Serbia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
February 15, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS22601
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

Serbia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

Summary
Serbia faces an important crossroads in its development. It is seeking to integrate into the
European Union (EU), but its progress has been hindered by tensions with the United States and
many EU countries over the independence of Serbia’s former Kosovo province.
Serbia’s government is a coalition led by pro-EU forces. The global economic crisis poses serious
challenges for Serbia. Painful austerity measures have been required for Serbia to receive loans
from the IMF and other international financial institutions. High unemployment and poor living
standards could result in the coming to power of forces more skeptical of close ties with the
United States and the EU after parliamentary elections are held in May 2012.
Serbia’s key foreign policy objectives are to secure membership in the European Union and to
hinder international recognition of Kosovo’s independence. In December 2009, Serbia submitted
an application to join the EU, but the EU has delayed a decision on whether to accept Serbia as a
membership candidate. The EU may accept Serbia in March 2012, if it judges Belgrade has made
sufficient progress in reaching agreements with Kosovo on a series of issues, and in
implementing them. However, even if Serbia is accepted as a candidate, many years of
negotiations will be required before it can join the EU.
Serbia has vowed to take “all legal and diplomatic measures” to preserve its former province of
Kosovo as legally part of Serbia. So far, 76 countries, including the United States and 22 of 27
EU countries, have recognized Kosovo’s independence. Russia, Serbia’s ally on the issue, has
used the threat of its Security Council veto to block U.N. membership for Kosovo. After the
International Court of Justice ruled in July 2010 that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did
not contravene international law, the EU pressured Serbia to hold talks with Kosovo. EU-
brokered talks on trade, freedom of movement and other issues began in March 2011.
In December 2006, Serbia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. PFP is aimed at
helping countries come closer to NATO standards and at promoting their cooperation with NATO.
Although it supports NATO membership for its neighbors, Serbia is not seeking NATO
membership. This may be due to such factors as memories of NATO’s bombing of Serbia in
1999, U.S. support for Kosovo’s independence, and a desire to maintain close ties with Russia.
U.S.-Serbian relations have improved since the United States recognized Kosovo’s independence
in February 2008, when Serbia sharply condemned the U.S. move and demonstrators sacked a
portion of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade. During a 2009 visit to Belgrade, Vice President Joseph
Biden stressed strong U.S. support for close ties with Serbia. He said the countries could “agree
to disagree” on Kosovo’s independence. He called on Serbia to transfer the remaining war
criminals to the ICTY, promote reform in neighboring Bosnia, and cooperate with international
bodies in Kosovo. The United States has strongly supported the EU-led talks between Kosovo
and Serbia, while making clear that it plays no direct role in them.

Congressional Research Service

Serbia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

Contents
Background...................................................................................................................................... 1
Current Political and Economic Situation........................................................................................ 1
Political Situation ...................................................................................................................... 1
Serbia’s Economy...................................................................................................................... 3
Foreign Policy.................................................................................................................................. 3
European Union......................................................................................................................... 5
NATO ........................................................................................................................................ 7
U.S. Policy....................................................................................................................................... 7

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 10

Congressional Research Service

Serbia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

Background
In October 2000, a coalition of democratic parties defeated Serbian strongman Slobodan
Milosevic in presidential elections, overturning a regime that had plunged the country into bloody
conflicts in the region, economic decline, and international isolation in the 1990s. The country’s
new rulers embarked on a transition toward Western democratic and free market standards, but
success has been uneven. Serbia has held largely free and fair elections, according to international
observers. A new constitution adopted in 2006 marked an improvement over the earlier, Socialist-
era one. However, the global economic crisis dealt a setback to Serbia’s economy. Organized
crime and high-level corruption remain very serious problems.
Serbia has set integration in the European Union as its key foreign policy goal, but its prospects
have been clouded by concerns of some EU countries that it has not done enough to normalize
relations with its former Kosovo province, which declared independence in 2008. U.S.-Serbian
relations have also been negatively affected by the leading role played by the United States in
promoting the Kosovo’s independence.1
Current Political and Economic Situation
Political Situation
Serbia’s most recent presidential elections were held on January 20, 2008. Incumbent Boris Tadic
of the pro-Western Democratic Party (DS) faced Tomislav Nikolic from the ultranationalist
Serbian Radical Party (SRS), as well as several candidates from smaller parties. Nikolic won
39.99% of the vote. Tadic came in second with 35.39%. The other candidates trailed far behind.
As no candidate received a majority, a runoff election was held between Tadic and Nikolic on
February 3. Tadic won reelection to a five-year term by a narrow majority of 50.6% to 47.7%.
President Tadic is Serbia’s leading political figure. The key role he plays in determining Serbia’s
domestic and foreign policies is due more to his leadership of the DS than to the relatively modest
formal powers of the Serbian presidency.
On May 11, 2008, Serbia held parliamentary elections. Tadic’s For a European Serbia bloc
(headed by the DS) performed substantially better than expected, receiving 38.8% of the vote and
102 seats in the 250-seat parliament. The Radicals won 29.2% of the vote and 77 seats. The
nationalist Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)-New Serbia list received 11.3% of the vote and 30
seats. A bloc led by the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)—the party once led by former Yugoslav
strongman Slobodan Milosevic—won 7.8% of the votes and 20 seats. The pro-Western Liberal
Democratic Party won 5.3% of the vote and 14 seats. The remaining seven seats went to parties
representing Hungarian, Bosniak, and Albanian ethnic minorities.2

1 Serbia was linked with Montenegro in a common state until Montenegro gained its independence in June 2006. For
more on Serbia’s development from the fall of Milosevic until Montenegro’s independence, see CRS Report RL30371,
Serbia and Montenegro: Background and U.S. Policy, by Steven Woehrel.
2 Serbian election commission website http://www.rik.parlament.sr.gov.yu/index_e.htm, accessed on May 14, 2008.
Congressional Research Service
1

Serbia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

Some observers attributed the success of the DS-led coalition to its strong support for EU
integration, and the prosperity voters believe it would foster. In contrast, the DSS and the
Radicals gave nationalist concerns such as Kosovo priority over EU integration.
On July 7, 2008, the Serbian parliament approved the new Serbian government, with a slim
majority of 128 votes in the 250-seat assembly. The government is led by Prime Minister Mirko
Cvetkovic, an economist who was finance minister in the previous government. The ruling
coalition is led by the DS, and includes other pro-Western groups and representatives of ethnic
minorities. It also includes a bloc headed by the Socialist Party, once led by indicted war criminal
Slobodan Milosevic. Socialist leaders say they are transforming the SPS into a European-style
social democratic party and support European integration for Serbia.
The government’s position was strengthened in September 2008 with the split of the Radical
Party, the largest opposition party in parliament. The largest group, under Nikolic’s leadership,
became the Serbian Progressive Party. It adopted a more pragmatic attitude to such issues as EU
integration for Serbia than the Radicals. The rump, ultranationalist wing of the Radical Party
continues to exist under the leadership of indicted war criminal Vojislav Seselj, who is currently
on trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague,
Netherlands.
The next parliamentary elections are expected to be held in May 2012. The global economic
crisis, the austerity measures the government has put in place to respond to it, and corruption
scandals have hurt the government’s popularity. The government has had to face demonstrations
from the nationalist opposition parties demanding early elections (including a hunger strike by
Nikolic), increasing dissatisfaction from labor unions, and violence from extreme nationalist
groups.
In a February 2012 public opinion poll by Ipsos Strategic Marketing, the Progressives had the
support of 32% of those polled, a DS-led coalition 25%, the Liberal Democratic Party (which
favors a less nationalistic policy on Kosovo and Bosnia than the DS) 10%, a SPS-led coalition
9%, and the Radical Party and the DSS with 6% each. Although the Progressives have the upper
hand at the moment, it is difficult to predict the outcome of the vote. This is due to a large number
of undecided voters and the fact that the character of the new government that will emerge from
the elections will depend on negotiations between the parties that surpass the 5% threshold
needed to receive seats in the parliament.
The Progressives’ electoral program is more moderate and EU-friendly than in the past, but it is
probable that they would still be difficult partners for the EU and United States on Kosovo,
Bosnia, and other regional issues. This would certainly be the case if the DSS or the Radicals
were part of the coalition. Another possibility is that the Progressives could form a coalition with
the DS, which could have a smaller impact on Serbia’s foreign policy orientation, but would also
be unlikely to lead to a more flexible approach on Kosovo and other issues than the current
government’s. Finally, the DS’s prospects could improve in the next few months, enabling them
to pull together a coalition similar to the current one.
Serbia has faced some problems with the Presevo Valley region in southern Serbia. This ethnic
Albanian majority region bordering Kosovo has been relatively quiet since a short-lived guerrilla
conflict there in 2000-2001 between ethnic Albanian guerrillas and Serbian police, in the wake of
the war in Kosovo. However, there have been sporadic incidents and problems since then, some
resulting in injuries to Serbian police. Local Albanians claim discrimination and a lack of funding
Congressional Research Service
2

Serbia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

from Belgrade. Some local ethnic Albanian leaders have called for the region to be joined to
Kosovo, perhaps in exchange for Serbian-dominated northern Kosovo. The United States and the
international community has strongly opposed this idea.
Serbia’s Economy
Until the global economic crisis hit in late 2008, Serbia experienced substantial economic growth.
This growth was fueled by loose monetary and fiscal policies (in part keyed to election cycles),
including increases in pensions and public sector salaries. The international economic crisis had a
negative impact on Serbia’s growth. Serbia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell by 3.5% in
2009. The economy has begun to recover. GDP grew by 1% in 2010, and by an estimated 1.9% in
2011. However, the Economist Intelligence Unit predicts that GDP growth will slow to 0.7% in
2012, due to slower growth in the EU, Serbia’s main export market. Serbia’s unemployment rate,
which was 16.7% at the end of 2011, will likely remain very high for some time.
Inflation in Serbia is high by European standards, although it has declined to 7% in December
2011, on a year-on-year basis. Serbia’s currency, the dinar, suffered heavily during the economic
crisis. The depreciation of the dinar stimulated exports, but aggravated inflation. The National
Bank has accordingly raised interest rates in an effort to throttle inflation.
In September 2011, the IMF approved an 18-month precautionary stand-by loan of $1.5 billion,
which Serbia will draw on only if necessary. The loan will provide continued IMF monitoring,
which is meant to reassure international financial markets. The government plans to cut the
budget deficit from 4.5% in 2011 to 4.25% in 2012 to 1% in 2015. In order to meet these targets,
Serbia will have to make deep cuts in spending, including in public administration, pensions and
healthcare. The IMF has expressed concerns about Serbia’s public debt, which stands at about
45% of GDP.
In early 2012, the global economic crisis caused international investors sell their stakes in two
key Serbian firms to the government. US Steel sold the Smederovo steel works, the country’s
largest exporter, to the Serbian government for the nominal price of $1. Declining steel prices and
heavy competition made the plant very unprofitable for U.S. Steel. The Serbian government
bought the steel works to prevent large job losses, and hopes to resell it as soon as possible to
another international investor. The Serbian government also bought the Greek telecom company
OTE’s 20% share in Telekom Srbija, with hopes of selling a stake in the company to a strategic
investor. 3
Foreign Policy
Since 2008, Serbia’s foreign policy has focused on two main objectives—integration into the
European Union and hindering international recognition of the independence of Serbia’s former
Kosovo province by legal and diplomatic means. To this end, Serbia has focused on seeking good
relations with the EU, in order to achieve its long-term goal of EU membership. It has tried to
avoid conflicts with the 22 EU countries that have recognized Kosovo’s independence, while

3 Economist Intelligence Unit, Serbia Country Report, February 2012.
Congressional Research Service
3

Serbia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

cultivating the five states whose non-recognition of Kosovo serves to block a closer formal
relationship between the EU and Kosovo.
Serbia has also bolstered ties with Russia and China, partly in an effort to secure economic
advantages and partly to ensure Russia maintains its opposition to Kosovo’s independence. U.S.-
Serbian ties have improved since U.S. recognition of Kosovo’s independence in February 2008,
but appear not to play a central role in either country’s foreign policy at present. Although the
United States has offered to “agree to disagree” with Serbia over Kosovo, the issue may continue
to affect relations, particularly as the United States remains Kosovo’s most powerful international
supporter.
Belgrade strongly opposed Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008. Serbia won
an important diplomatic victory when the U.N. General Assembly voted on October 8, 2008, to
refer the question of the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence to the International
Court of Justice (ICJ). However, Serbia’s diplomatic strategy suffered a setback when the ICJ
ruled in July 2010 that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not contravene international
law. Under strong EU pressure, Serbia agreed to hold talks with Kosovo under EU mediation. The
talks, which began in March 2011, are focused on technical issues, although it has been difficult
to separate technical issues from the main political one -- Kosovo’s status as an independent state.
Serbian leaders have criticized Serbs in northern Kosovo for blockading roads and holding a
referendum in February 2012 on whether they accept the institutions of an independent Kosovo,
saying such moves weaken Serbia’s negotiating position with Kosovo and the EU.
President Tadic and other senior Serbian leaders have raised the possibility that Kosovo could be
partitioned. Most observers have said that the line of partition would likely follow the current line
of de facto control at the Ibar River, between the Serbian-dominated north and the Albanian-
dominated south. Some Serbian officials have even suggested that they might discuss swapping
the Albanian-dominated parts of the Presevo valley for northern Kosovo. However, the Kosovars
are strongly opposed to partition. The United States and the international community also opposes
it, fearing that it could touch off the disintegration of Bosnia and Macedonia, which both have
ethno-territorial tensions of their own.
In January 2012, President Tadic admitted that partition was an outdated idea, given its lack of
support among key international players. He suggested that other models be looked at, including
Northern Ireland, South Tyrol, Aland Islands, or examples from the former Yugoslavia. He said
that any solution must provide a satisfactory solution to the administration of Serb monasteries,
special guarantees for Serbs in the enclaves, regulations regarding the property of Serb citizens
and of Serbia, and a solution for northern Kosovo. He said that a “frozen conflict” in Kosovo was
not in Serbia’s interest.
Another delicate issue in relations between Serbia and Kosovo is a report approved by the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in January 2011. The report, authored by
human rights rapporteur Dick Marty of Switzerland, linked Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci
and others with the alleged murder of prisoners during the Kosovo Liberation Army’s war with
Serbia in the 1990s, and the extraction of their organs in Albania for sale on the international
black market. Thaci and other former KLA leaders strongly deny the charges. The Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the United States have called on
Kosovo (including the EU-led EULEX rule-of-law mission there) and Albania to conduct a
serious investigation of these charges. Serbia has rejected this approach as insufficient, and has
Congressional Research Service
4

Serbia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

called for an independent investigative body to be formed by the U.N. Security Council. In June
2011, EULEX set up a special team to investigate the organ trafficking allegations.
Serbia’s relations with the other countries in its region have improved markedly in recent years,
but tensions remain over some issues; Croatia and Bosnia filed cases with the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) charging Serbia with genocide during the wars of the 1990s. (Ruling in the
Bosnia case in 2007, the ICJ cleared Serbia of genocide, but found Serbia in violation of
international law for not preventing the Srebrenica massacre, and other failings.) In 2009, Serbia
countered with an ICJ suit of its own against Croatia. Serbian and Croatian leaders have discussed
the possibility of both sides dropping their suits.
Some Bosnian leaders, mainly from the Bosniak (Muslim) ethnic group, have complained that
Serbian leaders have done little to rein in Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik’s perceived efforts
to undermine the effectiveness of Bosnia’s central government institutions. Serbia asserts that it
respects Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and abides fully by the terms of the Dayton
Peace Agreement that established Bosnia’s current governmental system. In March 2010, at the
urging of President Tadic, the Serbian parliament passed a resolution condemning the crimes
committed by Serbian forces in Srebrenica in Bosnia in 1995.
Kosovo is also a cause of tension in regional ties. Serbia’s neighbors (with the exception of
Bosnia, due to the opposition of Serbs there) have all recognized Kosovo, to Serbia’s irritation.
Serbian leaders boycott regional meetings if Kosovo government leaders attend as representatives
of an independent country, rather than under the aegis of the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
This policy has also provoked the annoyance of the United States and most EU countries.
European Union
In hopes of boosting the DS and other pro-European parties in the May 2008 elections, the
European Union signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia on April
29, 2008. The agreement grants trade concessions to Serbia. It provides a framework for
enhanced cooperation between the EU and Serbia in a variety of fields, including help in
harmonizing local laws with EU standards, with the perspective of EU membership.
However, the Netherlands blocked implementation of provisions of the SAA until all EU
countries agreed that Serbia is cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY). Serbia made substantial progress in this regard when it detained indicted war
criminal Radovan Karadzic on July 21, 2008, and later transferred him to the ICTY. In an effort to
show its strong support for EU integration, Serbia unilaterally began to implement trade
provisions of the SAA in February 2009, lowering tariff barriers for EU goods to enter Serbia.
After a largely favorable report on Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY from the Tribunal’s chief
prosecutor, the EU decided in December 2009 to unfreeze the key trade provisions of the SAA. In
June 2010, after another favorable report on Serbia’s ICTY cooperation, the Netherlands lifted its
veto on submitting the SAA to ratification by EU member governments. When ratified by all EU
member governments, all of the SAA’s provisions will come into force.
Serbia submitted its application for EU membership in December 2009. However, it was not until
November 2010 that the EU took the first step in the process, giving Serbia a detailed
questionnaire on its qualifications as a membership candidate. Serbia’s EU membership prospects
are clouded by several factors. One concern is the difficulty of meeting the EU’s stringent
requirements and growing “enlargement fatigue” in many EU countries. Perhaps the most
Congressional Research Service
5

Serbia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

intractable problem is the issue of Kosovo. Twenty-two of the 27 EU countries have recognized
Kosovo (including key countries such as Britain, France, Germany, and Italy). Five EU countries
(Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia, Romania, and Spain) have declined to recognize Kosovo’s
independence. These countries are either traditional allies of Serbia, or have minority populations
for whom they fear Kosovo independence could set an unfortunate precedent, or both.
Serbian leaders have said that they will reject EU membership if it is conditioned on recognizing
Kosovo’s independence. Given the sensitivity of the issue for Serbian public opinion and the
EU’s own divisions, such an explicit condition is unlikely. However, since 2008 the EU has
successfully pressed Serbia to cooperate with the EULEX law-and-order mission in Kosovo, to
drop its efforts to have the U.N. General Assembly condemn Kosovo’s independence as
illegitimate, and to hold talks with the Kosovo government. Leaders of many EU member states
are reluctant to “import” an unresolved territorial question such as Kosovo into the EU, as it did
when it admitted Cyprus. Serbia may therefore gradually be pressed by the most influential EU
states into de facto (if not de jure) recognition of Kosovo’s independence or be forced to give up
its membership hopes.
In October 2011, the European Commission released a report on Serbia’s qualifications to
become a member of the EU. Noting the progress made in the EU-brokered talks with Kosovo,
the Commission recommended that Serbia be given the status of a membership candidate if it re-
engages in the dialogue with Kosovo and implements in good faith agreements already reached.
The Commission recommended that Serbia be given a date to begin membership negotiations if it
achieves further steps in normalizing its relations with Kosovo. These include “fully respecting
the principles of inclusive regional cooperation; fully respecting the provisions of the Energy
Community Treaty; finding solutions for telecommunications and mutual acceptance of diplomas;
by continuing to implement in good faith all agreements reached; and by cooperating actively
with EULEX in order for it to exercise its functions in all parts of Kosovo.”4
In December 2011, EU leaders declined to offer membership candidacy status to Serbia, believing
that it had not met the conditions laid out in the October Commission report. Since then, the two
sides have started to implement agreements they have reached on freedom of movement, trade, on
the civil registry, and on university diplomas. Some countries, such as Italy and Austria, are eager
to see Serbia receive candidate status when the EU next considers the question in March 2012.
However, Germany and other skeptics of Serbia’ performance have signaled that candidate status
is not a foregone conclusion. In particular, they insist that Serbia conclude an agreement with
Kosovo in February 2012 on the latter’s participation in regional institutions.
Since December 2009, the EU has permitted Serbian citizens to travel visa-free to the EU. Many
Serbs may see the decision as the most tangible (and most prized) benefit they have received so
far from the Serbian government’s pro-EU policy. A surge of asylum-seekers from Serbia and
elsewhere led the EU in May 2011 to adopt a policy allowing visa-free travel to be temporarily
suspended if there is a surge in illegal immigration from a given country. This policy has not been
applied to Serbia as yet, in part due to measures by Serbia to clamp down on illegal migrants. The
government is reportedly focusing on areas of the country inhabited by ethnic Albanians and
Roma, considered by Serbia to be major sources of such illegal migrants.

4 Commission Opinion on Serbia’s Application for Membership of the European Union, October 12, 2011, at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/sr_rapport_2011_en.pdf
Congressional Research Service
6

Serbia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

NATO
In December 2006, Serbia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. PFP is aimed at
helping countries come closer to NATO standards and at promoting their cooperation with NATO.
Serbia’s government has pledged to enhance cooperation with NATO through the PFP program,
including through joint exercises and training opportunities. Serbia has generally supported
KFOR, the NATO-led peacekeeping force in neighboring Kosovo, while sometimes criticizing it
for allegedly not doing enough to protect Serbs there and has criticized KFOR for drawing down
its forces, despite what it views as continuing security concerns for Serbs in Kosovo. Serbia is
also unhappy with NATO’s role in overseeing the Kosovo Security Force (seen by both Serbia
and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo as a de facto Kosovo army in the making).
Serbian leaders have expressed support for the NATO membership aspirations of all of the other
countries in the region, but are not seeking NATO membership for Serbia. Due in part to
memories of NATO’s 1999 bombing of Serbia and anger at the U.S. role in Kosovo’s
independence, a public opinion poll in April-May 2011 showed that less than 16% of the Serbian
public favors NATO membership. NATO has offered Serbia an Intensified Dialogue with the
Alliance. If Serbia decides to seek such a status, it could eventually be followed by a Membership
Action Plan, which would lay out in detail what steps Serbia would need to take to become a
serious candidate for NATO membership. In a signal of closer ties, in June 2011 NATO’s
Transformation Command held its annual Strategic Military Partner Conference in Belgrade. The
conference sparked small demonstrations by nationalist parties and groups.
U.S. Policy
Serbia has played a key role in U.S. policy toward the Balkans since the collapse of the former
Yugoslavia in 1991. U.S. officials came to see the Milosevic regime as a key factor behind the
wars in the region in the 1990s, and pushed successfully for U.N. economic sanctions against
Serbia. On the other hand, the United States drew Milosevic into the negotiations that ended the
war in Bosnia in 1995. The United States bombed Serbia in 1999 to force Belgrade to relinquish
control of Kosovo, where Serbian forces had committed atrocities while attempting to suppress a
revolt by ethnic Albanian guerrillas. U.S. officials hailed the success of Serbian democrats in
defeating the Milosevic regime in elections in 2000 and 2001. The United States has seen a
democratic and prosperous Serbia, at peace with its neighbors and integrated into Euro-Atlantic
institutions, as an important part of its key policy goal of a Europe “whole, free, and at peace.”
U.S. aid to Serbia has declined sharply in recent years, perhaps reflecting overall U.S. budgetary
stringency, changing U.S. global priorities, and hopes of Serbia’s eventual EU membership
candidacy. In FY2011, Serbia received $45 million in U.S. aid for political and economic
reforms, $1.896 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), $0.9 million in IMET military
training funds and $1.15 million in Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related
(NADR) aid. In FY2012, the Administration requested $33.5 million in aid for political and
economic reform for Serbia, $2 million in FMF, $0.9 million in IMET, and $2.65 million in
NADR funding. For FY2013, the Administration has requested $19.913 million to aid Serbia’s
political and economic reforms, $3 million in International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement funding, $0.9 million in IMET, and $1.8 million in FMF.
The goal of U.S. aid for political reform is to strengthen democratic institutions, the rule of law,
and civil society. It includes programs to strengthen the justice system, support local
Congressional Research Service
7

Serbia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

governments, help fight corruption, foster independent media, and increase citizen involvement in
government. Aid is being used to help Serbia strengthen its free market economy by reforming
the financial sector and promote a better investment climate. Other U.S. aid is targeted at
strengthening Serbia’s export and border controls, including against the spread of weapons of
mass destruction. U.S. military aid helps Serbia participate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace
program and prepare for international peacekeeping missions.
The signing of a Status of Forces Agreement with Serbia in September 2006 has permitted greater
bilateral military cooperation between the two countries, including increased U.S. security
assistance for Serbia as well as joint military exercises and other military-to-military contacts.
The Ohio National Guard participates in a partnership program with Serbia’s military. However,
despite U.S. urging, Serbia has declined to contribute troops to the NATO-led ISAF peacekeeping
force in Afghanistan. In 2005, the Administration granted duty-free treatment to some products
from Serbia under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).
The most serious cloud over U.S.-Serbian relations is the problem of Kosovo. The United States
recognized Kosovo’s independence on February 18, 2008.5 On the evening of February 21, 2008,
Serbian rioters broke into the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade and set part of it on fire. The riot, in
which other Western embassies were targeted and shops were looted, took place after a
government-sponsored rally against Kosovo’s independence. The embassy was empty at the time.
Observers at the scene noted that Serbian police were nowhere to be found when the incident
began, leading to speculation that they had been deliberately withdrawn by Serbian authorities.
Police arrived later and dispersed the rioters at the cost of injuries on both sides. One suspected
rioter was later found dead in the embassy. U.S. officials expressed outrage at the attack and
warned Serbian leaders that the United States would hold them personally responsible for any
further violence against U.S. facilities. President Tadic condemned the attack and vowed to
investigate why the police had allowed the incident to occur.
After this nadir, Serbia has made some moves to improve ties with the United States. After having
been withdrawn after the recognition of Kosovo, Serbia’s ambassador to Washington returned to
his post in October 2008. On May 20, 2009, Vice President Joseph Biden visited Serbia, in a trip
to the region that also included Kosovo and Bosnia. Biden said the United States wants to
improve ties with Serbia. He acknowledged that Serbia must play “the constructive and leading
role” in the region for the region to be successful. He expressed the belief that the United States
and Serbia could “agree to disagree” on Kosovo. Biden stressed that the United States did not
expect Serbia to recognize Kosovo’s independence, and would not condition U.S.-Serbian ties on
the issue. However, he added that the United States expects Serbia to cooperate with the United
States, the European Union and other key international actors “to look for pragmatic solutions
that will improve the lives of all the people of Kosovo,” including the Serbian minority.
Biden said the United States also looks to Serbia to help Bosnia and Herzegovina become a “a
sovereign, democratic, multi-ethnic state with vibrant entities.” U.S. officials have often asked
Serbia to use its influence with Bosnian Serb leaders to persuade them to cooperate with
international officials there. Finally, Biden called on Belgrade to cooperate fully with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Biden said that the United States

5 For a text of the U.S. announcement on recognition of Kosovo’s independence, see the State Department website,
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/100973.htm. For more on Kosovo, see CRS Report RL31053, Kosovo and
U.S. Policy: Background to Independence
, by Julie Kim and Steven Woehrel, and CRS Report RS21721, Kosovo:
Current Issues and U.S. Policy
, by Steven Woehrel.
Congressional Research Service
8

Serbia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

“strongly supports Serbian membership in the European Union and expanding security
cooperation between Serbia, the United States, and our allies.” He called for strengthening
bilateral ties, including military-to-military relations, economic ties (the United States is currently
the largest foreign investor in Serbia) and educational and cultural exchanges.6
In what U.S. officials framed as a follow-up to Vice President Biden’s visit the previous year,
Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg met with President Tadic and top Serbian officials in
Belgrade on April 7-8, 2010. Steinberg reiterated U.S. support for Serbia’s EU integration. In
Belgrade and during a visit to Kosovo on the 8th, he called on Serbia and Kosovo to work together
on issues such as security, customs, and organized crime and corruption. Tadic reiterated that
Serbia would never recognize Kosovo and said that talks on Kosovo’s status should be resumed.
During talks with Interior Minister Ivica Dacic, Steinberg expressed satisfaction with U.S.-
Serbian cooperation in fighting organized crime and terrorism. The two also discussed Serbia’s
cooperation with UNMIK in Kosovo. Steinberg praised the Srebrenica resolution passed by the
Serbian parliament in March as a step toward better regional cooperation.
Secretary of State Clinton visited Serbia in October 2010. Secretary Clinton praised Serbia’s
progress toward greater partnership with the Euro-Atlantic community and closer relations with
its neighbors. She stressed U.S. support for Serbia’s EU membership aspirations. She thanked
Serbia for its “strong cooperation” with the ICTY, including its “good-faith effort” to arrest the
two remaining Serbian fugitive, Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic. Secretary Clinton said the
United States strongly supported “a meaningful, forward-looking dialogue” between Serbia and
Kosovo on “practical, day-to-day issues and the long-term relationship between you.” She added
such a dialogue would have a positive impact on Serbia’s relations with its neighbors, Europe,
and the United States.
Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon visited Belgrade on
June 15, 2011, as part of a visit to the region. In an interview with a local journalist, Gordon
highlighted U.S.-Serbian cooperation in such areas as intelligence, anti-narcotics cooperation, and
anti-terrorism. He noted continuing differences between Serbia and the United States on Kosovo.
He said that the United States believes that Serbia needed to “come to terms with” Kosovo before
it can join the EU, whether this took the form of formal diplomatic recognition or something else.
In the short term, he said, Serbia needs to make progress on “practical issues” with Kosovo. He
noted that NATO retains an “open-door” policy on membership, but that it was Serbia’s own
decision whether it would seek to join NATO.
In testimony before the Europe and Eurasia Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee in November 2011, Gordon praised Serbia for its progress in internal reforms and its
transfer of Mladic and Hadzic to the ICTY earlier in the year. He restated U.S. support for
Serbia’s EU aspirations, but warned that Belgrade needed to come to terms with Kosovo as an
independent state within its current borders. He stressed the strong opposition of the United States
to Kosovo’s partition. He called on Belgrade to make further progress in its dialogue with
Kosovo, to remove its security personnel from Kosovo, and to press local Serbs to remove
roadblocks in northern Kosovo.


6 Text of Vice President Joseph Biden’s address to the press in Belgrade, May 20, 2009, from the White House website
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-The-Vice-President-At-The-Palace-Of-Serbia/
Congressional Research Service
9

Serbia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

Author Contact Information

Steven Woehrel

Specialist in European Affairs
swoehrel@crs.loc.gov, 7-2291


Congressional Research Service
10