Multilateral Development Banks:
Overview and Issues for Congress
Rebecca M. Nelson
Analyst in International Trade and Finance
April 18, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41170
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
Summary
The multilateral development banks (MDBs) include the World Bank and four smaller regional
development banks: the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank
(AsDB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB). The United States is a member of, and major donor to, each
of the MDBs.
The MDBs provide financial assistance to developing countries in order to promote economic and
social development. They primarily fund large infrastructure and other development projects and,
increasingly, provide loans tied to policy reforms by the government. The MDBs provide non-
concessional financial assistance to middle-income countries and some creditworthy low-income
countries on market-based terms. They also provide concessional assistance, including grants and
loans at below-market rate interest rates, to low-income countries.
Critics argue that the MDBs focus on “getting money out the door” (rather than delivering
results), are not transparent, and lack a clear division of labor. They also argue that providing aid
multilaterally relinquishes U.S. control over where and how the money is spent. Proponents argue
that providing assistance to developing countries is the “right” thing to do and has been
successful in helping developing countries make strides in health and education over the past four
decades. They also argue that MDB assistance is important for leveraging funds from bilateral
donors, promoting policy reforms, and enhancing U.S. leadership.
The Role of Congress in the MDBs
• Funding: Congressional legislation is required for the United States to make
financial contributions to the MDBs. Appropriations for the concessional
windows occur regularly, but appropriations are far more infrequent for the non-
concessional windows. Unusually, all the MDBs are in the process of increasing
the size of their non-concessional lending facilities. Congress authorized U.S.
contributions to the “general capital increases” of the non-concessional lending
windows in FY2011 for the AsDB and in FY2012 for the other MDBs. The
appropriations for these increases are expected to be spread out over a five- to
eight-year period, depending on the institution.
• Oversight: In addition to congressional hearings on the MDBs, Congress
exercises oversight over U.S. participation in the MDBs through legislative
mandates. These mandates direct the U.S. Executive Directors to the MDBs to
advocate certain policies and how to vote on various issues at the MDBs.
Congress also issues reporting requirements for the Treasury Department on
issues related to MDB activities. Congress can also withhold funding for the
MDBs unless certain institutional reforms are met (“power of the purse”).
• U.S. Commercial Interests: More than $30 billion in contracts are awarded each
year to complete projects financed by the MDBs. Some of these contracts are
awarded to U.S. companies. The World Bank has been discussing major changes
in how companies bid on World Bank projects, and this could be an area for
Congress to monitor given U.S. commercial interests in the bank.
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Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Overview of the Multilateral Development Banks .......................................................................... 1
Historical Background............................................................................................................... 2
World Bank ......................................................................................................................... 2
Regional Development Banks ............................................................................................. 3
Operations: Financial Assistance to Developing Countries....................................................... 5
Financial Assistance Over Time.......................................................................................... 5
Recipients of MDB Financial Assistance............................................................................ 7
Funding: Donor Commitments and Contributions .................................................................... 9
Non-Concessional Lending Windows................................................................................. 9
Concessional Lending Windows ....................................................................................... 11
Structure and Organization...................................................................................................... 13
Relation to Other International Institutions....................................................................... 13
Internal Organization......................................................................................................... 13
Debates about Effectiveness of the MDBs .............................................................................. 14
Effectiveness of Foreign Aid............................................................................................. 14
Bilateral vs. Multilateral Aid............................................................................................. 16
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 18
Authorizing and Appropriating U.S. Contributions to the MDBs ........................................... 18
Congressional Oversight of U.S. Participation in the MDBs .................................................. 18
U.S. Commercial Interest in the MDBs................................................................................... 20
Figures
Figure 1. MDB Non-Concessional Financial Assistance, 2000-Present.......................................... 6
Figure 2. MDB Concessional Financial Assistance, 2000-Present.................................................. 6
Figure 3. U.S. Bilateral and Multilateral Official Development Assistance, 2000-Present........... 17
Tables
Table 1. Overview of MDB Lending Windows ............................................................................... 4
Table 2. MDB Non-Concessional Lending Windows: Top 10 Recipients, 2010 or FY2011 .......... 7
Table 3. MDB Concessional Lending Windows: Top 10 Recipients, 2010 or FY2011................... 8
Table 4. MDB Non-Concessional Lending Windows: U.S. Financial Commitments ................... 10
Table 5. MDB Non-Concessional Lending Windows: Top Donors, 2010 or FY2011................... 10
Table 6. MDB Concessional Lending Windows: Cumulative U.S. Contributions ........................ 12
Table 7. MDB Concessional Lending Windows: Top Donors, 2010 or FY2011........................... 12
Table 8. U.S. Executive Directors.................................................................................................. 13
Table 9. U.S. Voting Power in the MDBs ...................................................................................... 14
Table 10. MDB Contracts Identifiably Awarded to U.S. Companies, 2010 .................................. 20
Congressional Research Service
Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 21
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 21
Congressional Research Service
Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress
Introduction
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are international institutions that provide financial
assistance, typically in the form of loans and grants, to developing countries in order to promote
economic and social development. The term MDBs typically refers to the World Bank and four
smaller regional development banks:
• the African Development Bank (AfDB);
• the Asian Development Bank (AsDB);
• the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); and
• the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).1
The United States is a member of each of these institutions. Congress plays an important role in
determining U.S. funding for the MDBs and engaging in oversight of the Administration’s
participation in the MDBs.
This report provides an overview of the MDBs and highlights major issues for Congress. The first
section discusses how the MDBs operate, including the history of the MDBs, their operations and
organizational structure, and the effectiveness of MDB financial assistance. The second section
discusses the role of Congress in the MDBs, including congressional legislation authorizing and
appropriating U.S. contributions to the MDBs; congressional oversight; and U.S. commercial
interests in the MDBs.
Overview of the Multilateral Development Banks
The MDBs provide financial assistance to developing countries, typically in the form of loans and
grants, for investment projects and policy-based loans. Project loans include large infrastructure
projects, such as highways, power plants, port facilities, and dams, as well as social projects,
including health and education initiatives. Policy-based loans provide governments with
financing in exchange for agreement by the borrower country government that it will undertake
particular policy reforms, such as the privatization of state-owned industries or reform in
agriculture or electricity sector policies. Policy-based loans can also provide budgetary support to
developing country governments. In order for the disbursement of a policy-based loan to
continue, the borrower must implement the specified economic or financial policies. Some have
expressed concern over the increasing budgetary support provided to developing countries by the
MDBs. Traditionally, this type of support has been provided by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF).
1 There are also several sub-regional development banks, such as the Caribbean Development Bank and the Andean
Development Corporation. However, the United States is not a member of these sub-regional development institutions,
and they are not discussed in this report. This report also does not discuss the North American Development Bank
(NADBank), a binational financial institution capitalized and governed by the United States and Mexico. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose mandate is to ensure international financial stability, is not an MDB. For
more on the IMF, see CRS Report R42019, International Monetary Fund: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Martin A. Weiss.
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Most of the MDBs have two funds, often called lending windows or lending facilities. One type
of lending window is used to provide financial assistance on market-based terms, typically in the
form of loans, but also through equity investments and loan guarantees.2 Non-concessional
assistance is, depending on the MDB, extended to middle-income governments, some
creditworthy low-income governments, and private sector firms in developing countries.3 The
other type of lending window is used to provide financial assistance at below market-based terms
(concessional assistance), typically in the form of loans at below-market interest rates and grants,
to governments of low-income countries.
Historical Background
World Bank
The World Bank is the oldest and largest of the MDBs. The World Bank Group comprises three
sub-institutions that make loans and grants to developing countries: the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), and
the International Finance Corporation (IFC).4
The 1944 Bretton Woods Conference led to the establishment of the World Bank, the IMF, and
the institution that would eventually become the World Trade Organization (WTO). The IBRD
was the first World Bank affiliate created, when its Articles of Agreement became effective in
1945 with the signatures of 28 member governments. Today, the IBRD has near universal
membership with 187 member nations. Only Cuba and North Korea, and a few micro-states such
as the Vatican, Monaco, and Andorra, are non-members. The IBRD lends mainly to the
governments of middle-income countries at market-based interest rates.
In 1960, at the suggestion of the United States, IDA was created to make concessional loans (with
low interest rates and long repayment periods) to the poorest countries. IDA also now provides
grants to these countries. The IFC was created in 1955 to extend loans and equity investments to
private firms in developing countries. The World Bank initially focused on providing financing
for large infrastructure projects. Over time, this has broadened to also include social projects and
policy-based loans.
2 These carry repayment terms that are lower than those normally required for commercial loans, but they are not
subsidized. See the discussion of financing below.
3 Countries that are eligible for concessional and non-concessional assistance are often referred to as “blend” countries.
4 In addition to the IBRD, IDA, and the IFC, the World Bank Group also includes the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The term
“World Bank” typically refers to IBRD and IDA specifically. MIGA and ICSID are not covered in this report, even
though they arguably play an important role in fostering economic development, because they do not make loans and
grants to developing countries. MIGA provides political risk insurance to foreign investors, in order to promote foreign
direct investment (FDI) into developing countries. ICSID provides facilities for conciliation and arbitration of disputes
between governments and private foreign investors.
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Regional Development Banks
Inter-American Development Bank
The IDB was created in 1959 in response to a strong desire by Latin American countries for a
bank that would be attentive to their needs, as well as U.S. concerns about the spread of
communism in Latin America.5 Consequently, the IDB has tended to focus more on social
projects than large infrastructure projects, although the IDB began lending for infrastructure
projects as well in the 1970s. From its founding, the IDB has had both non-concessional and
concessional lending windows. The IDB’s concessional lending window is called the Fund for
Special Operations (FSO). The IDB Group also includes the Inter-American Investment
Corporation (IIC) and the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF), which extend loans to private
sector firms in developing countries, much like the World Bank’s IFC.
African Development Bank
The AfDB was created in 1964 and was for nearly two decades an African-only institution,
reflecting the desire of African governments to promote stronger unity and cooperation among the
countries of their region. In 1973, the AfDB created a concessional lending window, the African
Development Fund (AfDF), to which non-regional countries could become members and
contribute. The U.S. joined the AfDF in 1976. In 1982, membership in the AfDB non-
concessional lending window was officially opened to non-regional members. The AfDB makes
loans to private sector firms through its non-concessional window and does not have a separate
fund specifically for financing private sector projects with a development focus in the region.
Asian Development Bank
The AsDB was created in 1966 to promote regional cooperation. Similar to the World Bank, and
unlike the IDB, the AsDB’s original mandate focused on large infrastructure projects, rather than
social projects or direct poverty alleviation. The AsDB’s concessional lending facility, the Asian
Development Fund (AsDF), was created in 1973. Like the AfDF, the AsDB does not have a
separate fund specifically for financing private sector projects, and makes loans to private sector
firms in the region through its non-concessional window.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
The EBRD is the youngest MDB, founded in 1991. The motivation for creating the EBRD was to
ease the transition of the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and
the former Soviet Union from planned economies to free-market economies. The EBRD differs
from the other regional banks in two fundamental ways. First, the EBRD has an explicitly
political mandate: to support democracy-building activities. Second, the EBRD does not have a
concessional loan window. The EBRD’s financial assistance is heavily targeted on the private
sector, although the EBRD does also extend some loans to governments in CEE and the former
Soviet Union.
5 Sarah Babb, Behind the Development Banks: Washington Politics, World Poverty, and the Wealth of Nations
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
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Table 1 summarizes the different lending windows for the MDBs, noting what types of financial
assistance they provide, who they lend to, when they were founded, and how much financial
assistance they committed to developing countries in 2010 or FY2011.6 The World Bank
accounted for more than half of total MDB financial assistance commitments to developing
countries in 2010 or FY2011.7 Also, about three-quarters of the financial assistance provided by
the MDBs to developing countries was on non-concessional terms during those years.
Table 1. Overview of MDB Lending Windows
MDB
Type of Financing
Type of Borrower
Year
Commitments,
Founded
2010 or
FY2011
(Billion $)
World Bank Group
International Bank for
Non-concessional loans
Primarily middle-income
1944 26.7
Reconstruction and
and loan guarantees
governments, also some
Development (IBRD)
creditworthy low-income
countries
International
Concessional loans and
Low-income governments
1960
16.3
Development
grants
Association (IDA)
International Finance
Non-concessional
Private sector firms in
1956 12.2
Corporation (IFC)
loans, equity
developing countries (middle-
investments, and loan
and low-income countries)
guarantees
African
Non-concessional
Middle-income governments,
1964 4.0
Development Bank
loans, equity
some creditworthy low-
(AfDB)
investments, and loan
income governments, and
guarantees
private sector firms in the
region
African Development
Concessional loans and
Low-income governments in
1972 2.3
Fund (AfDF)
grants
the region
Asian Development
Non-concessional
Middle-income governments,
1966 9.3Error! Reference
Bank (AsDB)
loans, equity
some creditworthy low-
source not found.
investments, and loan
income governments, and
guarantees
private sector firms in the
region
Asian Development
Concessional loans and
Low-income governments in
1973 3.2Error! Reference
Fund (AsDF)
grants
the region
source not found.
European Bank for
Non-concessional loans
Primarily private sector firms
1991 11.8
Reconstruction and
equity investments, and
in developing countries in the
Development
loan guarantees
region, also developing-
(EBRD)
country governments in the
region
6 The World Bank reports operations data for the fiscal year (July – June), while the regional MDBs report data on a
calendar year.
7 Including IBRD, IFC, and IDA.
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MDB
Type of Financing
Type of Borrower
Year
Commitments,
Founded
2010 or
FY2011
(Billion $)
Inter-American
Non-concessional loans
Middle-income governments,
1959 12.1
Development Bank
and loan guarantees
some creditworthy low-
(IDB)
income governments, and
private sector firms in the
region
Fund for Special
Concessional loans
Low-income governments in
1959 0.3
Operations (FSO)
the region
Source: MDB Annual Reports. World Bank data is for the fiscal year (July – June). Regional development bank
data is for the calendar year. Most of the MDBs also have additional funds that they administer, typical y funded
by a specific donor and/or targeted towards narrowly defined projects. These special funds tend to be very small
in value and are not included in this table.
a. Loans only (does not include any loan guarantees or equity investments funded out of ordinary capital
resources).
Operations: Financial Assistance to Developing Countries
Financial Assistance Over Time
Figure 1 shows non-concessional MDB financial commitments to developing countries since
2000. As a whole, non-concessional MDB financial assistance was relatively stable in nominal
terms until the global financial crisis prompted major member countries to press for increased
financial assistance. In response to the financial crisis and at the urging of its major member
countries, the IBRD dramatically increased lending since FY2008. Regional development banks
also had substantial upticks in lending between 2008 and 2009. MDB non-concessional assistance
has started to decline as the financial crisis has stabilized.
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Figure 1. MDB Non-Concessional Financial Assistance, 2000-Present
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
Notes: World Bank data is for fiscal years (July – June), while regional development bank data is for calendar
years. AsDB data is loans only.
Figure 2 shows concessional financial assistance provided by the MDBs to developing countries
since 2000. The World Bank’s concessional lending arm, IDA, has grown steadily over the
decade in nominal terms, while the regional development bank concessional lending facilities, by
contrast, have remained relatively stable in nominal terms.
Figure 2. MDB Concessional Financial Assistance, 2000-Present
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
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Notes: World Bank data is for fiscal years (July – June), while regional development bank data is for calendar
years.
Recipients of MDB Financial Assistance
Table 2 lists the top recipients of MDB non-concessional financial assistance in FY2011 (for the
World Bank) and 2010 (for the regional development banks). The table shows that several large,
emerging economies, including the “BRICs” (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), receive a steady
flow of financial assistance from the MDBs. For example, at least one of the BRIC countries is
among the top three recipients of financial assistance from the IBRD, the IFC, the AsDB, the
EBRD, and the IDB in 2010 or FY2011.
Table 2. MDB Non-Concessional Lending Windows: Top 10 Recipients, 2010 or
FY2011
(New commitments)
World Bank, FY2011
IBRD
Bill. $ IFC
Bill.
$
India
3,469 Brazil
9,271
Mexico
2,754 India
7,752
Brazil
2,538 Russia
6,405
Indonesia
2,243 Turkey
5,580
Argentina
2,221 Mexico
4,598
China
1,740 Argentina
4,516
Turkey
1,370 China
4,424
Poland
1,115 Nigeria
4,149
Romania
1,091 Regional
3,495
Vietnam
1,068 Pakistan
3,495
Regional Development Banks, 2010
AfDB
Mil. $ AsDB Mil.
$
EBRD
Mil. $ IDB
Mil. $
Egypt
1,021 India
2,370 Russia
3,028 Mexico
3,010
Morocco
815 China
1,588 Ukraine
1,249 Brazil
2,260
South
Africa 633 Bangladesh
800 Kazakhstan
876 Argentina
1,165
Tunisia
465 Indonesia
785 Poland
843 Venezuela
890
Multinational 209 Pakistan
629 Serbia
784 Colombia
685
Senegal
111 Kazakhstan
606 Romania
778 Jamaica
630
Nigeria 106
Philippines
600 Bulgaria
716 Ecuador
509
Rwanda
50 Vietnam
510 Turkey
648 El
Salvador
435
Mali
40 Thailand
504 Croatia
506 Peru
341
Cameroon
36 Regional
475 Georgia
458 Panama
340
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
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Notes: AsDB data is for loans only.
Financial assistance from the MDBs to emerging economies is somewhat controversial. Some
argue that, instead of using MDB resources, these countries should rely on their own resources,
particularly countries like China which has substantial foreign reserves holdings and can easily
get loans from private capital markets to fund development projects. MDB assistance, it is
argued, would be better suited to focusing on the needs of the world’s poorest countries, which do
not have the resources to fund development projects and cannot borrow these resources from
international capital markets.
Others argue that MDB financial assistance provided to large, emerging economies is important,
because these countries have substantial numbers of people living in poverty and MDBs provide
financial assistance for projects for which the government might be reluctant to borrow.
Additionally, MDB assistance helps address environmental issues, promotes better governance,
and provides important technical assistance to which emerging economies might not otherwise
have access. Finally, supporters argue that because MDB assistance to emerging economies takes
the form of loans with market-based interest rates, rather than concessional loans or grants, this
assistance is relatively inexpensive to provide.
Table 3 shows the shows the top recipients of concessional financial assistance from the MDBs in
FY2011 (for the World Bank) and 2010 (for the regional development banks). Balgladesh and
India were top recipients of financial assistance from IDA, the World Bank’s concessional
lending window, in FY2011. Among the regional development banks, the AfDF concentrated
assistance on regional projects in 2010, as well as in a variety of sub-Saharan countries including
Ethopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. For the AsDF, the top recipients of financial
assistance in 2010 from the AsDF were Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan, while the top
recipients of aid from the IDB’s concessional lending window, the Fund for Special Operations
(FSO) were Honduras and Nicaragua.
Table 3. MDB Concessional Lending Windows: Top 10 Recipients, 2010 or FY2011
(New commitments)
World Bank, FY2011
Regional Development Banks, 2010
IDA
Mill. $ AfDF
Mill. $ AsDF
Mill. $ IDB: FSO
Mill. $
Bangladesh
2,139 Ethiopia
352 Vietnam
580 Honduras
103
India
2,072 Multinational
291 Bangladesh
449 Nicaragua
85
Pakistan
1,292 Congo, Dem Rep
248 Afghanistan
352 Bolivia
60
Vietnam
1,280 Tanzania
203 Pakistan
270 Guyana
18
Africa
(regional)
976 Kenya
183 Uzbekistan
265 Paraguay
16
Ethiopia
630 Ghana
172 Nepal
263 Guatemala
14
Ghana
605 Niger
84 Kyrgyzstan
168
Nigeria
535 Cameroon
76 Cambodia
161
Kenya
490 Benin
67 Laos
152
Tanzania
420 Mali
64 Tajikistan
122
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
Note: FSO is the Fund for Special Operations, the IDB’s concessional lending window.
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Funding: Donor Commitments and Contributions
MDBs are able to extend financial assistance to developing countries due to the financial
commitments of their more prosperous member countries. This support takes several forms,
depending on the type of assistance provided. The MDBs use money contributed or “subscribed”
by their member countries to support their assistance programs. They fund their operating costs
from money earned on non-concessional loans to borrower countries. Some of the MDBs transfer
a portion of their surplus net income annually to help fund their concessional aid programs.
Non-Concessional Lending Windows
To offer non-concessional loans, the MDBs borrow money from international capital markets and
then re-lend the money to developing countries. MDBs are able to borrow from international
capital markets because they are backed by the guarantees of their member governments. This
backing is provided through the ownership shares that countries subscribe as a consequence of
their membership in each bank.8 Only a small portion (typically less than 5-10%) of the value of
these capital shares is actually paid to the MDB (“paid-in capital”). The bulk of these shares is a
guarantee that the donor stands ready to provide to the bank if needed. This is called “callable
capital,” because the money is not actually transferred from the donor to the MDB unless the
bank needs to call on its members’ callable subscriptions. Banks may call upon their members’
callable subscriptions only if their resources are exhausted and they still need funds to repay
bondholders. To date, no MDB has ever had to draw on its callable capital. In recent decades, the
MDBs have not used their paid-in capital to fund loans. Rather it has been put in financial
reserves to strengthen the institutions’ financial base.
Due to the financial backing of their member country governments, the MDBs are able to borrow
money in world capital markets at the lowest available market rates, generally the same rates at
which developed country governments borrow funds inside their own borders. The banks are able
to relend this money to their borrowers at much lower interest rates than the borrowers would
generally have to pay for commercial loans, if, indeed, such loans were available to them. As
such, the MDBs’ non-concessional lending windows are self-financing and even generate net
income.
Periodically, when donors agree that future demand for loans from an MDB is likely to expand,
they increase their capital subscriptions to an MDB’s non-concessional lending window in order
to allow the MDB to increase its level of lending. This usually occurs because the economy of the
world or the region has grown in size and the needs of their borrowing countries have grown
accordingly, or to respond to a financial crisis. An across the board increase in all members’
shares is called a “general capital increase” (GCI). This is in contrast to a “selective capital
increase” (SCI), which is typically small and used to alter the voting shares of member countries.
The voting power of member countries in the MDB is determined largely by the amount of
capital contributed and through selective capital increases; some countries subscribe a larger
share of the new capital stock than others to increase their voting power in the institutions. GCIs
happen infrequently. Quite unusually, all the MDBs are in the process of increasing the size of
8 In most cases, the banks do not use the capital subscribed by their developing country members as backing for the
bonds and notes they sell to fund their market-rate loans to developing countries, but instead just use the capital
subscribed by their developed country members.
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their non-concessional windows. Simultaneous for capital increases for all the MDBs has not
occurred since the mid-1970s.
Table 4 summarizes current U.S. capital subscriptions to the MDB non-concessional lending
windows. Currently, the largest U.S. share of subscribed MDB capital is with the IDB at 30%
while its smallest share among the MDBs is with the AsDB at just below 6%.
Table 4. MDB Non-Concessional Lending Windows: U.S. Financial Commitments
MDB U.S.
U.S.
Total U.S.
U.S.
Paid-in
Callable
Commitment Share
Capital
Capital
Billion $
Billion $
Billion $
%
World Bank, as of FY2011
IBRD 2.00 29.97 31.96
16.50
IFC 0.57 — 0.57
24.03
Regional Development Banks, as of 2010
AfDB 0.23 2.03
2.26
6.03
AsDB 0.60 7.91
8.50
5.91
EBRD 0.82 1.93
2.76
10.10
IDB 1.30 29.01 30.31
28.87
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
Notes: Values may not add due to rounding.
Table 5 lists the top donors to the MDBs’s non-concessional facilities. Cumulatively, the United
States has the largest financial commitments to the non-concessional lending windows at the
IBRD, the IFC, the IDB, and the EBRD, and is tied with Japan for the largest financial
commitment at the AsDB. The United States is also a substantial donor to the AfDB.
Other top donor states include Western European countries, Japan, and Canada. Additionally,
several regional members have large financial stakes in the regional banks. For example, among
the regional members, China and India are large contributors to the AsDB; Nigeria, Egypt, and
South Africa are large contributors to the AfDB; Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela are large
contributors to the IDB; and Russia is a large contributor to the EBRD.
Table 5. MDB Non-Concessional Lending Windows: Top Donors, 2010 or FY2011
(Financial commitment, including callable and paid-in capital, as a % of total financial commitments)
World Bank, FY2011
IBRD
% IFC %
United States
16.50 United States
24.03
Japan 9.86
Japan 5.96
Germany 4.51
Germany 5.44
France 4.32
France 5.11
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UK 4.32
UK 5.11
China 2.79
Canada 3.43
Canada 2.79
India
3.43
India 2.79
Italy 3.43
Italy 2.79
Russia 3.43
Russia 2.79
Netherlands
2.37
Saudi Arabia
2.79
Regional Development Banks, 2010
AfDB
% AsDB %
EBRD
% IDB
%
Canada
10.25 Japan
17.72 United
States
10.10 United
States 28.87
Nigeria
8.08 China
7.32 France
8.61 Argentina
10.34
United
States 6.03 India
7.19 Germany
8.61 Brazil
10.34
Japan
4.99 Australia
6.57 Italy
8.61 Canada
7.70
Egypt
4.68 Indonesia
6.19 Japan
8.61 Mexico
6.65
South Africa
4.18 Canada
5.94 United Kingdom
8.61 Venezuela
5.54
Germany
3.75 United
States 5.91 Russia
4.04 Japan
4.81
Algeria
3.65 South
Korea
5.72 Canada
3.43 Chile
2.84
Libya
3.51 Germany
4.91 Spain
3.43 Colombia
2.84
France 3.42
Malaysia 3.09
European 3.03 France
1.82
Investment Bank
European
Union 3.03 Germany
1.82
Italy
1.82
Spain
1.82
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
Concessional Lending Windows
Concessional lending windows do not issue bonds; their funds are contributed directly from the
financial contributions of their member countries. Most of the money comes from the more
prosperous countries, while the contributions from borrowing countries are generally more
symbolic than substantive. The MDBs have also transferred some of the net income from their
non-concessional windows to their concessional lending window in order to help fund
concessional loans and grants.
As the MDB extends concessional loans and grants to low-income countries, the window’s
resources become depleted. The donor countries meet together periodically to replenish those
resources. Thus, these increases in resources are called replenishments, and most occur on a
planned schedule ranging from three to five years. If these facilities are not replenished on time,
they will run out of lendable resources and have to substantially reduce their levels of aid to poor
countries.
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Table 6 summarizes cumulative U.S. contributions to the MDB concessional lending windows.
The U.S. share of total contributions is highest to the IDB’s concessional lending window and
lowest to the AfDB’s concessional lending window.
Table 6. MDB Concessional Lending Windows: Cumulative U.S. Contributions
MDB U.S.
U.S.
Contribution
Share
Billion $
%
World Bank, as of FY2011
IDA 42.87
20.98
Regional Development Banks, as of
2010
AfDF 3.34
11.42
AsDF 3.59
10.43
EBRD —
—
IDB: FSOa 5.04
50.73
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
Notes: EBRD does not have a concessional lending window.
a. FSO is the Fund for Special Operations, the IDB’s concessional lending window. Cumulative contributions
are measured by the FSO contribution quotas. According to the IDB, “Contributions to the FSO are made
in the form of non-negotiable, non-interest bearing demand obligations in lieu of the immediate payment of
al or any part of a member’s contributions quotas. The payment of contribution quotas is conditional on
the members’ budgetary and, in some cases, legislative processes.” See http://www.iadb.org/en/idb-
finance/english/subscribed-capital-stock-and-contributions,2121.html.
Table 7 shows the top donor countries to the MDB concessional facilities. The United States has
made the highest cumulative contributions to IDA and the IDB’s FSO, and the second highest
cumulative contributions to the AfDF and the AsDF, after Japan. Other top donor states include
the more prosperous member countries: Japan, Canada, and those in Western Europe. Within the
FSO, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico have also made substantial contributions.
Table 7. MDB Concessional Lending Windows: Top Donors, 2010 or FY2011
(Cumulative contributions)
World Bank, FY2011 Regional Development Banks, 2010
IDA
% AfDF
% AsDF
% IDB: FSOa
%
United
States
20.98 Japan
11.79 Japan
53.67 United
States
50.43
Japan
19.75 United
States
11.42 United
States
10.43 Japan
4.81
Germany
10.88 France
10.32 Germany
5.59 Brazil
10.34
United
Kingdom 9.92 Germany
10.15 Canada
4.97 Argentina
10.34
France
7.14 United
Kingdom
7.70 Australia
4.21 Mexico
6.65
Canada
4.38 Canada
7.52 France
3.92 Canada
7.70
Italy
4.31 Italy
5.82 United
Kingdom
2.96 Venezuela
5.54
Netherlands
3.58 Sweden
5.13 Italy
2.52 Germany
1.82
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Sweden
3.15 Norway
4.44 Netherlands
2.33 Spain
1.82
Australia
1.79 Netherlands
3.97 Switzerland
1.36 France
1.82
Italy
1.82
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
Note: EBRD does not have a concessional lending window.
a. FSO is the Fund for Special Operations, the IDB’s concessional lending window. Cumulative contributions
are measured by the FSO contribution quotas. According to the IDB, “Contributions to the FSO are made
in the form of non-negotiable, non-interest bearing demand obligations in lieu of the immediate payment of
al or any part of a member’s contributions quotas. The payment of contribution quotas is conditional on
the members’ budgetary and, in some cases, legislative processes.” See http://www.iadb.org/en/idb-
finance/english/subscribed-capital-stock-and-contributions,2121.html.
Structure and Organization
Relation to Other International Institutions
The World Bank is a specialized agency of the United Nations. However, it is autonomous in its
decision-making procedures and its sources of funds. It also has autonomous control over its
administration and budget. The regional development banks are independent international
agencies and are not affiliated with the United Nations system. All the MDBs must comply with
directives (for example, economic sanctions) agreed to (by vote) by the U.N. Security Council.
However, they are not subject to decisions by the U.N. General Assembly or other U.N. agencies.
Internal Organization
The MDBs have similar internal organizational structures. Run by their own management and
staffed by international civil servants, each MDB is supervised by a Board of Governors and a
Board of Executive Directors. The Board of Governors is the highest decision-making authority,
and each member country has its own governor. Countries are usually represented by their
Secretary of the Treasury, Minister of Finance, or Central Bank Governor. The United States is
currently represented by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner. The Board of Governors meets
annually, though may act more frequently through mail-in votes on key decisions.
While the Boards of Governors in each of the Banks retain power over major policy decisions,
such as amending the founding documents of the organization, they have delegated day-to-day
authority over operational policy, lending, and other matters to their institutions’ Board of
Executive Directors. The Board of Executive Directors in each institution is smaller than the
Board of Governors. There are 24 members on the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors,
and fewer for some of the regional development banks. Each MDB Executive Board has its own
schedule, but they generally meet at least weekly to consider MDB loan and policy proposals and
oversee bank activities. The current U.S. Executive Directors to the MDBs are listed in Table 8.
Table 8. U.S. Executive Directors
MDB
U.S. Executive Director
World Bank
Ian H. Solomon
AfDB
Walter C. Jones
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MDB
U.S. Executive Director
AsDB
Robert M. Orr
EBRD James
Hudson
IDB Gustavo
Arnavat
Source: MDB websites.
Decisions are reached in the MDBs through voting. Each member country’s voting share is
weighted on the basis of its cumulative financial contributions and commitments to the
organization.9 Table 9 shows the current U.S. voting power in each institution. The voting power
of the United States is large enough to veto major policy decisions at the World Bank and the
IDB. However, the United States cannot unilaterally veto more day-to-day decisions, such as
individual loans.
Table 9. U.S. Voting Power in the MDBs
MDB
U.S. Voting Share
(%)
World Bank Group, FY2011
IBRD 16.05
IDA 11.03
IFC 23.59
Regional Banks, 2010
AfDB 6.415
AfDF 5.735
AsDB 5.025
IDB 30.006
EBRD 10.138
Source: MDB Annual Reports.
Notes: Data for FY2011 (World Bank Group) or 2010 (regional development banks).
Debates about Effectiveness of the MDBs
Effectiveness of Foreign Aid
The effectiveness of foreign aid, including the aid provided by MDBs, in spurring economic
development and reform in developing countries, is contested. Many academic studies of foreign
aid effectiveness typically examine the effects of total foreign aid provided to developing
countries, including both bilateral aid and multilateral aid. With bilateral aid, most U.S. resources
9 This is not necessarily the case with the MDBs’ concessional windows, though. In order to insure that borrower
countries have at least some say in these organizations, the contributions of donor countries in some recent
replenishments have not given the donor countries additional votes. In all cases, though, the donor countries together
have a comfortable majority of the total vote.
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go directly to programs and projects in developing countries. With multilateral aid, multilateral
organizations, like the MDBs, pool money from different donors and then provide money to fund
programs and projects in developing countries. The results of these studies that examine the
effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral aid are mixed, with conclusions ranging from (a) aid is
ineffective at promoting economic growth10 to (b) aid is effective at promoting economic
growth11 to (c) aid is effective at promoting growth in some countries under specific
circumstances (such as when developing-country policies are strong).12 The divergent results of
these academic studies make it difficult to reach firm conclusions about the overall effectiveness
of aid.
Beyond the debates about the overall effectiveness of foreign aid, there are also criticisms of the
providers of foreign aid. Many of these criticisms are made broadly about multilateral aid
organizations and government aid agencies, and are not targeted at the MDBs specifically. For
example, it is argued that the national and international bureaucracies that dispense foreign aid
focus on “getting money out the door” to developing countries, rather than on delivering services
to developing countries; emphasize short-term outputs like reports and frameworks but do not
engage in long-term activities like the evaluation of projects after they are completed; and put
enormous administrative demands on developing-country governments.13 Bilateral and
multilateral foreign aid agencies have also been criticized for their lack of transparency about
their operating costs and how they spend their aid money; the fragmentation of foreign aid across
many small aid bureaucracies that are not well coordinated; and the proportion of foreign aid that
goes to corrupt leaders or is spent ineffectively.14 However, some analysts contend that among
government and international foreign agencies, MDBs ranked among the best for adhering to
foreign aid “best practices.”15 Many of these criticisms and proposals for change are discussed in
a March 2010 report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the international financial
institutions (IFIs).16
Proponents of foreign aid argue that, despite some flaws, such aid at its core serves vital
economic and political functions. With 1.4 billion people in the developing world (one in four
people in the developing world) living on less than $1.25 a day in 2005,17 some argue that not
providing assistance is simply not an option; they argue it is the “right” thing to do and part of
“the world’s shared commitments to human dignity and survival.”18 These proponents typically
10 E.g., see William Easterly, “Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 17, no. 3
(Summer 2003), pp. 23-48.
11 E.g., see Carl-Johan Dalgaard and Henrik Hansen, “On Aid, Growth, and Good Policies,” Journal of Development
Studies, vol. 37, no. 6 (August 2001), pp. 17-41.
12 E.g., see Craig Burnside and David Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth,” American Economic Review, vol. 90, no. 4
(September 2000), pp. 847-868.
13 William Easterly, “The Cartel of Good Intentions,” Foreign Policy, vol. 131 (July-August 2002), pp. 40-49.
14 William Easterly and Tobias Pfutze, “Where Does the Money Go? Best and Worst Practices in Foreign Aid,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 22, no. 2 (Spring 2008). For more on foreign aid reform, also see CRS Report
R40102, Foreign Aid Reform: Studies and Recommendations, by Susan B. Epstein and Matthew C. Weed and CRS
Report R40756, Foreign Aid Reform: Agency Coordination, by Marian Leonardo Lawson and Susan B. Epstein.
15 Ibid.
16 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The International Financial Institutions: A Call for Change,
111th Cong., 2nd sess., March 10, 2010, http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/55285.pdf.
17 World Bank, New Data Show 1.4 Billion Live On Less Than US$1.25 A Day, But Progress Against Poverty Remains
Strong, August 26, 2008, http://go.worldbank.org/F9ZJUH97T0.
18 Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (Penguin Books, 2006), p. xvi.
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point to the use of foreign aid to provide basic necessities, such as food supplements, vaccines,
nurses, and access to education, to the world’s poorest countries. Additionally, proponents of
foreign aid argue that, even if foreign aid has not been effective at raising overall levels of
economic growth, foreign aid has been successful in dramatically improving health and education
in developing countries over the past four decades. For example, it is argued that foreign aid
contributed to rising life expectancy in developing countries from 48 years to 68 years over the
past four decades, and lowering infant mortality from 131 out of every 1,000 babies born in
developing countries to 36 out of every 1,000 babies.19 It is also argued that providing foreign aid
is an important component of U.S. national security policy and U.S. leadership in the world.
Bilateral vs. Multilateral Aid
There are also policy debates about the merits of giving aid bilaterally or multilaterally.20 Bilateral
aid gives donors more control over where the money goes and how the money is spent. For
example, donor countries may have more flexibility to allocate funds to countries that are of
geopolitical strategic importance, but not facing the greatest development needs, than might be
possible by providing aid through a multilateral organization. By building a clear link between
the donor country and the recipient country, bilateral aid may also garner more goodwill from the
recipient country towards the donor than if the funds had been provided through a multilateral
organization.
Providing aid through multilateral organizations offers different benefits for donor countries.
Multilateral organizations pool the resources of several donors, allowing donors to share the cost
of development projects (often called burden-sharing). Additionally, donor countries may find it
politically sensitive to attach policy reforms to loans or to enforce these policy reforms.
Multilateral organizations can usefully serve as a scapegoat for imposing and enforcing
conditionality that may be politically sensitive to attach to bilateral loans. Finally, many believe
that providing funds to multilateral organizations is important for enhancing and symbolizing
U.S. leadership in the world economy.
The United States provides most of its foreign aid for promoting economic and social
development bilaterally rather than multilaterally. Data from the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) reports that
in 2010, 12% of U.S. foreign aid disbursed to developing countries with the purpose of promoting
economic and social development was provided through multilateral institutions, while 88% was
provided bilaterally.21 Figure 3 shows that the level of multilateral aid disbursed by the United
States has remained fairly constant between 2000 and 2010, although U.S. bilateral aid for
development has increased.
19 William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), pp. 176-177.
20 For more on the choice between bilateral and multilateral aid, see, for example: Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley,
“The Choice for Multilateralism: Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy,” Working Paper, February 10, 2010 and
Helen Milner, “Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal-Agent Problems,” in Delegation and
Agency in International Organizations, eds. Darren Hawkins et al. (New York City: Cambridge University Press,
2006), pp. 107-139.
21 See the note in Figure 3 for explanation of OECD DAC data. DAC data does not, for example, include military
assistance provided by the United States or the callable capital committed by the United States to the MDBs.
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OECD-DAC data allows comparison of the United States with other developed countries.
Generally, other developed countries typically disburse a higher proportion of their development
assistance through multilateral institutions than the United States does. For example, 20% of
Japan’s, 34% of Germany’s, and 38% of the United Kingdom’s foreign aid for economic and
social development in 2010 was disbursed to multilateral organizations.22
Figure 3. U.S. Bilateral and Multilateral Official Development Assistance, 2000-
Present
(Billion $)
Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (www.oecd.org/dac/stats).
Notes: DAC reports data on gross disbursements at current prices of official development assistance (ODA).
ODA is defined as flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions which are administered with the
promotion of economic development and is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least
25%. DAC data does not include, for instance, other official flows including military assistance. DAC data also
focuses on the disbursements of ODA, and would not include, for example, the cal able capital committed by the
United States to the MDBs, because this money has never actually been disbursed from the United States to the
MDBs. Also, multilateral organizations not only include the MDBs but also U.N. agencies.
An alternative data source for U.S. multilateral and bilateral economic assistance to developing
countries is U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorization, published by
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).23 According to this publication, commonly
referred to as the “Greenbook,” 7.7% of U.S. economic assistance in 2010 was provided to
multilateral organizations. The data is drawn from the same source as the data provided by the
United States to the OECD-DAC, but the totals are different due to differences between the
definitions of economic assistance used by OECD-DAC and the Greenbook.
22 Gross disbursements at current prices.
23 Available at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/greenbook.html.
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Issues for Congress
Congress plays an important role in authorizing and appropriating U.S. contributions to the
MDBs and exercising oversight of U.S. participation in these institutions. The MDBs provide
commercial opportunities for U.S. firms, and one area of potential oversight is potential changes
to the procurement polices at the MDBs. For more details on U.S. policy-making at the MDBs,
see CRS Report R41537, Multilateral Development Banks: How the United States Makes and
Implements Policy, by Rebecca M. Nelson and Martin A. Weiss.
Authorizing and Appropriating U.S. Contributions to the MDBs
Authorizing and appropriations legislation is required for U.S. contributions to the MDBs. The
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Financial Services are
responsible for managing MDB authorization legislation. During the past several decades,
authorization legislation for the MDBs has not passed as freestanding legislation. Instead, it has
been included through other legislative vehicles, such as the annual foreign operations
appropriations act, a larger omnibus appropriations act, or a budget reconciliation bill. The
Foreign Operations Subcommittees of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations
manage the relevant appropriations legislation. MDB appropriations are included in the annual
foreign operations appropriations act or a larger omnibus appropriations act.
In recent years, the Administration’s budget request for the MDBs has included three major
components: funds to replenish the concessional lending windows, funds to increase the size of
the non-concessional lending windows (the “general capital increases”), and funds for more
targeted funds administered by the MDBs, particularly those focused on climate change and food
security.24 Replenishments of the MDB concessional windows happen regularly, while capital
increases for the MDB non-concessional windows occur much more infrequently. Quite
unusually, all the MDBs are in the process of increasing their non-concessional windows,
primarily to address the increase in demand for loans that resulted from the financial crisis,
prepare for future crises, and, in the case of the IDB, recover from financial losses resulting from
the financial crisis. Simultaneous capital increases for all the MDBs has not happened since the
1970s. For more information on the general capital increases, see CRS Report R41672,
Multilateral Development Banks: General Capital Increases, by Martin A. Weiss. Data on U.S.
contributions (including requests and appropriated funds) to the MDBs can be found in CRS
Report RS20792, Multilateral Development Banks: U.S. Contributions FY2000-FY2013, by
Rebecca M. Nelson.
Congressional Oversight of U.S. Participation in the MDBs
As international organizations, the MDBs are generally exempt from U.S. law. The President has
delegated the authority to manage and instruct U.S. participation in the MDBs to the Secretary of
the Treasury. Within the Treasury Department, the Office of International Affairs has the lead role
24 For information about the FY2013 budget request, see U.S. Department of Treasury, International Programs:
Justification for Appropriations, FY2013 Budget Request, http://www.treasury.gov/about/budget-
performance/Documents/FY2013_CPD_FINAL_508.pdf.
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in managing day-to-day U.S. participation in the MDBs. The President appoints the U.S.
Executive Directors, and their alternates, with the advice and consent of the Senate. Thus, the
Senate can exercise oversight through the confirmation process.
Over the years, Congress has played a major role in U.S. policy towards the MDBs. In addition to
congressional hearings on the MDBs, Congress has enacted a substantial number of legislative
mandates that oversee and regulate U.S. participation in the MDBs. These mandates generally fall
into one of four major types. More than one type of mandate may be used on a given issue area.
First, numerous legislative mandates direct how the U.S. representatives at the MDBs can vote on
various policies. Examples include mandates that require the U.S. Executive Directors to oppose:
(a) financial assistance to specific countries, such as Burma, until sufficient progress is made on
human rights and implementing a democratic government;25 (b) financial assistance to broad
categories of countries, such as major producers of illicit drugs;26 and (c) financial assistance for
specific projects, such as the production of palm oil, sugar, or citrus crops for export if the
financial assistance would cause injury to United States producers.27 Some legislative mandates
require the U.S. Executive Directors to support, rather than oppose, financial assistance. For
example, a current mandate allows the Treasury Secretary to instruct the U.S. Executive Directors
to vote in favor of financial assistance to countries that have contributed to U.S. efforts to deter
and prevent international terrorism.28
Second, legislative mandates direct the U.S. representatives at the MDBs to advocate for policies
within the MDBs. One example is a mandate that instructs the U.S. Executive Director to urge the
IBRD to support an increase in loans that support population, health, and nutrition programs.29
Another example is a mandate that requires the U.S. Executive Directors to take all possible steps
to communicate potential procurement opportunities for U.S. firms to the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the business community.30
Mandates that call for the U.S. Executive Director to both vote and advocate for a particular
policy are often called “voice and vote” mandates.
Third, Congress has also passed legislation requiring the Treasury Secretary to submit reports on
various MDB issues (reporting requirements). Some legislative mandates call for one-off reports;
other mandates call for reports on a regular basis, typically annually. For example, current
legislation requires the Treasury Secretary to submit an annual report to the appropriate
congressional committees on the actions taken by countries that have borrowed from the MDBs
to strengthen governance and reduce the opportunity for bribery and corruption.31
Fourth, Congress has also attempted to influence policies at the MDBs through “power of the
purse,” that is, withholding funding from the MDBs or attaching stipulations on the MDBs’s use
of funds. For example, the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act stipulates that 10% of the
25 Sec. 570(a)(2) of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997 (P.L. 104-208). Also on human rights more
broadly, see 22 USCS § 262d.
26 22 USC § 2291j(a)(2).
27 22 USC § 262g.
28 22 USC § 262p-4r(a).
29 22 USC § 262p-4m.
30 22 USC § 262s-1.
31 22 USC § 262r-6(b)(2).
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funds appropriated to the AsDF will be withheld until the Treasury Secretary can verify that the
AsDB has taken steps to implement specific reforms aimed at combating corruption.32
U.S. Commercial Interest in the MDBs
Billions of dollars of contracts are awarded to private firms each year in order to acquire the
goods and services necessary to implement projects financed by the MDBs. Table 10 shows that
more than $30 billion in contracts were awarded in 2010. MDB contracts are awarded through
international competitive bidding processes, although most MDBs allow the borrowing country to
give some preference to domestic firms in awarding contracts for MDB-financed projects in order
to help spur development.
Among the regional development banks, currently only a very small fraction (less than 1%) of
these contracts are known to have been awarded to U.S. companies. Data on contracts awarded by
the World Bank by firm nationality is not available,33 nor is data on the nationality of
subcontractors that participate in carrying out projects financed by the MDBs.
Table 10. MDB Contracts Identifiably Awarded to U.S. Companies, 2010
(Million $)
MDB Contracts Total
Percent of Contracts
Awarded to U.S.
Contracts
Awarded to U.S.
Companies
Awarded
Firms
World Bank
n.a.a
20,000b
n.a.
AsDB and
23.55 4,447 0.53%
AsDfc
AfDB
29.10 3,934 0.74%
GroupError!
Reference
source not
found.
EBRDe 0.00 2,176 0.00%
IDBf 22.29
3,308 0.67%
Source: World Bank Procurement website (http://go.worldbank.org/GM7GBOVGS0); ADB Annual Report;
AfDB Annual Report; EBRD Procurement Department, Annual Procurement Review, 2010; IDB Procurement
Portal website http://www.iadb.org/procurement/.
Notes: In some cases, contracts have been awarded to firms in one country that intend to subcontract major
elements of the work to firms in other countries. It is not clear to what extent the data capture subcontracting.
a. n.a. denotes not available. The World Bank reports data on the nationality of firms winning contracts for a
fraction of the total contracts awarded (http://go.worldbank.org/GM7GBOVGS0).
b. Estimate of annual contracts awarded by the World Bank from World Bank Procurement website
(http://go.worldbank.org/GM7GBOVGS0).
32 Sec. 7086 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117).
33 World Bank Contracts Award website (http://go.worldbank.org/GM7GBOVGS0) reports firm nationality for only a
fraction of total contracts awarded.
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c. Nationality of where the goods are mined, produced, grown, assembled and/or manufactured.
d. The AfDB Group includes the African Development Bank, the African Development Fund, and the Nigeria
Trust Fund. Data refers to the country from which the goods/services supplied originated.
e. Awards by country of origin of the tenders.
f.
Includes contracts for goods, works, and consulting. Data is for the nationality of firm.
U.S. commercial interest in the MDBs has been and may continue to be a subject of
Congressional attention, particularly if the banks expand their lending capacity for infrastructure
projects through the GCIs. One area of focus may be the Foreign Commercial Services (FCS)
representatives to the MDBs, who are responsible for protecting and promoting American
commercial interests at the MDBs.34 Some in the business community are concerned about the
impacts of possible budget cuts to the U.S. FCS, particularly if other countries are taking a
stronger role in helping their businesses bid on projects financed by the MDBs.
There may also be interest in discussions about policy changes for procurement standards at the
World Bank, who awards the largest number and highest volume of contracts each year. In
January 2011, the World Bank Executive Board approved a pilot program for a new lending
instrument, “Program for Results,” or P4R.35 This new lending instrument links the disbursement
of funds directly to the delivery of defined results. Proponents argue that P4R will help
developing countries improve the design and implementation of their development programs, and
help strengthen their institutions and build capacity. Opponents argue that relying on country’s
own systems could undermine adequate social and environmental safeguards, while also
undermining transparency objectives and accountability commitments.36
Author Contact Information
Rebecca M. Nelson
Analyst in International Trade and Finance
rnelson@crs.loc.gov, 7-6819
Acknowledgments
Amber Wilhelm, Graphics Specialist, prepared the graphs.
34 For more information, see: http://www.export.gov/advocacy/eg_main_022753.asp.
35 World Bank, “Program-for-Results Financing (PforR),” Accessed April 16, 2012,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTRESLENDING/0,,contentMDK:22748955~pagePK
:7321740~piPK:7514729~theSitePK:7514726,00.html.
36 Bank Information Center, “P4R Update: World Bank Approves Program for Results Policy,” February 29, 2012,
http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.12602.aspx.
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