Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of
FY2010 and FY2011 Results for Active and
Reserve Component Enlisted Personnel
Lawrence Kapp
Specialist in Military Manpower Policy
March 30, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32965
CRS Report for Congress
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epared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2010 and FY2011 Results

Summary
Congress has historically been quite interested in recruiting and retention of personnel in the
nation’s Armed Forces, since maintaining a fully manned and capable workforce is a key
component of military readiness. This report provides a brief overview of the recruiting and
retention results for Active and Reserve Component enlisted personnel during FY2010 and
FY2011. Both years were considered very strong for recruiting and retention in the Active and
Reserve Components.
Recruiting and Retention Metrics
Recruiting performance for enlisted personnel is principally measured in terms of meeting
quantity and quality goals. Quantity goals are based on the projected need for new personnel each
service must bring in over the course of the year to meet its congressionally authorized end-
strength. There are two principal quality goals: at least 90% of new recruits be high school
diploma graduates and at least 60% score above average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test.
Quality goals are only for recruits without any previous military service (“non-prior service”).
Retention performance for enlisted personnel is principally measured by meeting one or more
quantity goals. For the Active Components, quantity goals are based on career phase (for
example, initial term, mid-career, and career) and are stated in numerical terms. For the Reserve
Components, retention is tracked via overall attrition rates, which measure the ratio of people
who leave in a given year. Reserve Component retention goals establish a maximum attrition rate
or “ceiling” which should not be exceeded. They are stated in percentage terms and are not
broken out by career phase.
Overview of FY2010 Results
All the Active Components achieved their recruit quantity goals while recruit quality generally
increased over the previous year, in some cases markedly. Virtually all new recruits had high
school diplomas, and nearly three-quarters scored above average on the Armed Forces
Qualification Test. Retention remained strong for all the services, with the Army and Navy
exceeding their goals by substantial margins. The Air Force missed its goal for first term
personnel by 7%, and was slightly short of its goal for career personnel. All of the Reserve
Components except the Army National Guard met or exceeded their recruit quantity goals. The
National Guard shortfall was due to an intentional effort to cut back recruiting in order to lower
its strength, which had gone beyond its authorized end-strength. Recruit quality continued to
improve for nearly all the Reserve Components. All of the Reserve Components finished the year
under their attrition ceilings, and almost all showed lower attrition (better retention) than in 2009.
Overview of FY2011 Results
All of the Active Components achieved their recruit quantity goals while recruit quality continued
near the strong levels achieved in FY2010. Retention also remained strong, with the Army, Navy,
and Marine Corps exceeding their goals. The Air Force exceeded its goals for first-term and mid-
career personnel, but was slightly short of its goal for career personnel. All of the Reserve
Components except the Army National Guard met or exceeded their recruit quantity goals. (As in
2010, the National Guard shortfall was intentional.) Recruit quality remained at a high level for
the Reserve Components. Attrition increased slightly for four of the Reserve Components in
comparison to 2010, but all of the Reserve Components remained below their attrition ceilings.
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Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2010 and FY2011 Results

Contents
Recruiting ........................................................................................................................................ 2
Active Components ................................................................................................................... 2
Historical Context ............................................................................................................... 3
Reserve Components ................................................................................................................. 6
Historical Context ............................................................................................................... 7
Analysis ..................................................................................................................................... 9
Retention........................................................................................................................................ 10
Active Components ................................................................................................................. 10
Reserve Components ............................................................................................................... 13
Analysis ................................................................................................................................... 14
Historical Perspective: The Post-Cold War Drawdown and Its Impact on Recruiting and
Retention..................................................................................................................................... 15
Options for Congress ..................................................................................................................... 16

Tables
Table 1. Accession Data (Quantity) for Active Component Enlisted Personnel, FY2010
and FY2011 .................................................................................................................................. 3
Table 2. Accession Data (Quality) for Non-Prior Service Active Component Enlisted
Personnel, FY2010 and FY2011................................................................................................... 3
Table 3. Accession Data (Quantity) for Reserve Component Enlisted Personnel, FY2010
and FY2011 .................................................................................................................................. 6
Table 4. Accession Data (Quality) for Non-Prior Service Reserve Component Enlisted
Personnel, FY2010 and FY2011................................................................................................... 7
Table 5. Retention Data for Active Component Enlisted Personnel, FY2010 and FY2011 .......... 12
Table 6. Attrition Data for Reserve Component Enlisted Personnel FY2010 and FY2011........... 13

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 17

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Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2010 and FY2011 Results

ongress has historically been very interested in the recruiting and retention of personnel in
the nation’s Armed Forces, as maintaining a fully manned and capable workforce is a key
C component of military readiness. Congress exercises a powerful influence on recruiting
and retention goals through its establishment of personnel strength levels for each of the active
and reserve components. It influences the achievement of these goals primarily through setting
military compensation levels (which may include recruiting and retention bonuses, educational
benefits, and separation incentives), establishing criteria that affect eligibility for enlistment and
retention (for example, age, cognitive, behavioral, and citizenship standards), and by authorizing
and funding recruiting and retention programs (for example, providing for dedicated recruiters
and career counselors, military entrance processing stations, market research, and advertising).
Through its oversight powers, Congress also closely monitors the performance of the executive
branch in managing the size and quality of the military workforce.
Since 2001, the United States has conducted major military operations which have dramatically
increased the operations tempo of the military services, required the large scale mobilization of
reservists, and resulted in significant battle casualties. These factors have been particularly
applicable to the Army, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Marine Corps, and Marine Corps
Reserve, which have shouldered the bulk of the manpower burden associated with operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Many observers expressed concern that these factors would lead to lower
recruiting and retention rates and jeopardize the vitality of today’s all-volunteer military,
particularly in the FY2005-FY2007 timeframe, when the Army had difficulty meeting its recruit
quantity goals and began accepting lower quality recruits. However, starting in 2008 these
concerns were alleviated by the more favorable recruiting and retention environment brought
about by comparatively high unemployment rates in the civilian economy, by the improved
security situation in Iraq, and by reduced recruiting goals for the Army and Marine Corps as both
of those services completed major expansions.
Looking to the future, the completion of the Iraq mission in 2011, planned cuts in force structure,1
and ongoing weakness in the labor market will likely contribute to a favorable environment for
recruiting and retention over the next few years. After that, however, the situation is less clear. A
stronger economy could make civilian work comparatively more attractive than military work,
thereby making recruiting and retention more challenging. If Congress approves the Department
of Defense’s force reduction plans, a drawdown of forces will occur, leading to reduced recruiting
and retention goals; however, once the drawdown is complete, the services will need to increase
their recruiting and retention goals to stabilize the force at its planned level. Additionally, the
experience of the post-Cold War drawdown raises some cautionary flags. If the drawdown is
carried out in such a way as to undermine job satisfaction or to create a perception of limited
career prospects, it could have a negative effect on recruiting and retention.

1 The Administration has proposed reducing the personnel strength of the Active and Reserve Components between
FY2012 and 2017 by the following amounts: Army (-72,000), Navy (-6,200), Marine Corps (-20,000), Air Force (-
4,200), Army National Guard (-5,000), Army Reserve (no change), Navy Reserve (-9,100), Marine Corps Reserve (no
change), Air National Guard (-5,500), Air Force Reserve (-1,900). Proposed active and reserve component reductions
are summarized the FY2013 Department of Defense Budget Overview document, pages 4-13 and 4-15, available at
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2013/FY2013_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
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Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2010 and FY2011 Results

Recruiting
Recruiting has been called the life blood of the military. Without a robust ability to bring new
members into the military, the services would lack sufficient manpower to carry out mission
essential tasks in the near term and would lack a sufficient pool of entry-level personnel to
develop into the mid-level and upper-level leaders of the future. To protect against this, the Active
and Reserve Components set goals for new recruit “accessions”2 each fiscal year. Officer and
enlisted goals are set separately. There are both “quantity”3 and “quality”4 goals for the enlisted
force.
Active Components
The recruiting data presented in Table 1 below show that all of the Active Components met their
enlisted accession quantity goals in both FY2010 and FY2011. The recruiting data presented in
Table 2 show the performance of the Active Components with respect to the Department of
Defense (DOD) enlisted accession quality benchmarks for those same years. The two principal
DOD quality benchmarks are the percentage of non-prior service enlistees who are high school
diploma graduates (HSDG) and the percentage who score above average on the Armed Forces
Qualification Test (AFQT Categories I-IIIA).5 All of the Active Components exceeded their
quality goals in FY2010 and FY2011, often by large margins.

2 In the case of the Active Component, “accessions” are individuals who have actually begun their military service, as
distinguished from those who have signed a contract to serve but who have not yet begun their service. Accession for
Active Component personnel usually occurs when an individual is “shipped” to basic training. For the Reserve
Components, the term has a broader meaning: accession can occur shortly after an individual signs a contract, when he
or she is “shipped” to basic training, or when a servicemember transfers from an Active Component to a Reserve
Component.
3 This “quantity” goal is normally based primarily on the difference between the congressionally authorized end
strength of the Component for a given fiscal year and the projected number of currently serving personnel that
Component will retain through the end of the year. Officer and enlisted accession goals are set separately. To simplify
somewhat, if a Component has an authorized end strength of 200,000 enlisted personnel in a given year, and it projects
that it will retain 175,000 of its current enlisted members through the year, it will set a goal of bringing in
approximately 25,000 new enlisted recruits for that year (actually, the goal will be slightly higher to account for those
new recruits who are discharged early, usually while in initial entry training). The actual number of new enlisted
recruits a Component needs, however, may change during the year as new projections are made about the retention of
currently serving enlisted personnel or if the Component must increase or decrease the total size of its force.
4 DOD measures enlisted recruit “quality” based on two criteria: graduation from high school and score on the Armed
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). Since FY1993, DOD’s benchmarks for recruit quality stipulate that at least 90% of
new recruits must be high school diploma graduates and at least 60% must score above average on the AFQT.
5 Other metrics that are used less frequently include the percentage of non-prior service enlistees who score well below
average on the AFQT (Category IV) and the number and types of enlistment waivers granted to enlistees. However,
these measures are secondary to HSDG and above average AFQT and, in the case of waivers, there is no official
benchmark.
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Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2010 and FY2011 Results

Table 1. Accession Data (Quantity) for Active Component Enlisted Personnel,
FY2010 and FY2011
FY2010
FY2010
FY2010
FY2011
FY2011
FY2011
Service
(Goal)
(Achieved)
(Percent
(Goal)
(Achieved)
(Percent
of Goal)
of Goal)
Army
74,500 74,577 100.1% 64,000 64,019 100.0%
Navy
34,140 34,180 100.1% 33,400 33,444 100.1%
Marine Corps
28,000 28,041 100.1% 29,750 29,773 100.1%
Air Force
28,360 28,493 100.5% 28,515 28,518 100.0%
Source: Department of Defense.


Table 2. Accession Data (Quality) for Non-Prior Service Active Component Enlisted
Personnel, FY2010 and FY2011
FY2010
FY2011
DOD Quality Benchmarks
(Achieved)
(Achieved)
Service
HSDG
AFQT
HSDG
AFQT
HSDG
AFQT
CAT I-IIIA
CAT I-IIIA
CAT I-IIIA
Army
90% 60%
100%
64%
99%
63%
Navy
90%
60% 98% 83% 99% 89%
Marine Corps
90%
60% 100% 72% 100% 73%
Air Force
90% 60%
99%
90%
100%
99%
Source: Department of Defense.
Notes: HSDG: High School Diploma Graduate
AFQT: Armed Forces Qualification Test
CAT I-IIIA: Categories I-IIIA (above average scores)
Historical Context
In the three years immediately following the terrorist attacks of 2001—which saw a dramatic
increase in the use of U.S. military forces—all of the services achieved their quantity goals while
increasing their quality levels. In fact, recruit quality for all the services in the FY2003-FY2004
time frame reached levels not seen since the low accession goals of the post-Cold War drawdown
(early to mid-1990s) allowed the services to be highly selective in who they allowed to join. This
was followed by the very challenging recruiting environment of FY2005-FY2007, when a variety
of factors forced some of the services to accept a lower level of recruit quality in order to meet
their quantity goals. This decline in quality was most notable with respect to the Army. As the
Army’s recruiting difficulties were the primary source of concern during that time, a specific
discussion of its recruiting challenges and performance is provided below, followed by a brief
summary of the other services’ results.
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Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2010 and FY2011 Results

Army
In FY2004, the Army slightly exceeded its quantity goal of 77,000. Of these individuals, 92% had
high school diplomas (above the DOD benchmark of 90%) and 72% scored above average on the
Armed Forces Qualification Test or AFQT (well above the DOD benchmark of 60%). Only 0.5%
of Army recruits had AFQT scores in Category IV (the 10th through 30th percentile). The HSDG
figure was about the same as the Army had experienced for the preceding seven years, while the
AFQT figure was about the same as that of the preceding year, but higher than the Army had
experienced in the 10 years prior to that (FY1993-FY2002). However, for a number of reasons—
including the challenge of recruiting during wartime, competition from civilian employers during
an economic boom, and an effort to expand the size of the Army which necessitated bringing in
more recruits—the Army struggled to meet its recruiting goals from FY2005 to FY2007. In
FY2005, it failed to meet its quantity goal by 8% and the quality of its recruits fell. While
achieving its quantity goals in FY2006 and FY2007, Army recruit quality continued to slide. By
the end of FY2007, the Army reported that only 79% of its recruits were high school diploma
graduates and 61% had scored above average on the AFQT, levels not seen since the 1980s.
Additionally, the proportion of Category IV recruits rose from less than 1% in FY2003-FY2004
to about 4% in FY2005-FY2007.6 This decline in recruit quality occurred at a time when the
Army applied extraordinary resources to its recruiting efforts: it added over 2,500 recruiters to the
existing recruiting force, increased its advertising budget, raised the maximum age for enlistees
from 35 to 42,7 relaxed some existing standards (such as the prohibition on tattoos on the neck
and hands), increased enlistment bonus maximums from $20,000 to $40,000,8 and increased the
number of medical and conduct9 waivers being granted.10
The Army began to reverse this quality decline in FY2008, when it met its accession quantity
goal while also increasing the proportion who were high school diploma graduates to 83% and
slightly increasing the proportion who scored above average on the AFQT to 62%. Additionally,
the Army allowed fewer Category IV recruits (3.5%) and was able to reduce the number of
individuals who were enlisted with waivers for conduct by about 10%.11

6 DOD regulations require that no more than 4% of an annual enlistment cohort may be Category IV (10th -30th
percentile on the AFQT). In addition, no one in Category V (1st-9th percentile on the AFQT) may be admitted. DOD
Instruction 1145.01, Qualitative Distribution of Military Manpower, September 20, 2005, paragraph 4.1,
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/114501p.pdf.
7 P.L. 109-163, §543, increased the maximum allowable age for enlistment from 35 to 42.
8 P.L. 109-163, §635.
9 Conduct waivers are used for a wide range of pre-enlistment misconduct. Until 2008, conduct waivers included drug
use, traffic violations, misdemeanors, and felonies, although each of the services had different rules for categorizing
specific types of misconduct and different criteria for granting conduct waivers. DOD established an enlistment waiver
policy effective at the start of FY2009 which revised the waiver categories, standardized the definitions of the various
types of misconduct across the services, made drug use its own waiver category, and set minimum standards for
requiring drug and conduct waivers. See Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 08-018 – Enlistment Waivers, June 27,
2008, available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/DTM-08-018.pdf.
10 The following are the number and the percentage of Army non-prior service accessions enlisted accessions with a
waiver of any type in the cited fiscal year: FY2003 (8,836/12.7%); FY2004 (8,918/12.3%); FY2005 (10,185/ 15.7%);
FY2006 (13,518/19.5%); FY2007 (14,820/22.0%); FY2008 (14,929/21.5%). The percentage of non-prior service
enlisted accessions with waivers was relatively stable for the other three services during this period. The waiver figures
for subsequent years are as follows: FY2009 (9,938/15.6%); FY2010 (6,080/8.7%); FY2011 (6,653/10.7%). However,
these figures are not directly comparable to those of previous years due to a change in the methodology for counting
waivers (see discussion in footnote 9)
11 While the FY2008 conduct waiver figures were still above the levels for FY2006 – and well above the levels for
(continued...)
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Improvements in Army recruit quality accelerated markedly in FY2009 and FY2010. Aided by a
more favorable recruiting environment—generated by comparatively high unemployment rates
and an improved security situation in Iraq—and needing fewer recruits due to the completion of
the major force expansion which occurred during FY2004-FY2008, the Army was able to be
much more selective. As a result, the Army was able to exceed its quantity goal in FY2009 by 8%
while recruit quality shot up dramatically: 95% of new accessions were high school diploma
graduates, 66% scored above average on the AFQT, and just 1.5% were Category IV. In FY2010,
100% of the Army’s recruits were high school diploma graduates, 64% scored above average on
the AFQT, and less than 1% were Category IV. Army recruit quality in FY2011 was nearly
identical to FY2010.
Marine Corps
While the Marine Corps experienced some of the same recruiting stresses as the Army in the
FY2005-FY2007 timeframe—heavy involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan coupled with a major
force expansion that required a greater number of new recruits—the impact was not as great. In
FY2004, 97% of Marine Corps recruits were high school diploma graduates and 69% scored
above average on the AFQT. These figures dropped slightly to 95% and 65%, respectively, by
FY2007 but were still well above the DOD benchmarks and not substantially different from the
quality levels achieved by the Marine Corps since the mid-1990s. The Marine Corps did,
however, increase the proportion of Category IV recruits to 3% in FY2007, the highest level it
had accepted since 1985, and it did accept more individuals with records of serious misconduct
(although its overall ratio of waivered individuals remained relatively stable). Marine Corps
recruiting in FY2008 showed some small improvements in quality, while FY2009 saw much
larger improvements. In FY2009, 99% of Marine Corps recruits were high school diploma
graduates and 71% of them scored above average on the AFQT. In FY2010, 100% were high
school diploma graduates, 72% scored above average on the AFQT, and less than 1% were
Category IV. Marine Corps recruit quality in FY2011 was nearly identical to FY2010.
Navy and Air Force
The Navy and the Air Force were the least affected by the recruiting stresses of the FY2005-
FY2007 time frame. While deeply involved in the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
their role in these conflicts resulted in far fewer casualties than experienced by the Army and
Marine Corps. Additionally, both of these services were undergoing force reductions during this
time frame, in contrast to the force expansions of the Army and Marine Corps. As such, they
experienced less pressure to trade off quality to achieve quantity goals, enabling both services to
meet their quantity goals while suffering little change in their quality metrics.
The Navy’s HSDG rate declined from 96% in FY2004 to 93% in FY2007, but its above-average
AFQT rate improved from 70% to 73%. The Air Force’s HSDG metric remained at 99% between
FY2004 and FY2007, while its AFQT metric dropped from 82% to 79%. Neither service allowed

(...continued)
FY2003-FY2005 – the downward movement from FY2007 was noteworthy. Of particular significance, in FY2008 the
Army reduced the number of waivers for felony convictions from 511 to 372. With the change in methodology brought
about by Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 08-018 (see footnote 9), directly comparable conduct waiver data for
subsequent years is not available. Under the new methodology, the Army reported 220 waivers for “Major Misconduct
(Conviction)” in FY2009, just 7 in FY2010, and none in FY2011.
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Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2010 and FY2011 Results

in any Category IV personnel during this period. The Navy and the Air Force both met their
accession quantity goals during the FY2008-FY2011 time frame, and both experienced some
improvements in recruit quality. The Navy’s HSDG rate rose from 93% in FY2007 to 99% in
FY2011, while its above-average AFQT rate rose from 73% to 89%. The Air Force’s HSDG rate
dropped one percentage point in FY2008, but returned to 99% in FY2009-FY2010, and rose to
100% in FY2011; its above-average AFQT rate rose from 79% in FY2007 to 99% in FY2011.12
Reserve Components
The recruiting data presented in Table 3 show the performance of the Reserve Components with
respect to their enlisted accession quantity goals in FY2010 and FY2011. The recruiting data
presented in Table 4 show the performance of the Reserve Components with respect to the
Department of Defense (DOD) enlisted accession quality benchmarks for those same years.13 All
of the Reserve Components met their quantity and quality goals in FY2010 and FY2011, with the
exception of the Army National Guard. The Army Guard shortfall was due to an intentional effort
to reduce recruiting in order not to exceed its authorized end-strength by too great a margin.
Table 3. Accession Data (Quantity) for Reserve Component Enlisted Personnel,
FY2010 and FY2011
Reserve
FY2010
FY2010
FY2010
FY2011
FY2011
FY2011
Component
(Goal)
(Achieved)
(Percent
(Goal)
(Achieved)
(Percent
of Goal)
of Goal)
Army National
60,000 57,204 95.3% 53,000 50,430 95.2%
Guard
Army Reserve
26,000 26,810 103.5% 28,320 30,087 106.2%
Navy Reserve
6,654 6,669 100.2% 8,344 8,364 100.2%
Marine Corps
8,043 10,077 125.3% 9,157 9,180 100.3%
Reserve
Air National
6,430 6,983 108.6% 6,632 7,182 108.3%
Guard
Air Force Reserve
9,135 9,604 105.1% 8,831 9,069 102.7%
Source: Department of Defense.

12 Note that the Air Force’s above-average AFQT rate of 99% in FY2011 seems unusually high, even given the
exceptionally strong recruiting environment. If correct, this would represent the highest “above-average AFQT”
accession cohort of any service since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973. Previously, the highest scoring
accession cohort was the Air Force in 2010, with 91% above-average on the AFQT.
13 See the section entitled “Active Components” earlier in this report for a description of the DOD quality benchmarks.
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Table 4. Accession Data (Quality) for Non-Prior Service Reserve Component
Enlisted Personnel, FY2010 and FY2011
FY2010
FY2011
DOD Quality Benchmarks
(Achieved)
(Achieved)
Reserve Component
AFQT
AFQT
AFQT
HSDG
CAT I-IIIA
HSDG
CAT I-IIIA
HSDG
CAT I-IIIA
Army National Guard
90%
60% 95% 68% 92% 70%
Army Reserve
90% 60%
100%
71%
97%
69%
Navy Reserve
90%
60% 97% 79% 98% 82%
Marine Corps Reserve
90%
60% 100% 76% 100% 76%
Air National Guard
90%
60%
94% 78% 100% 80%
Air Force Reserve
90%
60% 100% 76% 100% 77%
Source: Department of Defense.
Historical Context
The recruiting trends for the Reserve Components were similar to those of their Active
Component counterparts in some respects, although the indicators of recruiting difficulties
appeared a bit earlier (FY2003) than for the Active Components and began rebounding earlier as
well (FY2006). The Reserve Components of the Army—the Army Reserve and the Army
National Guard—experienced the most significant recruiting problems particularly with respect to
meeting their quantity goals from FY2003 to FY2005. The Marine Corps Reserves met their
quantity goals in those years while seeing a slight decline in one of the quality metrics. The Air
Force Reserves and Air National Guard briefly experienced some recruiting difficulties as well.
Reserve Component recruiting has been quite strong across all components in FY2009-FY2011.
Army National Guard and Army Reserve
Recruiting difficulties for the Army National Guard began in FY2003, when it fell short of its
recruit quantity goal of 62,000 by 13%; it also missed its FY2004 recruit quantity goal of 56,002
by 13%. In FY2005, both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve missed their quantity
goals by 20% and 16%, respectively. Largely as a result of these shortfalls, both the Army
National Guard and the Army Reserve were well below their congressionally authorized end-
strength at the end of FY2005.14 There were also declines in recruit quality during this period.
The Army National Guard’s HSDG rate decline from 86% in FY2002 to 83% in FY2005, while
its AFQT metric dropped from 60% to 57%. During this same period, the HSDG rate for the
Army Reserve dropped from 94% to 88% and its above-average AFQT rate declined from 69% to
67%.

14 The term “end-strength” refers to the authorized strength of a specified branch of the military at the end of a given
fiscal year. (The term authorized strength means “the largest number of members authorized to be in an armed force, a
component, a branch, a grade, or any other category of the armed forces”). As of September 2005, the actual personnel
strength of the Army National Guard was 333,177—about 95% of its authorized end-strength of 350,000. The actual
strength of the Army Reserve was 189,005 in September, 2005—about 92% of its authorized end-strength of 205,000.
While end-strengths for the reserve components are maximum strength levels, not minimum strength levels, the
inability to maintain a force at the authorized end-strength level can be an indicator of strength management problems.
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Recruiting for the Army National Guard began improving in FY2006. From FY2006 to FY2009,
the Army National Guard met, or came close to meeting, robust recruit quantity goals. This
allowed it to slightly exceed its authorized end-strength by FY2007, and to significantly exceed
its authorized end-strength in FY2008 and FY2009. For FY2010 and FY2011, retention was
strong enough in the Army Guard that it cut back on its recruiting in the last few months of the
year in order to keep from exceeding it authorized end-strength by too great a margin.15 Recruit
quality also improved during this time frame, with the HSDG metric rising from 83% in FY2005
to 95% in FY2010, and then dropping to 92% in FY2011. Its proportion of recruits with above
average AFQT scores remained just under the DOD benchmark of 60% in FY2006-FY2008, but
jumped dramatically to 76% in FY2009, dropped to 68% in FY2010, and then increased to 70%
in FY2011.
The Army Reserve also improved its recruiting from the perspective of quantity from FY2006 to
FY2011, meeting or nearly meeting all of its quantity goals in these years. This allowed the Army
Reserve to stabilize its strength at around 190,000 personnel in FY2006 and FY2007 (about 7%
below its authorized end-strength), and to begin increasing its personnel strength in FY2008. In
FY2009, the Army Reserve was finally able to meet its authorized end-strength after four years of
operating under-strength, and it maintained this during FY2010 and FY2011.16 However, the
quality of Army Reserve recruits declined from FY2006 to FY2008. During these years, the
HSDG metric remained close to the FY2005 level of 88%, while the percentage of recruits
scoring above-average on the AFQT declined from 67% in FY2005 to 58% in FY2008. Recruit
quality improved dramatically in FY2009-FY2011. The percentage of recruits with a high school
diploma shot up to 97% in FY2009, reached 100% in FY2010, and dropped back to 97% in
FY2011. The percentage scoring above average on the AFQT increased to 63% in FY2009,
continued upward to 71% in FY2010, and dropped slightly to 69% in FY2011.
Other Reserve Components
The remaining Reserve Components appear to have been much less affected by the recruiting
stresses of the FY2003-FY2005 period; they likewise saw less of a rebound in the FY2006-
FY2010 period. The Marine Corps Reserve and Air Force Reserve met their quantity goals in
every year from FY2003 to FY2011. The Air National Guard missed its quantity goals by an
average of about 7% from FY2004 to FY2007, but nonetheless maintained a fairly stable strength
level consistent with its authorized end-strength. The Navy Reserve missed its quantity goals in
FY2005 and FY2006, but the significance of this shortfall should be assessed in light of the
reductions in the size of the Navy Reserve related to restructuring initiatives.17

15 The end-strength figures for the Army National Guard are as follows: FY2006 (350,000 authorized, 346,288 actual);
FY2007 (350,000 authorized, 352,707 actual); FY2008 (351,300 authorized, 360,351 actual); FY2009 (352,600
authorized, 358,391 actual), FY2010 (358,200 authorized, 362,015 actual), FY2011 (358,200 authorized, 361,561
actual).
16 The end-strength figures for the Army Reserve are as follows: FY2006 (205,000 authorized, 189,975 actual);
FY2007 (200,000 authorized, 189,882 actual); FY2008 (205,000 authorized, 197,024 actual); FY2009 (205,000
authorized, 205,297 actual); FY2010 (205,000 authorized, actual strength 205,281); FY2011 (205,000 authorized,
204,803 actual).
17 The authorized end-strength for the Navy Reserve has declined by about 23,500 from 2003 through 2011, dropping
from 88,156 at the end of FY2003 to 64,703 at the end of FY2011, with the largest declines occurring in FY2004-2006.
According to testimony by Navy leaders before Congress, this was largely the result of force realignments related to
greater integration of the Navy and the Navy Reserve. However, this testimony also indicated that the Navy Reserve
had recruiting difficulties in some of these years related to a lower flow of recruits from the Navy due to high retention
(continued...)
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Recruit quality has exhibited a positive trend in recent years. In FY2003, two Reserve
Components failed to meet one or both of its quality goals. That dropped to one Reserve
Component in FY2004, rose to three in FY2005 and FY2006, and dropped back to two in
FY2007 and FY2008. For FY2009-FY2011, every Reserve Component met both its quality goals,
in many cases by substantial margins.18
Analysis
Concerns about the health of military recruiting efforts were substantial in the FY2005-FY2007
timeframe, but these concerns have been mitigated by the more favorable results experienced in
subsequent years. In particular, FY2009-FY2011 were remarkably strong recruiting years for all
the services and their Reserve Components, most notably with regards to the quality of new
recruits for the Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard.
There are a number of likely causes for this recruiting success. One factor that has a powerful
impact on military recruiting is the state of the economy. Military recruiting is generally easier in
times of high unemployment and more difficult in times of low unemployment. Historical data
indicate that the unemployment rate dropped from 2003 through 2007 (falling from 6.0% in 2003
to 4.6% for 2006 and 2007) and then climbed to 5.8% in 2008, 9.3% in 2009, and 9.6% in 2010.
While the unemployment rate dropped to 8.9% for 2011, it was likely still high enough to benefit
military recruiting efforts.19
Another factor was likely the cumulative effect of the substantial increases in military
compensation that have occurred over the past decade or so. In most years between FY2001 and
FY2010, Congress increased basic pay by an amount that was at least 0.5% higher than the
annual increase in the employment cost index (a common measure of increases in wages for
private-sector employees). Congress initiated a multi-year reform of housing allowances between
FY1998 and FY2005 to raise housing allowance rates in order to bring them line with actual
housing costs. Congress also increased the amount of hostile fire pay and family separation
allowance in 2002, authorized premium-based TRICARE coverage for non-activated reservists in
2006, and enacted a generous new educational benefit in 2008. Cumulatively, these changes have
made the military compensation package much more attractive.
A third important factor was likely the improved security situation in Iraq, which resulted in a
rapid decline in casualties. From 2004 to 2007, roughly 700 servicemembers were killed in action
each year while serving in Iraq, with about 70% of them serving in the Army and its Reserve
Components. However, as security improved in Iraq, the number of those killed in action in Iraq

(...continued)
among active duty sailors, competition from the Army and Marine Corps, and low civilian unemployment. See
testimony of Vice Admiral John G. Cotton, Chief of Navy Reserve, before the Senate Armed Services Personnel
Subcommittee on March 31, 2004; April 13, 2005; and March 30, 2006. See also testimony of Vice Admiral Dirk J.
Debbink, Chief of Navy Reserve, before the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee on March 3, 2009.
18 The components failing to meet one or both quality metrics were as follows: the Army National Guard and the Navy
Reserve in FY2003; the Army National Guard in FY2004; the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, and the Air
Force Reserve in FY2005; the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, and the Navy Reserve in FY2006; the Army
National Guard and the Army Reserve in FY2007 and FY2008.
19 Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at http://www.bls.gov/.
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dropped to 221 in 2008, 74 in 2009, and 19 in 2010.20 The U.S. mission in Iraq ended in
December 2011.
One more factor which positively affected recruiting in FY2009 was the completion of the major
multi-year efforts by the Army and the Marine Corps to increase their personnel strength. These
growth initiatives required those services to set higher goals for the number of new accessions.
With the successful completion of its Grow the Army initiative, the Army was able to lower its
accession goal from 80,000 per year in FY2005-FY2008 to an average of about 68,000 per year
in FY2009-FY2011. Likewise, the Marine Corps was able to reduce its accession goal from
35,576 in FY2007 and 37,967 in FY2008 to an average of about 30,000 per year in FY2009-
FY2011. Planned reductions in end-strength for all of the active components will continue to
reduce the need for new enlisted accessions over the next several years. The accession goals of all
the active components for FY2012 are below their FY2011 goals.21
Retention
The term retention refers to the rate at which military personnel voluntarily choose to stay in the
military after their original obligated term of service has ended.22 Imbalances in the retention rate
can cause problems within the military personnel system. A common retention concern is that too
few people will stay in, thereby creating a shortage of experienced leaders, decreasing military
efficiency, and lowering job satisfaction. This was a particular concern during the middle part of
the last decade, as the stress of combat deployments raised concerns about the willingness of
military personnel to continue serving. The opposite concern—more salient today in light of
planned reductions in force structure—is that too many people will stay in, thereby decreasing
promotion opportunities and possibly requiring involuntarily separations in order to prevent the
organization from becoming “top heavy” with middle and upper level leaders, or to comply with
end-strength limitations. Each of these outcomes can have a negative impact on recruiting by
making the military a less attractive career option.
Active Components
The data presented in Table 5 show that the Army exceeded all of its retention goals for enlisted
personnel in FY2010 and FY2011, and exceeded them by fairly large margins. These results are a
continuation of a strong retention trend in the Army over the past decade, which has been
particularly remarkable in light of the heavy stress placed on Army personnel during that time by

20 DOD casualty data for Iraq available at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/oif-total-by-month.pdf
(for Operation Iraqi Freedom) and http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/ondmonth.pdf (for Operation
New Dawn). On the other hand, casualties in Afghanistan rose significantly from 2008 to 2010, although the numbers
are still below the peak experienced in Iraq. From 2005 to 2007, about 70 servicemembers on average were killed in
action each year while serving in Afghanistan; that figure rose to 132 in 2008, 271 in 2009, and 438 for 2010, before
declining to 359 in 2011. DOD casualty data for Afghanistan available at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/
CASUALTY/oefmonth.pdf.
21 The FY12 accessions goals for the active components are as follows: Army (58,000); Navy (32,669); Marine Corps
(28,500); Air Force (28,276).
22 The obligated term of service for enlisted personnel is determined by their initial enlistment contract. The normal
service obligation incurred is eight years, which may be served in the Active Component, in the Reserve Component,
or some combination of both. For example, an individual may enlist for four years of service in the Active Component,
followed by four years of service in the Reserve Component. See 10 USC 651 and DOD Instruction 1304.25.
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combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Marine Corps has likewise borne a heavy share
of the manpower burden associated with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it too has
exhibited strong retention over the past decade. It also exceeded its retention goals in FY2010 and
FY2011 by substantial margins.23

23It did fall about 13% short of its “first term” goal in FY2008 and about 8% short in FY2007, but this was due to
exceptionally high retention goals associated with increasing the size of the Marine Corps rather than poor retention.
While the Marine Corps had a “first term” retention goal of 5,892 in FY2006, it was increased to 8,298 in FY2007 and
to 9,507 in FY2008. While it did not meet these sharply increased retention goals, it nonetheless achieved a much
higher retention rate than it did in FY2006. See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee
on Military Personnel, Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Budget Request on Military Personnel
Overview, 111th Cong., 1st sess., May 21, 2009, Statement of Lieutenant General Ronald S. Coleman, Deputy
Commandant for Manpower & Reserve Affairs, http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/MP052109/
Coleman_Testimony052109.pdf, p. 6.
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Table 5. Retention Data for Active Component Enlisted Personnel, FY2010 and
FY2011
Service/
Retention FY2010
FY2010
FY2010
FY2011
FY2011
FY2011
(Goal)
(Achieved)
(Percent of Goal)
(Goal)
(Achieved)
(Percent of Goal)
Category
Armya
Initial Term
24,500
27,436
112.0%
16,848
17,674
104.9%
Mid Career
24,000
26,577
110.7%
15,608
17,104
109.6%
Career 11,500
14,092
122.5% 7,544 8,848
117.3%
Navyb
Zone A
12,600
16,930
134.4%
13,990
17,884
127.8%
Zone B
8,300
10,845
130.7%
8,239
9,536
115.7%
Zone C
5,800
7,750
133.6%
5,064
7,168
141.5%
Air Forcec
Zone A
17,052
15,827
92.8%
14,602
15,368
105.2%
Zone B
10,030
10,715
106.8%
9,791
10,340
105.6%
Zone C
9,102
8,959
98.4%
8,959
8,591
95.9%
Marine Corpsd
First Term
6,735
6,841
101.6%
6,832
6,870
100.1%
Subsequent 6,916
7,424
107.3%
6,537
8,455
129.3%
Source: Department of Defense.
a. The Army tracks retention rates in three categories: initial term (serving in first enlistment, regardless of
length), mid-career (second or subsequent enlistment with less than 10 years of service), and career
(second or subsequent enlistment with 10 or more years of service). It states its retention goals in
numerical terms.
b. The Navy’s most important retention categories are Zone A (up to six years of service), Zone B (6 years of
service to under 10 years of service) and Zone C (10 years of service to under 14 years of service).
c. The Air Force’s most important retention categories are Zone A (17 months to under 6 years of service),
Zone B (six years of service to under 10 years of service), and Zone C (10 years of service to under
fourteen years of service).
d. The Marine Corps tracks retention rates in two categories: first term (serving in first enlistment) and
subsequent (second or subsequent enlistment). The Marine Corps’ retention goal is stated in numerical
terms.
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After some difficulties in FY2008,24 the Air Force met, or nearly met, all of its reenlistment goals
in FY2009. It met, or nearly met, two of three reenlistment goals in FY2010. Its results for first-
term reenlistments in FY2010 were substantially below goal, but Air Force analysts point out that
the Air Force was trying to reduce its force at this time in order to stay under its end-strength
limits. To achieve these reductions, several thousand airmen were given incentives to separate
from the Air Force. In FY2011, the Air Force exceeded its goals for first-term and mid-career
personnel, but was slightly short of its goal for career personnel. The Navy exceeded its retention
goals in FY2009 by a comfortable margin, and by even larger margins in FY2010 and FY2011.
Reserve Components
The Department of Defense tracks Reserve Component retention via overall attrition rates.
Attrition rates measure the percentage of people who leave in a given year, rather than the number
of people who stay. Reserve Component retention goals establish a maximum attrition rate or
“ceiling” which should not be exceeded. They are stated in percentage terms and are not broken
out by career phase. The data show all of the Reserve Components achieved enlisted attrition
rates below their ceilings for FY2010 and FY2011 (see Table 6). This is consistent with reserve
component retention results over the past decade: the Reserve Components have typically stayed
under their attrition ceilings, often by substantial margins.25
Table 6. Attrition Data for Reserve Component Enlisted Personnel FY2010 and
FY2011
Reserve Component
Attrition Goal
FY2010
FY2011
(Ceiling)
(Achieved)
(Achieved)
Army National Guard
19.5% 17.3% 16.2%
Army Reserve
28.6% 16.1% 17.4%
Navy Reserve
36.0% 20.7% 21.3%
Marine Corps Reserve
30.0% 24.9% 24.3%
Air National Guard
12.0% 9.1% 9.9%
Air Force Reserve
18.0% 13.7% 14.1%
Source: Department of Defense.

24 The Air Force missed all three of its FY2008 retention goals by large margins, although the magnitude of this
shortfall appears to have been distorted by the implementation of new goal-setting and achievement-measuring
methodologies. Specifically, the Air Force changed its goal setting methodology from one based on historical
reenlistment rates to goals based on specific skill and grade needs, and narrowed the criteria for counting whether a
reenlistment “counted” towards a goal. This new counting methodology reportedly failed to count thousands of actual
reenlistments towards the Air Force’s goals. (Author’s discussion with Air Force enlisted analysis staff). The Air Force
tripled its funding for new Selective Reenlistment Bonuses in FY2009 and refined its methodology for counting
reenlistments to include some previously omitted.
25 Although there were some instances were a reserve component slightly exceeded its enlisted attrition ceiling over the
past decade (FY2001-2011): the Army National Guard in FY2002 (20.6%), FY2005 (20.2%), and FY2007 (19.7%); the
Air Force Reserve in FY2008 (18.7%); and the Air National Guard in FY2003 (12.7%).
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Analysis
Retention has been positively affected by some of the same factors which have led to strong
recruiting (see “Recruiting”). Put simply, a relatively weak civilian job market coupled with an
attractive military compensation package provides fewer incentives for members to leave the
military. Additionally, the planned reductions in active component force structure led the Army to
greatly reduce its retention goals between FY2010 and FY2011, thereby making it easier to
achieve them. The Marine Corps reduced its retention goals significantly between FY2009 and
FY2010.
Looking ahead, if Congress approves the Department of Defense’s force reduction plans, this
strong retention trend will likely continue during the drawdown. Needing fewer people, the
services will set lower retention goals, thereby making it easier to meet those goals. Additionally,
the reserve components will likely benefit significantly by an increased stream of personnel
leaving active duty and desiring to continue their military careers in the reserves. However, the
force structure reductions will also lead to decreased promotion opportunity in some career fields,
thereby potentially providing a retention disincentive in future years.
Although it may seem counterintuitive, the high operational tempo and large scale reserve
mobilizations that have occurred since September 11, 2001, may also have had a positive impact
on retention. A number of studies indicate that deployments can enhance retention, perhaps by
providing participants with a sense of accomplishment.26 With the U.S. mission in Iraq completed

26 James Hosek and Mark Totten, Does Perstempo Hurt Reenlistment? The Effect of Long or Hostile Perstempo on
Reenlistment, RAND, 1998; Paul Sticha, Paul Hogan and Maris Diane, Personnel Tempo: Definition, Measurement,
and Effects on Retention, Readiness and Quality of Life, Army Research Institute, 1999; Peter Francis, OPTEMPO and
Readiness, Center for Naval Analysis, 1999; and Paul Hogan and Jared Lewis, Voluntary Enlisted Retention and
PERSTEMPO: An Empirical Analysis of Army Administrative Data, The Lewin Group. However, some of these studies
also indicate that after a certain threshold level, this positive effect diminishes or becomes negative. Additionally, these
studies focused on retention behavior during the 1990s, when deployments were generally shorter and less hostile than
during the last nine years. A more contemporary report looks at more current data, contrasting the relationship between
deployment and retention during the periods 1996-2001 versus 2002-2007. Its findings, in part, are summarized below:
Analysis of the survey data indicates that survey respondents who had a deployment involving
hostile duty in the year prior to the survey experienced higher-than-usual work stress and higher-
than-usual personal stress. They also reported a lower intention to stay in the military.
However, the lower intention to stay was not borne out by analysis of actual reenlistment. Using
hostile deployment in the year before a reenlistment decision as an indicator, the study found that
the Air Force and Navy experienced no real effect on first-term reenlistment numbers, and the same
was true of the Marine Corps until 2005–2007, when the effect of deployment was positive.
Deployment had a positive but decreasing effect on Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps second-
term reenlistments through 2003, when the effect neared zero, but it then rebounded and was
positive in 2004–2007.
The Army’s trends were different, however. The effect of deployment on Army reenlistment had
been positive before 2002 and during the first few years of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
but the effect decreased after 2002 and turned negative in 2006. The pattern was similar for second-
term reenlistment.... The estimate for 2006 shows that hostile deployment in the previous 12
months reduced reenlistment by eight percentage points—a large decrease....
More than any other Service, the Army increased the number of occupations eligible for a bonus as
well as the dollar amount of bonuses, raising the number of reenlisting soldiers who received a
bonus from 15 percent in 2003–2004 to nearly 80 percent in 2005–2007; in that same period, the
average value of bonuses increased by more than 50 percent.
The Army’s extended use of reenlistment bonuses helped to offset the decreasing and (by 2006)
negative effect of deployments on reenlistment for both first- and second-term personnel.
(continued...)
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in 2011, and a drawdown of forces in Afghanistan underway, some current servicemembers may
be less inclined to continue their military service.
Historical Perspective: The Post-Cold War
Drawdown and Its Impact on Recruiting and
Retention
The nation’s most recent experience with force structure cuts illustrates some of the potential
impacts which such cuts can have on recruiting and retention. In the aftermath of the Cold War,
all of the services embarked on major force reduction efforts. Needing fewer people, the services
significantly reduced their recruiting and retention goals, which in turn made it easier for them to
meet these goals. As a result, the services all reported excellent recruiting and retention results in
the early 1990s. However, by the late 1990s, the Army, Navy, and Air Force began to experience
some difficulties. In FY1998 the Army and the Navy failed to meet their quantity goals for
enlisted recruits, as did the Army and the Air Force in FY1999. Retention shortfalls also surfaced
in the Army, Navy, and Air Force.27 There was a wide array of perceived causes for these
recruiting and retention shortfalls, including competition with a robust civilian economy and a
perceived “pay gap” between civilian and military compensation, competition with institutions of
higher education, and demographic and attitudinal changes among younger Americans. Other
cited causes included limited recruiting resources and dissatisfaction with military life, due to the
nature of military and pace of operations (e.g., Bosnia and Kosovo) and a lack of critical supplies
and equipment.28
The currently planned drawdown is much smaller in scope than that conducted at the end of the
Cold War, and is focused primarily on the Army and Marine Corps, but a similar dynamic could
occur.29 In such a scenario, recruiting and retention would likely remain strong in the near term
due to force reductions and sluggish competition from the civilian economy, but challenges would
arise once these factors faded. Specifically, recruiting and retention requirements would increase

(...continued)
James Hosek and Francisco Martorell, How Have Deployments During the War on Terrorism Affected Reenlistment,
RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009, p. 1 of Research Brief, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/
2009/RAND_RB9468.pdf. Full report available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG873.pdf.
27 Specifically, from FY1996-98 the Army missed its retention goals for career personnel by between 2 and 5%. The
Air Force did not meet its retention goals for first term personnel in FY1998-2000; for second term personnel in
FY1997-2001; and for career personnel in FY1998-2001. The shortfall was most pronounced with respect to second
term personnel, where the Air Force fell short of its goal by about six percentage points per year. The Navy did not
have specific retention goals during the late 1990s, but the Chief of Naval Operations testified in 2001 that retention
rates were not at a “steady state” level.
28 However, the data used to underpin these various claims were often rather limited. For more information on
recruiting and retention in the late 1990s, see CRS Report RL31297, Recruiting and Retention in the Active Component
Military: Are There Problems?, by Lawrence Kapp.
29 For comparative purposes, the Army went from a strength of about 770,000 in 1989 to a strength of about 480,000 by
1999 (a 38% reduction), with most of the reductions occurring between 1990 and 1994. The Marine Corps dropped
from 196,000 to 172,000 in that same period (a 12% reduction), with most of the reductions occurring between 1992
and 1994. The Administration plan proposes that the Army go from 562,000 in 2011 to 490,000 in 2017 (-12%) while
the Marine Corps goes from 202,000 down to 182,000 in the same period (-10%). However, strength levels are set by
Congress, not the Administration.
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as the drawdown neared completion in order to stabilize the force at its designated manpower
level. Meeting these requirements might also be made more difficult due to increased competition
from a more robust economy, fewer resources allocated to recruiting and retention, or the
development of negative attitudes about military career prospects and job satisfaction. If such a
scenario were to occur, its impact on recruiting and retention would likely not be manifest until
the later half of this decade.
Another cautionary flag raised by the post-Cold War drawdown relates to managing force
structure so as to hedge against future contingencies. To paraphrase the comments of a former
Chief of Staff of the Army, you can reduce force structure quickly, but it takes time to re-grow
quality soldiers and leaders.30 One way to hedge against this is to retain somewhat more mid-
grade officers and non-commissioned officers than is strictly necessary in order to allow for the
rapid addition of force structure if the situation requires it. This is precisely what the Department
of Defense proposes to do with the Army and Marine Corps as part of its “reversibility” concept.
As Secretary of Defense Panetta recently stated:
The force structure shifts I've outlined today entail some risks to be sure. But to manage that
risk we will ensure that we can mobilize, surge and adapt our force to meet the requirements
of an uncertain future. To that end, the Army will retain more mid-level, mid-grade officers
and NCOs. These are the guys who have the experience. And they will maintain them even
as their overall strength decreases to ensure that we have the structure and experienced
leaders necessary to re-grow the force quickly if we have to.31
Such a policy also provides a hedge against potential retention problems associated with a
drawdown, as discussed above.
Options for Congress
Congress exercises a powerful influence on recruiting and retention goals through its
establishment of personnel strength levels for each of the active and reserve components. As such,
Congress’s response to the Administration’s drawdown plans will have a major impact on each of
the services’ recruiting and retention goals. If Congress approves a smaller or more slowly
implemented reduction in military forces than what the Administration proposes, then the services
will need to increase their recruiting and retention goals; conversely, if Congress adopts a larger
or more rapidly implemented reduction in military forces, the services will need to decrease their
goals.

30 General Peter Schoomaker testified before Congress in 2005: “from the end of the first Gulf War until the end of the
1990’s, we reduced the active Army force by 300,000 people…If you cut down 300,000 trees, you can do that pretty
quick. But now grow 30,000 of them back. But there is an analogy there that is pretty apt. It takes time, as you know, to
grow the quality soldier, quality leaders that we have.” U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings
on the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2006—Budget Request from the U.S. Army, committee print, 109th
Cong., 1st sess., February 9, 2005, H.A.S.C. No. 109-2.
31 “The force structure shifts I've outlined today entail some risks to be sure. But to manage that risk we will ensure that
we can mobilize, surge and adapt our force to meet the requirements of an uncertain future. To that end, the Army will
retain more mid-level, mid-grade officers and NCOs. These are the guys who have the experience. And they will
maintain them even as their overall strength decreases to ensure that we have the structure and experienced leaders
necessary to re-grow the force quickly if we have to.” “Major Budget Decisions Briefing from the Pentagon,” Secretary
of Defense Leon Panetta, January 26, 2102, available at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4962 .
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Congress also influences the achievement of these goals through setting military compensation
levels (which may include recruiting and retention bonuses, educational benefits, and separation
incentives), establishing criteria that affect eligibility for enlistment and retention (for example,
age, cognitive, behavioral, and citizenship standards), and by authorizing and funding recruiting
and retention programs (for example, providing for dedicated recruiters and career counselors,
military entrance processing stations, market research, and advertising). Through its oversight
powers, Congress also closely monitors the performance of the executive branch in managing the
size and quality of the military workforce.
The policy levers most commonly used by Congress and DOD to manage recruiting and retention
in the near term include varying the number of recruiters, funding for advertising, and funding for
enlistment and reenlistment bonuses. When recruiting or retention shortfalls occur, or are
anticipated, Congress may elect to apply additional resources to these mechanisms, as it did
during the last decade. Conversely, when recruiting or retention are expected to be strong,
Congress may elect to shift resources away from these areas, as it has done in recent years.
The completion of the Iraq mission in 2011, a drawdown of forces in Afghanistan, planned cuts in
force structure, and ongoing weakness in the labor market will likely contribute to a favorable
environment for recruiting and retention over the next few years. However, the experience of the
post-Cold War drawdown raises some cautionary flags. If the drawdown is carried out in such a
way as to undermine job satisfaction or to create a perception of limited career prospects, or if an
improving economy makes civilian work comparatively more attractive than military work, the
services may face a more challenging recruiting and retention environment in three to five years.

Author Contact Information

Lawrence Kapp

Specialist in Military Manpower Policy
lkapp@crs.loc.gov, 7-7609


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