Reexamination of Agency Reporting
Requirements: Annual Process Under the
GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA)

Clinton T. Brass
Analyst in Government Organization and Management
April 18, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42490
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

Reexamination of Agency Reporting Requirements: Annual Process Under GPRAMA

Summary
On January 4, 2011, the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) became law. The
acronym “GPRA” in the act’s short title refers to the Government Performance and Results Act of
1993 (GPRA 1993), a law that GPRAMA substantially modified. Some of GPRAMA’s provisions
require agencies to produce plans and reports for a variety of audiences that focus on goal-setting
and performance measurement. Other provisions, by contrast, establish an annual process to
reexamine the usefulness of certain reporting requirements.
Specifically, Section 11 of GPRAMA enacts into law a multi-step process in which the President
and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) may propose to Congress that certain plans
and reports be eliminated or consolidated. The GPRAMA process covers the plans and reports
that executive branch agencies produce “for Congress” in response to statutory requirements or as
directed in non-statutory congressional reports. As a consequence of this scope, the GPRAMA
process covers some, but not all, reporting requirements. For example, reports from the President
are not covered, because the President is not an “agency” under the act. Notably, as a step in this
process, GPRAMA requires an agency to consult with congressional committees to determine
whether products are considered to be useful or could be eliminated or consolidated.
This Congressional Research Service report provides an overview of GPRAMA’s processes that
relate to the reexamination of agency reporting requirements. To provide context, the report
begins by discussing potential categories, advantages, and disadvantages of reporting
requirements. Notably, views about the advantages and disadvantages of reporting requirements
may be in the eye of the beholder. Congress also may intend to make information available to
primary audiences in addition to itself, such as key non-federal stakeholders and the broader
public. Because GPRAMA’s provisions are not the first to focus on agency reporting
requirements, the report contrasts GPRAMA’s provisions with related authorities and selected
efforts from the past.
The report concludes by highlighting potential issues for Congress in two categories. First,
looking ahead to annual implementation of GPRAMA’s provisions, the President and OMB may
propose that specific reporting requirements be consolidated or eliminated. Members and
committees of Congress may consider a specific proposal from several perspectives, including the
sufficiency of consultations with agencies about reporting requirements, the broader policy and
political context of a proposed change to a reporting requirement, a reporting requirement’s
usefulness to Congress and other primary audiences, and a reporting requirement’s costs and side
effects.
Second, Congress may evaluate how well the GPRAMA process is working. If Congress
perceives a problem or the potential for improvement, Congress may consider amending the law
to change aspects of how the process operates. A number of topics might be examined, including
the reporting requirements that GPRAMA’s statutory process covers and does not cover, how
consultations are required to take place, and how proposals to modify or eliminate reporting
requirements are to be justified with analysis.
This report will be updated to track any statutory changes to GPRAMA’s process and some
aspects of the law’s implementation.
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Reexamination of Agency Reporting Requirements: Annual Process Under GPRAMA


Contents
Background: Potential Categories, Advantages, and Disadvantages of Reporting
Requirements ................................................................................................................................ 1
GPRAMA’s Statutory Process ......................................................................................................... 4
Statutory Process and Outputs................................................................................................... 5
Initial List ............................................................................................................................ 5
Second List.......................................................................................................................... 5
Congressional Consultations Regarding Usefulness........................................................... 6
Presidential List................................................................................................................... 6
Contrast With Current Authorities and Previous Efforts ........................................................... 7
Implementation of GPRAMA’s Process .......................................................................................... 9
Some Potential Uncertainties..................................................................................................... 9
Implementation During the 112th Congress ............................................................................. 10
Potential Issues for Congress......................................................................................................... 11
Potential Issues When Considering Specific Proposals........................................................... 12
Potential Issues When Considering Changes to GPRAMA’s Process..................................... 14

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 17

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Reexamination of Agency Reporting Requirements: Annual Process Under GPRAMA

n January 4, 2011, the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) became law.1 The
acronym “GPRA” in the act’s short title refers to the Government Performance and
O Results Act of 1993 (GPRA 1993), a law that GPRAMA substantially modified.2 Some of
GPRAMA’s provisions require agencies to produce plans and reports for a variety of audiences
that focus on goal-setting and performance measurement.3 Other provisions, by contrast, establish
an annual process to reexamine the usefulness of certain reporting requirements.
Specifically, Section 11 of GPRAMA enacts into law a multi-step process in which the President
and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) may propose to Congress that certain plans
and reports be eliminated or consolidated.4 The GPRAMA process covers the plans and reports
that executive branch agencies produce “for Congress” in response to statutory requirements or as
directed in non-statutory congressional reports. As a consequence of this scope, the GPRAMA
process covers some, but not all, reporting requirements.5 Notably, as a step in this process,
GPRAMA requires an agency to consult with congressional committees to determine whether
products are considered to be useful or could be eliminated or consolidated.
This Congressional Research Service (CRS) report provides an overview of GPRAMA’s
processes that relate to the reexamination of agency reporting requirements. The report also will
be updated to track some aspects of GPRAMA’s implementation. Because GPRAMA’s provisions
are not the first to focus on agency reporting requirements, the report also contrasts GPRAMA’s
provisions with related authorities and selected efforts from the past. The report concludes by
highlighting potential issues for Congress. To provide some context, the report begins by
discussing potential categories, advantages, and disadvantages of reporting requirements.
Background: Potential Categories, Advantages, and
Disadvantages of Reporting Requirements

Reporting requirements have been categorized in varying ways, including by purpose and
frequency.6 To illustrate, purposes might be placed in at least three, sometimes overlapping,
categories:

1 P.L. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 (H.R. 2142). The law also has been cited as GPRMA, GPRA 2010, and GPRA.
2 P.L. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285. Some of GPRA 1993’s provisions were amended before enactment of GPRAMA.
3 For an overview, see CRS Report R42379, Changes to the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA):
Overview of the New Framework of Products and Processes
, by Clinton T. Brass.
4 GPRAMA, Section 11; 31 U.S.C. §§1105(a)(37) and 1125. This CRS report uses the terms “plans and reports,”
“reports,” “products,” “reporting,” and “reporting requirements” interchangeably, unless otherwise noted.
5 For example, a law may require an agency to produce a plan or report for audiences other than Congress, such as the
broader public, or require that a report be made available on a public website. Federal law also may require reporting
from entities other than federal agencies. Examples include the President, Vice President, units in the Executive Office
of the President, and recipients of federal grant and contract awards. Finally, in the absence of a specific requirement in
statute or directive in congressional report language, the President, OMB, or an agency official may use discretion to
direct agencies to produce plans and reports for Congress or other audiences. It is unclear in specific cases whether
agencies, OMB, or the President will implement GPRAMA in a way that includes these kinds of requirements.
6 For example, see John R. Johannes, “Statutory Reporting Requirements: Information and Influence for Congress,” in
Abdo I. Baaklini and James J. Heaphy, eds., Comparative Legislative Reforms and Innovations (Albany, NY: State
University of New York at Albany, 1977), pp. 33-60; and U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Required Reports to Congress on Foreign Policy, committee print, prepared by the Foreign Affairs Division of the
(continued...)
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• notifying Congress in advance of an action (“advance reporting”);
• reporting on past or relatively recent conditions or actions, or certifying the
accuracy or genuineness of a statement (“post facto reporting”); or
• studying a policy issue and offering recommendations, proposals, or plans
(“policy reporting”).
With regard to frequency, reporting may be required
• according to a fixed, regular schedule (“periodic reporting”);
• when a certain event or condition occurs (“triggered reporting”);
• only once (“one-time reporting”); or
• from time to time at the discretion of a reporting entity (“indeterminate
reporting”).
Other categories also may be used. For example, an observer may distinguish between reports
that executive agencies submit to Congress directly without prior OMB review (“direct
reporting”), and reports from executive agencies that are reviewed by OMB for potential
modification to conform to the President’s policy preferences (“OMB-reviewed reporting”).7 In
practice, terminologies that are used to describe reporting requirements may be idiosyncratic to a
particular agency or policy area.
Views about the advantages and disadvantages of reporting requirements may be in the eye of the
beholder. Congress, and by delegation its committees, have the constitutionally rooted authority
to compel the disclosure of information they need from agencies and the President in order to
perform Congress’s legislative functions.8 Congress often uses reporting requirements to help
inform its study of policy issues, oversight of agencies and programs, and lawmaking.9 In

(...continued)
Congressional Research Service, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., August 1, 1988 (Washington: GPO, 1988), pp. 10-14.
7 OMB directs many agency reports to undergo a review and clearance process to “ensure consistency of agency
legislative views and proposals with Presidential policy.” See U.S. Executive Office of the President (hereafter EOP),
Office of Management and Budget (hereafter OMB), “The Mission and Structure of the Office of Management and
Budget,” at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization_mission/. During the review process, OMB may attempt to
direct an agency to modify the contents of a report. In response, Congress sometimes has prohibited such reviews or
otherwise provided authority for an agency to report directly to Congress without OMB or presidential review and
modification. For example, see 12 U.S.C. § 250, regarding the authority of several financial regulatory agencies to
submit legislative recommendations, testimony, or comments on legislation directly to Congress.
8 When Congress establishes reporting requirements through law, or when a committee of jurisdiction conducts an
investigation for legislative or oversight purposes, Congress and the committee, respectively, have a right to
information held by an agency or the President in the absence of either a valid claim of constitutional privilege by the
President or a statutory provision whereby Congress has limited its constitutional right to information. For discussion,
see CRS Report RL31351, Presidential Advisers’ Testimony Before Congressional Committees: An Overview, by Todd
Garvey, Alissa M. Dolan, and Henry B. Hogue, under the heading “Congress’s Right to Executive Branch
Information”; and CRS Report RL30240, Congressional Oversight Manual, by Todd Garvey et al.
9 Congress frequently relies on this information to carry out its constitutional responsibilities before, during, and after
an agency’s implementation of law. For discussion of how Congress may use transparency and public participation to
facilitate congressional involvement in an agency’s formulation and implementation of public policies, see David H.
Rosenbloom, Building a Legislative-Centered Public Administration: Congress and the Administrative State, 1946-
1999
(Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2000). For research and analysis related to reporting
requirements, see Patrick R. Mullen, “Congressional Reporting: A Management Process to Build A Legislative-
(continued...)
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addition, reporting requirements may be intended to facilitate congressional involvement in how
an agency uses discretion and makes decisions,10 or to indirectly influence an agency’s thinking
and behaviors.11 When pursuing any of these activities, Congress may use reporting requirements
to cooperate or compete with the President to influence how agencies formulate and implement
policy.
When Congress establishes a reporting requirement, Congress also may intend to make
information available to additional primary audiences. Other audiences may include, for example,
personnel within the agency that authors a particular plan or report; other federal agencies and
officials; non-federal stakeholders; and the broader public. When Congress widens a reporting
requirement’s audience, Congress may pursue a variety of objectives. For example, Congress may
intend to enhance capacity within an agency;12 promote interagency collaboration and
information sharing;13 provide information or studies that may be valuable to non-federal
stakeholders or the broader public;14 establish broader transparency and accountability;15
influence the course of policy discussion;16 alert agencies to the existence of a problem and
influence them to act;17 facilitate the work of congressional support agencies;18 or enhance

(...continued)
Centered Public Administration” (Ph.D. diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2006), at
http://cspl.uis.edu/ILLAPS/AboutUs/FacultyandStaff/documents/PatrickRMullen-Dissertation.pdf.
10 For example, a statute may require an agency to notify certain committees of its desire to “reprogram” funds and,
thereafter, require the agency to wait a period of time before it follows through on the reprogramming request. The
term “reprogramming” refers to a process in which an agency reallocates funding from one program, project, or activity
to another within a single budget account. From a legal perspective, this kind of reallocation frequently is possible
without further enactment of legislation. Most appropriations are provided in large, lump-sum amounts, where an
agency has discretion under law to sub-allocate funds among various programs, projects, and activities within an
account. However, a failure to communicate with a committee, seek the committee’s approval, or abide by the
committee’s wishes may have future repercussions for an agency. In practice, appropriations committees and some
authorizing committees might use these kinds of report-and-wait and “committee approval” provisions to influence
agency decisions during policy implementation and to exercise oversight. For further discussion, see CRS Report
RL33151, Committee Controls of Agency Decisions, by Louis Fisher.
11 John R. Johannes, “Study and Recommend: Statutory Reporting Requirements as a Technique of Legislative
Initiative in Congress—A Research Note,” Western Political Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 4 (December 1976), pp. 589-596.
12 Apart from the potential value of information to Congress and others, reporting and the implicit threat of broader
scrutiny may provide some incentive for an agency to build capacity that is necessary to faithfully, effectively, and
efficiently carry out its statutory duties. For examples, see CRS Report RL34257, Earned Value Management (EVM) as
an Oversight Tool for Major Capital Investments
, by Clinton T. Brass; and CRS Report R41293, The Nunn-McCurdy
Act: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress
, by Moshe Schwartz.
13 For related discussion, see CRS Report R41803, Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities: Types,
Rationales, Considerations
, by Frederick M. Kaiser; and U.S. Government Accountability Office (hereafter GAO),
Information Sharing: DHS Could Better Define How It Plans to Meet Its State and Local Mission and Improve
Performance Accountability
, GAO-11-223, December 2010.
14 Ibid.
15 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Required Reports to Congress on Foreign Policy, committee
print, prepared by the Foreign Affairs Division of the Congressional Research Service, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., August 1,
1988 (Washington: GPO, 1988), p. 9.
16 Ibid.
17 John R. Johannes, “Study and Recommend: Statutory Reporting Requirements as a Technique of Legislative
Initiative in Congress—A Research Note,” Western Political Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 4 (December 1976), pp. 589-596.
18 Patrick R. Mullen, “Congressional Reporting: A Management Process to Build A Legislative-Centered Public
Administration” (Ph.D. diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2006), p. 7.
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oversight by allowing the public to more easily identify issues of potential concern to bring to
Congress’s closer attention.19
At times, Congress, agencies, and the President have reexamined reporting requirements to
ascertain whether they should continue, change, or be eliminated. Several rationales have been
considered for modifying or abolishing reporting requirements. During the 104th Congress, for
example, the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight expressed concern about
the burden and cost of outdated or unnecessary reporting requirements.20 A reporting requirement
might not increase an agency’s total costs if the agency operates under a defined budget amount,
but a requirement nevertheless may involve an “opportunity cost” where funds and staff time
could be used in other ways.
The costs of reporting requirements may be relatively small in some cases. For example, the 104th
Congress considered legislation in 1995 to eliminate and modify more than 200 reporting
requirements. Commenting on the measure, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
annual savings of $2 million.21 CBO explained that some statutory requirements at the time were
not being implemented. Hence, their elimination might result in no cost savings. In addition, CBO
said periodic reports may reuse generic content and require minimal personnel time for updating.
Even if a reporting requirement were eliminated, CBO said that agencies in practice still would
collect much of the information for continued use and therefore would not reduce costs.
Reporting requirements also may have non-financial costs. For example, scrutiny that results
from reporting may have side effects. If an agency’s reporting omits major aspects of an agency’s
or program’s mission, officials may face incentives to concentrate on reported tasks and not
others that are integral to accomplishing the mission.22 Other potential consequences of scrutiny
might include delays in the completion of tasks, increases in time that personnel spend
responding to scrutiny rather than performing regular duties, and reduced creativity in addressing
challenges.23
GPRAMA’s Statutory Process
Section 11 of GPRAMA establishes an annual, statutory process to reexamine certain reporting
requirements. Most executive branch agencies are required to take part.24 Each year, the process

19 For related discussion, see David H. Rosenbloom, Building a Legislative-Centered Public Administration: Congress
and the Administrative State, 1946-1999
(Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2000); and Mathew D.
McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms,”
American Journal of Political Science, vol. 28, no. 1 (February 1984), pp. 165-179.
20 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset
Act of 1995
, report to accompany S. 790, 104th Cong., 1st sess., November 8, 1995, H.Rept. 104-327 (Washington:
GPO, 1995), p. 23.
21 Ibid., p. 26. The legislation ultimately was enacted as P.L. 104-66.
22 For discussion of the potential for performance reporting to create perverse incentives, see CRS Congressional
Distribution Memorandum, Obama Administration Agenda for Government Performance: Evolution and Related
Issues for Congress
, January 19, 2011, by Clinton T. Brass (available on request).
23 For discussion, see Robert I. Sutton and D. Charles Galunic, “Consequences of Public Scrutiny for Leaders and Their
Organizations,” in Barry M. Staw and Larry L. Cummings, eds., Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol. 18
(Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1996), pp. 201-250.
24 Under GPRAMA, the term “agency” includes executive branch agencies, but explicitly does not include the Central
(continued...)
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may culminate in a presidential proposal to Congress to eliminate or consolidate certain plans and
reports.
Statutory Process and Outputs
As articulated in statute, the process unfolds in several steps.25 The Director of OMB is required
at the outset to provide guidance to agencies on how to implement the GPRAMA provisions that
relate to congressional reporting requirements.26 Thereafter and on an annual basis, the Chief
Operating Officer (COO) at each covered agency is required to undertake several tasks.27
Initial List
First, the COO is required to compile a list that identifies all plans and reports the agency
produces for Congress, as required by statute or directed in congressional reports (hereafter
“initial list”).28 It remains to be seen in specific cases how the expression “for Congress” will be
interpreted.29 GPRAMA does not require an agency’s COO to release the initial list of plans and
reports outside the agency.
Second List
Next, the COO is required to analyze the initial list and identify a minimum percentage of the
products as being “outdated” or “duplicative of other required plans and reports.”30 The agency’s
COO is required to submit this second, smaller list (hereafter “second list”) to OMB, along with a
total count of plans and reports that were included on the initial list.31 GPRAMA does not require

(...continued)
Intelligence Agency, United States Postal Service, Postal Regulatory Commission, and the Government Accountability
Office (a legislative branch agency that is included in some statutory definitions of “executive agency”). See
GPRAMA, Section 3, 31 U.S.C. §1115(h)(1); and Section 2, 5 U.S.C. §306(f). GPRAMA’s definition of agency does
not include the President, OMB, or other entities in the Executive Office of the President. As a result, requirements or
directives for the President, OMB, or other entities in the EOP to submit plans and reports to Congress do not fall
within GPRAMA’s scope. OMB or a President nevertheless might choose to implement GPRAMA in a way that
incorporates these kinds of reports into GPRAMA’s process. A further implication of GPRAMA’s definition of agency
is that the law does not cover reporting requirements of agencies in the legislative and judicial branches.
25 The requirements are contained in GPRAMA, Section 11; 31 U.S.C. §§1105(a)(37) and 1125.
26 31 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
27 GPRAMA establishes the term “Chief Operating Officer” as an additional title for the deputy head or equivalent
position of each agency. See GPRAMA, Section 8, 31 U.S.C. §1123.
28 31 U.S.C. §1125(a)(1).
29 More specifically, it remains to be seen whether agencies, OMB, or the President will interpret several kinds of
reporting requirements as being “for Congress.” For example, as noted earlier, a law may require an agency to produce
a plan or report for audiences other than Congress—such as the broader public—or require that a report be made
available on a public website. A law also may require reporting from non-federal entities to an agency or to a website.
Finally, in the absence of a specific statutory requirement or report language directive, the President, OMB, or an
agency official may use discretion to direct agencies to produce plans and reports for Congress or other audiences.
30 31 U.S.C. §1125(a)(2). GPRAMA does not define the terms “outdated” or “duplicative.”
31 31 U.S.C. §1125(a)(4). Dividing the total number of products on the initial list (e.g., 100 plans and reports) by the
total number on the second list (e.g., 12 plans and reports) would allow OMB to compute whether an agency has
complied with GPRAMA’s requirement for agencies to identify an OMB-determined percentage of products as being
outdated or duplicative. In this example, an agency would have identified 12% of its products as outdated or
(continued...)
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an agency to release the second list outside the executive branch. In the first year of GPRAMA’s
implementation, the law specifies that the minimum percentage must be at least 10%.
Subsequently, GPRAMA authorizes OMB to determine the minimum percentage each year.32
Congressional Consultations Regarding Usefulness
Third, the COO is required to consult with congressional committees that receive the products
included on the agency’s second list. GPRAMA’s stated purpose for the consultation is to
determine whether the plans and reports are no longer useful to the committees and could be
eliminated or consolidated with other products.33 In cases where a plan or report is required to be
submitted to Congress as a whole rather than to a specific committee, it remains to be seen how
agencies will implement this consultation requirement.
Presidential List
As a final step in the statutorily prescribed process, GPRAMA requires the President’s budget
proposal to include a list of certain plans and reports each year.34 This presidential list is required
to include the “list of plans and reports ... that agencies identified for elimination or consolidation
because the plans and reports are determined outdated or duplicative of other required plans and
reports.”35 The requirement for a presidential list appears to infer that when an agency identifies a
product on its second list as outdated or duplicative, the agency also implicitly identifies the
product for elimination or consolidation. However, the agency-level requirement for the second
list does not require agencies to identify reports and plans for elimination or consolidation.
Rather, each agency is required to identify an OMB-determined percentage of reports and plans
as outdated or duplicative, send this list to OMB, and then consult with congressional recipients
about the usefulness of the second list’s plans and reports and whether any could be eliminated or
consolidated. Consequently, if agencies operate according to the sequence in the agency-level
statutory requirement, the President’s list may not reflect agencies’ consultations about whether
any of the products are considered by recipients to be outdated or duplicative.

(...continued)
duplicative.
32 31 U.S.C. §1125(b).
33 31 U.S.C. §1125(a)(3).
34 31 U.S.C. §1105(a)(37). The President’s budget proposal is required by 31 U.S.C. §1105(a). Under this provision,
the President is required to submit to Congress an annual “budget of the United States Government” for the following
fiscal year, including some information that is specified in statute, on or after the first Monday in January but not later
than the first Monday in February. The submission includes consolidated budget proposals for federal agencies and
establishments. OMB compiles the proposal on behalf of the President. Before the President submits this proposal to
Congress, agencies are first required to provide budget requests to the President (31 U.S.C. §1108). At that time, an
executive branch agency’s views about funding needs may be modified by OMB to reflect the policy preferences of the
President, before the proposal is submitted to Congress.
35 GPRAMA adds that OMB may concurrently submit draft legislation to eliminate or consolidate these products (31
U.S.C. §1125(c)). Presidents may attempt to treat as non-binding a statutory provision that says the President “may” or
“shall” make legislative recommendations. Presidential signing statements sometimes justify this view by using
language from Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution, which says the President “shall ... recommend to [Congress’s]
Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.” For example, see U.S. National Archives and
Records Administration, George W. Bush White House Web Site, “Statement by the President,” November 25, 2002, at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021125-11.html.
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Contrast With Current Authorities and Previous Efforts
GPRAMA’s annual process for Congress, agencies, OMB, and the President to reexamine agency
reporting requirements stands in partial contrast with current authorities and previous efforts. For
instance, Congress established ongoing mechanisms within the legislative branch to help monitor
reporting requirements. Provisions from the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act
of 1974, for example, require the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to monitor recurring
reporting requirements and report annually to Congress on several aspects of reporting.36
Furthermore, the rules of the House of Representatives require the Clerk of the House to engage
in reporting-related activities. At the commencement of every regular session of Congress, the
Clerk is required to submit to Members of the House a list of reports that officers or departments
are legally required to make to Congress.37 The list is printed as a House document with the title
Reports to Be Made to Congress.38
Other legislation authorizes actions to be taken by OMB, the President, and agencies. In the wake
of recommendations by the William Clinton Administration’s National Performance Review
(NPR), Congress considered a variety of management reform options. Congress ultimately acted
on provisions related to reporting requirements in 1994 and 2000. One statutory provision is
similar to GPRAMA insofar as it authorizes OMB to include recommendations in the President’s
budget proposal to consolidate, eliminate, or adjust the frequency and due dates of statutory
requirements for periodic reporting.39 A separate law authorizes executive agencies, with the
concurrence of OMB, to consolidate or adjust the frequency and due dates of certain statutorily
required reports that focus on financial management and government performance.40
In addition to establishing ongoing authorities, Congress and its committees have reexamined
reporting requirements in the past with some frequency. At least 11 times in the last century,
Congress acted to modify or eliminate groups of reporting requirements across multiple
agencies.41 In contrast with GPRAMA’s annual process, these prior efforts were generally one-
time in nature. Congress also has modified or eliminated reporting requirements in narrower

36 P.L. 93-344 (88 Stat. 328), later recodified in 31 U.S.C. § 1113(e). For related historical discussion, see Patrick R.
Mullen, “Congressional Reporting: A Management Process to Build A Legislative-Centered Public Administration”
(Ph.D. diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2006), pp. 59-61, 66-70, and 115-122.
37 The requirement currently may be found at House Rule 2, clause 2(b).
38 Electronic versions are available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=CDOC.
39 Government Management Reform Act of 1994, Section 301 (GMRA, P.L. 103-356; 108 Stat. 3410; 31 U.S.C. §1113
note). OMB already had authority to make such recommendations. However, the act signaled that Congress was
receptive to these recommendations, required the recommendations to provide certain justification information, and
required the recommendations to be consistent with Congress’s purposes to improve efficiency and quality.
40 Reports Consolidation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-531; 114 Stat. 2537; see in particular codified language in 31 U.S.C.
§3516). This act permanently restored and expanded separate authority that GMRA had given to OMB on a pilot basis.
For discussion of some relevant reporting requirements that focus on financial management, see CRS Report R40610,
Federal Financial Management Reform: Past Initiatives and Future Prospects, by Virginia A. McMurtry. For
discussion of some relevant reporting requirements that focus on government performance, see CRS Report R42379,
Changes to the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA): Overview of the New Framework of Products and
Processes
, by Clinton T. Brass.
41 For examples of group modifications and eliminations, see P.L. 70-611 (enacted in 1928; 45 Stat. 986); P.L. 79-615
(1946; 60 Stat. 866); P.L. 83-706 (1954; 68 Stat. 966); P.L. 86-533 (1960; 74 Stat. 245); P.L. 89-348 (1965; 79 Stat.
1310); P.L. 93-608 (1975; 88 Stat. 1967); P.L. 96-470 (1980; 94 Stat. 2237); P.L. 97-375 (1982; 96 Stat. 1819); P.L.
99-386 (1986; 100 Stat. 821); P.L. 104-66 (1995; 109 Stat. 707); and P.L. 105-362 (1998; 112 Stat. 3280).
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policy areas.42 In some cases, committees and Members initiated reviews.43 At other times,
Congress considered recommendations and draft legislation from an Administration.44
One of these past efforts was different from others in a significant respect. The Federal Reports
Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995 (FRESA) included not only specific modifications and
eliminations, but also a catch-all sunset provision to terminate all legal requirements for certain
periodic reports.45 Specifically, the sunset provision said that all “annual, semiannual, or other
regular periodic” reports to Congress or any committee of Congress listed in the January 1993
version of Reports to Be Made to Congress would cease to be effective four years after the date of
FRESA’s enactment.46 As a result, FRESA covered reports from all three branches of the federal
government. The law also specified numerous exceptions to the sunset provision and did not
affect non-periodic (e.g., one-time or triggered) reporting requirements. Furthermore, the four-
year grace period was intended to provide time “for Members of Congress to reauthorize those
reports deemed necessary for carrying out effective congressional oversight.”47
Congress subsequently restored reporting requirements through provisions in at least 13 public
laws between 1999 and 2008.48 In one case, Congress restored requirements in a broad
category—requirements included in “any other law relating to the budget of the United States

42 These kinds of legislation illustrate how a close reading of a measure and knowledge of the broader statutory and
policy context may be necessary to discern whether changes are being made to reporting requirements. For example,
see P.L. 93-189 (Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 714; repealing sections of statutes without calling explicit
attention to repeals of reporting requirements); and U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, Improving the Reporting Requirement System in the Foreign Affairs Field, joint
committee print, prepared by the Foreign Affairs Division of the Congressional Research Service, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess.,
April 29, 1974 (Washington: GPO, 1974), pp. 12-13 (citing related changes to reporting requirements, including seven
terminations and additional modifications).
43 For example, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Reporting Requirements in Legislation on
Foreign Relations
, committee print, prepared by the Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service, 91st
Cong., 2nd sess., February 1970 (Washington: GPO, 1970) (reporting on a study initiated by the committee); and
Senators Carl M. Levin and William S. Cohen, remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 141
(May 11, 1995), pp. S6514-S6515 (citing actions by their subcommittee to solicit input from 89 agencies, vet responses
with Senate committees of jurisdiction, and introduce legislation to eliminate or modify reporting requirements).
44 For example, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, Discontinue or Modify Certain
Reporting Requirements of Law
, report to accompany S. 2150, 89th Cong., 1st sess., August 10, 1965, H.Rept. 89-545
(Washington: GPO, 1965), p. 2 (referring to a draft bill that was sent to Congress by the Bureau of the Budget, the
predecessor agency to OMB); and U.S. Vice President Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government
that Works Better and Costs Less, Report of the National Performance Review
(Washington: GPO, 1993), p. 34
(proposing to, among other things, “consolidate and simplify” statutory reporting requirements).
45 P.L. 104-66. The sunset provision was included as Section 3003.
46 FRESA was enacted on December 21, 1995. Therefore, the sunset date was initially established as December 21,
1999. Congress later revised the sunset date to be May 15, 2000 (P.L. 106-113; 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-302). For the
Clerk’s January 1993 list, see U.S. Congress, House, Reports to Be Made to Congress, list of reports pursuant to clause
2, Rule III of the Rules of the House of Representatives, prepared by the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, 103rd
Cong., 1st sess., January 5, 1993, H.Doc. 103-7 (Washington: GPO, 1993), available at http://clerk.house.gov/103/
hd103007.pdf.
47 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset
Act of 1995
, report to accompany S. 790, 104th Cong., 1st sess., November 8, 1995, H.Rept. 104-327 (Washington:
GPO, 1995), p. 25.
48 The website of the Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the House of Representatives lists 13 laws that either (1)
explicitly amended FRESA to restore reporting requirements or (2) explicitly said FRESA’s sunset provision does not
apply to certain reporting requirements. See notes for 31 U.S.C. §1113, at http://uscode.house.gov/search/criteria.shtml.
Additional laws may have restored reporting requirements without explicitly citing FRESA.
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Government.”49 A related committee report explained that “it would be impractical to sort through
the Clerk’s list to identify all such requirements. Therefore, [the measure] provides a categorical
exemption for budget-related reports.”50
Perhaps unsurprisingly, observers have experienced difficulty when assessing the results of
FRESA’s sunset provision.51 Uncertainties appear to remain regarding how many reporting
requirements were terminated through the sunset provision, how many of these requirements
actually were in a state of being implemented at the time of FRESA’s enactment, and how many
requirements were later restored. Nevertheless, many periodic reporting requirements appear to
have been eliminated. Enactment of restoration provisions also suggested that Congress and
stakeholders in many cases continued to value receiving a flow of information from agencies and
officials of the federal government. On occasion, the interim period between FRESA’s sunset date
and the enactment of restoration legislation caused gaps to occur in regular reporting.52
Implementation of GPRAMA’s Process
Some Potential Uncertainties
Looking ahead, it remains to be seen in practice how some of GPRAMA’s provisions will be
implemented in any specific year. As noted at the beginning of this report, GPRAMA’s process
covers plans and reports that agencies produce for Congress. A consequence of this scope is that
the GPRAMA process covers some, but not all, reporting requirements. Nevertheless, it remains
to be seen in specific cases how OMB and the President will interpret the expression “for
Congress”—such as whether a requirement to post a report online, without a specific recipient,
constitutes a covered report. It is also not clear if OMB and the President will implement
GPRAMA to include reports that are produced by entities that are not covered by the act’s
definition of “agency” (e.g., OMB).
Implementation of GPRAMA’s consultation requirement could be subject to uncertainty, as well.
It may be difficult, for example, for a Member or committee to know if an agency engages in
consultations regarding a plan or report that the agency submits to Congress as a whole as
opposed to a specific committee.53 Even if a product is submitted to a specific committee, it may

49 P.L. 106-554; 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-214.
50 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act
Amendments of 1999
, report to accompany S. 1877, 106th Cong., 1st sess., November 17, 1999, S.Rept. 106-223
(Washington: GPO, 1999), p. 4. This provision ultimately was included in a separate bill that became P.L. 106-554.
51 For related discussion, see Patrick R. Mullen, “Congressional Reporting: A Management Process to Build A
Legislative-Centered Public Administration” (Ph.D. diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2006),
pp. 128-133.
52 For example, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), as amended, established the Interagency Coordinating Committee
on Oil Pollution Research, a federal interagency committee that focuses on oil spill prevention and response
capabilities (P.L. 101-380, as amended; 104 Stat. 484; 33 U.S.C. §2761). OPA required the committee to submit a
biennial report on its activities and plans. In May 2000, FRESA’s sunset provision terminated this requirement.
Congress restored the reporting requirement in late 2002 (P.L. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2103). As a consequence of the 30-
month interim period between sunset and restoration, the committee produced no biennial report for the 1999-2000
biennium. See related discussion at U.S. Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research, “Biennial
Reports,” at http://www.iccopr.uscg.gov/apex/f?p=118:331:2870096731804408.
53 If a law or congressional report says that an agency must report to a specific congressional committee, the committee
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not be clear in advance whether an agency will consult about the product’s usefulness with the
majority, minority, or both. Furthermore, the precise stage of GPRAMA’s process at which
consultations with Congress will occur may not be clear in advance. As noted earlier, GPRAMA
directs agencies to submit lists of products they believe to be outdated or duplicative to OMB
before the agencies consult with congressional committees. The law’s sequence notwithstanding,
for GPRAMA’s first year of implementation OMB encouraged agencies to engage in
consultations with congressional committees several weeks before submitting lists to OMB, as
discussed later in this report.
Finally, it may not be clear in advance how OMB and the President will implement GPRAMA’s
statutory requirement for a presidential list. In a particular year, for example, it is possible that the
President will submit to Congress without modification the second list of products that an
agency’s COO identifies to be outdated or duplicative. However, agency budget requests and
recommendations on pending legislation typically are subject to OMB review, clearance, and
modification to conform to the policy preferences of the current President.54 Given these
precedents, the policy preferences of the President are likely to be a significant input to final
proposals. In addition, because GPRAMA does not define the terms “outdated” and “duplicative”
or otherwise specify criteria for consolidating or eliminating a report, the criteria that will be used
in a particular year for including a plan or report on the presidential list—or excluding a plan or
report—may vary across proposals in a single year and over time.
Implementation During the 112th Congress
The section of GPRAMA that provides for reexamination of agency reporting requirements
became effective on January 4, 2011, the date of the law’s enactment.55 The President and OMB
did not appear to implement GPRAMA’s process when formulating the President’s FY2012
budget proposal, which was submitted just a few weeks later.56 On August 18, 2011, OMB issued
two pages of guidance to agencies regarding the GPRAMA process.57 The guidance said that over
the next few months, OMB would coordinate the process for reexamining agency reporting
alongside the process of formulating the President’s FY2013 budget proposal. In the meantime,
OMB said agencies should immediately begin to compile lists of congressionally mandated
products and consult with “appropriate” committees.
The guidance reminded agencies of GPRAMA’s first-year requirement for an agency to identify
10% of the plans and reports on an agency’s initial list as outdated or duplicative. OMB said this

(...continued)
presumably will be in a position to know whether it has been consulted. By contrast, if a law or congressional report
does not identify a specific committee as the recipient of a plan or report, a particular committee may know whether it
itself has been consulted but may experience difficulty in ascertaining whether the reporting agency consulted with any
other committee. This raises the possibility that a committee may not be in a position to know if an agency has
complied with GPRAMA’s consultation requirement about a specific plan or report unless the committee also inquires
with some or all other committees about that plan or report.
54 OMB, Circular No. A-11, “Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget,” August 18, 2011, Section 22; and
OMB, Circular No. A-19, “Legislative Coordination and Clearance,” revised September 20, 1979, Section 5.e., at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_default/.
55 GPRAMA, Section 11; 31 U.S.C. §§1105(a)(37) and 1125.
56 Under 31 U.S.C. §1105(a), the FY2012 budget proposal was due to Congress by February 7, 2011. The President
submitted the proposal to Congress on February 14, 2011.
57 OMB, Circular No. A-11, “Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget,” August 18, 2011, Section 240.
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calculation should correspond only to “agency-specific” reports that an agency produces,
however, and not to “government-wide” plans and reports where reporting requirements apply
broadly to multiple agencies.58 Any changes to multi-agency reporting requirements would be
proposed by OMB. The guidance added that agencies should be prepared to send several data
elements to OMB for each plan or report identified as outdated or duplicative.59 In addition, the
guidance said an agency should make a recommendation for each of these products using one of
three possible options: elimination, consolidation, or a third category.60 The third category
addressed a situation where an agency does not find at least 10% of its plans and reports for
Congress to be outdated or duplicative. OMB appeared to say that agencies still must achieve the
10% figure—even if the plans and reports are not outdated or duplicative—by identifying
beneficial products that have comparatively lower net benefits and recommending them for
elimination.
Lists of products that agencies identified as outdated or duplicative were due to OMB by
September 12, 2011, a little less than a month after OMB issued its guidance. OMB elsewhere
referred to these agency-submitted lists of products as being “draft” in nature, appearing to
confirm that an agency’s second list would be subject to review and potential modification by
OMB. 61 The presidential list was due to be submitted to Congress by February 6, 2012, as part of
the President’s FY2013 budget proposal. President Barack Obama submitted the budget proposal
to Congress on February 13, 2012. In the Budget volume, the Obama Administration said a list of
plans and reports that were identified for possible elimination or consolidation had been posted on
the Performance.gov website for public comment.62 However, the actual list did not appear on the
website by that date and has not been posted as of the date of this CRS report.
Potential Issues for Congress
Under the system established by the U.S. Constitution, separate institutions share power and
utilize checks and balances as they cooperate or compete for influence over public policy.63
History demonstrates that Congress has relied extensively on receiving information and
viewpoints from agencies and their personnel when performing its constitutional responsibilities.
Reporting requirements in particular have been a mainstay of congressional involvement in
administration of public laws from the 1st Congress to the present. In 1789, for example, the
statute that established the Department of the Treasury said
it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to digest and prepare plans for the
improvement and management of the revenue ...; to prepare and report estimates of the
public revenue, and the public expenditures; ... to make report, and give information to either

58 As an example, OMB cited a reporting requirement established by the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000, which
authorized covered agencies to consolidate certain reports related to financial management and performance into a
Performance and Accountability Report (PAR).
59 This appeared to allude to a forthcoming data call to agencies that was not made public.
60 In directing agencies to make recommendations, OMB’s guidance appeared to go further than GPRAMA’s
requirement for agencies to identify products they consider to be outdated or duplicative.
61 OMB, Circular No. A-11, “Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget,” August 18, 2011, Section 200, p.
5.
62 OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2013 (Washington: GPO, 2012), p. 44.
63 Charles O. Jones, Separate but Equal Branches: Congress and the Presidency (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House,
1995).
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branch of the legislature, in person or in writing (as he may be required), respecting all
matters referred to him by the Senate or House of Representatives, or which shall appertain
to his office.64
In practice, reporting requirements may be used to pursue any of several objectives. These
include transparency, accountability, public participation, efficiency, and effectiveness. Values
like these may, on occasion, trade off against one another. Transparency may enhance
accountability and effectiveness, for example, but the collection and presentation of information
may affect behaviors and impose incremental costs.
Furthermore, the same information may have several interested audiences with their own
priorities. Congress and non-federal stakeholders frequently rely on access to information about
the plans and activities of the federal government when they oversee or work with agencies, or
when they participate in the lawmaking process. Agencies themselves, OMB, and the President
also need access to information to faithfully and effectively execute laws. In specific
circumstances, however, different audiences in Congress, the executive branch, and the public
may place differing weights on the aforementioned values. Some audiences also may have goals
in conflict with one or more of the values. Over time, changes in circumstances and technology
may have further implications for the types and formats of information that are feasible and
desirable. For example, many reporting requirements were established before the Internet and
relatively inexpensive information technology (IT) came into widespread use.
Given this complex institutional, policy, and technological background, GPRAMA’s process for
the reexamination of agency reporting requirements raises potential issues for Congress. The
following two sub-sections highlight several of these potential issues.
Potential Issues When Considering Specific Proposals
Looking ahead to annual implementation of GPRAMA’s provisions, the President and OMB may
propose the consolidation or elimination of specific reporting requirements. Members and
committees of Congress may consider a specific proposal from several perspectives.
Context. How does a reporting requirement fit in the broader picture of how an
agency provides information to its own staff? How does a plan or report fit in the
broader picture of how an agency provides information to, and interacts with,
Congress, other agencies, the President, non-federal stakeholders, and the
broader public? How does the agency manage relevant information? How does a
reporting requirement relate to an agency’s mission, priorities, management
processes, and IT systems?
Consultations. Are consultations occurring? Are they being conducted with
sufficient time and depth for a committee to have input before changes to a
reporting requirement are proposed by the President? For products that are
submitted to Congress as a whole rather than to a specific committee, are
agencies engaging in consultations? What are Congress’s expectations in that
regard? Did an agency consult in advance with other, non-federal stakeholders? 65

64 An Act to establish the Treasury Department, Section 2; Chapter XII, 1st Cong.; September 2, 1789 (1 Stat. 65-66).
65 One analysis cautioned that the elimination of a particular report as part of a group repeal “may go unnoticed by
many interested in a particular subject.” U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Reporting
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Does an agency have views that are different from those of OMB and the
President about the benefits or costs of a reporting requirement? Will Congress
have access to these concerns or opinions? What do non-federal stakeholders
think about a proposal?
Credibility. Does a proposal for elimination or consolidation of a plan or report
appear to be founded on quality analysis and justification? When an agency,
OMB, or the President identifies a plan or report as outdated or duplicative, how
did they define these terms? Did the relevant agency, OMB, and the President
make a credible proposal that justifies a recommendation adequately and
acknowledges any trade-offs or disadvantages? How might any of the
perspectives that are discussed below figure into an assessment of a proposal’s
credibility?
Usefulness. How useful is a plan or report to its audiences—including Congress
as a whole, congressional recipients, personnel in the federal agency that authors
a product, personnel in other government agencies, non-federal stakeholders, and
the public? How do they use the plan or report? What impact does a plan or
report have on the accountability and incentives of an agency, OMB, or the
President? Would disappearance of a plan or report have implications for policy
formulation or policy implementation, including Congress’s ability to legislate or
conduct oversight? Would disappearance of a plan or report have implications for
power relationships among Congress, agencies, the President, non-federal
stakeholders, or the public? Would consolidation of several products improve or
degrade usefulness?66
Costs and side effects. What are the workload, costs, and side effects that
correspond to a reporting requirement? Would changes in statute or report
language that eliminate or consolidate a product have any effect on an agency’s
costs or priorities? Would an agency’s data collection or reporting continue even
in the absence of a requirement in statute or directive in report language? Would
elimination of a reporting requirement entail costs for Congress or non-federal
stakeholders?
Options. After reviewing considerations like those outlined above, do the
benefits of a reporting requirement to Congress and other audiences justify the
requirement’s costs? Are there less costly or more effective options in contrast
with the President’s proposal? Could a reporting requirement be designed or
implemented in a better way? Would better systems or utilization of technology
improve the effectiveness of a reporting requirement or reduce its burden? In the

(...continued)
Requirements in Legislation on Foreign Relations, committee print, prepared by the Foreign Affairs Division of the
Legislative Reference Service, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., February 1970 (Washington: GPO, 1970), p. 10.
66 Another analysis of reporting requirements discussed a trade-off that may occur when one or more reports are
consolidated into an already existing product, such as an annual report. Consolidation may be pursued to reduce the
number of reports and integrate their information, in an effort to make reporting more efficient and effective. However,
consolidation may “create problems for both preparers and users of the reports” if a report’s contents become too
unwieldy, or if it becomes difficult for congressional or other audiences to determine in what part of a report a
requirement was supposed to have been met. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Required Reports to
Congress on Foreign Policy
, committee print, prepared by the Foreign Affairs Division of the Congressional Research
Service, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., August 1, 1988 (Washington: GPO, 1988), p. 40.
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age of “wiki” websites on the Internet and the possibility of designing websites to
allow bulk-downloading of their contents, what are the implications for agency
reporting requirements?67 Do non-federal stakeholders or congressional support
agencies have input regarding what should be done for each item on the
presidential list of proposed eliminations and consolidations?
Potential Issues When Considering Changes to GPRAMA’s Process
Congress also may evaluate how well the GPRAMA process is working. If Congress perceives a
problem or the potential for improvement, Congress may consider amending the law to change
aspects of how the process operates. A number of topics might be examined.
Coverage. The GPRAMA process covers plans and reports that agencies produce
for Congress but does not cover all reporting requirements. As noted earlier, a
statute may require that a plan or report be produced by an entity other than an
agency, like OMB,68 and for audiences other than or in addition to Congress,
such as the public through posting on the Internet. GPRAMA also does not
explicitly cover agency reporting to Congress—or for that matter, agency
reporting to the President—that occurs through the use of discretion by agencies,
OMB, and the President. What might be the advantages and disadvantages of
taking a broader view of reporting requirements in GPRAMA’s process? Would
broader coverage that includes the President and entities in the Executive Office
of the President paint a more useful picture? Would expanding the scope to
include some reporting inside the executive branch (e.g., from agencies to OMB)
offer more potential for identifying efficiencies and ways to generate and share
information more effectively?69
Consultations. GPRAMA’s process requires agencies to consult with
congressional committees. Unlike other provisions in GPRAMA, however, the
consultation requirement does not specify that an agency consult with both the
majority and minority of a committee or, furthermore, with non-federal
stakeholders.70 In addition, some plans and reports may be submitted to Congress

67 For example, it may be difficult or burdensome for an observer to track changes to a website’s contents if
information is presented in formats other than discrete files (e.g., PDF). Information about changes to a website’s
contents nevertheless might be captured if the website provides a bulk-download capability through which an observer
could electronically download the website’s contents at a particular point in time. Equipped with information that
shows the website’s contents on a specific date, an observer may be able to compare versions of a website over time
and detect significant changes. This kind of issue may become more salient when information is provided primarily or
only on the Internet in formats other than discrete files.
68 Requirements for OMB to report to Congress may rely ultimately on agencies for information. In these cases, OMB
may perform what is colloquially called a “data call” or more technically called a “budget data request” (BDR) to direct
agencies to provide information to OMB. OMB then is in a position to compile or aggregate information and choose
how to comply with a reporting requirement.
69 OMB’s guidance for GPRAMA’s FY2013 process, for example, referred to a separate process in 2010 that OMB
apparently pursued through use of discretion. In that process, OMB sought recommendations from agencies on how to
reduce the burden of reporting to OMB in several mission support areas like financial management. It is not clear how
the process worked or what its outcome was, but Congress and the public may have an interest in such processes and,
more generally, intra-governmental information reporting and sharing. For OMB’s brief reference to the process, see
OMB, Circular No. A-11, “Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget,” August 18, 2011, Section 240.2, p.
2.
70 For discussion of other consultation provisions in GPRAMA, see CRS Report R42379, Changes to the Government
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as a whole, as opposed to a specific committee. If agencies are perceived as not
adequately consulting with Congress or non-federal stakeholders about proposals
to eliminate or consolidate plans and reports, would any changes to GPRAMA be
desirable? Might other mechanisms for consultation be considered? For example,
what might be the advantages and disadvantages of amending GPRAMA to
require agencies to publish elimination and consolidation proposals in the
Federal Register for public notice and comment?71
Justification of proposals. GPRAMA does not address how agencies, OMB, and
the President are to analyze reporting requirements or justify proposals to
Congress. For example, the statute is silent about how agencies are to justify their
identification of products as being outdated or duplicative. The requirement for
the presidential list of plans and reports similarly does not address how proposals
for elimination or consolidation are to be justified. Past experience suggests that
a perception of poor justification may diminish the credibility of proposals for
Congress.72 In that light, what might be the advantages and disadvantages of
providing more explicit structure in GPRAMA for how agencies, OMB, and the
President are to document their analyses and justify their proposals? For
example, Congress might consider establishing criteria for designations of
“outdated” or “duplicative” or require OMB to do so in its guidance. Would any
of the topics from the previous sub-section of this report—such as context,
consultations with stakeholders, usefulness, and costs (see “Potential Issues
When Considering Specific Proposals”)—merit being required as topics for an
agency or OMB to address in an agency’s analysis or a presidential proposal?73
Coordination within Congress. Under GPRAMA, large group-repeal-and-
modification proposals may become an annual occurrence. In that light, Congress

(...continued)
Performance and Results Act (GPRA): Overview of the New Framework of Products and Processes, by Clinton T.
Brass.
71 A point of reference for this type of option might be the Administrative Procedure Act (APA, codified at 5 U.S.C.
§551 et seq.). Under the APA’s “informal” rulemaking process, an agency publishes a proposed rule in the Federal
Register
and solicits comments from the public. The agency considers these perspectives when formulating a revised
and final rule. Ultimately, the agency responds in the Federal Register to significant issues that were raised in the
public’s comments and may publish a revised and final rule using any insights that are gained in the process. The
agency’s written response provides a mechanism for Congress and the public to see whether comments from
stakeholders and the public were taken seriously and influenced the agency’s approach, and, thereby, may provide a
means for Congress and the public to hold the agency accountable for being responsive to stakeholder needs.
72 In an effort to reexamine reporting requirements during the 99th Congress, several committees noted instances when
agencies or OMB made proposals but did not evaluate needs for information, re-submitted proposals when similar
proposals had been rejected multiple times previously, and submitted proposals that, if enacted, would have gone
beyond reporting requirements to change substantive laws. On occasion, proposals “were viewed by some committees
as attempts by the administration to do away with programs under the guise of eliminating reports.” See U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Government Operations, Congressional Reports Elimination Act of 1986, report to accompany
H.R. 2518, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., July 21, 1986, H.Rept. 99-698 (Washington: GPO, 1986), pp. 3-5. Two years later,
GAO analyzed weaknesses in procedures used by agencies and OMB during the aforementioned process, where OMB
submitted a proposal to modify or eliminate 240 reporting requirements and Congress ultimately changed or eliminated
only 23 of them in P.L. 99-386. See GAO, Congressional Reports: Efforts to Eliminate or Modify Reporting
Requirements Need to Be Improved
, GAO/AFMD-88-4, April 1988.
73 As noted earlier in this report, Section 301 of the Government Management Reform Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-356; 108
Stat. 3410; 31 U.S.C. §1113 note) required covered proposals to provide certain justification information and to be
consistent with statutorily prescribed purposes.
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might consider strategies for how it wishes to consider proposals for many
modifications and eliminations of reporting requirements. In the past, Members
and committees of Congress have used several strategies to manage consideration
of ad hoc proposals from agencies, OMB, and the President. These proposals
typically crossed the jurisdictions of many committees. In response, a single
subcommittee sometimes coordinated the consideration of proposals within a
chamber of Congress.74 The subcommittee then solicited feedback from
committees of jurisdiction to develop a draft bill that could be introduced.
Looking ahead to annual implementation of GPRAMA’s process, might similar
approaches be used? In addition, some reporting requirements may correspond to
different committees and still be closely interrelated. Might there be opportunities
for committees to coordinate their efforts when they have jurisdictions and
reporting requirements that are closely related?
OMB’s activities and interactions with agencies. For the FY2013 round of
GPRAMA’s process, OMB’s guidance to agencies addressed the situation where
an agency may not find at least 10% of its plans and reports for Congress to be
outdated or duplicative. In such cases, OMB appeared to say agencies still must
achieve the 10% figure. To achieve that rate, OMB said agencies should
recommend products for elimination that have comparatively lower net benefits,
even if they are not outdated or duplicative and by implication still may be useful
to recipients. In future years, GPRAMA gives authority to OMB to determine a
minimum annual percentage of plans and reports that agencies are required to
identify as outdated or duplicative. If OMB’s exercise of this authority were of
interest, Congress might consider options for exercising oversight over the extent
to which OMB uses analysis to determine this minimum percentage. If Congress
were interested in the views of agencies about the value of certain reporting
requirements before potential modification by OMB to suit the President’s
preferences, Congress might consider options to better understand how an
agency’s second list of plans and reports changes after OMB’s review. These
options might include conducting hearings on the topic, asking GAO to look into
specific cases, or amending GPRAMA to require an agency to submit its second
list to Congress concurrently with its submission to OMB or later when the
President submits his or her budget proposal. This would allow Congress to see
what, if any, changes OMB made.
Institutional roles and responsibilities. GPRAMA establishes several roles and
responsibilities for agencies, OMB, and the President. Looking ahead, Congress
may consider how well this system is working. If Congress perceives a problem
or the potential for improvement, Congress may consider changes. To illustrate,
GPRAMA requires each covered agency to compile a list of all plans and reports
that it produces for Congress in accordance with statute or report language. The
law does not require compilation of this data into an overall database that is
available to agencies, OMB, Congress, and the public. As a consequence, it is
conceivable that agencies’ efforts to create parallel databases to manage this task

74 In the past, a single subcommittee of the House or Senate committee that focused on government operations
coordinated this work. The legislative histories of several measures indicate this strategy was used, including for P.L.
105-362, P.L. 99-386, and P.L. 97-374. Currently, the relevant committees would be the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
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Reexamination of Agency Reporting Requirements: Annual Process Under GPRAMA

may be vulnerable to duplication of effort. GPRAMA’s provisions may also
create some duplication of effort when viewed in the context of the House
Clerk’s Reports to Be Made to Congress document. Furthermore, efforts to
analyze reporting requirements across agencies may be difficult in the absence of
a more global view.75 If options for a single database were considered, numerous
questions might arise. What agency or agencies might be best positioned to set
policy for the database, administer it, and host it on the Internet? Under current
law and practice, individual agencies, the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA), and the General Services Administration participate in
federal records management with a statutory division of labor.76 What might their
respective roles be in a hypothetical, integrated system?77

Author Contact Information

Clinton T. Brass

Analyst in Government Organization and
Management
cbrass@crs.loc.gov, 7-4536


75 There may be opportunities for enhanced coordination and efficiencies across agencies. In addition, standardization
may be appropriate in some cases. In other cases, however, agencies may have need for customized processes and
systems to fit their unique circumstances and relationships with congressional committees.
76 For discussion, see 41 C.F.R. Part 102-193 (“Creation, Maintenance, and Use of Records”). OMB also has roles
concerning several mission support and management functions, including information and statistical policy, that could
be factored into the options that Congress considers.
77 In the 111th Congress, legislation expressed a point of view to address questions like these. See H.R. 6026 (111th
Cong.), the Access to Congressionally Mandated Reports Act.
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