Venezuela: Issues for Congress
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
March 29, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
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CRS Report for Congress
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Venezuela: Issues for Congress
Summary
The United States traditionally has had close relations with Venezuela, a major supplier of foreign
oil, but there has been friction and tensions in relations under the government of populist
President Hugo Chávez. Over the years, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about human
rights, Venezuela’s military arms purchases, its relations with Cuba and Iran, and its efforts to
export its brand of populism to other Latin American countries. Declining cooperation on anti-
drug and anti-terrorism efforts has been a major concern. The United States has imposed
sanctions: on several Venezuelan government and military officials for allegedly helping the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) with drug and weapons trafficking; on three
Venezuelan companies for providing support to Iran; and on two Venezuelan individuals for
providing support to Hezbollah. In December 2010, Venezuela revoked its agreement for the
appointment of Larry Palmer, nominated to be U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela. The United States
responded by revoking the diplomatic visa of Venezuelan Ambassador Bernardo Alavrez. Despite
tensions in relations, the Obama Administration remains committed to seeking constructive
engagement with Venezuela, focusing on such areas as anti-drug and counter-terrorism efforts.
Under the rule of President Chávez, first elected in 1998 and reelected to a six-year term in
December 2006, Venezuela has undergone enormous political changes, with a new constitution
and unicameral legislature, and a new name for the country, the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela. Human rights organizations have expressed concerns about the deterioration of
democratic institutions and threats to freedom of expression under the Chávez government.
Venezuelans approved a constitutional referendum in February 2009 that abolished term limits,
allowing Chávez to run for reelection in 2012. In September 2010 legislative elections, opposition
parties won 67 out of 165 seats in the National Assembly, denying President Chávez’s ruling
party a supermajority and providing the opposition with a voice in government. Venezuela is
scheduled to hold its next presidential election on October 7, 2012, with President Chávez
running against Henrique Capriles Radonski, the unified opposition candidate. While Chávez’s
continued popularity and use of state resources bode well for his reelection, high rates of crime,
inflation, and other economic problems could erode his support. A wildcard is the health status of
President Chávez, who has had three operations and treatment for an undisclosed form of cancer
since mid-2011.
As in past years, there are concerns in the 112th Congress regarding the state of Venezuela’s
democracy and human rights situation and its deepening relations with Iran. Several measures
have been considered or introduced related to Venezuela. H.R. 3783, approved by the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 7, 2012, would require the Administration to develop a
“a strategy to address Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere.”
H.R. 2542, approved by the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere December 15,
2011, would withhold some assistance to the Organization of American States unless that body
took action to invoke the Inter-American Democratic Charter regarding the status of democracy
in Venezuela. H.R. 2583, approved by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs July 19, 2011,
includes a provision that would prohibit aid to the government of Venezuela. H.Res. 247,
introduced May 4, 2011, would call on the Secretary of State to designate Venezuela as a state
sponsor of terrorism.
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Venezuela: Issues for Congress
Contents
Recent Developments ...................................................................................................................... 1
Political Situation............................................................................................................................. 3
Background: Chávez’s Rise to Power and Rule from 1998-2008 ............................................. 3
Political Developments: 2009-2012 .......................................................................................... 6
February 15, 2009, Term Limits Referendum ..................................................................... 6
September 2010 Legislative Elections ................................................................................ 7
December 2010 Actions by Outgoing National Assembly.................................................. 8
Chávez’s Health Status........................................................................................................ 8
October 2012 Presidential Election..................................................................................... 9
Economic Conditions..................................................................................................................... 12
U.S. Policy..................................................................................................................................... 17
Bilateral Relations during the George W. Bush Administration.............................................. 17
Obama Administration Policy ................................................................................................. 18
U.S. Foreign Aid to Venezuela ................................................................................................ 21
Human Rights Concerns.......................................................................................................... 23
Threats to Freedom of Expression..................................................................................... 26
Anti-Semitism ................................................................................................................... 28
Energy Issues........................................................................................................................... 30
Counternarcotics Issues ........................................................................................................... 31
September 2011 Presidential Determination ..................................................................... 32
State Department 2012 INCSR Report ............................................................................. 33
Venezuela’s Views of Its Anti-Drug Efforts ...................................................................... 33
Extradition of Walid Makled from Colombia.................................................................... 34
Venezuela’s Military Purchases............................................................................................... 35
Venezuela’s Activities in Latin America.................................................................................. 36
Terrorism Issues....................................................................................................................... 38
Colombian Terrorist Groups.............................................................................................. 38
Deepening Relations with Iran.......................................................................................... 39
Venezuela’s Extradition Request for Luis Posada Carriles ............................................... 43
Legislative Initiatives in the 112th Congress .................................................................................. 44
Legislative Initiatives in the 111th Congress .................................................................................. 45
Enacted and Considered Measures .......................................................................................... 45
Other Introduced Measures ..................................................................................................... 46
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Venezuela............................................................................................................. 2
Figure 2. Venezuela: GDP Growth (%), 2005-2011 ...................................................................... 13
Figure 3. Venezuela: Consumer Inflation (average %), 2005-2011............................................... 14
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Tables
Table 1. Venezuela’s Trade Balance, 2004-2010 ........................................................................... 16
Table 2. U.S. Foreign Aid to Venezuela by Account, FY2008-FY2013 ........................................ 22
Appendixes
Appendix A. Links to U.S. Government Reports .......................................................................... 48
Appendix B. Key Developments in 2009-2011 ............................................................................. 49
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 53
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Venezuela: Issues for Congress
Recent Developments
On March 7, 2012, the State Department issued the 2012 International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, which stated, as in previous reports, that Venezuela was one of the preferred trafficking
routes for the transit of cocaine out of South America. The State Department also maintained in
the report that the United States remained prepared to deepen anti-drug cooperation with
Venezuela beyond the currently limited case-by-case level of cooperation. (See “State Department
2012 INCSR Report” below.)
On March 7, 2012, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported out a measure, H.R. 3783,
which would require the Administration to develop a “a strategy to address Iran’s growing hostile
presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere.” (See “Legislative Initiatives in the 112th
Congress” below.)
On February 28, 2012, President Chávez underwent surgery in Cuba to remove a pelvic lesion
that turned out to be malignant. Chávez had two previous cancer surgeries and chemotherapy
treatment in Cuba in 2011, but has not revealed the type of cancer he is battling. The president
returned to Venezuela on March 16, but returned again to Cuba on March 24 for five days of
radiation treatment. He reportedly will return to Cuba several times over the next month for
additional treatments. Chávez’s sickness has raised a host of questions about Venezuela’s political
future. (See “Chávez’s Health Status” and “October 2012 Presidential Election” below.)
On February 12, 2012, Venezuela’s opposition parties held a unified presidential primary under
the banner of the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD). Henrique Capriles Radonski, governor
of Miranda state, won the primary with 62% of the vote. (See “October 2012 Presidential
Election” below.)
On January 8, 2012, the Department of State declared as persona non grata the Venezuelan
Consul General in Miami, Livia Acosta, and asked her to leave the United States. In December
2011, a documentary featured on the Spanish-language network Univisión had alleged that
Iranian and Venezuelan diplomats in Mexico tried to recruit Mexican students for plotting
possible cyberattacks against the United States. Acosta, a Venezuelan diplomat who had been
based in Mexico, was recorded participating in the discussion with the Mexican students. (Also
see “Deepening Relations with Iran.”)
On January 6, 2012, President Chávez appointed General Henry Rangel as defense minister. In
September 2008, the Treasury Department imposed financial sanctions on Rangel for allegedly
helping the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) with drug and weapons
trafficking. (See “Counternarcotics Issues” below.)
For developments earlier in 2009-2011, see Appendix B at the end of this report.
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Venezuela: Issues for Congress
Figure 1. Map of Venezuela
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
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Venezuela: Issues for Congress
Political Situation
For more than a decade, Venezuela has experienced significant political changes under the rule of
populist President Hugo Chávez, and for a number of years there has been concern about the
deterioration of democratic institutions and threats to freedom of expression in the country.
Background: Chávez’s Rise to Power and Rule from 1998-2008
With his election as President in December 1998, Hugo Chávez began to transform Venezuela’s
political system. The watershed election, in which former coup leader Chávez received 56% of
the vote (16% more than his closest rival), illustrated Venezuelans’ rejection of the country’s two
traditional parties, Democratic Action (AD) and the Social Christian party (COPEI), which had
dominated Venezuelan politics for much of the past 40 years. Elected to a five-year term, Chávez
was the candidate of the Patriotic Pole, a left-leaning coalition of 15 parties, with Chávez’s own
Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) the main party in the coalition.
Most observers attribute Chávez’s rise to
Chávez Biography
power to Venezuelans’ disillusionment with
Hugo Chávez Frias was born on July 28, 1954, in a small
politicians whom they judge to have
farming town in the western Venezuelan state of Barinas.
squandered the country’s oil wealth through
The son of school teachers, Chávez was a 1975 graduate
poor management and endemic corruption. A
of Venezuela’s Military Academy. He reached the rank of
lieutenant colonel by 1990. In February 1992, Chávez led
central theme of his campaign was
an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the elected
constitutional reform; Chávez asserted that the
government of President Carlos Andrés Pérez. He was
system in place allowed a small elite class to
imprisoned for two years for the coup attempt before
dominate Congress and that revenues from the
being pardoned. While in the military, Chávez founded
state-run oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela
the nationalistic and left-leaning Bolivarian Revolutionary
Movement, which was later transformed into the Fifth
S.A. (PdVSA), had been wasted.
Republic Movement in the 1998 elections when Chávez
was first elected president.
Although Venezuela had one of the most
Source: Current Leaders of Nations, Gale Group. May
stable political systems in Latin America from
20, 2004.
1958 until 1989, after that period numerous
economic and political challenges plagued the country and the power of the two traditional parties
began to erode. Former President Carlos Andres Perez, inaugurated to a five-year term in
February 1989, initiated an austerity program that fueled riots and street violence in which several
hundred people were killed. In 1992, two attempted military coups threatened the Perez
presidency, one led by Chávez himself, who at the time was a lieutenant colonel railing against
corruption and poverty. Ultimately the legislature dismissed President Perez from office in May
1993 on charges of misusing public funds, although some observers assert that the president’s
unpopular economic reform program was the real reason for his ouster.1 The election of elder
statesman and former President Rafael Caldera as president in December 1993 brought a measure
of political stability to the country, but the Caldera government soon faced a severe banking crisis
that cost the government more than $10 billion. While the macro-economy began to improve in
1997, a rapid decline in the price of oil brought about a deep recession beginning in 1998.
1 For example, see M. Delal Baer, “Revenge of the Venezuelan Dinosaurs,” Wall Street Journal, June 18, 1993.
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Venezuela: Issues for Congress
In the first several years of President Chávez’s rule, Venezuela underwent enormous political
changes and even received a new name for the country, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
named after the 19th century South American liberator Simon Bolivar, whom Chávez often
invokes. In 1999, Venezuelans went to the polls on three occasions—to establish a constituent
assembly that would draft a new constitution, to elect the membership of the 165-member
constituent assembly, and to approve the new constitution—and each time delivered victory to
President Chávez. The new document revamped political institutions, including the elimination of
the Senate and establishment of a unicameral National Assembly, and expanded the presidential
term of office from five to six years, with the possibility of immediate reelection for a second
term. Under the new constitution, voters once again went to the polls in July 2000 for a so-called
mega-election, in which the president, national legislators, and state and municipal officials were
selected. President Chávez easily won election to a new six-year term, capturing about 60% of the
vote while his opponent, fellow former coup leader Francisco Arias, received 38%. Chávez’s
Patriotic Pole coalition also captured 14 of 23 governorships and a majority of seats in the
National Assembly.
Although President Chávez remained widely popular until mid-2001, his standing eroded after
that, amid concerns that he was imposing a leftist agenda on the country and that his government
was ineffective in improving living conditions in Venezuela. In April 2002, massive opposition
protests and pressure by the military led to the ouster of Chávez from power for less than three
days. He ultimately was restored to power by the military, however, after an interim president
alienated the military and public by taking hardline measures, including the suspension of the
constitution. In the aftermath of Chávez’s brief ouster from power, the political opposition
continued to press for his removal from office, first through a general strike that resulted in an
economic downturn in 2002 and 2003, and then through a recall referendum that ultimately was
held in August 2004 and which Chávez won by a substantial margin. In 2004, the Chávez
government moved to purge and pack the Supreme Court with its own supporters in a move that
dealt a blow to judicial independence. The political opposition boycotted legislative elections in
December 2005, which led to domination of the National Assembly by Chávez supporters.
The rise in world oil prices beginning in 2004 fueled the rebound of the economy and helped
support an array of social programs and services known as “missions” that helped reduce poverty
by some 20% by 2007.2 In large part because of the economic rebound and attention to social
programs, Chávez was reelected to another six-year term in December 2006 with almost 63% of
the vote.
After he was reelected, however, even many Chávez supporters became concerned that the
government was becoming too radicalized. Chávez’s May 2007 closure of a popular Venezuelan
television station that was critical of the government, Radio Caracas Television (RCTV), sparked
significant protests and worldwide condemnation. Chávez also proposed a far-reaching
constitutional amendment package that would have moved Venezuela toward a new model of
development known as “socialism in the 21st century,” but this was defeated by a close margin in
a December 2007 national referendum. University students took the lead in demonstrations
against the closure of RCTV, and also played a major role in defeating the constitutional reform.
2 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Social Panorama of Latin America, 2008, Briefing
Paper, November 2008, p. 11.
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Venezuela: Issues for Congress
In 2008, President Chávez moved to unite his supporters into a single party—the United Socialist
Party of Venezuela (PSUV)—although several parties that had supported Chávez in the past
declined to join. The Venezuelan government also continued to move forward with
nationalizations in key industries, including food companies, cement companies, and the
country’s largest steel maker; these followed the previous nationalization of electricity companies
and the country’s largest telecommunications company and the conversion of operating
agreements and strategic associations with foreign companies in the oil sector to majority
Venezuelan government control.
State and local elections held in November 2008 revealed a mixed picture of support for the
government and the opposition. Pro-Chávez candidates won 17 of the 22 governors’ races, while
the opposition won governorships in three of the country’s most populous states, Zulia, Miranda,
and Carabobo, as well as the states of Nueva Esparta and Táchira (see Figure 1 for a map of
Venezuela). At the municipal level, pro-Chávez candidates won over 80% of the more than 300
mayoral races, while the opposition won the balance. Among the opposition’s mayoral successes
were races for the metropolitan mayor of Caracas, four out of the five smaller municipalities that
make up Caracas (including the poor municipality of Sucre), and the country’s second-largest
city, Maracaibo.3
Leading up to the November elections, President Chávez’s PSUV held primary elections around
the country on June 1, 2008, to select candidates, although the process was criticized for a lack of
transparency. The opposition initially had difficulty in agreeing on a single slate of candidates so
as not to split the opposition vote, but by the end of September 2008 had agreed on a unified
candidate for most governor races.4 The opposition includes newer parties such as Primero
Justicia (PJ, Justice First), Proyecto Venezuela (Project Venezuela), and Un Nuevo Tempo (UNT,
A New Era); leftist parties that defected from the Chavista coalition such as the Movimiento al
Socialismo (MAS, Movement toward Socialism) and Por la Democracia, Social (Podemos, For
Social Democracy); and the traditional political parties from the past such as AD and COPEI.5
One of the major problems for the opposition was that the Venezuelan government’s comptroller
general disqualified 272 individuals (down from almost 400 originally disqualified) from running
for office, purportedly for cases involving the misuse of government funds.6 There were several
challenges to Venezuela’s Supreme Court that the comptroller general’s action violated the
Constitution, but on August 5, 2008, Venezuela’s Supreme Court upheld the disqualifications. The
Venezuelan government maintained that the majority of those disqualified were from the ranks of
its own supporters,7 while the opposition maintained that a large percentage were from the
opposition, including several high-profile opposition candidates.8 Among those excluded was
Leopoldo López, the popular mayor of Chacao, who was seeking to run for mayor of Caracas.
3 “Both Sides Celebrate in Venezuela,” LatinNews Daily, November 25, 2008; “La oposición venezolana se atribuye un
“triunfo indiscutible” electoral,” Agencia EFE, November 26, 2008; Tyler Bridges, “Chávez Allies Score Big Wins in
Venezuela Elections,” Miami Herald, November 24, 2008; Simon Romero, “Venezuelan Opposition Gains in Several
Crucial Elections,” New York Times, November 24, 2008.
4 Ibid.
5 “Venezuela: Opposition Disarray Hurts Electoral Hopes,” Oxford Analytica, July 1, 2008.
6 “Inhabilitaciones a Políticos en Venezuela Se Reducen de 400 a 272,” Agence France-Presse, July 11, 2008.
7 Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United States, “Fact Sheet, Myths and Realities of the
Disqualifications from Holding Public Office,” July 17, 2008.
8 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report, 2008.
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Political Developments: 2009-2012
February 15, 2009, Term Limits Referendum
In the aftermath of the state and municipal elections in November 2008, President Chávez
announced that he would move ahead with plans to seek changes to the constitution that would
lift the two-term limit for the office of the presidency. This would allow him to run for reelection
in 2012 and beyond. The National Assembly voted on January 14, 2009, to hold a referendum on
the constitutional amendment, expanding it further so that the abolition of term limits would
apply to all elected government officials. As a result, the proposed amendment pertained to the
president, all state and municipal officials, and deputies to the National Assembly. The
referendum was scheduled for February 15, 2009, and various polls indicated that the vote would
be close. Ultimately, with a participation rate of 70%, Venezuelans approved the constitutional
reform with almost 55% voting for it and 45% voting against it.9 President Chávez proclaimed
that the vote was a victory for the Bolivarian Revolution, and virtually promised that he would
run for reelection in 2012.10
The amendment was controversial given the defeat of the government’s constitutional reform
package in December 2007, which had included an amendment that would have removed the
presidential two-term limit. Venezuela’s opposition maintained that President Chávez’s effort to
amend the constitution in 2009 was illegal because the constitution (Article 345) prohibits a
constitutional reform that was rejected from being presented again to the National Assembly in
the same constitutional period. According to this view, since the next National Assembly would
not be elected until late 2010 and take office until early 2011, such an amendment should not
have been considered until then.
Similar to the campaign against the government’s December 2007 constitutional reform package,
student groups played a leading role in the opposition to the abolishment of term limits in 2009.
During the referendum campaign, Venezuelan security forces used tear gas, plastic bullets, and
water cannons to disperse several student protests nationwide, although a massive student
demonstration was allowed to take place in Caracas. Opposition parties again united against the
referendum, including the democratic socialist Podemos party that had once supported President
Chávez.
During the campaign, President Chávez argued that the constitutional change would only allow
him to run again, but would not mean that he would be reelected or remain in power indefinitely.
He maintained that he does not want to be “President for life,” but would like to remain in power
until 2019 in order to ensure that his revolutionary project continues.11 Chávez campaigned
vigorously for the amendment, and spent hours on state-run television in support of it. The
president’s support among many poor Venezuelans, who have benefited from increased social
spending and programs, was an important factor in the vote.
9 See the results on the website of the National Electoral Council (CNE), available at http://www.cne.gov.ve/
divulgacion_referendo_enmienda_2009/.
10 Juan Forero, “Chávez Wins Removal of Term Limits,” Washington Post, February 16, 2009.
11 “Venezuela Poll Deadlocked,” LatinNews Daily, January 29, 2009.
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One likely reason that President Chávez moved quickly with the referendum was the economic
problems facing Venezuela due to the global financial crisis and the fall in the price of oil. With
declining government revenue, his government faced the possibility of losing support if the
economic situation deteriorated further, especially if the government was forced to cut back on
domestic spending. Such a scenario could have made it more difficult for an amendment on term
limits to be approved. Moreover, the National Assembly at the time almost completely dominated
by Chávez supporters because the opposition boycotted the 2005 legislative elections. Assuming
that the opposition would participate in the next legislative elections in 2010, the next National
Assembly would likely include an invigorated opposition that could have made it more difficult
for the government to advance a constitutional amendment to abolish term limits.
September 2010 Legislative Elections
In Venezuela’s September 26, 2010, elections for the 165-member National Assembly, pro-
Chávez supporters won 98 seats while opposition parties won 67 seats. For the government,
President Chávez’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) won 94 seats, while other
government supporters included one seat for the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) and three
indigenous representatives. For the opposition, 10 parties of the opposition coalition known as the
Democratic Unity Platform (MUD) won 65 seats, while the leftist Homeland for All (PPT) won 2
seats.12 Nationwide participation in the elections was high, with 66.45% participation (compared
to almost 75% participation in the 2006 presidential race).13
Even though the ruling party won a majority of seats, the result was viewed as a significant defeat
for President Chávez because it denied his government the three-fifths majority (99 seats) needed
to enact enabling laws that grant the president decree powers. It also denied the government with
the two-thirds majority (110 seats) needed for a variety of actions to ensure the enactment of the
government’s agenda, such as introducing or amending organic laws, approving constitutional
reforms, and making certain government appointments. The combined opposition (MUD and
PPT) also narrowly won the popular vote, capturing 51% of the vote compared to 49% for the
ruling PSUV and its ally, the PCV. Nevertheless, the government was able to maintain a majority
of seats because rural districts (where the government has strong support) elect a disproportionate
number of legislators.14
In the lead-up to the elections, many observers had expected that the President Chávez’s PSUV
would retain a majority, but that the opposition coalition would gain substantial representation.
The ruling party benefitted from the government’s decision last year to redraw electoral districts.
The PSUV also benefitted from significant resources, a nation-wide organization and electoral
machine, and effective use of social network websites. The PSUV’s campaign was dubbed
Operation Demolition in light of President Chávez’s call “to demolish the opposition.” Despite
the PSUV’s advantages, the legislative elections were held at a difficult time for the Chávez
government and the opposition benefited from this. President Chávez’s popularity had declined to
less than 40% and there were considerable public concerns about the difficult economic situation
and high rate of violent crime facing the country.
12 “Venezuela Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) November 2010.
13 “Poder Electoral Emitió Primer Boletín Oficial de Elecciones Parlamentarias,” Consejo Nacional Electoral,
September 27, 2010.
14 “Venezuela Country Report,” EIU, November 2010.
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The Venezuelan government did not allow observers from the Organization of American States
(OAS), the Carter Center, or other international groups with election monitoring experience,
although it did permit each electoral coalition to invite 30 witnesses from abroad for the elections.
Four domestic Venezuelan nongovernmental organizations, however, were involved in
monitoring the elections, with a total of almost 2,500 observers. Election-day voting appeared to
have been conducted peacefully with isolated minor problems.
December 2010 Actions by Outgoing National Assembly
In December 2010, Venezuela’s outgoing National Assembly approved several laws that have
been criticized by human rights organizations and others as threats to free speech, civil society,
and democratic governance. The laws were approved ahead of the inauguration of Venezuela’s
new National Assembly in early January 2011, in which opposition deputies have enough
representation to deny the government the two-thirds and three-fifths needed for certain actions.
Most significantly, the outgoing Assembly approved an “enabling law” that provided President
Chávez with far-reaching decree powers for 18 months. In February 2011, then-Assistant
Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Arturo Valenzuela described the Assembly’s
action as “undermining the authority of the new assembly and thereby circumscribing popular
will.”15 The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) also maintained that the law
“constitutes an illegitimate infringement on the new National Assembly’s authority, subverting
the will of the electorate.”16
Other measures approved by the Assembly include changes to broadcast media laws that,
according to Human Rights Watch, introduce sweeping restrictions on Internet traffic, reinforce
existing restrictions on radio and television content, and allow the government to terminate
broadcasting licenses on arbitrary grounds.17
Another measure, the Law of the Defense of Political Sovereignty and National Self-
Determination, imposes restrictions on Venezuelan human rights groups from receiving
international support (also see “Human Rights Concerns” below). The law could have
ramifications for U.S. government and other donors’ assistance to Venezuelan civil society
groups, and potentially could constrain the ability of nongovernmental organizations to operate.
Chávez’s Health Status
During a June 2011 trip to Cuba, President Chávez underwent emergency surgery for a “pelvic
abscess.” The initial operation took place on June 11 followed by another operation (date
unknown) to remove a cancerous tumor. Rumors were abounding about Chávez’s health until
June 30 when Chávez, from Cuba, announced on Venezuelan television that he had cancer,
although the president did not disclose the type of cancer he was battling. Several days later,
Chávez returned to Caracas on July 4, 2011, to order to be in the country the next day for its
15 U.S. Department of State, Testimony of Arturo Valenzuela, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere
Affairs, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, February 15, 2011,
available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2011/156598.htm
16 “Severe Setbacks to Democratic Governance and Human Rights Guarantees in Venezuela,” Washington Office on
Latin America, January 19, 2011.
17 “Venezuela: Legislative Assault on Free Speech, Civil Society,” Human Rights Watch, December 22, 2011.
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bicentennial celebrating Venezuelan independence from Spain. Chávez traveled to Cuba several
times for chemotherapy beginning in mid-July 2011, and by mid-October declared that he had
beaten cancer.18 Chávez appeared to be frail in the summer and fall, and gave up most public
appearances including his weekly Sunday television program, Alo Presidente.
By late 2011, however, Chávez had returned to public appearances, including a meeting of Latin
American and Caribbean leaders at the founding of the Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States (CELCAC) in Caracas in early December 2011. He hosted Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in early January 2012 and also returned to his weekly television
program. In an apparent attempt to send a message that his health had returned, on January 13,
Chávez gave a marathon address to Venezuela’s National Assembly that lasted more than nine
hours.19
Just several weeks later, however, on February 21, 2012, Chávez announced that his doctors had
found a new lesion in the same area of his pelvic region requiring surgery. He returned to Cuba
for the surgery on February 28 and confirmed on March 4 that the lesion was malignant. Chávez
headed home to Venezuela on March 16, but returned again to Cuba on March 24 for five days of
radiation treatment, heading home on March 29. He reportedly will return to Cuba several times
over the next month for additional treatments. The President has never disclosed the type of
cancer that he is battling, but doctors reportedly have speculated that it is prostate, colon, or
bladder cancer.20
Chávez’s sickness has raised a host of questions regarding Venezuela’s political future. Under
Venezuela’s Constitution (Article 233), new elections are to be called if the president leaves
office during the first four years of his term, but the vice president would assume office if the
president left office during the last two years of his term.21 So Vice President Eliás Jaua is the
official successor to Chávez if anything were to happen to him before his term expires in January
2013. To complicate matters, however, President Chávez has indicated that he will replace Jaua as
vice president because he will become a candidate for the governorship of Miranda state in
December 2012 state elections, but it is unclear who Chávez will appoint as vice president.
If Chávez were to run and win the October 2012 presidential election, but died before being
sworn into office in January 2013, Venezuela’s Constitution (also Article 233) calls for a new
presidential election within the next 30 days. In this case, the president of the National Assembly
would assume the office of the presidency until a new president could be elected and sworn into
office.
October 2012 Presidential Election
Venezuela is scheduled to hold its next presidential election on October 7, 2012, with the
inauguration to take place on January 10, 2013. The country has traditionally held its presidential
election in December, but in September 2011, the country’s National Electoral Council (CNE),
18 Simon Romero, “Chávez Says He Has Beaten Cancer,” New York Times, October 21, 2011.
19 William Neuman, “Chávez After Treatment for Cancer, Gets His Bluster Back and Flaunts It,” New York Times,
January 22, 2012.
20 Jim Wyss, “Chávez in Good Condition After Surgery,” Miami Herald, February 28, 2012.
21 “Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Constitution of 1999 with Reforms through 2009,” Political Database of the
Americas, Georgetown University, available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/vigente.html
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dominated by Chávez supporters, moved up the date of the presidential election to October 2012.
(State elections for governorships will be held on December 16, 2012, while municipal elections
are scheduled for April 14, 2013.) While public confidence in the CNE running a clean race on
election day reportedly is high, the body in the past has not curbed the extensive use of
government institutions and resources for partisan purposes during the election campaign.22
Venezuelans had approved a constitutional referendum in 2009 abolishing the term limits for
elected officials, so President Chávez is once again a candidate for reelection. As described
above, he was first elected in 1998, then in 2000 (under a new Constitution), and most recently in
2006 to a six-year term. Venezuela’s 2006 presidential election was characterized as free and fair
by international observers with some irregularities, while 2010 national legislative elections were
also characterized as free and fair by domestic observers with scattered irregularities, although
there was criticism of the electoral law and the government’s partisan use of state resources.
Venezuela’s opposition held a unified primary on February 12, 2012, under the banner of the
Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD, Democratic Unity Roundtable) and chose Henrique
Capriles Radonski in a landslide with about 62% of the vote in a five-candidate race. A member
of the Primero Justicia (PJ, Justice First) party, Capriles is the governor of Miranda, Venezuela’s
second-most populous state, which includes several municipalities of metropolitan Caracas. Just
over 2.9 million Venezuelans voted in the primary—while this only represents about 16% of the
18 million Venezuelans registered to vote, primary organizers had expected far less.
The wide margin of victory for Capriles (second in the race was Pablo Pérez, governor of Zulia,
who captured about 30% of the vote) gives him a boost in the general election race, although with
continued high favorability ratings for Chávez (between 50% and 60%), it appears that Capriles
at this juncture remains the underdog. Several polls from March 2012 showed Chávez with a
significant lead over Capriles, although an opinion poll by the firm Consultores 21 showed the
two candidates virtually tied.23 During the primary election, Capriles had a message of
reconciliation and national unity. He pledged not to dismantle Chávez’s social programs, but
rather to improve them. At 39 years of age, Capriles also represents a new generation of
Venezuelan politicians not belonging to the older traditional parties that have been largely
discredited.24
Despite Chávez’s strong popularity rating, the opposition appears to have a better opportunity
than ever before to win the presidency. The results of the September 2010 legislative elections
could be an indication that President Chávez will face a tough reelection bid. For many observers,
those elections changed political dynamics in Venezuela, and showed that President Chávez is
vulnerable at the polls.
There are also several areas of vulnerability for President Chávez that could pose challenges to
his support. These include Venezuelans’ concerns about high rates of crime (including murder and
kidnapping) and a difficult economic situation with high inflation, and periodic shortages of some
food and consumer products and electricity outages. The Chávez government has been boosting
22 “What Are Capriles’ Chances of Defeating Chávez in October?” Inter-American Dialogue’s Latin America Advisor,
February 27, 2012.
23 “Poll Shows Technical Tie Between Chávez, Main Opponent,” EFE News Service, March 23, 2012; “Venezuela’s
Chávez Leads Rival in Latest Poll,” Reuters News, March 27, 2012.
24 Michael Shifter, “Henrique Capriles’ Moment,” El Colombiano, February 15, 2012.
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public spending over the past several months, however, in an effort aimed at shoring up support
for Chávez’s reelection.
The high level of violent crime has made citizen security a top concern among Venezuelans.
According to the Venezuelan-based nongovernmental organization Venezuelan Violence
Observatory (OVV, Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia), there were 19,336 murders in
Venezuela in 2011, the most violent in the country’s history, reflecting a murder rate of 67 per
100,000.25 Kidnapping for profit has also become common in recent years as was highlighted by
the high profile kidnapping of Washington Nationals catcher Wilson Ramos in November 2011.
According to the Venezuelan government’s Cuerpo de Investigaciones Cientifiicas, Penales, y
Criminalísticas (CICPC), there were 1,150 kidnappings in 2011, reflecting an increase of 29%
from 2010. The actual figure could be much higher since some 80% of kidnappings reportedly go
unreported.26
A wildcard in the presidential race is Chávez’s health status. If Chávez were unable to run
because of his health, Capriles would have a good chance at defeating another PSUV presidential
candidate. Moreover, there is no clear successor to President Chávez among his supporters if
Chávez could not run. In January 2012, Chávez appeared to demote both Vice President Eliás
Jaua and Foreign Minister Nicolas Maduro when he indicated that both would be running for
state governorships in December.27 Both had been viewed as potential successors. Other potential
successors among Chávez supporters that have been mentioned in the press include the president
of Venezuela’s National Assembly, Diosdado Cabello, who also serves as first vice president of
the ruling PSUV (a former army officer, Cabello took part Chávez’s failed 1992 coup and is
reported to have influence in the military); and Adán Chávez, the president’s older brother and
political mentor, a socialist ideologue who has served in several government posts and is
currently the governor of Barinas state.
In the likelihood of a very close election, the response of the government and the opposition
could be keys to ensuring stability in the country. Some observers have concerns about the
potential reaction of the Venezuelan military in the likelihood of an opposition victory. Before
General Henry Rangel became defense minister, he maintained in a November 2010 press
interview that military was “wedded to [Venezuela’s] socialist political project,” and that neither
the military nor the public would support an opposition government that would try to overturn the
project. The comments raised doubts about whether the military would accept an opposition
victory in the 2012 election,28 although since becoming defense minister, General Rangel has said
that the military would respect the result of the election whatever the result.29 Some observers
have also expressed concern about potential violence in the case of a close election, with fears
25 Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia, “Informe Homicidios 2011,” December 29, 2011, available at
http://www.observatoriodeviolencia.org.ve/site/noticias/74-informe-homicidios-2011.html
26 U.S. Department of State, “Venezuela, Country Specific Information,” March 5, 2012, available at
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1059.html
27 Peter Orsi and Vivian Sequera, “In a World Without Chávez, Analysts See Greater Potential for Turmoil in
Venezuela,” Associated Press, February 29, 2012.
28 “La Palémica Entrevista de Rangel Silva a UNoticias,” Últimas Noticias (Venezuela), January 17, 2012, reprint of
November 8, 2010, interview from Últimas Noticias conducted by José Luis Carrillo; and Christopher Toothaker,
“Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez Defends General Whose Comments Stirred Democracy Concerns,” Associated Press,
November 14, 2010.
29 “Ministro Venezolano Dice Respetarán Resultados Elecciones,” AP Spanish Worldstream, February 10, 2012.
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centered on potential actions by radical elements on either side of the political divide who might
pursue violence if their candidate does not win.30
The October 2012 presidential election could have significant implications for Venezuela’s
political and economic future as well as for U.S.-Venezuelan relations. It is important to note that
if Capriles were to win the presidency, he would face a National Assembly still dominated by
Chávez supporters since the country’s next legislative elections are not due until September 2015.
Without legislative support, he could face difficulty in making significant policy changes, with
the result being extensive political gridlock. For the United States, however, an opposition victory
would likely reduce tension in bilateral relations and allow potential progress in the key areas of
anti-drug and counterterrorism cooperation.
If Chávez were to be reelected, there would likely be a deepening of his statist economic policies,
and some fear that there would be continued erosion of democratic institutions. With this
scenario, relations with the United States would likely continue to be strained. His health status
also could end up requiring new presidential elections. As noted above, if Chávez ran and won the
October 2012 election, a new election would be called if he died before being sworn into office in
January 2013 or if he died in the first four years of his new term. Venezuela’s opposition would
then have another opportunity to compete at the polls, and would be advantaged by not having
Chávez on the ballot.
Economic Conditions
With an estimated 211 billion barrels of proven oil reserves (the largest in the hemisphere, up
from previously reported 99 billion in proven reserves), Venezuela’s major economic sector is
petroleum, which accounts for 90% of exports, more than 30% of its gross domestic product, and
half of the government’s fiscal income.31 The country is classified by the World Bank as an upper
middle income developing country because of its relatively high per capita income of $11,590
(2010).32
Despite Venezuela’s oil wealth, economic conditions in the country deteriorated in the 1990s. The
percentage of Venezuelans living in poverty (income of less than $2 a day) increased from 32.2%
to 48.5% of the population between 1991 and 2000, while the percentage of the population in
extreme poverty (income of less than $1 a day) increased from 11.8% in 1990 to 23.5% in 2000.33
In 2002-2003, the country’s political instability and polarization between the government of
populist President Hugo Chávez and the political opposition contributed to a poor investment
climate, capital flight, and declines in gross domestic product (GDP). A national strike
30 Comments by Jennifer McCoy (Professor at Georgia State University and Director of the Americas Program at the
Carter Center) during presentation sponsored by the Washington Office on Latin America, “Venezuela: Countdown to
the October 7 Presidential Election,” March 6, 2012.
31 World Bank, “Venezuela Country Brief,” May 10, 2010; and “Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production,” Oil &
Gas Journal, December 5, 2011.
32 World Bank, World Development Report 2012, 2011.
33 World Bank, “Venezuela: Interim Country Assistance Strategy,” November 18, 2002, Report No. 25125-VE.
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Venezuela: Issues for Congress
orchestrated by the political opposition from late 2002 to early 2003 contributed to a contraction
of the national economy by almost 9% in 2002 and 7.7% in 2003.34
As a major oil producer, Venezuela benefitted from the rise in world oil prices that began in 2004.
Fueled by the windfall from oil price increases, the Venezuelan economy grew by over 18% in
2004 and averaged 8.6% growth annually from 2005 through 2008 (see Figure 2). The economic
boom allowed President Chávez to move ahead with economic goals that fit into his “Bolivarian
revolution.” These included the expansion of a state-led development model, renegotiation of
contracts with large foreign investors (especially in the petroleum sector) for majority
government control, and the restructuring of operations at the state oil company, Petroleos de
Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA). The government also nationalized numerous enterprises, including
telecommunications, electricity, and steel companies, as well as cement, coffee, sugar, flour, and
milk production facilities.
Figure 2. Venezuela: GDP Growth (%), 2005-2011
12
10.3
9.9
10
8.8
8
6
5.3
4
4
rcent
e
P
2
0
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
-2
-1.5
-3.2
-4
Years
Source: “Venezuela Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2012. The growth rate for 2011 is
estimated.
The economic boom also allowed President Chávez to increase expenditures on social programs
associated with his populist agenda. The government began implementing an array of social
programs and services known as misiones or missions. There have been some 25 missions
offering a wide array of services in the fields of education, health, nutrition, the environment,
sports, culture, and housing, as well as targeted programs for indigenous rights and services for
34 “Venezuela Country Data,” Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), accessed August 12, 2010.
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street children and adolescents.35 As a result of the booming economy and increased social
spending, poverty rates in Venezuela declined from 48.6% in 2002 to 27.6% in 2008, with
extreme poverty or indigence falling from 22.2% to 9.9% over the same period.36
The global financial crisis and associated drop in the price of oil had significant negative effects
on the Venezuelan economy, which contracted 3.2% in 2009 and 1.5% in 2010. This made
Venezuela the only country in South America, and one of the few in the region, to continue to
decline economically in 2010. Economic growth returned in 2011, with an estimated growth rate
of 4%, because of the rise in oil prices and because of increased central government expenditures
(see Figure 2). The government reportedly has increased its fiscal spending in order to help
Chávez in the October 2012 presidential election. With this spending and high oil prices, the
growth forecast for 2012 is 4.2%.37
Figure 3. Venezuela: Consumer Inflation (average %), 2005-2011
35
30.4
30
28.2
27.1
26.1
25
20
18.7
16
ercent
P 15
13.7
10
5
0
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Years
Source: “Venezuela Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2012.
The Venezuelan government continues to face significant economic challenges. Over the past four
years, high levels of inflation, averaging almost 28% annually from 2008 to 2011, have eroded
purchasing power (see Figure 3). The forecast for 2012 is for continued high inflation of about
35 For background on some of the missions, see “Fact Sheet: Social Justice in Venezuela,” Embassy of the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela, Washington, DC, July 2008.
36 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin America,
2010, Briefing Paper, November 2010, p. 13.
37 “Venezuela Country Report,” EIU, March 2012.
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Venezuela: Issues for Congress
26%.38 In addition to inflation, there have been periodic shortages of basic food staples and other
products because of price controls that have stifled local production. The government’s response
to shortages has been to nationalize some domestic agricultural producers or distributors. The
government has threatened to nationalize Polar, the country’s largest food manufacturing
company.
Venezuela’s private sector describes the business community as being under siege from the
government because some companies have been nationalized without compensation and without
appropriate legal procedures being followed. In June 2010, Venezuelan authorities discovered
30,000 tons of rotten food at a government warehouse that was supposed to be delivered to state-
run supermarkets known as Mercal. The scandal prompted widespread criticism of the
government, and raised questions about its strategy of taking over more economic activities. The
government reportedly seized over 500 properties in 2010 (34% higher than 2009), including over
200 companies (four with U.S. ownership), and some 300 urban or rural properties. Companies
that have been nationalized under the Chávez government are in a variety of economic sectors,
including energy, food and agriculture, finance, heavy industry, gold, steel, telecommunications,
electricity, transportation, and tourism.
While the government maintains that it will provide compensation for the nationalizations,
foreign companies are often forced to seek settlement through international arbitration.39 There
are currently18 pending cases against Venezuela at the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) affiliated with the World Bank.40 In January 2012, ExxonMobil won
a settlement valued at some $900 million at the International Court of Arbitration (of the
International Chamber of Commerce). The Chávez government reportedly welcomed the
settlement because ExxonMobil had sought much more, but the company has another outstanding
case against Venezuela at the ICSID that could provide it with a potentially much more
significant settlement. President Chávez announced in early January 2012 that he would not
recognize any decision made by the ICSID, and later in the month his government began
procedures to withdraw from the organization. Some analysts, however, maintain that that the
withdrawal process will be complex and could take as long as 15 years and involve Venezuela’s
re-negotiation of bilateral investment treaties with over 20 countries.41
In January 2010, the Venezuelan government took action to shore up its fiscal situation by
devaluing Venezuela’s currency, the bolivar fuerte, which increased the value of its oil earnings
and boosted government revenues. The government shifted the official exchange rate from
Bolivares Fuertes (BsF) 2.15/U.S. $1 to BsF2.6/U.S.$1 for essential imports such as food,
medicine, and for public-sector projects and strategic sectors, and established a second fixed
exchange rate of BsF4.3/U.S.$1 for other imports. The increased revenue enabled the government
to continue spending ahead of the September 2010 legislative elections, but also increased
inflationary pressure.
In January 2011, the government unified the two fixed foreign exchange rates by eliminating the
BsF2.6/U.S.$1 rate for essential imports in favor of a rate of BsF4.3/U.S.$1 for all imports.
38 Ibid.
39 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Doing Business in Venezuela: 2011 Country Commercial Guide for U.S.
Companies,”
40 See the ICSID’s website at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp
41 “Venezuela’s ICSID Exit Will Not Halt Exxon Arbitration,” Oxford Analytica, January 31, 2012.
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According to some analysts, the government’s move appears to be an effort to reduce the
complexity of the multiple exchange-rate system, but the action has raised concerns about an
increase in inflation. The government still retains an exchange rate of BsF5.4/U.S.$1 for bond
swaps operated by the Central Bank, while the illegal black market rate is estimated at
BsF9.0/U.S.$1, a reflection of the continued overvaluation of Venezuela’s currency.42 Given the
overvaluation, economic analysts expect Venezuela to devalue its currency again either later this
year after the 2012 election or in early 2013.43
As noted above, Venezuela still remains highly dependent on oil, which accounts for some 90%
of its exports. Because of its substantial oil exports, the country generally runs a positive trade
balance. The country’s trade surplus began to grow significantly as oil prices began to increase in
2004. Venezuela’s trade surplus grew from $16.7 billion in 2003 to a high of $44 billion in 2008.
The decline in the price of oil beginning in 2009 reduced the country’s exports by about 40%,
from $95 billion in 2008 to $57 billion in 2009. During the same period, imports declined at a
slower rate so that the trade surplus declined to almost $18 billion in 2009. Since then, with the
recovery and increase of oil prices, the trade surplus grew to an estimated $27 billion in 2010 and
$41 billion in 2011. (See Table 1.)
Table 1. Venezuela’s Trade Balance, 2004-2010
U.S. $ millions
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
(est.)
Exports 39,668 55,716 65,578 69,980 95,021 57,603 65,745 89,790
Imports 17,021 14,018 33,583 46,660 50,971 39,646 38,613 48,351
Trade
22,647 41,698 31,995 23,320 44,050 17,957 27,132 41,439
Balance
Source: Statistics for 2004-2009 are drawn from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics,
February 2012; estimates for 2011 are from “Venezuela Country Report,” EIU, March 2012.
In terms of export markets, Venezuela’s oil-based economy is highly dependent on the United
States and has been for many years, even though the U.S. share of Venezuela’s oil exports has
been declining in recent years. The country is a major supplier of foreign oil to the United States,
providing about 10% of U.S. crude oil imports in 2010.44 In 2010, the United States was the
destination of about 40% of Venezuela’s total exports. Ten years earlier—in 2000—about 55% of
Venezuela’s exports were destined for the United States. The percentage of Venezuela’s imports
that come from the United States has also declined somewhat over time, although the United
States still remains the single largest country of origin for Venezuelan imports. In 2010, about
29% of Venezuela’s imports were from the United States, while 10 years earlier, the United States
was the origin of about 38% of Venezuela’s imports.45
42 “Venezuela Country Report,” EIU, February 2011 and March 2012; and “Venezuela Finance: Operating in the
Shadows,” EIU, February 11, 2011.
43 Antonio Maria Delgado, “Analysts: Venezuela to Devalue Bolivar Next Year,” Miami Herald, February 21, 2012;
and “Venezuela: Living on the Edge,” Latin America Monitor, March 2012.
44 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Petroleum: U.S. Imports by Country of Origin.”
45 Calculations were made utilizing trade statistics drawn from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade
Statistics, Yearbooks for 2004 and 2011.
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U.S. Policy
The United States traditionally has had close relations with Venezuela, a major supplier of foreign
oil to the United States, but there has been significant friction with the Chávez government. For
several years, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about human rights, Venezuela’s military
arms purchases (largely from Russia), its relations with Cuba and Iran, its efforts to export its
brand of populism to other Latin American countries, and the use of Venezuelan territory by
Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary forces. Declining Venezuelan cooperation on antidrug and
antiterrorism efforts also has been a U.S. concern. Since 2005, Venezuela has been designated
annually (by President Bush and President Obama) as a country that has failed to adhere to its
international anti-drug obligations. Since 2006, the Department of State has prohibited the sale of
defense articles and services to Venezuela because of lack of cooperation on antiterrorism efforts.
Bilateral Relations during the George W. Bush Administration
Tensions in relations turned especially sour in the aftermath of President Chávez’s brief ouster
from power in April 2002. Venezuela alleged U.S. involvement in the ouster, while U.S. officials
repeatedly rejected charges that the United States was involved.
In the aftermath of the coup, U.S. statements and actions of the interim government represented a
defining moment that influenced the course of bilateral relations over the next several years. After
Chávez’s ouster, the United States expressed solidarity with the Venezuelan people and
maintained that undemocratic actions committed or encouraged by the Chávez administration had
provoked the political crisis.46 Yet at the same time, the leader of the interim government was
dismantling the National Assembly, firing the Supreme Court, and suspending the Constitution.
The interim government’s hardline actions resulted in its loss of support from the Venezuelan
military, and paved the way for Chávez’s return to power. With Chávez’s return, the United States
called on him to heed the message sent by the Venezuelan people by correcting the course of his
administration and “governing in a fully democratic manner.”47 In contrast, many Latin American
nations immediately condemned the overthrow of Chávez, labeling it a coup. The failure of the
United States to quickly condemn the coup and instead to criticize President Chávez upon his
return to power set the stages for continued deterioration in U.S.-Venezuelan relations. Moreover,
even after the coup, the widespread perception that the United States supported continued efforts
by Venezuela’s opposition to remove President Chávez from power contributed to the downward
spiral in bilateral relations.
While strong political rhetoric from both U.S. and Venezuelan officials in the 2002 to 2006 period
contributed to elevated tensions in U.S. relations, the tenor of U.S. political rhetoric changed in
the second half of 2006. When Chávez spoke disparagingly of President Bush at the United
Nations in September 2006, U.S. officials refrained from responding to those personal attacks.
Likewise, when President Chávez led an anti-American rally in Argentina in March 2007 during
President Bush’s visit to Brazil and Uruguay, President Bush ignored the taunts and U.S. officials
emphasized that they wanted to focus on a positive agenda of U.S. engagement with Latin
America.
46 U.S. Department of State, “Venezuela: Change of Government,” Press Statement, April 12, 2002.
47 U.S. Department of State, International Information Program, Washington File, “White House Calls on Venezuela’s
Chávez to Preserve Peace, Democracy,” April 14, 2002.
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In the aftermath of Colombia’s March 1, 2008, bombing of a Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) camp in Ecuador that killed the terrorist group’s second in command,
Colombian forces captured laptops that contained files potentially linking the Venezuelan
government with efforts to support the FARC. In an apparent shift in policy, however, on June 8,
2008, President Chávez publicly urged the FARC to end its armed struggle, and release all
hostages.
In 2008, U.S. policy toward Venezuela appeared to be to refrain from getting into any unneeded
conflicts or spats with President Chávez, and instead to focus on a positive U.S. agenda for the
hemisphere. Then Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Tom Shannon
stated in July 17, 2008, congressional testimony that “we remain committed to a positive
relationship with the people of Venezuela and have the patience and the persistence necessary to
manage our challenging relationship.” Shannon pointed out in his testimony that Venezuela “for
the first time in many years, expressed a willingness to explore improved relations with the
United States,” including counter-drug cooperation, and that “we have told Venezuela that we
would like to explore this diplomatic opening.”48
By September 2008, however, U.S. relations with Venezuela took a significant turn for the worse
when Venezuela expelled U.S. Ambassador Patrick Duddy in solidarity with Bolivian President
Evo Morales, who had expelled the U.S. Ambassador in La Paz after accusing him of fomenting
unrest; the United States responded in kind with the expulsion of Venezuelan Ambassador
Bernardo Alvarez. Also in September, U.S. officials criticized Venezuela’s efforts against drug
trafficking, and President Bush determined, for the fourth year in a row, that Venezuela had failed
demonstrably to adhere to its obligations under international narcotics control agreements. The
U.S. Treasury Department also froze the assets of two high-ranking Venezuelan government
officials and the former interior minister for allegedly helping the FARC with weapons and drug
trafficking. In October 2008, the Treasury Department froze the assets of an Iranian-owned bank
based in Caracas linked to an Iranian export bank that allegedly provided or attempted to provide
services to Iran’s ministry of defense.
Obama Administration Policy
During the U.S. presidential campaign, Barack Obama maintained that his Administration would
use principled bilateral diplomacy to engage with such adversaries in the region as Venezuela
under populist President Hugo Chávez. Nevertheless, tensions have continued in U.S.-Venezuelan
relations, with President Chávez continuing “to define himself in opposition to the United States,
using incendiary rhetoric to insult the U.S. Government and U.S. influence in Latin America.”49
While in mid-2009, Ambassadors were returned, in late 2010, the Chávez government revoked an
agreement for U.S. Ambassador-designate Larry Palmer to be posted to Venezuela. The Obama
Administration responded by revoking the diplomatic visa of the Venezuelan Ambassador to the
United States. Despite tensions in relations, the State Department maintains that the United States
remains committed to seeking constructive engagement with Venezuela, focusing on such areas
as anti-drug and counter-terrorism efforts.
48 Testimony of Thomas A. Shannon, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, hearing on
“Venezuela: Looking Ahead,” House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, July
17, 2008.
49 U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Venezuela,” September 2, 2011.
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Developments in 2009. A week before his inauguration, President Obama maintained in an
interview that President Chávez “has been a force that has impeded progress in the region,” and
expressed concern about reports that Venezuela is assisting the FARC.50 President Chávez
strongly criticized Obama for his comments, but subsequently stated that he would like to restore
bilateral relations to the same level as during the Clinton Administration. Chávez suggested that a
new period of constructive relations based on respect might be possible, but that it would depend
on the attitude of the President and Secretary of State.51
At the fifth Summit of the Americas held in Trinidad and Tobago in mid-April 2009, President
Obama met President Chávez along with other hemispheric leaders. Chávez maintained that he
would be open to the U.S. Ambassador returning to Caracas. Two months later, on June 25, 2009,
the State Department announced that the United States and Venezuela had exchanged diplomatic
notes and agreed to return respective ambassadors. This led to U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela
Patrick Duddy resuming his post in Caracas, and to the return of Venezuelan Ambassador
Bernardo Alvarez to Washington, DC.
The return of respective ambassadors raised some hopes of an overall improvement in bilateral
relations, but this did not occur. In an interview with Globovisión in early July 2009, Secretary of
State Clinton maintained that there needs to be a dialogue between the United States and
Venezuela on a range of issues, and that there are ways for countries that do not agree on many
issues to have a conversation. At the same time, with regard to the political situation in
Venezuela, Clinton maintained that she hoped to see over the next months “recognition that you
can be a very strong leader and have very strong opinions without trying to take on too much
power and trying to silence all your critics.”52 State Department officials continued to express
concerns about the intimidation of the news media in Venezuela, and steps taken by the
government to restrict political participation and debate, and Secretary of State Clinton raised
questions regarding Venezuela’s military purchases.53
Developments in 2010. In February 2010, then-Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Dennis
Blair testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the annual threat assessment
of the U.S. intelligence community. According to Blair, President “Chávez continues to impose an
authoritarian populist political model in Venezuela that undermines democratic institutions.” Blair
maintained that with regard to foreign policy, “Chávez’s regional influence may have peaked, but
he is likely to support likeminded political allies and movements in neighboring countries and
seek to undermine moderate, pro-U.S. governments.” Blair maintained that “Chávez and his allies
are likely to oppose nearly every U.S. policy initiative in the region, including the expansion of
free trade, counter drug and counterterrorism cooperation, military training, and security
initiatives, and even U.S. assistance programs.”54
50 Nestor Ikeda, “Obama: Chávez “ha impedido” progreso latinoamericano,” AP Spanish Worldstream, January 18,
2009; and Juan Forero, “Obama and Chávez Start Sparring Early,” Washington Post, January 19, 2009.
51 “Venezuelan President Chávez Interviewed on CNN,” CQ Newsmaker Transcripts, February 3, 2009.
52 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Interview with Leopoldo Castillo of
Globovision,” July 7, 2009.
53 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks with Uruguayan President Tabare
Vazquez After Their Meeting,” September 15, 2009.
54 U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”
prepared testimony by Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, February 2, 2009, p. 32, available at
http://intelligence.senate.gov/100202/blair.pdf.
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In August 2010, President Chávez criticized comments by U.S. Ambassador-designate to
Venezuela Larry Palmer for his responses to questions for record for his nomination before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that touched on Cuba’s influence in the Venezuelan military
and ties between members of the Venezuelan government and the FARC.55 The Venezuelan
government maintained that it would not accept Palmer as U.S. Ambassador in Caracas, and on
December 20, 2010, officially revoked its agreement for the appointment of Palmer as
Ambassador. The State Department responded on December 27, 2010, by revoking the diplomatic
visa of Ambassador Bernardo Alvarez. The full Senate did not act on Palmer’s nomination by the
end of the 111th Congress, so the nomination was sent back to the President in December 2010.
No further action has been taken to restore ambassadors.
Developments in 2011. In February 2011, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper
testified about President Chávez’s waning influence in Latin America. According to Clapper,
“deteriorating economic conditions in Venezuela and Chávez’s declining popularity at home and
abroad have limited his ability to exert influence beyond his core group of allies.”56
Also in February 2011 congressional testimony, then Assistant Secretary of State Arturo
Valenzuela criticized the December 2010 action of Venezuela’s outgoing National Assembly for
its approval of a law that delegated legislative authority to the executive for 18 months.
Valenzuela maintained that the action undermined the authority of the incoming National
Assembly and circumscribed its popular will. He maintained that the action “violates the doctrine
of the separation of powers and therefore contravenes the Inter-American Democratic Charter.”57
On May 11, 2011, the Department of State determined for the sixth consecutive year that
Venezuela was not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. This determination was made
pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629) and allowed for the
continuation of the U.S. arms embargo on Venezuela since 2006.
On May 24, 2011, the State Department also sanctioned the Venezuelan oil company, Petróleos de
Venezuela (PdVSA), pursuant to the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Disinvestment Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-195) for providing two shipments of reformate, an additive
used in gasoline, to Iran, between December 2010 and March 2011. The shipments were valued at
around $50 million. Under the sanctions, PdVSA is prohibited from competing for U.S.
government procurement contracts, securing financing from the Export-Import Bank, and
obtaining U.S. export licenses. The sanctions specifically exclude PdVSA subsidiaries (Citgo)
and do not prohibit the export of oil to the United States.
In September 2011, as part of the annual narcotics certification process, President Obama again
determined that Venezuela had “failed demonstrably” to meet its obligations under international
counternarcotics measures. This marked the seventh consecutive annual designation of Venezuela
in this category. The justification accompanying the determination maintained that “individual
55 See the full text of the questions for the record submitted by Senator Richard G. Lugar, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, July 27, 2010, available at http://lugar.senate.gov/issues/foreign/lac/venezuela/pdf/LugarPalmerQFR.pdf.
56 U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, ‘Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,”
prepared testimony by James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, February 16, 2011, available at
http://intelligence.senate.gov/110216/dni.pdf
57 U.S. Department of State, Testimony of Arturo Valenzuela, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere
Affairs, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, February 15, 2011,
available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2011/156598.htm
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“members of the government and security forces security forces were credibly reported to have
engaged in or facilitated drug trafficking activities.”58 The justification noted some positive steps
taken by the Venezuelan government in the past year, including the transfer of several major drug
traffickers to the United States and other drug traffickers to third countries and a bilateral
counternarcotics agreement with Colombia.
Developments in 2012. On January 8, 2012, the Department of State declared as persona non
grata the Venezuelan Consul General in Miami, Livia Acosta, and asked her to leave the United
States. In December 2011, a documentary featured on the Spanish-language network Univisión
had alleged that Iranian and Venezuelan diplomats in Mexico tried to recruit Mexican students for
plotting possible cyberattacks against the United States. Acosta, a Venezuelan diplomat who had
been based in Mexico, was recorded participating in the discussion with the Mexican students.
The State Department issued the 2012 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report on March
7, 2012, which stated, as in previous reports, that Venezuela was one of the preferred trafficking
routes for the transit of cocaine out of South America. The State Department also reiterated that
the United States remained prepared to deepen anti-drug cooperation with Venezuela beyond the
currently limited case-by-case level of cooperation.
U.S. Foreign Aid to Venezuela
Because of Venezuela’s oil wealth and relatively high per capita income level, the United States
has traditionally only provided small amounts of foreign assistance to Venezuela. In recent years,
assistance has focused on counternarcotics and support for democracy programs. Table 2 below
shows U.S. assistance level to Venezuela since FY2006.
From FY2002 to FY2007, Venezuela received small amounts of U.S. assistance under the State
Department’s Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) focusing on counternarcotics cooperation and
judicial reform support. Since FY2008, no counternarcotics assistance has been requested for
Venezuela, although in FY2009, the United States provided $0.5 million in International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance.
For a number of years, the United States has provided democracy-related assistance to Venezuela
through the U.S. Agency for International Development. In Table 2, all funding for the
Development Assistance (DA), Economic Support Funds (ESF), and Transition Initiatives (TI)
foreign aid accounts are for democracy-related funding. In addition, the United States has
supported democracy assistance in Venezuela through the U.S. government-funded National
Endowment for Democracy (NED), but this type of support has not been typically reflected in
U.S. foreign assistance funding statistics.
58 White House, “Presidential Determination No. 2011-16, Presidential Determination on Major Illicit Drug Transit or
Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2012,” September 15, 2011.
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Table 2. U.S. Foreign Aid to Venezuela by Account, FY2008-FY2013
U.S. $ millions
FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013
(est.)
(request)
ACI/INCLE
0.000 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DA
6.519 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ESF
2.976 5.000 6.000 5.000 5.000 3.000
TI
3.649 2.450 1.208 0.000 0.000 0.000
Total
13.144 7.950 7.208 5.000 5.000 3.000
Notes: ACI=Andean Counterdrug Initiative; DA=Development Assistance; ESF=Economic Support Funds;
INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; TI=Transition Initiatives.
Sources: U.S. Department of State, FY2010-FY2013 Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations.
From 2002 through December 2010, USAID supported democracy projects in Venezuela through
its Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) to provide assistance to monitor democratic stability and
strengthen the county’s democratic institutions. According to USAID, more than 600 small-grant
and technical assistance activities were funded by OTI from 2002 through 2010. The objectives
of the assistance, according to USAID, were to enhance access to objective information and
peaceful debate on key issues, and to promote citizen participation and democratic leadership.59
At the end of December 2010, USAID’s support for such activities for Venezuela was transferred
from OTI to USAID’s Latin America and Caribbean Bureau.
In FY2011 and FY2012, Congress appropriated $5 million each year in democracy assistance for
Venezuela, while for FY2013 the Obama Administration has requested $3 million in such
assistance. According to the State Department’s FY2013 Congressional Budget Justification, the
assistance seeks to promote broad participation in the democratic process by promoting good
governance, raising awareness about social issues, increasing confidence in the democratic
process, and encouraging citizen participation.
NED has funded democracy projects in Venezuela since 1992, but the level of funding increased
under the Chávez government. The FY2006 Foreign Operations appropriations measure (P.L.
109-102) provided $2 million in Democracy Funds for NED for democracy programs in
Venezuela. In subsequent years, NED’s funding amount to over $800,000 in FY2007 for 17
projects; over $1 million in FY2008 for 18 projects; and $1.4 million in FY2009 for 14 projects,
and almost $1.6 million in FY2010 for 21 projects.60
The Venezuelan government and Chávez supporters have strongly criticized U.S. government
funding for democracy projects in Venezuela.61 They maintain that NED-funded groups were
headed by people involved in the overthrow of Chávez in April 2002 as well as a group, Súmate,
involved in the signature collecting process for the 2004 recall referendum campaign. Critics of
59 U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID/OTI Venezuela Annual Summary Report, October 2009-
September 2010.
60 See NED’s website for a description of Venezuelan projects in FY2010, available at http://www.ned.org/where-we-
work/latin-america-and-caribbean/venezuela.
61 For example, see testimony of Mark Weisbrot, Center for Economic and Policy Research, at a hearing of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on “The State of Democracy in Venezuela,” June 24, 2004.
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the USAID and NED democracy programs maintain that they meddle in Venezuelan domestic
politics. They argue that the United States should get out of the business of democracy-promotion
in Venezuela, maintaining that such activity lends credence to claims by Chávez and others that
the U.S. government is pursing a policy of regime change.62
U.S. officials strongly defend U.S. democracy promotion activities in Venezuela, and Congress
has continued to fund such activities. In particular, U.S. officials criticized the Venezuelan
government’s efforts to intimidate the leaders of Súmate by charging them with conspiring
against the government. The State Department asserts that the charges are without merit, and
constitute an attempt “to intimidate members of civil society for exercising their democratic
rights.”63 According to NED, its program in Venezuela “focuses on promoting citizen
participation in the political process, civil and political rights, freedom of expression and
professional journalism, and conflict mediation.” NED asserts that all of the Venezuelan programs
that it funds operate on a non-partisan basis.64 As a result of issues raised regarding NED’s
programs in Venezuela, in late 2004 Congress reaffirmed NED’s duty to ensure that all sponsored
activities adhere to core NED principles and required a comprehensive report on NED’s activities
in Venezuela since FY2001 (Division B of P.L. 108-447, H.Rept. 108-792).
In December 2010, Venezuela’s outgoing National Assembly approved a measure that could
make it difficult for the U.S. government or other foreign donors to assist civil society groups in
Venezuela. The legislation prohibits civil society organizations involved in defending political
rights or monitoring the performance of government bodies from receiving international funds
and would impose stiff fines on those that do. As discussed below, human rights organizations
have expressed concern about the effect of the legislation.
Human Rights Concerns
Human rights organizations and U.S. officials have expressed concerns for several years about the
deterioration of democratic institutions and threats to freedom of speech and press in Venezuela
under the Chávez government. According to Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2012, “the
weakening of Venezuela’s democratic system of checks and balances under President Hugo
Chávez has contributed to a precarious human rights situation.” It maintained that “without
judicial checks on its actions, the government has systematically undermined the right to free
expression, workers’ freedom of association, and the ability of human rights groups to protect
human rights.”65
The Chávez government has taken significant actions since 2009 against opposition leaders
holding elected state and local government positions, and has moved to concentrate power of the
executive branch over state and local governments. The government took substantial power away
from opposition governors in five states and key municipalities, including Caracas and
62 Tom Barry, “The New Politics of Political Aid in Venezuela,” Venezuelanalysis.com, July 25, 2007 (updated and
corrected on August 25, 2007).
63 “United States Rejects Venezuelan Decision to Try Civic Group,” Department of State, Washington File, July 8,
2005.
64 National Endowment for Democracy, “NED Venezuela Programs FAQ,” available online at
http://www.ned.org/where-we-work/latin-america-and-caribbean/venezuela
65 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2011: Venezuela, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report-
2011/venezuela
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Maracaibo. In March 2009, President Chávez ordered the Navy to seize seaports in states with
opposition governors, including Maracaibo in the state of Zulia and Puerto Cabello in the state of
Carabobo.66 In April 2009, Manuel Rosales, who had been elected mayor of Maracaibo in
November 2008, took refuge in Peru in order to escape a trial on corruption charges that many
observers contend is part of a campaign of political persecution against the opposition. Rosales
had previously served as governor of Zulia state and ran against Chávez for president in 2006.
The elected mayor of metropolitan Caracas, Antonio Ledezma, was stripped of much of his
power, with most of his budget and powers transferred to the central government. His role as
mayor has been superseded by an official appointed by President Chávez.
The State Department’s 2010 human rights report (issued in April 2011) detailed numerous
human rights problems in Venezuela, such as unlawful killings, including summary executions of
criminal suspects; widespread criminal kidnappings for ransom; arbitrary arrests and detentions;
corruption and impunity in police forces; corruption, inefficiency, and politicization in the judicial
system characterized by trial delays and violations of due process; political prisoners and
selective prosecution for political purposes; restrictions on freedom of expression and
government threats to sanction or close television stations and newspapers; and threats against
nongovernmental organizations.67 The report also cited prison violence and harsh prison
conditions, problems that received international attention in June 2011 when prison riots killed at
least 22 people.
The State Department report noted that a Venezuelan NGO, the Venezuelan Awareness
Foundation, listed some 25 political prisoners in Venezuela at the end of 2010—as of March
2012, the organization listed 13 political prisoners.68 The State Department report cited three
high-profile cases of political detainees:
• In May 2010, retired General Raúl Baduel, a former defense minister in the
Chávez government, was sentenced to 7 years and 11 months in prison on
corruption-related charges. Baduel, who was first arrested and imprisoned in
April 2009, was a strong critic of President Chávez during the 2007
constitutional reform.
• Judge María Lourdes Afiuni was arrested and imprisoned on charges of
corruption in December 2009 just hours after she had ordered the release of
businessman Eligio Cedeño (who subsequently fled to the United States), who
had been imprisoned since February 2007 in pretrial detention on charges of
corruption and embezzlement.69 President Chávez urged that the judge receive
the maximum sentence of 30 years. U.N. human rights experts criticized the
judge’s arrest, maintaining that Venezuela’s reprisal against the judge created a
climate of fear that undermines the rule of law and obstructs justice.70 According
66 Simon Romero, “Chávez Tells His Navy To Take Over Key Seaports,” New York Times, March 16, 2009.
67 See the full report at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/wha/154523.htm
68 Venezuela Awareness Foundation, “Lista de ciudadanos Venezolanos que son prisioneros políticos del Gobierno de
Hugo Chávez,” available at http://www.venezuelaawareness.com/Presos/indexpresos.asp
69 For example, see the following white paper prepared by lawyers defending Eligio Cedeño, “Bolivarian Rule of
Lawlessness, The Eligio Cedeño Case: The Erosion of Judicial Autonomy under Hugo Chávez,” by Robert Amsterdam,
Gonzalo Himiob Santomé, and Antonio Rosich, June 2009, available at http://www.robertamsterdam.com/venezuela/
2009/06/new_white_paper_on_venezuelas_political_prisoners.htm.
70 U.N. Experts Say Venezuela’s Chávez Creating Fear,” Reuters, December 16, 2009.
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to Human Rights Watch, Judge Afiuni was held in deplorable conditions for over
a year, where she was repeatedly insulted and threatened by other inmates. She
reportedly received inadequate health treatment during her detention until she
was released from prison and placed under house arrest on February 2, 2011.
International human rights groups, such as Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch, have called for the charges to be dropped completely.71 In early
March 2012, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention asked
Venezuela to release Judge Afiuni, maintaining that her detention was an act of
retaliation for her release of an individual whom the Working Group had asked to
be released.72
• Jose “Mazuco” Sanchez, a former state security chief in the state of Zulia, was
sentenced to 19 years in jail in December 2010 for allegedly killing an
intelligence informant in 2007. Mazuco denies the charges, and maintains that he
was targeted because of his association with opposition leader and 2006
presidential candidate Manuel Rosales (now in exile in Peru). Mazuco was
imprisoned in 2007, but released and placed under house arrest in October 2010
following his election to the National Assembly in September. Although the
Supreme Court maintained that the charges against Mazuco would be suspended
while he was serving as deputy, he subsequently was taken into custody in
November and found guilty in December 2010. In late December 2011, however,
Mazuco was conditionally released on humanitarian grounds because a diagnosis
of prostate cancer.73
On August 30, 2010, hunger striker Franklin Brito died at a Venezuelan military hospital. Brito
had been engaged in a battle with the Venezuelan government beginning in 2004 over the seizure
of a portion of his farm by squatting farmers who were given permission by Venezuela’s National
Land Institute (INTI). In his protests against the government, Brito had engaged in eight hunger
strikes, and in 2005 cut one of his fingers off in front of reporters in order to call attention to his
case. In December 2009, Venezuelan authorities ordered his removal from a protest camp that he
had set up outside the Caracas office of the Organization of American States and he was taken to
the Venezuelan military hospital.74
Some Venezuelans have turned to using hunger strikes as a form of protest against the
government, with 5 reportedly conducted in 2009, 105 in 2010, and more than 50 in the first three
months of 2011.75 On February 22, 2011, more than 80 students ended a 23-day hunger strike
after the government agreed to review cases of alleged political prisoners and to establish a
committee to discuss the students’ grievances. The government conditionally released several of
those detained, including jailed opposition legislator Biagio Pilieri.76 In August 2011, several
71 “Venezuela: Judge Afiuni Before the United Nations Human Rights Council,” Human Rights Watch, March 8, 2011;
and “Venezuela: Amnesty International Welcomes the Granting of House Arrest to Judge Afiuni,” Amnesty
International, Public Statement, February 4, 2011.
72 “UN Working Group Calls for Judge Afiuni’s Release,” El Universal (Venezuela), March 7, 2012.
73 “Diputado Opositor Venezolano Preso y Con Cáncer, Recibe Libertad,” Agence France Presse, December 24, 2011
74 Ian James, “Venezuelan Hunger Striker Dies After Repeated Protests Over Land Dispute with Government,” AP
Newswire, August 31, 2010; and “Hunger Striker Dies in Venezuela,” Latin News Daily, September 1, 2010.
75 Ezequiel Minaya, “Venezuelan Protestors Increasingly Resort to Hunger Strikes,” Dow Jones Newswires, April 1,
2011.
76 “Chávez and the Students,” Latin American Andean Group Report, March 2011; “Venezuela’s Student Hunger
(continued...)
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members of the “Women in Back” human rights group initiated a hunger strike calling for the
release of some 55 people that they claimed to be political prisoners. In November 2011, a jailed
newspaper editor, Leocenis Garcias, imprisoned for insulting public officials and inciting hatred,
was released after an almost two-week hunger strike.77
NGOs in Venezuela and human rights organizations abroad have expressed concern about
legislation approved in December 2010, the Law for the Defense of Political Sovereignty and
National Self-Determination, that prohibits civil society organizations that “defend political
rights” or “monitor the performance of government bodies” from receiving international funds
and would impose stiff fines on those that do. According to Human Rights Watch, the measure
would make it very difficult for Venezuelan human rights to secure sustainable financing.78
Human Rights Reporting on Venezuela
Amnesty International, Human Rights in Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/venezuela
Committee to Protect Journalists, http://www.cpj.org/americas/venezuela/
Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/en/americas/venezuela;
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), http://www.cidh.oas.org/DefaultE.htm; Annual
Report of the IACHR 2010, March 2011 chapter IV includes an extensive section on Venezuela, available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2010eng/TOC.htm; Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, December 30,
2009, available at http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Venezuela2009eng/VE09.TOC.eng.htm;
Programa Venezolano de Educación-Acción en Derechos Humanos (PROVEA),
http://www.derechos.org.ve/
Reporters without Borders, http://en.rsf.org/venezuela.html
U.S. State Department, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2010, April 8, 2011, Venezuela,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/wha/154523.htm
Threats to Freedom of Expression
The Chávez government has taken actions in recent years that have undermined the right to free
expression. While there is vibrant political debate in Venezuela reflected in the print and
broadcast media, the government has discriminated against media that offer views of political
opponents, and has used laws and regulations regarding libel and media content as well as legal
harassment and physical intimidation that, according to human rights groups, have effectively
limited freedom of speech and the press in some cases. The Chávez government has also
(...continued)
Strikes Claim a Deal,” LatinNews Daily, February 23, 2011; and “Venezuela: Chávez Plays Defence,” EIU, Business
Latin America, April 11, 2011.
77 Christopher Toothaker, “Anti-Chávez Newspaper Editor Released in Venezuela, Hospitalized Following Hunger
Strike,” Associated Press, November 21, 2011.
78 “Venezuela: Legislative Assault on Free Speech, Civil Society,” Human Rights Watch, December 22, 2010; “Severe
Setbacks to Democratic Governance and Human Rights Guarantees in Venezuela,” Washington Office on Latin
America, January 19, 2011; and Ian James, “Ban On Foreign Funding Leave Venezuelan Activists in Limbo About
Whether They Are Targets,” Associated Press, January 30, 2011.
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expanded state-owned media, including radio and television stations, newspapers, and websites in
order to counter what it viewed as imbalance in the media environment.
RCTV Case. As noted above, President Chávez’s May 2007 closure of RCTV sparked significant
protests and worldwide condemnation. The Venezuelan government maintained that it did not
renew RCTV’s broadcast license because of the station’s actions in support of the April 2002
coup that temporarily removed Chávez from power. The 2007 closure shut down RCTV’s general
broadcast station that was available nationwide, but allowed RCTV to operate with a more
limited audience as a subscription-based cable station known as RCTV-Internacional.
In January 2010, however, the Venezuelan government took RCTV-Internacional off the air
(along with five other stations that were subsequently allowed to resume broadcasting). Many
observers believe that the government’s actions were taken to silence RCTV-Internacional, which
had continued to broadcast criticism of the Chávez government. The government maintains that
the stations violated the Law of Television and Radio Social Responsibility by not complying
with a requirement to broadcast government announcements and presidential speeches (which
have been numerous under President Chávez’s rule). International cable stations are not required
to comply with this broadcast requirement, but in December 2009, a decree by the National
Telecommunications Commission (CONATEL) maintained that cable stations would only be
considered international if 70% or more of their programming is foreign. This ultimately led to
the government taking RCTV-Internacional and the other five stations off the air on January 24,
2010.
There was widespread Venezuelan domestic and international criticism of the government’s
shutdown of the cable stations. OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression Catalina
Botero and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’ Commissioner for Venezuelan
Affairs Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro expressed their strong opposition and requested that guarantees of
freedom of expression and due process be reestablished.79 Human rights organizations, including
Human Rights Watch, the Committee to Protect Journalists, Reporters without Borders, and the
Washington Office on Latin America, also strongly criticized Venezuela’s action.
Globovisión Case. The Venezuelan government also began targeting the operation of
Globovisión in 2009, a Caracas-area television news station that has often been critical of the
government, and has used administrative and criminal investigations against the station. In March
2010, the president of Globovisión, Guillermo Zuloaga, was arrested for making remarks deemed
offensive to President Chávez at a meeting in Aruba of the Inter-American Press Association.
After strong domestic and international criticism, Zuloaga was released, but in June 2010, he fled
the country after another arrest warrant charged him with hoarding cars in an effort to capitalize
on future price increases at his car dealership. In October 2011, the Venezuelan government fined
Globovisión about $2.1 million for extensive coverage of a month-long standoff between
prisoners and government troops at a large prison outside Caracas. The government claimed that
the coverage had stirred public anxiety and included false accusations against the government. In
early March 2012, the Committee to Protect Journalists condemned an attack on Globovisión
79 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Commissioner for Venezuelan Affairs and IACHR’s Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression Reject the Closing of Cable Television Channels in Venezuela,” Press Release,
R05-10, January 24, 2010.
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journalists covering an opposition rally. The attack was allegedly conducted by members of the
ruling PSUV.80
Radio Broadcasting. With regard to radio broadcasting, the Chávez government announced in
2009 that it would open administrative proceedings against 240 radio stations (reportedly more
than a third of all stations) to revoke their licenses because they failed to update their registration
papers. Subsequently, 32 stations were shut down. Press rights groups such as the Committee to
Protect Journalists maintain that the action was another attempt by the Venezuelan government to
expand pro-government media, control the flow of information, and suppress dissent.81
Print Media. In terms of print media, there is a wide variety of privately owned newspapers in
Venezuela that often take a strong editorial stand against the Venezuelan government.
Nevertheless, according to some observers, there has been an increase of self-censorship since
privately owned newspapers are strongly dependent on government advertising and owners do
not want to jeopardize their companies. Press rights groups criticized the prosecution of a
journalist in June 2010 for reporting on a case of nepotism in local government. Press rights
groups also criticized a Venezuelan court’s decision in August 2010 to ban print media from
publishing images of violence in the lead-up to the September 2010 legislative elections. They
characterized the ban as an attempt to censor news coverage of crime and violence before the
elections.
In January 2009, Orel Sambrano, the director of a political weekly magazine, was murdered after
covering several drug trafficking cases. A former police officer was convicted for the murder in
May 2010, while in August 2010, a member of a powerful Venezuelan business family, Walid
Makled Garcia, the presumed instigator of the murder, was arrested in Colombia. Makled is
wanted in the United States on drug trafficking charges, but on November 16, 2010, Colombian
President Juan Manuel Santos announced that Makled would be extradited to Venezuela. This
ultimately occurred on May 9, 2011. (Also see “Extradition of Walid Makled from Colombia”
below.)
In May 2011, Venezuelan newspaper columnist Wilfred Iván Ojeda was shot and killed in the
state of Aragua. Press rights groups called on Venezuela authorities to fully investigate the murder
and bring those responsible to justice.
In August 2011, the Venezuelan government temporarily closed a Venezuelan newspaper, 6to
Poder (Sixth Power), and charged two of its executives with inciting hatred and insulting public
officials after the paper published a satirical article on several high-ranking female government
officials. One of the executives, newspaper editor Leocenis Garcias, was imprisoned for nearly
three months, but released in November 2011 after an almost two-week hunger strike.
Anti-Semitism
Venezuela, which has a Jewish community of about 9,500,82 has witnessed a rise in anti-Semitic
acts over the past several years under the government of President Chávez. In the past, anti-
Semitism appeared to be rare in Venezuela, but has grown in recent years as Venezuela has moved
80 “Globovisión Journalists Attacked in Venezuela,” Committee to Protect Journalists, March 6 , 2012.
81 Committee to Protect Journalists, “Venezuela Moves to Silence Hundreds of Broadcasters,” July 22, 2009.
82 U.S. Department of State, “July-December 2010 International Religious Freedom Report,” September 13, 2011.
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toward closer relations with Iran and as it has criticized Israel for its actions in Lebanon against
Hezbollah and for its actions in Gaza.83 According to the State Department’s 2009 human rights
report, there was an increase in anti-Semitic vandalism, caricatures, and expression at rallies and
in newspapers. Government-affiliated media outlets broadcast or printed numerous anti-Semitic
comments. The State Department report noted that the government did not officially condone
anti-Semitism, but maintained that it orchestrated several anti-Israel demonstrations and that
President Chávez called on the Jewish community to denounce Israel’s actions. These activities
were accompanied by an increase in anti-Semitic rhetoric and graffiti, and vandalism of property
owned by Jews.
In late January 2009, a Caracas synagogue was vandalized. Criminal charges have been filed
against 11 people for the attack, including 8 police officers, and the suspects remain in prison
awaiting trial. According to the State Department’s 2009 international religious freedom report,
Venezuelan government officials publicly condemned the synagogue attack, including President
Chávez, who phoned the president of Confederation of Jewish Associations in Venezuela (CAIV)
and promised to guarantee the safety of the Jewish community. A State Department official at the
OAS condemned the incident, maintaining that it served “as a warning of what can happen in a
highly politicized environment when intolerance is left to simmer.”84 In February 2009, 16
Members of Congress spoke out against the synagogue attack in a letter to President Chávez.
They stated in the letter that they believed that the attack was “a direct result of the dangerous
environment of fear and intimidation against the Jewish community which your government has
fostered.” The Members called on Chávez “to end the bullying and harassment of the Jewish
community” and “to extend the community the robust protection it deserves in light of the threats
it faces.”85
In the aftermath of Israel’s Gaza flotilla incident in late May 2010, the Venezuelan government’s
strong anti-Israeli rhetoric and conspiracy theories about the state of Israel contributed to
continued anti-Semitic language in Venezuelan media.86 In a September 2010 meeting with
President Chávez, Jewish leaders raised the problem of anti-Semitism in the state-owned media
and also asked for the restoration of diplomatic relations with Israel that were cut in early 2009.
In May 2011, CAIV and U.S.-based Jewish organizations denounced a state-owned radio station
that featured a reading of selections from the anti-Semitic tract known as the “Protocols of the
Elders of Zion,” with the radio host suggesting that listeners read it.
In February 2012, U.S. Jewish groups criticized attacks in the Venezuelan media against
opposition presidential candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski that portrayed his Jewish heritage
negatively. Capriles is a practicing Catholic, but is the grandson of Polish Jewish immigrants who
survived the Holocaust.
83 Roth Institute, Anti-Semitism Worldwide 2008/9.
84 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Delegation Condemns Anti-Semitic Attack Against Caracas Synagogue,” February
4, 2009.
85 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, “Engel Condemns Attack on
Synagogue in Venezuela,” February 2, 2009.
86 See, for example, the following report by the Anti-Defamation League, “Anti-Semitism in Venezuela in the Wake of
the Gaza Flotilla,” July 6, 2010.
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Energy Issues
Since Venezuela is a major supplier of foreign oil to the United States, providing almost 10% of
U.S. crude oil imports in 2010 (and 8.4% of total crude oil and petroleum products imports), a
key U.S. interest has been ensuring the continued flow of oil exports. Venezuela was the fifth-
largest foreign supplier of crude oil and products to the United States in 2010 (after Canada,
Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria), exporting 988,000 barrels per day to the United States.87
Venezuela’s oil exports to the United States amounted to about $42 billion in 2011, accounting for
97% of Venezuela’s total exports to the United States.88
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Venezuela sends a large share of
its crude oil exports to the United States, about 43% in 2010. Venezuela’s state-run oil company,
PdVSA, owns CITGO, which operates three crude oil refineries and a network of some 14,000
retail gasoline stations in the United States. Venezuela, according to EAI, is attempting to
diversify its export destinations away from the United States. One of the fastest growing
destinations for Venezuelan crude oil exports has been China, which imported almost 126,000
barrels per day, about 6% of Venezuela’s crude oil in 2010.89
Venezuela’s proven oil reserves are estimated to be 211 billion barrels of oil, up from 99 billion
barrels in 2010 because of the inclusion of heavy Orinoco Belt oil in the estimate. This makes
Venezuela the country with the largest reserves in the hemisphere. Venezuela’s proven natural gas
reserves are estimated to be 195 trillion cubic feet (the second largest in the hemisphere after the
United States).90 Most of Venezuela’s proven natural gas reserves are associated gas linked to its
oil production, but in September 2009, the Spanish energy company Repsol YPF announced a
major offshore gas find in the Gulf of Venezuela involving gas that reportedly could amount to 7
trillion-8 trillion cubic feet.91
Under President Chávez, the Venezuelan government has asserted greater control over the
country’s oil reserves. By March 2006, it had completed the conversion of its 32 operating
agreements with foreign oil companies to joint ventures, with the Venezuelan government now
holding a majority share of between 60% and 80% in the ventures. In 2007, the government
completed the conversion of four strategic associations involving extra-heavy oil Orinoco River
Basin projects. Six foreign companies had been involved in the projects—U.S.-based
ConocoPhillips, Chevron, and ExxonMobil; Norway’s Statoil-Hydro; Britain’s BP; and France’s
Total. In the conversion to Venezuelan government majority ownership, Chevron and BP
maintained their previous investments, Total and Statoil-Hydro reduced their holdings, and
ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil chose to leave the projects. Subsequent bilateral agreements for
the development of additional Orinoco Belt resources have involved PdVSA partnering with a
number of foreign oil companies, including Chevron, PetroVietnam, the China National
87 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Petroleum: U.S. Imports by Country of Origin,” July 28, 2011 (next
release date July 2012).
88 Department of Commerce statistics, as presented by Global Trade Atlas.
89 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Briefs, Venezuela,” March 2011.
90 “Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production,” Oil & Gas Journal, December 5, 2011.
91 “Repsol YPF Confirms Large Gas Find Off Venezuela,” Oil & Gas Journal, September 28, 2009.
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Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Italy’s Eni, Malaysia’s Petronas, and Spain’s Repsol as well as
Indian, Japanese, and Russian consortiums.92
According to the EIA, Venezuela’s total oil production has been falling in recent years and was
estimated at around 2.36 million barrels per day (mbd) in 2010, with crude oil accounting for 2.09
mbd. This compares to total oil production of 2.47 mbd in 2009 and 2.64 mbd in 2008. The
decline in production, according to EIA, stems from natural decline at older fields, maintenance
issues, and compliance with OPEC production cuts.93
Despite notable frictions in bilateral relations, Venezuela has continued to be a major supplier of
oil to the United States. On numerous past occasions, however, Chávez threatened to stop selling
oil to the United States, although Venezuelan officials maintained that Venezuela would only stop
sending oil to the United States if attacked by the United States. Because of Chávez’s strong
rhetoric, however, some observers raised questions about the security of Venezuela as a major
supplier of foreign oil. In June 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a
report, requested by then-Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar, on the
issue of potential Venezuelan oil supply disruption. At the time, the GAO report concluded that a
sudden loss of all or most Venezuelan oil from the world market could raise world prices up to
$11 per barrel and decrease U.S. gross domestic product by about $23 billion.94
Counternarcotics Issues
Because of Venezuela’s extensive 1,370-mile border with Colombia, it is a major transit route for
cocaine and heroin destined for the United States. Venezuela suspended its cooperation with the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in August 2005 because it alleged that DEA agents
were spying on Venezuela. U.S. officials maintained that the charges were baseless. From 2005 to
2008, President Bush annually designated Venezuela, pursuant to international drug control
certification procedures set forth in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2003 (P.L. 107-
228), as a country that had failed demonstrably to adhere to its obligations under international
narcotics agreements. At the same time, the President waived economic sanctions that would have
curtailed U.S. assistance for democracy programs in Venezuela. President Obama has taken the
same action over the past three years, most recently in September 2011, marking the seventh
consecutive year for Venezuela’s designation as a country not adhering to its anti-drug
obligations.95
The United States and Venezuela were on the verge of signing an anti-drug cooperation
agreement in 2006 that had been negotiated in 2005 (an addendum to the 1978 Bilateral
Counternarcotics Memorandum of Understanding or MOU), but Venezuelan approval of the
agreement has still not taken place. The issue has been repeatedly raised by the United States as a
way to improve bilateral antidrug cooperation.
92 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Briefs, Venezuela,” March 2011.
93 Ibid, and U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Venezuela Energy Profile,” information updated July 14, 2010.
94 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Energy Security: Issues Related to Potential Reductions in Venezuelan Oil
Production,” GAO-06-668, June 2006.
95 White House, “Presidential Determination No. 2011-16, Presidential Determination on Major Illicit Drug Transit or
Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2012,” September 15, 2011.
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The Treasury Department has imposed sanctions on at least 14 Venezuelans for narcotics
trafficking, freezing the assets of these individuals subject to U.S. jurisdiction and blocking U.S.
persons from engaging in any transactions with these individuals. These include seven current or
former Venezuelan officials. In September 2008, the Treasury Department froze the assets of two
senior Venezuelan intelligence officials—General Hugo Carvajal and General Henry Rangel—
and the former interior minister, Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, for allegedly helping the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) with drug and weapons trafficking.96 General
Rangel was subsequently appointed Venezuela’s defense minister in January 2012. In September
2011, the Treasury sanctioned four more Venezuelan officials for supporting the weapons and
drug-trafficking activities of the FARC. These included: Major General Cliver Antonio Alcala
Cordones; Freddy Alirio Bernal Rosales, a PSUV representative to Venezuela’s National
Assembly; Amilicar Jesus Figueroa Salazar, a former alternative president of the Latin American
Parliament; and Ramon Isidro Madriz Moreno, an officer with the Venezuelan Intelligence
Service (SEBIN, Servicio Bolivariano de Inteligencia).97
Some press reports have cited concerns that elements of the Venezuelan military are becoming
increasingly involved in drug trafficking, moving from simply facilitating the transit of drugs to
taking direct control of shipments and routes.98 As noted above, General Henry Rangel—added to
the U.S. Treasury Department drug trafficking sanctions list in 2008—was elevated to minister of
defense in 2011 while another military official, General Cliver Alcala Cordones, was added to the
list in September 2011. Some reports allege that Venezuela’s military leaders involved in drug
trafficking pressed President Chávez to negotiate with Colombia for the extradition of Walid
Makled, a Venezuelan drug trafficker who alleged that he had paid off numerous Venezuelan
military officials.99 (Also see “Extradition of Walid Makled from Colombia” below.)
September 2011 Presidential Determination
On September 15, 2011, President Obama issued the seventh annual determination (as part of the
annual narcotics certification process) that Venezuela had “failed demonstrably” to meet its
obligations under international counternarcotics measures. According to a memorandum of
justification accompanying the determination, while as a matter of state policy the Venezuelan
government does not encourage, support, or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug
trafficking, “individual members of the government and security forces were credibly reported to
have engaged in or facilitated drug trafficking activities.”100 The justification maintained that
since Venezuela ceased formal cooperation with the DEA in 2005, bilateral counternarcotics
cooperation has been inadequate and conducted on a limited case-by-case basis, consisting
“mainly of informal information exchanges with remaining DEA representatives in Caracas,
coordination of fugitive deportations from Venezuela to the United States, and maritime
96 Phil Gunson, “U.S. Slams Venezuelan Hugo Chávez Top Intelligence Men, Miami Herald, September 13, 2008;
Federal Register, September 19, 2008, pp. 54453-54454.
97 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Recent OFAC Actions, Specially Designated
Nationals Update,” September 8, 2011; and Fabiola Sanchez, “U.S. Accuses 4 Chávez Allies of Aiding Leftist Rebels,”
Washington Post, September 9, 2011.
98 Jeremy McDermott and Geoffrey Ramsey, “Is Venezuelan Military Stepping up Role in Drug Trafficking?” InSight,
Organized Crime in the Americas, January 30, 2012.
99 Antonio Maria Delgado, “Cables: Chávez Betrayed the FARC to Appease Generals,” Miami Herald, March 9, 2012.
100 White House, “Presidential Determination No. 2011-16, Presidential Determination on Major Illicit Drug Transit or
Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2012,” September 15, 2011.
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interdiction activities carried out by the U.S. Coast Guard.” While Venezuela continued to grant
the U.S. Coast Guard to board Venezuelan-flagged vessels suspected of narcotics trafficking, it
also required the return of confiscated vessels, suspects, and contraband to Venezuela with no
follow up information provided to U.S. officials.
The justification noted some positive steps take by the Venezuelan government in the past year.
These included the transfer of three major drug traffickers to the United States and the transfer of
nine other fugitives to third countries; a bilateral counternarcotics agreement with Colombia; and
the capture and transfer to Colombia of seven members of the FARC and National Liberation
Army (ELN) guerrilla groups (which rely heavily on drug trafficking to fund their operations).
State Department 2012 INCSR Report
In its March 2012 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), the State
Department contended that Venezuela was one of the preferred trafficking routes for the transit of
cocaine out of South America because of a porous border with Colombia, a weak judicial system,
inconsistent international counternarcotics cooperation, generally permissive law enforcement,
and a corrupt political environment. The illicit drugs transiting Venezuela are destined for the
Eastern Caribbean, Central America, United States, Western Africa, and Europe. The report
maintained that U.S. government estimates of cocaine transiting through Venezuela were 161-212
metric tons (compared to 250 metric tons noted in the 2011 INCSR).
According to the 2012 INCSR, Venezuela’s National Anti-Drug Office (ONA), Venezuela seized
42 metric tons in 2011 (down from 63 metric tons in 2010), with 62% cocaine and 37%
marijuana. In 2011, Venezuela also deported three fugitives wanted on drug charges to the United
States: in March, Gloria Rojas Valencia, allegedly working for Los Zetas (a violent Mexican drug
trafficking organization) in Venezuela; in September, Lionel Scott Harris, a U.S. citizen; and in
December, Maximiliano Bonilla Orozco, also known as “Valenciano,” one of Colombia’s top
drug traffickers.
The State Department maintained in the INCSR that that “the United States remains prepared to
deepen cooperation with Venezuela to help counter the increasing flow of cocaine and other
illegal drugs.” As in the past, the State Department reiterated that cooperation could be improved
through formal reengagement between Venezuelan and U.S. law enforcement agencies and the
signing of the outstanding addendum to the 1978 Bilateral Counternarcotics MOU that was
negotiated in 2005, which would provide funds for joint counternarcotics projects and demand
reduction programs. The INCSR proffered that bilateral cooperation could also include
counternarcotics and anti-money laundering training programs for law enforcement and other
officials; Venezuelan participation in the U.S. Coast Guard’s International Port Security Program;
and activation of the Container Inspection Facility at Puerto Cabello that was partially funded by
the United States in 2004. According to the INCSR, “these cooperative activities would increase
the exchange of information that could lead to arrests, help dismantle organized criminal
networks, aid in the prosecution of criminals engaged in narcotrafficking, and stem the flow of
illicit drugs transiting Venezuelan airspace, land, and sea.”
Venezuela’s Views of Its Anti-Drug Efforts
Venezuelan officials maintain that, contrary to U.S. government claims, their government has
been taking significant antidrug measures, including 52 international anti-drug cooperation
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agreements and participation in the OAS’s Inter-American Drug Abuse Control of Drug
Commission (CICAD). The government maintains that the annual U.S. anti-drug determination is
designed to serve political ends and is an inaccurate portrayal of Venezuela’s actions. According
to Venezuelan government statistics, Venezuela seized 63 metric tons of illicit drugs in 2010, 36%
more than in 2004, the last year of cooperation between Venezuela and the DEA. The government
maintains that it has a zero policy toward drug trafficking, with more than 13,000 drug-related
arrests in 2010, and more than 9,000 arrests in the first six months of 2011. According to the
government, in recent years it has stepped up patrols along the border with Colombia and
acquired new radar stations to intercept planes and special incinerators to dispose of seized drugs.
The government also maintains that it takes a comprehensive approach to combating drugs,
including a national anti-drug plan under the government has supervised hundreds of educational
workshops and aims to train 5 million Venezuelans as prevention advisers.101
Extradition of Walid Makled from Colombia
On November 16, 2010, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos said that his government
would extradite a Venezuelan businessman and alleged narcotics trafficker, Walid Makled Garcia,
to Venezuela. Makled was arrested in Colombia in August 2010. In addition to narcotics
trafficking, Makled is wanted in Venezuela for several killings, including the 2008 killing of a
suspected Colombian drug trafficker in Venezuela and for the murder of journalist Orel Sambrano
in January 2009. After his arrest, Makled gave media interviews alleging that he had close links
with high-level Venezuelan officials and that he paid millions of dollars for favors and protection.
Venezuelan officials refute the claims, and President Chávez has alleged that the United States
would try to use the fabricated allegations in order to justify an attack against his government
similar to the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama that removed General Manuel Noriega from
power.102
Makled is also wanted in the United States on drug trafficking charges. In May 2009, President
Obama identified Makled as a significant foreign narcotics trafficker under the Foreign Narcotics
Kingpin Designation Act (which targets the financial assets of traffickers), while in early
November 2010, Makled was indicted by a federal court in New York for trafficking tons of
cocaine into the United States.103 While the United States wanted Makled extradited to the United
States, the Administration maintained that it respected Colombia’s extradition processes. Some
Members of Congress called on President Santos to reconsider extraditing Makled to Venezuela
and to instead extradite him to the United States.
President Santos maintained that Venezuela’s extradition request came before that of the United
States, and that he gave his word to President Chávez that Makled would be handed over once the
judicial process in Colombia was completed.104 This ultimately occurred on May 9, 2011,
reflecting continued warming relations with Colombia. In a media interview before his
extradition, Makled maintained that 5 current Venezuelan legislators and 40 generals had been on
101 Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the U.S., “Fact Sheet: Venezuela’s Fight Against Drugs,
“September 16, 2011.
102 Luis Jaime Acosta, “Colombia to Extradite Accused Venezuelan Drug Lord,” Reuters, November 16, 2010.
103 “Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Indictment of One of the World’s Most Significant Narcotics Kingpins,”
Targeted News Service, November 4, 2010.
104 Luis Jaime Acosta, “Colombia to Extradite Accused Venezuelan Drug Lord,” Reuters, November 16, 2010.
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his payroll, including General Hugo Carvajal, the director of Military Intelligence. Makled also
reportedly was questioned by U.S. officials before his extradition.105
Venezuela’s Military Purchases
For several years, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about Venezuela’s purchases of military
equipment. In January 2006, the State Department reported that the United States had denied
licenses—required by the Arms Export Control Act—to transfer U.S. technology for use in 12
military transport planes that Spanish companies had contracted to sell to Venezuela. According
to a State Department spokesman at the time, the proposed sale could have contributed to de-
stabilization in Latin America. Spain initially responded by indicating that it would go ahead with
the sale of the airplanes utilizing non-U.S. technology, but in mid-October 2006, Spain’s foreign
minister announced that such an alternative was not economically feasible and the deal was
cancelled.106 Venezuela responded to the U.S. action by labeling it as “imperialist.” The State
Department official also indicated that the United States had expressed similar concerns to Brazil
about military sales to Venezuela. Venezuela expressed interest in purchasing at least a dozen
light-attack aircraft, manufactured by Embraer (Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica, SA), that
contain U.S. technology.107
In May 2006, the State Department determined (pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export
Control Act) that Venezuela was not fully cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism efforts, an action
that triggered a prohibition on the sale or license of defense articles and services to Venezuela.
Since then, the State Department has made the same annual determination each year, most
recently in May 2011.
Venezuela has bought significant amounts of military equipment from Russia, more than $6
billion from 2005 through 2009. This included 24 Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jets, helicopters, armored
personnel carriers, air defenses missiles, and small arms.108 The Venezuelan government
maintains that it purchased the Russian fighter jets because the United States is refusing to sell the
country spare parts for its aging fleet of F-16 fighters that it purchased in the 1980s. After visiting
Russia in September 2009, President Chávez announced that Russia would grant Venezuela a
$2.2 billion credit line to purchase military equipment. At the end of 2011, Venezuela and Russia
reportedly signed another $4 billion Russian credit deal to fund additional military equipment,
including additional fighter aircraft.109
Over the past several years, several Directors of National Intelligence (DNI) have expressed
concerns about Venezuela’s military purchases. In January 11, 2007, testimony before the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, then-DNI John Negroponte expressed concern that President
Chávez’s military purchases and moves toward developing his own weapons production
105 Jim Wyss, “Alleged Venezuelan Kingpin Raises Stakes for U.S. Prosecutors,” Miami Herald, April 4, 2011.
106 Renwick McLean, “U.S. Objections Lead Spain to End Venezuela Deal,” New York Times, October 19, 2006.
107 U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, January 13, 2006; Phil Gunson and Pablo Bachelet, “Spain’s Planes
for Chávez Can’t Use U.S. Components,” Miami Herald, January 14, 2006; Leslie Crawford and Andy Webb-Vidal,
“Spain to Defy U.S. over Military Sale to Venezuela,” Financial Times, January 14, 2006.
108 U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”
prepared testimony by Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, February 2, 2010, p. 33.
109 “Details of Russian Arms Sales to Venezuela; Arms Trade with China Said Stable,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet
Union, January 15, 2012.
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capability were increasingly worrisome to his neighbors, and could fuel an arms race in the
region. In February 5, 2008, testimony before the same committee, then-DNI Michael McConnell
again noted growing anxiety among Venezuela’s neighbors because of this arms build-up.
McConnell also testified at a February 27, 2008, Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that
Venezuela’s military build-up is probably three to four times what would be needed for external
defense. With regard to rifles from Venezuela potentially ending up in the hands of the FARC,
DIA Director Maples maintained at the hearing that he had not seen that, and that the likely
purpose was “using asymmetric capabilities and tactics and empowering the population in some
way, in a home guard sense.”
Under the Obama Administration, then-DNI Dennis Blair testified before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence on February 12, 2009, that while the Chávez government’s military
purchases from Russia have been significant, Venezuela’s overall military capabilities remain
plagued by logistic, maintenance, and transportation shortfalls.110 In September 2009, Secretary
of State Clinton noted U.S. concern about Venezuela’s arms purchases, which she maintained
raised questions about a potential arms race in the region. The Secretary urged Venezuela to be
transparent in its purchases and clear about the purposes of the purchases. She maintained that
Venezuela “should be putting in place procedures and practices to ensure that the weapons that
they buy are not diverted to insurgent groups or illegal organizations, like drug trafficking gangs
and other criminal cartels.”111 On February 2, 2010, then-DNI Blair again testified before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that while Venezuela’s military acquisitions from Russia
are significant, more than $6 billion since 2005, “their armed forces lack the training and logistics
capacity to use these to their full capacity.”112
In response to U.S. criticism, President Chávez has vowed to continue with his nation’s military
purchases, asserting that he is acquiring the minimum equipment for Venezuela to defend itself
from the United States. Venezuelan Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro maintains that the
purchases are a sovereign decision and that U.S. criticisms have “no political or moral weight.”113
Venezuela’s Activities in Latin America
For a number of years, the Chávez government has focused its relations with Latin America and
its activities in the region in part as a means of countering the United States and U.S. interests and
influence in the hemisphere, but Venezuela’s influence in the region appears to have waned. In
February 2011, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper testified that “deteriorating
economic conditions in Venezuela and Chávez’s declining popularity at home and abroad have
limited his ability to exert influence beyond his core group of allies.”114
110 U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community,”
prepared testimony by Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, February 12, 2009, p. 32.
111 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks with Uruguayan President Tabare
Vazquez After Their Meeting,” September 15, 2009.
112 U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”
prepared testimony by Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, February 2, 2009, p. 33.
113 James Suggett, “Venezuela: U.S. Criticisms of Venezuelan Arms Purchases Lack ‘Moral Weight,’”
Venezuelanalysis.com, September 16, 2009.
114 U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, ‘Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,”
prepared testimony by James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, February 16, 2011, available at
http://intelligence.senate.gov/110216/dni.pdf
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Over the years, there had been concerns about President Chávez’s attempts to export his brand of
populism to other Latin American countries. He strongly supported Bolivia’s President Evo
Morales, and offered assistance to help Bolivia re-write its constitution and implement radical
reforms to the economy. Venezuela also has had close relations with Nicaragua under the
presidency of Daniel Ortega, providing substantial assistance, and with Ecuador under the
presidency of Rafael Correa.
President Chávez launched a Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) in 2004 as an
alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas. ALBA advocates a socially oriented trade
block that includes mechanisms for poverty reduction, and cooperation in a range of areas
including health, education, culture, investment, and finance. Currently, eight countries in the
region have joined ALBA. Venezuela and Cuba were the first countries to launch ALBA in 2004,
while Bolivia joined in 2006, and Nicaragua in 2007. In 2008, the Caribbean nation of Dominica
joined in January, while Honduras joined in August, but subsequently withdrew in January 2010
under the de facto government of Roberto Micheletti. In June 2009, three additional countries
joined—Ecuador, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Antigua and Barbuda,115 while in February
2012, both Suriname and St. Lucia expressed interest in joining ALBA. Despite the increase in its
membership, DNI James Clapper testified before Congress in late January 2012 that “ALBA was
created in part to spread Chávez’s influence in the region,” but “is only muddling through.”116
Over the past decade, Venezuela has provided Cuba with substantial assistance. Cuba benefits
from a preferential oil agreement with Venezuela signed in 2000, which provides Cuba with more
than 90,000 barrels of oil per day. In payment for the oil, Cuba has provided extensive services to
Venezuela, including thousands of medical personnel and advisers in a number of other areas,
including sports, education, agriculture, communications, and even security programs involving
the military. In addition to the substantial oil provided to Cuba, Venezuela has made significant
investments in Cuba. PdVSA Cuba upgrade an oil refinery in Cienfuegos, which was inaugurated
in 2007, and reportedly will help boost refining at the plant from 65,000 barrels per day to
150,000 barrels per day. It also reportedly will help upgrade another current refinery in Santiago,
and has plans to build a joint oil refinery in Mantanzas province. In June 2010, construction of a
joint Cuban-Venezuelan nickel plant began in western Cuba. PdVSA also has signed an oil
exploration and production agreement with Cupet, Cuba’s state-oil company. Because of
Venezuela’s oil assistance, the country is very much an economic lifeline for Cuba. There would
be significant economic disruption in Cuba if the flow of Venezuelan oil were curtailed.
Since 2005, President Chávez has used so-called “oil diplomacy” to provide oil to other
Caribbean Basin nations on preferential terms in a program known as PetroCaribe, prompting
some concern that Venezuela is using these programs to increase its influence in the region.
Under the program, Venezuela initially offered to supply oil to the region on preferential terms
with 50% of the oil financed over 25 years at an annual interest rate of 1%. At a July 2008
PetroCaribe summit, President Chávez announced that up to 60% of the oil could be financed
while oil prices remained over $100 a barrel, and this would rise to 70% financed if oil prices rise
to over $150 a barrel. Most Caribbean nations are members of PetroCaribe, with the exception of
Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. In Central America, Nicaragua and Honduras joined
115 For additional background, see the web portal of ALBA, available at http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/
116 U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, ‘Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,”
prepared testimony by James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, January 31, 2012, available at
http://intelligence.senate.gov/120131/clapper.pdf
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PetroCaribe in 2007 and Guatemala joined in July 2008. Venezuela stopped exporting preferential
oil to Honduras under PetroCaribe in 2009 after the ouster of Honduran President Zelaya, but the
current Honduran government wants to rejoin the program. PetroCaribe also has the goal of
putting in place a regional supply, refining, and transportation and storage network, and
establishing a development fund for those countries participating in the program.
Favorable opinions of President Chávez in Latin America are weak. As reflected in the annual
Latinobarómetro public opinion survey of Latin American countries, President Chávez has been
one of the least favorite leaders in the Americas over the past several years. His rating improved
in the 2011 survey, likely because of sympathy because of his illness, but he still ranked among
the least favorite leaders in the region. In contrast, favorable ratings for President Barack Obama
have remained high since he took office and have made him the most popular leader in the
Americas.117
Terrorism Issues
U.S. officials have expressed concerns over the past several years about Venezuela’s lack of
cooperation on antiterrorism efforts, President Chávez’s sympathetic statements for Colombian
terrorist groups (the FARC and ELN), and Venezuela’s relations with Cuba and Iran. Since May
2006, the Secretary of State has made an annual determination that Venezuela has not been
“cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts” pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms
Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629). As a result, the United States has imposed an arms embargo on
Venezuela since 2006, which prohibits all U.S. commercial arms sales and re-transfers to
Venezuela. For several years, U.S. officials also expressed concern that Venezuelan citizenship,
identity, and travel documents were easy to obtain, making the country a potentially attractive
way-station for terrorists. In June 2011 congressional testimony, State Department officials again
expressed concern about “Venezuela’s relations with Iran, its support for the FARC, [and] its
lackluster cooperation on counterterrorism.”118
Colombian Terrorist Groups119
In its 2010 terrorism report (issued in August 2011), the State Department maintained that the
Venezuelan government took no action against Venezuelan government and military officials
linked to the FARC and ELN. While it described Colombia’s accusations against the Venezuela
government for harboring the FARC and ELN, the report also noted an improved bilateral
Colombian-Venezuelan relationship on security issues under the new government of Colombian
President Juan Manuel Santos, including Venezuela’s extradition to Colombia of several
suspected members of the terrorists groups.
117 Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2011 Report, Santiago, Chile, October 2011.
118 Joint Hearing on “Venezuela’s Sanctionable Activities,” House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere and Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, and House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations. State
Department testimony of Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator for Counterterrorism; Kevin Whitaker, Acting
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs; and Thomas Delare, Director of the Terrorist Finance and
Economic Sanctions Policy, Bureau of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs, June 24, 2011, available at
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/ben062411.pdf
119 For additional information, see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Background, U.S. Relations, and Congressional
Interest, by June S. Beittel.
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According to June 2011, State Department congressional testimony, “Colombian-Venezuelan
cooperation on terrorism and security matters is clearly increasing and being systematized,
yielding notable results.” The State Department noted Venezuela’s deportation of several FARC
and ELN members to Colombia, including key operatives and high-profile political actors. It said
that President Chávez has “called on the FARC to join a political reconciliation process and has
claimed that any discussion between Venezuelan government officials and the FARC about
establishing bases in Venezuela took place without his authorization.”120 In October 2011
congressional testimony, a U.S. official maintained that there continues to be evidence that the
FARC are sheltering in Venezuela, but not as close to the border as before.121
To date, the United States has imposed financial sanctions against seven current or former
Venezuelan government and military officials for providing support to the FARC. As note above,
in September 2008, the Treasury Department froze the assets of two senior intelligence
officials—General Hugo Carvajal and General Henry Rangel—and the former interior minister,
Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, for allegedly helping the FARC with weapons and drug trafficking.122
General Rangel was appointed by President Chávez as defense minister in January 2012, an
action that raised concern among U.S. policymakers. In September 2011, the Treasury
Department imposed financial sanctions on four more Venezuelan officials for acting for or on
behalf of the FARC, often in direct support of its narcotics and arms trafficking activities. (Also
see “Counternarcotics Issues” above.)
Deepening Relations with Iran123
Over the past several years, there has been concern among policymakers about Iran’s growing
interest and activities in Latin America, particularly its relations with Venezuela under President
Chávez, although there has been disagreement over the extent and significance of Iran’s relations
with the region. The January 2012 visit by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on a four-
nation tour to Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela increased concerns of some
policymakers about Iran’s efforts to deepen ties with Latin America. On March 7, 2012, the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported out a measure, H.R. 3783, which would require the
Administration to develop a “a strategy to address Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity in
the Western Hemisphere.”
Iran’s ties to the region predate its recent increased attention. Venezuela’s relations with Iran have
been long-standing because they were both founding members of OPEC in 1960. Under the
government of President Mohammed Khatami (1997-2005), Iran made efforts to increase its trade
with Latin America, particularly Brazil, and there were also efforts to increase cooperation with
Venezuela. Not until President Ahmadinejad’s rule began in 2005, however, did Iran aggressively
work to increase its diplomatic and economic linkages with Latin American countries. A major
120 Ibid.
121 See testimony of Kevin Whitaker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs in “The
Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control Holds a Hearing on ‘U.S.-Andean Security Cooperation,’ – News
Event,” Political Transcripts by CQ Transcriptions, October 19, 2011.
122 Phil Gunson, op. cit., September 13, 2008; Federal Register, September 19, 2008, pp. 54453-54454.
123 For further background on Iran’s expanded relations with Latin America, see CRS Report RS21049, Latin America:
Terrorism Issues, by Mark P. Sullivan, and CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by
Kenneth Katzman.
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rationale for this increased focus on Latin America has been Iran’s efforts to overcome its
international isolation.
The personal relationship between Ahmadinejad and Chávez also has driven the strengthening of
bilateral ties. Venezuela and Iran reportedly have signed numerous accords over the past decade,
including agreements on construction projects (including housing, agricultural and food plants,
and corn processing plants), car and tractor factories, energy initiatives (including petrochemicals
and oil exploration in the Orinoco region of Venezuela), and banking programs.124 During an
April 2009 trip to Tehran, Chávez and Ahmadinejad inaugurated a new development bank for
economic projects in both countries, with each country reportedly providing $100 million in
initial capital. Weekly flights between the two countries began in 2007, but were curtailed in
September 2010.125 The State Department had expressed concern about these flights, maintaining
that they were only subject to cursory immigration and customs controls.
An April 2010 unclassified Department of Defense report to Congress on Iran’s military power
(required by Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, P.L. 111-84)
maintained that Iran’s Qods Force, which maintains operational capabilities around the world, has
increased its presence in Latin America in recent years, particularly in Venezuela.126 Despite the
report, the commander of the U.S. Southern Command, General Douglas Fraser, subsequently
maintained that the focus of Iran in the region has been diplomatic and commercial, and that he
has not seen an increase in Iran’s military presence in the region.127
In November 2010 and again in May 2011, an online German publication, Die Welt, alleged that
Venezuela and Iran had signed an agreement in October 2010 for a jointly operated missile base
in Venezuela.128 The Department of State, however, maintains that there is no evidence to support
such claims, and that that there is no reason to believe that the assertions are credible.129
Venezuela’s foreign minister called the reports by the German newspaper “an extravagant lie.”130
In December 2011, a documentary featured on the Spanish-language network Univisión alleged
that Iranian and Venezuelan diplomats in Mexico tried to recruit Mexican students for plotting
possible cyberattacks against the United States. There is no indication that U.S. officials have
124 “Ahmadinejad, Chávez Reiterate Efforts to Enhance World Peace,” FARS News Agency, January 13, 2012.
125 “House Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia, and Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
and House Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign
Operations Hold Joint Hearing on Venezuela’s Sanctionable Activity,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, June 24, 2011;
and “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Threats and Security in the Western Hemisphere,” CQ
Congressional Transcripts, October 13, 2011.
126 Department of Defense, “Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran,” April 2010. For the full text of the report,
see http://www.politico.com/static/PPM145_link_042010.html. For background on the Qods Force, see CRS Report
RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
127 Anne Flaherty, “Pentagon Says Iran’s Reach in Latin America Doesn’t Pose Military Threat,” AP Newswire, April
27, 2010. General Fraser reiterated that Iran’s focus in Latin America has been “primarily diplomatic and commercial,”
in March 30, 2011, testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. See: “Hearing of the House Armed
Services Committee; Subject FY2012 National Defense Authorization Budget Requests for the U.S. Southern
Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. European Command,” Federal News Service, March 30, 2011.
128 “Iran Planning to Build Missile Base in Venezuela,” November 25, 2010, and “Venezuela, Iran Press Ahead with
Missile Base,” May 13, 2011, website of Die Welt online (as translated by Open Source Center).
129 CRS correspondence with Department of State, January 5, 2011, and May 23, 2011; “Chávez Mocks Missile Base
Reports,” CNN Wire, June 1, 2011.
130 “Chávez Mocks Missile Base Reports,” CNN Wire, June 1, 2011.
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been able to corroborate the allegations in the documentary. Subsequently, a Venezuelan diplomat
based in Mexico at the time, Livia Acosta, who was recorded participating in the discussion with
the Mexican students, was declared persona non grata by the State Department on January 8,
2012, and asked to leave the United States from her position as Venezuelan Consul General in
Miami.
President Ahmadinejad began his fifth official visit to Latin America on January 8, 2012, first
stopping in Venezuela. During the trip, Iran and Venezuela signed cooperation agreements in
industry, science and technology, and politics. The agreements reportedly included training,
studies, workshops, and professional exchanges in nanotechnology; the creation of bi-national
groups on development needs and complementary productive activities; and technology transfer
in areas of agriculture, food industry, mining, and construction. During the visit, President Chávez
maintained that Venezuela was showing its solidarity with Iran since it is “one of the targets that
Yankee imperialism has in its sights.”131
Venezuela also has played a key role in the development of Iran’s expanding relations with other
countries in the region. This outreach has largely focused on leftist governments—Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Nicaragua—that share the goal of reducing U.S. influence in the region. While Iran
has promised significant assistance and investment to these countries, observers maintain that
there is little evidence that such promises have been fulfilled.132 Iranian President Ahmadinejad
also visited Cuba, Nicaragua, and Ecuador in January 2012. Although he signed a number of
agreements during his tour, it is doubtful that this will lead to significant Iranian investment or
financial support. Analysts point out that leaders’ statements during these trips are largely
propaganda, with the official Iranian press trumpeting relations with these countries in order to
show that Iran is not isolated internationally and that it has good relations with countries
geographically close to the United States.133 Some press accounts characterized Ahmadinejad’s
tour of the region as “lackluster” and a mere diplomatic show attempting to remind the world that
Iran continues to have relations with countries in Latin America.134 Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper testified before Congress in late January 2012 that while the U.S.
intelligence community remains concerned about Iran’s connection with Venezuela,
Ahmadinejad’s recent trip to Latin America “was not all that successful.”135
Venezuela and Iran-Related Sanctions
The United States has imposed sanctions on Venezuelan companies because of their alleged
support for Iran, and also has imposed sanctions on Venezuelan individuals because of their
support for Hezbollah, the radical Lebanon-based Islamic Shiite group supported by Iran.
131 “Chávez and Ahmadinejad Taunt U.S. Over “Big Atomic Bomb,” The Times (London), January 10, 2012.
132 For example, see Kavon “Hak” Hakimzadeh, “Iran & Venezuela: The Axis of Annoyance,” Military Review, May 1,
2009; and Anne-Marie O’Connor and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Iran’s Invisible Nicaragua Embassy; Feared Stronghold
Never Materialized,” Washington Post, July 13, 2009. Also see “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on
Democracy in Nicaragua,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, December 1, 2011.
133 Comments by Stephen Johnson, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Afshin Molavi, New America
Foundation, at a January 19, 2012, event sponsored by the Council of the Americas (Washington, D.C.) on “Iran in the
Americas: A Readout of the Visit.”
134 Brian Ellsworth, “Iranian Leader Ends Lackluster Latin America Tour,” Reuters News, January 13, 2012.
135 “Senate Select Intelligence Committee Holds Hearing on Worldwide Threats,” CQ Congressional Transcripts,
January 31, 2012.
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To date, the United States has imposed sanctions on two companies in Venezuela because of
connections to Iran’s proliferation activities. In August 2008, the State Department imposed
sanctions on the Venezuelan Military Industries Company (CAVIM) pursuant to the Iran, North
Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 109-353) for allegedly violating a ban on technology
that could assist Iran in the development of weapons systems.136 The sanctions prohibited any
U.S. government procurement or assistance to the company. While these sanctions expired in
2010, they were imposed once again on May 23, 2011, for a two-year period.137 In October 2008,
the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on an Iranian-owned bank based in Caracas, the
Banco Internacional de Desarollo, C.A., under Executive Order 13382 that allows the President to
block the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters. The bank is
linked to the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI), which the Treasury Department asserts
has provided or attempted to provide services to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces
Logistics.138
In May 2011, the United States imposed sanctions on Venezuela’s state oil company, Petróleos de
Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA), pursuant to the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Disinvestment Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-195) because the company provided $50 million worth of
reformate, an additive used in gasoline, to Iran between December 2010 and March 2011.
Specifically, the State Department imposed three sanctions on PdVSA to prohibit it from
competing for U.S. government procurement contracts, securing financing from the Export-
Import Bank, and obtaining U.S. export licenses. The sanctions specifically exclude PdVSA
subsidiaries (Citgo) and do not prohibit the export of oil to the United States.139
Past Venezuelan comments about potential Iranian support for the development of nuclear energy
in Venezuela raised concerns among U.S. officials and other observers. In September 2009,
President Chávez announced during a visit to Iran that Venezuela was working on a preliminary
plan for the construction of a “nuclear village” in Venezuela with Iranian assistance so that “the
Venezuelan people can count in the future on this marvelous resource for peaceful purposes.”140
The transfer of Iranian nuclear technology from Iran would be a violation of U.N. Security
Council Resolutions—1737 (2006), 1747 ( 2007), and 1803 (2008)—that imposed restrictions on
Iran’s nuclear technology transfers. In September 2010, President Chávez maintained that his
government was carrying out initial studies into starting a nuclear energy program. In October
2010, Russia agreed to help Venezuela build its first nuclear power plant, but in March 2011, in
the aftermath of Japan’s nuclear plant disaster, President Chávez said that he was freezing plans
for a nuclear power program.141
136 Although the sanction became effective in August 2008, it was not published in the Federal Register until October
2008. See Federal Register, pp. 63226-63227, October 23, 2008.
137 U.S. Department of State, “Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA),” Fact Sheet, May 24,
2011.
138 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Export Development Bank of Iran Designated as a Proliferator,”
October 22, 2008.
139 U.S. Department of State, “Seven Companies Sanctioned Under the Amended Iran Sanctions Act,” Fact Sheet, May
24, 2011.
140 “Iran Will Not Back Down on Nuclear Energy: Hugo Chávez” Agence France Presse, September 4, 2009.
141 “Hugo Chávez Says Venezuela Is Studying Idea of Starting Peaceful Nuclear Energy Program,” AP Newswire,
September 28, 2010; “Russia to Build Nuclear Power Plant in Venezuela,” Reuters News, October 15, 2010; Diego
Ore, “Venezuela Halts Nuclear Program After Japan Disaster,” Reuters News, March 15, 2011.
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In September 2009, comments by Venezuelan officials offered conflicting information about
Iran’s support for Venezuela’s search for uranium deposits. Venezuelan Minister of Basic Industry
and Mining Rodolfo Sanz said that Iran was assisting Venezuela in detecting uranium reserves in
the west and southwest of Venezuela.142 Subsequently, however, Venezuela’s Minister of Science,
Technology, and Intermediary Industry Jesse Chacon denied that Iran was helping Venezuela seek
uranium, while Venezuela’s Minister of Energy Rafael Ramirez maintained that Venezuela has yet
to develop a plan to explore or exploit its uranium deposits.143 Observers point out that Venezuela
does not currently mine uranium. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 (June 9, 2010) bars
Iranian investment in uranium mining projects abroad.
Another reason for U.S. concerns about Iran’s deepening relations with Latin America is its ties to
Hezbollah, a State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. Hezbollah, along with
Iran, is reported to have been linked to two bombings against Jewish targets in Argentina in the
early 1990s: the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 30 people and
the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires that
killed 85 people. The United States has imposed sanctions on individuals and companies in Latin
America for providing support to Hezbollah. Specifically as it relates to Venezuela, in June 2008,
the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on two Venezuelans—Ghazi Nasr al Din (a
Venezuelan diplomat serving in Lebanon) and Fawzi Kan’an—for providing financial and other
support to Hezbollah. U.S. citizens are prohibited from engaging in any transactions with the two
Venezuelans, including any business with two travel agencies in Caracas owned by Kan’an.144
Venezuela’s Extradition Request for Luis Posada Carriles
Venezuela has requested the extradition of anti-Castro Cuban activist Luis Posada Carriles for his
alleged role in the 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner that killed 73 people.145 Posada was
imprisoned in Venezuela for the bombing from 1976 until 1985, but not convicted. He escaped
from prison in 1985. Posada is alleged to be involved in a series of bombings in Havana in 1997
in which an Italian businessman was killed. In November 2000, Posada was arrested in Panama
(along with three other anti-Castro activists) for a plot to kill Fidel Castro, and ultimately
convicted on weapons charges and sentenced to eight years in prison in April 2004. Then
Panamanian President Mireya Moscoso pardoned Posada in August 2004, just before the end of
her presidential term.
Posada entered the United States illegally in 2005. In subsequent removal proceedings, an
immigration judge found that Posada could not be removed to Cuba or Venezuela because of
concerns that he would face torture, and he was thereafter permitted to remain in the United
States pending such time as he could be transferred to a different country. Posada subsequently
applied for naturalization to become a U.S. citizen. This application was denied, and criminal
142 See the following press reports: “Iran Helps Venezuela Find Uranium Deposits,” BBC Monitoring Caucasus,
September 26, 2009; and “Iran Helps Venezuela Find Uranium Deposits,” Tehran Press TV Online, September 26,
2009.
143 “Venezuela Denies Iran is Helping It,” New York Times, September 27, 2009; and Fabian Cambero, “Interview:
Venezuela Says No Plans Yet on Exploring Uranium,” Reuters, September 27, 2009.
144 “Treasury Targets Hizballah in Venezuela,” States News Service, June 18, 2008.
145 For additional information, see “Background on Luis Posada Carriles,” CRS Congressional Distribution
Memorandum, December 8, 2010, prepared by Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, and Michael
John Garcia, Legislative Attorney. Available from the authors.
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charges were brought against him for allegedly false statements made in his naturalization
application and interview. Although a federal district court dismissed the indictment in 2007, its
ruling was reversed by an appellate court in 2008.
In April 2009, the United States filed a superseding indictment, which included additional
criminal charges based on allegedly false statements made by Posada in immigration removal
proceedings concerning his involvement in the 1997 Havana bombings. His trial originally was
set to begin in August 2009, but was rescheduled three times until it finally began in January
2011. Ultimately, Posada was acquitted of the perjury charges in April 2011. The Venezuelan
government criticized the acquittal, accusing the United States of protected Posada, and reiterated
its call for Posada’s extradition to Venezuela.146
Legislative Initiatives in the 112th Congress
H.Res. 247 (Mack). Introduced May 4, 2011; referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
The resolution calls on the Secretary of State to designate Venezuela as a state sponsor of
terrorism and urges increased and sustained cooperation on counter-terrorism initiatives between
the United States and allies in the region.
H.R. 2542 (Mack). Introduced July 14, 2011; referred to the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs; ordered reported (amended) by the House Committee on the Western Hemisphere
December 15, 2011. As introduced, the bill would withhold 20% of U.S. assessed and voluntary
contributions to the OAS for every Permanent Council meeting that takes place in which Article
20 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter is not invoked with regard to Venezuela’s violation
of the Charter. (Note—Article 20 of the Charter may be invoked by the Secretary General or any
OAS member “in the event of an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that
seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state.”)
H.R. 2583 (Ros-Lehtinen). Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2012. Introduced
July 19, 2011. Reported, amended, by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs September 23,
2011 (H.Rept. 112-223). As reported, Section 931 of the bill provides that no funds authorized
under the Act may be made available to the governments of Argentina, Venezuela, Nicaragua,
Ecuador, or Bolivia.
H.R. 3783 (Duncan). Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act. Introduced January 18,
2012; referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. On March 1, 2012, the House Foreign
Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade approved the
measure after it initially approved an amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by
Representative Duncan, the bill’s sponsor.147 As amended by the subcommittee, the bill would
state that it shall be U.S. policy “to use appropriate elements of national power to counter Iran’s
growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere by working together with
United States allies and partners in the region to mutually deter threats to our interests by the
Government of Iran.” As approved by the subcommittee, the bill would also require the Secretary
146 “Venezuela acusa a EEUU de proteger a Posada Carriles,” AP Spanish Worldstream, April 9, 2011; “Reitera
Venezuela pedido de extradición de Posada Carriles,” Agencia Mexicana de Noticias, April 13, 2011.
147 See the amended language of H.R. 3783, available from the House Committee on Foreign Affairs at
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/ANS%20DUNCSC_040_xml%202%2029%2012.pdf
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of State to conduct an assessment within 180 days of the threats to the United States posed by
“Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere” and a strategy to
address these threats. On March 7, 2012, the full House Committee on Foreign Affairs approved
the measure by voice vote and ordered the bill to be reported.
Legislative Initiatives in the 111th Congress
Several initiatives were enacted, considered, or introduced in the 111th Congress regarding
Venezuela and proliferation, terrorism, and human rights concerns.
Enacted and Considered Measures
P.L. 111-195 (H.R. 2194), Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Disinvestment Act
of 2010, signed into law July 1, 2010. The law amended the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 to make
gasoline sales to Iran subject to U.S. sanctions. The House approved the measure on December
15, 2009, while the Senate passed it on March 11, 2010. A conference report (H.Rept. 111-512)
was filed on June 23, 2010, which was approved by both houses on June 24, 2010.
On June 4, 2010, the Senate Committee on Armed Services reported S. 3454 (Levin), the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011 (S.Rept. 111-201), with a provision in Section
1237 that would have required a report on Venezuela related to terrorism issues within 180 days
of enactment. The report was to contain a description of any activities by the government of
Venezuela to supply any terrorist organization with planning, training, logistics, and lethal
material support; activities to provide direct or indirect support to any terrorist organization;
activities to provide other types of assistance that could provide material support for the activities
of any terrorist organization; activities or assistance to governments currently on the U.S. list of
state sponsors of terrorism; and activities by the government of Venezuela in the Western
Hemisphere that undermine the national interest of the United States. The report was to focus
primarily, but not be limited to, Hamas, Hezbollah, the National Liberation Army (ELN, of
Colombia), and the FARC. The House version of the defense authorization bill, H.R. 5136, did
not have a similar provision, and Senate action was not completed on S. 3454.
On July 22, 2009, the Senate approved S.Amdt. 1536 (Martinez) to the Senate version of the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, S. 1390, that would have required the Director
of National Intelligence to provide a report within180 days on issues relating to Venezuelan
military and intelligence activities. The Senate subsequently approved S. 1390 on July 23, 2009,
and then approved the language of S. 1390 as an amendment to H.R. 2647, the House legislative
vehicle for the defense authorization measure. The House bill did not include a similar Venezuela
report requirement, and the October 7, 2009, conference report to the measure did not include the
Senate provision (H.Rept. 111-288).
On June 10, 2009, the House approved its version of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
FY2010 and FY2011, H.R. 2410, with a provision in Section 1011 that would have required a
report within 90 days after enactment of the act on Iran’s and Hezbollah’s actions in the Western
Hemisphere. The provision cited the State Department’s 2008 terrorism report noting passengers
on the weekly flights connecting Tehran and Damascus with Caracas were reportedly subject to
only cursory immigration and customs controls in Caracas. The provision also noted that Iran had
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sought to strengthen ties with several Western Hemisphere countries in order to undermine U.S.
foreign policy. The Senate did not consider the measure.
Other Introduced Measures
H.R. 375 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced January 9, 2009, as the Western Hemisphere
Counterterrorism and Nonproliferation Act of 2009, would, among its provisions, have placed
restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela or
Cuba (section 209). The bill would also have authorized the President to impose foreign aid and
export controls on countries that the President determined was engaged in military cooperation or
nonmarket-based trade with a state sponsor of terrorism, was carrying out policies that threaten
U.S. national security interests, or was not fully cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism or
nonproliferation efforts (section 106). It would also have amended annual international drug
control certification procedures to include progress in adhering to obligations under international
counterterrorism agreements and the implementation of effective counterterrorism measures
(section 104).
H.R. 2475 (Ros-Lehtinen), the Foreign Relations Authorization and Reform Act for FY2010 and
FY2011 introduced on May 19, 2009, included a provision (section 728) identical to that in H.R.
375 described above that would have placed restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries
assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela or Cuba.
Also related to proliferation concerns, H.R. 4436 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced January 13, 2010,
would have expressed the sense of Congress that any use by Iran of nuclear cooperation
agreements with other countries as a means to proliferate weapons technology and expertise to
countries such as Venezuela, either directly or by means of arrangements with Belarus or other
countries, would not be in the interest of the United States. The bill also would have required an
annual report from the Secretary of State (1) regarding a determination as to whether nuclear
cooperation agreements and activities involving Iran, Belarus, or Venezuela were being used as
means to proliferate nuclear arms technology and expertise and (2) on the sale or delivery of
weapons or related technologies from Belarus to any country designated as a state sponsor of
terrorism or not fully cooperation with U.S. antiterrorism efforts, including Venezuela.
Before Venezuela’s February 2009 constitutional referendum was held, H.Res. 161 (Mack) was
introduced on February 11. The resolution would have expressed the sense of the House
regarding the need for free, democratic, transparent, and fair elections in Venezuela without
threats or intimidation.
Also related to the state of democracy in Venezuela is a resolution introduced on March 1, 2010,
S.Res. 428 (LeMieux), that would have expressed concerns about violations of civil liberties
taking place in Venezuela.
Before Venezuela’s September 26, 2010, legislative elections, S.Res. 645 (Ensign) was
introduced on September 24, 2010; it would have expressed the sense of the Senate supporting
the right of the people of Venezuela to free and fair elections and to freedoms of speech and
assembly and rejecting any effort by President Chávez to intimidate or punish Venezuelans who
exercise these rights.
Two introduced resolutions would have expressed concerns about anti-Semitism in Venezuela.
H.Res. 174 (Hastings), introduced February 13, 2009, would have expressed concern about “the
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growing threat of anti-Semitism throughout South America, namely in Venezuela, Bolivia, and
Argentina.” H.Con.Res. 124 (Mack), introduced May 12, 2009, would have expressed the
support of Congress for the Jewish community in Venezuela. Among its provisions, the resolution
would have condemned anti-Semitic acts in Venezuela and urged the government of Venezuela to
take verifiable steps to ensure the safety of the Jewish community in the country. The resolution
also would have expressed grave concern regarding the increased collaboration between Iran,
Hezbollah, and the Venezuelan government, and the ramifications of such collaboration on the
Jewish community in Venezuela.
H.Res. 872 (Mack), introduced October 27, 2009, would have condemned the Venezuelan
government “for its state-sponsored support of international terrorist groups”; called on the
Secretary of State to designate Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism; and urged increased and
sustained cooperation on counterterrorism initiatives between the government of the United
States and allies in Latin America.
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Appendix A. Links to U.S. Government Reports
Background Note, Venezuela
Date: September 2, 2011
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2012, Annex: Regional
Perspectives (pp. 837-838 of pdf)
Date: April 8, 2011
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/158268.pdf
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2010, Venezuela
Date: April 8, 2011
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/wha/154523.htm
Country Reports on Terrorism 2010 (Western Hemisphere Overview)
Date: August 18, 2011
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/170259.htm
Doing Business in Venezuela: 2011 Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies
Date: 2011
Full Text: http://www.buyusainfo.net/docs/x_9727130.pdf
International Religious Freedom Report July-December 2010, Venezuela
Date: September 13, 2011
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168234.htm
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2012, Vol. I (Venezuela, pp. 465-470 of pdf)
Date: March 2012
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/184314.pdf
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2012, Vol. II (Venezuela, pp. 190-191 of
pdf)
Date: March 2012
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/184329.pdf
National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers 2011, Venezuela
Date: March 2011
Full Text: http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2747
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Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 (Venezuela, pp. 37-38 of pdf)
Date: June 27, 2011
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/164458.pdf
Appendix B. Key Developments in 2009-2011
On June 24, 2011, three House subcommittees (House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere and Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia;
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security,
Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations) held a joint hearing on “Venezuela’s Sanctionable
Activities” featuring State Department and Treasury Department witnesses.
On June 10, 2011, while visiting Cuba, President Hugo Chávez underwent emergency surgery for
a “pelvic abscess.” Rumors abounded about the president’s health.
On May 24, 2011, pursuant to the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Disinvestment Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-195), the State Department imposed sanctions on Petróleos
de Venezuela (PdVSA) for providing cargoes of reformate, an additive used in gasoline, to Iran
between December 2010 and March 2011 valued at around $50 million. The State Department
prohibited PdVSA from competing for U.S. government procurement contracts, securing
financing from the Export-Import Bank, and obtaining U.S. export licenses. The sanctions
specifically exclude PdVSA subsidiaries (like Citgo) and do not prohibit the export of oil to the
United States.
On May 11, 2011, for the sixth consecutive year, the Department of State made a determination
pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act that Venezuela has not been cooperating
fully with the United States on antiterrorism efforts.
On May 9, 2011, Colombia extradited to Venezuela alleged Venezuelan trafficker and murderer
Walid Makled Garcia. Makled is also wanted in the United States on drug trafficking charges, and
several Members of Congress had wanted Colombia to extradite Makled to the United States.
On April 8, 2011, the State Department issued its 2010 human rights report detailing numerous
human rights problems in Venezuela. (See the full text of the report at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/wha/154523.htm.)
On March 1, 2011, the State Department issued its 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, which maintained that Venezuela was one of the preferred trafficking routes for the transit
of cocaine out of South America because of a porous border with Colombia, a weak judicial
system, inconsistent international counternarcotics cooperation, and a generally permissive and
corrupt environment.
On February 22, 2011, more than 80 students ended a 23-day hunger strike after the government
agreed to review cases of some 27 alleged political prisoners.
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On February 2, 2011, Judge María Lourdes Afiuni was released from prison and placed under
house arrest. The judge has been held since December 2009 after she had ordered the release of a
prominent businessman. Human rights groups have called for the corruption changes against her
to be dropped completely, and view her imprisonment as creating a climate of fear that
undermines the rule of law.
On December 20, 2010, the Venezuelan government revoked its agreement for the appointment of
Larry Palmer, nominated to be U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela. The United States responded by
revoking the diplomatic visa of Venezuelan Ambassador Bernardo Alvarez.
On December 17, 2010, Venezuela’s outgoing National Assembly approved an enabling law
granting President Chávez far-reaching decree powers for 18 months.
On November 16, 2010, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos said that his government
would extradite a Venezuelan businessman and alleged narcotics trafficker, Walid Makled, to
Venezuela. While the United States also wanted Makled extradited to the United States on drug
trafficking changes, the Administration maintained that it respected Colombia’s extradition
processes.
On September 26, 2010, Venezuela held elections for its 165-member unicameral National
Assembly, in which pro-Chávez supporters won 98 seats while opposition parties won 67 seats.
Even though the ruling party won a majority of seats, the result was viewed as a significant defeat
for President Chávez because it denied his government the three-fifths and two-thirds majorities
needed for a variety of actions to ensure the enactment of the government’s agenda.
On September 15, 2010, President Obama issued the sixth annual determination that Venezuela
had “failed demonstrably” to meet its obligations under international counternarcotics measures.
The justification accompanying the determination maintained that Venezuela has not responded to
U.S. government offers to work in a consistent, rigorous, and effective way towards greater
cooperation on counternarcotics.
On August 30, 2010, hunger striker Franklin Brito died. He had been protesting the seizure of a
portion of his farm in 2004.
On August 5, 2010, the State Department released its 2009 Country Reports on Terrorism, which
maintained that Venezuela’s cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism was reduced
to an “absolute minimum” after the United States and Colombia signed a defense cooperation
agreement in 2009.
On July 22, 2010, Venezuela suspended diplomatic relations with Colombia after the government
of outgoing Colombian President Álvaro Uribe asserted at the Organization of American States
that Venezuela was harboring Colombian guerrillas. Less than three weeks later, on August 10,
2010, bilateral tensions eased when new Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos met with
President Chávez and the two leaders agreed to reestablish diplomatic relations.
On July 1, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Disinvestment Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-195, H.R. 2194), which amended the
Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 to make gasoline sales to Iran subject to U.S. sanctions. In September
2009, Venezuela and Iran signed an agreement for Venezuela to supply Iran with some gasoline in
the case of U.N. or U.S. sanctions against Iran’s gasoline imports.
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On June 16, 2010, the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere held a hearing on “Press
Freedom in the Americas” that focused in part on threats to freedom of expression in Venezuela.
(A transcript of the hearing is available from the subcommittee’s website at
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/56996.pdf.)
On June 4, 2010, the Senate Committee on Armed Services reported S. 3454 (Levin), the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011 (S.Rept. 111-201), with a provision in Section
1237 that would have required a report on Venezuela related to terrorism issues within 180 days
of enactment. The Senate did not complete action on the measure.
On March 11, 2010, the State Department released its annual human report for 2009. The section
on Venezuela maintained that “politicization of the judiciary and official harassment and
intimidation of the political opposition and the media intensified during the year.” (See the full
text of the report at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/wha/136130.htm.)
On March 1, 2010, the State Department released its 2010 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report (INCSR), in which it maintained that Venezuela continued to suffer from high
levels of corruption, a weak judicial system, and inconsistent counternarcotics cooperation that
have enabled a growing illicit drug transshipment industry. The State Department also asserted
that the United States was prepared to deepen anti-drug cooperation beyond the minimal
cooperation that now exists.
On February 2, 2010, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair testified before the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence that President “Chávez continues to impose an authoritarian
populist political model in Venezuela that undermines democratic institutions.” Blair maintained
that Chávez “and his allies are likely to oppose nearly every U.S. policy initiative in the region,
including the expansion of free trade, counter drug and counterterrorism cooperation, military
training, and security initiatives, and even U.S. assistance programs.” Venezuela’s Ambassador to
the United States strongly criticized Blair’s statement, maintaining the assessment was full of
politically motivated and cynical accusations against Venezuela.
On February 2, 2010, Venezuelan officials announced the deportation of suspected Colombian
drug trafficker Salomon Camacho Mora to the United States. The officials also announced the
deportation of two other drug traffickers to France and Colombia.
On January 25, 2010, two students were killed during demonstrations between pro- and anti-
government supporters. Venezuelan human rights groups called for the government to guarantee
the right to peaceful protest.
On January 24, 2010, the Venezuelan government took six cable channels off the air, including
RCTV Internacional, which had broadcast programs critical of the government. The government’s
action prompted widespread domestic and international criticism, including by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights.
On January 8, 2010, President Chávez announced a devaluation of the bolivar fuerte and the
creation of a two-tiered exchange rate system. The action will likely help shore up the
government’s fiscal situation, but could lead to a surge in inflation.
On December 15, 2009, the House approved H.R. 2194 (Berman), the Iran Refined Petroleum
Sanctions Act of 2009 on December 15, 2009, which would amend the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
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to make gasoline sales to Iran subject to U.S. sanctions. In September 2009, Venezuela reportedly
agreed to provide Iran with gasoline (reportedly some 20,000 barrels per day) in the case of U.N.
or U.S. sanctions against Iran’s gasoline imports.
On December 10, 2009, a Venezuelan judge released prominent business leader Eligio Cedeño
from prison. Cedeño had been held in pretrial detention in 2007, and some human rights activists
considered him a political prisoner. After his release, Cedeño traveled to the United States and is
awaiting an immigration hearing; Venezuela has asked for his extradition. The judge who released
Cedeño, María Lourdes Afiuni, was arrested just hours after his release on allegations of
corruption, and remains imprisoned. U.N. human rights experts criticized the judge’s arrest as
undermining the rule of law.
On October 27, 2009, the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere held a hearing on
“Iran in the Western Hemisphere” that focused extensively on Venezuela’s deepening relations
with Iran.
On September 15, 2009, President Obama made a determination pursuant to the annual narcotics
certification process that Venezuela had “failed demonstrably” during the last 12 months to
adhere to international counternarcotics agreements. This marked the fifth consecutive annual
designation of Venezuela in this category. At the same time, President Obama waived economic
sanctions that would have cut U.S. funding for democracy programs in Venezuela.
On July 27, 2009, the government of Sweden asked for an explanation from Venezuela of how the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) obtained Swedish-made anti-tank rocket
launchers that had been sold to Venezuela in the 1980s. President Chávez asserted that the
missiles were stolen in a robbery in 1995, and that Colombia made the claims to divert attention
from the plan to open seven of its military bases to the United States.
On July 22, 2009, the Senate approved an amendment to the Senate version of the National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, S. 1390/H.R. 2647 that would have required the Director
of National Intelligence to provide a report within 180 days on issues relating to Venezuelan
military and intelligence activities. The House version of the bill did not include a similar
provision, and it was stripped from the conference report on the measure (H.Rept. 111-288 filed
October 7, 2009).
On July 20, 2009, the U.S. Government Accountability Office issued a report on the status of
drug trafficking through Venezuela and the status of U.S.-Venezuelan counternarcotics
cooperation. The report concluded that the lack of Venezuelan counternarcotics cooperation is a
significant impediment to the U.S. capacity to interdict drugs en route to the United States.
According to the report, U.S. and Colombian officials assert that Venezuela has extended a
lifeline to illegally armed Colombian groups by providing significant support and safe haven
along the border.
On June 25, 2009, the State Department announced that the United States and Venezuela agreed
to return respective ambassadors. This led to U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela Patrick Duddy
resuming his post in Caracas, and to the return of Venezuelan Ambassador Bernardo Alvarez to
Washington.
On February 15, 2009, Venezuelans voted in a national referendum to approve a constitutional
amendment abolishing term limits for elected local, state, and national officials, including
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president. The amendment was approved with almost 55% voting for it and 45% voting against it.
President Chávez proclaimed that the vote was a victory for the Bolivarian Revolution, and
virtually promised that he would run for reelection in 2012.
On January 30, 2009, an unidentified group of assailants vandalized a synagogue in Caracas.
President Chávez and other Venezuelan officials strongly condemned the attack. Subsequently, on
February 2, 2009, 16 Members of Congress spoke out against the attack in a letter to President
Chávez. The Members called on Chávez “to end the bullying and harassment of the Jewish
community” and “to extend the community the robust protection it deserves in light of the threats
it faces.”
Author Contact Information
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
msullivan@crs.loc.gov, 7-7689
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