Latin America and the Caribbean:
U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress
in 2012
Mark P. Sullivan, Coordinator
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
June S. Beittel
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Anne Leland
Information Research Specialist
Peter J. Meyer
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Maureen Taft-Morales
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
February 14, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42360
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress in 2012
Summary
Geographic proximity has ensured strong linkages between the United States and the Latin
American and Caribbean region, with diverse U.S. interests, including economic, political and
security concerns. Current U.S. policy toward the region is focused on four priorities: promoting
economic and social opportunity; ensuring citizen security; strengthening effective democratic
institutions; and securing a clean energy future. There has been substantial continuity in U.S.
policy toward the region under the Obama Administration, which has pursued some of the same
basic policy approaches as the Bush Administration. Nevertheless, the Obama Administration has
made several significant policy changes, including an overall emphasis on partnership and shared
responsibility.
U.S. policy toward the region must also contend with a Latin America that is becoming
increasingly independent from the United States. Strong economic growth has increased Latin
America’s confidence in its ability to solve its own problems. The region has also diversified its
economic and diplomatic ties with countries outside the region. Over the past few years, several
Latin American regional organization organizations have been established that do not include the
United States.
Congress plays an active role in policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. Legislative and
oversight attention to the region during the 112th Congress is focusing on the continued increase
in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico and U.S. assistance to Mexico under the Mérida
Initiative; efforts to help Central American and Caribbean countries contend with drug trafficking
and violent crime; as well as continued counternarcotics and security support to Colombia. The
January 2010 earthquake that devastated Port-au-Prince, Haiti, continues to focus congressional
attention on the enormous task of disaster recovery and reconstruction. As in past years, U.S.
sanctions on Cuba, particularly restrictions on travel and remittances, has remained a contentious
issue in the debate over how to support change in one of the world’s last remaining communist
nations. Another area of congressional oversight has been concern about the deterioration of
democracy in several Latin American countries, especially Nicaragua and Venezuela.
Congressional concern has also increased about Iran’s growing relations in the region, especially
with Venezuela, and about the activities of Hezbollah.
This report provides an overview of U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean,
including the Obama Administration’s priorities for U.S. policy and a brief comparison of policies
under the Obama and Bush Administrations. It then examines congressional interest in Latin
America, first providing an overview, and then looking at selected countries and regional issues
and identifying key policy issues facing Congress in 2012. The final section of the report analyzes
several upcoming events in the region in 2012 that could have an impact on developments in
several countries or on U.S. relations with the region: the Pope’s upcoming trip to Cuba in March,
the sixth Summit of the Americas in April, Mexico’s elections in July, and Venezuela’s elections
in October. An appendix provides a listing of hearings in the 112th Congress focused on Latin
America. For additional information, see the CRS Issues in Focus webpage on “Latin America
and the Caribbean.”
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress in 2012
Contents
Latin America and the Caribbean: Overview of U.S. Policy........................................................... 1
Four Priorities for the Region.................................................................................................... 1
Continuity and Change in U.S. Policy....................................................................................... 4
Latin America’s Increasing Independence................................................................................. 5
Congressional Interest in Latin America and the Caribbean............................................................ 6
Overview ................................................................................................................................... 6
Brazil ......................................................................................................................................... 8
Central America and the Caribbean: Citizen Security............................................................... 9
Colombia ................................................................................................................................. 10
Cuba......................................................................................................................................... 10
Haiti ......................................................................................................................................... 11
Mexico..................................................................................................................................... 12
Venezuela................................................................................................................................. 13
Iran’s Growing Relations in Latin America............................................................................. 13
Organization of American States ............................................................................................. 14
Looking Ahead: Key Events in 2012............................................................................................. 15
March 26-28, 2012: Pope Benedict XVI Visit to Cuba ........................................................... 15
April 14-15, 2012: Summit of the Americas ........................................................................... 16
July 1, 2012: Mexican Elections.............................................................................................. 16
October 7, 2012: Venezuelan Election..................................................................................... 17
Figures
Figure 1. Latin America and the Caribbean..................................................................................... 2
Tables
Table A-1. Congressional Hearings in the 112th Congress on Latin America and the
Caribbean.................................................................................................................................... 19
Appendixes
Appendix. Hearings in the 112th Congress..................................................................................... 19
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 21
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress in 2012
Latin America and the Caribbean:
Overview of U.S. Policy
U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere are diverse, and include economic, political, security
and humanitarian concerns. Geographic proximity has ensured strong economic linkages between
the United States and the region, with the United States being the major trading partner and
largest source of foreign investment for many countries. Free trade agreements (FTAs) have
augmented economic relations with many countries in the region, including Mexico, Chile, Peru,
Central America, and the Dominican Republic. Latin American nations, primarily Mexico and
Venezuela, supply the United States with almost one-third of its imported crude oil. The Western
Hemisphere is also the largest source of U.S. immigration, both legal and illegal, with geographic
proximity and economic conditions being major factors driving migration trends. Curbing the
flow of illicit drugs from Latin America and the Caribbean has been a key component of U.S.
relations with the region and a major interest of Congress for almost two decades, and in recent
years has included close security cooperation with Mexico as that country struggles to combat
drug trafficking and related violence. With the exception of Cuba, the region has made enormous
strides in terms of democratic political development over the past two decades, but the rise of
undemocratic practices in several countries, especially Venezuela, has been a U.S. concern. The
United States has often taken the lead in responding to natural disasters in the region, as was
demonstrated once again in the aftermath of Haiti’s catastrophic 2010 earthquake.
Four Priorities for the Region
The Obama Administration has set forth a broad framework for U.S. policy toward Latin America
and the Caribbean centered on four pillars or priorities:
• promoting economic and social opportunity;
• ensuring citizen security;
• strengthening effective institutions of democratic governance; and
• securing a clean energy future.
According to former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Arturo
Valenzuela, these policy “priorities are based on the premise that the United States has a vital
interest in contributing to the building of stable, prosperous, and democratic nations” in the
hemisphere that can play an important role in dealing with global challenges.1 The Obama
Administration has emphasized that its policy approach toward the region is one that emphasizes
partnership and shared responsibility, with policy conducted on the basis of mutual respect
through engagement and dialogue.2
1 U.S. Department of State, Arturo Valenzuela, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs,
“U.S.-Latin American Relations: A Look Ahead,” January 6, 2011.
2 Ibid; and U.S. Department of State, Arturo Valenzuela, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere
Affairs, “U.S. Foreign Policy in the Obama Era,” October 9, 2010. The same general policy approach has continued
under Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Secretary Roberta Jacobson, who was also
nominated to the position by President Obama and is awaiting Senate confirmation.
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress in 2012
Figure 1. Latin America and the Caribbean
Source: Map Resources, adapted by CRS.
Expanding economic opportunity focuses on one of the key problems facing Latin America:
lingering poverty and inequality. At the end of 2010, some 177 million people in Latin America
were living in poverty—31.4% of the region’s population—while 70 million people or 12.3%
lived in extreme poverty or indigence. These statistics reflect a significant improvement from
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2002 when 44% of the region’s population lived in poverty.3 Moreover, the 2010 statistics showed
an improvement from 2009 when the region faced an uptick in poverty because of the global
financial crisis. In addition to traditional U.S. development assistance programs focusing on
health and education, expanding economic opportunity also has included programs such as: the
Pathways to Prosperity Initiative launched in 2008, designed to help countries learn from each
other’s experiences through the exchange of best practices; and support for the Organization of
American State’s Inter-American Social Protection Network (IASPN), launched in 2009 to
facilitate an exchange of information on policies, experiences, programs, and best practices in
order to reduce social disparities and inequality and reduce extreme poverty.4
Citizen safety is one of the most important concerns among Latin Americans, with high levels of
crime and violence (often associated with drug trafficking) a significant problem in many
countries.5 The Central America-Mexico corridor is the route for 95% of South American cocaine
entering the United States, while murder rates in several Central American and Caribbean
countries are among the highest in the world and drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has
risen to unprecedented levels. U.S. support in this area includes a series of partnerships to help
countries combat drug trafficking and organized crime such as the Mérida Initiative for Mexico,
the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), and the Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative (CBSI). The Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) is designed to support
Colombia’s strategy in remote, but strategically important, areas by increasing the presence of
civilian state economic and social development institutions.
Over the past three decades, Latin America has made enormous strides in democratic political
development, not only in terms of regular free and fair elections, but in terms of an improvement
in respect for political rights and civil liberties. Despite this improvement, many countries in the
region still face considerable challenges. Improving and strengthening democratic governance
includes support to improve the capacity of state institutions to address citizens’ needs through
responsive legislative, judicial, law enforcement and penal institutions. It includes defending
press freedoms and democratic rights, such as free and fair elections and the protection of
minority rights. Most significantly, according to former Assistant Secretary Valenzuela, because
democratic institutions are absolutely critical and because of the history of military and other
coups in the region, hemispheric nations need to stand together collectively to ensure that elected
democratic institutions are not interrupted.6
Many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are vulnerable to climate change, which can
have a negative effect on sustainable development and economic prosperity. Leaders in the region
have committed to working together to address the challenges of climate change and to strengthen
energy security. The Obama Administration advanced an Energy and Climate Partnership of the
Americas (ECPA) in 2009 through which nations have committed themselves to strengthen inter-
American collaboration on clean energy. ECPA includes voluntary bilateral and multi-country
initiatives to promote clean energy, advance energy security, and reduce greenhouse gas
3 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Social Panorama of Latin America 2011, Briefing
paper, November 29, 2011.
4 U.S. Department of State, “Pathways to Prosperity in the Americas, Fact Sheet,” April 8, 2011. See the website of the
IASPN at http://www.socialprotectionet.org/english/index.html.
5 Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2010 Report, December 2010.
6 U.S. Department of State, Arturo Valenzuela, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs,
“First Diplomacy Briefing Series Meeting: Issues and Challenges of U.S. Relations with Latin America,” December 11,
2009.
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emissions. Some of the initiatives involve international and regional organizations and the private
sector.7
Continuity and Change in U.S. Policy
Substantial continuity characterizes U.S. policy toward the region under the Obama
Administration, which has pursued some of the same basic policy approaches as the Bush
Administration. Like the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration is providing significant
anti-drug and security support to Colombia and significant support to Mexico and Central
America to combat drug trafficking and organized crime through the Mérida Initiative and
CARSI. In anticipation of a potential “balloon effect” of drug trafficking shifting to the Caribbean
region, the Obama Administration also established the CBSI, the origin of which dates back to the
Bush Administration. Implementing bills for FTAs with Colombia and Panama that were
negotiated under the Bush Administration were officially introduced in early October 2011 after
extensive work by the Administration to resolve outstanding congressional concerns related to
both agreements, which were then approved by Congress. Just as the Bush Administration had,
the Obama Administration has expressed support for comprehensive immigration reform, an
especially important issue in U.S. relations with Mexico and Central America. In terms of
Venezuela, it can be argued that the Obama Administration is following a policy similar to the
latter years of the Bush Administration by attempting to avoid any unnecessary public spats with
President Hugo Chávez, but at the same time speaking out with regard to concerns about
undemocratic actions of the Venezuelan government as well as drug trafficking and terrorism
concerns.
Despite the continuity, the Obama Administration has made a number of changes that
differentiate its policy from that of the Bush Administration. The Obama Administration has put
an emphasis on partnership and multilateralism. It has also implemented several changes in Cuba
policy by lifting restrictions on family travel and remittances, restarting semi-annual migration
talks, and easing restrictions on other types of purposeful travel and remittances. At the same
time, the Administration has continued to speak out about the poor human rights situation in Cuba
and has repeatedly called for the release of a U.S. government subcontractor, Alan Gross,
imprisoned since late 2009. The Administration has also increased development assistance to the
region compared to that provided under the Bush Administration, although overall budget
cutbacks could end up reducing both development and other types of foreign assistance to the
region.
In some areas where there has been continuity in U.S. policy toward Latin America, there
nevertheless has been a change of emphasis. For example, assistance to Mexico is shifting toward
more support for rule of law programs (including police, judicial, and penal reform) and programs
to help communities withstand the pressures of crime and violence. Another example is
Colombia, where assistance has become more evenly balanced between enhancing rule of law,
human rights and economic development programs on the one hand, and continuing efforts on
security and drug interdiction on the other.
Assessments of U.S. policy toward Latin America during the Obama Administration offer a
mixed picture. Some policy analysts have lauded the Administration for its emphasis on
7 White House, “Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas,” March 21, 2011.
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partnership and multilateralism; for deepening security cooperation with Mexico, Central
America, and the Caribbean; for broadening relations with Colombia beyond counternarcotics
and counterterrorism issues; and for a strong U.S. response to the earthquake in Haiti. On the
other hand, some have urged the Administration to articulate a strategic vision and approach
toward Latin America with a clearer explanation of why the region matters to the United States.8
Other critics of the Administration call for U.S. policy toward Latin America to be reshaped to
support Mexico more strongly in its efforts against organized crime and to provide more
sustained focus on Venezuela’s conduct and activities. 9 Some policy analysts maintain that the
growing polarization of U.S. domestic politics is an additional impediment to productive
engagement with the region.10
Latin America’s Increasing Independence
U.S. policy toward the Latin American region needs to be considered in the context of the
region’s increasing independence from the United States. The region has diversified its economic
and diplomatic ties with countries outside the region—China, for example, has become a major
trading partner for many countries in the region. Strong regional economic growth rates—5.9% in
2010 and 4.3% in 201111—also has increased confidence in Latin America’s ability to solve its
own problems, and has lessened the region’s dependency on the United States. The region’s
growing ideological diversity in recent years has also been a factor in the region’s increased
independence from the United States, as has the rise of Brazil as a regional and global power.
Several Latin America regional integration organizations have been established in the past few
years, a reflection of both the region’s increasing independence and its growing internal
cooperation. In December 2011, 33 hemispheric nations—excluding the United States and
Canada—met in Caracas to establish the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
(CELAC) to boost regional integration and cooperation. While some observers have concerns that
CELAC could be a forum for countries that have tense or difficult relations with the United
States, others point out that strong U.S. partners in the region are also members. Some observers
have predicted that CELAC could diminish the role of the Organization of American States
(OAS), while others maintain that CELAC does not have a permanent staff or secretariat that
could compete with the OAS. The next CELAC summit will not take place until January 2013.
The organization reportedly will work in the areas of energy, science and technology,
infrastructure, finance, and social development.
Some observers contend that CELEC’s establishment reflects declining U.S. influence in Latin
America, but the United States still remains very much engaged in the region bilaterally and
multilaterally through the OAS and its numerous affiliated organizations. In addition, the Summit
of the Americas process, with the next summit scheduled for April 2012 in Colombia, is an
8 Shifting the Balance, Obama and the Americas, ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal, Theodore J. Piccone, and Lawrence
Whitehead (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011).
9 Roger F. Noriega, “Latin American Action Agenda for the New Congress,” American Enterprise Institute, January
2011; Testimony by Ambassador Jaime Daremblum, Hudson Institute, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December
1, 2010.
10 Testimony by Dr. Cynthia J. Arnson, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, December 1, 2010.
11 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin
America and the Caribbean 2011, December 2011.
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important mechanism for the United States to engage with Latin American nations at the highest
level.
Other regional organizations that have been established in recent years include the 12-member
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), established in 2008 (largely because of Brazil’s
influence) to promote political coordination in South America. It has served as a forum for
dispute resolution. For example, the organization played a role in defusing tensions between
Colombia and Venezuela in 2008, and helped resolve political conflicts in Bolivia in 2008 and
Ecuador in 2010. Some analysts, however, have raised questions about UNASUR’s overall
efficacy, financial support, and ability to develop specialized capabilities and programs.12 Another
regional grouping, the Venezuelan-led Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA, originally
established as the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas), was launched by President Hugo
Chávez in 2004 with the goals of promoting regional integration and socioeconomic reform and
alleviating poverty. In addition to Venezuela, this eight-member group includes Bolivia, Cuba,
Ecuador, and Nicaragua as well as the Caribbean island nations of Dominica, Antigua and
Barbuda, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Some observers maintain that ALBA has lost its
initial energy. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper maintained in recent congressional
testimony that ALBA was “created in part to spread Chávez’s influence in the region” but “is only
muddling through.”13
Congressional Interest in Latin America
and the Caribbean
Overview
As in the previous Congress, legislative and oversight attention to Latin America and the
Caribbean during the 112th Congress is focusing on the continued increase in drug trafficking-
related violence in Mexico and U.S. assistance to Mexico under the Mérida Initiative; efforts to
help Central American and Caribbean countries contend with drug trafficking and violent crime;
as well as continued counternarcotics and security support to Colombia, which still faces threats
from armed actors. The earthquake that devastated Port-au-Prince in January 2010, combined
with a cholera outbreak in the fall of 2010, has continued to focus congressional attention on the
enormous task of disaster recovery and reconstruction in Haiti. As in past years, debate over U.S.
sanctions on Cuba, particularly restrictions on travel and remittances, has remained a contentious
issue with ongoing congressional debate over how to support change in one of the world’s last
remaining communist nations. Latin American nations, especially Mexico, which remains the
leading source country of both legal permanent residents and unauthorized immigrants in the
United States, have been disappointed by what they see as a lack of effort in Congress on
comprehensive immigration reform.
12 Michael Shifter, “The Shifting Landscape of Latin American Regionalism,” Current History, February 2012;
Testimony of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
January 31, 2012, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” available at
http://intelligence.senate.gov/120131/clapper.pdf
13 Ibid.
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The U.S. government has spent billions of dollars in anti-drug assistance programs since the mid-
1970s aimed at reducing the flow of Latin American-sourced illicit drugs (largely from the
Andean region) to the United States. Most of these programs have emphasized supply reduction
tools, particularly drug crop eradication and interdiction of illicit narcotics. Successes in one
country or sub-region have often led traffickers to alter their cultivation patterns, production
techniques, and trafficking routes and methods in order to avoid detection. Congress has
influenced U.S. drug control policy in Latin America by appropriating certain types and levels of
funding for counterdrug assistance programs and conditioning the provision of antidrug funding
on the basis of human rights and other reporting requirements. Congress has also sought to ensure
that counterdrug programs are implemented in tandem with judicial reform, anti-corruption, and
human rights programs. In the 112th Congress, numerous oversight hearings have been held
evaluating drug assistance programs—especially the Mérida Initiative in Mexico, CARSI in
Central America, and CBSI in the Caribbean—and related domestic initiatives and border
security efforts.14
Another focus of congressional oversight has been the deterioration of democracy in several Latin
American countries, including Nicaragua, where Daniel Ortega was re-elected in November 2011
in elections widely seen as seriously flawed, and Venezuela, where there have been concerns for
several years about the deterioration of democratic institutions and threats to freedom of speech
and press. Despite significant improvement in political rights and civil liberties in the region over
the past three decades, in a number of countries weaknesses remain in the state’s ability to deliver
public services, ensure accountability and transparency, and advance the rule of law. The
executive’s abuse of power in several countries in the region has led to a setback in liberal
democratic practices. The quality of democracy in Latin America is also being negatively affected
by organized crime and violence; some governments have been unable to stem the wave of
violence and to protect citizens, journalists, and elected officials.
With regard to energy, issues of congressional concern include declines in production and U.S.
dependence on oil from the region. Latin American and Caribbean nations supplied the United
States with almost one-third of U.S. crude oil imports in 2010—Mexico and Venezuela accounted
for 12.5% and 9.9%, respectively.15 There have been concerns in recent years, however, about
Mexico’s declining oil production; the country’s proven oil reserves are declining because of
insufficient funds available for maintenance and exploration. Venezuela has vast proven oil
reserves, the second largest in the world, but its production also has been in decline in recent
years because of maintenance issues, natural decline of older fields, and compliance with
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) production cuts. Venezuela remains a
major supplier of crude oil to the United States (the fifth largest), but its U.S.-destined oil exports
have declined as the country has diversified its trading partners and supplied significant amounts
of oil at preferential prices to Caribbean and Central American nations, especially Cuba.16
Members of Congress have expressed concern about the continued U.S. dependence on imported
oil from Venezuela, although observers point out that the two countries are mutually dependent
on the oil sector since a large portion of Venezuela’s oil is refined in the United States. Another
pending issue for Congress is Cuba’s development of its offshore oil sector and the potential
14 For additional information, see CRS Report R41215, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and
U.S. Counterdrug Programs , coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.
15 Derived from oil important statistics provided by the U.S. Energy Administration.
16 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Briefs: Venezuela,” March 2011.
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impact of an oil spill on the United States. A foreign consortium led by the Spanish oil company
Repsol will soon begin exploratory drilling off Cuba’s north coast.17
With regard to trade, the 112th Congress conducted numerous hearings during the first session on
the pending FTAs with Colombia and Panama, with implementing legislation for both agreements
introduced and approved in October 2011. Congressional attention is now likely to turn to the
implementation of those agreements. Oversight on Colombia, which was the more controversial
of the two agreements, will focus on whether the country is meeting its commitments under an
“Action Plan Related to Labor Rights.” Progress on U.S. negotiations with eight Pacific rim
countries for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement will likely be of congressional
interest—Chile and Peru are among the eight TPP countries that are negotiating the trade
agreement with the United States, while Mexico has expressed strong interest in joining.18 Other
trade issues related to Latin America includes consideration of potential changes to U.S. cotton
subsidies that would allow the United States to avoid retaliatory trade measures imposed by
Brazil, and the safety of Mexican trucks operating in the United States.
U.S. attention to terrorism in Latin America intensified in the aftermath of the September 2001
terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, with an increase in bilateral and regional
cooperation.19 The State Department maintains that terrorism in the region today is largely
perpetrated by terrorist organizations in Colombia and by the remnants of radical leftist Andean
groups, while the threat of a transnational terrorist attack remains low for most countries in the
hemisphere. Cuba has been on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism since
1982, and both Cuba and Venezuela are on the State Department’s annual list of countries
determined to be not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. There has also been
increased congressional concern about Iran’s growing relations with several countries in the
region, especially Venezuela, and related concerns about the activities of Hezbollah in the region.
Both Hezbollah and Iran have been implicated in the bombing of two Jewish targets in Buenos
Aires in the early 1990s. The State Department maintains that there are no known operational
cells of either Al Qaeda or Hezbollah-related groups in the hemisphere, but it has concerns about
the fundraising activities of these groups in the region.
Brazil
U.S. policy toward Brazil is in flux as policymakers seek to adjust to Brazil’s role as an emerging
center of influence. Brazil’s economy is now the sixth largest in the world, and the country has
utilized its economic clout to consolidate its power in South America and exert more influence on
global matters. Consequently, U.S.-Brazilian engagement increasingly involves regional and
international issues in addition to bilateral concerns. The changing relationship has occasionally
frustrated U.S. officials as the two multicultural democracies’ shared values have not always
translated into Brazilian backing for U.S. initiatives. In 2010 and 2011, for example, Brazil used
its temporary seat on the U.N. Security Council to advocate engagement with internationally-
isolated regimes like Iran, Libya, and Syria, rather than sanctions. Although U.S. policymakers
17 For additional information, see CRS Report R41522, Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S.
Policy Considerations, by Neelesh Nerurkar and Mark P. Sullivan.
18 For additional information on the TPP, see CRS Report R40502, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, by Ian F.
Fergusson and Bruce Vaughn; and CRS Report R42344, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Countries: Comparative
Trade and Economic Analysis, by Brock R. Williams.
19 For additional information, see CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by Mark P. Sullivan.
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have expressed concerns about Brazil’s foreign policy, they have continued to pursue bilateral
cooperation on many issues. Collaboration on energy issues, especially biofuels development, has
been a major focus of bilateral engagement, and the decision by Congress to allow the tariff on
Brazilian ethanol to expire at the end of 2011 has removed a major barrier to further cooperation.
U.S. policymakers have also sought to boost trade relations as Brazil’s fast growing market is a
potential destination for increased U.S. exports.
Key Policy Issues in 2012: Energy and trade relations with Brazil are likely to continue to be of
congressional interest in 2012. Congress may seek to advance collaboration on biofuels issues
and build upon the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation that President Obama and
Brazilian President Rousseff signed in March 2011. As Congress debates the 2012 farm bill, it
will likely evaluate potential changes to U.S. cotton subsidies that would ensure U.S. compliance
with World Trade Organization (WTO) rulings, and allow the United States to reach a permanent
agreement with Brazil to avoid WTO-sanctioned retaliatory measures. Brazil’s foreign policy,
including its relations with Iran, China, and others, is also likely to be an ongoing issue for
congressional oversight.
For additional information, see CRS Report RL33456, Brazil-U.S. Relations, by Peter J. Meyer
and CRS Report RL32571, Brazil’s WTO Case Against the U.S. Cotton Program, by Randy
Schnepf.
Central America and the Caribbean: Citizen Security
In recent years, U.S. policymakers have grown increasingly concerned about security conditions
in Central America and the Caribbean. Although conditions vary by country, many nations in the
region have struggled for years to deal with rising levels of crime and violence, which analysts
have linked to factors such as widespread social exclusion, security force corruption, and
impunity for the perpetrators of crime. These problems have been compounded by traffickers
seeking to exploit the region’s institutional weaknesses to transport illicit narcotics from
producers in South America to consumer markets in the United States and Europe. The U.S.
government has sought to counter these trends through: the Central America Regional Security
Initiative (CARSI) and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). Both initiatives provide
partner nations with equipment, training, and technical assistance to support immediate law
enforcement and interdiction operations. They also fund efforts to strengthen the long-term
capacities of governmental institutions to address security challenges and the underlying
conditions that contribute to them. Congress appropriated almost $362 million for CARSI
between FY2008 and FY2011, and $139 million for CBSI between FY2010 and FY2011. For
FY2012, congressional appropriators expressed support for the Administration’s request of $100
million for CARSI and $73 million for CBSI.
Key Policy Issues in 2012: Congress will likely continue to closely track the implementation of
CARSI and CBSI in 2012, including how funds are being employed and the extent to which the
programs are advancing U.S. objectives. The FY2012 appropriations bill placed conditions on aid
to security forces in Guatemala, Honduras, and Haiti, and human rights abuses in those and other
countries in the region are likely to remain of congressional interest. Additional questions of
interest to Congress may include How do CARSI and CBSI fit into a broader Western
Hemisphere security strategy? How do the initiatives relate to other U.S. security efforts in
Central America and the Caribbean such as those conducted by the Department of Defense? And
are current U.S. efforts striking the right balance between assisting partner nations with
immediate needs and fostering the institutional reforms necessary for long-term success?
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For additional information, see CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security
Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando
Seelke; CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America, by Clare Ribando Seelke; and CRS
Report R41215, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug
Programs , coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.
Colombia
A key U.S. ally in the region, Colombia has endured internal armed conflict for nearly half a
century. In recent years, the Colombian government, in close cooperation with the United States
through a strategy known as Plan Colombia, has reestablished government control over much of
its territory, reduced poverty, and made significant headway in combating drug trafficking and
terrorist activities. Colombia’s achievements in improved citizen security and economic stability
are notable, but some observers continue to raise concerns about human rights conditions in the
country. Between FY2000-FY2012, Congress provided Colombia more than $8 billion in
assistance. This support, provided through U.S. State Department and Department of Defense
accounts, is gradually being reduced as programs are being turned over to Colombian control.
Under current President Juan Manuel Santos, Colombia has been strengthening its trade relations
with the United States and others, and improving its relationships with neighboring countries,
including Venezuela and Ecuador. In October 2011, Congress approved implementing legislation
for the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) with bipartisan support, despite continuing
concerns about allegations of violence against Colombian trade unionists, protection of workers
rights, and related human rights issues.
Key Policy Issues in 2012: Following successful passage of the CFTA in late 2011,
Congressional interest will likely shift to entry into force and implementation of the
comprehensive trade agreement and Colombia’s compliance with the “Action Plan Related to
Labor Rights” announced prior to passage of the CFTA. Congress will also consider U.S.
assistance to Colombia with its ongoing counternarcotics, counterterrorism, judicial reform,
economic development, and human rights components.
For additional information, see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress, by June S.
Beittel; CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and
Issues, by M. Angeles Villarreal; and CRS Report RL34759, U.S.-Colombia Free Trade
Agreement: Labor Issues, by Mary Jane Bolle.
Cuba
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy has consisted largely of isolating Cuba through a variety of
strong economic sanctions. A second policy component has consisted of support measures for the
Cuban people, including U.S.-sponsored broadcasting and support for democracy and human
rights activists. In light of Fidel Castro’s stepping down from power in 2006 because of poor
health and the potentially significant economic changes that have been implemented under the
government of Raúl Castro, a number of observers have called for a new approach aimed at
influencing the Cuban government and society through increased contact and engagement. Others
maintain that despite Cuba’s release of many political prisoners, the human rights situation
remains poor with thousands of short-term detentions. They contend that easing U.S. sanctions
without concrete political reform would facilitate the survival of the communist regime. The
Obama Administration has relaxed various restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba, most
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significantly for Cuban families, but the Administration has continued to express concern about
the human rights situation. Moreover, a key impediment to improved relations since late 2009 has
been Cuba’s imprisonment of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) subcontractor
Alan Gross, who was working on USAID-funded democracy projects in Cuba. (Also see “March
26-28, 2012: Pope Benedict XVI Visit to Cuba” below.)
Key Policy Issues in 2012: Legislative efforts in 2011 to roll back President Obama’s easing of
restrictions on remittances and family travel were unsuccessful, but the issue may again be
debated in 2012. Other policy issues of sustained congressional interest include the status of
Cuba’s offshore oil development and preparedness and response in the case of a spill (drilling is
expected to begin in 2012); funding for U.S. government democracy and human rights projects;
funding for Radio and TV Martí broadcasting to Cuba; the continued imprisonment of Alan
Gross; payment terms for U.S. agricultural and medical exports to Cuba; and the human rights
situation in Cuba.
For additional information, see CRS Report R41617, Cuba: Issues for the 112th Congress, by
Mark P. Sullivan; CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, by
Mark P. Sullivan; and CRS Report R41522, Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and
U.S. Policy Considerations, by Neelesh Nerurkar and Mark P. Sullivan.
Haiti
In the two years since the January 2010 earthquake that devastated much of Haiti and killed an
estimated 316,000 people,20 the overarching goal of U.S. assistance there has been to help Haiti
“build back better.” U.S. assistance focuses on four key sectors, in alignment with Haiti’s national
plan for reconstruction and development: 1) infrastructure and energy; 2) governance and rule of
law; 3) health and other basic services; and 4) food and economic security. Major
accomplishments include removal of five million cubic feet of rubble (a much faster rate than in
recent disasters elsewhere); the election of and transition to a new president and legislature; a
rapid and coordinated response to a cholera epidemic and prevention of its outbreak in displaced
persons camps in the capital; and increased agricultural production.
Nonetheless, there is widespread criticism that aid is not being disbursed quickly enough. There
are many obstacles to more rapid recovery and reconstruction, including the concentration of
damage in a densely populated urban area. Another obstacle is political fragility and instability:
the already weak Haitian government suffered massive losses in infrastructure and personnel, and
often seemed paralyzed with inaction after the disaster; the election process to choose a new
government was flawed and sometimes violent; gridlock between the new administration of
President Michel Martelly and the legislature continue to make aid disbursal and development
difficult. An aid coordinating mechanism, the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC),
was criticized for being slow to get organized and approve programs, and its term has now
expired without a new mechanism in its place. A cholera epidemic further delayed the shifting of
funds and efforts from emergency response to reconstruction programs.
Key policy issues: The key congressional concern remains, how effectively is U.S. aid to Haiti
being disbursed and implemented, especially now that no an official coordinating mechanism is
20 U.S. Agency for International Development, “Haiti – Earthquake and Cholera, Fact Sheet #3, FY2012,” December
12, 2011.
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in place? Other concerns include, what is the best way to continue to improve security in Haiti,
through further strengthening of the Haitian National Police, as outlined in Haiti’s national plan
for development, and agreed upon by international donors, or through re-creation of an army, as
proposed by President Martelly? How can U.S. aid programs further strengthen Haitian
institutions of governance and rule of law in a context of political gridlock between the Haitian
executive and parliament? How can U.S. programs promote greater respect for basic human
rights, including addressing the problem of gender-based violence?
For background information, see CRS Report R41689, Haiti’s National Elections: Issues,
Concerns, and Outcome, by Maureen Taft-Morales; and CRS Report R41023, Haiti Earthquake:
Crisis and Response, by Rhoda Margesson and Maureen Taft-Morales.
Mexico
In recent years, security issues have overshadowed immigration and trade in U.S. relations with
Mexico, a country with which the United States shares a nearly 2,000 mile border and close to
$400 billion in annual trade. Upon taking office in December 2006, Mexican President Felipe
Calderón made combating organized crime a top priority of his Administration and expanded
security cooperation with the Bush and then Obama Administrations through the Mérida
Initiative. From FY2008 to FY2012, Congress appropriated more than $1.9 billion in Mérida
assistance for Mexico, with the focus of aid gradually shifting from training and equipping
security forces towards institution-building. Bilateral cooperation has helped Mexico arrest or kill
record numbers of drug kingpins, but more than 47,500 people have died as a result of organized
crime-related violence since President Calderón took office. Concerns about the violence in
northern Mexico have prompted border security to return to the forefront of the bilateral agenda,
with policymakers trying to find ways to make the border as secure and efficient as possible. As
comprehensive immigration reform efforts have stalled in Congress, the enactment of tough state
laws against illegal immigration has concerned the Mexican government. In the economic realm,
the U.S. and Mexican governments have sought to improve North American competitiveness as
both countries continue to recover from the 2008-2009 global economic crisis. And, as Mexico is
a top U.S. oil supplier, energy policy could become a more important bilateral issue should
Mexico’s oil production continue to decline.
Key Policy Issues in 2012: Congressional funding and oversight of the Mérida Initiative is likely
to continue, but Congress may also engage in broader debates about how U.S.-Mexican efforts
and related U.S. domestic programs might be revised in order to better respond to security
conditions in Mexico. Congress may also monitor how organized crime and government efforts to
suppress it are affecting human rights and democracy in Mexico, particularly as the July 1, 2012
Mexican elections approach. Ongoing drug trafficking-related violence in northern Mexico is
likely to keep border security on the agenda of congressional oversight committees. While
comprehensive immigration reform is unlikely to advance this year, Congress may consider
discrete immigration measures to facilitate the admission of nurses and other highly skilled
workers. Efforts to boost bilateral trade and increase economic integration, as well as to resolve
periodic trade disputes under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), are also likely
to be of interest to Congress, including the implementation of NAFTA trucking provisions that
permit Mexican trucks to travel in the United States.
For additional information, see CRS Report RL32724, Mexico: Issues for Congress, by Clare
Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative
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and Beyond , by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea; and CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-
Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
Venezuela
While historically the United States has had close relations with Venezuela, a major supplier of
oil, friction in bilateral relations has risen over the past decade under the populist government of
President Hugo Chávez. Among the concerns of U.S. policymakers have been the deterioration of
human rights and democratic conditions, Venezuela’s significant military arms purchases, lack of
cooperation on anti-terrorism efforts, limited bilateral anti-drug cooperation, and Venezuela’s
relations with Cuba and Iran. In September 2011, President Obama issued the seventh annual
determination (as part of the annual narcotics certification process) that Venezuela had “failed
demonstrably” to meet its obligations under international counternarcotics measures. The State
Department maintains that individual members of the Chávez government and security forces are
credibly reported to have engaged in or facilitated drug trafficking activities. The United States
has imposed financial sanctions on six current Venezuelan government and military officials for
allegedly helping the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) with drug and weapons
trafficking, including General Henry Rangel Silva, who Chávez appointed as defense minister in
January 2012. The United States has also imposed sanctions on three Venezuelan companies for
alleged support to Iran and on two Venezuelan individuals for providing financial support to
Hezbollah (for more details, see “Iran’s Growing Relations in Latin America” below).
Key Policy Issues in 2012: In 2012, Congressional oversight on Venezuela will likely continue
on human rights, drug trafficking, and terrorism concerns, including the extent of relations with
Iran. Venezuela’s October 2012 presidential elections will also focus congressional attention on
the state of democracy in the country—President Chávez, who underwent significant cancer
treatment in 2011, is running against a candidate of the unified opposition, Henrique Capriles
Radonski. (Also see “October 7, 2012: Venezuelan Election” below.)
For additional background, see CRS Report R40938, Venezuela: Issues for Congress, by Mark P.
Sullivan.
Iran’s Growing Relations in Latin America
There has been concern among policymakers in recent years about Iran’s growing interest in
Latin America, particularly its relations with Venezuela. The personal relationship between
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has driven the
strengthening of bilateral ties, although there has been contention among policymakers over the
extent and significance of Iran’s relations with the region. A major rationale for Tehran’s
increased focus on Latin America has been Iran’s efforts to overcome its international isolation,
including efforts to circumvent U.S. and U.N. sanctions. To date, the United States imposed
sanctions on two companies in Venezuela in 2008 because of connections to Iran’s proliferation
activities, while in May 2011, the United States imposed sanctions on Venezuela’s state oil
company for providing cargoes of a gasoline additive to Iran. Venezuela has played a key role in
the development of Iran’s expanding relations with other countries in the region, especially
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. While Iran has promised significant investment in these
countries, observers maintain that there is little evidence to show that such promises have been
fulfilled. President Ahmadinejad’s January 2012 trip to Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Ecuador
again increased concerns by some about Iran’s efforts to forge ties with the region.
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Another reason for U.S. concerns about Iran’s deepening relations with Latin America is its
support for the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group Hezbollah, a State Department-designated
Foreign Terrorist Organization, which along with Iran is reported to have been linked to two
bombings against Jewish targets in Argentina in the early 1990s. In recent years, U.S. concerns
regarding Hezbollah in Latin America have focused on its fundraising activities among
sympathizers in the region, particularly in the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay,
and in Venezuela. The United States has imposed sanctions on individuals and companies in the
region for providing support to Hezbollah.
Key Policy Issues in 2012: Congress is continuing its strong oversight of Iran and Hezbollah in
Latin America, with hearings on the issue in both houses. Some Members want the
Administration to do more to counter the activities of Iran and Hezbollah in the region, while
others maintain that the Administration is already taking significant actions through economic
sanctions.
For additional background, see CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by Mark
P. Sullivan; and CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth
Katzman.
Organization of American States
Since its foundation in 1948, the Organization of American States (OAS) has served as a forum
through which the United States has sought to foster regional cooperation and advance U.S.
priorities in the Western Hemisphere. Throughout much of the institution’s history, OAS actions
reflected U.S. policy as the other member states sought to closely align themselves with the
dominant economic and political power in the region. This has changed to a certain extent over
the past decade as Latin American and Caribbean governments have diversified their foreign
relations and grown increasingly independent of the United States. In recent years, U.S.
policymakers have expressed concerns about the organization’s repeal of a 1962 resolution that
expelled Cuba, its nearly two-year suspension of Honduras after the country’s 2009 presidential
turmoil, and what some consider its insufficient support for democracy in nations such as
Nicaragua and Venezuela. These and other issues have led some Members of Congress to assert
that the OAS advances policies that run counter to U.S. interests, and that the United States
should no longer fund the organization. Others maintain that OAS actions continue to closely
align with U.S. priorities in most cases, and that U.S. policy should seek to strengthen the
institution since it links the United States to the rest of the region at a time when many nations are
intensifying relations with extra-regional powers and participating in multilateral organizations
that exclude the United States.
Key Policy Issues in 2012: Although the FY2012 appropriations bill continued to provide
funding for the OAS, legislation that would prevent the United States from paying its assessed
contributions ($48.1 million in FY2011) advanced through the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs in 2011 and may be further debated in 2012. Congress is also likely to maintain interest in
OAS efforts to promote and protect democracy in the hemisphere, with particular emphasis on
efforts to ensure free and fair elections in Venezuela. Other policy issues of ongoing
Congressional interest include the transparent and efficient use of OAS resources, and efforts by
some OAS member states to weaken the authority of the autonomous Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights.
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Looking Ahead: Key Events in 2012
Several upcoming events and scheduled elections in the region in 2012 could have a significant
impact on political developments in several countries or on U.S. relations with the region.
March 26-28, 2012: Pope Benedict XVI Visit to Cuba
Pope Benedict XVI is scheduled to visit Cuba from March 26-28, 2012, the first papal visit since
the visit of Pope John Paul II in 1998. The Pope’s visit coincides with the 400th anniversary of
Our Lady of Charity (La Virgen de Caridad del Cobre), the patron saint of Cuba. After a trip to
Mexico, the pontiff’s visit to Cuba will begin in the eastern city of Santiago, where he will
celebrate mass in the Plaza of the Revolution, and visit the shrine of Our Lady of Charity in the
town of El Cobre outside Santiago. The Pope will then travel to Havana, where he will celebrate
an outdoor mass in the Plaza of the Revolution and also meet with church and Cuban government
officials. While the purpose of the Pope’s visit is pastoral (some 60 to 70% of Cubans are
Catholic), the trip will also serve to highlight the increased social and political profile of the
Catholic Church in Cuba and its efforts in recent years to influence the Cuban government.
Cuba’s Catholic Church became more openly critical of the Cuban government in 1993 when
Cuban bishops issued a pastoral letter opposing limitations on freedom, excessive surveillance by
state security, and imprisonment and harassment of dissidents. For many observers, the bishops’
statement reflected a new era in which the Church would be more openly critical of the
government. Pope John Paul elevated Archbishop of Havana Jaime Ortega to the position of
Cardinal in 1994, which raised the profile of the Church in Cuba. Since then, Ortega has been
widely commended for reinvigorating the Cuban Catholic Church—the role of Caritas Cuban, the
Church’s social assistance agency, has expanded throughout Cuba under Ortega. Cuban bishops
have not refrained from speaking out on the need for change in Cuba, and Church publications
have become a way for the Church to broaden the debate in Cuba on social and economic
problems facing the country.
Beginning in 2010, the Cuban Catholic Church under Cardinal Ortega took on a prominent role in
engaging with the Cuba government over political prisoners. This led to the release of more than
125 prisoners, with the majority going to Spain. In anticipation of Pope Benedict’s visit, the
Cuban government pardoned almost 3,000 prisoners in late December 2011, although only seven
were reported to be political prisoners.21 Today, there are reported to be around 60 remaining
political prisoners, although the government has continued to harass and intimidate dissidents and
human rights activists with thousands of short-term detentions. The death of imprisoned hunger
striker Wilman Villar Mendoza on January 19, 2012, again focused world attention on Cuba’s
continuing poor human rights situation.
The visit of Pope Benedict could augment the increasing role of the Catholic Church in Cuba as
intermediary between the government and the opposition. The visit could also provide the Church
with more space to speak out on significant economic, social, and political issues facing the
country. Given that the Catholic Church is Cuba’s largest independent civil society group, it is
21 “2,991 Inmates Benefit from Cuba’s Pardons,” Agence France Presse, December 28, 2011.
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likely that it will continue to have a significant voice as Cuba confronts economic and political
change in the years ahead.
April 14-15, 2012: Summit of the Americas
The Western Hemisphere’s 34 democratically-elected leaders are scheduled to gather in
Cartagena, Colombia on April 14-15, 2012 for the sixth Summit of the Americas. The Summits of
the Americas, which have been held periodically since 1994, serve as opportunities for the
hemisphere’s leaders to engage directly with one another and discuss issues of collective concern.
The theme of the Cartagena Summit is “Connecting the Americas: Partners for Prosperity.” It is
expected to focus in particular on how physical integration and regional cooperation can assist the
countries of the hemisphere in addressing the challenges of poverty and inequality, citizen
security, natural disasters, and access to technology.
The heads of government attending the Cartagena Summit are unlikely to resolve their
differences regarding how best to address hemispheric challenges; however, the Summit could
serve as a forum for President Obama to introduce new initiatives and set the stage for U.S.
policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean moving forward. At the last Summit of the
Americas, which was held in April 2009, the assembled leaders disagreed on a range of subjects
and ended up producing a rather expansive and vague Summit Declaration that many observers
characterized as lacking measurable objectives. President Obama’s actions at the 2009 Summit
were more notable. He introduced several initiatives—including the Caribbean Basin Security
Dialogue, the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas, and the Microfinance Growth
Fund for the Western Hemisphere—which were limited in scale but served as early indications of
the Administration’s priorities for the region. Similarly, President Obama’s speech at the 2009
Summit spoke of “equal partnership” and “mutual respect,” foreshadowing his Administration’s
greater emphasis on multilateral diplomacy. President Obama’s actions at the Cartagena Summit
could be of interest to Congress, particularly if he introduces new initiatives requiring U.S.
funding, or provides indications that his Administration intends to pursue changes in U.S. policy
toward the region during the remainder of 2012, or during a potential second term.
July 1, 2012: Mexican Elections
On July 1, 2012, Mexico will hold presidential, legislative, and state elections. Mexican voters
will elect a president who will serve a six- year term that begins on December 1, 2012. All 128
seats in the Senate and all 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies are also up for election, with
senators serving six-year terms and deputies serving three-year terms that begin on September 1,
2012.22 Elections for local and state offices will take place in the federal district and 14 states,
five of which will hold gubernatorial elections. The three major parties competing in the elections
are the centrist Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) party that governed Mexico from 1929 to
2000, the conservative National Action Party (PAN) that has held the presidency since 2000, and
the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). The PRI is in alliance with the Green
Ecological Party (PVEM) party, while the PRD is in alliance with the Workers’ Party (PT) and
Citizens’ Movement (PMC).
22 A portion of each Chamber is selected through direct election (300 senators and deputes) and the remainder are
chosen through a closed-list proportional representation system.
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Given the security and economic challenges that Mexico has experienced during the current PAN
Administration, and the recent weak electoral performances of the leftist PRD, many observers
are predicting a strong showing by the PRI in the 2012 elections. The PRI possesses formidable
campaign machinery and will seek to build on the momentum it has gathered after winning four
of the six gubernatorial races held in 2011. Polls published in early January showed Enrique Peña
Nieto of the PRI, the former governor of the state of Mexico, with a commanding lead over
Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the populist PRD candidate who narrowly lost the 2006
presidential election, and any potential PAN candidate. 23 Analysts predict, however, that this lead
will narrow as the elections approach, particularly since the PAN has selected Josefina Vázquez
Mota, a popular former Education Minister and leader of the PAN in the Chamber of Deputies as
its standard bearer.24 The parties will not officially register their candidates until mid-March, with
the campaign beginning on March 30.
The results of the Mexican elections could have an impact on U.S.-Mexican relations, including
the future of security cooperation efforts under the Mérida Initiative. For this reason,
congressional interest is likely to focus on each of the candidate’s positions on security, trade,
migration, and energy policy. Congress is likely to support the Mexican government’s efforts to
ensure that the elections are carried out in a transparent manner. Electoral challenges include
trying to keep the process free from the influence of criminal groups and ensuring that
deteriorating security conditions in some areas of the country do not interfere with the electoral
process.
October 7, 2012: Venezuelan Election
Venezuela is scheduled to hold its next presidential election on October 7, 2012, with the
inauguration to take place on January 10, 2013. Venezuela has traditionally held its presidential
election in December, but in September 2011, the country’s National Electoral Council (CNE),
dominated by Chávez supporters, moved up the date of the presidential election to October.
Venezuelans had approved a constitutional referendum in 2009 abolishing the term limits for
elected officials, so President Chávez is once again a candidate for re-election. He was first
elected in 1998, then in 2000 (under a new Constitution), and most recently in 2006 to a six-year
term. Venezuela’s 2006 presidential election was characterized as free and fair by international
observers with some irregularities, while 2010 national legislative elections were also
characterized as free and fair by domestic observers with scattered irregularities, although there
was criticism of the electoral law and the government’s partisan use of state resources.
Venezuela’s opposition held a unified primary on February 12, 2012 under the banner of the Mesa
de la Unidad Democrática (MUD, Democratic Unity Roundtable) and chose Henrique Capriles
Radonski of Primero Justicia (PJ, Justice First) as their candidate. Capriles is the governor of
Miranda, Venezuela’s second most populous state, which includes several municipalities of
metropolitan Caracas.
Some observers predict that Chávez’s continued popularity (between 50-60%) and use of state
resources will result in him capturing another six-year term. Nevertheless, the opposition appears
23 According to a Mitofsky poll published in early January 2012, 42% of those surveyed said that they would vote for
Peña Nieto, 21% for Vázquez Mota (highest among the PAN), and 17% for López Obrador.
24 Andrew Selee, Five Questions About Mexico and U.S.-Mexican Relations in 2012, Woodrow Wilson Center for
Scholar: Mexico Institute, January 18, 2012, http://mexicoinstitute.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/five-questions-
2012.pdf; Shannon K. O’Neill, “Vázquez Mota and the 2012 Mexican Election,” Foreign Affairs, February 8, 2012.
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to have a better opportunity than ever before to win the presidency because of Venezuelans’
concerns about high rates of crime (including murder and kidnapping) and a difficult economic
situation with high inflation, and food and electricity shortages. A wildcard in the elections is the
health status of President Chávez, who underwent operations and several rounds of chemotherapy
in Cuba in 2011 for an undisclosed form of cancer. Chávez now maintains that he is cancer free,
although there continue to be unsubstantiated press reports that he still needs significant
treatment. There is no clear successor to President Chávez among his supporters. Under
Venezuela’s Constitution, new elections are to be called if the President leaves office in the first
four years of his term, but the Vice President would assume office if the President left office
during the last two years of his term. Chávez has indicated that he will replace current Vice
President Eliás Jaua who will be a candidate for the governorship of Miranda state in December
2012 elections, but there is no indication who will become the new Vice President.
The October 2012 presidential election could have significant implications for Venezuela’s
political and economic future as well as for U.S.-Venezuelan relations. If Chávez were to be re-
elected, there would likely be a continuation of statist economic policies and continued erosion of
democratic institutions. His health status also could end up requiring new presidential elections. If
the opposition were to win the presidency, it would face a National Assembly still dominated by
Chávez supporters since the country’s next legislative elections are not due until September 2015.
Without legislative support, an opposition President could face difficulty in making significant
policy changes, with the result being extensive political gridlock. For the United States, an
opposition victory would likely reduce tension in bilateral relations and allow potential progress
in the key areas of anti-drug and counterterrorism cooperation.
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Appendix. Hearings in the 112th Congress
Table A-1. Congressional Hearings in the 112th Congress on
Latin America and the Caribbean
Committee and Subcommitteea Date
Title
House Ways and Means Committee,
January 25,
Hearing on the Pending Free Trade
Subcommittee on Trade
2011
Agreements with Colombia, Panama, and
South Korea and the Creation of U.S. Jobs
House Ways and Means Committee
February 9,
President Obama’s Trade Policy Agenda
2011
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
February
Does the U.S. Have a Policy Toward Latin
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
15, 2011
America?
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
February
U.S. Policy Toward Latin America
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
17, 2011
Peace Corps and Global Narcotics Affairs
Senate Caucus on International Narcotics
March 9,
Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling
Control
2011
Across the Southwest Border
House Foreign Affairs Committee
March 16,
Agency for International Development and
2011
the Millennium Challenge Corporation: Fiscal
Year 2012 Budget Requests and Future
Directions in Foreign Assistance
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
March 17,
The Colombia and Panama Free Trade
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
2011
Agreements: National Security and Foreign
Policy Priorities
House Ways and Means Committee,
March 17,
Job-Creating Trade Agreements Part I
Subcommittee on Trade
2011
House Armed Services Committee
March 30,
Hearing on National Defense Authorization
2011
Act for FY 2012 and Oversight of Previously
Authorized Programs: FY 2012 NDAA
Budget Requests for U.S. European
Command, U.S. Southern Command, and
U.S. Northern Command
House Ways and Means Committee,
March 30,
Job-Creating Trade Agreements: Panama
Subcommittee on Trade
2011
Trade Promotion Agreement, Part II
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
March 31,
A Shared Responsibility: Counternarcotics
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
2011
and Citizen Security in the Americas
Peace Corps and Global Narcotics Affairs
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
April 13,
Priorities for U.S. Assistance in the Western
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
2011
Hemisphere
House Agriculture Committee
May 12,
Hearing To Review Pending Free Trade
2011
Agreements
Senate Caucus on International Narcotics
May 25,
Combating Drug Violence in Central
Control
2011
America
Senate Caucus on International Narcotics
June 15,
Illegal Tunnels on the Southwest Border
Control
2011
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Committee and Subcommitteea Date
Title
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
June 23,
Rebuilding Haiti in the Martelly Era
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
2011
Peace and Subcommittee on International
Development and Foreign Assistance,
Economic Affairs, and International
Environmental Protection
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
June 30,
The State of Democracy in the Americas
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
2011
Peace Corps and Global Narcotics Affairs
House Homeland Security Committee,
July 7, 2011
Hezbollah in Latin America—Implications for
Subcommittee on Counter-terrorism and
U.S. Homeland Security
Intelligence
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
September
Has Merida Evolved? Part One: The
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
13, 2011
Evolution Of Drug Cartels And The Threat
and Subcommittee on Oversight and
to Mexico’s Governance
Investigations
House Ways and Means Committee
September
Hearing on the Pending Free Trade
23, 2011
Agreements with Colombia, Panama, and
South Korea and the Creation of U.S. Jobs
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
October
The International Exploitation of Drug Wars
Subcommittee on Oversight and
12, 2011
and What We Can Do About It
Investigations
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
October
Narcoterrorism and the Long Reach of U.S.
Subcommittee on Terrorism,
12, 2011
Law Enforcement, Part I
Nonproliferation, and Trade
House Foreign Affairs Committee
October
Emerging Threats and Security in the
13, 2011
Western Hemisphere: Next Steps for U.S.
Policy
Senate Energy and Natural Resources
October
Hearing to examine the status of response
Committee
18, 2011
capability and readiness for oil spills in
foreign Outer Continental Shelf waters
adjacent to US waters
House Natural Resources Committee,
November
North American Offshore Energy: Mexico
Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral
2, 2011
and Canada Boundary Treaties and New
Resources
Dril ing by Cuba and Bahamas
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
November
Narcoterrorism and the Long Reach of U.S.
Subcommittee on Terrorism,
17, 2011
Law Enforcement, Part II
Nonproliferation, and Trade
House Foreign Affairs Committee
December
Democracy Held Hostage in Nicaragua
1, 2011
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
December
The U.S.-Caribbean Shared Security
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
15, 2011
Partnership: Responding To The Growth Of
Peace Corps and Global Narcotics Affairs
Trafficking And Narcotics In The Caribbean
Senate Caucus on International Narcotics
February 1,
U.S.-Caribbean Security Cooperation
Control
2012
House Foreign Affairs Committee
February 2,
Ahmadinejad’s Tour of Tyrants and Iran’s
2012
Agenda in the Western Hemisphere
Source: Prepared by Anne Leland, Information Research Specialist, CRS
Congressional Research Service
20
Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress in 2012
a. House Committee websites available at http://www.house.gov/committees/. Senate Committee websites
available at http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/committees/d_three_sections_with_teasers/
committees_home.htm.
Author Contact Information
Mark P. Sullivan, Coordinator
Peter J. Meyer
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
msullivan@crs.loc.gov, 7-7689
pmeyer@crs.loc.gov, 7-5474
June S. Beittel
Clare Ribando Seelke
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
jbeittel@crs.loc.gov, 7-7613
cseelke@crs.loc.gov, 7-5229
Anne Leland
Maureen Taft-Morales
Information Research Specialist
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
aleland@crs.loc.gov, 7-4704
mtmorales@crs.loc.gov, 7-7659
Congressional Research Service
21