Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s
Nuclear Facilities
Jim Zanotti, Coordinator
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Jeremiah Gertler
Specialist in Military Aviation
Steven A. Hildreth
Specialist in Missile Defense
March 27, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42443
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities
Summary
Several published reports indicate that top Israeli decisionmakers now are seriously considering
whether to order a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, and if so, when. Twice in Israel’s
history, it has conducted air strikes aimed at halting or delaying what Israeli policymakers
believed to be efforts to acquire nuclear weapons by a Middle Eastern state—destroying Iraq’s
Osirak reactor in 1981 and a facility the Israelis identified as a reactor under construction in Syria
in 2007. Today, Israeli officials generally view the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran as an
unacceptable threat to Israeli security—with some viewing it as an existential threat.
This report analyzes key factors that may influence current Israeli political decisions relating to a
possible strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. These include, but are not limited to, the views of and
relationships among Israeli leaders; the views of the Israeli public; U.S., regional, and
international stances and responses as perceived and anticipated by Israel; Israeli estimates of the
potential effectiveness and risks of a possible strike; and responses Israeli leaders anticipate from
Iran and Iranian-allied actors—including Hezbollah and Hamas—regionally and internationally.
For Congress, the potential impact—short- and long-term—of an Israeli decision regarding Iran
and its implementation is a critical issue of concern. By all accounts, such an attack could have
considerable regional and global security, political, and economic repercussions, not least for the
United States, Israel, and their bilateral relationship. It is unclear what the ultimate effect of a
strike would be on the likelihood of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. The current Israeli
government, President Barack Obama, and many Members of Congress have shared concerns
about Iran’s nuclear program. They appear to have a range of views on how best to address those
shared concerns. Iran maintains that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful, civilian energy
purposes, and U.S. intelligence assessments say that Iran has not made a decision to build nuclear
weapons. However, Iran continues to enrich uranium in militarily hardened sites and questions
remain about its nuclear weapons capabilities and intentions.
Short- and long-term questions for Members of Congress to consider regarding a possible Israeli
decision to strike Iranian nuclear facilities militarily might include, but are not limited to, the
following:
• How might an Israeli strike affect options and debate regarding short-term and
long-term U.S. relations and security cooperation with, and foreign assistance to,
Israel and other regional countries?
• Would an Israeli strike be considered self-defense? Why or why not? What would
be the legal and policy implications either way?
• How might a strike affect the implementation of existing sanctions legislation on
Iran or options and debate over new legislation on the subject?
• How might Congress consult with the Obama Administration on and provide
oversight with respect to various political and military options?
This report has many aspects that are the subject of vigorous debate and remain fully or partially
outside public knowledge. CRS does not claim to independently confirm any sources cited within
this report that attribute specific positions or views to various U.S. and Israeli officials.
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Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities
Contents
Introduction, Issue Overview, and Questions for Congress............................................................. 1
Preliminary Considerations Regarding an Israeli Decision ............................................................. 9
Nature of the Threat – Differing Stated Perceptions ................................................................. 9
Possible “Zone of Immunity” and Israel’s Ability to Act Independently ................................ 12
Military Action Versus Alternative Courses of Action ............................................................ 13
The Israeli Decisionmaking Process.............................................................................................. 15
Decisionmakers: Views and Interactions................................................................................. 15
Public Opinion and Debate in Israel........................................................................................ 19
Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Stances and Anticipated Responses Outside Israel ........ 21
The United States..................................................................................................................... 21
Regionally and Internationally ................................................................................................ 24
Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Possible Operational Aspects of an Israeli Strike .......... 25
Access...................................................................................................................................... 26
Aircraft .................................................................................................................................... 28
Weapons .................................................................................................................................. 29
Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Estimated Effects of a Possible Strike ........................... 32
Effect on Iran’s Nuclear Program............................................................................................ 32
Effect on Iran’s Regime........................................................................................................... 35
Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Possible Iranian Responses to a Strike........................... 36
Diplomatic Responses ............................................................................................................. 36
Hostile but Non-Military Responses ....................................................................................... 37
Military Responses .................................................................................................................. 37
Attacks on Israeli Territory................................................................................................ 38
Attacks Against Israeli Interests Abroad ........................................................................... 43
Expanded Military Responses ................................................................................................. 44
Attempted Closure of the Strait of Hormuz ...................................................................... 44
Attacks on U.S. Allies in the Persian Gulf ........................................................................ 45
Attacks on U.S. Installations and Interests in the Region or Elsewhere Abroad............... 45
Possible Attacks on the U.S. Homeland............................................................................ 46
Conclusion: Possible Implications for Congress ........................................................................... 47
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Major Iranian Facilities in Regional Context....................................................... 7
Figure 2. Timeline of Relevant Events Involving Iran’s Nuclear Program and Israel..................... 8
Figure 3. Underground Nuclear Facilities and Penetrating Munitions .......................................... 31
Figure 4. Potential Ranges of Iranian Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles...................................... 40
Figure 5. Possible Ranges of Rockets and Missiles from Iranian-Allied Groups.......................... 42
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Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 48
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 48
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Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities
Introduction, Issue Overview, and Questions for
Congress1
In February 2012, a U.S. newspaper columnist reported that Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta
“believes there is a strong likelihood that Israel will strike Iran in April, May or June.”2 Less than
two weeks later in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 14,
Secretary Panetta declined when questioned to take a position on the likelihood of a spring 2012
Israeli attack against nuclear facilities in Iran.3
Secretary Panetta’s comments were only part of the stream of statements from U.S. and Israeli
officials and media reports that drew attention to a question that has periodically recurred in the
national security discourse of both countries (and more broadly): Might Israel choose to attack
Iran’s nuclear facilities, possibly counter to U.S. advice?
For decades, successive regimes in Iran have engaged in nuclear-related activities. The ultimate
goal of these activities, however, has remained stubbornly ambiguous. Despite extensive
examination of these activities by both government and non-government experts around the
world, including on-site investigation by representatives of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), no definitive proof has been offered to conclude with certainty the validity of:
• Iran’s claims that its nuclear work is entirely for peaceful purposes as allowed
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to which it is a party;
• Concerns of some government officials and non-government experts in the
United States and elsewhere that Iran is seeking a “nuclear capability” below the
threshold of nuclear weapons (which entails the combination of fissile material
with a nuclear warhead and an appropriate delivery vehicle) that nevertheless
may allow it to rapidly cross the nuclear threshold at some time in the future; or
• Allegations that the Iranian regime is committed to acquiring nuclear weapons.
Ongoing disagreements among analysts as to how far away Iran is from achieving a “nuclear
capability” or nuclear weapons if it is committed to doing so only exacerbates this ambiguity and
uncertainty regarding Iran’s nuclear-related efforts. This uncertainty and ambiguity is a major
feature of the environment in which international actors decide their policies and actions vis-à-vis
1 Prepared by Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, with contributions from Kenneth Katzman, Specialist
in Middle Eastern Affairs and Paul K. Kerr, Analyst in Nonproliferation. See also CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S.
Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations,
by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International
Obligations, by Paul K. Kerr. Outside reports on the issue include Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner, Iran
and the Gulf Military Balance – II: The Missile and Nuclear Dimensions: Working Draft, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, February 22, 2012. Bergman, “Will Israel Attack Iran?”, op. cit.; Dalia Dassa Kaye, et al., Israel
and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry, RAND Corporation, 2011; Dana H. Allin and Steven Simon, The Sixth Crisis: Iran,
Israel, America and the Rumors of War, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
2 David Ignatius, “Of a mind to attack Iran,” Washington Post, February 3, 2012.
3 At the same hearing, Secretary Panetta acknowledged having talked with the columnist who wrote the February 2012
report “about a lot of things.”
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Iran. The view a state holds of the ultimate goal of Iran’s nuclear-related activities informs the
approach it takes in dealing with the Iranian regime.
For various reasons—including geopolitical, historical, and ideological—the prospect of an Iran
with nuclear weapons arguably affects the threat perceptions of Israel more than those of the
United States4 or other nations. Twice in its history, Israel has conducted air strikes aimed at
preventing a regional actor from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability—destroying Iraq’s
Tammuz-Osirak reactor in 1981 and a presumed reactor under construction at Al Kibar near Deir
al Zur in Syria in 2007. For some period of time, Israeli leaders have conveyed their view that
Israel may similarly be compelled to act to prevent a potentially nuclear-armed Iran. Analysts
generally agree that Israeli military action against multiple Iranian nuclear facilities would be
significantly more complex operationally than these previous attacks, both of which targeted
single facilities that were closer in range to Israel (see Figure 1 below). What lessons the
previous strikes—particularly the one on Osirak in 1981—impart for an Israeli decision on
whether to strike Iran is a subject of debate.5
For Congress, the potential impact—short- and long-term—of an Israeli decision regarding Iran
and its implementation is a critical issue of concern.
Since Iran’s nuclear program became a major international issue a decade ago, Israel has deferred
to the United States and other actors in coordinating diplomacy and implementing economic and
other sanctions aimed at convincing Iran to abandon activities that could allow it to develop
nuclear weapons. In recent years, however, reports suggest that Israel has pursued covert
means—including sabotage, cyberwarfare, and assassination—to intimidate Iran and delay the
nuclear program, with some reported success.6 Without confirming or denying involvement,
Israeli officials also generally have welcomed reports of events that might set back Iran’s nuclear
program.7
Even before the reports in recent months of possible Israeli military action, at various stages of
the international effort to persuade Iran to relinquish any possible nuclear weapons ambitions
some Israeli officials have hinted that Israel might be compelled to take unilateral action to
counter what they see as an Iranian nuclear weapons program.8 It was in the first three months of
4 Leslie Susser, “Spy vs. Spy,” Jerusalem Report, March 26, 2012, stating, “Although he too is committed to stopping
the Iranians, US President Barack Obama does not see the prospect of a nuclear Iran in the same apocalyptic terms as
Netanyahu does. True, a nuclear Iran would hurt vital American interests in the Middle East, but Iran is a long way
from American shores.”
5 Allin and Simon, p. 53. Some analysts cite Osirak to emphasize the potential perils of an attack on Iran, pointing to
Saddam Hussein’s subsequent clandestine pursuit of nuclear weapons on an accelerated timetable. Some use it to
emphasize the potential benefits of an attack, pointing to the U.S.-led international action from 1991-2003 that
eventually squelched Hussein’s nuclear ambitions, even though the international coalition was not initially assembled
in response to Iraq’s nuclear program, but its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. According to a 2010 book, many Israelis
believe that buying time through a strike on Iran “might prove worthwhile in [unanticipated] ways…” Ibid.
6 See Yossi Melman, “The war against Iran’s nuclear program has already begun,” Ha’aretz, December 2, 2011. Some
reports state that U.S. and British intelligence agencies have aided Israel with some non-lethal covert operations. Daniel
Klaidman, Eli Lake, and Dan Ephron, “Obama’s Dangerous Game with Iran,” Newsweek, February 13, 2012.
7 For example, after the January 2012 assassination of an Iranian nuclear scientist, Brig. Gen. Yoav Mordechai, an
Israeli military spokesman, reportedly wrote on his Facebook page, “I don’t know who took revenge on the Iranian
scientist, but I am definitely not shedding a tear.” Alan Cowell and Rick Gladstone, “Iran Reports Killing of Nuclear
Scientist in ‘Terrorist’ Blast,” New York Times, January 11, 2012.
8 See, e.g., Jeffrey Goldberg, “Point of No Return,” The Atlantic, September 2010.
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2012, however, that the issue came into sharper relief for U.S. policymakers, including in
Congress. This was in part a result of comments by senior Israeli government officials and former
officials that intensified the debate within their country as to the wisdom and potential
effectiveness of military action against nuclear-related targets in Iran, linked to a similar
discussion in the United States and worldwide.
This report assesses this issue, focusing primarily on the decision that might be made by the
government of Israel. In particular, it examines the range of factors that could influence such an
Israeli decision.
Implementation of an Israeli decision to strike Iran’s nuclear-related facilities could have
significant implications for U.S. interests and goals related both to the nuclear issue itself and to
broader regional and international concerns, including U.S. relations with Israel.9 In assessing
those implications and considering possible action either before or after a possible Israeli strike
(see “Conclusion: Possible Implications for Congress” below), Congress and the Obama
Administration might consider the following questions:
Israeli Debate and Decision Regarding a Potential Attack:
• What is the nature of the public and official debate in Israel over the Iranian nuclear issue
and possible Israeli, U.S., and international approaches to it, including military and non-
military options? How might that debate evolve?
• What are the factors in Israeli thinking and who are the main actors involved in the
decision?
• Under what conditions is a final political decision regarding military action likely?
• How does Israel assess the operational requirements of a potential strike?
Effect on Iran’s Nuclear Program and Regime:
• Ultimately, is an attack more likely to prevent an Iran with nuclear weapons or help bring
it about? If an attack only delayed a potential nuclear weapons program in Iran, would
Israel feel compelled to take additional military action later?
• What effect might an attack have on a potential Iranian decision to weaponize its nuclear
program?
• Would an attack help or hinder the ongoing international effort to use diplomacy,
monitoring, sanctions, and possible threats of further military action to persuade Iran not
to pursue nuclear weapons? To what extent might the large coalition that is now working
with the United States to enforce sanctions against Iran fracture in the event of a strike?
• Would an attack strengthen or weaken the Iranian regime, particularly given that current
trends indicate that the regime faces significant economic challenges and political
divisions?
9 For more information on U.S.-Israel relations, including the level of U.S. commitment to Israel’s security, see CRS
Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid
to Israel , by Jeremy M. Sharp.
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Effect on Other U.S. Interests:
• What retaliation from Iran and its regional allies (including Lebanese Hezbollah and
Hamas or other Palestinian militants) is likely against Israeli targets?
• If Iran retaliated, would it limit the targeted area to Israel, or would it also target U.S.
interests and allies in the region and elsewhere? If Iran expands its response to U.S. or
U.S.-allied targets, what forms might that take?
• What is the likelihood and potential scope of a crisis in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian
Gulf regarding global energy prices and potential region-wide conflict? What are other
possible regional consequences of an Israeli attack?
This report has many elements that are the subject of vigorous debate and remain fully or partially
outside public knowledge. CRS does not claim that it has confirmed independently any sources
cited within this report that attribute specific positions or views to Israeli, U.S., or other officials.
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Iran’s Nuclear Program and Facilities of Main Concern: A Primer10
Iran’s leaders claim that Iran’s nuclear program is solely for peaceful, civilian energy purposes. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution,
Iran’s leaders (including current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i) have regularly spoken in public against the development
and use of nuclear weapons.11 Iran is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and conducts its declared nuclear
activities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring and safeguards. For a discussion of Iran’s compliance or
non-compliance with international obligations regarding its nuclear program, see Figure 2 below and CRS Report R40094, Iran’s
Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K. Kerr.
Iran’s gas centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program is currently the main source of proliferation concern for the
international community. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride gas at high speeds to increase the
concentration of the uranium-235 isotope. Such centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in
nuclear power reactors, and highly enriched uranium (HEU).12 HEU and plutonium are the two types of fissile material used in
nuclear weapons.
Iran’s construction of a nuclear reactor moderated by heavy water has also been a source of proliferation concern. The reactor is
a proliferation concern because the reactor’s spent fuel will contain plutonium well-suited for use in nuclear weapons. To be used
in nuclear weapons, however, plutonium must be separated from the spent fuel—a procedure cal ed “reprocessing.” Iran has said
that it will not engage in reprocessing, and there is no public evidence that Tehran either has constructed or is constructing a
reprocessing facility.
A 2007 National Intelligence Estimate said that Iran “probably would use covert facilities—rather than its declared nuclear sites—
for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon,”13 at least in part because of the difficulty of diverting significant
amounts of nuclear material from safeguarded facilities without detection. According to Colin Kahl, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Middle East Policy from 2009 until the end of 2011, “there is no evidence that Iran has built additional covert
enrichment plants.”14
For a January 31, 2012 Senate Select Intelligence Committee hearing, James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, submitted
written testimony stating that Iran has the “capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons” and “is keeping open the option to
develop” such weapons, but added that “[w]e do not know... if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.”
Some high-ranking U.S. and Israeli political decisionmakers reportedly differ on the question of how long action might remain
possible to prevent a potential y nuclear-armed Iran. This relates to the question of a possible “zone of immunity” discussed
below. Differences on this question reportedly persist even though U.S. and Israeli assessments are similar on the timetables for
Iran to
•
achieve the capability to develop and produce the components for a nuclear weapon; and
•
if it chooses, to weaponize successfully.
In a January 2012 60 Minutes interview, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said, “The consensus is that, if [Iran] decided to do it,
it would probably take them about a year to be able to produce a bomb and then possibly another one to two years in order to
put it on a deliverable vehicle of some sort in order to deliver that weapon.”15
According a February 2012 report from IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano, Iran has produced 5,451 kilograms of LEU in the
10 Prepared by Paul K. Kerr, Analyst in Nonproliferation, with contributions from Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle
Eastern Affairs.
11 President Obama was quoted in a late February 2012 interview as saying that Iranian leaders in early 2012 have been
saying that “nuclear weapons are sinful and un-Islamic.” President Barack Obama, quoted in Jeffrey Goldberg, “Obama
to Iran and Israel: ‘As President of the United States, I Don’t Bluff,’” theatlantic.com, March 2, 2012.
12 LEU typically contains less than 5% uranium-235. Weapons-grade HEU typically contains approximately 90%
uranium-235.
13 Similarly, a CIA report for 2004 concluded that “inspections and safeguards will most likely prevent Tehran from
using facilities declared to the IAEA directly for its weapons program as long as Iran remains a party to the NPT.”
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Advanced Conventional Munitions, January 1-December 31, 2004.
14 Colin H. Kahl, “Not Time to Attack Iran: Why War Should Be a Last Resort,” Foreign Affairs, January 17, 2012.
15 Transcript of remarks by Secretary Panetta from CBS’s 60 Minutes interview, January 29, 2012, available at
http://www.votesmart.org/public-statement/664274/cbs-60-minutes-transcript.
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Natanz commercial facility. This quantity of LEU, if further enriched, could produce enough HEU for four nuclear weapons,
according to the Institute for Science and International Security.16 According to Amano’s report, Iran has enriched approximately
95 kilograms of uranium up to 20% uranium-235 at the Natanz pilot facility and approximately 14 kilograms of similarly enriched
uranium at the Fordow facility.
The four facilities described below are under IAEA safeguards and monitoring:
Natanz
Iran has both a pilot centrifuge facility and a larger commercial facility located at this site. The commercial facility is reportedly
hardened by steel-reinforced concrete, buried underground, and covered by a mound of earth.17 This facility is capable of
eventually holding more than 47,000 centrifuges. Iran is currently using first-generation centrifuges in the commercial facility to
produce uranium enriched up to 5% uranium-235. Iran is using the pilot facility both to produce uranium enriched up to 20%
uranium-235 and also to test more-advanced centrifuges. According to the IAEA Director-General’s February 2012 report, Iran
has installed approximately 9,100 centrifuges in the commercial facility and is feeding uranium hexafluoride into as many as 8,808
of those centrifuges.
Fordow
Iran has a centrifuge facility located at this site—reportedly built into the side of a small mountain18 and specially-hardened.19 The
facility is eventually supposed to contain approximately 3,000 centrifuges. Tehran has told the IAEA that the facility will be
configured to produce both uranium enriched to 5% uranium-235 and 20% uranium-235. Iran has instal ed approximately 700
first-generation centrifuges in the facility, and it is now reportedly producing 20%-enriched uranium.
Esfahan
Among several nuclear facilities located at this site, Iran’s above-ground uranium conversion facility converts uranium oxide into
several compounds, including gaseous uranium hexafluoride that can be enriched in centrifuges.
Arak
Iran is constructing a nuclear reactor moderated by heavy water at this above-ground site. Tehran also has a plant at this site for
producing heavy water. According to a February 2012 IAEA report, the plant appears to be operating.
Iran also has other nuclear-related facilities, including a light-water nuclear power reactor at Bushehr and a research reactor in
Tehran, as well as research, centrifuge production, and mining facilities. See “Effect on Iran’s Nuclear Program” below for a
textbox describing other facilities related to Iran’s nuclear program.
Figure 1 below provides a map showing facilities related or possibly related to Iran’s nuclear program, the site of the two
previous Israeli strikes in Iraq and Syria, and the surrounding region. Figure 2 below provides a timeline of selected events
relevant to the Iranian nuclear issue and Israel’s involvement.
(...continued)
16 ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report: Production of 20% Enriched Uranium Triples; Iran Increases
Number of Enriching Centrifuges at Natanz FEP by Nearly 50% and Signals an Intention to Greatly Expand the
Number of Centrifuges at Both Natanz and Fordow; Advanced Centrifuge Program Appears Troubled, Institute for
Science and International Security, February 24, 2012.
17 Todd Lindeman and Bill Webster, “Hardened targets,” Washington Post, March 1, 2012.
18 Ibid.
19 Joby Warrick, “Iran: Underground sites vulnerable, experts say,” Washington Post, March 1, 2012.
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Figure 1. Map of Major Iranian Facilities in Regional Context
Sources: Economist, adapted by CRS.
Notes: All locations are approximate. Parchin is an Iranian military testing facility that, according to the Washington Post, “U.S. officials believe was used a decade ago to test
explosive triggers of the kind used to detonate nuclear warheads.” Thomas Erdbrink and Joby Warrick, “Iran urged to grant access to inspectors,” Washington Post, March
9, 2012. According to the IAEA Director-General’s November 2011 report, the IAEA was “permitted by Iran to visit the site twice in 2005. From satellite imagery available
at that time, the Agency identified a number of areas of interest, none of which, however, included the location now believed to contain the building which houses the
explosives chamber mentioned above; consequently, the Agency’s visits did not uncover anything of relevance.” In early March 2012, the “P5+1” countries (United States,
United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, Russia) that manage international diplomacy with Iran on the nuclear issue urged Iran to grant IAEA monitors renewed access to
Parchin. See Figure 3 for additional reported details on the underground facilities at Natanz and Fordow.
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Figure 2. Timeline of Relevant Events Involving Iran’s Nuclear Program and Israel
2002-2012
Sources: Various, compiled by CRS.
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Preliminary Considerations Regarding an Israeli
Decision20
Nature of the Threat – Differing Stated Perceptions
The question of whether a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran will or will not pose an existential threat
to Israel has become an important debate among Israeli leaders. Some Israeli officials express
concerns, based on Iranian leaders’ longstanding pronouncements against the existence of Israel,21
that Iran might seek to use a nuclear weapon against Israel even if faced with the prospect of
near-certain retaliation22 from Israel’s presumed but officially undeclared nuclear arsenal.23 In a
2010 interview, Prime Minister Netanyahu was quoted as saying:
Iran has threatened to annihilate a state. In historical terms, this is an astounding thing. It’s a
monumental outrage that goes effectively unchallenged in the court of public opinion….
Iranian leaders talk about Israel’s destruction or disappearance while simultaneously creating
weapons to ensure its disappearance.24
20 Prepared by Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, with contributions from Kenneth Katzman, Specialist
in Middle Eastern Affairs and Paul K. Kerr, Analyst in Nonproliferation.
21 Israeli official and public discourse regularly refers to many of these actual and alleged pronouncements. Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, decreed that the elimination of a Zionist regime in Israel was a
religious duty. His successor as supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, has repeatedly referred to Israel as a
“cancerous tumor” since his accession in 1989, including in a rare Friday sermon at a Tehran mosque in February 2012.
Elected President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad quoted Khomeini when he made a remark in October 2005 that was widely
translated in Israel and Western countries as expressing the hope that Israel would eventually be “wiped off the map,”
though some analysts have claimed that a more accurate translation was “this regime occupying Jerusalem must vanish
from the page of time.” Juan Cole, “Hitchens the Hacker; And, Hitchens the Orientalist; And, ‘We don’t Want Your
Stinking War!’”, Informed Comment, May 3, 2006. Ahmadinejad also has reportedly described the Holocaust as a
“myth” used as a pretext to create an “artificial Zionist regime.” In a March 2012 CNN interview, an advisor to
Khamene’i said that Ahmadinejad’s comments were “definitely not” meant in a military sense and that such an
approach was not “a policy of Iran.” “Top Iran official calls for cooperation from West in return for ‘transparency,’”
CNN, March 15, 2012.
22 Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former Iranian president (1989-1997), said in a December 2001 speech, “If one
day, the Islamic world is also equipped with weapons like those that Israel possesses now, then the imperialists’
strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything.
However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality.” Translation by
BBC Global Monitoring of Rafsanjani’s Jerusalem Day speech (from Farsi) in Tehran, December 14, 2001, as carried
by Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2001/011214-text.html. However, Iranian officials, including
Ahmadinejad, have made the case that Iran does not have a history of aggression. For example, in 2006, Javad Zarif,
then Iran’s permanent representative to the United Nations, said, “Our history, in the past 250 years, we have not
attacked any other country. We have been the subject of invasion; we have been the subject of aggression; we have
been the subject of use of chemical weapons. But we have defended ourselves, but we never resorted to use of chemical
weapons, even in retaliation. So our record is very clear. On the other hand, unfortunately, Israel has a record of
aggression against its neighbors, has a known nuclear stockpile, is not a member of any international instrument.”
Transcript of PBS Newshour, April 28, 2006.
23 Israel is not a party to the NPT and maintains a policy of “nuclear opacity” or amimut. A consensus among media
and analysts’ reports is that Israel possesses an arsenal of 80 to 200 nuclear weapons, although some suggest a higher
figure. See, e.g., International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear programmes in the Middle East: In the shadow of
Iran, May 2008, p. 133.
24 Goldberg, “Point of No Return,” op. cit.
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Other leading Israeli officials and analysts—including Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Tamir
Pardo, director of Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency—generally avoid characterizing the threat
from Iran as existential at least partly because they claim that Israel “is a strong state and it could
protect itself under any circumstances.”25 According to three Israeli analysts, including a former
deputy national security advisor, whether or not Iran will behave as a “rational actor” has
“become an important dimension of the Israeli debate about a nuclear Iran.”26
Yet, even some Israeli officials who generally avoid characterizing the threat of a nuclear-
weapons-capable Iran as existential describe it as still presenting unacceptably high risks. They
express concern that a nuclear Iran would compromise traditional Israeli security doctrine and
practices—based on principles of self-reliance and maintaining overwhelming military
superiority—and lead to an unacceptable level of national security uncertainty. This in turn would
fundamentally damage the quality of life and psychological sense of safety that Israelis deem
critically important to their country’s continued viability as a Jewish national home.27 According
to a March 2012 article in Israel’s Jerusalem Report, “Even if the Iranians don’t use the bomb,
[Netanyahu] fears the very fact that they have it could lead to a mass exodus of Jews from an
Israel under nuclear threat, weakening the state and compromising the Zionist dream.”28
Some Israelis worry that even if Iran did not attack Israel with a nuclear weapon, mere possession
of a weapon or the capability to assemble one quickly would make it more difficult to deter Iran
from pursuing greater regional influence and amplifying threats to Israeli security through proxies
and allies—the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah, Hamas and other Palestinian militants in Gaza,
and possibly even the beleaguered Asad regime in Syria. Some in Israel, however, argue that Iran
might be limited in its ability to use a potential nuclear weapons capability to thwart conventional
Israeli military action against regional threats.29 Analysts discuss a range of other possible
regional reactions that would undermine Israeli security, including less willingness of Gulf Arab
states to oppose Iranian ambitions; the possibility of proliferation in countries such as Egypt,
Turkey, and Saudi Arabia; and perhaps international pressure on Israel either to declare its nuclear
weapons status or consider giving it up if Iran would do the same.30
25 Avner Cohen, “Israel ponders a nuclear Iran,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Web edition), August 17, 2010. See
also Barak Ravid, “Mossad chief: Nuclear Iran not necessarily existential threat to Israel,” Ha’aretz, December 29,
2011. A February 2012 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report stated, “In actual practice, Israel
can already deliver an ‘existential’ nuclear strike on Iran, and will have far more capability to damage Iran than Iran is
likely to have against Israel for the next decade.” Cordesman and Wilner, op. cit. The Washington Post has written that
President Obama “has declined to call on Israeli leaders to declare [its nuclear] program, a source of frustration and fear
in the Middle East.” Scott Wilson, “Obama to urge Israel’s patience,” Washington Post, March 3, 2012.
26 Shai Feldman, Shlomo Brom, and Shimon Stein, “What to Do About Nuclearizing Iran? The Israeli Debate,”
Brandeis University, Crown Center for Middle East Studies Brief No. 59, February 2012.
27 Haim Malka, Crossroads: The Future of the U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 2011, pp. 58-59; Kaye, et al., op. cit., pp. 37, 52-53.
28 Susser, op. cit.
29 Stein, et al., “The Public Discussion of Israel’s Strategy Regarding a Nuclear Iran,” op. cit.
30 Kaye, et al., op. cit., pp. 27-28; Cohen, op. cit.; Shimon Stein, Shai Feldman, and Shlomo Brom, et al., “The Public
Discussion of Israel’s Strategy Regarding a Nuclear Iran,” Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 310,
January 31, 2012. Israel has expressed support for a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, but has asserted that other
regional countries should reconcile themselves to Israel’s existence before negotiating such a zone. Sha’ul Horev,
Director General of Israel’s Atomic Energy Commission, explained the government’s position in September 2009, “It
is our vision and policy, to establish the Middle East as a mutually verifiable zone free of weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery systems. We have always emphasized, that such a process, through direct negotiations, should begin
with confidence building measures. They should be followed by mutual recognition, reconciliation, and peaceful
relations. Consequently conventional and non-conventional arms control measures will emerge ... In our view, progress
(continued...)
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Israelis continue to debate whether the risks of a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran outweigh the risks
of a strike that most assessments doubt would definitively end Iran’s nuclear program (see “Effect
on Iran’s Nuclear Program” below). According to one Israeli report, “Netanyahu faces one of the
most difficult choices any Israeli prime minister has had to contemplate. A strike against Iran’s
nuclear facilities could lead to regional conflagration, tens of thousands of missiles and rockets
raining down on Israeli population centers and war on several fronts. But with no attack, Iran
could go nuclear on his watch.”31 Unlike the wide range of views expressed among U.S. and
international analysts about whether a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran might or might not be
contained, based on concepts and experiences dating from the Cold War, Israeli officials—
according to a 2011 RAND Corporation report—appear to be “reluctant to address futures
involving a nuclear-armed Iran, as they [want] to maintain the focus on preventing such an
outcome.”32 Some Israeli analysts have, however, contemplated the prospects for mutual
deterrence between Israel and Iran, including some who collaborated on the subject in a 2008
memorandum published by Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), under the
assumption that Iran might not be prevented from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. One
article from this memorandum questioned whether Cold War-era containment would be
applicable:
The fact that since Hiroshima and Nagasaki no nuclear device has been used in the course of
hostilities might lead to the tentative conclusion that a third use of a nuclear weapon in war is
of very low probability. This conclusion is based on the superpowers relationship during the
Cold War—the only historical example of a relatively stable and long nuclear deterrence
balance. But would this pattern recur in various regional nuclear conflicts?33
Despite Israelis’ general reluctance to discuss containment scenarios, some Israeli public figures
are less expansive in their characterization of the inherent risks of a potentially nuclear-armed
Iran. In the words of one analyst:
If and when there was a clear Iranian threat to attack Israel, then Israel could launch a
preemptive assault. And if no such threat ever materializes, Israel need never attack. Any
future Iran-Israel war will happen if Iran’s regime makes it unavoidable, not in theory but in
actual practice.34
(...continued)
towards realizing this vision cannot be made without a fundamental change in regional circumstances, including a
significant transformation in the attitude of states in the region towards Israel.” Statement by Dr. Sha’ul Horev,
Director General, Israel Atomic Energy Commission, to the 53rd General Conference of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, September 2009, Israel Atomic Energy Commission, September 15, 2009.
31 Susser, op. cit.
32 Kaye, et al., op. cit., p. 47.
33 Yair Evron, “An Israel-Iran Balance of Nuclear Deterrence: Seeds of Instability,” Israel and a Nuclear Iran:
Implications for Arms Control, Deterrence, and Defense, INSS Memorandum No. 94, July 2008. For an Israeli
perspective on whether missile defense systems could effectively deter a “rational” Iran, see Uzi Rubin, “Missile
Defense and Israel’s Deterrence against a Nuclear Iran,” from the same memorandum. In February 2012, Louis René
Beres, a Purdue University professor with significant past involvement in assisting Israel formulate national security
strategy, co-authored an essay that said, “Perhaps a nuclear Iran can still be prevented by preemption. But in the more
likely absence of any remaining options for ‘anticipatory self-defense,’ Israel’s best available stance will be to
effectively deter an already-nuclear Iran.” Louis René Beres and General John T. Chain (USAF ret.), “Israel and Iran at
the eleventh hour,” Oxford University Press Blog, February 23, 2012.
34 Barry Rubin, “Israel Isn’t Going to Attack Iran and Neither Will the United States,” PJ Media, January 26, 2012.
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Possible “Zone of Immunity” and Israel’s Ability to Act
Independently
Longstanding Israeli national security doctrine emphasizes Israel’s prerogative to “defend itself,
by itself.” In a January 24, 2012 speech in the Knesset, Prime Minister Netanyahu said, in
reference to the Iranian nuclear issue, “In the end, with regard to threats to our very existence, we
cannot abandon our future to the hands of others. With regard to our fate, our duty is to rely on
ourselves alone.”35
In a November 2011 CNN interview, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak appeared to set forth
parameters for Israel’s ability to act independently when he said that the window of opportunity
for a preventive strike to stop or slow Iran’s progress toward nuclear weapons capability could
close within nine months. He explained that the Iranians could enter a “zone of immunity” from
military action “by widening [the] redundancy of their plan, making it spread over many more
[sites], with many more elements.”36 As evidence of his claim that Iran is progressing toward a
zone of immunity, Barak has cited Iran’s ongoing movement of enriched uranium and/or uranium
enrichment centrifuges into the supposedly difficult-to-attack Fordow facility.37
It is unclear whether Israeli leaders’ willingness to make policy decisions in line with the zone of
immunity concept explained by Barak might be affected by the views of U.S. military planners
who reportedly question the imminence of Iran achieving such a zone.38 According to a February
2012 New York Times article, a senior Obama Administration official who has discussed the
concept with Israelis says that “‘there are many other options’ to slow Iran's march to a completed
weapon, like shutting off Iran's oil revenues, taking out facilities that supply centrifuge parts or
singling out installations where the Iranians would turn the fuel into a weapon.”39
The concept Barak has articulated may anticipate that Iran would consider using IAEA-monitored
and -safeguarded enrichment facilities at Fordow to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium.
Although it is unclear how Iran may act, there is no precedent for an NPT party to use declared
facilities to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.40 If weapons-grade enrichment were to
occur at Fordow or Natanz under IAEA safeguards (assuming that Iran was cooperating with the
IAEA), the international community would probably learn of it because of the difficulty in
35 Transcript of English translation (from Hebrew) available on Israeli Prime Minister’s Office website.
36 Transcript of remarks by Ehud Barak on CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS, November 20, 2011. According to one report,
“Iran has announced plans for 10 new enrichment sites—further dispersing later-generation centrifuges in places
smaller, harder to locate and easier to harden.” Karl Vick, “Can Israel Stop Iran’s Nuke Effort?”, Time, February 6,
2012.
37 “Israel and Iran: Closer to take-off,” Economist, February 11, 2012. A report dated February 24, 2012 from IAEA
Director-General Yukiya Amano said that Iran began using the site in December 2011 to enrich uranium up to 20%
uranium-235. Iranian officials have stated that this uranium will be used as fuel in nuclear reactors to produce medical
isotopes. “Iran Plans Several New Nuclear Reactors,” PressTV, April 12, 2011.
38 Joby Warrick, “Iran’s underground nuclear sites not immune to U.S. bunker-busters, experts say,” Washington Post,
March 1, 2012.
39 Mark Landler and David E. Sanger, “U.S. and Israel Split on Speed of Iran Threat,” New York Times, February 8,
2012.
40 North Korea used plutonium instead of uranium-enriching centrifuges to provide fissile material for its nuclear
weapons program and announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, “two years before announcing that it had the
bomb and three years before testing one.” “Attacking Iran: Up in the air,” Economist, February 25, 2012.
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diverting significant amounts of nuclear material from safeguarded centrifuge facilities without
detection.41
To put the current Israeli debate into context, one report has claimed that Barak’s “zone of
immunity” warning did not mark “the first time that the Israelis have invented a phrase that
suggests a hard deadline before an attack. At the end of the Bush administration, they said they
could not allow Iran to go past ‘the point of no return.’ That phrase was also ill-defined, but
seemed to suggest that once Iran had the know-how and the basic materials to make a bomb, it
would be inevitable.”42 In that case, and in the current case as well, some observers have
expressed opinions that the timetables are mainly intended to intimidate Iran and to prod the
United States and other international actors into taking tougher and more urgent action.43
The issue of Israeli independent action is linked to U.S. attitudes and decisions. According to
multiple sources, including the following excerpt from a February 2012 article, Israeli leaders
have not been satisfied with U.S. responses to their attempts to obtain assurances that the United
States would use force against Iran if non-military measures are deemed insufficient:
One former Israeli official tells Newsweek he heard this explanation directly from Defense
Minister Ehud Barak. “If Israel will miss its last opportunity [to attack], then we will have to
lean only on the United States, and if the United States decides not to attack, then we will
face an Iran with a bomb,” says the former Israeli official. This source says that Israel has
asked Obama for assurances that if sanctions fail, he will use force against Iran. Obama’s
refusal to provide that assurance has helped shape Israel’s posture: a refusal to promise
restraint, or even to give the United States advance notice.44
It is unclear whether the Israelis might be willing to reconsider this posture in the wake of
Netanyahu’s meeting with President Obama and other U.S. officials in March 2012. Amos Yadlin,
a former head of Israeli military intelligence and one of the Israel Air Force pilots who carried out
the 1981 Osirak strike, has been quoted as saying, “The US has promised not to allow Iran to
have the bomb, but can Israel rely on this promise? That is the key to what Israel may decide to
do.”45
Military Action Versus Alternative Courses of Action
It is unclear how Israeli officials might react to Obama Administration efforts to convince them to
give more time for sanctions with increasingly broad multilateral support to take fuller effect
before elevating military options to the fore.46 An Israeli investigative reporter quoted a “very
senior Israeli security source” as saying that “Americans tell us there is time, and we tell them
that they only have about six to nine months more than we do and that therefore the sanctions
have to be brought to a culmination now, in order to exhaust that track.”47
41 Colin H. Kahl, “An Israeli strike on Iran would backfire,” Washington Post, March 4, 2012.
42 Landler and Sanger, op. cit.
43 Tobias Buck, “Israel debate on Iran strike gains urgency,” Financial Times, February 3, 2012.
44 Klaidman, et al., op. cit. See also “Israel wouldn't warn U.S. before Iran strike, says intelligence source,” Associated
Press, February 28, 2012; Bergman, “Will Israel Attack Iran?”, op. cit.
45 Susser, op. cit.
46 Klaidman, et al., op. cit.
47 Ronen Bergman, “Will Israel Attack Iran?”, New York Times Magazine, January 25, 2012.
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In late 2011 and early 2012, the United States and the European Union (EU) imposed sanctions—
due to take effect in June and July, respectively—aimed directly at Iran’s export of crude oil,
which accounts for around 70% of its hard currency revenue.48 Many Israeli officials
acknowledge that sanctions have begun to significantly affect Iran’s economy.49 That effect could
be compounded following the March 2012 expulsion by the Brussels-based SWIFT (Society for
Worldwide International Financial Transfers) of all Iranian banks blacklisted by the EU from its
electronic transfer system. It is not clear, however, how a sustained, intensifying economic impact
on the Iranian regime and its people could affect the regime’s behavior or policy, including with
regard to a possible return to international diplomacy.50 In early March, the “P5+1” (United
States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, and Russia) accepted Iran’s proposal to restart
negotiations in the spring of 2012 on its nuclear program. Israeli Vice Prime Minister and
Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Ya’alon was quoted as saying in March that the spring 2012
talks between Iran and the P5+1 would show “if there is a chance that the sanctions are working
or that the Iranians are continuing to manoeuvre and advance toward a military nuclear
capability.”51
It is also unclear to what extent Israelis believe that their alleged ongoing covert action or “secret
war” against Iran’s nuclear program52 might mitigate the need for an air strike. The two most
recently retired heads of the Mossad, Meir Dagan and Ephraim Halevy, have both publicly stated
that an Israeli military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities would be counterproductive, partly
because they both reportedly “believe sabotage and diplomacy have done much to set back Iran’s
nuclear ambitions and can do more yet.”53 Dagan has been quoted as saying, “The Iranian
problem must be shaped as an international problem, and efforts to delay Iran's nuclear program
should continue.”54 In March 2012, Vice Prime Minister Ya’alon was quoted as saying, when
asked if Israel might be just weeks away from a strike on Iran, “No. Look, we have to see. The
[Iranian nuclear] project is not static … Sometimes there are explosions, sometimes there are
worms there, viruses, all kinds of things like that.”55 However, according to one report from an
Israeli investigative journalist, some senior Israeli military intelligence officials believe that—as
was the case with Iraq’s nuclear program in the late 1970s/early 1980s—possible Mossad actions
have not stopped Iran’s progress toward nuclear weapons capability.56
48 For more information on Iran sanctions and their effects, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth
Katzman.
49 Buck, op. cit.
50 For two U.S. perspectives on this question, see Dennis B. Ross, “Iran is Ready to Talk,” New York Times, February
14, 2012; Gerald F. Seib, “Iran Is Becoming Election Wild Card,” Wall Street Journal, February 28, 2012.
51 Dan Williams, “Israel says sabotage may stretch Iran atom timeline,” Reuters, March 27, 2012.
52 Melman, “The war against Iran’s nuclear program has already begun,” op. cit.
53 Bruce Riedel, “The Israeli Anti-Attack-Iran Brigade,” The Daily Beast, November 7, 2011.
54 Quote from Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth translated in “Former Mossad chief against Iran strike,” United
Press International, May 8, 2011. An Israeli analyst has suggested a wider array of options short of a preemptive strike:
“As the Iranian regime works hard to get nuclear weapons and missiles capable of carrying them, Israel uses the time to
build a multi-level defensive and offensive capability. These layers include: U.S. early warning stations and anti-
missile missile installations in the Gulf; Israeli missile-launching submarines; Israeli long-range planes whose crews
have rehearsed and planned for strikes at Iranian facilities; different types of anti-missile missiles capable of knocking
down the small number of missiles Iran could fire simultaneously; covert operations, possibly including computer
viruses and assassinations, to slow down Iran’s development of nuclear weapons; improved intelligence; help to the
Iranian opposition (though the idea of “regime change” in the near future is a fantasy); and other measures.” Rubin, op.
cit.
55 Ya’alon quoted and translated from Israel’s Army Radio in Williams, op. cit.
56 Bergman, “Will Israel Attack Iran?”, op. cit.
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The Israeli Decisionmaking Process57
Several factors may influence any Israeli political decision relating to a possible strike on Iranian
nuclear facilities. These include, but are not limited to, the views and interactions of Israeli
decisionmakers; the public debate in Israel,
the stances and anticipated responses of U.S.,
The Security Cabinet and “Octet”
regional, and international actors; estimates of
Israel’s security cabinet is the group of government
the effects of a possible strike; and the
ministers convened by the prime minister to make
anticipated Iranian response regionally and
decisions on matters related to national security.58 The
internationally.
prime minister can have outside security and military
officials brief the group. Prime ministers also rely upon
security cabinet majorities to confirm broad-based
Discussion below regarding the Israeli
support within Israel’s coalition-based parliamentary
decisionmaking process and the factors that
democracy for important courses of action.
may influence it is largely dependent on
During the tenure of this government, Prime Minister
secondary sources that CRS does not claim to
Netanyahu has tended to convene and rely upon the
confirm independently.
opinions of a smaller group of eight ministers within the
security cabinet, known as the “octet,” perhaps partly
due to concerns that larger groups are more prone to
Decisionmakers: Views and
leaking information publicly.59
Interactions
Current security cabinet (first eight comprise octet)
Binyamin Netanyahu (Prime Minister)
Ehud Barak (Defense Minister/Deputy PM)
According to one report, the issue of a
Avigdor Lieberman (Foreign Minister/Deputy PM)
possible Israeli strike on Iran has “sparked
Moshe Ya’alon (Vice PM/Strategic Affairs Minister)
fierce public debate in Israel among political
Silvan Shalom (Vice PM/Regional Dev. Minister)
and military leaders, past and present, dividing
Eli Yishai (Interior Minister/Deputy PM)
Dan Meridor (Intel. & Atomic Ener. Min./Dep. PM)
cabinet ministers, generals and Mossad chiefs.
Benny Begin (Minister without Portfolio)
Most see military action as a last resort to be
Yuval Steinitz (Finance Minister)
contemplated only if sanctions and diplomacy
Yitzhak Aharonovitch (Internal Security Minister)
fail; others insist that bombing Iran could
Yaakov Ne’eman (Justice Minister)
actually stabilize the Middle East by setting
Gideon Sa’ar (Education Minister)
Uzi Landau (National Infrastructure Minister)
back the radical cause indefinitely.”60
Ariel Atias (Housing & Construction Minister)
A 2011 RAND Corporation report cited a
former Israeli official as saying that “the majority of ministers currently in power (including
Prime Minister Netanyahu) would support military action to avoid Iran’s acquiring a bomb under
57 Prepared by Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.
58 A February 2012 report quoted Israeli Vice Prime Minister and Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Ya’alon as saying,
“In the State of Israel, any process of a military operation, and any military move, undergoes the approval of the
security cabinet and in certain cases, the full cabinet.” Jeffrey Heller and Dan Williams, “Prime Minister Netanyahu
can’t fly solo in Israel to attack Iran,” Reuters, February 7, 2012. The security cabinet of Menachem Begin reportedly
elected to carry out the 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor over the objections of the then Mossad director, and
the security cabinet of Ehud Olmert reportedly supported the 2007 strike against Syria’s presumed nuclear reactor
under construction at Al Kibar (near Deir al Zur) by a vote of 13-1. For additional information on how the
decisionmaking process on Iran might proceed under Prime Minister Netanyahu, see a transcript of an interview with
the former director-general of Netanyahu’s office in Dovid Efune, “On Iran and Obama, How Bibi will Decide –
Exclusive Interview with Eyal Gabbai, Part 1” The Algemeiner, March 5, 2012.
59 Eli Lake, “Meet the Israeli ‘Octet’ That Would Decide an Iran Attack,” Daily Beast, March 9, 2012.
60 Susser, op. cit.
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their watch.”61 However, an Israeli journalist known for covering intelligence issues wrote in
February 2012 that “as [former Mossad chief Meir] Dagan, the majority of Israeli Cabinet
ministers, the CIA, and others have made clear, there is no need to strike in the near future since
there is still time before Iran produces its first bomb.”62
In a January 2012 interview, Defense Minister Barak indicated that there were “three categories
of questions, which he characterized as ‘Israel’s ability to act,’ ‘international legitimacy’ and
‘necessity,’ all of which require affirmative responses before a decision is made to attack:”
1. Does Israel have the ability to cause severe damage to Iran’s nuclear sites and bring about
a major delay in the Iranian nuclear project? And can the military and the Israeli people
withstand the inevitable counterattack?
2. Does Israel have overt or tacit support, particularly from America, for carrying out an
attack?
3. Have all other possibilities for the containment of Iran’s nuclear threat been exhausted,
bringing Israel to the point of last resort? If so, is this the last opportunity for an attack?63
Whether Israel’s leaders believe the answer is “yes” or “no” to each of these three questions is a
subject of debate among U.S. and Israeli analysts. A January 2012 New York Times article stated
that “conversations with eight current and recent top Israeli security officials suggested several
things: since Israel has been demanding the new sanctions, including an oil embargo and seizure
of Iran’s Central Bank assets, it will give the sanctions some months to work; the sanctions are
viewed here as probably insufficient; a military attack remains a very real option; and [post-
attack] situations are considered less perilous than one in which Iran has nuclear weapons.”64 In
Israeli policymakers’ evaluation of post-attack situations, however, one Israeli analyst asserted in
February 2012 that they are so focused on the “immediate military implications” that they “are
ignoring several of the potential longer-term aspects of a strike: the preparedness of Israel’s home
front; the contours of an Israeli exit strategy; the impact on U.S.-Israel relations; the global
diplomatic fallout; the stability of world energy markets; and the outcome within Iran itself.
Should Israel fail to openly debate and account for these factors in advance of an attack, it may
end up with a strategic debacle, even if it achieves its narrow military goals.”65
Israeli sources indicate that top leaders are divided on the issue. One journalist asserted in
February that Netanyahu’s and Barak’s apparent support for an attack in the near future is
countered by many cabinet ministers and security establishment officials who supposedly share
former Mossad chief Dagan’s perspective “against a strike and in favor of sanctions and covert
operations.” That view is based at least partly on doubts about Israel’s military capability to set
back Iran’s nuclear program three to five years.66 According to a November 2011 article by
another Israeli journalist:
61 Kaye et al., op. cit., p. 40.
62 Melman, “Face Off,” op. cit.
63 Bergman, “Will Israel Attack Iran?”, op. cit.
64 Ethan Bronner, “Israel Senses Bluffing in Iran’s Threats of Retaliation,” New York Times, January 26, 2012.
65 Ehud Eiran, “What Happens After Israel Attacks Iran,” foreignaffairs.com, February 23, 2012.
66 Melman, “Face Off,” op. cit.
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Benny Begin and Moshe Yaalon, two of the most hardline right-wing ministers in the “Octet
Forum,” the Israeli Cabinet’s main decision-making body, are currently opposed to an attack
because they believe a military strike will cause a massive backlash from Iran and its proxies
and should only be a very last resort.67
According to the same article, “Netanyahu’s decision to replace Dagan [in early 2011]—coupled
with Barak’s insistence on removing popular army chief [Gabi] Ashkenazi in February [2011]—
was seen by many as an intentional strategy to remove opponents of a military strike on Iran from
positions of influence.”68 In June 2011, the New York Times quoted Dagan as saying, “I decided to
speak out because when I was in office, [former Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) director Yuval]
Diskin, Ashkenazi and I could block any dangerous adventure. Now I am afraid that there is no
one to stop Bibi [Netanyahu] and Barak.”69 Despite changeovers in top Israeli security positions,
an Israeli military correspondent was quoted as claiming in February 2012 that the current Israel
Defense Forces Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Benny Gantz, is considered a leader of a
school of thought within the security establishment that reportedly has not concluded that the time
has come for military action.70 One report cited a former senior Israeli official as saying that the
defense establishment “was not enthusiastic about an attack. It hoped that sanctions and
diplomacy would work and that if military action were needed it would come from the United
States.”71
It is unclear how influential security officials’ views would be in a decision on a strike. When an
interviewer told Barak in January 2012 about top-ranking military personnel who argue that a
military strike is either unnecessary or would be ineffective, Barak said, “It’s good to have
diversity in thinking and for people to voice their opinions. But at the end of the day, when the
military command looks up, it sees us—the minister of defense and the prime minister. When we
look up, we see nothing but the sky above us.”72 In mid March 2012, one report quoted an Israeli
journalist as writing that a slight majority of Israel’s security cabinet supports a strike:
According to the most recent assessments, at this point eight ministers tend to support
Netanyahu and Barak’s position, while six object to it. It should be noted that the security
cabinet has yet to hold a decisive meeting on the issue and the assessments are based on
secret talks being held between the prime minister and his ministers, one at a time.73
Another mid March Israeli report claimed that “if Netanyahu and Minister of Defense, Ehud
Barak, decide to attack, they'll be able to pass a decision through the cabinet without significant
67 Anshel Pfeffer, “Will They?”, Tablet, November 18, 2011. Israeli reports in early November 2011 about other
“octet” members said that Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman had been convinced to support a strike on Iran, while
Intelligence and Atomic Energy Minister Dan Meridor objected to an “immediate attack” and Interior Minister Eli
Yishai had not made up his mind. Barak Ravid, et al., “Netanyahu trying to persuade cabinet to support attack on Iran,”
Ha’aretz, November 2, 2011; Ari Shavit, “Decision to attack Iran must be made with a clear mind,” Ha’aretz,
November 3, 2011.
68 Pfeffer, “Will They?”, op. cit. However, Dagan was one of the longest-serving Mossad directors (2002-2011), having
had his term extended multiple times following his initial appointment, including once by Netanyahu.
69 Ethan Bronner, “A Former Spy Chief Questions the Judgment of Israeli Leaders,” New York Times, June 3, 2011.
70 Ha’aretz journalist Amir Oren, quoted in Vita Bekker, “US worries grow over Israeli strike on Iran,” The National
(United Arab Emirates), February 20, 2012.
71 Bronner, “Israel Senses Bluffing in Iran’s Threats of Retaliation,” op. cit.
72 Bergman, op. cit.
73 Excerpt from article by Ben Caspit in Israel’s Hebrew-language Ma’ariv newspaper, translated and quoted in “Most
of Israel security cabinet backs Iran strike,” Agence France Presse, March 15, 2012.
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Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities
difficulty. With the exception of ministers Benny Begin and Dan Meridor, a tenacious objection
against an Israeli strike on Iran is not expected.”74
Some Israeli analysts question whether Netanyahu is likely to launch a strike against Iran. He has
not ordered a major military offensive during either of his stints as Israel’s prime minister (1996-
1999 and 2009-present), possibly owing in part to what some analysts have observed to be a
generally cautious approach to decisionmaking.75 In his meeting with President Obama at the
White House on March 5, 2012, Netanyahu reportedly confirmed that no decision had been made
to that point.76
Yet, speaking at the annual American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) conference in
Washington, DC on March 5, 2012, Netanyahu said:
We’ve waited for diplomacy to work. We’ve waited for sanctions to work. None of us can
afford to wait much longer. As Prime Minister of Israel, I will never let my people live under
the shadow of annihilation. Some commentators would have you believe that stopping Iran
from getting the bomb is more dangerous than letting Iran have the bomb. They say that a
military confrontation with Iran would undermine the efforts already underway, that it would
be ineffective, and that it would provoke even more vindictive action by Iran.
Netanyahu then referred to correspondence in 1944 between the World Jewish Congress and the
U.S. government that apparently indicated U.S. unwillingness to bomb Auschwitz because of the
“doubtful efficacy” of the operation and the possibility of “even more vindictive action by the
Germans.” In response to Netanyahu’s speech, the editor-in-chief of Israel’s Ha’aretz newspaper
wrote:
The Holocaust talk has but one meaning—forcing Israel to go to war and strike the
Iranians…. No amount of missiles falling on Tel Aviv, rising oil prices and economic crises
matter when compared to genocide…. Enough loopholes can be detected that would allow
Netanyahu to escape an imminent decision to go to war…. Nevertheless, Netanyahu took on
a public obligation on Monday that would make it very hard for him to back away from the
path of war with Iran.
In early March 2012 interviews on Israeli television following his Washington, DC trip,
Netanyahu reportedly said, “This is not a matter of days or weeks. It is also not a matter of years.
The result has to be that the threat of a nuclear weapon in Iran’s hands is removed…. If you don’t
make the decision, and you don’t succeed in preventing it, who will you explain that [to]? To
historians? To the generations that were here before us? To the generations that won’t come after
us? It is forbidden to let the Iranians get nuclear arms. And I intend not to allow that to happen.”77
74 Amir Rapaport, “Who Opposes Attacking Iran,” Israel Defense, March 16, 2012.
75 CRS telephone interview with former Israeli deputy national security advisor and military planning director Brig.
Gen. (ret.) Shlomo Brom, February 21, 2012. Daniel Levy, “Netanyahu Won’t Attack Iran (Probably),”
foreignpolicy.com, March 2, 2012.
76 Barak Ravid, “Netanyahu tells Obama: I have yet to decide whether to attack Iran,” Ha’aretz, March 6, 2012.
77 Prime Minister Netanyahu quoted in Herb Keinon, “Netanyahu: Attack on Iran not immediately in offing,”
jpost.com, March 8, 2012.
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Public Opinion and Debate in Israel
A U.S.-based Israeli analyst has noted that domestic Israeli political factors might militate against
Netanyahu undertaking the risks a strike would entail—including his coalition’s apparently strong
prospects for reelection in 2012 or 2013, and a reported lack of pressure for military action on
Iran from the public or from coalition partners seen as having generally hawkish views.78 Public
opinion polls conducted in February and March 2012 indicated reluctance by a large majority of
Israelis to propose an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in the absence of U.S. support. Assuming
an Israeli attack without U.S. cooperation, a late February poll conducted by Israel’s Dahaf
Institute indicated that Israelis would oppose a strike by a 63%-31% margin. A majority, however,
would apparently support an attack with U.S. cooperation by a 62%-34% margin.79 An Israeli
political science professor involved in the polling process reportedly explained the Israeli views
as follows: “They are not challenging the right to [attack], [they are] challenging the ability to do
it effectively and with international support. People don’t want Israel to become the troublemaker
of the world.”80 A poll taken by Israel’s Dialog polling institute in early March indicated only
26% support for an independent Israeli strike.81
A public debate in which Israeli officials and non-government analysts might engage appears to
be a controversial subject in its own right. According to one report, “No issue in Israel is more
fraught than the debate over the wisdom and feasibility of a strike on Iran…. Security officials are
increasingly kept from journalists or barred from discussing Iran. Much of the public talk is as
much message delivery as actual policy.”82 In a November 2011 Dialog poll, Israelis indicated by
a 51%-39% margin that they oppose public discussion of a possible attack because it could
“cause damage.”83
Some Israeli commentators have voiced concern that the public is resigned to the possibility of
war with Iran, based on a tradition of deference to national leaders.84 According to one
commentator, “The impression is that the majority of Israelis are not afraid…. The decision is left
up to a handful of people who have decided that the public, as usual, trusts them blindly,
obediently.”85 The March 2012 Dialog poll indicated that by a 50%-38% margin Israelis trust
Netanyahu and Barak on the Iran issue.86
Two January 2012 articles co-authored by three Israeli analysts (including two former officials)
argued that “a public discussion will assist those officials who are authorized to make informed
decisions on this issue.”87 Both articles acknowledged the limitations of such a discussion given
78 Levy, op. cit. See also Paul Pillar, “Why Israeli Public Opinion Opposes a Strike on Iran,” theatlantic.com, March 1,
2012.
79 Details of the poll, which has a margin of error of 4.5%, are available at
http://www.peaceindex.org/indexMonthEng.aspx?num=240#anchor269.
80 Tel Aviv University professor Tamar Herrmann, quoted in Joshua Mitnick, “Majority of Israelis oppose a unilateral
strike on Iran nuclear program,” Christian Science Monitor, March 8, 2012.
81 Details of the poll, which has a margin of error of 4.5%, are available at http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=55988.
82 Bronner, “Israel Senses Bluffing in Iran’s Threats of Retaliation,” op. cit.
83 Details of the poll, which has a margin of error of 4.6%, are available at http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=54362.
84 Joel Greenberg, “Sense of inevitable war grips Israel,” Washington Post, February 23, 2012; Larry Derfner, “Israel’s
Silent March to War with Iran,” Jewish Daily Forward, February 10, 2012.
85 Gideon Levy, “Israelis should be afraid of their leaders, not Iran,” Ha’aretz, February 5, 2012.
86 Details of the poll, which has a margin of error of 4.5%, are available at http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=55988.
87 Stein, et al., “The Public Discussion of Israel’s Strategy Regarding a Nuclear Iran,” op. cit. See also Shlomo Brom,
(continued...)
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the apparent centrality to decisionmakers’ considerations of classified information on Iran’s
nuclear program and on the operational capacity of Israel’s air force. Yet, they still argued for a
debate to proceed:
Instead, the public debate must focus on the strategic dimensions of the issue—a realm in
which civilian strategists have much to contribute. Indeed, airing these dimensions is an
absolute imperative. Without it we are condemned to repeat the mistakes of the past or to
commit worse ones. More important, without such airing we are doomed to step mindlessly
closer and closer to a military confrontation with Iran or, possibly just as dangerous, to
accept and accommodate its nuclear ambitions and designs.88
(...continued)
Shai Feldman, Shimon Stein, “A real debate about Iran,” mideast.foreignpolicy.com, January 30, 2012.
88 Brom, et al., “A real debate about Iran,” op. cit.
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Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Stances and
Anticipated Responses Outside Israel89
The United States
Despite the reference by Defense Minister Barak to the possible need for “overt or tacit support,
particularly from America” before approving an Israel strike, it is unclear to what extent Israeli
decisionmakers might be influenced by the stated positions and anticipated responses of U.S.
policymakers in the Obama
Administration and Congress
Selected Polls of U.S. Views on
regarding an attack. Not
Potential Israeli Strike
surprisingly, Israeli leaders are
extremely sensitive to U.S. views
These poll results are included to provide information regarding U.S.
public opinion on the issue that could impact U.S. policymakers’ views
for a variety of reasons, including
and positions and ultimately influence Israeli decisionmaking.
but not limited to:
Reuters/Ipsos Public Affairs (March 8-11, 2012)
• Strong U.S.-Israel
Do you support or oppose Israel taking military action against Iran if
there is evidence that Iran is building nuclear weapons?
relations dating back to
Strongly support: 40%, Somewhat support: 22%, Somewhat oppose:
when the United States
11%, Strongly oppose: 19%, Neither: 4%, Unsure: 4%
was the first country to
(Pol of 1,084 adults with 3.1% margin of error)
recognize the provisional
CBS News/New York Times (March 7-11, 2012)
Jewish government as the
If Israel were to attack Iran in order to prevent it from developing a
de facto government of
nuclear weapons program, should the U.S. support Israel's military
Israel upon itsdeclaration
action, or should the U.S. not get involved?
Support: 47%, Not get involved: 42%, Oppose (volunteered response):
of statehood in May 1948;
1%, Unsure: 10%
• Robust ongoing military
(Pol of 1,009 adults with 3% margin of error)
and security cooperation,
ABC News/Washington Post (March 7-10, 2012)
including significant U.S.
Would you support or oppose Israel bombing Iran's nuclear
development sites?
arms sales and other forms
Support: 42%, Oppose: 51%, No opinion: 7%
of support; and
(Pol of 1,003 adults with 4% margin of error)
• Trade ties and important
Program on International Policy Attitudes/University of
bilateral economic and
Maryland (March 3-7, 2012)
scientific cooperation.90
Do you think the U.S. should…
Discourage Israel from attacking Iran’s nuclear program: 34%
Take a neutral stance: 46%
Israeli leaders’ perspectives about
Encourage Israel to attack Iran’s nuclear program: 14%
the possible effects of a strike on
Don’t know/Refused: 6%
U.S. political and material
(Pol of 727 Americans with 4.5% margin of error)
assistance to Israel, possible
The Hill/Pulse Opinion Research (March 1, 2012)
negative security consequences for
Support or oppose Israel attack on Iran to destroy nuclear program?
the United States from a potential
Very supportive: 28%, Somewhat supportive: 24%, Somewhat opposed:
Iranian retaliation, and the
22%, Very opposed: 19%, Not sure: 8%
probability of future U.S. military
(Pol of 1,000 likely voters with 3% margin of error)
action to prevent a nuclear-armed
89 Prepared by Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.
90 For more details on these interactions, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim
Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel , by Jeremy M. Sharp.
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Iran, may, among other considerations, influence the Israeli decisionmaking process
An Israeli journalist wrote in March 2012 that Israel did not ask permission when it acted to
prevent Saddam Hussein and Bashar al Asad from obtaining nuclear weapons, but that “the
[Obama] administration can credibly counter that in neither case did Israeli unilateralism threaten
to draw America into an armed conflict, as it does now.”91 According to three Israeli analysts
(including two former officials) mentioned above:
Even after the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq, the U.S. remains extremely exposed to
Iranian retaliation—either directly against its forces in the area or by Iran’s attempting to
ignite a broader conflict in the region—so an Israeli strike would harm U.S. interests in the
region and would place many U.S. lives at risk. And while in an election year America’s
political reaction to such a strike may be mitigated by domestic political considerations, the
reaction of the U.S. defense community to an Israeli military strike might be extremely
negative, as such an action might be seen as representing Israeli insensitivity to and disregard
of U.S. priorities and concerns.92
Some reports have speculated that an Israeli decision to attack, if it occurs, could come before the
U.S. presidential election in November 2012, with one Israeli report stating, “A second-term
president, not constrained by electoral necessities, will be able to apply a lot more pressure on the
Israeli government not to attack.”93
Separate from the question of whether the United States might support an Israeli strike on Iran,
Israeli decisionmakers might be influenced by how they anticipate the United States would
respond after an attack, including in the event of retaliation by Iran and its allies. Although the
United States does not have a formal treaty obligation to defend Israel in the event it is attacked,
successive Administrations have either stated or implied that the United States would act to
protect Israel’s security if it were endangered—including by Iran—andhave worked with
Congress to ensure and bolster Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over regional security threats.94
It is unclear to what extent U.S. expressions of willingness to act forcefully on Iran might
encourage Israeli restraint. Since the second term of the George W. Bush Administration, U.S.
officials have sought to maintain that a credible strike option exists while simultaneously
communicating the possible risks for U.S. interests, regional security, and global energy markets
91 Yossi Klein Halevi, “Can Israel Trust the United States When It Comes to Iran?”, The New Republic, March 2, 2012.
92 Feldman, et al., “What to Do About Nuclearizing Iran? The Israeli Debate,” op. cit.
93 Anshel Pfeffer, “US election hands Netanyahu giant dilemma on Iran,” Jewish Chronicle Online, February 9, 2012.
See also Bret Stephens, “(How) Should Israel Bomb Iran,” Wall Street Journal, February 7, 2012, stating, “Jerusalem
knows that Mr. Obama will be hard-pressed to oppose an Israeli strike—the way Dwight Eisenhower did during the
Suez crisis—before election day. A re-elected President Obama is a different story.”
94 For more information on the level of U.S. commitment to Israel’s security, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel:
Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel , by Jeremy M.
Sharp. In addition to a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (TIAS 2675) dated July 23, 1952, the United States and
Israel have entered into a range of stand-alone agreements, memoranda of understanding, and other arrangements
varying in their formality. In remarks at the White House on March 5, 2012 with Prime Minister Netanyahu, the
President said, “As I’ve said repeatedly, the bond between our two countries is unbreakable. My personal
commitment—a commitment that is consistent with the history of other occupants of this Oval Office—our
commitment to the security of Israel is rock solid. And as I've said to the Prime Minister in every single one of our
meetings, the United States will always have Israel’s back when it comes to Israel’s security.” In a March 2006 speech
against the backdrop of Iran’s hostile rhetoric toward Israel and pursuit of a nuclear program, President George W.
Bush said, “I made it clear, I’ll make it clear again, that we will use military might to protect our ally Israel.” Seymour
M. Hersh, “The Iran Plans,” The New Yorker, April 17, 2006.
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if Israel were to act alone.95 Addressing the AIPAC conference on March 4, 2012, President
Obama said,
Iran’s leaders should have no doubt about the resolve of the United States—just as they
should not doubt Israel’s sovereign right to make its own decisions about what is required to
meet its security needs…. Iran's leaders should know that I do not have a policy of
containment; I have a policy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
An Israeli in Netanyahu’s “inner circle” reportedly said in February that, compared with a year
ago, President Obama’s recent rhetoric indicates greater credibility that the United States would
be “ready to attack if worse comes to worst,”96 though it is not clear whether this provides
reassurance at a level that might significantly affect Israeli leaders’ calculations regarding the
advisability of and need for independent action. In 2007, according to former President George
W. Bush, Netanyahu’s predecessor Ehud Olmert unsuccessfully sought U.S. action to destroy the
secret Syrian reactor before he ordered the Israeli strike. Bush said that he declined to order
military action owing to the low confidence of the U.S. intelligence community that Syria had a
nuclear weapons program, proposing—to Olmert’s dismay—that they instead publicly expose the
reactor’s existence and pursue internationally-backed coercive diplomacy.97
U.S. views have potential salience for Israeli decisionmakers because top Israeli officials do not
necessarily agree with the Obama Administration on every aspect of how to address Iran’s nuclear
program. It is unclear, for example, to what extent views conveyed by President Obama and other
U.S. officials in early 2012 that appear to appeal for more time to judge the effectiveness of
international sanctions and diplomacy might affect Israeli positions on a possible strike. There are
indications that Israeli officials continue to differ with the Obama Administration on points
possibly relating to timeframes for action.98 U.S. officials reportedly said in early March that the
President “is not ready to accept a central part of Israel’s strategic calculation: that an attack on
Iran’s nuclear facilities would be warranted to stop it from gaining the capability to build a
nuclear weapon, rather than later, to stop it from actually manufacturing one.”99 The President and
Netanyahu “did not close the gap on this issue” during their March 5 meeting, according to a U.S.
official cited in one report who claimed that the issue was not addressed.100
In a February 19, 2012 CNN interview, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, revealed apparent differences in Israeli and U.S. positions, saying:
we think that it’s not prudent at this point to decide to attack Iran. I mean, that’s been our
counsel to our allies, the Israelis, well-known, well-documented.... I wouldn’t suggest, sitting
95 Eli Lake, “U.S., Israel Discuss Triggers for Bombing Iran’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Daily Beast, December 28,
2011.
96 Klaidman, et al., op. cit.
97 George W. Bush, Decision Points, New York: Crown Publishers, 2010, pp. 421-422.
98 Some Members of Congress have explicitly supported the concept of possible Israeli military action against Iran
without setting forth a specific timeframe. In May 2011, Congressman Louie Gohmert introduced H.Res. 271, entitled:
“Expressing support for the State of Israel’s right to defend Israeli sovereignty, to protect the lives and safety of the
Israeli people, and to use all means necessary to confront and eliminate nuclear threats posed by the Islamic Republic
of Iran, including the use of military force if no other peaceful solution can be found within reasonable time to protect
against such an immediate and existential threat to the State of Israel.” To date, H.Res. 271 has 69 Republican co-
sponsors and was referred to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia.
99 Mark Landler, “Israel’s Backers Pressure Obama on Iran Position,” New York Times, March 4, 2012.
100 Mark Landler, “Obama Presses Israel to Resist Strikes on Iran,” New York Times, March 6, 2012.
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here today, that we’ve persuaded them that our view is the correct view and that they are
acting in an ill-advised fashion, but we’ve had a very candid, collaborative conversation.101
In testimony before the Senate Budget Committee on February 28, General Dempsey explained
his CNN remarks by saying, “I didn't counsel Israel not to attack. We’ve had a conversation with
them about time, the issue of time.” Further to the question of timing, President Obama said in an
interview less than a week before the March 5 meeting with Netanyahu that “at a time when there
is not a lot of sympathy for Iran and its only real ally [Syria] is on the ropes, do we want a
distraction in which suddenly Iran can portray itself as a victim, and deflect attention from what
has to be the core issue, which is their potential pursuit of nuclear weapons?”102 A U.S. European
Command-Israel joint missile defense exercise planned for April 2012—known as Austere
Challenge 12—was postponed and has been rescheduled for later in 2012. Some reports claim
that the postponement is at least partly intended to discourage perceptions of joint U.S.-Israel
planning with respect to a possible early 2012 Israeli attack on Iran.103
During his March 2012 Washington, DC trip, Prime Minister Netanyahu explicitly insisted on
Israel’s prerogative to act independently. In his March 5 AIPAC speech, Netanyahu said:
Israel must always have the ability to defend itself, by itself, against any threat. We deeply
appreciate the great alliance between our two countries. But when it comes to Israel’s
survival, we must always remain the masters of our fate.
After Netanyahu reportedly met in private with various congressional leaders during his trip to
Washington, DC on March 6, 2012, Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, was quoted as saying that if Iran does not follow international demands that it stop
uranium enrichment, “an attack on them by Israel is very likely.”104 Referring to Netanyahu’s U.S.
meetings following his return to Israel, his spokesman reportedly said, “A red light was not given.
And if we’re already talking about colors, then a green light was not given either.”105 In a March
14 speech in the Knesset addressing the issue, Netanyahu cited past decisions by Israeli leaders—
the 1948 declaration of statehood, the initiation of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and the 1981 strike
on Osirak—that were supposedly undertaken either without U.S. knowledge or despite prior
counsel from U.S. officials to delay action.106
Regionally and Internationally
It is unclear to what degree Israeli decisionmakers might take into account the anticipated
reactions of other regional and international actors. Some Israeli analysts voice concern—given
the possibility that a possible Israeli attack would not be sanctioned in advance by an
international legal or political mandate107—about possible damage to Israel’s growing political
101 Transcript of interview with General Martin Dempsey on CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS, February 19, 2012.
102 Goldberg, “Obama to Iran and Israel…,” op. cit.
103 Yaakov Katz, “Joint drill with US to be held after delay,” Jerusalem Post, February 6, 2012.
104 Donna Cassata, “Sen. Levin says Israeli attack on Iran likely,” Associated Press, March 6, 2012.
105 Netanyahu spokesman Liran Dan quoted in “Israel cautiously welcomes Western nuclear talks with Iran,” Reuters,
March 7, 2012.
106 Transcript of English translation of speech (from Hebrew) available on Israeli Prime Minister’s Office website.
107 In one view, Yale law and political science professor Bruce Ackerman has argued that if “President Obama supports
Netanyahu’s preemptive strike, he will transform Bush’s Iraq aberration into the founding precedent of a new era of
international law. He should instead reaffirm Reagan’s position in 1981 [joining the unanimous U.N. Security Council
(continued...)
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and economic relations with key countries such as China and Russia and potential acceleration of
its international isolation or “delegitimization.”108 In 1981, the United Nations Security Council—
including the United States under the Reagan Administration—voted unanimously in favor of
Resolution 487, which condemned Israel’s strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor as a violation of the
U.N. Charter and the “norms of international conduct.” Nevertheless, some of these same analysts
suggest that if an Israeli attack successfully delays Iran’s nuclear program without resulting in
significant costs to other countries, “there might be quite a few regional and international players
who in retrospect would be pleased that Israel took on itself the risks to solve the problem of
Iranian nuclearization.”109
It is not clear how other Middle Eastern actors’ potential reactions might be affected by ongoing
political change that may lead Arab governments to become more responsive to popular
sentiment that includes anti-Israel strains. Israeli decisionmakers might be weighing the possible
consequences of further alienating neighboring Arab states with which Israel has always had
problematic relations. Doing so could possibly increase prospects for greater regional conflict,
decrease chances for diplomatic progress on the Palestinian issue, and harm the U.S. regional
profile.
Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Possible
Operational Aspects of an Israeli Strike110
Another factor in Israel’s deliberations is the question of operational capability: Can Israeli forces
conduct a successful strike, however they define “success”? One Israeli journalist has written:
While a large-scale operation against Iran … would stretch the IAF’s resources, it is still
within its capabilities. This is exactly what the lion’s share of the defense budget has been
spent on for over more than a decade. On fighter jets, airborne tankers, long-range
reconnaissance drones and electronic warfare aircraft.111
(...continued)
vote on Resolution 487, which found Israel’s Osirak strike to be in violation of the U.N. Charter] and return the
presidency to its traditional commitments to international law abroad and constitutional fidelity at home.” Bruce
Ackerman, “The legal case against attacking Iran,” Los Angeles Times, March 5, 2012. In another view, Peter
Berkowitz, a fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, has argued, partly in light of what he characterizes as
changing views on the imminence of national security threats in a post-9/11 world, that many considerations
“separately, and certainly taken together, furnish legal justification, grounded in the right of anticipatory self-defense,
for Israel or the United States to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. However, not everything that is lawful is prudent and
wise.” Peter Berkowitz, “Would a Military Strike Against Iran Be Legal?”, RealClearPolitics, March 4, 2012. The
IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution in 1985 (GC(29)/RES/444) considering that an “armed attack on and
threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United
Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency” and a resolution in 1990 (GC(34)/RES/533)
encouraging all IAEA member states to be ready to provide immediate peaceful assistance—if requested—to countries
whose safeguarded facilities have been attacked.
108 Stein, et al., “The Public Discussion of Israel’s Strategy Regarding a Nuclear Iran,” op. cit. Israel claims that its
detractors—some of whom it claims are motivated by anti-Israel or anti-Semitic convictions—seek to delegitimize its
international standing, often by exaggerating alleged human rights and international law violations regarding its actions
vis-à-vis Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
109 Ibid.
110 Prepared by Jeremiah Gertler, Specialist in Military Aviation.
111 Anshel Pfeffer, “Israel could strike Iran's nuclear facilities, but it won't be easy,” haaretz.com, February 20, 2012.
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According to another Israeli report, “military thinkers acknowledge the objective difficulties but
argue that, with the out-of-the-box improvisation and planning the Israel Air Force is renowned
for, they can be surmounted.”112 Not all Israeli assessments agree, however. One Israeli analyst
has written:
Would such an attack by Israel be likely to succeed even in doing maximum damage to
Iranian facilities? No, a great deal could go wrong, especially against multiple hardened
targets at the planes’ maximum range. Planes could get lost or crash or have to turn back.
Planes arriving over the targets could miss, or accidentally drop their bombs on civilians, or
simply not do much damage. Many targets would remain unscathed.113
A senior Israeli official was cited in one report as quoting a senior commander who reportedly
told the Israeli cabinet in September 2011 that “we have no ability to hit the Iranian nuclear
program in a meaningful way.”114
In open source assessments mainly in non-Israeli media, analysts assert that although the Israel
Air Force (IAF) is formidable, an attempt to destroy Iran’s nuclear capability would be a
challenge due to both the IAF’s technical capabilities and the limited numbers of aircraft in its
fleet that are equipped to simultaneously operate over long ranges, carry the necessary ordnance,
and thwart foreign air defenses. Former Central Intelligence Agency and National Security
Agency Director Michael Hayden said, for example, “that airstrikes capable of seriously setting
back Iran’s nuclear program were ‘beyond the capacity’ of Israel.”115 Multiple reports have
asserted that military analysts believe that reaching all critical Iranian nuclear facilities “would
require an air campaign of hundreds of sorties and would have to last for weeks.”116 However, a
U.S. defense analyst has said that any Israeli attack would probably be a one-time event: “Given
the unfriendly airspace Israeli strike aircraft would have to traverse to reach Iran’s facilities as
well as Israel’s geographic distance from Iran, the likelihood of Israel being able to carry out
repeated strikes is low. Israeli strike aircraft would only have one opportunity to strike at Iran’s
nuclear facilities.”117 Nevertheless, the same defense analyst has said, “One wave can do a lot,
depending on the quality of the penetrating munitions and the targeting abilities.”118
Access
The distance from Israeli bases to Iranian nuclear facilities imposes two significant difficulties.
The first involves airspace. Depending on the route selected, Israeli aircraft would have to cross
the sovereign airspace of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and/or Turkey both en route and on
the return trip. According to one report, “The route over Iraq would be the most direct and likely,
112 Susser, op. cit.
113 Rubin, op. cit.
114 Vick, op. cit. Following this quote, the article states, “The key word is meaningful [emphasis original]. The working
assumption behind Israel’s military preparations has been that a strike, to be worth mounting, must delay Tehran’s
nuclear capabilities by at least two years.” Ibid.
115 Elizabeth Bumiller, “Iran Raid Seen as a Huge Task for Israeli Jets,” New York Times, February 19, 2012.
116 Vick, op. cit. See also General (USAF ret.) Charles Wald, in Jim Michaels, “Israeli Attack On Iran Would Be
Complex," USA Today, February 14, 2012.
117 Anthony H. Cordesman, The New IAEA Report And Iran’s Evolving Nuclear And Missile Forces, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, November 8, 2011.
118 Vick, op. cit.
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defense analysts say, because Iraq effectively has no air defenses and the United States, after its
December withdrawal, no longer has the obligation to defend Iraqi skies.”119
Each route involves different diplomatic considerations, but Israel has shown a willingness and
ability to operate in foreign airspace for limited periods with little or no detection and without
targeting air defense sites, as in the 2007 raid on the suspected Syrian nuclear site near Deir al
Zur.120 However, although Israel may be able to hide comparatively small combat aircraft from
foreign air defense systems through electronic and other means, large tankers and other support
aircraft required for a long-range strike on Iran may be another matter. According to a 2010 book
by two U.S. analysts, “It seems likely that Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait would be able to
detect the overflight of Israeli aircraft. Syria might not see ingressing aircraft, but the ability to
blind the Syrians again, after doing so in 2007, is not something Israel can take for granted.”121
Although there have been past reports—officially denied—that Saudi Arabia has granted or
would grant advance permission for Israel to overfly its territory,122 Israel may rely on
technological and logistical advantages mentioned in the above paragraph to elude interception
during its overflight of third-party countries. Additionally, according to a book by two U.S.
analysts, “For all these countries except Syria, the balance of incentives might well lie on the side
of silence … a humbled Iran would be the overriding interest, especially if intercepting aircraft
were likely to be shot to pieces by Israeli fighters.”123 Active resistance to Israeli overflight using
surface-to-air missiles or intercepting aircraft could, at a minimum, derail Israel’s “intricate attack
plan”124—for example, by lengthening Israeli flight routes and complicating refueling plans.
A second challenge is that the distance to targets and the size of a possible strike package would
require all of Israel’s aerial refueling capability, with little or no margin for equipment or
operational failures. A February 2012 Economist article anticipated the facilities that an Israeli
strike might target:
Israel would probably pay particular attention to the enrichment plants at Natanz and
Fordow; after them would come the facility at Isfahan that turns uranium into a gas that the
centrifuges can work with and the heavy-water reactor under construction at Arak, both of
which are above the ground. The larger Russian-built reactor at Bushehr would probably
escape unscathed; it is less relevant to weapons work and damage to it could spread
contamination across the Gulf.125
119 Bumiller, op. cit.
120 An article by former German Defense Ministry director of planning (1982-1988) Hans Rühle for Switzerland’s
Neuer Zürcher Zeitung on the 2007 Syria raid claimed that seven Israeli F-15s “flew along the Mediterranean coast,
brushed past Turkey and pressed on into Syria. Fifty kilometers (30 miles) from their target they fired 22 rockets at the
three identified objects inside the Kibar complex.” Article translated and quoted in “Iranian defector tipped Syrian nuke
plans,” Associated Press, March 19, 2009. In the 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor, the eight Israeli F-16s that
carried out the bombing and six supporting F-15s transited Jordanian and Saudi airspace en route and on the return trip.
An overflight of present-day Jordan might have more complicated political ramifications, given that Israel and Jordan
signed a peace treaty in 1994.
121 Allin and Simon, op. cit., p. 99.
122 Hugh Tomlinson, “Saudi Arabia gives Israel clear skies to attack Iranian nuclear sites,” The Times (UK), June 12,
2010.
123 Allin and Simon, op. cit., pp. 99-100.
124 Ibid., p. 49.
125 “Attacking Iran: Up in the air,” op. cit. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Colin Kahl has said that an
Israeli attack might also target “multiple centrifuge production facilities in and around populated areas of Tehran and
Natanz.” Kahl, “An Israeli strike on Iran would backfire,” op. cit.
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See Figure 1 for a map of major Iranian facilities in regional context. Israel has five KC-130s and
four 707-based tankers similar to American KC-135s.126 A 2009 study estimated a need for 12
tanker equivalents per mission simply to attack Iranian nuclear facilities at Esfahan, Natanz, and
Arak (the Fordow facility had not yet been revealed).127 Without additional tankers, the fighters
would have to refuel twice over the duration of the mission. This need may be somewhat reduced
by the fact that Israel is also believed to have “mastered the operation of ‘buddy refueling,’”
using the F-15s’ drop tanks to refuel the shorter-range F-16s en route.128 Additionally, one Israeli
report states, “For the last few years, Israeli representatives have been snapping up every old
Boeing 707 airliner in good condition … and converting them into airborne tankers. According to
various sources, the IAF has by now eight or nine such tankers.”129
Analysts differ in assessing the effectiveness of Iranian air defenses. Iran’s defensive missile
systems are among the least modern in the Middle East, relying on Hawk systems supplied by the
U.S. before the Iranian Revolution and Vietnam-era Russian SA-2s, along with a few more
modern SA-5s. But they are controlled, some argue, by a modern, coordinated network. One
analyst has said, “They're not using wax pencils on glass...[t]hey have updated computerized
modern air defenses.”130 Another has raised the possibility, however slight, that Russia might have
“in recent years secretly supplied [Iran] with the SA-12 Giant or the latest variants of the S-300
series” air defense systems.131 If that is the case, analysts estimate that the attrition rate of Israeli
aircraft in an air strike could be significantly higher than otherwise.132
Aircraft
Although an attack on Esfahan, Natanz, and Arak might require deploying only 20% of Israel’s
top-line fighters purchased from the United States, it would probably require 100% of the most
capable—the IAF’s 25 F-15Is.133 Undertaking additional strikes on Fordow and possibly other
facilities—such as those related to research, centrifuge production, uranium mining and
processing, or even possible weapons production—would probably require diverting some of
these aircraft from the first three targets and possibly addressing some targets through alternative
means (see below). According to a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report,
“Israeli aircraft would probably need to carry close to their maximum payloads to achieve the
necessary level of damage against most targets suspected of WMD activity, although any given
[above-ground] structure could be destroyed with 1-3 weapons.”134 Striking Natanz, Esfahan, and
Arak simultaneously would probably require 90 tactical fighters, including a 10% margin for
126 The Military Balance 2011, Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, International Institute for Strategic
Studies, March, 2011. Israel has supported distant deployments before, most notably a 2600-kilometer deployment to
Poland, albeit only three fighters were involved.
127 Abdullah Toukan and Anthony H. Cordesman, Study on a Possible Israeli Strike on Iran’s Nuclear Development
Facilities, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, DC, March 8, 2009.
128 Hans Rühle, “Wie Israel Irans Atomprogramm zerstören könnte (How Israel could destroy Iran's nuclear program),”
Die Welt (Germany), February 16, 2012 (CRS translation).
129 Pfeffer, “Israel could strike Iran's nuclear facilities, but it won't be easy,” op. cit.
130 Scott Johnson, an analyst at IHS Jane’s, in Jim Michaels, “Israeli Attack On Iran Would Be Complex,” USA Today,
February 14, 2012.
131 Rühle, op. cit.
132 Toukan and Cordesman, op. cit.
133 Ibid. The IAF also has 101 F-16Is (per Military Balance, op. cit.).
134 Cordesman, op. cit.
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reliability.135 With support, this yields an Israeli strike “involving at least 100 aircraft.”136 Most
sources indicate that Israel has a total of “around 350 fighter jets, a larger aerial combat force than
countries of the likes of Britain and Germany.”137
Weapons
The facilities at Esfahan and Arak are above ground, meaning they can be attacked with a variety
of weaponry. Those that are underground, such as the commercial enrichment facility at Natanz,
or above-ground structures that have been hardened, can be struck with precision-guided “bunker-
buster” weapons, two types of which the United States has sold to Israel. The Guided Bomb Unit
(GBU)-27 2000-lb class weapon carries 550 lbs of high explosives, and can penetrate more than 6
feet of reinforced concrete. The GBU-28 5000-lb class weapon penetrates at least 20 feet of
concrete and 100 feet of earth.138 According to CSIS, “The key weapon to be used against hard
targets and underground sites like Natanz might be the GBU-28, although the US may have
quietly given Israel much more sophisticated systems or Israel may have developed its own.”139
Because the GBU-27 and -28 can be laser-guided, other aircraft or special operations forces
inserted on the ground may be used to designate the target.140
Israel possesses Jericho II medium-range ballistic missiles with ranges capable of striking Iran.141
They could be used against above-ground targets and free up aircraft to focus on hardened targets
or those less amenable to missile attack. However, whether these ballistic missiles have the
accuracy and capacity to destroy such targets in Iran is unclear.
From a weaponeering perspective, Fordow offers a unique challenge. Because the facility is
reportedly built inside a mountain an estimated 295 feet deep,142 Israel’s current earth-penetrating
munitions may be ineffective.143 Observers suggest strikes against the reinforced entrance doors
may be necessary, which would require a great degree of precision. Such an attack would not be
possible with missiles, as the angle of approach required would not be possible from a ballistic
trajectory. According to CSIS, “The hard target bombs [Israel] has acquired from the US are
bunker-busters, however, not systems designed to kill underground facilities. They could damage
entrances but not the facilities. What is not known is whether Israel has its own ordnance or has
secretly acquired more sophisticated systems.”144
135 Toukan and Cordesman, op. cit.
136 Joseph Cirincione, quoted in “Expert: Attack on Iran may mean $200/barrel oil,” CBSNews.com, February 20, 2012.
137 Pfeffer, “Israel could strike Iran's nuclear facilities, but it won't be easy,” op. cit.
138 Toukan and Cordesman, op. cit.
139 Cordesman, op. cit. Although small nuclear warheads, in the event Israel has them, could be effective against targets
too hardened for Israel’s conventional weapons to address, their use would, in the words of CSIS, “generate severe
diplomatic and military consequences for Israel.” Ibid.
140 Rühle, op. cit., states that Israel used special operations forces to designate targets in the strike on Syria’s nuclear
facility in 2007.
141 Toukan and Cordesman, op. cit.
142 Lindeman and Webster, op. cit.
143 A former RAND Corporation analyst has argued, however, that a highly-coordinated and precise attack using GBU-
27s and GBU-28s could conceivably incapacitate Fordow’s centrifuges. Long, op. cit.
144 Cordesman, op. cit.
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However, it may not be necessary to damage a facility directly in order to disrupt its functionality.
Centrifuges, for example, require an enormous degree of precision to work, and even a relatively
minor shock or other event can destroy a centrifuge’s utility. In the case of Natanz, even if the
reinforced building is not breached, an explosion strong enough to significantly damage the walls
could still ruin centrifuges—and the consensus of planners is that one to two GBU-28s would be
sufficient to shatter the reinforced dome.145 At Fordow, assuming that munitions would not be
able to penetrate the mountainous terrain over the facility, the question would be how well the
centrifuges have been isolated from shock and the possible blast effects of an attack on the
facility’s entrances.146 In a Washington Post interview apparently contemplating a hypothetical
U.S. strike on Fordow, a U.S. defense analyst was cited as a source for the following statement:
“‘There are good outcomes short of destroying’ the centrifuge hall. Strikes against more
accessible targets—from tunnel entrances and air shafts to power and water systems—can
effectively knock the plant out of action.”147
See Figure 3 below for a graphic with reported details on the underground facilities at Natanz
and Fordow and on penetrating munitions that could be used to target the facilities.
145 Rühle and Toukan/Cordesman evaluate the use of GBU-28s against Natanz; Long dedicates all GBU-28 strikes to
Fordow, but finds GBU-27s sufficient for Natanz.
146 Long, op. cit.
147 Anthony Cordesman of CSIS cited in Warrick, “Underground sites vulnerable, experts say,” op. cit.
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Figure 3. Underground Nuclear Facilities and Penetrating Munitions
Sources: Washington Post (from DigitalGlobe via Google Earth Pro, GlobalSecurity.org), adapted by CRS
Note: CRS does not claim to confirm this information independently.
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In a February 2012 Bipartisan Policy Center report, former Senator Charles S. Robb and retired
Air Force General Charles Wald suggested that the United States provide Israel with 200 GBU-31
bunker-busting munitions and additional aerial refueling assets.148 GBU-31s have the same
warhead as Israel’s existing GBU-28s (the BLU-122), but with a more precise guidance kit.
Although its warhead would cause little to no more damage than a GBU-28, the report asserts that
“The GBU-31 would augment the IAF’s existing capabilities, in this case by increasing the
likelihood that any given sortie would score a direct hit on its target.”149 Reports indicate that
Prime Minister Netanyahu might have requested additional GBU-28s and tanker aircraft from
U.S. officials during his early March 2012 Washington, DC trip, though White House press
secretary Jay Carney claimed that the topic was not discussed in Netanyahu’s meeting with the
President.150
Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Estimated
Effects of a Possible Strike
Effect on Iran’s Nuclear Program151
Another major consideration for Israeli decisionmakers is the ultimate impact of an Israeli
military strike on Iran’s existing nuclear program. Israeli officials and analysts generally agree
that a strike would not completely destroy the program. One journalist has said, “According to the
Israeli assessment, a successful strike, a strike that would be conducted according to planning,
would … inflict a significant damage that would end with a delay of three to five years.”152 In
February 2012, a senior Israeli official was cited in Time magazine as saying that “given the wide
geographic dispersion of Iran’s atomic facilities, combined with the limits of Israel’s air armada,
the Jewish state can expect to push back the Iranian program by only a matter of months—a year
at most, according to the official. He attributes that estimate to the Israel Atomic Energy
Commission, which is charged with assessing the likely effect of a strike”153 In March 2012,
however, another source cited optimism among some Israeli national security officials that a
strike in “the next six months—conducted before Iran can further harden its nuclear sites, or make
them redundant—will set back the ayatollahs’ atomic ambitions at least five years.”154 Aside from
estimates of how much time the Iranian program might be set back as a result of a strike, Israeli
148 Senator Charles S. Robb and General (USAF ret.) Charles Wald, Co-Chairs, Meeting the Challenge: Stopping the
Clock, Bipartisan Policy Center, Washington, DC, February 2012. They make these suggestions under the following
rationale: “While we do not advocate an Israeli military strike, we believe a more credible Israeli threat can only
increase the pressure on Iran to negotiate.” Ibid.
149 Robb and Wald, op. cit.
150 Kent Klein, “White House Denies Report of Deal With Israel Over Iran,” Voice of America, March 8, 2012.
According to Reuters, a report in Israel’s Ma’ariv newspaper that President Obama agreed to provide the equipment on
the condition that Israel not attack in 2012 was dismissed in Israeli government circles as “unrealistic.” “Iran-Konflikt -
Israel fordert in USA bunkerbrechende Bomben an (Israel requests bunker-buster bombs in USA),” Reuters
Deutschland, March 8, 2012 (CRS translation).
151 Prepared by Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, with contributions from Paul K. Kerr, Analyst in
Nonproliferation.
152 Ronen Bergman, quoted in Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, “In Israel, A Nonstop Debate on Possible Iran Strike,” NPR,
January 31, 2012.
153 Vick, op. cit.
154 Jeffrey Goldberg, “Israelis Grow Confident Strike on Iran’s Nukes Can Work,” Bloomberg, March 19, 2012.
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officials and analysts have generally not focused in open sources on technical details that might
provide hints about potential Israeli attack plans and how they might factor into Israeli
decisionmaking. According to one Israeli analysis from January 2012:
the censor’s office is charged with preventing publication of secrets that may harm state
security…. A public discussion ought not to deal with the operational issues connected to a
military action, lest operational plans, Iranian vulnerabilities, and limitations of Israeli
capabilities are exposed. In addition, the public does not have the necessary information for a
discussion of this sort, such as detailed intelligence on the Iranian nuclear program and
information on the IDF’s operational capabilities that are relevant to such an action.155
Public discussion of this issue in the United States may give some hint as to the considerations
Israeli leaders are addressing. Many officials and analysts in the United States have argued that,
following a military attack that destroyed most of Iran’s major nuclear facilities, Iran would be
able to reconstitute the program.156 General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, in his February 19 CNN interview, said:
I think that Israel has the capability to strike Iran and to delay the production or the capability
of Iran to achieve a nuclear weapons status, probably for a couple of years. But some of the
targets are probably beyond their reach and, of course, that’s what—that’s what concerns
them. That’s this notion of a zone of immunity that they discuss.157
According to a February 13, 2012 CRS telephone interview with a U.S. executive branch official,
an attack that left Iran’s conversion and centrifuge production facilities intact would considerably
reduce the timeline for reconstitution. This timeline would possibly also be affected by variables
such as the number of centrifuges and quantity of LEU and 20%-enriched uranium remaining
usable after an attack. Director of National Intelligence Clapper, in February 16, 2012 testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that the intelligence community does not have
a “single number” for the amount of time necessary for Iran to reconstitute its program,
explaining that the number of relevant variables precludes formulating such an assessment.
Reconstitution of a program aimed at developing a full nuclear weapons capability would depend
not only on Iran’s ability to produce fissile nuclear material for a weapon, but also research,
development, and production relating to the creation of both functional warheads and delivery
systems such as missiles.
155 Stein, et al., “The Public Discussion of Israel’s Strategy Regarding a Nuclear Iran,” op. cit.
156 Kahl, “Not Time to Attack Iran…,” op. cit. See also Vick, op. cit.
157 General Dempsey transcript, op. cit.
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Other Facilities Related to Iran’s Nuclear Program158
Iran’s facilities for producing centrifuges and components would probably be important to Tehran’s ability to
reconstitute its nuclear program after a military attack. Iran might have facilities that are unknown to Israel. IAEA
inspectors had access to Iranian centrifuge workshops in order to verify an October 2003 agreement under which
Iran suspended its enrichment program. However, the agency’s knowledge of Iran’s workshops has deteriorated since
Iran ended this access in early 2006. Several months later, Wayne White, a former top Middle East intelligence analyst
at the Department of State, expressed concern that Tehran could be moving some components related to its nuclear
program.159
More recently, a U.S. official told CRS in an April 2011 in-person interview that there “could be lots of workshops” in
Iran. A former U.S. government official with direct experience on the issue told CRS via telephone on February 27,
2012 that Iran’s centrifuge production is widely distributed and that the number of workshops has probably multiplied
“many times” since 2005 because of an increase in Iranian contractors and subcontractors working on the program.
Perhaps referring to Iranian centrifuge workshops, former Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency
Director Michael Hayden stated in January 2012 that neither the United States nor Israel knows the location of all key
Iranian nuclear-related facilities.160
An executive branch official said in a February 27, 2012 CRS telephone interview that Iran does not have sufficient
spare centrifuges or components that would enable it to install new centrifuges immediately after an attack. However,
the former official interviewed on February 27 added that most centrifuge workshops could probably be rebuilt or
replicated within six months.
Perhaps anticipating that a military strike might not permanently set back Iran’s nuclear program,
some Israeli officials reportedly acknowledge that Israel may feel compelled to mount periodic
follow-up attacks161 that, in the words of one U.S. analyst, could seek to “demoralize the
industry’s workforce, disrupt its operations, and greatly increase the costs of the program. Israeli
leaders might hope that their attrition tactics, delivered through occasional air strikes, would bog
down the nuclear program while international sanctions weaken the civilian economy and reduce
political support for the regime.”162 Amos Yadlin the former head of Israel’s military intelligence
unit and one of the IAF pilots who carried out the 1981 Osirak strike, wrote in March 2012 that
Iran might not fully resume its nuclear program if “military action is followed by tough sanctions,
stricter international inspections and an embargo on the sale of nuclear components to Tehran.”163
In contrast, a Israeli analyst wrote in January 2012, “If Israel attacks Iran now, does that mean
Iran would never get nuclear weapons? No, it would merely postpone that outcome for at most a
year or two more than it would take otherwise. And then it would ensure an all-out, endless
bloody war thereafter.”164 Former IAF commander Eitan Ben-Eliyahu, who flew in escort of the
1981 Osirak bombing mission, was cited by the Jerusalem Report in March 2012 as having the
view that “the ultimate success of any military operation in Iran—no matter who carries it out—
will depend to a large extent on the follow-up diplomatic activity.”165
158 Prepared by Paul K. Kerr, Analyst in Nonproliferation.
159 Paul Kerr, “News Analysis: IAEA Limits Leave Iran Intel Gaps,” Arms Control Today, October 2006.
160 Transcript of remarks by Michael Hayden, Center for the National Interest, Washington, DC, January 19, 2012,
available at http://www.cftni.org/Hayden%20_1.19.12.pdf.
161 Allin and Simon, op. cit., p. 53; Pfeffer, “Will They?”, op. cit.
162 Robert Haddick, “The Ticking Clock,” foreignpolicy.com, February 10, 2012.
163 Amos Yadlin, “Israel’s Last Chance to Strike Iran,” New York Times, February 29, 2012.
164 Rubin, op. cit.
165 Susser, op. cit.
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Effect on Iran’s Regime166
How the Israelis assess the effect of an air strike on the popularity and durability of Iran’s regime
is unclear, as is whether this is even a major factor in their decisionmaking process. In U.S.-Israel
government discussions, U.S. officials reportedly have cited analyses indicating that military
action against Iran’s nuclear program—particularly if carried out by Israel—might heal
increasingly evident rifts within Iranian society and government. U.S. officials assess that
divisions are widening among Iranian elites and that Iran’s economy is “weighed down by
international sanctions,” but they are apparently not convinced that these divisions jeopardize the
regime.167 Nevertheless, trends observed over several years—and heightened by a broad uprising
in Iran in 2009 over the results of June 12, 2009 presidential elections—suggest that the regime’s
grip on power might be weakening. U.S. policymakers apparently do not want U.S. allies to
undertake any policies that might undermine the perceived deterioration in the regime’s position.
Secretary of Defense Panetta, at a December 2, 2011 Brookings event, stated that one of the
unintended consequences of a military strike on Iran’s nuclear program would be that “the regime
that is weak now … would suddenly be able to reestablish itself, suddenly be able to get support
in the region….”168 That view is shared by some Iranian opposition figures, including a U.S.-
based opposition figure who visited Israel in January 2012 and expressed on Israeli television the
view that an Israeli airstrike on Iran would increase the regime’s domestic popularity.169
Although Israeli leaders do not generally speak publicly about the potential effect of an Israeli
strike on the Iranian regime, Prime Minister Netanyahu reportedly “has told visitors [to his office]
that he believes the Tehran government to be deeply unpopular, indeed despised, and that a
careful attack on its nuclear facilities might even be welcomed by Iranian citizens.”170 Even if the
current Iranian regime were to fall, there is no guarantee that a successor regime would be less
disposed to pursuing a program that could give Iran a nuclear weapons capability. Therefore,
Israeli leaders may not be particularly concerned about incurring the cost of preserving an Iranian
regime that might otherwise have collapsed were there no strike. However, according to Israeli
analysts who have summarized the Israeli debate over a possible military strike on Iran, regime
change “is regarded by some opponents of a strike as possible, given the degree of discontent
prevailing in Iran, especially among its large minorities—and as the only long-term way of
rendering Iran’s nuclear program less dangerous.”171
166 Prepared by Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.
167 Testimony of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
January 31, 2012.
168 Transcript of Panetta’s remarks at the Brookings event available at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4937.
169 Joshua Mitnick, “Israeli defense minister implies a strike on Iran nuclear program is near,” Christian Science
Monitor, February 3, 2012. See also http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NNWDhpOPYIY.
170 Bronner, “Israel Senses Bluffing in Iran’s Threats of Retaliation,” op. cit.
171 Feldman, et al., “What to Do About Nuclearizing Iran? The Israeli Debate,” op. cit.
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Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Possible
Iranian Responses to a Strike172
On February 4, 2012, amid widespread reports about Israeli contemplation of a strike, Iranian
Supreme Leader Khamene’i was quoted as saying that Iran will “carry out its own threat in
response to the threats of war and oil sanctions should the need arise.”173 The potential
consequences of a strike on Iran’s nuclear program—for Israel, Israel’s allies, particularly the
United States, and others—are widely assessed to factor significantly into Israel’s decisionmaking
about a strike. Israeli open source reporting generally avoids addressing detailed Iranian response
scenarios and how they might factor into Israeli decisionmaking, perhaps partly due to a belief
expressed in January 2012 by three Israeli commentators (including two former officials) who
have been cited earlier that “the operative capabilities [for Israel] to cope with [Iranian] responses
are not a subject for public discussion because of the risks of exposure.”174 However, as discussed
below, Israeli leaders such as Defense Minister Barak and public opinion polls make general
references to Israel’s ability to withstand a retaliation.
Beyond an Iranian response directly against Israel, Iran could choose other courses as well. At the
December 2011 Brookings Institution event, Secretary Panetta raised concerns about the possible
unintended consequences of a potential attack for the United States, the Middle East, and the
global economy:
the United States would obviously be blamed and we could possibly be the target of
retaliation from Iran, striking our ships, striking our military bases…. [T]here are economic
consequences to that attack—severe economic consequences that could impact a very fragile
economy in Europe and a fragile economy here in the United States…. And lastly I think that
the consequence could be that we would have an escalation that would take place that would
not only involve many lives, but I think could consume the Middle East in a confrontation
and a conflict that we would regret.175
Although some of Iran’s threatened responses are specific—such as its as-yet unimplemented
December 2011 threat to close the Strait of Hormuz if sanctions were placed on Iran’s Central
Bank—most are vague. The potential Iranian responses discussed below are intended to be
suggestive, not exhaustive or definitive. For purposes of clarity, they are discussed in terms of
increasing degrees of severity. It is also possible that Iran would pursue multiple responses
simultaneously, or not respond at all.
Diplomatic Responses
It is possible that Iran might respond to an Israeli strike not with military action, but with a
diplomatic reaction intended to attract international sympathy, reduce its isolation, and perhaps
even ease international and multilateral sanctions. Iran could take advantage of pre-existing
international criticism of Israel on the Palestinian question and other issues to portray itself as a
172 Prepared by Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, except as otherwise specified.
173 “Iran will carry out its threats if necessary: Leader,” Mehr News Agency, February 3, 2012.
174 Stein, et al., “The Public Discussion of Israel’s Strategy Regarding a Nuclear Iran,” op. cit.
175 Panetta Brookings transcript, op. cit.
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victim of “unwarranted and unprovoked Israeli aggression” that Iran might argue violated
international law.
Under this scenario, Iran still might not be able to persuade the U.N. Security Council to lift
existing U.N. sanctions. However, the continued effectiveness of many international and
multilateral sanctions against Iran would depend on the degree of international compliance and
enforcement. Iran could possibly use the Israeli strike to convince countries opposed to the strike
or skeptical of the overall utility of sanctions to abandon their adherence to the sanctions regime.
Additional international sanctions or international compliance with existing U.S. and EU
sanctions might become very difficult to obtain or maintain.176
Hostile but Non-Military Responses
Another option for Iran could be considered hostile to the international community, but would not
involve military action. In the aftermath of an Israeli air strike, Iran could try to reconstitute its
nuclear program rather than accept a permanent setback. Presumably, Iran would do so in sites
that are hardened and well defended to try to deter another such strike.177
As part of such an effort, Iran could possibly stop permitting the IAEA to monitor Iran’s
compliance with its Safeguards Agreement. Iran could cease allowing IAEA visits, stop
responding to IAEA questions, and/or withdraw from the NPT outright.178 Anticipation of these
measures could influence Israeli decisionmaking regarding a strike because an end to IAEA
monitoring would deprive the international community of valuable sources of first-hand
information on Iran’s nuclear program. An NPT withdrawal could also undermine the
international legal basis for action to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
Military Responses
One major question for Israeli leaders to consider is whether Iran, were it to respond militarily or
otherwise violently to an Israeli air strike, would confine its response to Israel-related targets or
expand its response to the United States and other countries deemed complicit. On February 14,
2012, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Public Relations Department
said Israel would face “appalling retaliation” for an attack on Iran, and that any military strike
will have “terrible and inconceivable consequences” for the United States and its allies.179 In mid
March, Supreme Leader Khamene’i was quoted as saying on Iranian state television that “against
an attack by enemies—to defend ourselves either against the U.S. or Zionist regime—we will
attack them on the same level that they attack us.”180 Nevertheless, the breadth of Iranian
retaliation might depend on how the strike were carried out, which route(s) were used, what
reported communications there were, if any, between Israel and other governments, and similar
factors.
176 William Maclean, “Iran raid likely to drag in U.S. and hurt global economy,” Reuters, February 5, 2012.
177 Vick, op. cit.
178 Maclean, op. cit.
179 “Israel War on Iran Will Evoke Gory Retaliation: Commander,” Iran Press TV, February 14, 2012.
180 “Iran vows to retaliate ‘on the same level’ to US or Israel attack,” msnbc.com, March 21, 2012.
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Attacks on Israeli Territory
Israeli officials are, by almost all accounts, braced for an Iranian response on Israeli territory,
were there to be a strike against Iran. The forms of Iranian response could determine whether
Iran’s responses set off a regional war involving other states, or remain relatively confined to
attacks that Israel could absorb or against which it would counter-attack with its own capabilities.
According to one Israeli report:
If it comes to a shooting war, Israel will face an estimated 200,000 rockets and missiles in
enemy hands in Iran, Syria, Lebanon and Gaza. According to Military Intelligence Chief
Aviv Kochavi, most have a range of up to 40 kilometers (25 miles), and there are a few
thousand with ranges of between 100 and 1,300 kilometers (60-800 miles). All of northern
and central Israel is within range of Lebanon, Syria and Iran while rockets from Gaza
threaten most of the south.181
In previous instances—1991 during the Gulf War, 2006 against Hezbollah, 2008-2009 against
Hamas and other Palestinian militants—Israelis took cover in bomb shelters and safe rooms.
According to reports, approximately 50 Israeli civilians were directly killed by missile and rocket
strikes during these three conflicts combined.182 But there are concerns that retaliatory missile
attacks by Iran could be of an altogether different magnitude. In addition, some Israeli reports
have raised concerns regarding the level of Israel’s civil defense preparedness. According to one,
“1.7 million Israelis, a quarter of the population, do not have ready access to bomb shelters. An
estimated $256 million is needed to produce gas masks for the 40 percent of Israelis who do not
have them.”183 A late February 2012 poll indicated that by a 60%-25% margin, a majority of
Israelis disagree with Defense Minister Barak’s statement that in case of an attack on Iran, if
Israeli citizens obey instructions and remain in their homes, Iran’s retaliatory strikes will probably
cause only about 500 casualties. The poll indicated that the majority believed that the number of
casualties would be higher.184
Iranian Ballistic Missile Attacks185
It is clear from the many reports discussing the possibility of an Israeli air strike that Israeli
leaders generally assume that, at the very least, Iran would retaliate against Israel directly with
ballistic missiles.186 According to one U.S. defense analyst, this could include “Israeli military
and civilian centers, and Israeli suspected nuclear weapons sites.”187 Iranian leaders almost
181 Susser, op. cit.
182 Greenberg, “Sense of inevitable war grips Israel,” op. cit. According to information provided by Israel’s embassy in
Washington, DC on March 8, 2012, the Jerusalem Post reported on January 7, 1992 that 72 Israeli civilians died
indirectly from but as a consequence of Iraqi Scud missile attacks during the 1991 Gulf War—four from gas mask
suffocation and 68 from heart attacks. Thousands of Israeli civilians were injured in the previous three conflicts
combined, and the casualty numbers do not fully measure psychological effects. The combined cost in the three
conflicts of property damage, civil defense and military preparedness (including evacuation and relocation of civilians),
and the inability of many Israelis to work under emergency conditions is estimated to be in the billions.
183 Susser, op. cit. See also Eiran, op. cit.
184 Dahaf Institute poll, February 28-29, 2012, with a 4.5% margin of error, details available at
http://www.peaceindex.org/indexMonthEng.aspx?num=240#anchor269.
185 Prepared by Steven A. Hildreth, Specialist in Missile Defense; and Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern
Affairs.
186 See, e.g., Bergman, “Will Israel Attack Iran?”, op. cit.
187 Cordesman, op. cit.
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certainly calculate that missile strikes against Israel could provoke additional escalation and—
perhaps more importantly—bring the United States into conflict with Iran, whether or not Iran
conducted any strikes against U.S. targets.188 Still, Iranian leaders could be under significant
pressure from key constituencies, such as the IRGC, to demonstrate a forthright response to an
Israeli strike. It is widely expected that Israel would prepare and deploy its ballistic missile
defense capabilities prior to attacking Iran.
Although Iran has perhaps the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, Iran
cannot reach targets in Israel with its hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) because
of the distances involved. However, Iran reportedly has a number of medium-range ballistic
missiles (MRBMs) that could strike anywhere within Israel. This includes the liquid-fueled
Shahab-3 and its variants, whose range estimates in open sources vary from 1,000 kilometers to
almost 2,000 kilometers. Exact numbers are not publicly known, but estimates are that Iran has
less than 50 Shahab-3 launchers (for all its variant missiles) and perhaps 25-100+ Shahab-3
missiles (including variant versions).189 In recent years, Iran also has developed and tested solid-
fueled Sejil-1 and Sejil-2 MRBMs with ranges estimated upwards of 2,000 kilometers or greater.
Figure 4 below illustrates potential ranges of these MRBMs.
188 A U.S. national security columnist has written, “Administration officials caution that Tehran shouldn’t
misunderstand: The United States has a 60-year commitment to Israeli security, and if Israel’s population centers were
hit, the United States could feel obligated to come to Israel’s defense.” Ignatius, op. cit.
189 Various. See, e.g., “Iran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment,” Michael Elleman, International
Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2010, p. 20; “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” National Air and Space
Intelligence Center, NASIC-10301-0985-09, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 2009, p. 17.
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Figure 4. Potential Ranges of Iranian Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles
(calculated from possible launch sites)
Sources: Various, adapted by CRS.
Notes: All ranges are approximate.
It is very difficult to project the number of potential Israeli casualties from an Iranian ballistic
missile counter-attack against Israel. Because of the conventional yields and relative inaccuracies
of the Iranian missiles, a relatively low Israeli casualty count might hold true. But if the ballistic
missile attack is sizeable and hits large population densities in city cores, casualties could be
significantly higher.
Attacks by Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas or Other Palestinian Militants190
Many Israeli analysts assert that Iran would respond against Israel using allied non-state actors
such as Lebanese Hezbollah.191 Iran has reportedly supplied Hezbollah with about 50,000
missiles and rockets, including several thousand that can reportedly target Israeli population
centers significantly farther south than those hit in the 2006 war—including Tel Aviv and its
vicinity.192 For possible ranges, see Figure 5 below. However, over the past fifteen years
190 For more information, see CRS Report R41446, Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress, by Casey L.
Addis and Christopher M. Blanchard; and CRS Report R41514, Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress, by Jim
Zanotti.
191 Bronner, “Israel Senses Bluffing in Iran’s Threats of Retaliation,” op. cit.
192 Bergman, “Will Israel Attack Iran?”, op. cit.
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Hezbollah has evolved from a reflexive proxy of Iran to a political and military force in Lebanon
in its own right. Hezbollah might ultimately decide independently to stay out of any retaliatory
operations against Israel, in part to avoid starting a long-running conflict with Israel similar to
that which occurred in 2006. According to the Economist, “the situation in Syria means that
[Hezbollah] cannot be certain that, if it fires at Israel, its Iranian-supplied arsenal will be
replenished.”193
Iran has always had far less influence over the Palestinian Sunni Islamist movement Hamas,
which controls the Gaza Strip and is routinely described by Israeli officials as an Iranian proxy.
Ongoing unrest in Syria and its violent suppression by the Asad regime has reportedly led to a
weakening of ties between Hamas and Iran and to fissures within Hamas itself, as Hamas’s
external leadership has left its Damascus headquarters, said that “we are not with the regime in its
security solution,” and emphasized its Muslim Brotherhood roots.194 Perhaps in an attempt to
keep its ties with Hamas’s Gaza leadership strong, Iran hosted Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’s prime
minister in Gaza, in early February.195 Reports indicate that Iran is also providing more resources
to Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), another Sunni Islamist group based in Gaza, possibly to
maintain its influence there in the event of a further drift in its relations with Hamas.
Between them, Hamas and PIJ have thousands of rockets and mortars capable of hitting Israel—
including some that could approach Tel Aviv. Though they have not demonstrated ability or
willingness to carry out major non-rocket terrorist attacks within Israel since 2006, the year
Hamas became more politically active and won Palestinian Authority legislative elections, Hamas
and PIJ may be capable of terrorist attacks on Israeli settlers in the West Bank. Given these
factors, and also considering Israel’s demonstrated ability to retaliate against rocket launching
militants in Gaza and the reportedly successful deployment of its Iron Dome short-range missile
defense system,196 it is unclear whether Iran can count on Hamas or PIJ to respond on Iran’s
behalf to an Israeli air strike. In early March 2012, some senior Hamas leaders reportedly stated
that an Israeli attack on Iran alone would not cause Hamas to retaliate, and reports conflicted over
whether other senior leaders disagreed with this stance.197
193 “Attacking Iran: Up in the air,” Economist, February 25, 2012.
194 “Hamas ‘to renounce’ armed resistance to Israel,” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, December 15, 2011; Ehud Yaari,
“The agony of Hamas,” Times of Israel, February 27, 2012; Mohammed Daraghmeh, “AP Interview: Hamas out of
Syria, leader says,” Associated Press, February 26, 2012.
195 Fares Akram and Isabel Kershner, “Hamas Premier Visits Iran In Sign That Ties Are Strong,” New York Times,
February 11, 2012.
196 For more information on Iron Dome, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim
Zanotti.
197 Harriet Sherwood, “Hamas rules out military support for Iran in any war with Israel,” guardian.co.uk, March 6,
2012; “US arms offer to Israel to delay hit,” Agence France Presse, March 9, 2012. “‘Hamas denies it would stay out
of Israel-Iran war,’” jpost.com, March 8, 2012.
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Figure 5. Possible Ranges of Rockets and Missiles from Iranian-Allied Groups
(as of February 2012)
Source: Bipartisan Policy Center, adapted by CRS.
Notes: All ranges are approximate.
Possible Israeli Missile Defense Capabilities198
Israel has deployed ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities designed specifically for
countering short- and medium-range ballistic attacks, as well as indigenous defenses (such as the
Iron Dome system mentioned above) against possible rocket barrages. The United States
contributes annually to the cooperative U.S.-Israel BMD programs known as David’s Sling (for
SRBMs—which is not yet deployed) and Arrow (for MRBMs), and has sold Patriot air defense
198 Prepared by Steven A. Hildreth, Specialist in Missile Defense.
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batteries to Israel.199 Although Israel reports high confidence in the abilities of those BMD
systems that they have deployed, Israel has not tested how well they would perform in wartime.
In general, some weapon systems, including the performance of U.S. BMD systems, have not
performed as well in actual combat conditions as in limited developmental or operational test
environments.200 One Israeli journalist has expressed concern about Israeli missile defense
capabilities and costs in the event of retaliation by Iran and its allies to an Israeli strike:
Israel’s active missile defense systems—the Arrow, Patriot and Iron Dome (Magic
Wand/David’s Sling will only be operative in 2013)—will be severely tested. Besides the
difficulty of dealing with multiple missile attacks, active defense is also extremely
expensive. Each Arrow missile costs around $2.7 million and each Iron Dome projectile
around $80,000.201
In addition to Israel’s own capabilities, the United States has naval and other BMD capabilities in
theater that could be used to support Israel’s efforts to deal with an Iranian or Iranian ballistic
missile counter-attack, if a decision to do so were made.202
Attacks Against Israeli Interests Abroad
Many analysts have stated that Iran would possibly target Israeli facilities and diplomats abroad
as part of its retaliatory strategy. Agents of the IRGC Qods Force, which is the arm of the IRGC
that operates outside Iran’s borders, regularly cooperating with Hezbollah, would presumably be
involved in such retaliation. Hezbollah has been implicated in the July 1992 bombing of Israel’s
embassy in Buenos Aires,203 and—along with the Qods Force—in the bombing of a Jewish
cultural center (AMIA building) in that same city two years later.204 Combined, the two bombings
killed approximately 114 people and injured hundreds more.205
At least one Israeli journalist has pointed to events in February 2012 as an indicator that Iran
might employ such an approach.206 Attacks, attempted attacks, and alleged attack plots were
conducted or revealed against Israeli diplomatic personnel in several countries, including
Thailand, Georgia, India, and Azerbaijan.207 Israel blamed Iran for these events, although
199 For more information on U.S. cooperation with Israel on missile defense, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel:
Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel , by Jeremy M.
Sharp.
200 See, e.g., House of Representatives. Performance of the Patriot Missile in the Gulf War: Hearing before the
Legislation and National Security Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, 102 Cong., 2nd Sess., 7
April 1992; U.S. Government Printing Office, (Washington DC: 1993), and Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the
Air War, GAO/PEMD-96-10, July 1996.
201 Susser, op. cit.
202 The United States and Israel have worked closely together for several years in simulated and actual war gaming
exercises that focused on countering a ballistic missile attack against Israel.
203 U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2010, Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, August 18,
2011.
204 Ibid.; Yaakov Katz, “Iran’s Quds Force expanding in Europe, S. America,” jpost.com, January 6, 2012.
205 These figures come from the State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism report for 1992, available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_92/review.html, and a July 18, 2007 item on the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s website
commemorating the 13th anniversary of the 1994 AMIA bombing. Iran’s current Defense Minister, Ahmad Vahidi, was
head of the Qods Force when the AMIA bombing was conducted, and he is wanted for questioning by Interpol for that
attack. Aidan Jones, “Ahmadinejad chooses wanted man for cabinet,” guardian.co.uk, August 22, 2009.
206 Yaakov Katz, “Why is Iran having a hard time targeting Israeli diplomats?”, Jerusalem Post, February 17, 2012.
207 Thomas Fuller and Rick Gladstone, “Explosions in Thailand Cast Suspicion on Iranians,” New York Times,
(continued...)
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investigators in most of the countries have not announced definitive conclusions to that effect.
Israeli leaders appear to believe that Iran may be attempting copycat retaliations against Israel for
a series of seemingly related assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists over the past two years,
the most recent of which occurred in January 2012.208
Expanded Military Responses
It is unclear how significantly contingencies of Iran potentially attacking U.S. targets in response
to an Israeli strike factor into Israeli decisionmaking. Some Israeli analysts have argued that the
Israeli public debate should include greater discussion of how a possible Iranian retaliation aimed
at U.S. targets or interests might affect the overall risk-benefit assessment of an Israeli strike:
The possibility that in the event of an Israeli military action Iran would decide to attack US
targets in the Gulf or target oil exports cannot be ruled out. In such a case, the United States
would be forced to respond, and would thus find itself involved in a military confrontation it
did not initiate. This might have serious consequences on American public opinion (not to
mention some of its elected officials) toward Israel, which will have involved the United
States in a war.209
According to one report citing U.S. officials, based on the results of a March 2012 U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) exercise simulating the repercussions of a possible Israeli attack on Iran,
CENTCOM’s commander General James Mattis reportedly told aides that “an Israeli first strike
would be likely to have dire consequences across the region and for United States forces there.”210
Attempted Closure of the Strait of Hormuz
One potential scenario that Israeli decisionmakers may consider, were Iran to expand its
retaliation beyond Israeli targets, would be an Iranian attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz. In
December 2011 and January 2012, Iran issued the threat in response to looming additional
economic sanctions, not specifically in response to reports of a possible Israeli air strike.
Nevertheless, the threat suggests that Iranian leaders see closing the Strait or attacking ships
transiting it as a viable option for raising the cost to international actors of pressure on Iran—no
matter what form that pressure might take.211 An Israeli analysis co-authored in January 2012 by
former head of military intelligence Amos Yadlin, and not explicitly contemplating Iranian
responses to a possible Israeli military strike, expressed skepticism in Iran’s abilities to block the
Strait for an extended period and further asserted that doing so would run counter to Iran’s own
economic and strategic interests.212 For more information on possible conflict scenarios in the
(...continued)
February 15, 2012. The Jerusalem Post has reported that similar plots may have been foiled in Bulgaria, Egypt, and
Turkey as well since January 2012. Katz, op. cit.
208 See transcript of Public Radio International’s The World show from February 14, 2012 entitled, “Thailand Blasts:
‘Iranian’ Bomber Injured in Bangkok.”
209 Stein, et al., op. cit.
210 Mark Mazzetti and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Simulation Forecasts Perils of Strike at Iran,” New York Times, March 20,
2012.
211 See, e.g., Maclean, op. cit.
212 Amos Yadlin and Yoel Guzansky, “The Strait of Hormuz: Assessing and Neutralizing the Threat,” Strategic
Assessment, vol. 14, no. 4, January 2012.
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Strait, see CRS Report R42335, Iran’s Threat to the Strait of Hormuz, coordinated by Kenneth
Katzman and Neelesh Nerurkar.
Attacks on U.S. Allies in the Persian Gulf
Israeli decisionmakers might also be influenced by the possibility of Iranian attacks on U.S. allies
in the Persian Gulf—the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman).213 All of these countries have
formal defense or facilities access agreements with the United States, and most have had
contentious or even hostile relations with Iran since its 1979 Islamic Revolution, although to
varying degrees. All have been publicly critical of Iran’s nuclear program, and some Saudi royal
family members have implied that Saudi Arabia would seek nuclear weapons if Iran obtains
them.214 Analysts see Saudi Arabia, in particular, as a leader in efforts to weaken Iran’s influence
in the region. Several GCC leaders, including those of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and UAE, have
been widely cited in press reports as supporting an air strike on Iran’s nuclear program, though in
the context of a possible U.S. strike, not an Israeli strike.215 Nonetheless, Iran might not want to
risk a response against the GCC that could cause its members—and with them, other Arab
states—to support the Israeli action.
All of the GCC states are oil exporters and most have oil loading terminals on the Gulf that are
within easy range of Iranian ballistic or cruise missiles. During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war—
particularly the last two years when Iran perceived the United States had entered the war on Iraq’s
side—Iran attacked some of the Gulf states’ facilities, particularly those of Kuwait.216 Israel does
not maintain diplomatic relations with any GCC states. Although Israeli officials have not spoken
publicly about the possibility of Iranian retaliation against GCC states, in addition to possible
Israeli concerns that such a retaliation might cause the United States to view an Israeli strike
negatively because of close U.S. security ties with GCC states, Israel might weigh the possibility
that such a retaliation could further antagonize GCC governments and populations toward Israel.
Attacks on U.S. Installations and Interests in the Region or Elsewhere Abroad
Another possible concern for Israeli decisionmakers, as mentioned above in multiple quotes from
Israeli commentators, is how a potential Iranian response against U.S. interests in the region
might affect U.S. official and public views on a strike and U.S.-Israel relations more broadly.
Secretary Panetta and others have anticipated that, were Iran to expand its response to U.S.
targets, it would target U.S. personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. The last U.S. combat troops left
Iraq in December 2011, but there are still over 16,000 U.S. personnel there (diplomats, other
civilian officials, security contractors, and others), including those based at the large U.S.
Embassy in Baghdad and at U.S. consulates in Basra and Irbil. U.S. officials have repeatedly
asserted that agents of Iran’s Qods Force are present in Iraq, building influence with and
providing material assistance to Iraqi factions and militias. Like Lebanese Hezbollah, these Iraqi
factions have their own independent objectives in Iraqi politics and are not controlled by Tehran,
but they are widely assessed to be susceptible to Iranian influence. Pro-Iranian Iraqi Shiite
213 Allin and Simon, op. cit., p. 101.
214 Hugh Tomlinson, “Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons to counter Iran,” The Times (UK), February 11, 2012.
215 Ross Colvin, “‘Cut Off the Head of the Snake,’ Saudis Told U.S.,” Reuters, November 29, 2010.
216 CRS Report R42335, Iran’s Threat to the Strait of Hormuz, coordinated by Kenneth Katzman and Neelesh
Nerurkar.
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militias are particularly prevalent in southern Iraq, particularly Basra. Analysts perceive that Iran
would have ample capability to retaliate there against U.S. personnel following an Israeli air
strike.217
There is also the threat of a potential Iranian response in Afghanistan. Approximately 90,000 U.S.
military personnel remain in Afghanistan as of March 2012, but Iran has substantially less
influence in Afghanistan than it does in Iraq. Nevertheless, as with Iraq, U.S. officials and U.S.
government reports consistently assert that Iran—through the Qods Force—is arming and training
anti-U.S. elements in Afghanistan—in this case, anti-government Taliban militants.218 This
suggests that Iran sees potential in retaliating against the United States in Afghanistan.219
The Qods Force is widely believed to operate extensively in some GCC states. On occasion, some
GCC countries, particularly Kuwait, have arrested purported Qods Force agents who were
allegedly spying or attempting to support Shiite opposition groups in some of these states. U.S.
officials accused a Qods-supported Shiite opposition group of a lead role in the June 1996
bombing of the Khobar Towers housing complex, in which 19 U.S. Air Force officers were killed.
Other U.S. targets in GCC states that Iran might try to attack include the numerous military bases
and other facilities that the U.S. military accesses, U.S. embassies, and offices of U.S.-based
multinational corporations. The latter are particularly prevalent in the UAE emirate of Dubai.
Additionally, according to Bloomberg, Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the air defense division of
the IRGC, said in November 2011 that a newly deployed U.S. X-Band radar in eastern Turkey
that is part of a NATO-approved missile defense system for Europe would be a target for Iran “if
there is a threat.”220
Some believe that Iran, using the Qods Force, could try to retaliate against U.S. targets outside the
Middle East—for example in Europe, Asia, Latin America, or elsewhere. U.S. officials have
asserted that the Qods Force has a presence in Venezuela, for example,221 and the force is known
to operate worldwide.
Possible Attacks on the U.S. Homeland
At least one reported Israeli source, along with some U.S. officials and outside analysts, has
suggested or implied that Iran could have the capability to retaliate inside the United States itself
if there were an Israeli strike against Iran. An internal Israeli security document that ABC News
claimed it obtained in early February 2012 reportedly indicated concern that sites in North
America—including both Israeli government sites (embassies and consulates) and Jewish
religious and cultural sites (synagogues, schools, community centers) were subject to an increased
threat from Iran.222 Law enforcement officials have reportedly stepped up patrols around Jewish
sites in some major U.S. urban areas.223 Assessments of possible Iranian infiltration of the U.S.
217 CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights, by Kenneth Katzman.
218 State Department Country Reports on Terrorism 2010, Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism, “Iran.”
219 For more information on Iran’s influence in Afghanistan, see: CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and
Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
220 Emre Peker, “Iran-Turkey Ties Under Increasing Strain From Mideast Sunni-Shiite Divide,” Bloomberg, February
2, 2012.
221 Department of Defense, “Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran,” April 2010.
222 Richard Esposito, “Exclusive: Israel Warns US Jews: Iran Could Strike Here,” ABC News, February 3, 2012.
223 Ibid.; Mitchell D. Silber, “The Iranian Threat to New York City,” Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2012; “Tensions
with Iran raise US safety concerns, but intelligence official says attack unlikely,” Associated Press, February 17, 2012.
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homeland are based in part on an alleged plot—contained in a Justice Department indictment
filed in October 2011—that an Iranian-American citizen working with officials in the Qods Force
sought to kill the Saudi Ambassador in Washington, DC. Citing the alleged plot, Director of
National Intelligence James Clapper testified on January 31, 2012 before the Senate Select
Intelligence Committee that:
The 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States shows that some
Iranian officials—probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i—have changed their
calculus and are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States in response to
real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime.
U.S. officials have incorporated into their assessments Tehran’s calculations about the risks of
taking such a step. Director Clapper, in his testimony, added that “Iran’s willingness to sponsor
future attacks in the United States … probably will be shaped by Tehran’s evaluation of the costs
it bears….” It is unclear how much these considerations factor into Israeli assessments of the
possible consequences of a strike.
Conclusion: Possible Implications for Congress224
According to one assessment by two U.S. analysts:
an Israeli decision to risk indeterminate war with the Islamic Republic … would be
momentous, transforming the regional order in ways that cannot be inferred from past
wars.225
This report discusses many factors that may influence the Israeli debate and a possible decision
by its leaders regarding military action against Iranian nuclear facilities.
An Israeli strike on Iran could raise significant questions for Members of Congress, both short-
and long-term. These include, but are not limited to, the following:
• How might a strike affect options and debate regarding short-term and long-term
U.S. relations and security cooperation with, and foreign assistance to, Israel and
other regional countries?226
• Would an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities be considered self-defense?
Why or why not? What would be the legal and policy implications either way?227
224 Prepared by Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.
225 Allin and Simon, op. cit., p. 105.
226 On March 5, 2012, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor introduced the United States-Israel Enhanced Security
Cooperation Act 2012 (H.R. 4133). The bill, if enacted, would require the President to report on the status of Israel’s
“qualitative military edge” within 180 days, while also expressing the sense of Congress that the United States should
take the following actions, among others, in support of Israel: (1) Provide Israel such support as may be necessary to
increase development and production of joint missile defense systems, particularly such systems that defend the urgent
threat posed to Israel and United States forces in the region; (2) Provide Israel defense articles and defense services
through such mechanisms as appropriate, to include air refueling tankers, missile defense capabilities, and specialized
munitions; (3) Allocate additional weaponry and munitions for the forward-deployed United States stockpile in Israel;
(4) Provide Israel additional surplus defense articles and defense services, as appropriate, in the wake of the withdrawal
of United States forces from Iraq. The bill has been referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
227 See footnote 107. The July 23, 1952 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and Israel
(continued...)
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• How might a strike affect the implementation of existing sanctions legislation on
Iran or options and debate over new legislation on the subject?228
• How might Congress consult with the Obama Administration on and provide
oversight with respect to various political and military options?
Author Contact Information
Jim Zanotti, Coordinator
Jeremiah Gertler
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Military Aviation
jzanotti@crs.loc.gov, 7-1441
jgertler@crs.loc.gov, 7-5107
Kenneth Katzman
Steven A. Hildreth
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Missile Defense
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
shildreth@crs.loc.gov, 7-7635
Acknowledgments
Amber Hope Wilhelm provided and adapted graphics for this report.
(...continued)
(TIAS 2675) states, “The Government of Israel assures the United States Government that such equipment, materials,
or services as may be acquired from the United States ... are required for and will be used solely to maintain its internal
security, its legitimate self-defense ... and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state.”
Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA, P.L. 94-329) contains a similar requirement that arms
supplied by the United States to other countries be used solely for purposes of self-defense. Section 3(c)(2) of the
AECA requires the President to report promptly to the Congress upon the receipt of information that a “substantial
violation” described in section 3(c)(1) of the AECA “may have occurred” pertaining to the possible breach of an
existing agreement or of section 4. For more information on this requirement and the Reagan Administration’s actions
pursuant to the AECA following Israel’s 1981 attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor, see CRS Report R42385, U.S. Defense
Articles and Services Supplied to Foreign Recipients: Restrictions on Their Use, by Richard F. Grimmett.
228 Bills in the 112th Congress that, if enacted, would expand sanctions or seek to promote their implementation include
the Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Human Rights Act of 2012 (S. 2101), reported out of the Senate Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee on February 13, 2012; and the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011 (H.R. 1905),
which was passed by the House by a 410-11 vote on December 14, 2011 and referred to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. See CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
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