Senegal: Background and U.S. Relations
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
April 11, 2012
Congressional Research Service
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www.crs.gov
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CRS Report for Congress
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epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Senegal: Background and U.S. Relations
Summary
Senegal, a small, semi-arid nation on West Africa’s Atlantic coast, has long been viewed as one of
the region’s most stable democracies. Political trends under former President Abdoulaye Wade (in
office 2000-2012) raised concerns among analysts and policymakers over possible democratic
“backsliding,” particularly in connection with Wade’s attempt to win a third term in office in
elections held on February 26. Popular anger over Wade’s candidacy sparked demonstrations and
rioting, leading analysts to question Senegal’s stability and the potential for a free and fair vote.
To many observers’ surprise, voting was peaceful, and Wade lost to opposition candidate (and
former protégé) Macky Sall in a run-off vote held on March 25. Wade did not contest the results,
instead calling Sall to concede. Sall was sworn in on April 2, becoming Senegal’s fourth president
since independence in 1960. The election results and Wade’s concession were internationally
hailed as a victory for democracy in an often troubled region.
The State Department refers to U.S.-Senegalese relations as “excellent.” U.S. bilateral
engagement has increased in recent years. Bilateral assistance, estimated at $98.8 million in
FY2011, is focused on public health, food security, democratic governance, economic growth,
rural development, and military professionalism. In addition, the United States signed a $540
million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact with Senegal in 2009. The United
States has viewed Senegal as an anchor of regional stability and a potential partner in combating
transnational security threats, such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and maritime piracy.
Senegal is a significant contributor of troops to international peacekeeping missions, and
thousands of Senegalese peacekeepers have received U.S. training through the State Department’s
Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. During the later
years of Wade’s presidency, senior U.S. officials expressed concerns over negative governance
trends and over Wade’s decision to run for a third term, while Wade publicly objected to what he
views as outside attempts to interfere in domestic politics.
Congress plays a role in guiding U.S. policy toward Senegal through its authorization,
appropriation, and oversight of foreign assistance and executive branch policies. Some Members
of Congress expressed concern regarding the decision to award Senegal an MCC compact in light
of concerns over corruption and political trends under Wade. In the conference report
accompanying P.L. 112-74, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, appropriators directed the
allocation of at least $50 million in development aid to Senegal, while also expressing concern
over Senegal’s failure, to date, to bring to justice former Chadian president Hissène Habré, who
lives in Senegal and has been accused of crimes against humanity.
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Senegal: Background and U.S. Relations
Contents
Background...................................................................................................................................... 1
U.S. Interests ............................................................................................................................. 2
Politics ............................................................................................................................................. 2
Governance and Human Rights................................................................................................. 4
The Economy................................................................................................................................... 6
Security Issues ................................................................................................................................. 7
Foreign Relations............................................................................................................................. 8
U.S. Relations .................................................................................................................................. 9
U.S. Assistance ........................................................................................................................ 10
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact....................................................... 12
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 13
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Senegal................................................................................................................. 1
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Assistance for Senegal, Selected Accounts ............................................... 11
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 13
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Senegal: Background and U.S. Relations
Background
Senegal has remained relatively stable but
Figure 1. Map of Senegal
poor since gaining independence from France
in 1960. It is an electoral democracy and
among the few countries in Africa never to
have experienced a coup d’etat. Its relatively
well trained and disciplined military numbers
some 17,000 personnel. Senegal is seen as a
diplomatic leader in Africa, particularly
among Francophone states. The population is
94% Muslim, with most Senegalese adhering
to one of four prominent Sufi orders. While
ethnic and religious divisions exist, they play
less of a role in politics in Senegal than in
much of West Africa.
Senegal’s first post-independence leader,
Léopold Senghor, was a poet and politician
celebrated as one of post-colonial Africa’s
most important intellectuals. Although a self-
described socialist and pan-Africanist,
Source: CRS.
Senghor cultivated close ties with the West—
in particular, France—and resisted the Eastern Bloc influence then prevalent elsewhere in the
region. Senghor presided over a de-facto one-party state through his ruling Socialist Party (PS)
until 1981, when he stepped down and was succeeded by the PS’s Abdou Diouf. Diouf continued
Senghor’s pro-Western policies and oversaw Senegal’s gradual political liberalization. Still,
elections in the late 1980s and 1990s were marred by alleged fraud, repression of anti-
government activism, and in some cases violence.1
In March 2000, longtime opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade (pronounced “wahd”) won
presidential elections widely seen as free and fair. Wade’s victory and the peaceful transfer of
power to his Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) were hailed as a landmark for democracy in
Senegal and the region, which had seen few democratic transitions between civilian leaders.
During Wade’s second term (2007-2012), however, Senegalese and international observers raised
concerns over apparent democratic “backsliding.” Wade ran for a third term in office in early
2012, but lost to Macky Sall, who had served in several senior government positions under Wade
before joining the opposition. Sall was sworn in as president on April 2, becoming Senegal’s
fourth president since independence. The election results and Wade’s concession were
internationally hailed as a victory for democracy in an often troubled region.
Although government investments in infrastructure, reforms, and donor assistance have provided
the conditions for economic growth in recent years, many Senegalese reportedly feel excluded
from the resulting wealth, which they perceive as having been concentrated in the capital, Dakar,
and among the political and economic elite.
1 The current president, Abdoulaye Wade, was imprisoned in the mid-1990s on charges widely seen as politically
motivated.
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U.S. Interests
U.S. policy toward Senegal focuses on
Senegal at a Glance
encouraging democratic governance,
Population: 12.6 million (2011 est.)
economic growth and development, and
Area: slightly smaller than South Dakota
military professionalism. The United States
views Senegal as an anchor of regional
Gross Domestic Product: $14.7 billion (2011)
stability and a partner in combating
Population Living Below National Poverty Line:
transnational security threats, such as
50.8% (2005)
terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and
Median Age: 18 years
maritime piracy. U.S. engagement has
Key Economic Sectors: fishing, tourism, groundnuts
increased in recent years, in part due to
(peanuts), phosphates, cotton
Senegal’s identity as a moderate, majority-
Muslim country in a region affected by
Religion: Muslim 94%, Christian 5% (mostly Roman
Catholic), indigenous beliefs 1%
violent extremism. Former President
Abdoulaye Wade also pursued closer
Languages: French (official), Wolof, other local languages
bilateral ties as part of a foreign policy that
Life Expectancy at Birth: 59.8 years
appeared broadly aimed at weaning Senegal
Literacy Rate: 50% (2009)
from its traditional reliance on France. U.S.
officials nevertheless criticized democracy
Adult HIV/AIDS Prevalence Rate: 0.9% (2009 est.)
and governance trends under Wade, and
Major Trading Partners: France, Mali, United Kingdom,
expressed concern over their potential to
India, China
spark instability.
Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank Development
Indicators database.
Congress has played a role in U.S. policy
toward Senegal through the annual appropriation of foreign assistance and via the oversight of
executive branch policies and strategies. Recent congressional interest has arisen over a number
of issues, including
• socioeconomic development, health outcomes, and food security;
• democracy and governance trends;
• the management of bilateral assistance, in particular Senegal’s Millennium
Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact, amid concerns over corruption; and
• security issues, such as Senegal’s capacity to counter transnational threats and
Senegalese troop contributions to international peacekeeping.
Politics
Senegal has a political system that endows the presidency with significant authorities. The
president appoints the prime minister and can dismiss him at will, and also appoints the justices
of the country’s highest appeals court and Constitutional Council. Former President Wade and his
Democratic Senegalese Party (PDS), supported by a broad coalition known as Sopi (“Change” in
Wolof), initially benefited from widespread support. One of Wade’s signature achievements was
the adoption, via a 2001 referendum, of a new constitution that reduced presidential terms from
seven to five years and introduced a two-term limit. In 2007, Wade was easily reelected in a vote
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that the State Department termed “open, peaceful, and highly competitive.”2 However, opposition
parties objected to aspects of the electoral procedure and boycotted subsequent legislative
elections, leading to a parliament dominated by the PDS and allied parties.
During Wade’s second term (2007-2012), civil society groups, opposition figures, and analysts
grew increasingly concerned over growing corruption and nepotism within the government, and
over Wade’s increasingly unilateral exercise of power. Multiple amendments to the 2001
constitution by the ruling party-dominated legislature further concentrated power in the
presidency. In 2006, an upper legislative chamber, the Senate, was created in which 65 out of 100
members are appointed by the president. In 2008, the presidential term was re-extended to seven
years. Potential political rivals to Wade within the ruling party were stripped of their positions or,
in at least one high-profile case (that of former Prime Minister Idrissa Seck), charged with crimes.
Critics also alleged that Wade sought to undermine the independence of regulatory and oversight
bodies, such as the electoral commission, the media regulator, and the judiciary.3
In 2009, Wade announced he would run for a third term in office, reversing earlier pledges to
abide by a two-term limit. Opposition leaders, along with many members of the public, objected
to this move as unconstitutional. However, Wade’s candidacy was upheld in January 2012 by
Senegal’s Constitutional Council (whose members were appointed by the president), which ruled
that the constitution was enacted after Wade’s election in 2000 and therefore came into effect only
after Wade’s first term ended in 2007. The Council’s decision was criticized as opaque by
European Union election observers, and opposition figures accused the Council of carrying out a
“constitutional coup.” Still, 13 opposition candidacies were approved, including at least three that
had been challenged by the ruling PDS.4
Public discontent with the government—already sparked by economic hardships and high
unemployment, frequent power cuts, corruption, and Wade’s efforts to extend his rule—was
compounded by perceptions that Wade was promoting his unpopular son, Karim, as a future
president.5 In June 2011, Wade proposed new constitutional amendments to shorten the
presidential electoral system to one in which a plurality, instead of a majority, was required to
win, and to make the post of Vice President a position jointly elected on a presidential ticket.
Violent protests broke out in Dakar, and the proposals were withdrawn. The protests gave rise to a
coalition of civil society and opposition parties focused on deterring Wade’s candidacy, known as
the June 23rd Movement, or M23. The protests also brought attention to a rapper-led social
movement calling itself “Y’En A Marre,” or “We’ve Had Enough,” which focused on
encouraging youth voter turnout. The June 2011 protests were followed days later by rioting over
electricity cuts in Dakar, which was curbed only after the military was called up to perform crowd
control. Sporadic anti-Wade demonstrations and riots continued in Dakar and other urban centers
through late 2011 and early 2012.
Tensions were high as Senegalese prepared to vote on February 26, 2012. Wade had publicly
stated that he would easily win over 50% of the vote, while opposition and civil society leaders
2 State Department, “Background Note: Senegal,” updated April 5, 2012.
3 Penda Mbow, “Senegal: The Return of Personalism,” Journal of Democracy, January 2008; comments by Chris
Fomunyoh of the National Democratic Institute at the Brookings Institution, February 16, 2012.
4 Reuters, “EU Mission Urges Clarity in Senegal Poll Ruling,” January 29, 2012.
5 Karim was given a cabinet appointment with an extensive portfolio during Wade’s second term, after he was defeated
in the 2009 election for mayor of Dakar.
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had declared a free and fair vote impossible, instead calling for mass “resistance” against Wade’s
candidacy. To many observers’ surprise, voting was peaceful, and Wade garnered only 32%
against 13 opponents, necessitating a run-off vote against opposition front-runner Macky Sall.
Ahead of a second round held on March 25, all the other opposition candidates threw their
support behind Sall. Instead of the close contest that many had anticipated, Sall won with nearly
66% of the vote. Wade did not try to contest the results, instead calling Sall to concede.
Macky Sall: Senegal’s Newly Elected President
Macky Sall, 51, is one of Africa’s few heads of state to belong to a post-independence generation. A geological
engineer by profession, Sal rose to national prominence as a senior official in the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS)
of former President Abdoulaye Wade. Reputed to be a protégé of the then-president, Sal served as Prime Minister
(2004-2007) and Speaker of the National Assembly (2007-2008). He was ousted from the latter position following a
public falling-out with Wade; one of the reasons behind the dispute was reportedly Sall’s decision to summon Wade’s
unpopular son, Karim, for parliamentary questioning in connection with government spending on the 2008
Organization of the Islamic Conference summit in Dakar. Sall went on to found his own party, the Alliance for the
Republic (APR), and emerged as Wade’s closest contender for the presidency, besting older opposition figures during
the February 26 first-round vote. Fol owing his victory, Sall pledged to serve only two terms and to reduce the
presidential term from seven to five years—a reform previously undertaken, then reversed, by his predecessor.
Governance and Human Rights
Former President Wade prioritized improvements in urban infrastructure, particularly in the
capital, as he sought to position Dakar as a major transportation and service hub in the region.
However, this strategy appeared unable to provide sufficient economic dividends to stave off
rising expectations from a burgeoning, disproportionately youthful, urban populace.6 Wade’s
government also focused on improving health services and rural education. Senegal has been
particularly praised for its HIV/AIDS programs, which were initiated in the mid-1980s—long
before most—and have contributed to a relatively low rate of infection (less than 1% of the adult
population).7 Senegal’s anti-malaria program has also received plaudits. Still, many rural areas
and some urban neighborhoods remain underserved by roads, electricity, sanitation, and drinking
water. Gaps in service provision in Casamance have provided a basis for ongoing conflict there,
though the government has attempted to improve services in the region, with donor assistance.8
Official corruption reportedly rose under Wade, and some analysts have critiqued the
concentration of wealth in the capital and among a relatively small elite. Senegal’s ranking on
Transparency International’s Corruptions Perceptions Index dropped from 71 in 2007 to 112 in
2011, out of 182 countries assessed. Senegal nevertheless continues to rank better on the Index
than many of its neighbors. Several high-profile corruption scandals were reported in recent
years.9 Controversy was also sparked by Wade’s decision, in 2009, to construct a $27 million
monument to the “African Renaissance,” a 50-yard-high bronze statue overlooking Dakar.10
6 Leonardo A. Villalón, “Senegal: Assessing Risks to Stability,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2011.
7 The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has attributed Senegal’s success at maintaining low HIV
prevalence to “the confluence of a number of factors, including strong political leadership, early involvement and
leadership among religious leaders, conservative cultural norms regarding sexual practices, and a comprehensive
strategic approach implemented early in the epidemic.” Health Profile: Senegal, HIV/AIDS, 2004.
8 See, e.g., USAID, Evaluation of the USAID Peace-Building Program in Casamance and Sub-Region, 2006.
9 For example, in early 2010, Senegalese officials reportedly attempted to extort $200 million from a Luxembourg-
based telecommunications company, Millicom. In September 2009, Wade gave nearly $200,000 in cash to the outgoing
International Monetary Fund (IMF) resident representative during a meeting over dinner in September 2009. Wade
(continued...)
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Some analysts alleged that Wade’s administration created opportunities for corruption through the
privatization of parastatals, such as the national telecommunications agency, and by creating new
“special agencies” in charge of aspects of state procurement, such as the Agency for Investments
and the National Agency for the Organization of the Islamic Conference.11 The latter, then headed
by Wade’s son, Karim, oversaw government procurement for large public infrastructure projects
initiated ahead of Senegal’s hosting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference summit in
2008, and was repeatedly implicated in corruption allegations.12 In recent years, the government
took small steps to combat corruption, such as establishing audit and anti-corruption
commissions, an independent authority to oversee government procurement, and the adoption of a
software tracking system for government accounting.13
The 2010 State Department human rights report identified the following as “major” human rights
issues: poor treatment of detainees and prisoners; overcrowded prisons; “questionable
investigative detention and long pretrial detention,” lack of an independent judiciary; limits on
freedoms of speech, press, and assembly; corruption and impunity; rape, domestic violence,
sexual harassment of and discrimination against women; female genital mutilation (FGM)14; child
abuse; child marriage; infanticide; trafficking in persons; and child labor. The State Department
also documented abuses by rebel forces in Casamance.15 Recent reports by Human Rights Watch
have noted police abuses against gay men (and men perceived as gay), and the widespread abuse
and economic exploitation of children at Senegalese Quranic schools, where tens of thousands of
young boys, often separated from their impoverished rural families, receive religious
instruction.16 Amnesty International has accused Senegalese security forces of torturing suspects
in custody in connection with criminal cases, civil offenses, and the conflict in Casamance, a
practice that the government contends is rare and that it has promised to combat.17
Rights groups have also criticized the government for delays in prosecuting former Chadian
President Hissène Habré, who lives in Senegal, for crimes committed under his leadership in
Chad (1982-1990). In July 2006, the African Union directed Senegal to prosecute Habré after
(...continued)
later admitted to giving the money as a “farewell gift,” but denied he was attempting to influence IMF assessments.
10 Wade declared himself the “intellectual owner” of the monument and claimed he was therefore entitled to a 35% cut
of future related tourism revenues, which he said he would donate to charity. The statue, reportedly constructed with
North Korean labor, was inaugurated in April 2010 for Senegal’s celebration of its 50th anniversary of independence.
The statue sparked local opposition on political, economic, and esthetic grounds.
11 See, e.g., Tarik Dahou and Vincent Foucher, “Le Sénégal, Entre Changement Politique et Révolution Passive. ‘Sopi’
or not ‘Sopi’?” Politique Africaine, December 2004.
12 See, for example, Abdou Latif Coulibaly, Contes et Mecomptes de l’ANOCI, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009.
13 Oxford Analytica, “Senegal: Governance Concerns Rise Over Wade Agenda,” July 29 2010; U.S. Embassy Dakar,
“Senegal’s Budget Process is Transparent [UNCLASSIFIED],” May 4, 2010.
14 The 1999 Penal Law outlawed domestic violence and female genital mutilation, and the rate of FGM has reportedly
decreased; however, implementation has been uneven.
15 State Department, “2010 Human Rights Report: Senegal,” April 8, 2011.
16 HRW, Fear for Life: Violence Against Gay Men and Men Perceived as Gay in Senegal, November 2010; Human
Rights Watch (HRW), “Off the Backs of the Children”: Forced Begging and Other Abuses against Talibés in Senegal,
April 15, 2010. In response to the report and related U.S. pressure over child trafficking, the government announced it
would enforce a ban on street begging and brought seven Quranic teachers to trial. However, police sweeps and other
enforcement efforts raised new child protection concerns.
17 Amnesty International, Senegal: Land of Impunity, September 15, 2010; AFP, “Senegal: La Pratique de la Torture
Existe Mais Est ‘Minime’ (Gouvernement),” September 16, 2010.
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Belgium issued an international arrest warrant charging him with crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and torture. Then-President Wade initially agreed to a prosecution, and the Senegalese
legislature amended the constitution and passed legislation aimed at removing any legal
obstacles. However, the prosecution stalled, initially due to Senegalese claims of insufficient
donor funding. Debate over whether to extradite Habré to either Belgium or Chad is ongoing.18
Senegal has long been considered a regional leader in press freedom. In recent years, however,
criminal prosecutions of journalists increased, along with physical attacks against members of the
press and media outlets, allegedly biased enforcement of media regulation by state agencies,
occasional efforts to suppress publications critical of then-President Wade, and verbal assaults on
the media by senior officials.19 Still, local media continue to express a diverse range of political
opinions and frequently provide a platform for opposition views.
The Economy
Senegal is a semi-arid, predominantly agrarian country with few natural resources. Key foreign
exchange earners include fishing, peanuts, phosphates, tourism, and remittances from Senegalese
workers abroad. Senegal is also highly dependent on foreign aid, which in 2007 represented about
23% of overall government spending.20 Although government investments in infrastructure,
reforms, and donor assistance have provided the conditions for relatively strong annual economic
growth of 4-5.5% over the past decade, Senegal remains among the world’s least developed
countries (LDCs). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently estimated growth in 2011 at
4%, and projected a slight increase to 4.4% in 2012 due to infrastructure investments in energy
and transportation.21 In 2010, the IMF noted that Senegal’s real GDP growth over the previous 15
years had lagged behind Africa’s “best-performing, non-oil exporting countries” by at least 2%
annually; the Fund attributed the difference to Senegal’s relative deficiencies in a number of areas
“including infrastructure, non-price competitiveness, and strength of fiscal institutions, as well as
factors such as governance, the quality of institutions, and financial market development.”22
Former President Wade undertook reforms aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability,
improving tax collection, enhancing competitiveness, and weaning parastatal firms off public
subsidies. In 2009, the World Bank named Senegal one of the world’s “top ten reformers,” citing
regulatory and trade reforms.23 Still, bureaucratic burdens, corruption, rigid labor laws, chronic
electricity shortages, a lack of transparency in public contracting, shortfalls in judicial
independence and efficiency, and opaque land titling procedures potentially hinder further
18 See HRW, “The Case Against Hissène Habré, an ‘African Pinochet,’” at http://www.hrw.org/justice/habre/.
19 Committee to Protect Journalists, Attacks on the Press in 2009.
20 State Department, “Background Note.” According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), Senegal received over a billion dollars in official development assistance in 2009, excluding debt relief.
21 IMF, Senegal: Second Review Under the Policy Support Instrument, December 2011.
22 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Completes Final Review Under PSI with Senegal and Approves New Three-Year PSI,”
Press Release No. 10/469, December 3, 2010.
23 World Bank, “Top Ten Reformers from Doing Business 2009,” at [www.doingbusiness.org].
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growth.24 Critics also objected to Wade’s focus on “prestige” projects, such as a new international
airport and highways in Dakar.25
Senegal has continually faced challenges in alleviating poverty and addressing the burden of
disease. Senegal ranks 155 out of 187 countries assessed by the 2011 U.N. Human Development
Index. Nineteen percent of the population is undernourished, and 31% of the population lacks
reliable access to clean water, according to the World Bank. Senegal suffers from food insecurity,
attributable in part to a dry and unpredictable climate, poor water and land management,
demographic pressures, and periodic locust infestations. It relies on imports for 70% of its food
supply—the highest rate in Sub-Saharan Africa.26 The effects of global climate change are
expected to further worsen food insecurity in Senegal, as in much of the region.27 Discontent over
socioeconomic conditions has contributed to a high rate of emigration, particularly among young
men and often in highly unsafe travel conditions.28
Security Issues
Senegal’s primary internal security concern is unrest in the southern Casamance region, the
location of a three-decade, low-level separatist insurgency. Casamance is cut off from much of
Senegal by The Gambia, a separate country, and is ethnically and religiously distinct. It was
historically populated by the Diola ethnic group, who largely follow Christian and animist beliefs,
in contrast to Senegal’s Muslim majority, who speak Wolof as a lingua franca. A landmark peace
agreement was signed in 2004, but violence has resurged since 2009. The main rebel
organization, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC), has been increasingly
fragmented in the wake of the death of its longtime leader, Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor,
in 2007. Fighters and ex-combatants reportedly also engage in banditry and organized crime,
including trafficking in arms, narcotics, and timber.29 A Senegalese military source alleged in late
2010 that rebel fighters had displayed “new equipment… such as rocket launchers, mortars, and
machine guns.”30 While the conflict remains locally contained, it has hurt the regional economy,
which is ordinarily a tourism destination, and caused population displacements in rural areas.
Transnational security threats include narcotics trafficking, organized crime, and the regional
presence of violent extremist groups. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an criminal-
terrorist network with ties to Al Qaeda and roots in Algeria’s 1990s civil conflict, is active in
neighboring Mauritania and Mali, but has not carried out attacks in Senegal. Many analysts
believe that there is little indigenous support for Islamist extremism, given Senegal’s history of
24 See, e.g., State Department “2011 Investment Climate Statement,” March 2011.
25 Oxford Analytica, “Bolder Senegal Opposition Still Lacks a Clear Leader,” July 1, 2011.
26 U.S. government, Feed the Future, “Senegal FY2010 Implementation Plan,” at http://www.feedthefuture.gov/
documents/FTF_2010_Implementation_Plan_Senegal.pdf.
27 U.N. Development Program and Government of Senegal, Changement Climatique, Sécurité Alimentaire et
Développement Humain, 2010; Oxfam Senegal profile, December 2009.
28 See International Organization on Migration (IOM), Migration au Sénégal: Profil National, 2009.
29 U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat
Assessment, July 2009. MFDC factions long financed themselves through proceeds from the sub-regional trade in
hashish, but the entry of cocaine and other narcotics into the region has reportedly altered existing trafficking networks
and the dynamics of the conflict.
30 AFP, “Violence Surges in Casamance as Peace Process Stays Blocked,” December 29, 2010.
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religious tolerance. The State Department reported in 2011 that “Senegal cooperated with U.S.
counterterrorism efforts.”31
The U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2009 assessed the value of illicit trafficking
flows through Senegal at 8.2 times larger than GDP.32 The trafficking of cocaine from South
America to Europe via West Africa is widely viewed as a significant potential threat to regional
stability and the rule of law. Cocaine reportedly enters Senegal either overland or by sea via
neighboring Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, or directly by air. Though Senegal’s law enforcement
agencies are relatively effective compared to many in the region, they are considered to lack the
capacity to effectively prevent or prosecute organized crime and related financial crimes, such as
money laundering and terrorist financing.33
The drug trade is thought to benefit from regional smuggling networks that are also leveraged for
duty-free cigarettes, counterfeit prescription drugs, small arms, and persons.34 Senegal is a source,
transit, and destination country for trafficking in persons, notably children and women subjected
to forced labor, forced begging, and sex trafficking. In 2011, the State Department classified
Senegal as “Tier 2” under the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA,
P.L. 106-386), an improvement from its “Tier 2 Watchlist” ranking in 2010.35
Foreign Relations
Senegal has long benefited from close partnerships with Western donors. Former colonial power
France is its largest source of bilateral development aid, followed by the United States.36 While
France transferred a long-held military base in Dakar to Senegalese control in 2010 and initiated a
withdrawal of all but 300 of its troops (from 1,000 previously), military cooperation is set to
continue. Former President Wade pursued non-traditional sources of economic support, notably
from the Middle East and China, while maintaining strong ties to longtime partners. This strategy
appeared to be motivated by a desire to emphasize independence to a domestic audience, an effort
to maximize aid flows, and a hedge against conditions placed on Western aid flows.
Senegal is an active member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), having headed
the organization in the 1970s and hosted the annual summit twice (in 1969 and 2008). Ahead of
the 2008 OIC summit, Senegal benefitted from substantial infrastructure assistance from Arab
Gulf countries. Despite previously warming relations with Iran, Senegal cut diplomatic ties in
February 2011, stating that a military investigation showed an Iranian arms shipment seized in
Nigeria had been destined for Casamance rebels based in The Gambia.37 Although Wade had
31 State Department, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2010,” August 18, 2011.
32 UNODC, Transnational Trafficking, op. cit.
33 State Department, 2011 Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Country Database, May 2011.
34 UNODC, Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa, op. cit.
35 State Department, Trafficking in Persons Report 2011, June 27, 2011. See CRS Report RL34317, Trafficking in
Persons: U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress, by Alison Siskin and Liana Sun Wyler.
36 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) statistics on official development aid. The 2009
U.S. MCC compact may push the United States ahead as its funding is disbursed.
37 AP, “Senegal Cuts Ties with Iran Over Weapons Shipment Believed to Target Senegalese Forces,” February 23,
2011.
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previously cultivated a close relationship with Muammar al Qadhafi, he embraced Libya’s
Transitional National Council in May 2011, earlier than most of his African counterparts.
Senegal cultivates a position of regional diplomatic leadership and has generally refrained from
direct involvement in neighboring conflicts, apart from conflict resolution efforts. Still, tensions
occasionally arise with neighboring Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia over those countries’ alleged
links to Casamance rebels and over a border dispute with Guinea-Bissau. In 2011, relations with
Guinea appeared strained after Guinean President Alpha Condé accused Senegal of hosting an
armed plot against him. (Senegal vehemently denied the allegation.) In 1989, tensions over
grazing and fishing rights along the border with Mauritania sparked riots and vigilante reprisals in
both countries, resulting in large-scale, ethnically based forced expulsions from Mauritania into
Senegal. The two countries have pursued a rapprochement in recent years, and the United Nations
has facilitated the return of displaced populations. Former President Wade brokered a 2009
political agreement in Mauritania that paved the way for elections following a military coup. As
of January 2012, over 1,500 Senegalese troops (nearly one-tenth of Senegal’s total armed forces)
and 745 police were serving in U.N.-mandated peacekeeping missions, notably in Darfur, Sudan;
Côte d’Ivoire; the Democratic Republic of Congo; and Haiti.38
U.S. Relations
The State Department describes U.S.-Senegalese relations as “excellent.”39 The U.S. Embassy in
Dakar is the third largest in Africa, and the United States is among Senegal’s top donors.
Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush visited Senegal during their tenures, and President
Wade met President Bush at the White House in June 2001. President Barack Obama
congratulated newly elected President Macky Sall on his victory in March 2012, stating that
“domestic and international observers report that the election was carried out transparently, freely,
and reflects the will of the Senegalese people.” He also recognized outgoing President Wade for
“his leadership and friendship to the United States during his presidency.”40 Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton also congratulated Sall, hailing the Senegalese people on their “peaceful,
democratic election,” and thanking Wade “for his twelve years of leadership and dedicated
service to the Senegalese people.”41
U.S. officials occasionally criticized democracy and governance trends under Wade. The State
Department’s FY2013 aid budget request for Senegal referred to “the gradual erosion of
governance and transparency,” indicating that bilateral assistance would “play a crucial role in
consolidating democratic outcomes resulting from the 2012 presidential and legislative elections
while continuing to support Senegal’s efforts in anti-corruption, transparency, and good
governance.”42 In May 2010, the U.S. Ambassador to Senegal suggested that Senegal had to
reduce corruption in order to retain MCC assistance, provoking a hostile, though short-lived,
public response from Wade.43 The Obama Administration was initially silent on Wade’s third-
38 United Nations, U.N. Mission’s Summary Detailed by Country, January 31, 2012.
39 State Department, “Senegal: Background Note,” op. cit.
40 The White House, “Statement By the President On Senegal’s Elections,” March 26, 2012.
41 State Department, “Senegal: Statement By U.S. Secretary Clinton on Presidential Elections,” March 26, 2012.
42 State Department, FY2012 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations.
43 Wade criticized the Ambassador’s statement and, referring to MCC aid, said the United States should “take it and
give it to some country where people don't mind being insulted.” Reuters, “U.S. Tells Senegal Aid Hangs on Anti-Graft
(continued...)
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term candidacy (which he announced in 2009 while visiting Washington, DC, to sign Senegal’s
MCC compact), but grew more critical in public statements delivered during the weeks leading
up to the February presidential contest. Following the Constitutional Council verdict upholding
Wade’s candidacy, senior State Department officials called on Wade to step down, portraying his
candidacy as a potential threat to Senegal’s democratic tradition.44 Similar statements were made
by French officials. Administration officials reportedly also privately petitioned Wade to step
down, as did some Members of Congress. Wade responded by declaring that he would not accept
“orders” from foreigners.45 The Senegalese Foreign Ministry summoned U.S. Ambassador Lewis
Lukens in early February after a media interview in which Lukens referred to Wade’s candidacy
as “regrettable.” On February 14, Ambassador Lukens met with President Wade, after which the
Senegalese presidency stated that Lukens had “declared that the United States never asked
President Wade to leave and supports no candidate.”46
Senegal is eligible for trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA; Title
I, P.L. 106-200), although exports to the United States are minimal. Senegal hosted the fourth
annual AGOA Forum in July 2005. A bilateral investment treaty entered into force in 1990. U.S.
direct foreign investment in Senegal is estimated at more than $150 million.47 U.S. bilateral
imports for consumption totaled $6.7 million in 2011; bilateral exports totaled $262.5 million.48
U.S. Assistance
U.S. bilateral foreign assistance to Senegal has increased significantly in recent years, from under
$60 million in FY2008 to an estimated $106.7 million in FY2012 (Table 1), in addition to a 2009
MCC compact worth $540 million. The increase largely reflects growing allocations for food
security and health assistance; Senegal is a focus country for the Obama Administration’s Feed
the Future initiative and the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI). Other areas of focus for U.S.
bilateral aid include democratic governance; economic growth; rural development; countering
violent extremism; and military effectiveness. In the lead up to 2012 presidential election, U.S.
aid (about $850,000) provided support to domestic election observation groups.49 Bilateral aid
currently looks set to decrease; the Administration has requested $89.8 million for FY2013.
The conference report accompanying the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-74)
recommended the allocation of “not less than” $50 million in Development Assistance funding
for Senegal. At the same time, the report noted conferees’ concern “that [former Chadian
president] Hissène Habré has not been extradited for prosecution for crimes against humanity,”
and directed the Secretary of State to submit a report on “steps taken by the Government of
(...continued)
Effort,” May 27, 2010; AFP, “Senegal President Snaps at US Over Corruption Comment,” May 29, 2010.
44 Reuters, “Senegal Leader’s Poll Bid Could Risk Stability-US,” January 30, 2012; State Department Daily Briefing,
January 30, 2012.
45 AFP, “Présidentielle: Le Sénégal N’Acceptera ‘Pas de Diktat’ de l’Etranger (Gouvernement),” February 1, 2012.
46 AFP, “Senegal’s Wade Meets Critical US Ambassador,” February 14, 2012.
47 State Department, “2011 Investment Climate Statement,” op. cit.
48 U.S. International Trade Commission data, accessed on February 10, 2012.
49 Remarks by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson, State Department Senegal roundtable,
February 17, 2012.
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Senegal to assist in bringing Habré to justice” (see “Governance and Human Rights” section
above.)
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Assistance for Senegal, Selected Accounts
appropriations, $ thousands (not adjusted for inflation)
FY2012
FY2013
FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 (est.)
(requested)
TOTAL
57,859 93,754 109,480 98,813 106,660 89,772
DA
21,798 55,834 56,528 44,600 50,000 33,900
ESF
0 0
400 0 0 0
Food for
4,070
3,355 0 0 0 0
Peace
GHCS (State
1,535 1,535 1,768 1,535 1,535 1,397
Dept.)
GHCS
29,279 32,043 48,350 51,253 53,950 53,400
(USAID)
FMF
0 0 300 399 325 325
NADR
0 0
1,143 0 0 0
IMET
1,177 987 991
1,026 850 750
Source: State Department Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2010-FY2013.
Notes: This table reflects bilateral assistance administered by the State Department and USAID. It does not
include aid disbursed from regional accounts (such as funds al ocated for TSCTP) or funded through agencies
other than the State Department and USAID, such as the MCC (see below) or DOD.
Accounts: DA=Development Assistance; ESF=Economic Support Fund; GHCS=Global Health and Child
Survival; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; NADR=Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related
Programs; IMET=International Military Education and Training.
In addition to the State Department and USAID, other agencies that fund and implement
assistance programs in Senegal include the Defense Department (DOD), the Department of
Agriculture, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Senegal also hosts some
200 Peace Corps volunteers, the largest contingent in Africa. Senegal further benefits from
multilateral assistance through international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, the
IMF, and the African Development Bank (AfDB), which receive substantial financial support
from the United States. In 2004, Senegal became eligible for $850 million in multilateral debt
relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.50
U.S. security assistance has focused on military professionalization, counterterrorism, maritime
security, and peacekeeping training. Thousands of Senegalese peacekeepers have received
training through the State Department’s Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
(ACOTA) program. Senegal is also one of 10 participant countries in the Trans-Sahara Counter-
Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a multi-year, interagency program aimed at defeating terrorist
organizations in North and West Africa by promoting democratic governance, discrediting
terrorist ideology, and strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities. Through its
50 International Monetary Fund and International Development Association, “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
Initiative – Statistical Update,” March 31, 2004.
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complementary Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), DOD conducts
multinational and bilateral exercises with the Senegalese armed forces. Senegal has benefited
from several DOD “Section 1206” security assistance packages, including two multi-country
counterterrorism programs and three regional maritime security programs.51 Senegal also benefits
from a DOD State Partnership Program with the National Guard of Vermont.52
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact
Senegal has been eligible for MCC assistance since the start of determinations in 2004.53 In April
2009, the MCC awarded Senegal $13.39 million to support the development of a compact. In
September 2009, the MCC approved a five-year, $540 million compact aimed at encouraging
economic growth through improvements in infrastructure and agricultural production. The
compact, which entered into force in September 2010, focuses on road rehabilitation and
expanding irrigation in two geographic regions that are considered to hold potential for
commercial agriculture, the Senegal River Valley and the Casamance region.
During former President Wade’s tenure, some Members of Congress expressed concerns over
Senegal’s MCC compact in light of perceived democratic backsliding and rising corruption.54
MCC officials have defended the compact, noting that Senegal has performed in the top quartile
on most MCC indicators, including “control of corruption”; that Senegal’s government is highly
committed to the compact’s policy objectives; and that Senegal is also “a good investment bet”
for the MCC’s food security and global health initiatives. MCC officials also state that there are
ample policy tools at their disposal to monitor MCC disbursements and to ensure Senegal’s
compliance with good governance standards.55 In March 2011, MCC CEO Daniel Yohannes
testified before Congress that Senegal had reformed certain procurement procedures in response
to U.S. pressure.56 MCC disbursements have nonetheless been slower than initially anticipated
due to procurement-related corruption concerns as well as technical issues. MCC officials also
continue to monitor political conditions ahead of elections.57
51 Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 provides the Secretary of Defense with
authority to train and equip foreign military and maritime security forces. See CRS Report RS22855, Security
Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
52 See CRS Report R41957, The National Guard State Partnership Program: Background, Issues, and Options for
Congress, by Lawrence Kapp and Nina M. Serafino.
53 Eligibility is based on policy performance, relative to the median for low-income countries, on criteria related to
political freedom, government effectiveness, and economic governance. See CRS Report RL32427, Millennium
Challenge Corporation, by Curt Tarnoff.
54 See, e.g., David Freddoso, “Specter: Senegal Shakes Down Americans. Twice,” The Washington Examiner, March
16, 2010; House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Hearing on the
Millennium Challenge Corporation, April 14, 2010, transcript via Congressional Quarterly (CQ); and Chuck Neubauer,
“For Senegal: U.S. Aid, 164-Ft. Statue,” The Washington Times, August 15, 2010.
55 “Millennium Challenge Corporation Hosts Post-Board Public Outreach,” March 25, 2010, transcript via CQ; MCC
response to CRS inquiry, September 22, 2009.
56 House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Hearing on the Proposed
Fiscal 2012 Appropriations for the Millennium Challenge Corporation, March 15, 2011.
57 MCC response to CRS inquiry, February 10, 2012.
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Outlook
The 2012 presidential election was widely viewed as a key test of Senegal’s reputation as a stable
democracy. Many Senegalese saw the vote as a potential watershed for the country’s political
future, in which Senegal would either further its democratic consolidation or potentially
experience a flawed election that could damage its international image. To the delight of many
Senegalese and international observers, the conduct of the elections—and incumbent President
Wade’s eventual loss to Macky Sall—appeared to prove that, despite widespread concerns over
the erosion of democratic institutions in recent years, the system retained the potential for
fairness. Electoral processes will again be tested in legislative elections slated for mid-2012. Yet
the extent to which Sall will (and can) address Senegal’s deeper governance shortfalls and
widespread economic hardships remains to be seen. Despite economic growth over the past
decade, political instability, corruption, insecurity in Casamance, and the potentially distortive
effects of transnational drug trafficking could pose barriers to socioeconomic development and
security. Events in the turbulent surrounding region may also impact Senegal’s trajectory.
Author Contact Information
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459
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