Assembly was to draft a permanent constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a
referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three
provinces. On May 10, 2005, a 55-member drafting committee was appointed, but with only two
Sunni Arabs (15 Sunnis were later added as full members and 10 as advisors). In August 2005,
the talks produced a draft, providing for:
• The three Kurdish-controlled provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah to
constitute a legal “region” administered by the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG), which would have its own elected president and parliament (Article 113).
• a December 31, 2007, deadline to hold a referendum on whether Kirkuk (Tamim
province) would join the Kurdish region (Article 140);
• designation of Islam as “a main source” of legislation;
• a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47);
• families choosing which courts to use for family issues (Article 41); making only
primary education mandatory (Article 34);
• having Islamic law experts and civil law judges on the federal supreme court
(Article 89).
Many women opposed the two latter provisions as giving too much discretion to male family
members. It made all orders of the U.S.-led occupation authority (Coalition Provisional Authority,
2 Text of the Iraqi constitution is at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/
AR2005101201450.html.
Congressional Research Service
2
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
CPA) applicable until amended (Article 126), and established a “Federation Council” (Article
62), a second chamber with size and powers to be determined in future law (not adopted to date).
The major disputes—never fully resolved—centered on regional versus centralized power. The
draft permitted two or more provinces together to form new autonomous “regions”—reaffirmed
in passage of an October 2006 law on formation of regions. Article 117 allows “regions” to
organize internal security forces, legitimizing the fielding of the Kurds’ peshmerga militia
(allowed by the TAL). Article 109 requires the central government to distribute oil and gas
revenues from “current fields” in proportion to population, and gave regions a role in allocating
revenues from new energy discoveries. Disputes over these concepts continue to hold up passage
of national hydrocarbons legislation. Sunnis dominate areas of Iraq that have few proven oil or
gas deposits, and favor centralized control of oil revenues, whereas the Kurds want to maintain
maximum control of their own burgeoning energy sector.
With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-85%) to try to
defeat the constitution, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11, 2005) providing for a
panel to propose amendments within four months after a post-December 15 election government
took office (Article 137), to be voted on within another two months (under the same rules as the
October 15 referendum). The Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin (which includes
Saddam’s home town of Tikrit) had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively, but the constitution
was adopted because Nineveh province only voted 55% “no,” missing the threshold for a “no”
vote by a two-thirds majority in three provinces.
December 15, 2005, Elections
The December 15, 2005, elections were for a full-term (four-year) national government (also in
line with the schedule laid out in the TAL). Under the voting mechanism used for that election,
each province contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of Representatives”
(COR)—a formula adopted to attract Sunni participation. Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were
allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats for entities that would have won additional seats
had the constituency been the whole nation. There were 361 political “entities,” including 19
multi-party coalitions, competing in a “closed list” voting system (in which party leaders choose
the people who will actually sit in the Assembly). As shown in Table 5, voters chose lists
representing their sects and regions, and the Shiites and Kurds again emerged dominant. The
COR was inaugurated on March 16, 2006, but political infighting caused the Shiite bloc “United
Iraqi Alliance” to replace Jafari with another Da’wa figure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as prime
minister.
On April 22, 2006, the COR approved Talabani to continue as president. His two deputies were
Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq al-
Hashimi, leader of the broad Sunni-based coalition called the Accord Front (“Tawafuq”—within
which Hashimi leads the Iraqi Islamic Party). Another Accord figure, the hardline Mahmoud
Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council party), became COR speaker. Maliki won COR approval
of a 37-member cabinet (including two deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key slots
(Defense, Interior, and National Security) were not filled permanently until June 2006, due to
infighting. Of the 37 posts, there were 19 Shiites; 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; and 1 Christian. Four were
women.
Congressional Research Service
3
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
2006-2011: Sectarian Conflict and U.S.-Assisted
Reconciliation
The 2005 elections were, at the time, considered successful by the Bush Administration but did
not resolve the Sunni-Arab grievances over their diminished positions in the power structure.
However, later events showed that the elections in 2005 worsened the violence by exposing the
new-found subordination of the Sunni Arabs. With tensions already high, the bombing of a major
Shiite shrine within the Sunni-dominated province of Salahuddin in February 2006 set off major
sectarian unrest, characterized in part by Sunni insurgent activities against government and U.S.
troops, high-casualty suicide and other bombings, and the empowerment of Shiite militia factions
to counter the Sunni acts. The sectarian violence was so serious that many experts, by the end of
2006, were considering the U.S. mission as failing, an outcome that an “Iraq Study Group”
concluded was a significant possibility absent a major change in U.S. policy.3
Benchmarks and a Troop Surge
As assessments of possible overall U.S. policy failure multiplied, in August 2006, the
Administration and Iraq agreed on a series of “benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented,
might achieve political reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 110-28), “progress” on 18 political and security benchmarks—as assessed in
Administration reports due by July 15, 2007, and then September 15, 2007—was required for the
United States to provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq. President Bush
used the waiver provision. The law also mandated an assessment by the GAO, by September 1,
2007, of the degree to which the benchmarks have been met, as well as an outside assessment of
the Iraqi security forces (ISF).
In early 2007, the United States began a “surge” of about 30,000 additional U.S. forces (bringing
U.S. troop levels from their 2004-2006 baseline of about 138,000 to about 170,000 at the height
of the surge) intended to blunt insurgent momentum and take advantage of growing Sunni Arab
rejection of extremist groups. The Administration cited the Iraq Study Group as recommending a
temporary surge of troops as one possible policy choice that could salvage what was perceived as
a failing mission, along with other measures such as linking the continued U.S. military presence
to Iraqi leaders’ commitment to reconciliation. As 2008 progressed, citing the achievement of
many of the major Iraqi legislative benchmarks and a dramatic drop in sectarian violence that was
attributed to surge—the Bush Administration asserted that political reconciliation was advancing.
However, U.S. officials maintained that its extent and durability would depend on the degree of
implementation of adopted laws, on further compromises among ethnic groups, and on continued
attenuated levels of violence. For Iraq’s performance on the benchmarks, see Table 7.
3 “The Iraq Study Group Report.” Vintage Books, 2006. The Iraq Study Group was funded by the conference report on
P.L. 109-234, FY2006 supplemental, which provided $1 million to the U.S. Institute of Peace for operations of an Iraq
Study Group. The legislation did not specify the Group’s exact mandate or its composition.
Congressional Research Service
4
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
The Strengthening of Maliki and the Iraqi Government: 2008-2009
The passage of Iraqi laws in 2008 considered crucial to reconciliation, continued reductions in
violence accomplished by the U.S. surge, and the continued turn of many Sunni militants away
from violence, enhanced Maliki’s political position. A March 2008 offensive ordered by Maliki
against the Sadr faction and other militants in Basra and environs (“Operation Charge of the
Knights”) pacified the city and caused many Sunnis and Kurds to see Maliki as even-handed.
This contributed to a decision in July 2008 by the Accord Front to end its one-year boycott of the
cabinet. Other cabinet vacancies were filled with independents. During the period in which the
Accord Front, the Sadr faction, and the bloc of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi were
boycotting, there were 13 vacancies out of 37 cabinet slots.
Attempts to Decentralize Governance: Provincial Powers Law and
January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections
Although Maliki gained adherents within the political structure, the January 31, 2009, provincial
elections represented an opportunity to try to ensure that neither he, nor any future prime minister,
could centralize power to the extent witnessed under Saddam Hussein’s rule. In addition to the
checks and balances established in the central government, a 2008 “provincial powers law” was
intended to decentralize Iraq by setting up powerful provincial councils that decide on local
allocation of resources. The provincial councils in Iraq choose each province’s governor and
governing administrations—in contrast to Afghanistan, where provincial governors are appointed
by the president. Some central government funds are given as grants directly to provincial
administrations for their use, although most of Iraq’s budget is controlled centrally.
The provincial elections had originally been planned for October 1, 2008, but were delayed when
Kurdish restiveness over integrating Kirkuk and other disputed territories into the KRG caused a
presidential council veto of the July 22, 2008, election law needed to hold these elections. That
draft provided for equal division of power in Kirkuk (among Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans) until
its status is finally resolved, a proposal strongly opposed by the Kurds. On September 24, 2008,
the COR passed a final election law, providing for the elections by January 31, 2009, and putting
off provincial elections in Kirkuk and the three KRG provinces.4
In the elections, about 14,500 candidates vied for the 440 provincial council seats in the 14 Arab-
dominated provinces of Iraq. About 4,000 of the candidates were women. The average number of
council seats per province was about 30,5 down from a set number of 41 seats per province
(except Baghdad) in the 2005-2009 councils. The Baghdad provincial council has 57 seats. This
yielded an average of more than 30 candidates per council seat. However, the reduction in
number of seats also meant that many incumbents were not reelected.
The provincial elections were conducted on an “open list” basis—voters were able to vote for a
party slate, or for an individual candidate (although they also had to vote for that candidate’s
slate). This procedure encouraged voting for slates and strengthened the ability of political parties
4 The election law also stripped out provisions in the vetoed version to allot 13 total reserved seats, spanning six
provinces, to minorities. An October 2008 amendment restored six reserved seats for minorities: Christian seats in
Baghdad, Nineveh, and Basra; one seat for Yazidis in Nineveh; one seat for Shabaks in Nineveh; and one seat for the
Sabean sect in Baghdad.
5 Each provincial council has 25 seats plus one seat per each 200,000 residents over 500,000.
Congressional Research Service
5
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
to choose who on their slate will occupy seats allotted for that party. This election system was
widely assessed to favor larger, well-organized parties, because smaller parties might not meet the
vote threshold to obtain any seats on the council in their province.6 This was seen as likely to set
back the hopes of some Iraqis that the elections would weaken the Islamist parties, both Sunni
and Shiite, that have dominated post-Saddam politics.
About 17 million Iraqis (any Iraqi 18 years of age or older) were eligible for the vote, which was
run by the Iraqi Higher Election Commission (IHEC). Pre-election-related violence was minimal,
although five candidates and several election/political workers were killed. There were virtually
no major violent incidents on election day. Turnout was about 51%, somewhat lower than some
expected. Some voters complained of being turned away at polling places because their names
were not on file. Other voters had been displaced by sectarian violence in prior years and were
unable to vote in their new areas of habitation.
The vote totals were finalized on February 19, 2009, and were certified on March 29, 2009.
Within 15 days of that (by April 13, 2009) the provincial councils began to convene under the
auspices of the incumbent provincial governor, and to elect a provincial council chairperson and
deputy chairperson. Within another 30 days after that (by May 12, 2009) the provincial councils
selected (by absolute majority) a provincial governor and deputy governors. The term of the
provincial councils is four years from the date of their first convention.
Outcomes: Maliki Strongest Among Shiites, and Sunni Tribalists Enter Politics
Some concerns of Maliki’s opponents—and of those who favor decentralized power—were
realized when his allies in his “State of Law Coalition” were clear winners of the provincial
elections. ISCI, which had already been distancing itself from its erstwhile ally, Maliki’s Da’wa
Party, ran under a separate slate in the provincial elections—thus splitting up the formerly
powerful UIA. It fared poorly. With 28 out of the 57 total seats, the Maliki slate gained control of
the Baghdad provincial council, displacing ISCI. Da’wa also emerged very strong in most of the
Shiite provinces of the south, including Basra, where it won an outright majority (20 out of 35
seats). Nor did ISCI did win outright in Najaf province, which it previously dominated and which,
because of Najaf’s revered status in Shiism, is considered a center of political gravity in southern
Iraq. It won seven seats there, the same number that was won by the Maliki slate. ISCI won only
3 seats on the Baghdad province council, down from the 28 it held previously, and only 5 in
Basra. Some observers believe that the poor showing for ISCI was a product not only of its call
for devolving power out of Baghdad, but also because of its perceived close ties to Iran, which
some Iraqis believed was exercising undue influence on Iraqi politics. Others say ISCI was
perceived as interested in political and economic gain for its supporters.
Although Maliki’s coalition fared well, the subsequent efforts to form provincial administrations
demonstrated that he still needed to strike bargains with rival factions, including Sadr, ISCI, and
even the Sunni list of Saleh al-Mutlaq (National Dialogue Front) that contains many ex-Baathists.
The provincial administrations that took shape are discussed in Table 5. Aside from the victory of
Maliki’s slate, the unexpected strength of secular parties, such as that of former Prime Minister
Iyad al-Allawi, corroborated the view that voters favored slates committed to Iraqi nationalism
and strong central government.
6 The threshold for winning a seat is the total number of valid votes divided by the number of seats up for election.
Congressional Research Service
6
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
The Sadr faction, represented mainly in the “Independent Liberals Trend” list, did not come close
to winning outright control of any councils. However, it won enough seats in several southern
provinces to negotiate for itself senior positions in a few southern provinces.
Another important trend noted in the 2009 provincial elections was the entry of ever more Sunnis
into the political process. Participating in the provincial elections were Sunni tribal leaders
(“Awakening Councils”) who had recruited the “Sons of Iraq” fighters and who were widely
credited for turning Iraqi Sunnis against Al Qaeda-linked extremists in Iraq. These Sunni tribalists
had largely stayed out of the December 2005 elections because their attention was focused
primarily on the severe violence in the Sunni provinces, particularly Anbar. Some tribalists also
were intimidated by Al Qaeda in Iraq’s admonition that Sunnis stay out of the political process.
However, in the 2009 provincial elections, as the violence ebbed, Sunni tribalists offered election
slates and showed strength at the expense of the established Sunni parties, particularly the Iraqi
Islamic Party (IIP) and the National Dialogue Council. The main “Iraq Awakening” tribal slate
came in first in Anbar Province. The tribalists benefitted from the decline of the IIP and other
mostly urban Sunni parties, including the National Dialogue Council. In Diyala Province, hotly
contested among Shiite and Sunni Arab and Kurdish slates, the provincial version of the (Sunni
Arab) Accord Front edged out the Kurds for first place, and subsequently allied with the Kurds
and with ISCI to set up the provincial administration.
The March 7, 2010, Elections: Shiites Fracture and Sunnis Cohere
After his slate’s strong showing in the January 2009 provincial elections, Maliki became the
immediate favorite to retain his position in the March 7, 2010, COR elections. The elected COR
chooses the full-term government. Maliki derived further political benefit from the U.S.
implementation of the U.S.-Iraq “Security Agreement” (SA, sometimes referred to as the Status
of Forces Agreement, or SOFA), discussed below in the section on the U.S. military mission.
However, as 2009 progressed, Maliki’s image as protector of law and order was tarnished by
several high-profile attacks from mid-2009 to the eve of the election. Realizing the potential for
security lapses to reduce his chances to remain prime minister, Maliki ordered several ISF
commanders questioned for lapses in connection with the major bombings in Baghdad on August
20, 2009, in which almost 100 Iraqis were killed and the buildings housing the Ministry of
Finance and of Foreign Affairs were heavily damaged. Makeshift alternate Ministry of Finance
buildings were attacked again on December 7, 2009.
Politically, sensing Maliki’s weakness and a more open competition for prime minister, Shiite
unity broke down and a rival Shiite slate took shape as a competitor to Maliki’s State of Law. The
“Iraqi National Alliance (INA)” was composed of ISCI, Sadr, and other Shiite figures. The INA
coalition believed that each of its component factions would draw support from their individual
constituencies to produce an election majority or clear plurality. Sistani remained completely
neutral in the election, endorsing no slate, but calling on all Iraqis to participate.
To Sunni Arabs, the outwardly cross-sectarian Iraq National Movement (“Iraqiyya”) of former
transitional Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi had strong appeal. There was an openly Sunni slate,
leaning Islamist, called the Accordance slate (“Tawaffuq”) led by IIP figures, but it was not
expected to fare well compared to Allawi’s less sectarian bloc. Some Sunni figures were recruited
to join Shiite slates.
Congressional Research Service
7
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Table 1. Major Coalitions for 2010 National Elections
State of Law Coalition
Led by Maliki and his Da’wa Party. Included Anbar Salvation Front of Shaykh
Hatim al-Dulaymi, which is Sunni, and the Independent Arab Movement of Abd
(slate no. 337)
al-Mutlaq al-Jabbouri. Appealed to Shi te sectarianism during the campaign by
backing the exclusion of candidates with links to outlawed Baath Party.
Iraqi National Alliance
Formed in August 2009, was initially considered the most formidable challenger
to Maliki’s slate. Consisted mainly of his Shiite opponents and was perceived as
(slate no. 316)
somewhat more Islamist than the other slates. Included ISCI, the Sadrist
movement, the Fadilah Party, the Iraqi National Congress of Ahmad Chalabi, and
the National Reform Movement (Da’wa faction) of former Prime Minister
Ibrahim al-Jafari. Possible Potential prime ministerial candidate from this bloc was
deputy President Adel Abd al-Mahdi, a moderate well respected by U.S. officials.
However, some observers say Chalabi—the key architect of the effort to
exclude candidates with Baathist ties—wanted to replace Maliki. This slate was
considered close to Ayatol ah Sistani, but did not receive his formal
endorsement.
Iraqi National Movement
Formed in October 2009. Led by former Prime Minister Iyad al-Al awi (Iraq
National Accord) who is Shi te but his faction appeals to Sunnis, and Sunni leader
(“Iraqiyya”—slate no. 333)
Saleh al-Mutlaq (ex-Baathist who leads Iraq Front for National Dialogue). Backed
by Iraqi Islamic Party leader and Deputy President Tariq Al-Hashimi as well as
other powerful Sunnis, including Usama al-Nujaifi and Rafi al-Issawi. Justice and
Accountability Commission (formerly the De-Baathification Commission)
disqualified Mutlaq and another senior candidate on this slate, Dhafir al Ani, for
supporting the outlawed Baath Party. An appeals court affirmed their
disqualification, but the decision was legislatively reversed after the election).
Kurdistan Alliance
Competed again in 2010 as a joint KDP-PUK Kurdish list. However, Kurdish
solidarity was shaken by July 25, 2009, Kurdistan elections in which a breakaway
(slate no. 372)
PUK faction called Change (Gorran) did unexpectedly well. Gorran ran its own
separate list for the March 2010 elections. PUK’s ebbing strength in the north did
not jeopardize Talabani’s continuation as president, although Sunnis sought that
position.
Unity Alliance of Iraq
Led by Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, a moderate Shiite who has a reputation for
political independence. Bolani was not previously affiliated with the large Shiite
(slate no. 348)
parties such as ISCI and Dawa, and was only briefly aligned with the Sadr faction
(which has been strong in Bolani’s home town of Amarah, in southeastern Iraq).
Considered non-sectarian, this list Included Sunni tribal faction led by Shaykh
Ahmad Abu Risha, brother of slain leader of the Sunni Awakening movement in
Anbar. The list included first post-Saddam defense minister Sadun al-Dulaymi.
Iraqi Accordance
A coalition of Sunni parties, including breakaway factions of the Iraqi Islamic Party
(IIP). Led by Ayad al-Samarrai, speaker of the COR. Viewed as a weak
(slate no. 338)
competitor for Sunni votes against Allawi slate.
Sources: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; various press.
Election Law Dispute and Final Provisions
While coalitions formed to challenge Maliki, disputes emerged over the ground rules for the
election. The holding of the elections required passage of an election law setting out the rules and
parameters of the election. Under the Iraqi constitution, the elections were to be held by January
31, 2010, in order to allow 45 days before the March 15, 2010, expiry of the current COR’s term.
Iraq’s election officials had ideally wanted a 90-day time frame between the election law passage
and the election date, in order to facilitate the voter registration process.
Congressional Research Service
8
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Because the provisions of the election law (covering such issues as voter eligibility, whether to
allot quota seats to certain constituencies, the size of the next COR) have the potential to shape
the election outcome, the major Iraqi communities were divided over its substance. These
differences caused the COR to miss almost every self-imposed deadline to pass it. One dispute
was over the election system, with many COR members leaning toward a closed list system
(which gives the slates the power to determine who occupies actual COR seats after the election),
despite a call by Grand Ayatollah Sistani for an open list vote (which allows voters to also vote
for candidates as well as coalition slates). Each province served as a single constituency and a
fixed number of seats for each province (see Table 2, for the number of seats per province).
There was also a dispute over how to apply the election in disputed Tamim (Kirkuk) province,
where Kurds feared that the election law drafts would cause Kurds to be underrepresented. The
version of the election law passed by the COR on November 8, 2009 (141 out of 195 COR
deputies voting), called for using 2009 food ration lists as representative of voter registration. The
Kurds had sought this provision, facing down the insistence of many COR deputies to use 2005
voter lists, which presumably would contain fewer Kurds. A compromise in that version of the
law allowed for a process to review, for one year, complaints about fraudulent registration, thus
easing Sunni and Shiite Arab fears about an excessive Kurdish vote in Kirkuk.
However, this version guaranteed only a small quota of seats for Iraqis living abroad or who are
displaced—and Sunnis believed they would therefore be undercounted because it was mainly
Sunnis who had fled Iraq. On this basis, one of Iraq’s deputy presidents, Tariq al Hashimi, a Sunni
Arab, vetoed the law. The veto, on November 18, sent the law back to the COR. A new version
was adopted on November 23, but it was viewed as even less favorable to Sunni Arabs than the
first version, because it eliminated any reserved seats for Iraqis in exile. Hashimi again threatened
a veto, which he was required to exercise within 10 days. As that deadline was about to lapse, the
major factions, at the urging of U.S. diplomats, adopted a new law (December 6, 2009).
Election Parameters
The compromise version, not vetoed by any member of the presidency council, provided for
• Expansion of the size of the COR to 325 total seats. Of these, 310 were allocated
by province, with the constituency sizes ranging from Baghdad’s 68 seats to
Muthanna’s 7. The COR size, in the absence of a recent census, was based on
taking 2005 population figures and adding 2.8% per year growth.7
• The remaining 15 seats were to be minority reserved seats (8) and “compensatory
seats” (7)—seats allocated from “leftover” votes; votes for parties and slates that
did not meet a minimum threshold to achieve any seats outright.
• No separate electoral constituency for Iraqis in exile, so Iraqis in exile had their
votes counted in the provinces where these voters originated.
• An open list election system.
• An election date set for March 7, 2010.
7 Analysis of Iraq expert Reidar Visser. “The Hashemi Veto.” http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2009/11/18/the-
hashemi-veto/.
Congressional Research Service
9
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Flashpoint: De-Baathification and Disqualification of Some Prominent Sunnis
The electoral process was at least partly intended to bring Sunni Arabs ever further into the
political structure and to turn them away from violence and insurgency. Sunnis boycotted the
January 2005 parliamentary and provincial elections and were, as a result, poorly represented in
all governing bodies. Sunni slates, consisting mainly of urban, educated Sunnis, did participate in
the December 2005 parliamentary elections, an apparent calculation that it would not serve Sunni
interests to remain permanently alienated from the political process.
The Sunni commitment to the political process appeared in some jeopardy in the context of a
major dispute over candidate eligibility for the March 2010 elections. Although a Sunni boycott
of the elections did not materialize, there was a Sunni Arab perception that the election might be
unfair because of this dispute. The acute phase of this political crisis began in January 2010 when
the Justice and Accountability Commission (JAC, the successor to the “De-Baathification
Commission” that worked since the fall of Saddam to purge former Baathists from government)
invalidated the candidacies of 499 individuals (out of 6,500 candidates running), spanning many
different slates. The JAC was headed by Ali al-Lami, a Shiite who had been in U.S. military
custody during 2005-2006 for alleged assistance to Iranian agents active in Iraq. He was
perceived as answerable to or heavily influenced by Ahmad Chalabi, who had headed the De-
Baathification Commission. Both were part of the Iraqi National Alliance slate and both are
Shiites, leading many to believe that the disqualifications represented an attempt to exclude
prominent Sunnis from the vote.
The JAC argued that the disqualifications were based on law and careful evaluation of candidate
backgrounds and not based on sect, because many of the candidates disqualified were Shiites. The
IHEC reviewed and backed the invalidations on January 14, 2010; disqualified candidates had
three days to file an appeal in court. Apparently due in part to entreaties from the U.S. Embassy,
Vice President Joseph Biden (during a visit to Iraq on January 22, 2010) and partner embassies in
Iraq—all of which feared a return to instability—the appeals court at first ruled that disqualified
candidates could run in the election and clear up questions of Baathist affiliation afterwards.
However, reported pressure by Maliki and other Shiites caused the court to reverse itself on
February 12, 2010, and to disqualify 145 candidates. Twenty-six candidates were reinstated. The
remaining approximately 300 disqualified candidates had already been replaced by other
candidates on their respective slates. The slate most affected by the disqualifications was
Iraqiyya, because two of its leading candidates, National Dialogue Front party leader Saleh al-
Mutlaq and Dhafir al-Ani, both Sunnis, were barred from running.
The Iraqiyya slate did not, as a whole, call for a broad boycott—nor did Mutlaq himself call for a
boycott. Mutlaq was replaced as a candidate by his brother. The slate campaigned vigorously, and
many Sunnis seemed to react by recommitting to a high turnout among their community, in order
to achieve political results through the election process. Even the JAC’s disqualification of an
additional 55 mostly Iraqiyya candidates the night before the election did not prompt a boycott.
The crisis appeared to prompt the February 16, 2010, comments by General Ray Odierno, then
the top U.S. commander in Iraq (who was replaced as of September 1, 2010, by his deputy,
General Lloyd Austin), that Iran was working through Chalabi and al-Lami to undermine the
legitimacy of the elections. General Odierno specifically asserted that Chalabi was in close
contact with an Iraqi, COR member Jamal al-Ibrahimi, who is a purported ally of General Qasem
Soleimani, who commands the Qods Force unit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
Congressional Research Service
10
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
(IRGC).8 Chalabi’s successful efforts to turn the election into a campaign centered on excluding
ex-Baathists—which Sunnis view as a codeword for their sect—caused particular U.S. alarm.
Possibly because of the disqualification dispute, Lami was assassinated on May 26, 2011,
presumably by Sunnis who viewed him as an architect of the perceived discrimination. Chalabi,
now a member of parliament, replaced Lami as manager of the JAC, but Maliki dismissed him in
that role, appointing instead the minister for human rights to serve in that role concurrently.
Election and Results
About 85 total coalitions were accredited for the March 7, 2010, election. There were about 6,170
total candidates running on all these slates and, as noted, Iraqis were able to vote for individual
candidates as well as overall slates. The major blocs are depicted in Table 1. All available press
reports indicated that campaigning was vibrant and vigorous. Total turnout was about 62%,
according to the IHEC. Turnout was slightly lower in Baghdad because of the multiple insurgent
bombings that took place there just as voting was starting.
The final count was announced on March 26, 2010, by the IHEC. As noted in Table 2, Iraqiyya
won a plurality of seats, winning a narrow two-seat margin over Maliki’s State of Law slate. The
Iraqi constitution (Article 73) mandates that the COR “bloc with the largest number” of members
gets the first opportunity to form a government. On that basis, Allawi, leader of the Iraqiyya slate,
demanded the first opportunity to form a government. However, on March 28, 2010, Iraq’s
Supreme Court issued a preliminary ruling that any group that forms after the election could be
deemed to meet that requirement, laying the groundwork for Allawi to be denied the right to the
first opportunity to form a government.
The vote was to have been certified by April 22, 2010, but factional wrangling delayed this
certification. On March 21, 2010, before the count was final, Prime Minister Maliki issued a
statement, referring to his role as armed forces commander-in-chief, demanding the IHEC
respond to requests from various blocs for a manual recount of all votes. The IHEC responded
that any recount decisions are under its purview and that a comprehensive recount would take an
extended period of time. Several international observers, including then-U.N. Special
Representative for Iraq Ad Melkert, indicated that there was no cause to suggest widespread
fraud. (Melkert was replaced in September 2011 by Martin Kobler.)
However, in response to an appeal by Maliki’s faction, on April 19, 2010, an Iraqi court ordered a
recount of votes in Baghdad Province. The recount in the province, which has 68 elected seats,
was completed on May 15, 2010, and did not result in an alteration of seat totals. This followed a
few days after the major factions agreed to put aside any JAC disqualifications of winning
candidates. With the seat count holding, Iraq’s Supreme Court certified the results on June 1,
2010, triggering the following timelines:
• Fifteen days after certification (by June 15, 2010), the new COR was to be seated
and to elect a COR speaker and deputy speaker. (The deadline to convene was
met, although, as noted, the COR did not elect a leadership team and did not meet
again until November 11, 2010.)
8 Gertz, Bill. “Inside the Ring.” Washington Times, February 18, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
11
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
• After electing a speaker, but with no deadline, the COR is to choose a president
(by a two-thirds vote). (According to Article 138 of the Iraqi constitution, after
this election, Iraq is to have a president and at least one vice president—the
“presidency council” concept was an interim measure that expired at the end of
the first full-term government.)
• Within another 15 days, the largest COR bloc is tapped by the president to form a
government. (The selection of a president occurred on November 11, 2010, and
Maliki was formally tapped to form a cabinet on November 25, 2010.)
• Within another 30 days (by December 25, 2010), the prime minister-designate is
to present a cabinet to the COR for confirmation (by majority vote).
Post-Election Government
In accordance with timelines established in the Constitution, the newly elected COR did convene
on June 15, 2010. However, the session ended after only 18 minutes and, because of the political
deadlock, did not elect a COR leadership team. Under Article 52 of the Constitution, the “eldest
member” of the COR (Kurdish legislator Fouad Massoum) became acting COR speaker. During
the period when no new government was formed, the COR remained inactive, with most COR
members in their home provinces while still collecting their $10,000 per month salaries. The
resentment over this contributed to the popular unrest in February 2011.
Allawi’s chances of successfully forming a government appeared to suffer a substantial setback in
May 2010 when Maliki’s slate and the rival Shiite INA bloc agreed to an alliance called the
“National Alliance.” However, the alliance was not able to agree to a prime minister selectee,
with the Sadr faction and ISCI opposing Maliki. With no agreement, the COR aborted its second
meeting scheduled for July 27, 2010. On August 3, 2010, this putative alliance splintered.
The various factions made little progress through August 2010, as Maliki insisted he remain
prime minister for another term. With the factional disputes unresolved, Maliki remained prime
minister in a caretaker role. Some observers assert that he continued to govern as a caretaker,
having had little incentive to see a new government formed. With the end of the U.S. combat
mission on August 31, 2010, approaching, the United States reportedly stepped up its
involvement in political talks. Some discussions were held between Maliki and Allawi’s bloc on a
U.S.-proposed formulas under which Allawi, in return for supporting Maliki, would head a new
council that would have broad powers as a check and balance on the post of prime minister.
Alternate proposals had Allawi being given the presidency, although the Kurds refused to cede
that post to another community, fearing loss of leverage on other demands. An expectation that
the August 10-September 11, 2010, Ramadan period would enable the blocs to reach an
agreement was not met.
Part of the difficulty forming a government was the close result, and the dramatic implications of
gaining or retaining power in Iraq, where politics is often seen as a “winner take all” proposition.
Others blamed Allawi for the impasse, claiming that he was insisting on a large, powerful role for
himself even though he could not assemble enough COR votes to achieve a majority there.
Congressional Research Service
12
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Agreement on a New Government Reached (“Irbil Agreement”)
On October 1, 2010, Maliki received the backing of most of the 40 COR deputies of Shiite cleric
Moqtada Al Sadr. The United States reportedly was alarmed at the prospect that Maliki might be
able to form a government primarily by allying with Sadr, and by extension, Iran. However, in
early November 2010, the United States, Allawi, and many of the Sunni Arab regional states
acquiesced to a second Maliki term. The key question that remained was whether Maliki, and
Iraq’s Kurds would agree to form a broad based government that met the demands of Iraqiyya for
substantial Sunni Arab inclusion. Illustrating the degree to which the Kurds reclaimed their
former role of “kingmakers,” Maliki, Allawi, and other Iraqi leaders met in the capital of the
Kurdistan Regional Government-administered region in Irbil on November 8, 2010, to continue
to negotiate on a new government. (Sadr did not attend the meeting in Irbil, but ISCI/Iraq
National Alliance slate leader Ammar Al Hakim did.)
On November 10, 2010, with reported direct intervention by President Obama, the “Irbil
Agreement” was reached in which (1) Allawi agreed to support Maliki and Talabani to remain in
their offices for another term; (2) Iraqiyya would be extensively represented in government—one
of its figures would become COR Speaker, another would be defense minister, and another
(presumably Allawi himself) would chair the enhanced oversight body discussed above, though
renamed the “National Council for Strategic Policies;”9 and (3) amending the de-Baathification
laws that had barred some Iraqis, such as Saleh al-Mutlaq, from holding political positions.
Observers praised the agreement because it included all major factions and was signed with KRG
President Masoud Barzani and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq James Jeffrey in attendance. The
agreement did not specify concessions to the Sadr faction.
2010-2014 Government Formed10
At the November 11, 2010, COR session to implement the agreement, Iraqiyya figure Usama al-
Nujaifi (brother of controversial Nineveh Governor Atheel Nujaifi) was elected COR speaker, as
agreed. However, Allawi and most of his bloc walked out after three hours over the refusal of the
other blocs to readmit the three Iraqiyya members who had been disqualified from running for the
COR by the JAC (see above). The remaining COR members were sufficient for a quorum and
Talabani was re-elected president after two rounds of voting. Fears were futher calmed on
November 13, 2010, when most of Allawi’s bloc attended the COR session and continued to
implement the settlement agreement; Allawi himself did not attend. On November 25, 2010,
Talabani formally tapped Maliki as the prime minister-designate, giving him 30 days (until
December 25) to name and achieve majority COR confirmation for a new cabinet.
The stage was set for a new cabinet to be announced after December 19, 2010, when Allawi
reaffirmed his intent to join the government. That assurance came the same day that the COR
voted (with barely a quorum achieved after a Shiite walkout) to reinstate to politics the three
senior members of his bloc, including Saleh al-Mutlaq, who had been barred from politics by the
JAC, as discussed above. Mutlaq was subsequently named one of three deputy prime ministers.
On December 21, 2010, in advance of the December 25, 2010, deadline, Maliki presented a
cabinet to the COR (42 seats, including the posts of prime minister, 3 deputy prime ministers, and
9 Fadel, Leila and Karen DeYoung. “Iraqi Leaders Crack Political Deadlock.” Washington Post, November 11, 2010.
10 The following information is taken from Iraqi news accounts presented in http://www.opensource.gov.
Congressional Research Service
13
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
38 ministries and ministers of state) receiving broad approval. No permanent appointments were
named for seven ministries. Still, the government formed was inclusive of all major factions.
Among major outcomes were the following:
• As for the State of Law list, Maliki remained prime minister, and retained for
himself the Defense, Interior, and National Security (minister of state) posts
pending permanent nominees for those positions. The faction took seven other
cabinet posts, in addition to the post of first deputy president (Khudair al Khuzai
of the Da’wa Party) and deputy prime minister for energy issues (Hussein
Shahristani, previously the oil minister).
• For Iraqiyya, in addition to Mutlaq becoming a deputy prime minister, Tariq al-
Hashimi remained a deputy president (the second deputy).11 The bloc also
obtained nine ministerial posts, including the key Finance Ministry (Rafi al-
Issawi, previously a deputy prime minister).
• For the Iraqi National Alliance, a senior figure, Adel Abdul Mahdi, remained one
of the three deputy presidents. The alliance also obtained 13 cabinet positions,
parceled out among its various factions. An INA technocrat, Abd al Karim
Luaibi, was appointed oil minister. A Fadilah party member, Bushra Saleh, is a
minister of state without portfolio and was the only woman in the cabinet until
the February 13, 2011, naming of Ibtihal Al Zaidy as minister of state for
women’s affairs (although she is not from the INA). Another Fadila activist was
named minister of justice.
• Of the 13 INA cabinet seats, Sadr faction members head eight ministries,
including Housing, Labor and Social Affairs, Ministry of Planning (Ali Abd al-
Nabi, appointed in April 2011), and Tourism and Antiquities. A Sadrist also is one
of two deputy COR speakers. However, these positions are relatively junior
within the cabinet. Still, the Sadr faction received some compensatory influence
when one of its members subsequently became governor of Maysan Province.
• The Kurdistan Alliance received major posts. Talabani stayed president; and the
third deputy prime minister is Kurdish figure (PUK faction) Rows Shaways, who
has served in various central and KRG positions since the fall of Saddam. Arif
Tayfour is second deputy COR speaker. Alliance members have six other cabinet
seats, including longtime Kurdish (KDP) stalwart Hoshyar Zebari remaining as
foreign minister (a position he’s held since the transition governments that
followed the fall of Saddam). Khairallah Hassan Babakir, was named trade
minister in the February 13, 2011, “second wave” of ministerial appointments.
Unresolved Schisms and Post-U.S. Withdrawal
Political Collapse
The agreements that led to the 2010 government formation did not resolve the underlying
differences among the major communities. Subsequent disputes, particularly between Maliki and
11 Some sources say that Hashimi and another figure, Adel Abdul Mahdi, may not have received permanent
appointments to these second and third deputy presidential posts.
Congressional Research Service
14
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
the Iraqiyya bloc of Iyad al-Allawi (who is himself Shiite but most members of the bloc are
Sunnis) tarnished the U.S. assessment that Iraqi factions would permanently engage in power-
sharing. The unraveling of the Irbil Agreement in the aftermath of the December 18, 2011, U.S.
withdrawal cast some doubt on President Obama’s assertion, marking the U.S. withdrawal, that
Iraq is now “sovereign, stable, and self-reliant.” The sections below also discuss the various
disagreements and their causes.
Centralization of Power Disputes/Security Ministry Appointments
Maliki critics cite numerous examples that demonstrate that Maliki seeks to centralize power in
his own and his faction’s hands. His attempts to purge leading Sunni Arabs from government are
discussed below in the context of the post-U.S. withdrawal political crisis. Earlier, his critics cited
his request, in late 2010, that Iraq’s Supreme Court rule that several independent commissions—
including the Independent Higher Election Commission and the anti-corruption commission—be
supervised by the cabinet. The court ruled in Maliki’s favor on January 23, 2011, although the
court also said in its ruling that the institutions must remain free of political interference.12 In
early 2012, Maliki also asserted that the government should control the Central Bank.
Maliki’s critics have also long asserted that Maliki has used his control over the security forces
for political purposes. In 2008, he began to create or restructure security organs to report to his
office rather than the Defense or Interior ministries. Through his Office of the Commander-in-
Chief, he commands direct command of the National Counter-Terrorism Force (about 10,000
personnel) as well as the Baghdad Brigade, responsible for security in the capital. Reports quoting
U.S. commanders in Iraq in June 2011 said that lower-level commanders routinely bypass the
official chain of command and report directly to Maliki’s office. In an earlier example, in
February 2010, Maliki’s government reportedly directed the Iraqi Army’s Fourth Division to
cordon a provincial council building in Tikrit to influence the resolution of a dispute over the
Salahuddin provincial council’s ousting of the former governor of the province.13 As discussed
below, the post-U.S. withdrawal disputes have included the intimidating deployment of tanks
around the homes and offices of some of Maliki’s opponents.
Security Ministerial Appointments
As part of this broader theme, Maliki’s critics accuse him of monopolizing control of the major
security posts. Maliki refutes Allawi’s interpretation of the Irbil Agreement as requiring
appointment of an Iraqiyya official as defense minister, asserting that a Sunni Arab, not
necessarily a member of the Iraqiyya faction, is required. With this dispute unresolved, Maliki has
appointed allies and associates as acting ministers of Defense, of Interior, and of National
Security. On August 16, 2011, Maliki appointed Sadun Dulaymi as acting Defense Minister—he
is a Sunni Arab but he is a member of the Iraq Unity Alliance, not Iraqiyya. He subsequently
appointed Falih al-Fayad, a Shiite in the faction of former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari, as
acting Minister of State for National Security, and Adnan al-Asadi, another Shiite aligned with
Maliki, as acting Interior Minister. No permanent choices for any of these posts has been
nominated to date.
12 Parker, Ned and Salar Jaff. “Electoral Ruling Riles Maliki’s Rivals.” Los Angeles Times, January 23, 2011.
13 Myers, Steven Lee and Anthony Shadid. “Maliki Faulted On Using Army in Iraqi Politics.” New York Times,
February 11, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
15
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
National Council for Strategic Policies Dispute
Another issue within this broader theme has been the continuing stalemate over the formation of
the National Council for Strategic Policies—a key provision of the Irbil Agreement. Some
proposals from those sympathetic to Allawi called for the council to include the prime minister,
president, their deputies, and a representative of all major blocs—and for decisions of the council
to be binding on Maliki if they achieve support of 80% of the council members. Maliki and his
supporters want this council to have as few powers as possible so as not to impinge upon the
power of the prime minister. The body and its powers have not been voted on by the COR, and
Allawi was always considered unlikely to chair the body unless it is given significant authorities.
Broader Sunni Community Grievances and Reactions
Below the level of elites and factions, many Iraqi Sunnis continue to believe that Maliki and his
Shiite allies want to monopolize power. This belief flows not only from the factional disputes
discussed above, but also from a variety of government actions and policies discussed below.
As the U.S. withdrawal completion approached, fears of some Sunnis were inflamed in October
and November 2011 by a series of arrests by security forces. About 600 Sunnis were arrested,
ostensibly for involvement in an alleged plot revealed by the new leaders of Libya (based on
information captured from former leader Muammar Qadhafi and his regime) in which Sunni
Iraqis were attempting to organize a coup against the Iraqi government. Some Sunnis were
reportedly purged from the security forces, and 140 faculty members from the University of Tikrit
(Saddam’s home town) for alleged Baathist associations.
Sunni Moves to Form Separate Regions
In late 2011, Sunnis responded to the perceptions of inequity by attempting to use legal
mechanisms to reduce central government control. The provincial council of the mostly Sunni
province of Salahuddin (which contains Tikrit) voted on October 28, 2011, to start the process of
forming a separate “region.” Overwhelmingly Sunni Anbar province followed suit. The mixed
province of Diyala took a similar step on December 12, 2011, setting off protests by Shiites in the
province who might have been instigated by the Shiite-dominated central government. Sunni
members of the provincial council subsequently fled into the Kurdish controlled areas just north
of Diyala. Previously, the mostly Shiite provinces of Basra and Wasit had begun similar
processes, although doing so involved full parliamentary concurrence and a popular referendum
of approval.
Seeking to squelch these moves, the government has essentially ignored these votes and has not
tasked the Independent Higher Election Commission (IHEC), which is a central government
body, to organize the referenda needed as part of the region formation process. The IHEC is
subject to Maliki’s control, giving him a de-facto veto over the region formation process
Sons of Iraq Fighters
One of the most significant long-standing Sunni grievances has been the slow pace with which
the Maliki government implemented its pledge to fully integrate the approximately 100,000
“Sons of Iraq” fighters (former insurgents who ended their fight and cooperated with U.S. forces
against Al Qaeda in Iraq and other militants) into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) or provide them
Congressional Research Service
16
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
with government jobs. During 2009 and 2010, there were repeated reports that some Sons of Iraq
had been dropped from payrolls, harassed, arrested, or sidelined, and that the Maliki government
might want to strangle the program. Ambassador Jeffrey testified on February 1, 2011, that no
payment difficulties existed as of that time, although reports of payments delays resurfaced in late
2011. As of early 2012, about half of the fighters (approximately 50,000) have been integrated
into the ISF or given civilian government jobs. On November 7, 2011, tribal leaders close to the
Sons of Iraq movement claimed government complicity in an assassination attempt on the
governor of the overwhelmingly Sunni province of Anbar.
Sunni Insurgent Violence/Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I)
The suspicions of the Sunni community might account for some of the high-profile attacks that
continue in Iraq, including those carried out by Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I). U.S. officials estimated in
November 2011 that there might be 800-1,000 people in Al Qaeda-Iraq’s network, of which many
are involved in media or finance of operations.14
Following the completion of the U.S. withdrawal on December 18, 2011, there have been
numerous high-profile suicide and other attacks against Shiite religious pilgrims and
neighborhoods throughout Iraq. These attacks, some of which AQ-I has claimed responsibility
for, are perceived as an effort by Sunni insurgents and AQ-I to undermine Maliki’s leadership, to
retaliate against his perceived actions against Sunnis, and to possibly reignite sectarian conflict.
On February 7, 2012, the AQ-I affiliate Islamic State of Iraq claimed responsibility for two of the
deadliest attacks on Shiites since the U.S. withdrawal—on January 5 and January 14, 2012, which
killed 78 and 53 Shiite pilgrims, respectively. In one of the most complex attacks in recent
months, on February 23, 2012, bombings in 12 Iraqi cities killed over 50 persons; based on the
method and scope of the attacks, Iraqi observers attributed the attacks to AQ-I. AQ-I claimed
responsibility for a broad series of attacks—encompassing six cities—on March 20, 2012; over
40 persons were killed. Another spate of attacks took place in Baghdad and Kirkuk on April 19,
2012, killing about 36 persons.
Still, U.S. officials note that similar attacks occurred while U.S. forces were still in Iraq, and there
is debate over whether aggregate levels of violence have increased since the U.S. pullout. Others
fear that the attacks could represent a resurgence of AQ-I now that U.S. forces are not there to
help suppress the group. Suggesting that Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders do not want the group to re-
emerge, in early 2012, more than 60 leaders of tribes in Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq—with the
concurrence of local government and security officials—reached agreement to authorize tribal
leaders to enforce strict codes of justice against insurgents and their accomplices.
In early 2012, there have been indications that AQ-I might be intervening in the unrest in Syria.15
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified on February 16, 2012, that it might have
been responsible for several suicide bombings against security targets in Damascus. Iraq’s
position on the Syria unrest is discussed in greater detail below.
14 Michael Schmidt and Eric Schmitt. “Leaving Iraq, U.S. Fears New Surge of Qaeda Terror.” New York Times,
November 6, 2011.
15 Sahar Issa. “Iraq Violence Dips Amid Rise in Syria.” Philadelphia Inquirer, February 21, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
17
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
KRG-Central Government Disputes/Combined Security
Mechanism16
The United States has played a role since 1991 of protecting Iraq’s Kurds from the central
government, and the Kurds have tried to preserve this “special relationship” and use it to their
advantage. Iraq’s Kurdish leaders say they do not seek outright independence or affiliation with
Kurds in neighboring countries, but the Iraqi Kurds seek to preserve the autonomy they have
achieved since 1991.
Still, some Kurds are disappointed that, even at the height of U.S. influence in Iraq in 2003-2011,
the United States was unable to help them resolve the many KRG-central government disputes
over territory, autonomy for the KRG, oil exports from the KRG, proposed oil laws, and several
other issues. Although the Kurds continue to participate in the central government at all levels,
these differences between the Kurds and Maliki could cause a Kurdish shift toward Iraq’s Sunnis.
KRG President Masoud Barzani, who was directly elected by the residents of the Kurdish region
in July 2009, hinted at a potential break with Maliki on March 20, 2012, accusing him of
monopolizing power with terms similar to those used by leading Sunnis. He repeated this
criticism numerous times during a visit to Washington, DC, in early April 2012, which included
accusations that Maliki might move against the KRG militarily.17 The two main Kurdish factions
(Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, PUK, and Kurdistan Democratic Party, KDP) field their own force
of peshmerga (Kurdish militiamen) numbering perhaps 75,000 fighters, but they are generally
lightly armed. Still, there has also been a historic hesitancy among the Kurds to side with the
Sunni Arabs because of the legacy of repression of the Kurds by Saddam Hussein and other Sunni
Iraqi leaders in the past.
Territorial Issues/“Disputed Internal Boundaries”
There has been virtually no progress in recent years in resolving the various territorial disputes
between the Kurds and Iraq’s Arabs—the most emotional of which is the Kurdish insistence that
Tamim Province (which includes oil-rich Kirkuk) be formally affiliated to the KRG. There was to
be a census and referendum on the affiliation of the province by December 31, 2007, in
accordance with Article 140 of the Constitution, but the Kurds have agreed to repeated delays in
order to avoid jeopardizing overall progress in Iraq. Nor has the national census that is pivotal to
any such referendum been conducted. It was scheduled to begin on October 24, 2010, but was
then postponed until at least December 2010 to allow time for a full-term government to be put in
place. It still has not begun, in part because of the broader political crisis (discussed below) as
well as differences over how to account for movements of populations into or out of the Kurdish
controlled provinces.
In the absence of movement on a process to integrate Kirkuk, the Kurds have attempted to
steadily assert control in the province. The current governor of Kirkuk is Najmaddin Karim, a
longtime Kurdish activist in the United States before he moved back to Iraq following the fall of
Saddam Hussein. The Property Claims Commission that is adjudicating claims from the Saddam
regime’s forced resettlement of Arabs into the KRG region is functioning, and about 10,000 Iraqi
16 For more information on Kurd-Baghdad disputes, see CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq, by
Kenneth Katzman.
17 Interview with Masoud Barzani by Hayder al-Khoie on Al-Hurra television network. April 6, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
18
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Arabs have relocated from Kirkuk back to their original provinces. Attempting to resolve these
long-standing disputes is another issue within the mandate of UNAMI, and consultations with all
parties are ongoing, according to UNAMI.18
Combined Security Mechanism at Kurd-Arab Frontier
In the absence of resolution, the territorial disputes have grown more acute since the 2009
provincial elections, in which Sunni Arabs wrested back control of the Nineveh (Mosul)
provincial council from the Kurds. The Kurds had won control of that council in the 2005
election because of the broad Sunni Arab boycott of that election. A Sunni list (al-Hadba’a) won a
clear plurality of the 2009 Nineveh vote and subsequently took control of the provincial
administration there. Al-Hadba’a is composed of hardline Sunni Arabs who openly oppose
Kurdish encroachment in the province and who are committed to the “Arab and Islamic identity”
of the province. A member of the faction, Atheel al-Nufaiji, is the governor (brother of 2010-2014
COR speaker Usama al-Nujaifi), and the Kurds have been preventing his visitation of areas of
Nineveh where the Kurds’ peshmerga militia operates. In October 2011, the central government
ordered the Kurdish flags taken down from public buildings in Khanaqin, a Kurdish town in the
province; the Kurdish police in the city disobeyed the order.
In part to prevent outright violence between the KRG and the central government, in August 2009
then-top U.S. commander in Iraq General Raymond Odierno developed a plan to partner U.S.
forces with peshmerga units and with ISF units in the province to build confidence along the
frontier between the two forces. The process was also intended to reassure Kurdish, Arab,
Turkomen, and other province residents. Implementation of this “combined security mechanism”
(CSM) began in January 2010, consisting of joint (ISF-U.S-Kurdish) patrols, maintenance of 22
checkpoints, and U.S. training of participating ISF and peshmerga forces. The mechanism has
been administered through provincial level Combined Coordination Centers. Disagreements are
referred to a Senior Working Group and a High Level Ministerial Committee.19 As of October
2010, the United States had ceased participating at four of the checkpoints, in concert with the
U.S. change of mission to a non-combat role (Operation New Dawn) on September 1, 2010.
Many who asserted that at least some U.S. forces should remain in Iraq after 2011 did so on the
grounds that U.S. troops are needed to continue to participate in CSM operations.20 However,
Major General David Perkins, commander of the 5,000 U.S. forces then in northern Iraq, said on
September 29, 2011, that the CSM continued to work well even after U.S. forces ceased
participating in the remaining joint checkpoints and patrols, and that there is not the need for a
substantial U.S. force in northern Iraq after 2011. The headquarters of the 750 U.S. troops in the
north closed on October 20, 2011.
The United States continues to participate in the process despite the completion of the U.S.
withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011. Through the Office of Security Cooperation—Iraq
(OSC-I) facilities in Nineveh Province, the United States helps coordinate the joint patrols and
checkpoints even though no U.S. forces participate in them. Previously, some have advanced
alternatives to U.S. force participation in the CSM, including giving the U.S. role to a United
18 Meeting with congressional staff, February 24, 2011.
19 “Managing Arab-Kurd Tensions in Northern Iraq After the Withdrawal of U.S. Troops.” Rand Corporation, 2011.
20 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
19
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Nations force, NATO, or civilians (Iraqi or international). It is not clear that any of these
alternative ideas are supported by Iraqi factions.
Kurdish leaders continue to criticize Maliki for opposing paying the peshmerga out of the
national budget, leaving the KRG to fund its operations. KRG President Barzani, during his U.S.
visit in April 2012, discussed the reform of the peshmerga into a smaller but more professional
and well trained force.
KRG Oil Exports/Oil Laws
The KRG and Baghdad are also locked in dispute over the ability of the Kurds to export oil that is
discovered and extracted in the KRG region. The Kurds view it as their right to develop their
resources, whereas Baghdad fears Kurdish oil exports can allow the Kurds to set up an
independent, economically viable state. Oil exports from the KRG were suspended during 2010
over central government opposition to proposed mechanisms for paying the international
investors who are performing the extraction and exportation. In early 2011, after the formation of
the current government, a compromise was reached that allowed the KRG energy exports to
resume. KRG oil exports reached nearly 200,000 barrels of crude oil per day. However, the Kurds
again suspended oil exports through the national oil grid in April 2012 after accusing Baghdad of
falling $1.5 billion in arrears to the companies extracting oil in the KRG region. At the same time,
the Kurds are reportedly building their own oil pipeline to the Turkish border that would reduce
their dependence on the national oil export grid.21
The two sides do not appear close to resolving differences over national oil laws. The KRG
adopted its own oil laws in 2007. The Kurds oppose oil laws adopted by the Iraqi cabinet in late
August 2011, and sent on to the COR for ratification, as favoring a centralized energy sector that
would impinge on KRG control of its energy resources. In connection with the visit of KRG
Prime Minister Barham Salih, Kurdish representatives told the author on November 8, 2011, that
it is likely that the oil laws would taken up by the COR, after further negotiation, by the end of
2011.22 However, in part due to the political crisis discussed further below, there has been no
further action on this issue to date.
The October 2011 KRG signing of an energy development deal with U.S. energy giant Exxon-
Mobil set off a further row with Baghdad. The central government denounced the deal as illegal,
in part because the oil fields involved are in or very close to disputed territories. The KRG has
sought to defuse this consideration by saying that if the territory of the oil fields is subsequently
judged to be part of central government-administered territory, then the revenues would be
reallocated accordingly. Still, the central government threatened to cancel the firm’s existing
contract to develop the West Qurna oil field near Basra, which was signed with the central
government. On February 13, 2012, the central government announced its sanction against the
firm as a prohibition on bidding for work on unexplored fields to be tendered later in 2012. On
March 17, 2012, Baghdad claimed that Exxon-Mobil has frozen the KRG contract, but the KRG
denies the company has stopped work in the KRG region.
21 International Crisis Group. “Iraq and the Kurds: The High-Stakes Hydrocarbons Gambit.” April 19, 2012.
22 Author conversation with KRG Washington, DC, representative Qubad Talabani, November 8, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
20
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Intra-Kurdish Divisions
Further complicating the political landscape are widening divisions within the Kurdish
community. The KRG elections also, to some extent, shuffled the political landscape. A
breakaway faction of President Talabani’s PUK, called “Change” (“Gorran”), won an
unexpectedly high 25 seats (out of 111) in the Kurdistan national assembly, embarrassing the
PUK and weakening it relative to the KDP. KRG President Masoud Barzani, leader of the KDP,
easily won reelection against weak opposition. Gorran ran its own list in the March 2010
elections and constituted a significant challenge to the Kurdistan Alliance in Sulaymaniyah
Province, according to election results. As a result, of the 57 COR seats held by Kurds, 14 are
held by parties other than the Kurdistan Alliance. Gorran has 8, the Kurdistan Islamic Union has
4, and the Islamic Group of Kurdistan has 2.
These divisions may also have played a role in the popular demonstrations that occurred in
Sulaymaniyah in early 2011. The demonstrations reflected frustration over jobs and services but
possibly also over the monopolization of power in the KRG by the Barzani and Talabani clans.
Some of these were suppressed by peshmerga.
The Sadr Faction’s Continuing Ambition and Agitation
Within the broader Shiite community, the faction of the young Shiite cleric, Moqtada Al Sadr,
who is about 36 years old, sees itself as the main representative for Iraq’s Shiites, causing an
inherent rivalry with Maliki and other Shiite leaders in Iraq. As noted above, Sadr was part of the
anti-Maliki Shiite coalition (Iraqi National Alliance) for the March 2010 national elections, but
later reached a political arrangement with Maliki that paved the way for Maliki’s achieving
another term. Sadrists were given several seats in the cabinet and a Sadrist governor was later
installed in Maysan Province, which includes the Sadrist stronghold of Amarah.
Moqtada Al Sadr himself became more politically visible and active since he returned to Iraq,
from his studies in Iran, on January 5, 2011. After his return, he gave numerous speeches that,
among other themes, insisted on full implementation of a planned U.S. withdrawal by the end of
2011. Sadr has also called on his followers to protest the failure of the Maliki government to
improve public services. Sadr’s position on the U.S. withdrawal appeared so firm that, in an April
9, 2011, statement, he threatened to reactivate his Mahdi Army militia if U.S. forces remained in
Iraq beyond the December 31, 2011, deadline. His followers conducted a large march in Baghdad
on May 26, 2011, opposing any extension of the U.S. presence. The threats were considered
pivotal to the Iraqi decision not to retain U.S. troops in Iraq beyond 2011.
Sadr’s threats against U.S. forces were considered not idle. In June and July 2011, U.S. officials
accused pro-Sadr or Sadr-offshoot Shiite militias for an elevated level of U.S. troop deaths in
June 2011 (14 killed, the highest in any month in over one year). These militias operate under
names including Asa’ib Ahl al- Haq (AAH, League of the Righteous), Khata’ib Hezbollah
(Hezbollah Battalions), and Promised Day Brigade. U.S. officials have accused Iran of arming the
militias with upgraded rocket-propelled munitions, possibly in an effort to ensure a full U.S.
withdrawal and to claim credit for forcing that withdrawal. U.S. officials reportedly requested that
the ISF act against these militias and prevail on Iran to stop aiding the militias. Press reports and
U.S. commander comments in August and September 2011 suggested the strategy had, at least
temporarily, succeeded in reducing Shiite attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq. However, outgoing Joint
Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mike Mullen testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that
Congressional Research Service
21
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Iran was providing the militias with increasingly capable Improvised Rocket Assisted Munitions
(IRAMs) and that the United States would act against the militias if they act against U.S. forces.
In the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal, journalists report that rocket attacks continue against the
U.S. consulate in Basra, which has nearly 1,000 U.S. personnel (including contractors). On the
other hand, violence by one of the Sadr militia offshoots, AAH, has reduced substantially
following a January 2012 agreement for it to integrate into the Maliki government. AAH agreed
not to use its weapons and to participate in the next national elections. Because AAH broke with
Sadr in 2008, its decision to compete in politics could weaken the Sadr faction.
While Sadr has long sought to highlight Maliki’s failures to bolster his own influence, the Sadr
faction’s extensive participation in the post-2010 government complicates the Sadrist efforts to
paint governmental failures as purely the fault of Maliki. In addition, the Sadr faction is said to be
using its fundraising ability to develop charity and employment networks (so-called Mumahidoon
or “those who pave the way”) that rival or displace those of the central government—employing a
political model similar to that of Hizballah in Lebanon.23 Iraqi civil society leaders told the author
in February 2012 that Sadrist COR deputies and other Sadr supporters appear increasingly
cooperative in political resolution discussions with other groups, including Sunnis.24
Post-U.S. Withdrawal Political Crisis
All the political disputes discussed above intensified as U.S. forces drew down until the final
withdrawal on December 18, 2011. As the last U.S. forces were exiting, and even as Maliki
visited Washington, DC, on December 12, 2011, to meet with President Obama, the carefully
constructed consensus was breaking down in what Sunni Iraqis—and also KRG President
Barzani—have called a clear power grab by Maliki. Iraq entered perhaps its worst political crisis
since the U.S. invasion of 2003, and it is still possible that the Iraqi central government might
unwind, although most experts perceive that Maliki and his Shiite allies could reconstitute a
central government overwhelmingly composed of Shiites.
The day of the final U.S. withdrawal, Maliki asked the COR to vote no confidence against
Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq, a senior Iraqiyya figure and prominent Sunni (discussed
above in the 2010 election disqualification crisis). That day, Iraqiyya parliamentarians walked out
of the COR and most of the Iraqiyya members of the cabinet suspended their work. On December
19, 2011, the government announced an arrest warrant against Deputy President Tariq al-
Hashimi, another major Iraqiyya figure, accusing him of ordering his security staff to commit acts
of assassination. Three such guards were shown on television “confessing” to assassinating rival
politicians at Hashimi’s behest. Hashimi fled to the KRG region for meetings with President
Talabani and refused to return to face trial in Baghdad, as is demanded by the judiciary, unless his
conditions for a fair trial there are met. On several occasions, Maliki has threatened the Kurds
with unspecified action if they continue to shelter Hashimi. One theme he stressed in a December
21, 2011, news conference, which was praised by U.S. officials, was that he envisions a
government in which each faction works on behalf of the country and not its own interests. The
assertion that Maliki seeks a comprehensive purge of Sunnis gained additional strength during
23 Healy, Jack. “Cleric’s Anti-U.S. Forces Poised for Gains in Iraq.” New York Times, December 20, 2010.
24 Author conversation with visiting Iraqi civil society activists. February 8, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
22
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
January 19-20, 2012, when security forces raided the homes of two Sunni politicians in Diyala
province and arrested the Sunni vice chairman of the Baghdad provincial council.
With political inclusiveness seeming to unravel, U.S. officials, including Vice President Biden,
attempted to promote a peaceful resolution to the crisis. The Vice President’s efforts were joined
by Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, and CIA Director Petraeus, who traveled to Iraq in late
December 2011 for meetings with some of the close contacts he developed when he was overall
U.S. commander in Iraq. On January 5, 2012, Ambassador Jeffrey tried to calm tensions by
stating that the Maliki government appears to be allowing the judiciary to conduct a fair
investigation of the charges against Hashimi—an indication that the United States does not
necessarily concur with the Sunni view that the arrest warrant represents a power grab by Maliki.
In a potentially positive sign for Iraqi democracy amid the crisis, a cross-sectarian, secular
political opposition party called the Union of Patriotic Figures was formed on February 12, 2012.
It announced that it would monitor both the government and the COR.
The Crisis Abates?
The U.S. diplomatic intervention—as well as the fear among all Iraqi factions of sparking all-out
political warfare—seemed to calm the crisis somewhat, although not necessarily permanently.
Iraqiyya COR deputies resumed their duties in late January 2012. The Iraqiyya ministers returned
to their offices on February 8, 2012. For his part, Maliki has arranged for the release of some of
the Baathists arrested in recent months (see above), and he has agreed to legal amendments to
give provinces more autonomy over their budgets and the right of consent when national security
forces are deployed.25 Deputy President Hashimi remained in KRG-controlled territory until early
April 2012, when he left for Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and then Turkey, where he reportedly remains.
If Hashimi has left Iraq permanently, the tensions between Baghdad and the KRG over sheltering
him are likely to ease.
By March 2012, the easing of a sense of crisis appeared to pave the way for the start of a
“national conference” to be chaired by President Talabani. The purpose of the conference is to
achieve durable solutions to the outstanding fundamental Sunni-Shiite-Kurdish issues. A
“preparatory committee” was named to establish an agenda and format, but the committee
repeatedly failed to meet. The March 20, 2012, comments by KRG President Barzani, accusing
Maliki of a power grab by harnessing control of the security forces, indicated prospects for
holding the conference were dim. On April 1, 2012, Maliki nonetheless formally issued
invitations to the major factions to convene on April 5, 2012. A key participant, KRG President
Barzani, held to his plans to visit the United States at that time and the conference was not held,
nor was a new date for it set. Based on comments by KRG President Barzani during his early
April 2012 visit to the United States, it is possible that anti-Maliki factions might organize a vote
of no confidence against him.
Moreover, the crisis threatened to become acute again in mid-April when the chairman of the
Independent Higher Electoral Commission (IHEC) was arrested on charges of corruption. Maliki
asserted this was a purely judicial matter that he did not instigate, but the arrest again heightened
tensions between Maliki and leaders of rival factions.
25 Tim Arango. “Iraq’s Prime Minister Gains More Power After Political Crisis.” New York Times, February 28, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
23
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Further clouding the prospects for a political solution is the perceived weakness of Allawi and his
Iraqiyya bloc, particularly because of Allawi’s inability to prevent members of his bloc from
ending their boycott of parliament and government. Maliki, on the other hand, is seen as
strengthened by the crisis and may be unwilling to make further concessions.
Effect of the Crisis on Upcoming Elections
The political crisis could have a direct effect on several upcoming elections in Iraq. The mandate
of the current nine member IHEC is to expire at the end of April 2012. The arrest of the IHEC
chairman, Faraj al-Haidari, could complicate the naming of a new panel. The IHEC is needed to
run the upcoming elections scheduled, or possible, for later in 2012 or early 2013.
KRG Elections. As noted above, provincial elections in the KRG-controlled provinces were not
held during the January 2009 provincial elections in the other areas of Iraq. Nor were they held
during the March 7, 2010, COR vote. There was discussion about holding them in November
2010, and then again by the end of 2011, but neither schedule was met. In late December 2011,
the KRG announced these elections would be held on September 27, 2012.
Provincial Elections. As noted above, the terms of the provincial councils are four years. New
provincial elections in the central government controlled provinces are due by early 2013.
Kirkuk Referendum. There is also to be a vote on a Kirkuk referendum at some point, if a
negotiated settlement is reached. However, a settlement does not appear within easy reach as of
early 2012 and no referendum is scheduled.
District and Sub-District Elections. District and sub-district elections throughout Iraq were
previously slated for July 31, 2009. However, those have been delayed as well, and no date has
been announced.
Constitutional Amendments. There could also be a vote on amendments to Iraq’s 2005
constitution if and when the major factions agree to finalize the recommendations of the
constitutional review commission (CRC). There has been no movement on this issue for at least
three years, and not indication such a referendum will be held in the near future.
Related Governance Issues
The political crisis has dashed hopes that Iraq was well on its way to permanent stability, the
strengthening of democracy and institution-building, and a turning of Iraqi official attention
toward basic governance and economic issues. That hope was expressed by President Obama
after his meeting with Prime Minister Maliki on December 12, 2011, and in President Obama’s
statement marking the December 18, 2011, completion of the withdrawal that Iraq is “sovereign,
stable, and self-reliant.” U.S. officials, as testified by Ambassador Jeffrey on February 1, 2011,
had earlier seen signs that factional comity would enable the COR to move quickly on long-
stalled initiatives.
Congressional Research Service
24
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
National Oil Laws and Other Pending Laws/Budget
Substantial progress appeared near in August 2011 when both the COR and the cabinet drafted
the oil laws long in the works to rationalize the energy sector and clarify the rules for foreign
investors. However, there were differences in their individual versions: the version drafted by the
Oil and Natural Resources Committee was presented to the full COR on August 17, 2011. The
cabinet adopted its separate version on August 28, 2011; there was some expectation that the
COR would take up the issue when it reconvened on September 6, 2011, after the Eid al-Fitr
celebration marking the end of Ramadan. It was unclear which version would form the basis of
final legislation, amid opposition from the Kurds to what they see as an overly centralized energy
industry encapsulated in the cabinet’s draft law. The opposition and the presence of two
competing versions of the oil laws accounted for the postponement of further COR action until at
least the end of 2011, and the political crisis that erupted in December 2011 has led to a
suspension of further progress on it.
Also not passed are laws addressing the environment, other elections, consumer protections,
intellectual property rights, building codes, a new national flag, and the permanent rules for de-
Baathification. Others say that the failure to adopt new laws governing investment, taxation, and
property ownership account for the slow pace of building a modern, dynamic economy.
One issue delayed by the political crisis has been the adoption of a 2012 budget. A $100 billion
budget was adopted by the cabinet in December 2011, and it was adopted by the COR on
February 24, 2012. It is based on an $85 price for a barrel of oil, and, with prices higher than that,
the budget will likely be close to balanced. (The cabinet budget predicted a $10 billion deficit.)
Iraq possesses a proven 143 billion barrels of oil, and high oil prices and increasing exports
should enable Iraq’s GDP to grow by about 12% in 2012, according to the World Bank. Iraq’s oil
exports recovered to about 2.1 million barrels per day by March 2012, roughly the level achieved
during Saddam’s rule. Production reached the milestone 3 million barrels per day mark in
February 2012, which Iraqi leaders trumpeted as a key milestone in Iraq’s recovery.
2011 Arab Spring-Related Demonstrations
Iraq’s government, although flawed, is the product of democratic choices. Therefore, many
experts were surprised when protests (which built to the point where they ousted leaders in Egypt
and Tunisia) began in several provinces of Iraq on February 6, 2011, and later expanded to
numerous provinces. Protests resulted in 20 deaths on the February 25, 2011, “Day of Rage”
demonstrations called by activists. Most experts agree that the protesters, although to some extent
inspired by the uprisings throughout the Middle East, did not have the similar objective of
toppling Iraq’s leadership because Iraq’s government is the product of democratic processes.
Still, the spread of unrest into Iraq suggested to many that Iraqis have been frustrated by what
they perceive as a nearly exclusive focus of the major factions on politics rather than governing or
improving services. Many protesters expressed particular outrage at the still severe shortages of
electricity in Iraq, as well as the lack of job opportunities and perceived elite corruption. Iraqis
who cannot afford their own generators (or to share a generator with a few others) face repeated
power outages every day. Many of the protests that took place were instigated by the Sadr faction,
which sought to capitalize politically on governmental failures. The demonstrations caused the
resignations of provincial governors in Wasit and Basra provinces and of several municipal
leaders in Anbar Province. In sympathy with the protests, Jafar Al Sadr, who obtained the second-
Congressional Research Service
25
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
most votes in the March 2010 elections on Maliki’s list (after Maliki himself), resigned from the
COR on February 17, 2011.
Unrest in the KRG region appeared to reflect deep frustrations and was more intense than in the
rest of Iraq. The unrest in Sulaymaniyah resulted in the deaths of at least three protestors at the
hands of peshmerga and Kurdish intelligence (Asayesh), and is said to rattle the top Kurdish
leaders, who fear the KRG’s image as an oasis of stability and prosperity in Iraq is being clouded.
Demonstrations in Sulaymaniyah on February 17 also revived long-standing but suppressed
tensions between the PUK and the KDP as the KDP retaliated for protester attacks on some of its
offices.
Protest-Prompted Governmental Reforms
The government was able to defuse popular unrest with varied measures. In February 2011,
Maliki announced a voluntary cut in his salary (from about $350,000 per year to half that) and
indicated he would not seek a third term when his current term expires in 2014. On February 27,
2011, he announced that his new cabinet would have “100 days” to prove its effectiveness or face
replacement. That deadline expired on June 7, 2011, without significant incident, although U.S.
diplomats say the government began public works projects and provided some fuel supplies as
part of its efforts to show results by that time. In addition, on May 31, 2011, third deputy
president Adel Abdul Mahdi resigned in an effort to show that the government is committed to
cutting its bloated bureaucracy. To reinforce that commitment, the COR voted on July 30, 2011,
to back Maliki’s plan to reduce the number of cabinet posts from the current 42 to 29.
Another component of the response was to appoint several technocrats to permanently fill cabinet
slots in ministries that deliver services to the public. In a wave of appointments on February 13,
2011, an Iraqiyya technocrat, Raad Shallal, was appointed minister of electricity and power. In
addition, Municipality and Public Works Minister Adel Mohder was named, as were
appointments to be ministers of state for tribal affairs, civilian community affairs, and national
reconciliation. Shallal was removed in August 2011, most likely as a scapegoat for continued
electricity shortages, although the stated cause of his removal was a failure to follow proper
procedures in signing $1.7 billion worth of power plant construction contracts with Canadian and
German firms.
The government also used a modest amount of repression. In early June 2011, in advance of the
June 7 “100 day” deadline, the government detained several dozen activists in order to preempt
protests. Additional steps have been taken since to curb protests, including tolerating pro-
government thugs to beat demonstrators on June 10, 2011. Either because of the repression or
because of lack of popular support, subsequent demonstrations have been scattered and small.
General Human Rights Issues
U.S. and international officials say they expect the 2010-2014 government to make further
progress establishing rule of law and adherence to international standards of human rights. The
State Department’s report on human rights for 2010 released April 8, 2011, largely repeated the
previous year’s characterizations of Iraq’s human rights record as follows: “Extremist violence,
coupled with weak government performance in upholding the rule of law, resulted in widespread
Congressional Research Service
26
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
and severe human rights abuses.”26 The State Department report cited a wide range of human
rights problems committed by Iraqi government security and law enforcement personnel,
including some unlawful killings; torture and other cruel punishments; poor conditions in prison
facilities; denial of fair public trials; arbitrary arrest; arbitrary interference with privacy and
home; limits on freedoms of speech, assembly, and association due to sectarianism and extremist
threats; lack of protection of stateless persons; wide scale governmental corruption; human
trafficking; and limited exercise of labor rights. Many of these same abuses and deficiencies are
discussed in the Human Rights Watch World Report for 2012, released January 22, 2012.
Trafficking in Persons
The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons report for 2011, released on June 27, 2011, places
Iraq in “Tier 2 Watch List.” This is one rank below Tier 3, the lowest ranking. The relatively
negative rating is on the grounds that, during the reporting period, Iraq did not demonstrate
evidence of significant efforts to punish traffickers or proactively identify victims. The report says
the Iraqi government has a written plan that, if implemented, would go a long way toward
complying with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and, for that reason, was not
given a Tier 3 ranking.
Media and Free Expression
While State Department and other reports attribute most of Iraq’s human rights difficulties to the
security situation and factional infighting, apparent curbs on free expression appear independent
of such factors. The State Department human rights report for 2010 noted numerous laws that
restrict press freedoms, and instances in which officials have beaten or intimidated journalists
who try to do their work. In some past cases, Maliki has sued publications that have written
articles alleging corruption or nepotism on his part.
One issue that troubles human rights activists is a draft law on freedom of expression. The draft
reportedly allows authorities to curtail rights in order to protect “the public interest.” The draft
was approved by the Council of Ministers (the cabinet) on May 16, 2011, and remains under
consideration in the COR. The draft allows for peaceful protest but would require demonstration
organizers to obtain a permit. It also imposes jail terms on anyone who “attacks a belief of any
religious sect” or insults a “symbol or person who is held sacred, exalted, or venerated by a
religious sect.”
In March 2012, some observers reported a setback to free expression, although instigated by
militias or non-governmental groups, not the government. There were reports of 14 youths having
been stoned to death by militiamen for wearing Western-style clothes and haircuts collectively
known as “Emo” style.
Labor Rights
A 1987 (Saddam era) labor code remains in effect. Although Iraqis are legally allowed to join
unions, the labor code virtually rules out independent union activity. Unions have no legal power
to negotiate with employers or protect workers’ rights through collective bargaining. However,
26 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/154462.htm.
Congressional Research Service
27
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
some of the February 2011 street demonstrations protesting lack of services have included
demands for more worker rights.
Religious Freedom/Situation of the Christian Religious Minority
In regard to human rights, a major concern is the safety and security of Iraq’s Christian
population, which is concentrated in northern Iraq as well as in Baghdad. Since the 2003 U.S.
intervention, more than half of the 1 million-1.5 million Christian population that was there
during Saddam’s time have left. Recent estimates indicate that the Christian population of Iraq is
less than 500,000.
The current situation of Christians and other religious minorities is addressed in the State
Department’s “July–December 2010 Religious Freedom Report,” released September 13, 2011.
The report noted “no change” in the status of respect for religious freedom by the government for
the reporting period, but did list numerous attacks on the community’s houses of worship and its
clergy. The report praised the COR’s November 2010 approval of a document calling on the
government to protect Iraq’s Christians.
Attacks on members of the community appear to occur in waves. The body of Chaldean Catholic
archbishop Faraj Rahho was discovered in Mosul on March 13, 2008, two weeks after his
reported kidnapping. An attack on the Yazidis in August 2007, which killed about 500 people,
appeared to exemplify the precarious situation for Iraqi minorities. In the run-up to the January
2009 provincial elections, about 1,000 Christian families reportedly fled the province in October
2008, although Iraqi officials report that most families returned by December 2008. The issue
faded in 2009 but then resurfaced late in that year when about 10,000 Christians in northern Iraq,
fearing bombings and intimidation, fled the areas near Kirkuk during October-December 2009.
On October 31, 2010, a major attack on Christians occurred when a church in Baghdad (Sayidat
al-Najat Church) was besieged by militants and as many as 60 worshippers were killed. The siege
shook the faith of the Christian community in their security. Many Christian families fled their
homes after the church attack, often going to live with relatives in Christian-inhabited locations
around Iraq. Partly as a result, Christian celebrations of Christmas 2010 were said to be
subdued—following three years in which Christians had felt confident enough to celebrate that
holiday openly. Several other attacks appearing to target Iraqi Christians have taken place since.
Some Iraqi Christians blame all the various attacks on them on Al Qaeda in Iraq, which is still
somewhat strong in Nineveh Province and which associates Christians with the United States.
Some human rights groups allege that it is the Kurds who are committing abuses against
Christians and other minorities in the Nineveh Plains, close to the KRG-controlled region.
Kurdish leaders deny the allegations, and the State Department human rights report for 2010 says
the KRG has permitted Christians fleeing violence in Baghdad to relocate into KRG-controlled
areas. Some Iraqi Christian groups advocate a “Nineveh Plains Province Solution,” in which the
Nineveh Plains would be turned into a self-administering region, possibly its own province but
affiliated or under KRG control. Supporters of the idea claim such a zone would pose no threat to
the integrity of Iraq, but others say the plan’s inclusion of a separate Christian security force
could set the scene for violence and confrontation. Even at the height of the U.S. military
presence in Iraq, U.S. forces did not specifically protect Christian sites at all times, partly because
Christian leaders do not want to appear closely allied with the United States.
The FY2008 consolidated appropriation earmarked $10 million in ESF from previous
appropriations to assist the Nineveh Plain Christians. A supplemental appropriation for 2008 and
Congressional Research Service
28
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
2009 (P.L. 110-252) earmarked another $10 million for this purpose. The Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-117) made a similar provision for FY2010, although
focused on Middle East minorities generally and without a specific dollar figure mandated for
Iraqi Christians. In the 112th Congress, a bill, H.R. 440, which would establish a post of Special
Envoy to promote religious freedom in the Middle East and South Central Asia, passed the House
on July 29, 2011, by a vote of 402-20.
Women’s Rights
Iraq has a tradition of secularism and liberalism, and women’s rights issues have not been as large
a concern for international observers and rights groups as they have in Afghanistan or the Persian
Gulf states, for example. Women serve at many levels of government, as discussed above, and are
well integrated into the work force in all types of jobs and professions. By tradition, many Iraqi
women wear traditional coverings but many adopt Western dress. On October 6, 2011, the COR
passed legislation to lift Iraq’s reservation to Article 9 of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
Corruption
The State Department human rights report for 2010 contains substantial detail on the relative lack
of progress in curbing official corruption. The report discusses political and other factors that
have caused anti-corruption institutions, such as the Commission on Integrity, to be regularly
thwarted or hampered in attempts to investigate and prosecute corruption. The COR has its own
Integrity Committee that oversees the executive branch and the governmental anti-corruption
bodies. Some note that efforts to rein in official corruption have faltered because no
comprehensive anti-corruption law has been passed.
Mass Graves
As is noted in the State Department report on human rights for 2010, the Iraqi government
continues to uncover mass graves of victims of the Saddam regime. This effort is under the
authority of the Human Rights Ministry. On April 15, 2011, a mass grave of more than 800 bodies
became the latest such discovery. The largest to date was a mass grave in Mahawil, near Hilla,
that contained 3,000 bodies; the grave was discovered in 2003, shortly after the fall of the regime.
Regional Dimension
For Iraq’s neighbors as well as for the United States, the stakes in the outcome of the political
process in Iraq have been high. Still at odds with Iran on virtually every issue in the Middle East,
the United States has considerable concerns about the potential for increased Iranian influence in
Iraq now that U.S. forces are no longer there. Yet, Iraq appears to seek primarily to reintegrate
into the Arab fold, after more than 20 years of ostracism following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in
August 1990. That motive mitigates, to some extent, Iranian influence in Iraq because a
substantial portion of the Arab world is either at odds with or highly suspicious of Iran.
Iraq’s reintegration into the Arab fold took a large step forward with the holding of an Arab
League summit in Baghdad during March 27-29, 2012. Iraq hailed the gathering as a success
Congressional Research Service
29
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
primarily because of the absence of major security incidents during the gathering. However, only
9 heads of state out of the 22 Arab League members attended, and only one Persian Gulf leader,
Amir Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah, attended. Building on that success, and on its relations with both
the United States and Iran, on May 23, 2012, Iraq will be the host of nuclear talks between Iran
and the six negotiating powers.
Iraq is also sufficiently confident to begin offering assistance to other emerging Arab
democracies. Utilizing its base of expertise in chemical weaponry during the Saddam Hussein
regime, Iraq has provided some technical assistance to the post-Qadhafi authorities in Libya to
help them clean up chemical weapons stockpiles built up by the Qadhafi regime. It has also
donated $100,000 and provided advisers to support elections in Tunisia after its 2011 revolution.27
Iran
Despite Iraq’s attempts to rebuild bridges in the Arab world, some argue that the withdrawal of all
U.S. troops from Iraq represented a success for Iranian strategy in Iraq and that Iranian influence
in Iraq is preponderant. In an interview with CNN broadcast on October 23, 2011, Iran’s
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Iran planned a closer security relationship with Iraqi
forces after U.S. troops depart. In the days after the U.S. withdrawal that was completed
December 18, 2011, Iran announced it would welcome closer defense ties to Iraq, including
training Iraqi forces, although no such training has been reported as of April 2012.
Additional evidence of Iranian influence can be seen in Iraq’s alignment, in general, with Iranian
policy that seeks to keep Bashar Al Asad in power in Syria. Iraq reportedly continues to allow
Iranian arms supplies to overfly Iraq en route to Syria.28 However, the Iraqi government position
is likely more self-interested; the Shiite leadership in Iraq fears that an ascension to power of the
majority Sunnis of Syria would enable Syria to help Sunni Iraqis in their political contest with
Maliki and other Iraqi Shiites.
To counter the impression that Iran might benefit from the complete U.S. pullout, Secretary of
State Clinton said on October 23, 2011, that:
I think Iran should look at the region. We may not be leaving military bases in Iraq, but we
have bases elsewhere. We have support and training assets elsewhere. We have a NATO ally
in Turkey. The United States is very present in the region.
That theme was echoed by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. That same day, he said Iraq, even
without U.S. troops present there, would be able to counter any threat from Iranian influence or
from Iran-backed Iraqi Shiite militias. These militias are perceived as a threat particularly to U.S.
personnel in southern Iraq. As noted, the U.S. consulate in Basra has come under some rocket fire
from Sadrist and other Shiite militias.
Prime Minister Maliki has tried to calm fears that Iran will exercise undue influence over post-
U.S. military Iraq. In so doing, he has stressed themes that are advanced by many experts that
Iraqi nationalism will resist Iranian influence. Experts also note lingering distrust of Iran from the
27 Tim Arango. “Iraq Election Official’s Arrest Casts Doubt on Prospects for Fair Voting.” New York Times, April 17,
2012.
28 Kristina Wong, “ Iraq Resists U.S. Prod, Lets Iran Fly Arms to Syria.” Washington Times, March 16, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
30
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, in which an estimated 300,000 Iraqi military personnel (Shiite and
Sunni) died. In his December 5, 2011, op-ed in the Washington Post, entitled “Building a Stable
Iraq,” Maliki wrote:
Iraq is a sovereign country. Our foreign policy is rooted in the fact that we do not interfere in
the affairs of other countries; accordingly, we oppose foreign interference in Iraqi affairs.
Iraq’s Shiite clerics also resist Iranian interference and take pride in Najaf as a more prominent
center of Shiite theology and history than is the Iranian holy city of Qom. The 2011 relocation to
Najaf, Iraq of Ayatollah Mahmud Shahrudi, an Iraqi cleric long resident in Iraq, has failed to
undermine the stature of Iraq’s most senior cleric, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.
Still others see Iranian influence as less political than economic. Observers report that Iran is
heavily promoting brands of its products, such as yogurt and jams, in Iraqi shops primarily in
southern Iraq. Some Iraqi businessmen are said to resent what they believe is Iranian dumping of
cheap products in Iraq, which is depressing the development of Iraqi industries.
Iranian Opposition: People’s Mojahedin/Camp Ashraf and PJAK
The Iraqi government treatment of the population of Camp Ashraf, a camp in which over 3,500
Iranian oppositionists (People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, PMOI) have resided, is an
indicator of the government performance on human rights. The residents of the camp accuse the
government of repression and of scheming to expel the residents or extradite them to Iran, where
they might face prosecution or death. An Iraqi military redeployment at the camp on April 8,
2011, resulted in major violence against camp residents in which 36 of them were killed.
Maliki reiterated in November 2011 that the camp will close at the end of 2011, and the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees, the European Union, and other organizations worked to broker
a solution that avoids violence or forcible expulsion. In late December 2011 Maliki announced
that the residents could be relocated as late as April 2012, and he signed an agreement on
December 26, 2011, with the United Nations to relocate the population to former U.S. military
base Camp Liberty. The PMOI later accepted the agreement, dropping demands that U.S. troops
guard the residents during any relocation, and the move of the first 400 Ashraf residents to Camp
Liberty (renamed Camp Hurriya) took place in mid-February 2012, with additional residents
moving subsequently. There, each case is being evaluated by the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees for the potential for relocation outside Iraq. This issue is discussed in substantially
greater detail in CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth
Katzman.
Iran has periodically acted against other Iranian opposition groups based in Iraq. The Free Life
Party (PJAK) consists of Iranian Kurds, and it is allied with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party that
opposes the government of Turkey. Iran has shelled purported camps of the group on several
occasions. Iran is also reportedly attempting to pressure the bases and offices in Iraq of such
Iranian Kurdish parties as the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I) and Komaleh.
Syria
As noted above, Iraq has been viewed as unhelpful to U.S. policy toward Syria, in large part
because Maliki’s government sees the likely successors to Bashar al-Assad of Syria, should he
Congressional Research Service
31
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
fall, to be Sunni Arabs. Such a Syrian government would likely be close to Saudi Arabia, Turkey,
and Jordan, and less friendly to Iraq than Assad is now. U.S. policy is that the government of
President Bashar al-Assad has lost legitimacy due to its extensive use of force against peaceful
protesters, and should step down. During March 2011-August 2011, Iraq, as did Iran, refrained
from sharp criticism of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for using military force against protests.
During that same period, Maliki received high-level business and other delegations from Syria in
a show of support for his government. In September 2011 Iraq moved closer to the Iranian
position by calling on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to make major reforms or risk unrest that
could spill into Iraq itself. Iraq opposed the Arab League move in November 2011 to suspend
Syria’s membership, but it voted for a January 22, 2012, Arab League plan for a transition of
power in Syria. Still, both Iraq and Iran are perceived as wanting the Assad regime to remain in
power.
Aside from official Iraqi policy, the unrest in Syria has generated a scramble among Iraqi factions
to affect the outcome there. Some reports suggest that Sadrist and other Shiite militiamen might
be entering Syria to help the Assad government. AQ-I members have reportedly entered Syria to
help the mostly Sunni opposition to President Assad. The Iraqi government announced in
February 2012 that it was tightening its border with Syria to prevent the movement of Iraqi
militants and arms into Syria. The KRG appears to be using its influence with Syrian Kurds to
persuade them to more decisively revolt against Assad. The KRG has hosted meetings of Syrian
Kurds intended to promote that stance.
Turkey
Turkey’s concerns focus mostly, although not exclusively, on northern Iraq, which borders
Turkey. Turkey has historically been viewed as concerned about the Iraqi Kurdish insistence on
autonomy and Iraqi Kurds’ ethnically based sympathies for Kurdish oppositionists in Turkey. The
anti-Turkey Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has long maintained camps inside Iraq, along the
border with Turkey. Turkey continues to conduct periodic bombardments and other military
operations against the PKK encampments in Iraq. For example, in October 2011, Turkey sent
ground troops into northern Iraq to attack PKK bases following the killing of 24 Turkish soldiers
by the PKK. However, suggesting that it has built a pragmatic relationship with the KRG, Turkey
has emerged as the largest outside investor in northern Iraq.
Gulf States
Iraq also has unresolved disputes with several of the Sunni-led Persian Gulf states who have not
fully accommodated themselves to the fact that Iraq is now dominated by Shiite factions.
However, Iraq has tried, with some success, to settle some of these issues to encourage maximum
Gulf participation in the March 27-29, 2012, Arab League summit in Baghdad. All the Gulf states
were represented at the summit but, among Gulf rulers, only Amir Sabah of Kuwait attended.
Qatar sent a very low-level delegation which it said openly was meant as a protest against the
Iraqi government’s treatment of Sunni Arab factions.
Saudi Arabia had been widely criticized by Iraqi leaders because it has not opened an embassy in
Baghdad, a move Saudi Arabia pledged in 2008 and which the United States has long urged. This
issue was mitigated on February 20, 2012, when Saudi Arabia announced that it had named its
ambassador to Jordan, Fahd al-Zaid, to serve as a non-resident ambassador to Iraq concurrently.
However, it did not announce the opening of an embassy in Baghdad. The Saudi move came after
Congressional Research Service
32
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
a visit by Iraqi national security officials to Saudi Arabia to discuss greater cooperation on
counter-terrorism and the fate of about 400 Arab prisoners in Iraqi jails. The other Gulf countries
have opened embassies and all except the UAE have appointed full ambassadors to Iraq.
The relationship with Kuwait has always been considered difficult to resolve because of the
legacy of the 1990 Iraqi invasion. However, a possible indication of greater acceptance of the
Iraqi government by the state it once occupied (1990-1991) came when Kuwait’s prime minister
visited Iraq on January 12, 2011. Maliki subsequently visited Kuwait on February 16, 2011.
These key exchanges took place after the U.N. Security Council on December 15, 2010, passed
three resolutions (1956, 1957, and 1958) that had the net effect of lifting most Saddam-era
sanctions on Iraq, although the U.N.-run reparations payments process remains intact (and
deducts 5% from Iraq’s total oil revenues). A U.N. envoy, Gennadi Tarasov, remains empowered
by the Security Council to clear up the issues of Kuwaitis and other nationals missing from the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the issue of the missing Kuwaiti national archives that Iraq
allegedly took out of Kuwait. Very little progress on these issues has been made in recent years,
as was made clear in a Security Council statement of December 15, 2011 (SC/10490). Other
mutual suspicions persist—in August 2011 Iraqi politicians accused Kuwait of intruding on Iraq’s
oil through slant drilling at the border.
Some of these unresolved issues moved forward during the March 15, 2012, visit of Maliki to
Kuwait. After Maliki’s meetings, the two announced that Iraq had agreed to pay its share of
compensation to maintain border markings between the two. Iraq agreed to pay $300 million to
the Kuwaiti government and to invest $200 million in a joint venture of the two as settlement for
Kuwait Airways’ claim for $1.2 billion in compensation for planes and parts allegedly stolen by
Iraq during the 1990-1991 occupation. These agreements paved the way for Amir Sabah to attend
the Arab League summit in Baghdad.
The government of Bahrain, which is mostly Sunni, also fears that Iraq might work to empower
Shiite oppositionists who have demonstrated for a constitutional monarchy during 2011.
Ayatollah Sistani is revered by many Bahraini Shiites, and Iraqi Shiites have demonstrated in
solidarity with the Bahraini opposition, but there is no evidence that Iraq has had any direct role
in the Bahrain unrest.
U.S. Military Withdrawal and Post-2011 Policy
A complete U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq by the end of 2011 was a specific stipulation of
the November 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement (SA), which took effect on January 1, 2009.
Following the SA’s entry into force, President Obama, on February 27, 2009, outlined a U.S.
troop drawdown plan that provided for a drawdown of U.S. combat brigades by the end of August
2010, with a residual force of 50,000 primarily for training the Iraq Security Forces, to remain
until the end of 2011. An interim benchmark in the SA was the June 30, 2009, withdrawal of U.S.
combat troops from Iraq’s cities. These withdrawal deadlines were strictly adhered to and, as
noted above, the last U.S. troops departed Iraq on December 18, 2011.
Question of Whether U.S. Forces Would Remain Beyond 2011
During 2011, with the deadline for a complete U.S. withdrawal approaching, continuing high-
profile attacks, fears of expanded Iranian influence, and perceived deficiencies in Iraq’s 650,000
Congressional Research Service
33
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
member security forces caused U.S. officials to seek to revise the SA to keep some U.S. troops in
Iraq after 2011. Renegotiating the SA to allow for a continued U.S. troop presence required
discussions with the Iraqi government and likely a ratification vote of the Iraqi COR.
In seeking a revision of the SA, some U.S. experts feared the potential for rifts among major
ethnic and sectarian communities to widen to the point where Iraq could still become a “failed
state” unless some U.S. troops remained. Still others believed that U.S. troops were required to
ensure that the Kurd-Arab tensions in northern Iraq did not escalate into all-out conflict. U.S.
officials couched their ongoing concerns about the ISF as questions about Iraq’s ability to defend
its airspace and borders, and the ISF’s need for ongoing U.S. training. Some of these concerns
were reflected in an October 2011 audit by the SIGIR on potential deficiencies in the training
program for the Iraqi police forces as that responsibility was transferred from Department of
Defense to Department of State on October 1, 2011.29 Iraqi comments, such as an October 30,
2011, statement by Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Babaker Zebari to the effect that
Iraq would be unable to execute full external defense until 2020-2024, reinforced those who
asserted that a U.S. force presence was still needed.30
U.S. Efforts to Convince Iraq to Request A Continued U.S. Military Presence
Several high-level U.S. visits and statements urged the Iraqis to consider extending the U.S. troop
presence. On April 22, 2011, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen,
on a visit to Iraq, said U.S. logistical and operational considerations required that an Iraqi request
for U.S. troops to remain in Iraq beyond 2011 come within a few weeks.31 Maliki told visiting
Speaker of the House John Boehner, during an April 16, 2011, visit to Baghdad, that Iraqi forces
were capable of securing Iraq after 2011, but that Iraq would welcome U.S. training and arms
after that time.32 Subsequent to Boehner’s visit, Maliki, anticipating that a vote of the COR would
be needed for any extension, stated that a request for U.S. troops might be made if there were a
“consensus” among political blocs, which he defined as at least 70% concurrence.33 This
appeared to be an effort to isolate the Sadr faction, which was the most vocal opponent of a
continuing U.S. presence.
In his first visit to Iraq as Defense Secretary on July 11, 2011, Leon Panetta urged Iraqi leaders to
make a decision, and an affirmative one, soon. His visit, and another one a few weeks later by
Mullen, appeared to galvanize the Iraqi political system to agree on a decision and, on August 3,
2011, major factions gave Maliki their backing to negotiate an SA extension. The Sadr faction
opposed such a decision and, as noted above, stated its willingness to conduct widescale protests
against a continued U.S. troop presence. Press reports indicated that the Defense Department
shaped its final withdrawal schedule to allow for certain units to remain if a U.S.-Iraq agreement
to keep U.S. troops materialized very late in 2011.
With the prospects appearing promising, Secretary Panetta said on August 20, 2011, that it was
likely that Iraq would request a continued U.S. presence primarily to train the ISF. In September
29 http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-006.pdf#view=fit.
30 “Iraq General Says Forces Not Ready ‘Until 2020.’” Agence France Presse, October 30, 2011.
31 Schmidt, Michael and Tim Arango. “Iraq Must Decide Within Weeks If U.S. Troops Will Stay Past 2011, Top
Official Says.” New York Times, April 23, 2011.
32 Prashant Rao. “Maliki Tells US’ Boehner Iraqi Troops Are Ready.” Agence France Presse, April 16, 2011.
33 Aaron Davis. “Maliki Seeking Consensus on Troops.” Washington Post, May 12, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
34
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
2011, a figure of about 15,000 remaining U.S. troops, reflecting recommendations of the U.S.
military, was being widely discussed.34 However, the issue became a subject of substantial debate
when the New York Times reported on September 7, 2011, that the Administration was considering
proposing to Iraq to retain only about 3,000-4,000 forces, mostly in a training role, after 2011.35
Many experts and some Members of Congress criticized that figure as too low to ensure force
protection and carry out the intended missions.
President Obama Announces Decision on Full Withdrawal
The difficulty in the negotiations—primarily a function of strident Sadrist opposition to a
continued U.S. presence—became clearer on October 5, 2011, when Iraq issued a statement that
it agreed on the need to keep U.S. military personnel in Iraq as trainers, but that Iraq would not
extend the legal protections contained in the existing SA. That stipulation failed to meet the
requirements of the Defense Department, which feared that trying any American soldier under the
Iraqi constitution (which states that no Iraqi law shall contradict Islam) could lead to serious
crises at some stage.
With little evident Iraqi flexibility, on October 21, 2011, President Obama announced that the
United States and Iraq had agreed that, in accordance with the November 2008 Security
Agreement (SA) with Iraq, all U.S. troops would leave Iraq at the end of 2011. With the formal
end of the U.S. combat mission on August 31, 2010, U.S. forces dropped to 47,000, and force
levels dropped steadily from August to December 2011. The last U.S. troop contingent crossed
from Iraq into Kuwait on December 18, 2011.
Structure of the Post-Troop Security Relationship
After the withdrawal announcement, senior U.S. officials, including Defense Secretary Leon
Panetta, stated that the United States would be able to continue to help Iraq secure itself using
programs commonly used with other countries. Some detail was provided at a hearing on
November 15, 2011, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, at which Secretary Panetta
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey testified as follows:36
• An Office of Security Cooperation—Iraq (OSC-I), under the authority of the U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq, would continue to train and mentor the Iraq Security Forces
(ISF). OSC-I has nearly 1,000 total personnel, of which about 147 are U.S.
military personnel and the remainder are mostly contactors. The office, working
out of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and 10 locations around Iraq, helps train and
mentor the Iraqis, and manages nearly 370 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases
totaling over $9 billion worth of pending arms sales to Iraq. The largest FMS
case is the sale of 36 U.S.-made F-16 combat aircraft to Iraq, notified to
Congress in two equal tranches, the latest of which was made on December 12,
2011 (Transmittal No. 11-46). The total value of the sale of 36 F-16s is up to $6.5
billion when all parts, training, and weaponry are included.
34 Author conversations with Iraq experts in Washington, DC, 2011.
35 Eric Schmitt and Steven Lee Myers. “Plan Would Keep Military in Iraq Beyond Deadline.” September 7, 2011.
36 Senate Armed Services Committee. “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Iraq Security Issues.”
November 15, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
35
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
• The United States continues to cooperate with Iraq on counter-terrorism, naval
and air defense, and cooperation through joint exercises.
• U.S. personnel (mostly contractors) continue to be “embedded” with Iraqi forces
as trainers not only tactically, but at the institutional level (by advising Iraqi
security ministries and its command structure). Ongoing discussions with the
Iraqis will determine whether these personnel would accompany Iraqi forces on
counter-terrorism missions.
The withdrawal—and perhaps the political crisis that broke out immediately after the completion
of the withdrawal—has provoked some criticism of the Administration. Some argue that U.S.
gains have been jeopardized by the full pullout and that the Administration should have pressed
Iraqi leaders harder to allow a U.S. contingent to remain. Those who support the Administration
view say that political crisis was likely no matter when the United States withdrew and that it is
the responsibility of the Iraqis to resolve their differences.
The Bilateral Relationship and State Department As Lead Agency in Iraq
In his withdrawal announcement, President Obama stated that, through U.S. assistance programs,
the United States would be able to continue to develop all facets of the bilateral relationship with
Iraq, help Iraq strengthen its institutions, and “partner with an Iraq that contributes to regional
security and peace.”37 The bilateral civilian relationship was the focus of a visit to Iraq by Vice
President Biden in early December 2011, just prior to the December 12, 2011, Maliki visit to the
United States, which reportedly focused on these issues but also exposed some U.S.-Iraq
disagreements, such as over policy toward Syria.
The cornerstone of the bilateral relationship is the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA). The
SFA, signed and entered into effect at the same time as the SA, presents a framework for long-
term U.S.-Iraqi relations, and is intended to help orient Iraq’s politics and its economy toward the
West and the developed nations, and reduce its reliance on Iran or other regional states.
The SFA provides for the following (among other provisions):
• U.S.-Iraq cooperation “based on mutual respect,” and that the United States will
not use Iraqi facilities to launch any attacks against third countries, and will not
seek permanent bases.
• U.S support for Iraqi democracy and support for Iraq in regional and
international organizations.
• U.S.-Iraqi dialogue to increase Iraq’s economic development, including through
the Dialogue on Economic Cooperation and a Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement.
• Promotion of Iraq’s development of its electricity, oil, and gas sector.
• U.S.-Iraq dialogue on agricultural issues and promotion of Iraqi participation in
agricultural programs run by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and USAID.
37 Remarks by the President on Ending the War in Iraq.” http://www.whitehouse.gov, October 21, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
36
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
• Cultural cooperation through several exchange programs, such as the Youth
Exchange and Study Program and the International Visitor Leadership Program.
The State Department as Lead Agency
Virtually all of the responsibility for conducting the bilateral relationship now falls on the State
Department, which became the lead U.S. agency in Iraq as of October 1, 2011. In July 2011, as
part of the transition to State leadership in Iraq, the United States formally opened planned
consulates in Basra and Irbil. Embassy branch offices were considered for Mosul and Kirkuk, but
cost and security issues, particularly in Mosul, have derailed these plans and facilities in these
locations remain limited diplomatic offices. There are approximately 16,000 total U.S. personnel
in Iraq, about half of which are contractors. Of the total, about 2,000 are U.S. diplomats.38 Of the
contractors, most are security contractors protecting the U.S. Embassy and consulates, and other
State Department and OSC-I facilities throughout Iraq. With the transition completed, the State
Dept. announced on March 9, 2012, that its “Office of the Iraq Transition Coordinator” has
closed. In concert with that closure, the former coordinator, Ambassador Pat Haslach, assumed a
senior post in the bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations.
Not only have U.S. plans for some consulates been altered, but the size and cost of the U.S.
civilian presence in Iraq has become an issue for debate. U.S. efforts to cut costs in all spheres of
government are widely reported. Coupled with that is the perception that Iraqi leaders chafe at
further U.S. tutelage and advice, and are less welcoming of frequent U.S. diplomatic visits. Press
reports say the Iraqis are increasingly displacing foreign firms and contractors from the
International Zone (Green Zone) in favor of Iraqi institutions, and U.S. diplomats have trouble
going outside the Zone for official appointments because of security concerns. Iraqis and some
U.S. officials are said to believe that the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, built at a cost of about $750
million, is too large and carries too much staff relative to the remaining mission. One press report
in February 2012 said a staff cut of nearly 50% was under consideration;39 U.S. officials
subsequently denied considering cuts that large. On a visit to Iraq on February 16, 2012, senior
State Department official for management Thomas Nides said the U.S. Embassy might face a
10% funding cut for FY2013, but he did not specify how that would translate into staff reductions
at the Embassy. As shown in the aid table below (footnote), the State Department request for
operations (which includes costs for the Embassy as well as other facilities and all personnel in
Iraq) is about $2.7 billion for FY2013, down from $3.6 billion requested for FY2012—with
FY2012 considered a “transition year” to State Department leadership, and requiring high start-up
costs.
The debate over staff is separate from but related to the debate over whether the State
Department, using security contractors, can fully secure its personnel in Iraq. A staff report of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, released January 31, 2011, expressed substantial
skepticism.40 Still, no U.S. civilian personnel in Iraq have been killed or injured since the troop
withdrawal.
38 Tim Arango. “U.S. Plans to Cut Its Staff by Half at Iraq Embassy.” New York Times, February 8, 2012.
39 Tim Arango. Op. cit.
40 Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “Iraq: The Transition From a Military Mission to A Civilian-Led Effort.” S.Prt.
112-3. January 31, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
37
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
State Department-run aid programs are intended to fulfill the objectives of the SFA, according to
State Department budget documents. These programs, implemented mainly through the
Economic Support Fund account, are intended to promote Iraqi political reconciliation and
peaceful dispute resolution, as well as economic ties, cultural ties, educational ties, and broader
relations. Table 4 provides information on U.S. assistance to promote Iraqi democracy and
peaceful political competition and consensus building.
If Iraq’s major factions permanently shift away from supporting violence and toward peaceful
political competition, some might argue that U.S. funding contributes to that transition. Others
might argue that the change is caused by numerous factors, such as the improvement of security
and rejection of foreign terrorist influence, and that it is virtually impossible to assess the
contribution made by U.S. assistance.
Regional Reinforcement Capability
In conjunction with the withdrawal, Defense Secretary Panetta stressed that the United States
would retain a large capability in the Persian Gulf region, presumably to be in position to assist
the ISF were it to falter, and to demonstrate continuing U.S. interest in Iraq’s security as well as to
deter Iran. The United States has about 50,000 military personnel in the region, including about
15,000 mostly U.S. Army forces in Kuwait, which are to transition to combat ready rather than
support forces; about 7,500 mostly Air Force personnel in Qatar; 5,000 mostly Navy personnel in
Bahrain; and about 3,000 mostly Air Force and Navy in the UAE, with very small numbers in
Saudi Arabia and Oman. The remainder are part of at least one (and often two) aircraft carrier
task force in or near the Gulf at any given time. The forces are in the Gulf under defense
cooperation agreements with all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states that give the United
States access to their military facilities and, in several cases, to station forces and preposition
even heavy armor.
The United States reportedly considered stationing about 4,000 additional U.S. forces in Kuwait
to provide enhanced capability to support Iraq, were that necessary.41 At the November 15, 2011,
hearing cited above, Joint Chiefs Chairman Dempsey advanced a version of this option, saying “it
would be my view that we should have some kind of rotational presence [of additional U.S.
forces in Kuwait], ground, air, and naval.” However, suggesting this option has been discarded,
deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes told journalists that “there are not really plans to
have any substantial increases in any other parts of the Gulf as this war winds down.”42 Still, the
transition of U.S. forces in Kuwait from support to combat forces, mentioned above, could
represent a scaled-down version of that idea.
41 Pauline Jelinek. “Kuwait, US Still Talking About Troop Plan.” Associated Press, November 7, 2011.
42 “The Cable: Foreign Policy’s Josh Rogin.” Washington Post, December 22, 2011. p. 17.
Congressional Research Service
38
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Table 2. March 2010 COR Election: Final, Certified Results by Province
Elected Seats in
Province
COR Results
Baghdad
68
Maliki: 26 seats; Iraqiyya: 24 seats; INA: 17 seats; minority
reserved: 2 seats
Nineveh (Mosul)
31
Iraqiiya: 20; Kurdistan Alliance: 8; INA: 1; Accordance: 1; Unity
(Bolani): 1; minority reserved: 3
Qadisiyah
11
Maliki: 4; INA: 5; Iraqiyya: 2
Muthanna
7
Maliki: 4; INA: 3
Dohuk
10
Kurdistan Alliance: 9; other Kurdish lists: 1; minority reserved:
1
Basra
24
Maliki: 14 ; INA: 7; Iraqiyya: 3
Anbar
14
Iraqiyya: 11; Unity (Bolani): 1; Accordance: 2
Karbala
10
Maliki: 6; INA: 3; Iraqiyya: 1
Wasit
11
Maliki: 5; INA: 4; Iraqiyya: 2
Dhi Qar
18
Maliki: 8; INA: 9; Iraqiyya: 1
Sulaymaniyah
17
Kurdistan Alliance: 8; other Kurds: 9
Kirkuk (Tamim)
12
Iraqiyya: 6; Kurdistan Alliance: 6
Babil
16
Maliki: 8; INA: 5; Iraqiyya: 3
Irbil
14
Kurdistan Alliance: 10; other Kurds: 4
Najaf
12
Maliki: 7; INA: 5
Diyala
13
Iraqiyya: 8; INA: 3; Maliki: 1; Kurdistan Alliance: 1
Salahuddin
12
Iraqiyya: 8; Unity (Bolani): 2; Accordance: 2
Maysan
10
Maliki: 4; INA: 6
Total Seats
325
Iraqiyya: 89 + 2 compensatory = 91
(310 elected + 8
Maliki: 87 + 2 compensatory = 89
minority reserved + 7
compensatory)
INA: 68 + 2 compensatory = 70 (of which about 40 are Sadrist)
Kurdistan Alliance: 42 +1 compensatory = 43
Unity (Bolani): 4
Accordance: 6
other Kurdish: 14
minority reserved: 8
Source: Iraqi Higher Election Commission, March 26, 2010.
Notes: Seat totals are approximate and their exact allocation may be subject to varying interpretations of Iraqi
law. Total seat numbers include likely allocations of compensatory seats. Total seats do not add to 325 total
seats in the COR due to some uncertainties in allocations.
Congressional Research Service
39
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Iraq: FY2003-FY2013
(appropriations/allocations in millions of $)
FY
Total
FY’13
‘03 04 05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
03-12
Request
IRRF
2,475
18,389 —
10
— — — — —
––
20,874
ESF
—
—
— 1,535.4 1,677 429 541.5 382.5 325.7
299 5,190
262.9
Democracy
Fund
— — — — 250 75 — — —
–– 325
IFTA
(Treasury
Dept.
Asst.)
— — — 13.0 2.8 — — — —
–– 15.8
NADR
—
— 3.6
— 18.4 20.4 35.5 30.3 29.8
32
170
30.3
Refugee
Accounts
(MRA and
ERMA)
39.6
.1 — — 78.3 278 260 316 280
–– 1,252
IDA
22 — 7.1 .3
45 85 51 42 17
–– 269
Other
USAID
Funds
470 — — — —
23.8 — — —
–– 494
INCLE
—
—
—
91.4
170
85
20
702
114.6
500
1,683
850
FMF
–– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– 850 850
900
IMET
—
1.2
—
—
1.1
—
2
2
1.7
2
10
2
DOD—ISF
Funding
—
— 5,391 3,007 5,542 3,000 1,000 1,000 1,500
— 20,440
DOD—
Iraq
Army 51.2 — 210
— — — — — —
— 261
DOD—
CERP
— 140 718 708 750 996 339
263 44.0
— 3,958
DOD—Oil
Repair
802 — — — — — — — —
— 802
DOD—
Business
Support
—
— —
— 50.0 50.0 74.0 —
—
—
174
Total
3,859 18,548 6,329 5,365 8,584 5,042 2,323 2,738 2,313
1,683 56,768 2,045.2
Sources: State Department FY2013 Executive Budget Summary, February 2012; SIGIR Report to Congress,
January 30, 2012; and CRS calculations. FY2012 appropriations in Consolidated Appropriation, P.L. 112-74.
Notes: Table prepared by Curt Tarnoff, Specialist in Foreign Affairs, on February 17, 2012. This table does not
contain agency operational costs, including CPA, State Department, and PRTs, except where these are
embedded in the larger reconstruction accounts. Estimated operational costs to date are an additional $9.3
billion, including $3.6 billion estimated for FY2012. Approximately $2.7 billion is requested by State Department
for these costs in FY2013. Possible cuts in staff at the U.S. embassy and other locations is addressed in this
report. IG oversight costs estimated at $417 million. IMET=International Military Education and Training;
IRRF=Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund; INCLE=International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Fund; ISF=Iraq
Security Force; NADR=Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related: ESF=Economic Support Fund;
IDA=International Disaster Assistance; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; ISF= Iraqi Security Forces.
Congressional Research Service
40
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Table 4. Recent Democracy Assistance to Iraq
(in millions of current $)
FY2009
FY2010 (act.)
FY2011
FY2012
Rule of Law and Human Rights
32.45
33.3
16.5
29.75
Good Governance
143.64
117.40
90.33
100.5
Political
41.00 52.60 30.00
16.25
Competition/Consensus-Building
Civil
Society
87.53 83.6 32.5
55.5
Totals 304.62
286.9
169.33
202.0
Source: Congressional Budget Justification, March 2011. Figures for these accounts are included in the overall
assistance figures presented in the table above.
Congressional Research Service
41
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Table 5. January 31, 2009, Provincial Election Results (Major Slates)
Baghdad—55 regular seats, plus one
State of Law (Maliki)—38% (28 seats); Independent Liberals Trend (pro-Sadr)—9%
Sabean and one Christian set-aside
(5 seats); Accord Front (Sunni mainstream)—9% (9 seats); Iraq National (Allawi)—
seat
8.6%; Shahid Mihrab and Independent Forces (ISCI)—5.4% (3 seats) ; National
Reform list (of former P.M. Ibrahim al-Jafari)—4.3% (3 seats)
Basra—34 regular seats, plus one
State of Law—37% (20); ISCI—11.6% (5); Sadr—5% (2); Fadhila (previously
Christian seat
dominant in Basra)—3.2% (0); Allawi—3.2% (0); Jafari list—2.5% (0). Governor :
Shiltagh Abbud (Maliki list); Council chair: Jabbar Amin (Maliki list)
Nineveh—34 regular seats, plus one
Hadbaa—48.4%; Fraternal Nineveh—25.5%; IIP—6.7%; Hadbaa took control of
set aside each for Shabaks, Yazidis,
provincial council and administration. Governor is Atheel al-Nujaifi (Hadbaa).
and Christians
Najaf—28 seats
State of Law—16.2% (7); ISCI—14.8% (7); Sadr—12.2% (6); Jafari—7% (2); Allawi—
1.8% (0); Fadhila—1.6% (0). Council chairman: Maliki list
Babil—30 seats
State of Law—12.5% (8); ISCI—8.2% (5); Sadr—6.2% (3); Jafari—4.4% (3); Allawi—
3.4%; Accord Front—2.3% (3); Fadhila—1.3%. New Council chair: Kadim Majid
Tuman (Sadrist); Governor—Salman Zirkani (Maliki list)
Diyala—29 seats
Accord Front list—21.1%; Kurdistan Alliance—17.2%; Allawi—9.5%; State of Law—
6 %. New council leans heavily Accord, but allied with Kurds and ISCI.
Muthanna—26 seats
State of Law—10.9% (5); ISCI—9.3% (5); Jafari—6.3% (3); Sadr—5.5% (2); Fadhila—
3.7%.
Anbar—29 seats
Iraq Awakening (Sahawa-Sunni tribals)—18%; National Iraqi Project Gathering
(established Sunni parties, excluding IIP)—17.6%;; Al awi—6.6%; Tribes of Iraq—
4.5%.
Maysan—27 seats
State of Law—17.7% (8); ISCI—14.6% (8); Sadr—7; Jafari—8.7% (4); Fadhila—3.2%;
Allawi—2.3%. New Governor: Mohammad al-Sudani (Maliki); Council chair:
Hezbollah Iraq
Dhi Qar—31 seats
State of Law—23.1% (13); pro-Sadr—14.1% (7); ISCI—11.1% (5); Jafari—7.6% (4);
Fadhila—6.1%; Allawi—2.8%. Governor—Maliki list; Council chair: Sadrist
Karbala—27 seats
List of Maj. Gen. Yusuf al-Habbubi (Saddam-era local official)—13.3% (1 seat); State
of Law—8.5% (9); Sadr—6.8% (4); ISCI—6.4% (4); Jafari—2.5% ; Fadhila—2.5%.
Salah Ad Din—28 seats
IIP-led list—14.5%; Al awi—13.9%; Sunni list without IIP—8.7%; State of Law—3.5%;
ISCI—2.9%. Council leans Accord/IIP
Qadissiyah—28 seats
State of Law—23.1% (11); ISCI—11.7% (5); Jafari—8.2% (3); Al awi—8%; Sadr—
6.7% (2); Fadhila—4.1%. New governor: Salim Husayn (Maliki list)
Wasit—28 seats
State of Law—15.3% (13); ISCI—10% (6); Sadr—6% (3); Al awi—4.6%; Fadhila—
2.7%. Governor: Shiite independent; Council chair: ISCI
Source: UNAMI translation of results issued February 2, 2009, by the Independent Higher Election Commission
of Iraq; Vissar, Reidar. The Provincial Elections: The Seat Allocation Is Official and the Coalition-Forming Process
Begins. February 19, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
42
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Table 6. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Seats
Seats
Bloc/Party
(Jan. 05)
(Dec. 05)
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). 85 seats after departure of Fadilah (15 seats)
and Sadr faction (28 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz al-
140 128
Hakim has 30; Da’wa Party (25 total: Maliki faction, 12, and Anizi faction, 13);
independents (30).
Kurdistan Alliance—KDP (24); PUK (22); independents (7)
75
53
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added Communist and other mostly Sunni parties for Dec.
40 25
vote.
Iraq Accord Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP,
— 44
Tariq al-Hashimi, 26 seats); National Dialogue Council of Khalaf Ulayyan (7); General
People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi (7); independents (4).
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, led by former Baathist Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan.
— 11
2005 vote.
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)
2
5
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
—
0
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
5
—
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
3
1
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr
3
2
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
2
—
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
2
0
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
1
—
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
1
1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Umar al-Jabburi, Sunni, secular)
1
3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
0
1
Yazidi list (smal Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
—
1
Notes: Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election;
15 million in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66%
(10 million)/December: 75% (12 million).
Congressional Research Service
43
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Table 7. Assessments of the Benchmarks
Subsequent Actions and Assessments—May
2008 Administration report, June 2008 GAO
July 12,
Sept. 14,
report, International Compact with Iraq
2007,
GAO
2007,
Review in June 2008, and U.S. Embassy
Admin.
(Sept.
Admin.
Weekly Status Reports
Benchmark
Report
07)
Report
(and various press sources)
1. Forming Constitutional
(S)
unmet
S
CRC filed final report in August 2008 but major
Review Committee (CRC)
satisfactory
issues remain unresolved and require achievement of
and completing review
consensus among major faction leaders.
2. Enacting and
(U)
unmet
S
“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12, 2008.
implementing laws on De-
unsatisfact.
Al ows about 30,000 fourth ranking Baathists to
Baathification
regain their jobs, and 3,500 Baathists in top three
party ranks would receive pensions. Could al ow for
judicial prosecution of al ex-Baathists and bars ex-
Saddam security personnel from regaining jobs. De-
Baathification officials used this law to try to harm
the prospects of rivals in March 2010 elections.
3. Enacting and
U
unmet
U
Framework and three implementing laws long stalled
implementing oil laws that
over KRG-central government disputes, but draft
ensure equitable
legislation still pending in COR. Revenue being
distribution of resources
distributed equitably, including 17% revenue for KRG.
Kurds also getting that share of oil exported from
fields in KRG area.
4. Enacting and
S partly
S
Regions law passed October 2006, with relatively low
implementing laws to form
met
threshold (petition by 33% of provincial council
semi-autonomous regions
members) to start process to form new regions, took
effect April 2008. November 2008: petition by 2% of
Basra residents submitted to IHEC (another way to
start forming a region) to convert Basra province
into a single province “region. Signatures of 8% more
were required by mid-January 2009; not achieved.
Najaf, Diyala, Salahuddin, and Anbar have asked for a
referendum to become a region.
5. Enacting and
S on (a)
overall S on (a) and Draft law stipulating powers of provincial
implementing: (a) a law to
and U on
unmet; (c)
governments adopted February 13, 2008, took effect
establish a higher electoral
the others
(a)
April 2008. Implementing election law adopted
commission, (b) provincial
met
September 24, 2008, provided for provincial elections
elections law; (c) a law to
by January 31, 2009. Those elections were held, as
specify authorities of
discussed above.
provincial bodies, and (d)
set a date for provincial
elections
6. Enacting and
no rating
unmet
Same as July Law to amnesty “non-terrorists” among 25,000 Iraq-
implementing legislation
held detainees passed February 13, 2008. Most of
addressing amnesty for
these have been released. 19,000 detainees held by
former insurgents
U.S. were transferred to Iraqi control under SA.
Musa Daqduq, Hezbol ah al egedly responsible for
killing American soldiers, transferred to Iraqi control
in December 2011 for Iraqi trial.
7. Enacting and
no rating
unmet
Same as July March 2008 Basra operation, discussed above, viewed
implementing laws on
as move against militias. On April 9, 2008, Maliki
militia disarmament
demanded all militias disband as condition for their
parties to participate in provincial elections. Law on
militia demobilization stalled.
Congressional Research Service
44
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Subsequent Actions and Assessments—May
2008 Administration report, June 2008 GAO
July 12,
Sept. 14,
report, International Compact with Iraq
2007,
GAO
2007,
Review in June 2008, and U.S. Embassy
Admin.
(Sept.
Admin.
Weekly Status Reports
Benchmark
Report
07)
Report
(and various press sources)
8. Establishing political,
S
met
met
No longer applicable; U.S. “surge” has ended and U.S.
media, economic, and
troops now out of Iraq.
services committee to
support U.S. “surge”
9. Providing three trained
S partly
S
No longer applicable. Eight brigades were assigned to
and ready brigades to
met
assist the surge when it was in operation.
support U.S. surge
10. Providing Iraqi
U
unmet
S to pursue
No significant change. Still some U.S. concern over
commanders with
extremists
the Office of the Commander in Chief (part of
authorities to make
U on
Maliki’s office) control over appointments to the
decisions, without political
political
ISF—favoring Shiites. Some politically motivated
intervention, to pursue all
interference leaders remain in ISF. But, National Police said to
extremists, including Sunni
include more Sunnis in command jobs and rank and
insurgents and Shiite
file than one year ago.
militias
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security
U unmet
S
on
U.S. interpreted March 2008 Basra operation as
Forces (ISF) providing
military, U
effort by Maliki to enforce law even-handedly.
even-handed enforcement
on police
Widespread Iraqi public complaints of politically-
of law
motivated administration of justice.
12. Ensuring that the surge
S partly
S
No longer applicable with end of surge. Ethno-
plan in Baghdad will not
met
sectarian violence has fal en sharply in Baghdad.
provide a safe haven for
any outlaw, no matter the
sect
13. (a) Reducing sectarian
Mixed. S
unmet
same as July Sectarian violence has not re-accelerated outright,
violence and (b) eliminating
on (a); U
12
although there are fears the political crisis in
militia control of local
on (b)
December 2011 could reignite sectarian conflict.
security
14. Establishing Baghdad
S
met
S
Over 50 joint security stations operated in Baghdad
joint security stations
at the height of U.S. troop surge. Closed in
compliance with June 30, 2009, U.S. pull out from the
cities.
15. Increasing ISF units
U
unmet
U
ISF now securing Iraq under the SA. Iraqi Air Force
capable of operating
not likely to be able to secure airspace and DOD has
independently
approved potential sale to Iraq of F-16s and other
major equipment.
16. Ensuring protection of
S
met
S
No change. Rights of minority parties protected by
minority parties in COR
Article 37 of constitution. Minorities given a
minimum seat al ocated in 2010 election law.
17. Al ocating and spending
S partly
S
About 63% of the $10 billion 2007 allocation for
$10 billion in 2007 capital
met
capital projects was spent.
budget for reconstruction.
18. Ensuring that Iraqi
U
unmet
U
Some governmental recriminations against some ISF
authorities not falsely
officers still observed.
accusing ISF members
Source: Compiled by CRS.
Congressional Research Service
45
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
Congressional Research Service
46